DOCSLIB.ORG

Hardening Land Force Vehicles Dr Carlo Kopp

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Hardening Land Force Vehicles Dr Carlo Kopp Hardening Land Force vehicles Dr Carlo Kopp One of great success stories of the post-911 counter insurgency campaigns has been the deployment of hardened wheeled vehicles to reduce casualties produced by insurgent placed mines and Improvised Explosive land warfare conference Devices (IED). Generally termed MRAP (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected) vehicles, these hardened trucks and personnel carriers are replacing conventional vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the public perception is that the need for ‘harder’ land force vehicles is driven by While insurgent attacks are often seen as the main imperative for hardening land vehicles, smart munitions with insurgent bombs, the reality is that stand off range have proliferated globally and are a far stronger reason for this critical investment. increasing range in conventional There is little doubt that MRAPs have reduced the used land mines for area denial and for vehicle guided weapons and their global number of personnel casualties dramatically, and ambushes over and over again, and the sorry story proliferation are a much stronger this is clearly a win as it has allowed coalition of Cambodia speaks for itself. imperative. forces to sustain operations that would have The specific use of land mines and improvised This means that in the near term otherwise been impossible to sustain (politically). land mines for vehicle ambushes became common IEDs and land mines have been the single largest during the Vietnam War; later cable or radio link armies will have no choice but cause of combat personnel deaths but, more detonated weapons became a trademark of IRA to fully re-equip with hardened importantly, personnel maimings, as observed in insurgency operations against the British Army and vehicles for in-theatre use – the the counter-insurgency effort since 2001. Western the Ulster constabulary. nations involved in these campaigns, especially Remotely controlled weapons of this ilk can be differentiation between ‘exposed the US, have to carry the burden of medical care used to attack individual ‘high value’ vehicles, such forward deployment’ and ‘secure for the victims of IED and mine attacks for several as trucks loaded with troops, munitions or fuel, or rear area deployment’ is becoming decades. Injuries produced by these weapons to cripple the lead vehicle in a convoy to initiate a increasingly meaningless. include loss of limbs, internal organ injuries, spinal conventional infantry style ambush. injuries, shrapnel injuries, blindings and brain In Iraq, improvised weapon explosive components injuries. Improvements in battlefield MedEvac and included 155 mm and 152 mm artillery shells, LPG in-theatre treatment have resulted in many more bottles, landmines, and even aerial bombs of up to personnel surviving very severe blast injuries than 500 kg or greater weight. in any other previous campaign. That IEDs would prove to be the plague they The massed deployment of MRAP category vehicles became in Iraq and later Afghanistan is with as replacements for conventional ‘flat bottomed’ hindsight inevitable. truck and HMMWV fleets raises questions about After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, insurgents the nature of modern conflicts, but also presents repeatedly launched conventional ‘infantry style’ important lessons. Perhaps the most fundamental attacks on coalition troops. More than often lesson is that in war winners are those who can the outcome was disastrous for the insurgents, adapt and evolve faster than their opponents, and with typical kill ratios in close quarter infantry those who cannot adapt become losers. combat amounting to dozens of insurgents for every coalition soldier killed. Superior discipline, hardened vehIcles In counter training and tactics produced this outcome, and to a lesser extent, body armour and better infantry Insurgency operatIons - the present weapons. When armour, attack helicopters or CAS The use of landmines and more recently IEDs aircraft were on hand, the results were even more as a tool for the interdiction of road transport is disastrous for the insurgents. Massing insurgent In modern wars, the whole theatre is the FEBA, not new; indeed landmines are now a pervasive and all vehicles must be hardened. personnel more than often provided opportunities problem in a large part due to their success in the for intelligence to locate the insurgents and identify Second World War. During the Cold War both sides them, enabling devastating aerial attacks using 26 - DefenceToday DT_OCT2010_LODfinal.indd 26 1/11/10 4:15 PM Military Vehicles_Layout 1 15/09/10 9:08 AM Page 1 While the public perception is that the need for "harder" land force vehicles is driven by insurgent bombs, the reality is that increasing range in conventional guided weapons and their global proliferation are a much stronger long term imperative. precision guided bombs. Importantly, repeated as the HMMWV (Humvee). Only a small number particularly dangerous areas to sustain resupply attacks of this kind resulted in the progressive ‘self- of vehicles were hardened, such as specialised and to deploy troops for combat operations. annihilation’ of insurgent leaders and followers HMMWV variants following the well publicised A major effort was launched to use ISR to locate who favoured this approach. difficulties in Somalia. ‘bomb factories’ and interdict IED emplacement Inevitably, the insurgent leaders and groups who Major General Jim Molan (Retd) observed the teams, an effort that sometimes yielded good preferred sniper attacks and IED attacks were following in his 2008 book ‘Running the War in results but often poor results. The technological all who remained, and new recruits in turn were Iraq’. (see separate interview) problems in using ISR for detecting, tracking indoctrinated to use these methods rather than “In the IED Working Group, I was quickly into and identifying both insurgents on the ground or infantry style assaults. Alas, this is the normal statistics. At that stage, early in 2004, about one- emplaced IEDs are not easily solved. land warfare conference process of adaptation: the evolution in tactics and third of all attacks on the coalition used IEDs. On To the credit of US commanders and personnel in techniques over centuries in all warfare. any one day we had about 50 IED incidents. Of the theatre, the IED problem was well understood The problem was exacerbated by the ample supply those 50 bombs we found about half before they early at both a tactical and strategic level. In that of explosive materials, especially artillery shells, exploded. Two or three exploded accidentally as sense the ‘adaptation’ to the rapidly evolving threat which Saddam’s regime dispersed across the they were being emplaced, either because we was sound. country. Politically mandated limits on the number were using electronic countermeasures or because The aspect of ‘adaptation’ which proved more of US personnel deployed for the occupation of of a lack of skill on the bombers’ part. This left an difficult was execution – the process of securing Iraq precluded the rapid collection and disposal of average of 20 bombs each day that were exploded sufficient funding, implementing the hardening of this stockpile, large portions of which were in turn against us: one coalition soldier was being killed existing vehicles, and deployment to theatre of collected and cached by insurgents for future use every two days. Apart from the deaths, the injuries replacement vehicles. as IED feedstock materiel. were appalling.” For comparison, the problem of dealing with an IED In forensically exploring the IED problem, the most “We conducted operations specifically against the type of threat is not new and other case studies interesting subject is how quickly the Coalition was bombers, and as we killed the ones with experience exist. The Vietnam conflict is one example, where able to adapt to the rapidly evolving insurgency. novice bomb-makers stepped up, which meant the convoy and vehicle ambushes were common, While the IED offensive in Iraq ultimately failed as rate of premature explosions increased. We put a albeit not on the scale of Iraq. a campaign for the insurgents, it did expose the lot of effort into making the troops ‘bomb-smart’: The South African experience in Namibia and Angola extent to which bureaucratic micromanagement we produced pamphlets, pocket cards, videos and is the real case study of interest. Fighting Soviet of military matters and lethargic procurement newsletters, and we made training compulsory. sponsored insurgent groups and Cuban Special practices can hamper the ability to rapidly respond But it was really the natural cunning and ability Forces across large areas of thinly populated to changes in the operational environment. of the soldiers that kept casualties relatively low. bush, the South Africans soon experienced heavy When Coalition forces rolled into Iraq in 2003, much Experience and training told soldiers where not to losses in rear areas due to landmines. Lacking of the land force inventory comprised equipment go and what discarded garbage might be hiding the population numbers to sustain heavy losses, developed during the late Cold War period. The a bomb. The coalition relied a lot on luck and on and the resources to use conventional armoured Cold War was a ‘conventional’ conflict in the sense electronic technology, but experience and training vehicles exclusively across the theatre, the South that NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces would accounted for most of our successes, which were Africans adapted and evolved. have fought a traditional manoeuvre land warfare satisfying but never enough to protect all our The result was the Buffel armoured personnel battle, with heavy armoured manoeuvre forces soldiers, and never enough for our critics in the carrier and logistical resupply vehicle, and punching holes through the FEBA (Forward Edge of media.” Casspir armoured truck or in contemporary terms, Mercedes-Benz Military Vehicles the Battle Area) to ‘envelop’ opposing strongpoints, When IED attacks began to escalate, and casualties ‘MRAP’. Both featured armoured cabins, and the and cut lines of supply.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Limiting Terrorist Use of Advanced Conventional Weapons
    THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY research organization providing POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY objective analysis and effective SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY solutions that address the challenges SUBSTANCE ABUSE facing the public and private sectors TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY around the world. TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Homeland Security Program View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Stealing theSword Limiting Terrorist Use of Advanced Conventional Weapons James Bonomo Giacomo Bergamo David R.
    [Show full text]
  • Improvised Firearms in the Collection of the Forensic Laboratory
    FORENSIC PRACTICE Sławomir Kudełka Forensic Laboratory, Voivodeship Police Headquarters in Kraków [email protected] Tomasz Konopka Department of Forensic Medicine, Collegium Medicum, Jagiellonian University [email protected] Improvised firearms in the collection of the Forensic Laboratory, Voivodeship Police Headquarters in Kraków and the Department of Forensic Medicine, Collegium Medicum, Jagiellonian University — towards a systematics Summary Despite a very large variety of improvised firearms, repeatability of certain actions of the manufacturers can be observed, reflecting the purpose to which such weapons are produced (e.g. poaching), and the availability of appropriate technologies. The aim of this article is to make an attempt to systematize improvised firearms on the basis of the expert opinions elaborated at the Weapon Research and Ballistics Department of the Voivodeship Police Headquarters in Kraków (LK KWP) as well as studies carried out on weapons belonging to the collection of the Department of Forensic Medicine (ZMS) in Kraków. Research material included both primitive devices made by using simple methods and without concern for accuracy or aesthetics, as well as fine-tuned pieces with individual design solutions or copies of factory-made weapons. Improvised firearms can generally be divided into conversions and own designs. The conversion most frequently applies to alarm, gas or pneumatic weapons. It consists in removing factory safety mechanisms or, in the case of pneumatic weapons, in introducing technical modifications, which enable to blast off the cartridge and discharge the projectile by means of gas pressure arising during combustion of the propellant. Own designs may contain certain factory elements, most frequently the barrel, however, in most cases, they are manufactured from scratch.
    [Show full text]
  • JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, 04 October 2013
    Joint Publication 3-11 OF NT TH E E W M I S E' L L H D T E F T E N A R D R A M P Y E D • • U A N C I I T R E E D M S A T F AT E S O Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments 29 October 2018 PREFACE 1. Scope This publication provides doctrine for planning, conducting, and assessing military operations in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments. 2. Purpose This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives. 3. Application a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.
    [Show full text]
  • Easier Said Than Done: Legal Reviews of Cyber Weapons
    Easier Said Than Done: Legal Reviews of Cyber Weapons Gary D. Brown* & Andrew O. Metcalf** INTRODUCTION On June 1, 2012, author and New York Times reporter David Sanger created a sensation within the cyber-law community. Just over a year previously, Vanity Fair, among other media outlets, reported that a malware package of unprec- edented complexity had effectively targeted the Iranian nuclear research pro- gram.1 The malware, which came to be known as Stuxnet, was also discovered on many computer systems outside Iran, but it did not appear to do any damage to these other systems. Just as the discussions spurred by the discovery of Stuxnet had begun to die down, the New York Times published an interview with Mr. Sanger to discuss his newest book, in which he alleged that the Stuxnet malware had been part of a U.S. planned and led covert cyber operation. The assertion that a nation state had used a “cyber attack” in support of its national objectives reinvigorated the attention of cyber-law commentators, both in and out of government. What makes Stuxnet interesting as a point of discussion is that the basic functioning of the software is easy to understand and easy to categorize. A piece of software was deliberately inserted into the target systems, and physical damage was the result. However, resulting physical damage is not characteristic of most cyber operations, and the legal analysis of Stuxnet is of limited utility when examining a broad range of cyber activities.2 A distinct lack of physical effects is much more characteristic of cyber operations, and the absence of physical effects has continued to complicate the legal analysis of cyber in the context of military operations.
    [Show full text]
  • Improvised Weapons
    Updated Apr 2009 The purpose of this presentation is to make you better aware of the numerous improvised weapons and ingenious hiding places that have been created and are in use by today’s criminals. The majority of the material used in this presentation comes from various law enforcement officer safety bulletins throughout the world. This presentation attempts to combine information from those bulletins into one easy to view presentation. In the interest of keeping the focus to the threat on hand, many of the circumstances surrounding the identification of these items has been removed. Knowledge is safety. Unless you stay informed, danger will find you… Improvised Weapon Any item that has been designed, modified, or disguised to function as a weapon. California’s Dangerous Weapon Law (12020 P.C.) 12020(a) PC Any person in this state who does any of the following is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year or in the state prison: (1) Manufactures or causes to be manufactured, imports into the state, keeps for sale, or offers or exposes for sale, or who gives, lends, or possesses any cane gun or wallet gun, any undetectable firearm, any firearm which is not immediately recognizable as a firearm, any camouflaging firearm container, any ammunition which contains or consists of any flechette dart, any bullet containing or carrying an explosive agent, any ballistic knife, any multiburst trigger activator, any nunchaku, any short-barreled shotgun, any short-barreled rifle, any metal knuckles, any belt buckle knife, any leaded cane, any zip gun, any shuriken, any unconventional pistol, any lipstick case knife, any cane sword, any shobi-zue, any air gauge knife, any writing pen knife, any metal military practice handgrenade or metal replica hand grenade, or any instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a blackjack, slungshot, billy, sandclub, sap, or sandbag.
    [Show full text]
  • Terrorist and Insurgent Teleoperated Sniper Rifles and Machine Guns Robert J
    Claremont Colleges Scholarship @ Claremont CGU Faculty Publications and Research CGU Faculty Scholarship 1-1-2016 Terrorist and Insurgent Teleoperated Sniper Rifles and Machine Guns Robert J. Bunker Claremont Graduate University Alma Keshavarz Claremont Graduate University Recommended Citation Bunker, R. J. (2016). Terrorist and Insurgent Teleoperated Sniper Rifles and Machine Guns. Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), 1-40. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CGU Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in CGU Faculty Publications and Research by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WL KNO EDGE NCE ISM SA ER IS E A TE N K N O K C E N N T N I S E S J E N A 3 V H A A N H Z И O E P W O I T E D N E Z I A M I C O N O C C I O T N S H O E L C A I N M Z E N O T Terrorist and Insurgent Teleoperated Sniper Rifles and Machine Guns ROBERT J. BUNKER and ALMA KESHAVARZ August 2016 Open Source, Foreign Perspective, Underconsidered/Understudied Topics The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is an open source research organization of the U.S. Army. It was founded in 1986 as an innovative program that brought together military specialists and civilian academics to focus on military and security topics derived from unclassified, foreign media. Today FMSO maintains this research tradition of special insight and highly collaborative work by conducting unclassified research on foreign perspectives of defense and security issues that are understudied or unconsidered.
    [Show full text]
  • Army Guide Monthly • Issue #2 (29) • February 2007
    Army G uide monthly # 2 (29) February 2007 GD Awarded Test Vehicle Contract for Four Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles US Marine Corps Announces Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle Contracts The United States Gives Weapons to Afghanistan's Army Armoured Personnel Carrier Northrop Grumman to Test Fire Kinetic Energy Interceptor Booster PVI Wins MRAP Test Contract Award Last Laser-Based Firing Simulator Handed Over for the Light Armoured Vehicle RadSpz 93 BAE SYSTEMS Receives Follow-on Contract for New Swedish Artillery System LM Receives $18.6M U.S. Army BCS3 Follow-On Contract Half-track FCS Successfully Completes Experiment and Soldier-testing of Key Technologies Textron Marine & Land Contracted to Build Test Vehicles for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Program Cost Effective Integration Of The Fido Explosives Detection System Additional Heavy Tank Transporters for Australian Army Oshkosh Truck Signs Contract To Provide Medium Tactical Trucks To Egyptian Ministry of Defense Howitzer DRS Technologies Receives $124 M Contract to Produce Infrared Sighting Systems for U.S. Army Combat Vehicles Force Dynamics Announces $67 M U.S. Marine Corps Contract Tetra Tech Joint Venture Wins $62 M Technical Services Contract with U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency DFNS Announces a First Order from a Leading US Supplier of Armored Buses www.army-guide.com Army Guide Monthly • #2 (29) • February 2007 Defence Industry lives by augmenting the current level of mine and GD Awarded Test Vehicle Contract for Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) protection with a Four Mine Resistant Ambush Protected V-shaped hull and raised chassis. The increased Vehicles survivability performance requirements and production rates are a direct result of theater operational needs.
    [Show full text]
  • JP 3-05, Special Operations
    Joint Publication 3-05 Special Operations 16 July 2014 PREFACE 1. Scope This publication provides overarching doctrine for special operations and the employment and support for special operations forces across the range of military operations. 2. Purpose This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the joint force commander deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 3. Application a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies. b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance.
    [Show full text]
  • The Us Withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Fate of the Mraps
    ZESZYTY NAUKOWE RUCHU STUDENCKIEGO Nr 2 (2014) ISSN 2084-2279 Cdt. Richard Kovács1 Under mentoring of Col. Tomasz Smal, PhD, Assoc. Prof. THE US WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN AND THE FATE OF THE MRAPS Summary: This article describes the problems connected with the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and focuses on the hardships of transporting the MRAPs from the area of operations. Keywords: military logistics, MRAP, Global War on Terror, bilateral agreement, Afghanistan, IED INTRODUCTION Shortly after 9/11 the US and its allies started so called the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and Afghanistan (among other countries) became a battlefield. The Internation- al Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Operation Enduring Freedom is made up of the coalition of NATO countries, but the biggest contributor to the cause is without doubt the USA. Since 2001, they have deployed most of the soldiers and the equipment to the area. Now the US is considering the withdrawal from the country and is faced with a huge amount of problems. When and how exactly will they leave the country? How can they manage the withdrawal efficiently from the logistic point of view? To better under- stand the significance of these questions, we must take a look into the history of the war and the current situation. 1. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW In the opening stages of the war, the invasion of the country went extremely fast, faster than the intelligence officers at the CIA would predict. At the beginning air strikes and a limited number of ground troops (mostly CIA paramilitary officers and special op- erations forces) with the help of the local anti-taliban militias launched successful cam- paigns against enemy strongholds and captured important cities such as Mazar-i Sharif, Kabul, Kunduz and Kandahar2.
    [Show full text]
  • Martial Arts of the Middle Age
    IQP JLS-0072 Martial Arts of the Middle Age Interactive Qualifying Project Report Submitted to the Faculty of the Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation by Andrew Aveyard ___________________ Jason Cardwell ___________________ Brad Davison ___________________ Daniel Haggerty ___________________ May 6, 2014 _______________________________ Professor Jeffrey L. Forgeng, Advisor 1 Table of Contents Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................................... 1 Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... 4 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 5 History of European Martial Arts ................................................................................................................ 10 Medieval Time Period ............................................................................................................................. 10 Environment of the Medieval Age ...................................................................................................... 10 Knightly Combat .................................................................................................................................. 12 Masters and their Manuscripts
    [Show full text]
  • Improvised Weapons a Real Weapon Is Preferable to an Improvised One – but Dumbbell: Swing As Small Mace at Full Damage an Improvised One Is Much Better Than Nothing
    Improvised Weapons A real weapon is preferable to an improvised one – but Dumbbell: Swing as small mace at full damage an improvised one is much better than nothing. Below are [Axe/Mace-1]. Can parry. some everyday items that can stand in for real weapons at Earring Posts, Pins, etc.: Rake at +1 “damage” [Eye-Rake- skill and/or damage penalties. The skills or techniques need- 1].* ed appear in brackets. The Improvised Weapons perk (p. 50) Eyeglasses: Rake at +1 “damage” [Eye-Rake-1], automat- for a skill allows you to ignore penalties to that skill but not ically ruining them as eyeglasses.* to damage. Ice Scraper: Swing as small knife at -2 damage [Knife-1]. Treat an improvised weapon as cheap for all purposes. If Keys: Rake at +1 “damage” [Eye-Rake-1].* it uses an unarmed skill or technique, the user can still parry Magazine, Tightly Rolled: Thrust (not swing) as baton at with his hand. If it uses a weapon skill, it can’t parry unless full damage [Shortsword-1]. Can parry. specifically noted. Glass objects break on 1-3 on 1d on any Nail Clippers: Stab as dagger at -3 damage [Knife-2]. strike or parry; on a 1, you also suffer thrust cutting damage Rake at +1 “damage” [Eye-Rake-1].* to the hand. Pen or Pencil: Stab as dagger at -2 damage (-1 for a huge pen) [Knife-1]. Barbell: Swing as maul at full damage [Two-Handed Purse, Clutched: Use for two-handed punch [Two- Axe/Mace-2]. Can parry. Handed Punch-2].
    [Show full text]
  • Mine-Protected Transports 2013
    Mine-protected Transports 2013 armada INTERNATIONAL: The trusted source for defence technology information since 1976 To bridge the gap between its Cobra light armoured vehicle and its IFVs Otokar of Turkey developed a mine-resistant vehicle named Kaya. (Otokar) MINE-PROTECTED TRANSPORTS: WHat LIES AHEAD? One of the unanswered questions for most military planners is what will happen after Afghanistan. The Second Gulf War, or to be more precise the “follow-on stabilisation effort”, had led to a new category of vehicle, namely the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected, or Mrap as it became universally known. As this definition is very much US-related we prefer that of “mine-protected vehicles”, which includes the notion of protection against improvised explosive devices, which became the main risk for troops moving in theatre. Paolo Valpolini raq’s main lines of communications protection and patrol missions, a role in surroundings, thus an upwards spiralling and flat desert tracks were a perfect which most widely produced military quickly started. setting for vehicles based on a vehicle in the American inventory showed of truck chassis carrying highly limitations in terms of survivability. In In the early days of the Afghan mission, Iprotected crew cells. These vehicles Iraq, dimensions and weights of those those vehicles initially seemed up to their started to replace the Humvees in convoy Mraps were not much limited by their new theatre of operations, but things armada Mine Protected Transports 1/2013 01 The motor pool of a US Marine Corps base in Afghanistan. The United States will soon have to decide how to cope with all the Mraps acquired in the last decade – more than 27,000 of them.
    [Show full text]