The Economic Rehabilitation of the Samurai in the Early Meiji Period Author(s): Harry D. Harootunian Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Aug., 1960), pp. 433-444 Published by: Association for Asian Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2943582 . Accessed: 03/01/2014 23:13 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Association for Asian Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Asian Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 3 Jan 2014 23:13:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The EconomicRehabilitation of the Samuraiin theEarly Meiji Period HARRY D. HAROOTUNIAN THE Meiji Restorationof I868, unquestionablythe mostimportant event in modernJapanese history, brought in itswake social and economicchanges of a revolutionarynature. With the overthrow of theTokugawa bakufu, the subsequent abolitionof thehan system,the equalization of classes,and the establishmentof a conscriptarmy, the need for a hereditarymilitary class ceased to exist.Certainly, the presenceof a samuraiclass, numbering approximately i,800,ooo, or 400,000families, strandedin a societyin processof divestingitself of all feudalfetters, constituted an acuteproblem. The continuedexistence of thisvast army of unemployedretainers couldhave easily hamstrung all effortsto modernize.And it is hardlysurprising that the new Meiji leadersrealized at theinception of thenew regimethat if thework of theRestoration was to be completedsuccessfully, it was necessaryto workout a satisfactorysettlement for the samurai class. It is truethat when the new government abolished the shogunal and han govern- mentsit did awaywith the specialsocial, political, and economicprivileges of the samurai.But it is alsotrue that this destruction of theold orderwas accompaniedby theMeiji government'sassumption of responsibilitytoward the declassed samurai, a responsibilitythat was expressedin thegovernment's efforts to finda placefor mem- bersof theclass in thenew society.Throughout the I870's and earlyi88o's, concern was shownin governmentcircles for the plight of thesamurai. Few if anygovern- mentalleaders were willing to committhe classto a permanentstate of economic depression.Iwakura Tomomi, a memberof the courtnobility and one of themost eloquentspokesmen for samurai interests in thegovernment, constantly warned his peersof the perils of thesamurai problem and urgeda speedyand satisfactorysettle- ment.Aware of thespecial contribution the samurai had madeto Japanesesociety, Iwakuraconsidered the class too valuableto be leftto thearbitrary uncertainties of economicdeprivation.' "For the past 300 years,"he declared,"the samurai have been the naturalleaders in society;they have participatedin governmentalaffairs and broughtto it a polishedpurity and virtue.Because of the militaryand literaryac- complishmentsof the class,they alone possessa characterthat is bothnoble and individualistic.It is forthis reason that the 400,000samurai of todayare the most usefulgroup in society...".2 Iwakura'swords were not neglected. Since most mem- bersof the governmentwere samurai, they needed little convincing of the special The authoris AssistantProfessor of Historyat the Universityof Rochester. 1 Iwakurak6 ikki, ed. Tada Takamon (Tokyo, 1927) II, 545; see also Yoshikawa Hidez6, Shizoku jusan no kenky97(Tokyo, 1943), p. 244. Hereafter,this work will be cited as SJK. 2 lwaku*rakoiikki, II, 547- 433 This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 3 Jan 2014 23:13:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 434 HARRY D. HAROOTUNIAN qualitiesof the class.3 Furthermore, many of the young leaders were impressed by the politicalimplications of samuraieconomic discontent, for the weight of armedrevolt was on thembefore they could consolidate the authority of thestate. From I873 to I878, foursamurai uprisings were directed at theoverthrow of thenew state.Even thoughthe government successfully weathered these rebellions, the samuraiopposi- tionwas not crushed.Rather, it assumeda differentand moreenduring form-a politicalmovement which called for the establishment of representativeinstitutions (jiyuiminken und6).4 Sincethe problem of the samurai was at bottomeconomic, the government sought an economicsolution. Instead of usingartificial measures to relievethe plight of the samurai,the logical solution to theproblem was foundin theconditions attending thegeneral expansion of the Japanese economy. Industrial and agriculturalexpansion wouldprovide a placefor both samurai investments and employment;at the same time,it wouldallow the classto be absorbedinto the new society.'"In tryingto createemployment for the samurai," Iwakura advised, "we mustgive first importance to the developmentof industry.. Let thosesamurai with ability be placedin chargeof thenew enterprises,those with physical strength be employedas workers, andwithin a fewyears production in differentparts of the country will be sufficiently increasedso thatall samurainow idle will be usefulproducers."6 The samurai,in short,were to providea pool of uncommittedmanpower from which financiers, managers,and workerswere to be recruitedfor the new Western-styleindustries.7 From i868 to roughlyI889, the taskof absorbingthe samuraiwas the aim of a specificprogram known officially as shizoku jusan, the samurai rehabilitation policy. Althoughshizoku jusan was essentiallymotivated by the need to findemploy- mentfor ex-samurai, it was also hopedthat it mightserve the broader objective of economicdevelopment. In theirmany memorials and petitionsconcerning the prob- lem of samurai,government leaders such as Iwakura,Okubo, and Kido indicated thata rehabilitationpolicy need not be limitedto protectingformer samurai, but couldbe consideredas anothertechnique by which the government would accumulate capital.In thissense, samurai rehabilitation was subordinatedto thegeneral program of theMeiji government,one whichtook the form of makingJapan economically 3 For the views of governmentmembers, see Fukaya Hiroharu, Kashizoku chitsurokushobun no kenkyzu[A Studyof theSamurai Pension System], (Tokyo, 1942), pp. 258-268; 279 ff. '-It has been rightlyobserved by many Japanesehistorians that the beginningsand developmentof the so-called "popular rightsmovement" merely expressed a segmentof samurai discontent,that jiyu7minken, for the foundersof the movement,actually meant shizoku minken (samurai rights). See Harry D. Harootunian,The Samurai Class during the Early Years of the Meiji Period in Japan (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,University of Michigan, 1957), Pp. 97-114; Got6 Yasui, "Shizoku minken no rekishi teki hyomen" ("Historical analysis of shizoku minken"), limbun gakuh6, IV (I954), 139. ProfessorGoto argues that in realityItagaki Taisuke's espousal of liberal symbolswas not much differentthan the rebel ideologyof Saig6 Takamori. For ProfessorGot6, the movementfor politicaldemocracy proved to be little more than anotherwing of the samurai oppositionto oligarchicalgovernment (hambatsu). 5 Yoshikawa Hidez6, "Meiji seifu no shizoku jusan" ("The samurai rehabilitationpolicy of the Meiji government"),in Meiji Ishin keizaishi kenkyu,ed. by Honjo Eijir6 (Tokyo, 1931), p. 584. Hereafter cited as MIKK. 6 Quoted in Thomas C. Smith, Political Change and IndustrialDevelopment in Japan: Government Enterprise,s868-s88o, (Stanford, I955), p. 34. For a detailed analysis of Iwakura's views on shizoku jusan, see Yoshikawa,SJK, pp. 243-257. 7 For an explanationof how samurai representedan "exploitablesocial stratum"from which recruit- mentfor change could be made, see my article,"The Progressof Japanand the Samurai Class," PacificHis- toricalReview, III (1959), 257-259. This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Fri, 3 Jan 2014 23:13:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SAMURAI REHABILITATION 435 independentand militarilypowerful and bestexpressed in thepopular slogans of the day,fukoku ky5hei (enrich the nation, strengthen the army) 8 and bussanbanshoku (increaseproduction). Yet, themotivation underlying shizoku jusan and the aims whichserved to guidethe program were two different things; while the motivation was unmistakablyclear, the specific aims of thepolicy often appeared to be vague and ill-defined.The goalsof samurairehabilitation were uncertain because the policy was alwaysconsidered as secondaryto largereconomic considerations. If the pro- gramwas designedspecifically to protectdeclassed samurai by findingemployment forthem, it failedto fulfillits foremostobligation, for it was neithersuccessful in providingthe samuraiwith a satisfactoryfinancial settlement, nor did it createa lastingsolution to theirunemployment problems. Despite this fundamental failure of shizokujusan, there is littledoubt that the program had significancefor the de- velopmentof modern Japanese society. It certainlycontributed to theprocess of capital accumulation,it stimulated the growth of an entrepeneurialclass, and it provideda laborforce upon which Japanese industry could be expanded.9 In Decemberof i87I, afterlimited