The Economic Rehabilitation of the in the Early Meiji Period Author(s): Harry D. Harootunian Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Aug., 1960), pp. 433-444 Published by: Association for Asian Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2943582 . Accessed: 03/01/2014 23:13

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This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 3 Jan 2014 23:13:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The EconomicRehabilitation of the Samuraiin theEarly Meiji Period

HARRY D. HAROOTUNIAN

THE Meiji Restorationof I868, unquestionablythe mostimportant event in modernJapanese history, brought in itswake social and economicchanges of a revolutionarynature. With the overthrow of theTokugawa bakufu, the subsequent abolitionof thehan system,the equalization of classes,and the establishmentof a conscriptarmy, the need for a hereditarymilitary class ceased to exist.Certainly, the presenceof a samuraiclass, numbering approximately i,800,ooo, or 400,000families, strandedin a societyin processof divestingitself of all feudalfetters, constituted an acuteproblem. The continuedexistence of thisvast army of unemployedretainers couldhave easily hamstrung all effortsto modernize.And it is hardlysurprising that the new Meiji leadersrealized at theinception of thenew regimethat if thework of theRestoration was to be completedsuccessfully, it was necessaryto workout a satisfactorysettlement for the samurai class. It is truethat when the new government abolished the shogunal and han govern- mentsit did awaywith the specialsocial, political, and economicprivileges of the samurai.But it is alsotrue that this destruction of theold orderwas accompaniedby theMeiji government'sassumption of responsibilitytoward the declassed samurai, a responsibilitythat was expressedin thegovernment's efforts to finda placefor mem- bersof theclass in thenew society.Throughout the I870's and earlyi88o's, concern was shownin governmentcircles for the plight of thesamurai. Few if anygovern- mentalleaders were willing to committhe classto a permanentstate of economic depression.Iwakura Tomomi, a memberof the courtnobility and one of themost eloquentspokesmen for samurai interests in thegovernment, constantly warned his peersof the perils of thesamurai problem and urgeda speedyand satisfactorysettle- ment.Aware of thespecial contribution the samurai had madeto Japanesesociety, Iwakuraconsidered the class too valuableto be leftto thearbitrary uncertainties of economicdeprivation.' "For the past 300 years,"he declared,"the samurai have been the naturalleaders in society;they have participatedin governmentalaffairs and broughtto it a polishedpurity and virtue.Because of the militaryand literaryac- complishmentsof the class,they alone possessa characterthat is bothnoble and individualistic.It is forthis reason that the 400,000samurai of todayare the most usefulgroup in society...".2 Iwakura'swords were not neglected. Since most mem- bersof the governmentwere samurai, they needed little convincing of the special

The authoris AssistantProfessor of Historyat the Universityof Rochester. 1 Iwakurak6 ikki, ed. Tada Takamon (Tokyo, 1927) II, 545; see also Yoshikawa Hidez6, Shizoku jusan no kenky97(Tokyo, 1943), p. 244. Hereafter,this work will be cited as SJK. 2 lwaku*rakoiikki, II, 547- 433

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 3 Jan 2014 23:13:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 434 HARRY D. HAROOTUNIAN qualitiesof the class.3 Furthermore, many of the young leaders were impressed by the politicalimplications of samuraieconomic discontent, for the weight of armedrevolt was on thembefore they could consolidate the authority of thestate. From I873 to I878, foursamurai uprisings were directed at theoverthrow of thenew state.Even thoughthe government successfully weathered these rebellions, the samuraiopposi- tionwas not crushed.Rather, it assumeda differentand moreenduring form-a politicalmovement which called for the establishment of representativeinstitutions (jiyuiminken und6).4 Sincethe problem of the samurai was at bottomeconomic, the government sought an economicsolution. Instead of usingartificial measures to relievethe plight of the samurai,the logical solution to theproblem was foundin theconditions attending thegeneral expansion of the Japanese economy. Industrial and agriculturalexpansion wouldprovide a placefor both samurai investments and employment;at the same time,it wouldallow the classto be absorbedinto the new society.'"In tryingto createemployment for the samurai," Iwakura advised, "we mustgive first importance to the developmentof industry.. . Let thosesamurai with ability be placedin chargeof thenew enterprises,those with physical strength be employedas workers, andwithin a fewyears production in differentparts of the country will be sufficiently increasedso thatall samurainow idle will be usefulproducers."6 The samurai,in short,were to providea pool of uncommittedmanpower from which financiers, managers,and workerswere to be recruitedfor the new Western-styleindustries.7 From i868 to roughlyI889, the taskof absorbingthe samuraiwas the aim of a specificprogram known officially as shizoku jusan, the samurai rehabilitation policy. Althoughshizoku jusan was essentiallymotivated by the need to findemploy- mentfor ex-samurai, it was also hopedthat it mightserve the broader objective of economicdevelopment. In theirmany memorials and petitionsconcerning the prob- lem of samurai,government leaders such as Iwakura,Okubo, and Kido indicated thata rehabilitationpolicy need not be limitedto protectingformer samurai, but couldbe consideredas anothertechnique by which the government would accumulate capital.In thissense, samurai rehabilitation was subordinatedto thegeneral program of theMeiji government,one whichtook the form of makingJapan economically

3 For the views of governmentmembers, see Fukaya Hiroharu, Kashizoku chitsurokushobun no kenkyzu[A Studyof theSamurai Pension System], (Tokyo, 1942), pp. 258-268; 279 ff. '-It has been rightlyobserved by many Japanesehistorians that the beginningsand developmentof the so-called "popular rightsmovement" merely expressed a segmentof samurai discontent,that jiyu7minken, for the foundersof the movement,actually meant shizoku minken (samurai rights). See Harry D. Harootunian,The Samurai Class during the Early Years of the Meiji Period in (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,University of Michigan, 1957), Pp. 97-114; Got6 Yasui, "Shizoku minken no rekishi teki hyomen" ("Historical analysis of shizoku minken"), limbun gakuh6, IV (I954), 139. ProfessorGoto argues that in realityItagaki Taisuke's espousal of liberal symbolswas not much differentthan the rebel ideologyof Saig6 Takamori. For ProfessorGot6, the movementfor politicaldemocracy proved to be little more than anotherwing of the samurai oppositionto oligarchicalgovernment (hambatsu). 5 Yoshikawa Hidez6, "Meiji seifu no shizoku jusan" ("The samurai rehabilitationpolicy of the Meiji government"),in Meiji Ishin keizaishi kenkyu,ed. by Honjo Eijir6 (Tokyo, 1931), p. 584. Hereafter cited as MIKK. 6 Quoted in Thomas C. Smith, Political Change and IndustrialDevelopment in Japan: Government Enterprise,s868-s88o, (Stanford, I955), p. 34. For a detailed analysis of Iwakura's views on shizoku jusan, see Yoshikawa,SJK, pp. 243-257. 7 For an explanationof how samurai representedan "exploitablesocial stratum"from which recruit- mentfor change could be made, see my article,"The Progressof Japanand the Samurai Class," PacificHis- toricalReview, III (1959), 257-259.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 3 Jan 2014 23:13:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SAMURAI REHABILITATION 435 independentand militarilypowerful and bestexpressed in thepopular slogans of the day,fukoku ky5hei (enrich the nation, strengthen the army) 8 and bussanbanshoku (increaseproduction). Yet, themotivation underlying shizoku jusan and the aims whichserved to guidethe program were two different things; while the motivation was unmistakablyclear, the specific aims of thepolicy often appeared to be vague and ill-defined.The goalsof samurairehabilitation were uncertain because the policy was alwaysconsidered as secondaryto largereconomic considerations. If the pro- gramwas designedspecifically to protectdeclassed samurai by findingemployment forthem, it failedto fulfillits foremostobligation, for it was neithersuccessful in providingthe samuraiwith a satisfactoryfinancial settlement, nor did it createa lastingsolution to theirunemployment problems. Despite this fundamental failure of shizokujusan, there is littledoubt that the program had significancefor the de- velopmentof modern Japanese society. It certainlycontributed to theprocess of capital accumulation,it stimulated the growth of an entrepeneurialclass, and it provideda laborforce upon which Japanese industry could be expanded.9 In Decemberof i87I, afterlimited experimentation, the Meiji governmenttook itsfirst step in theformulation of a samurairehabilitation program when it promul- gatedthe so-called commercial law. The newlaw permittedthe samurai and to take up any occupationthey desired. While signalingthe new freedomof em- ploymentand occupationnow allowedthe samurai,the commerciallaw also sanc- tionedoccupations which for centuries had been prohibited."Hereafter," the edict announced,"samurai and kazoku,besides holding governmental positions, may ... performduties in agriculture,industry, and commerce."'1With this pronouncement as a startingpoint, the Meiji governmentfelt prepared to workout thedetails of a samurairehabilitation program. As theprogram was envisaged,there were at least threemajor activities in whichthe governmentdeliberately merged rehabilitation witheconomic policy: (i) the governmentencouraged samurai emigration to and thereclamation of new areas; (2) it establishedbranches of thenational bank as a safeguardfor samurai investments; and (3) it set up themachinery for loaning re- habilitationmoney in orderto providesamurai with the necessary funds to engage in agricultural,industrial, and commercialenterprises.' Emigrationand Reclamation The firstimportant aspect of therehabilitation program was in thegovernment's effortsto inducesamurai to emigrateand to reclaimland whichhitherto had not beenunder cultivation. It was thehope of manyMeiji leadersthat this initial step wouldlay the foundations of a widerrehabilitation program to follow.The general aims of reclamationrevealed how far Meiji officialdomwould go to shapebasic economicpolicy to meetthe needs of samurai rehabilitation. The plancalled for using

8 For the philosophicantecedents of this slogan and its relationshipto modern Japanesenationalism, see MaruyamaMasas, Kindai Nihon seiji shisoshikenkyii (Tokyo, 1954), pp. 343-346. 9 For the samurai contributionto modern Japanesesociety, especially those elementswhich have been molded by samuraithought and conduct,see Fukuchi Shigetaka,Shizoku to shizoku ishiki (Tokyo, 1956). 10 Nakayama Yasumasa, ed., Shimblunshusei Meiji hennenshi(Tokyo, 1935), 1, 417. Hereaftercited as SSMH. 11 Actually,there was anothermethod which the governmentadopted to aid the samurai. At the out- set of the Meiji period, grantsof money were offeredto samurai who were willing to surrendertheir familypensions. However, thismethod was abandoned at the timc the governmentcalled for the voluntary commutationof pensions.Yoshikawa, SIK, pp. 149-157.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 3 Jan 2014 23:13:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 436 HARRY D. HAROOTUNIAN former samurai to clear waste lands, and once the land was reclaimed, the same samurai would take possession of it. The cleared land was to serve as a stimulus to new investmentand enterprise.Meiji leaders were also confidentthat such a re- clamation program would be in line with the sweeping changes of the day-the abolition of feudalism-for it would not only "return"the samurai to the land, but also "restorethe traditionalseparation of peasant and soldier."'12 Finally, the govern- ment assumed that since samurai were designated to join the ranks of agrarian cultivators,agricultural production would naturallyincrease. Since most of the land earmarked for reclamationlay in the northeasternpart of Honshu (t5hoku) and in , the governmentrecognized the necessityof settlingsamurai-employees in these areas. What this meant in concrete terms was that samurai would have to be recruitedfrom the various provincesand relocatedon lands in northeasternHonshu and Hokkaido that had been designated as reclama- tion sites. However, beforethis could be carried out, it was necessaryfor the govern- ment to establishthe appropriateadministrative machinery. In December of I869, the government,in order to unify the supervisionof affairsrelating to reclamation,set up a special Reclamation Office(Kaikon kyoku)in the Home Ministry.A year later, in I870, this Reclamation Office dispatched personnel to the provinces of Dewa, Shinano, and Echizen in order to investigatepossible sites for reclamationin these areas. The work of investigatingpotential reclamation sites continuedfor threeyears, and in this time the governmentneither indicated how reclamationwas to be con- ducted nor how it was to be specificallyapplied to samurai rehabilitation. It was not until December i873 that the governmentannounced the firstconcrete arrangementfor land reclamation.In that year, at approximatelythe same time the governmentcalled for the voluntarycommutation of pensions,a plan was advanced to provide grants for the purchase of national waste lands (kanrin kobfichi). It was the intentionof the Meiji governmentto sell all varietiesof waste land at half the value of the marketprice. The hope must have been high that such a programwould induce samurai to invest their funds safely in governmentsponsored reclamation enterprises.Because of the nature of reclamation projects,samurai were compelled to respondto the offernot as individuals but as groups organized as reclamationcom- panies (kaikon kaisha)."3 Immediate samurai response to the new arrangement,at least until the commutationof all samurai pensions in I876, was not very great,nor was it met by any great enthusiasmby those who participatedin the program.Owing to timidityand fear or a reluctanceto commit themselvesto a new life of financial independence, only a modest number of samurai took up reclamation and agricul- tural cultivation. After I876, however, the governmentmoved to expand its original reclamation program. Because of the acute necessityof findinga place for the samurai now that

12 Yoshikawa, SJK, p. I I 5. 13 Reclamation also stimulated the growth of native industries.Many of the kaikonkaisha were ulti- matelyorganized with the express purpose of using the reclaimed land for some sort of commercial enter- prise. In spite of the limited nature of this development, a contemporarynewspaper in I874 reported enthusiasticallyone such success storyin Ibaraki prefecturewhen a group of 433 samurai banded together and pooled their finances in order to establish a mulberrycompany. The newspaper article ". . . hoped that the example of this group would establisha patternin promotingareas of individual industrythrough- out the country." SSMH, I, I36. The Tokuk6sha of Okayama prefecturewas another such cooperative enterprise,established in I875. For its statementof aims, see its charterin Okayama Ken, Okayamakenji kiji [Politicalaffairs of Okayamaprefecture], (Okayama, I939-1942), IV, 499; III, 450 ff.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 3 Jan 2014 23:13:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SAMURAI REHABILITATION 437 theyno longerdrew annual pensions, Okubo Toshimichi suggested the immediate establishmentof a morepowerful rehabilitation bureau. Closely modeled after the earlierexample, this new agency was to investigatelands suitable for reclamation and also to provideways by whichthe governmentcould extend more aid to the dis- possessedclass. Two yearslater, on theheels of theSatsuma Rebellion, Okubo took anotherand moredecisive step when he presentedto the governmentcouncillor Sanj6 Sanetomia petitionentitled "A MemorialConcerning Samurai Rehabilitation and GeneralIndustry" ("Ippan shokusan oyobi kashizoku jusan ni kan suru").14In thispetition, Okubo presented three major recommendations regarding the problem ofsamurai rehabilitation. Relying on earlierexperiences in rehabilitation,he endorsed thecontinued search for potentially arable land and thecontinuation of government managedreclamation projects. Yet, he wenton to recommendthat the government makea specialeffort to recruitits laborforce from among "sincere" samurai and equip thesemen withsuch necessitiesas houses,tools, living expenses, and food. Secondly,Okubo suggested that the government also consignthese lands on loan to thesamurai for an indefiniteperiod of time. Finally, he expressedthe hope that these reclamationprojects would lead to the organizationof an extensivepublic works program,such as thedraining of marshes, the excavation of canals and channels,and theredirection of riversand streamsfor purposes of irrigation,.5 There is litdedoubt thatthe firsttwo recommendationswere prompted by the problemof samuraire- habilitation;and while the third suggested as itsmain objective the general expansion of Japaneseindustry, it is also clearthat Okubo intended large scale public projects to servethe basic interests of shizoku jusan.16 If Okubo'spetition pointed up theneed for a morecomprehensive rehabilitation program,his concernalso provedto be symptomaticof governmentthinking in the yearsafter I876. FromI876 to I884 thegovernment launched a numberof reclama- tionprojects which recruited as laborvast numbers of ex-samurai.17 Although it may be opento questionwhether such projects, from the drainage of a laketo theclearing of a woodedpatch on a mountainside, actually made available a significantamount ofarable land, it shouldbe clearthat as a rehabilitativemeasure, reclamation not only gave a substantialnumber of formersamurai temporary employment, it also pro- videdthem with land from which they could draw a livelihood.By I884 over34,000 acresof fallow land had beenreclaimed throughout twenty-four prefectures; approxi- mately20,000 samuraihad beenenlisted for the operation.18

14 The full textof the memorialcan be found in Okubo Toshimichibunsho, ed. by Hayakawa Junza- buro, (Tokyo, I927-29), IX, 40-52. 15 Azuma T5saku, Meijishakai seisakushi (Tokyo, I941), pp. 78-79. 16 This third suggestionwas actually the substanceof an earlier memorial entitled"Shokusan kigyo ni kan-suru kengisho" ("Petition relating to the encouragementof industrialproduction"), in Nkubo Toshimichibunsho, V, 56I. 17 An example of one such project was the reclamationof Lake Inawashiro in Asaka districtof Fukushima prefecturein northeasternJapan. The project was begun in I879 after it was estimatedby governmentsurveyors that drainage of the lake would make accessible approximately9,800 acres of arable land. Shortlyafter drainage of the lake began, the centralgovernment turned the administration of the project over to local authorities.In I88o, the prefectureoffered a limited number of samurai familiessuch thingsas expense funds,farm equipment, and land up to seven acres a family.Recruitment was not limitedto samuraiof the Fukushimaarea, forsamurai of otherlocales were also enlisted.For a de- scriptionof this projectsee TsunoshitaTsuyoi, "Asaka kokuei kaikonshoni okeru shizoku ijii" ("Samurai immigrationto the national reclamationproject in Asaka"), Keizaishi kenkyzu,I (I94I), I56-I74. 18 Yoshikawa,SJK, pp. II5-I26.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 3 Jan 2014 23:13:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 438 HARRY D. HAROOTUNIAN The secondaspect of the reclamationprogram concerned the colonizationof Hokkaido.Colonization of Japan'snorthernmost island was promptedboth by the needto insurethe defense of the nation'soutermost frontier and by the searchfor morearable land.19 It is alsotrue, however, that Meiji leaders were quick to see how wellcolonization could be mergedwith samurai rehabilitation. As earlyas AprilI869, a governmentalagency was establishedfor the purposeof encouraging"protective emigration"to and thecolonization of areaswithin the main islands. By Augustof thesame year, a ColonizationBureau (Kaitakushi) was setup. Upon theestablish- mentof theKaitakushi the government also announcedits desire "to colonizeover- seas landsand makethem available ... to themasses and the samurai."20Shortly after,the ColonizationBureau drafted a set of rulescalled the "Emigrants'Aid Regulations"which enumerated the various services that prospective emigrants could expectfrom the government.21 However,this zealouspaternalism was soon abandonedwhen the schemefor emigrationproved to be littlemore than an enormousdole forsamurai seeking an easysolution to theirfinancial problems. In orderto discouragecolonization from degeneratinginto pump-priming, the government in I872 reducedthe provisionsit originallyallowed to emigrants.The revision,needless to say,was designedto dis- courageindividuals who had no real desireto emigrateand, at the same time,to appealto largegroups willing to committhemselves to a new kind of lifeon the frontier.The administrativedirection of the program was alsochanged in thefollow- ingyears, being first placed under the jurisdiction of the prefectural governments and thenlater under the Hokkaido department whose function it was to integrateemi- grationwith the general economic development of theisland. The governmentalso recognized that the program of reclamationand cultivation wouldattract prospective colonists. A publicnotice issued in AugustI869, in this connection,announced that emigrant-applicants were qualified to divideand possess land in Hokkaidoafter it had beenreclaimed. By Septemberof the sameyear, ap- proximately450 personshad respondedto thisoffer and had gone to Hokkaido.22 Yet it was not untilthree years later that the governmentissued official rules, the HokkaidoLand Sale Regulations,which laid downthe provisions for the acquisition of reclaimedland in thenorthern island. The ordinanceserved until i886, at which timeit was abrogated. The programof emigrationand reclamation,at leastat its inception,was not limitedto recruitingdeclassed samurai alone. But the Meiji leadersdid expectthe program,like reclamation plans within Honshu, to servethe specific goals of samurai rehabilitationas well as thosewhich aimed at thegeneral economic development of Hokkaido.Therefore, in I875, thegovernment, through the offices of the Coloniza- tionBureau, extended the right of purchasing waste lands at halfthe market value to samuraiwilling to emigrateto Hokkaido.The plan,as it was realized,encouraged samuraito pooltheir resources as incorporatedgroups and to applyfor the land on a

19 For the officialstatement vis a vis Hokkaido, see MatsushitaYoshio, Kindal Nihon gunjishi, (Tokyo, 1944), pp. 190-208. This is a documentaryhistory in which the originaldecrees relating to Hokkaido are reproduced. 20 Quoted in Yoshikawa,SIK, p. 131. 21 Accordingto the size of families,emigrants could expect in addition to land, some expense funds, utensils,tools, and food. 22 Yoshikawa,SIK, pp. 134-136.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 3 Jan 2014 23:13:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SAMURAIREHABILITATION 439 collectivebasis. Such samurai companies as theKaishinsha of Wakayamaprefecture and theSekishinsha of Hyogo were examples of this development. A similar response had been made by the samuraiwho committedthemselves to reclamationprojects withinthe main islands. After the , the government expanded its originalefforts to encouragethe colonization of thenorthern island. As a result,be- tweenI882 and i889, thegovernment spent nearly Y50o,ooo a yearon development of whichYI50,ooo was loaned specificallyto samuraiwho choseto emigrateto Hokkaido.In the same years,approximately 2,000 samuraifamilies were recruited forthe new endeavor.23 A crucialaspect of thegovernment's program to developHokkaido was thecrea- tionof militarycolonies (tondenhei). The establishmentof militarycolonies, based on a memorialdrafted by the Minister of Colonization Kuroda Kiyotaka in I873, was designedto enlistpeople who were able both to tillthe soil and defendHokkaido in theevent of an invasion.24Kuroda's memorial recommended that the military colonies consistof formersamurai, since they were admirably suited by training and disposi- tion,to fulfillat leastone of thefunctions; in periodsof peace,they would normally pursueagricultural and industrialenterprises, but in timesof war, theywould automaticallybe organizedinto army units, attached to a militarycommand.25 These samurai-colonistswere to be generouslysupplied with arable land, houses, utensils, tools,farm equipment, and foodfor a periodof threeyears. Samurai response to this offer,however, proved initially to be disappointing.Until the abolition of theColoni- zationBureau in I882, only2,420 men and theirfamilies had beenenlisted.26 The programof tondenheiwas temporarilysuspended in I882, butin I884 it was placed underthe Ministryof the Armyand relaunchedwith a new vigor.From I884 to I889, thisnew drive recruited nearly 7,500 samurai.27 The NationalBank as a Rehabilitati'veMeasure When in I876 the governmentcalled for the commutationof all samuraipen- sions,28it also acknowledgedthe necessityof investigatingthe meansby which samuraibonds could be protectedfrom the uncertaintiesattending the growthof an immatureeconomy. Okuma Shigenobu, Finance Minister at thetime, was fully awareof the fact that the bond settlement was nota lastingsolution to themounting financialproblems that ex-samurai were facing. In hissearch for a long-termsolution, he struckupon a plan wherebythe government would establish a loan bureaufrom whichsamurai could obtain low-interest loans by mortgagingtheir bonds. While it was Okuma'shope to providethe samurai with sufficient capital to enablethem to

23For a breakdownof figuresrelating to recruitmentsee ShinsenHokkaidoshi (Tokyo, x934), m, 859-860. 24FujiiJintaro and MoriyaHidesuke, Meiji jidaishi (Tokyo, I930), II, 664-665. 25Matsushita,Kindai Nihon gunjishi, pp. I90-9I. To fulfillthis objective, the government turned to the impoverishedsamurai of northeasternJapan. The officialdecree reads: "Samurai of Aomori,Miyagi, Saketa. . . and the old prefectureof Hakodate. . . will be recruitedas tondenhei."It is morethan probablethat the government selected these areas not onlyfor their geographic proximity to Hokkaido, butalso becausesamurai from thesc northern han had foughtwith the Tokugawa during the Restoration warsof I867. 28 Thisfigure is basedon thereports in theHokkaid6 shi (Tokyo,19I8), XXI, i-p. 27 Yoshikawa,SIK, p. I46. 28 Approximately310,97I ex-samuraireceived, in exchangefor their military pensions, public bonds amountingto Y'II3,ooo,ooo. TsuchiyaTakao and OuchiHy6hei, ed., Meiji zenki zaisei shiryoshusei (TokyO,I 932), IV, I2I.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 3 Jan 2014 23:13:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 440 HARRY D. HAROOTUNIAN engagein business,the pitfallsof his schemewere obvious. Had the arrangement beenenacted, the samurai would have been left with a sumof moneywhich might easilyhave been lost. For Okuma'splan could neither prevent samurai from spending the moneyall at one time,nor couldit protectthem from losing the cash in one financialgamble. Because of the dangersof Okuma'srecommendations, they were neveradopted. Yet rejectionby no meansmeant that Meiji statesmenfailed to appre- ciatethe pressing importance of protecting samurai bonds after I876. As a moredurable measure, one designedto protectsamurai bonds either from financialslumps or humanfrailties, the governmentin I876 revisedthe National Bank Regulationsof I872. The reformnow allowedsamurai who possessedpublic bondsto exchangethem at theNational Bank for paper notes which, in turn,would be usedto establisha branchsystem of thebank. In otherwords, negotiable bonds held by samuraiwere to be used as securityfor investment in the developmentof branchbanks. The governmenthoped to realize two aims: expansion of bank facilities and protectionof samuraibonds and investments.In less thantwo yearsafter the reform,approximately I48 branchesof the NationalBank were established.Te breakdownof shareholders in i878 also revealed that only 4,730 commoners (heimin)29 held Y8,870,oooin stock,while 29,630 samuraiand kazokucontrolled Y30,58o,ooo worthof bankstock, most of w'hichhad beenraised by theexchange of bondsfor banknotesY0 By i882 overseventy-five per centof thestock in thebanks was still in thehands of declassedsamurai. Perhaps, the best evaluation of thisprogram was madeby FinanceMinister Matsukata Masayoshi in I883. In "A Memo Explaining theWay to EliminateBank Notes" addressed to theDaj6kan, Matsukata pointed up theextremely close relationship between the bank regulation reform and theexpan- sionof samurairehabilitation after I876. He arguedthat if the regulationshad not beenrevised, the future market value of the samurai bonds would have surely depre- ciated,that samurai would have been forcedinto a lifeof financialdespair and aimlesswandering, and thegovernment would have failed to meetone of its most compellingobligations. "If the governmentremained as an onlookerto the plight of thesamurai," he concluded,"it wouldhave certainly meant that the government did notunderstand the relationship between peace and rebellion."'"In sum,Matsu- katawas confidentthat the establishment of bankbranches had notonly proved to be a preventivemeasure against rebellion, but also had contributedto the creation ofa convertiblecurrency. The Loaningof Rehabilitation Capital Manysamurai were still far from realizing financial security. One contemporary sourcecounted seven or eightsamurai in everyten that had "falleninto poverty."32 Indeed,the problem of samuraipoverty became a favoritesubject of angryeditorials

29 term used to denote commonerin the Meiji period is confusing.On more than one occasion low-rankingsamurai (e.g. ashigaru,sotsu, chfigen, etc.) were officiallymerged with peasantsand merchants, so that by I878 it was difficultto determinewhat percentageof heimin originallyhad been commoners and what percentagewere of samuraiorigin. 30Takahashi Kamekichi,Meiji Taishd sangyd hattatsushi(Tokyo, I929), p. Io8. Cf. Tsuchiya Takao and-Okazaki Sabur5, Nihon shihonshugiharatsushi gaisetsu (Tokyo, 1938), p. I03. 31 Quoted in Yoshikawa,SIK, p. i6i. 32 In the Okayama kenchdshoz6 bunsho,there are a numberof reportswhich reveal the impoverished conditions of the samurai of Bizen han. These reports,made by the prefecturalInspection Bureau

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 3 Jan 2014 23:13:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SAMURAIREHABILITATION 441 in thenation's newspapers in theyears following I876. It was notuncommon to read editorialsdemanding that the problemof "samuraipoverty be solvedand greater attentionbe paidto the means by which they can be aided."33But despite the growing publicawareness of and concernover the question of samuraipoverty, it was obvious also thatthere were several good reasonsfor their poor financial position. For those who convertedbonds into cash to investin new companies,the uneasyeconomic conditionswrought by the financialvacillations of the late i87o's and earlyi88o's underminedthe stability and security of their ventures.84 Then, too, there were always thosesamurai who, on convertingtheir bonds into cash, found it difficultto manage theirmoney because it was givento themin one lumpsum. The samuraiwere never notedfor their skill in financialaffairs, and manyformer warriors evidently were notable to shakeoff habits common to the classbefore the Restoration. Once they wereforced to confrontthe problemof makingtheir own way,it is littlewonder thatso manylost theirfunds through mismanagement and dissipation.A public recordof I884 notedin thisconnection that "samurai lost all moneydespite their financialresources . . . and this was due chieflyto theirlack of experiencein a new way of life."38However, it wouldbe misleadingto concludethat financial failure was causedsolely by a congenitalweakness or a lackof experience. In somecases, the failureof samuraito succeedfinancially was due to thenature of Meijisociety itself. The availabilityof short-termbusiness opportunities and permanentemployment was seriouslynarrowed by the naturallimits of theJapanese economy. There were justso manyjobs to be doneand enterprisesto be started.As Iwakuraput it: "For half the class . . . there are no jobs to be done, no skills to be practiced. . . and consequentlythese samurai are forcedto wanderabout the countryand carryon thebest they can."8" Meijileaders, to be sure,were obliged to do morethan merely insure the stability ofsamurai bonds. To meetthe gnawing demands of samuraineeds, the government workedout and launchedwhat proved to be themost significant aspect of shizoku jusan-the loaningof rehabilitationcapital in orderto promotethe expansionof industrialproduction. The idea of loaningcapital for industrial purposes had its originsin suggestionsmade by Okubo and Iwakura,both of whombelieved that the problemof samuraiemployment could be solvedonly through the expansionof industry.87Moreover, the use of samuraiin thedevelopment of industrywas easily

(Jansatsushi),were usually in the formof an officialplea or petition.One such case of I883 claimed that the bulk of samurai in Okayama "were pressed into unemploymentor into menial jobs such as pulling rickshas,while others spent their time in hunger, idleness,and dissipation...." Poverty,however, is difficultto measure by Meiji standards.It would seem that the most acceptablecriterion was unemploy- ment. Although there were many samurai who were unemployed,there were also many who were en- gaged in occupationswhich a decade earlierhad been looked upon with disdain. Therefore,in describing poverty,the problemis in separatingsamurai who were actuallyunemployed from those who held "menial" jobs. See SSMH, IV, 70, 234; also, Yoshikawa Hidez6, "Meiji shonen shitsugyomondai" ("The problem of unemploymentin the earlyMeiji period"), Keizaishi kenkyvu,I4, (x935), No. 2. 33 Sanyoshimpo (Sanyd News), September I8, I88o. 34 Azuma, Meiji seisakushi,pp. 23-36. See also the more detailed account by Hachinoki Sawazenji, "Seinan sengo no infureshon"("The Inflationafter the Satsuma Rebellion"), Keizaishi kenkyfi,22 (1933), No. 3. 35 Quoted in Yoshikawa,MIKK, p. 604. 36lwakurak6 jikki, III, 65o. 37 For the opinions of Okubo and Iwakura on industrializationand samurai employment,see Azuma, Meijiseisakushi, pp. 48-57,62-89.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 3 Jan 2014 23:13:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 442 HARRY D. HAROOTUNIAN rationalizedby thosewho believedthat the former warriors were better fitted than eitherpeasant or merchantto assumethe responsibilities of Western-type industrial- izationbecause they were not burdenedby traditionalbusiness techniques and methods.38 AfterI876, and especiallyafter the Satsuma Rebellion, the loaning of rehabilita- tioncapital proved to be thegovernment's major method of dealing with the samurai problem.Certainly, financial aid had beengiven to thesamurai before the abolition of pensions,but thisactivity was limitedto thelocal leveland consistedof grants (kafu)not loans (kashitsuke).The programto loan "officialcapital" to declassed samuraiwas inauguratedin MarchI879 and continueduntil March i89o. The loans it providedbore various names at differenttimes: kigy6 kikin (promotion of business fund)from March I879 to DecemberI882, kangy6itakukin (encouragement of in- dustrialcapital held in trust) from December I882 toJune I885, and kangy6shihonkin (encouragementofcapital fund) from June I885 to MarchI89o. Althoughthere may havebeen some overlapping in theimplementation ofthese three types of loans, there was littleor no differencebetween them, for each category merely represented a cer- tainstage in theoverall program. Originally,Okubo Toshimichi had suggestedin I878 thatthe government should raisemoney for industrial expansion by collectingthe domesticdebts owed to it.39 Thoughhe intendedthis revenue to be usedfirst for industrial expansion, the experi- enceof therebellion in Satsumaprompted him to expandhis originalrecommenda- tionto includeshizoku jusan. While in grantingthese loans the governmentcon- sideredany industrypatterned after Western practice a respectablerisk, certain qualificationshad to be met.In general,(i) capitalloans wouild be madeto declassed samuraiof various prefectures and citieswho petitionedfor the industrial loans; (2) capitalloans would be grantedto personswho demonstratedsufficient initiative to engagein industryand commerce;and (3) capitalloans would be givento applicants benton emigratingto Hokkaido.40 Accordingto the contemporary"Roster of RehabilitationLoans" (Jusankin kashitsuke-ryd),the programof loans embraceda wide varietyof companiesand businesses.The mostcommon loans, for example, were made to promoteshipbuild- ing,school construction, the establishment of cement works, pottery shops, lacquer- warefactories, fertilizer concerns, saltworks, and homeindustries of all types.How- ever,the program also encouragedthe construction of harbors,canals, railways, coal mines,and textileestablishments; and soon lesserenterprises such as tea factories, sugarplants, fisheries, and match-worksalso passedunder official patronage.4'

88Takahashi, Meiji Taisho5sangy6 hattatsushi,p. 103. ProfessorTakahashi has suggestedthat former samurai were far betterequipped for Western-typeenterprises than the traditionalmerchant. He feels that the merchantwas hindered,at all turns,because of his committmentto traditionalmethods of business practiceand organization.Yet Takahashi is also aware of the factthat many samurai who triedtheir hand at a Western-typeenterprise failed miserably.Nonetheless, there is abundantevidence to supporthis original contention.In this connection,one contemporarychronicle bore witness to a woeful, but typical story when it reportedthe following: "There were many samurai who took up the life of the merchant (ch6nin); many opened up curio shops, while others established restaurants,sakeya, tea rooms, fish markets,and the like. But thesesame men, eitherbecause of negligentpartners or lack of experience,were not able to make sufficientgains with which to live . . . and lost theirinvestments. Soon thereafter. . manyof theseshops began to close." SSMH, VI, 70. 89 6kubo Toshimichibunsho, V, 56I. 40 Yosmkawa,SIK, pp. 174-I75. 41 See thechart in Yoshikawa,SJK, pp. I90-193.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 3 Jan 2014 23:13:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SAMURAI REHABILITATION 443 The rehabilitationloans were generallymade directlythrough the individual prefecturaland cityadministrations. In most cases, the loans were not made to indi- vidualentrepeneurs, but to associations,usually composed of samurai and commoners of theformer han. In theeleven years in whichsuch loans were granted, over 450 samuraiassociations were formedspecifically to recruitgovernment aid in order to startsome sort of enterprise.Quite naturally, these associations varied in size and scope,ranging from a handfulof mento an entireclan. Owing to earlierexperiences theindustrial loans were designed not to rehabilitateidle and unemployedsamurai individually,but rather to relievegreat numbers of hard-pressedand joblesssamurai. Again,according to the"Roster of Rehabilitation Loans," the samurai associations in littlemore than a decadeenlisted roughly ioo,ioo men, or abouttwenty-three per centof theentire class.4" It mightalso be addedthat the program,while in effect, made availableapproximately Y5,255,59o in loans forindustrial and rehabilitative purposes. Conclusion The samuraiproblem, as it unfoldedin theearly years of theMeiji period,was clearlyan economicone and was recognizedas suchby mostMeiji leaders.Their solutionof thisproblem, shizoku jusan, revealed in all its detailthe profoundeco- nomicdislocation of the declassedsamurai. Yet it shouldnot be assumedthat the expansionof the Meiji economyand the subsequentrehabilitation program were ironcladguarantees for the continued financial security of the class. Relief of former samurai,it is wellto recall,was butone of the major goals of the shizoku jusan. Any evaluationof the programmust be basedon thisfact. Samurai rehabilitation, as a successfulalternative to unemploymentand poverty,fell short of its mark,for it oftenfailed to providethe samurai with a permanentsolution to his financialdiffi- culties.The reasonsfor this failure were many. In reclamationprojects, for example, therewere no doubtmany samurai who did not reallyintend "to breaksoil," but hiredpeople to cultivatethe land afterreclaiming was completed.Others intended merelyto sell theirplots once the land was cleared;while there were always those who abandonedthe wholeadventure as a totalloss sincethey were dearly unable to endurethe rigorousdemands of agriculturallife. Another element of the class respondedsincerely to reclamationwith the hope of pursuing a bucoliclife but failed simplyfrom lack of experience.48In business, commerce, and industrymany samurai failedfor similar reasons, while others were the victims of an immatureeconomy in whichonly long-term investments had a chanceto succeed.And, of course,the very natureof theclass and its traditionaloutlook inhibited its successfuladaptation to thenew society.The factthat samurai were totally unequipped and unaccustomed to thedemands of agriculture,commerce, or industryaccounts in considerablemeas- ure fortheir failure to bridgethe gap betweentwo conflictingways of life." Not-

42 This figurecorresponds very closely to my own estimatewhich is based on the completetables in Yoshikawa,SIK, pp. 553-567. 43 Such was the case in Okayama prefecturewhen the reclamationof Kojima Bay enlisted144 former samurai, none of whom by I876 had made a satisfactoryliving from the allotted lands. Inoue Keishul, Kojimawankaikonsho [A historyof the reclamation of Kojima Bay], (Okayama,I92I), pp. 2I-22. 44 This does not referto individualmembers of the class who did make a satisfactoryadjustment to the changesof the day and went on to becomeentrepeneurs, policemen, teachers, bureaucrats, etc. Harootunian, "Japan and the Samurai Class," PHR, pp. 260-263.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 3 Jan 2014 23:13:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 444 HARRY D. HAROOTUNIAN withstandingsuch reasons,it is more than probablethat the large numberof samuraibusinesses and endeavorswhich did failwere the result of inherentweak- nessesin theprogram itself. The morepermanent result of theMeiji government's rehabilitation policy was a by-productof it.Shizokit jusan touched broadly upon all majorspheres of theMeiji economy.Therefore, there is a realrelationship between the program and thegen- eralgrowth and developmentof theJapanese economy during the transitional years followingthe Restoration. In agriculture,the program opened up thousandsof acres of usefulgrazing and farmlands and gave employmentto over20,000 samurai. Rehabilitationstimulated commerce by the creation of a networkof branchesof the NationalBank. As forindustry and business,government loans clearly encouraged manyto trytheir hands in Western-typeenterprises. At bothnational and prefectural levels,there was a virtualmushrooming of samuraibusinesses in theyears between I876 and i889, rangingfrom small companies (kaisha) to largecorporations (kabu- shikikaisha), and employingthousands of formerretainers as managersand labor- ers.45Finally, the government'sefforts contributed much to the settlementand developmentof Japan'snorthernmost frontier, Hokkaido. That theprogram accomplished what the government intended is dubious.Yet, byerasing the dangers of classrebellion and relocatinga largesocial group with no apparentfunction in an industrializedsociety, the Meiji governmentdid realizea measureof success.Although Meiji statesmendid notprovide the class with a satis- factoryfinancial settlement, the program did allowsufficient time and suitablemeans forthe adjustment of the samurai to thenew age. By the late i88o's, the threat of class discontenthad been removed,and the governmentcould allow the programof rehabilitationto lapse. A new generation,far removed from the harsh realities and insecuritiesof the transitionalyears, was rapidlyreplacing the firstgeneration of Restorationsamurai.

45 Somewriters assert that one thirdof thelaborers, or aboutIOO,OOO, in thefirst two decades of the Meiji era wereex-samurai. But thereis neithersufficient data nor adequatetechniques with which to measurethe precise number of samuraiin theMeiji labor force. Indeed, it is evendifficult to differentiate salariedlaborers from those who had investmentsin the company in whichthey were employed, manages fromworkers, etc. See Yoshikawa,SIK, p. 54I; HorieYasuzo, Nihon shihonshugi no seiritsu(Tokyo and Kyoto,1949), pp. I88-I89; and Ok&chiKazuo, Reimeiki no Nihonrodd und6 (Tokyo, I954), pp. I9-24.

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