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JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, 04 October 2013 Joint Publication 3-11 OF NT TH E E W M I S E' L L H D T E F T E N A R D R A M P Y E D • • U A N C I I T R E E D M S A T F AT E S O Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments 29 October 2018 PREFACE 1. Scope This publication provides doctrine for planning, conducting, and assessing military operations in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments. 2. Purpose This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives. 3. Application a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies. b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a i Preface multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: DANIEL J. O’DONOHUE Lieutenant General, USMC Director, Joint Force Development ii JP 3-11 SUMMARY OF CHANGES REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-11 DATED 04 OCTOBER 2013 • Synchronizes and updates language in Joint Publication (JP) 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, with JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response. • Recognizes the proponent change for global countering weapons of mass destruction operations responsibility from United States Strategic Command to United States Special Operations Command. • Removes the “Prepare, Prevent, Protect, Respond, and Recover” model. • Synchronizes planning discussion with JP 5-0, Joint Planning. • Updates discussion on logistics and sustainment execution in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) environments. • Adds discussion of CBRN operations proximate to and effects of intentional or unintentional release of hazards in urban environments. • Adds discussion on information function as it relates to operations in CBRN environments. • Updates toxic industrial materials and radiological hazard considerations. • Adds classified appendix for nontraditional agents. • Adds, revises, or deletes numerous definitions. iii Summary of Changes Intentionally Blank iv JP 3-11 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii CHAPTER I FUNDAMENTALS General ........................................................................................................................ I-1 National Strategy ........................................................................................................ I-3 Strategic Context ......................................................................................................... I-4 Operational Context .................................................................................................... I-5 Relation to the Joint Functions ................................................................................... I-6 CHAPTER II PLANNING General .......................................................................................................................II-1 Understanding the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operational Environment ...........................................................................................II-2 Strategic and Operational Planning ...........................................................................II-4 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Staff Assessment Components ...............................................................................................................II-6 Planning Considerations ............................................................................................II-8 Preparation Considerations ......................................................................................II-26 Sustainment Considerations .....................................................................................II-30 CHAPTER III EXECUTION General ..................................................................................................................... III-1 Hazard Awareness and Understanding and Situational Awareness ........................ III-2 Protection ................................................................................................................. III-4 Contamination Mitigation ........................................................................................ III-5 Sustainment Considerations ..................................................................................... III-5 CHAPTER IV OPERATION ASSESSMENT Operation Assessment .............................................................................................. IV-1 Operation Assessment Process ................................................................................ IV-1 APPENDIX A Chemical Hazard Considerations .............................................................. A-1 B Biological Hazard Considerations ..............................................................B-1 v Table of Contents C Radiological Hazard Considerations ..........................................................C-1 D Nuclear Hazard Considerations ................................................................. D-1 E Nontraditional Agent Hazard Considerations ............................................ E-1 F Contamination Mitigation Considerations ................................................. F-1 G Technical Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Forces ......... G-1 H Points of Contact ....................................................................................... H-1 J References ................................................................................................... J-1 K Administrative Instructions ....................................................................... K-1 GLOSSARY Part I Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms .............................................. GL-1 Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-4 FIGURE II-1 Hazard Awareness and Understanding in the Joint Operational Environment .............................................................................................II-21 II-2 Joint Ship/Land Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Mission-Oriented Protective Posture Comparison ...................................II-24 A-1 Chemical Agent Effects ............................................................................ A-1 A-2 Chemical Warfare Agent Categories ......................................................... A-2 A-3 Industrial Chemical Site Minimum Downwind Hazard (Sample) ............ A-4 B-1 Pathogens, Viruses, and Toxins of Military Significance ..........................B-2 B-2 Examples of Biological Material Viability ................................................B-4 B-3 Weather Effects on Biological Agent Dissemination ................................B-5 C-1 Effects of Prompt Radiation Exposure .......................................................C-4 C-2 Sources of Radiation ..................................................................................C-5 C-3 Radiation Exposure Status Categories .....................................................C-15 C-4 Severity of Radiological Threat ...............................................................C-17 C-5 Probability of Radiological Threat ...........................................................C-18 C-6 Level of Radiological Risk .......................................................................C-19 C-7 Recommended Operational Exposure Guidance Levels ..........................C-19 D-1 Energy Distribution of Typical Nuclear Air Burst .................................... D-2 F-1 Forms of Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
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