Military Withdrawal from Politics: Discourse and Reform Agenda

Januari 1999 13 Military Withdrawal from Politics: Discourse and Reform Agenda

By : I Ketut Gunawan*

Abstrak Di jaman Orde Baru, intervensi militer dalam urusan-urusan non-militer sangat intensif dan ekstensif. Bagi kehidupan demokrasi, costs yang ditanggung jauh melebihi benefits yang diperoleh. Karenanya, tuntutan penarikan intervensi militer dalam bidang non-militer semakin lama semakin kuat dan memuncak belakangan ini. Di tengah-tengah besarnya gelombang tuntutan reformasi total atas format politik Indonesia di Orde Reformasi ini, respons pemerintah terhadap tuntutan reformasi sistem dan kelembagaan sipil cukup “akomodatif” walaupun upaya-upaya mempertahankan pola rezim lama masih terlihat kuat. Di sisi lain, tuntutan reformasi atas posisi dan peran militer dalam bentuk penarikan intervensi militer dalam politik disikapi dengan resistensi berbau romantisme sejarah. Tulisan ini berusaha menelusuri agenda reformasi peran sosial-politik militer melalui telaah diskursus penarikan intervensi militer dalam politik. Dalam “membawa” diskursus ke agenda praksis, kendala yang ditemui tidak sedikit. Namun demikian, kejadian-kejadian dramatis setelah Orde Reformasi ditegakkan, seperti penghapusan tiga jalur dalam Golkar (ABRI, Birokrasi, Golkar) serta tuntutan luas pemisahan Korps Polisi dari ABRI, telah memberi entry points dan dukungan luas ke arah itu. Tapi jalan yang mesti dilalui masih panjang dan berliku. Pada titik inilah concern dan peran reformis dan kelompok pro-demokrasi menjadi imperatif.

he Indonesian armed forces has been The pervasive role of the military in playing a significant role in Indone- Indonesian political life is justified espe- Tsian politics since at least 1957 when cially by dwifungsi doctrine, the doctrine the martial law was enacted. For many years that the military has a dual or twin function, after Soeharto assumed power in 1966, the that is, as a military force and a socio- army intervened in all aspects of people’s political force. As William Liddle observed, political life; it “dominated the country’s dwifungsi has been government almost completely ... decisively used to justify: appointment of large overshadowing and controlling –– if not in a numbers of military officers to Par- functional sense subsuming –– all others.”1 liament, the MPR, and regional legis- lature; the placement of first serving, * Graduated from the Department of Politics, Monash then retired officers in controlling University, Melbourne, Australia; lecturer at the Fa- positions in Golkar; military supervi- culty of Social and Political Sciences, Mulawarman University, Samarinda. 1 George McT. Kahin, “Foreward,” in Harold Crouch, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Revised Edition p. 9. 13 Jurnal Sosial-Politika No. 2

sion of the internal workings of other In this reform era, proposed reforms in parties and of the general elections; political parties, election system, restruc- military intelligence surveillance of the ture of Parliament have been paid serious press, legitimated through a doctrine of attention. Reform agenda in the socio- a ‘free and responsible’ press; and the political role of the military, however, is appointment of many officers to cabi- still unclear whereas such a reform would net and sub-cabinet positions.2 be a cornerstone of the success of total Prior to the resignation of Soeharto, it reforms in Indonesian political format as has become common to see the legitimacy was intended by many sections of the problems of the Indonesian government as communities. having two separate aspects, one to do with The socio-political role of the military the regime as such (and President Soeharto take forms military “participation” in non- specifically), and one to do with the armed military sectors. Reforms in the socio- forces (and the army in particular). With the political roles thus mean reforms in the fall of Soeharto, the military is now a military role in non-military tasks. This subject of scrutiny. This article focuses on work examines proposed reforms in mili- the later. tary “participation” in politics,3 and the The legitimacy problem can be traced discussion would focus on discourse and back. With the growing concern of many reform agenda on military withdrawal Indonesians about democratisation in poli- from politics. tics and economics, there has emerged a growing challenge toward military intervention Concept and Factors Leading to in non-military sectors. Over time the Military Withdrawal challenges intensify. While prior to the There are many similar terms which 1990s the challenges were mostly presented can be used to refer to “military within political trials or underground publica- drawal from politics.” That is, “return to tions or debated half openly by reform- the barracks,” “military exit from politics,” minded groups within the military, in the and “military disengagement.” “Return to first half of 1990s civilians, particularly pro- the barracks” according to S.E. Finer democracy groups, openly demand the refers to “abdication” and “re-civiliani- reduction of military intervention, and even zation.” “Abdication” or the “military’s the abolition of dwifungsi doctrine. The disengagement from overt rule” refers to demands become more daring and so open the termination of military rule and since Soeharto was forced to step down by replacing it with civilian rule. Finer argues students. that the military would return to the barracks if three problems occurred, 2 R. William Liddle, “Politics 1992-1993: Sixth Term namely, conflict between the military and Adjustments in the Ruling Formula,” in Chris Manning and Joan Hardjono (eds.), Indonesia Assessment 1993, Labour: Sharing in the Benefits of 3 Military “participation” in politics is the most crucial Growth? (Canberra: Research School of Pacific one as it is a driving force for “participation” in other Studies, Australian National University, 1993), p. 29. fields (e.g. economic activities).

14 Januari 1998 conspiratorial civilians, growing friction (usually technocrats). In such circum- within the military, and economic and stances, the military is the dominant political difficulties faced by military partner and the civilians play an rulers.4 “Re-civilianization” on the other auxiliary role.6 hand deals with the concern, decision, and Thus, the difference between these terms struggle of civilian elements of the society, lies in the degree of civilian rule vis-à-vis not under the dictation of the military military rule or the position of military in junta, to have civilian rule. The military the government. In “military withdrawal or leaders may have some influence in this disengagement” the role of the military is political movement but such influence is auxiliary, whereas in “de-intervention or minor since the principal decisions and civilianization” its role is still dominant in actions are taken by civilian leaders. the system. The former, therefore, can be Facing growing pressure from civilians, regarded as (relatively) total/complete or the military is often in a dilemma substantial withdrawal whereas the latter is concerning whether to remain in office or limited or partial withdrawal return to the barracks. If the military Another expert, Talukder Maniruzzaman, decides to disengage from politics, “the defines military withdrawal from politics as: men on horseback” would re-civilianise the return of the intervening army to the government and concentrate on en- the military barracks, with the military hancing their professionalism.5 playing only an instrumental role, In distinguishing between “military with- leaving the civilian political leadership drawal or disengagement” and “de-interven- in an unfettered position to determine tion or civilianization,” Danopoulos says political goals and make all “decisions that : of decisive consequence” for the state. Withdrawal or disengagement can be Under this model, the army does have defined as the substitution of praeto- influence on decisions affecting de- rian policies and personnel with those fense and foreign policies of the state, advocated by the recognized civilian but in this respect the military performs authorities. De-intervention or civilia- only staff functions. It provides expert nization on the other hand, refers to advice but does not challenge the limited or partial disengagement and authority of the civilian political denotes a situation in which the military coopts and/or forms coalitions 6 Danopoulos, quoted by Suvarnajata Supaluck, The with a selected number of civilians Thai Military Coup D’Etat: Origins, Withdrawal/ Civilian Control, and Perspectives, Ph.D. Thesis (Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI Dissertation Service, 1995), p. 4 S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the 157. For Danoupoulus’ prominent work, see Military in Politics, Second, enlarged edition Constantine P. Danoupoulus, “Civilian Supremacy in (Ringwood: Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 173-174. Changing Society: Comparative Prespectives,” in 5 Ibid., pp. 179-186. Regarding the dilemmas faced by Constantine P. Danoupoulus (ed.), Civilian Rule in the military, see also Christopher Clapham and George Developing World: Democracy on the March? Philip (eds.), The Political Dilemmas of Military (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, Regimes (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985). 1992).

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leadership even if the decision of the ruling class use the military as a power base civilian authorities is contrary to the in governing the people.9 advice submitted by the military.7 Military withdrawal from politics is not Maniruzzaman’s concept of military always final. The military may wish to withdrawal is therefore not so different to regain power for one reason or another. that of Danopoulos’ “military withdrawal or Because of this, in the study of military disengagement” and Finer’s “return to the politics, there are also the terms of “short- barracks.” They insist that even though the term withdrawal” and “long-term with- military retreats from politics, they still have drawal.”10 an influence and a role in political life. This Nordlinger argues that there are three influence, however, is minor, and the role is factors behind military withdrawal from instrumental, and as a consequence the politics. Firstly, extensive civilian opposi- military is under the shadow of civilian tion to the military regime. The opposition leadership. can take the form of civilian pressures such In the search for an operational defini- as demonstrations, strikes, and riots. In tion, Maniruzzaman further claims that to world history, this type of opposition has determine whether there is military with- succeeded in forcing the military to drawal one question can be raised: “Who is surrender power to civilian government. the final decision-maker in all critical and Sudan in 1964, Thailand in 197311 and 1992, substantive issues confronting the state, and and South Korea in the early 1990s are with whose support does the decision-maker prominent examples. Secondly, the over- exercise ultimate power?”8 This is because throw of military government by dissident many juntas cleverly camouflage the nature officers (coup d’etat) followed by the of their regime. They have often “civilia- handing over of power to civilian politi- nised” the regime by running general elec- cians. This occurred in Argentine in 1955, tions to acquire political legitimacy from the people (Mobutu in Zaire, Kerekon in Benin, 9 Ibid. Eyadema in Togo), conducting “plebiscites” 10 See ibid., p. 17 - 27, and Suvarnajata Supaluck, op. and securing a large majority of votes for cit., p. 170. Supaluck suggests that to achieve a long- themselves (Nasser in Egypt, Pinochet in term withdrawal or to maintain civilian control over Chile), or installing civilian figures “in the military, civilian leadership must look after military interests by providing attention to military power” (civilian president in Bangladesh in budgets, financial support, and respect for their advice 1975-6 and 1983-4). This kind of “civiliani- and hopes. This, however, is not sufficient, “political sation,” however, cannot be categorised as institutions of the country, including the political skills (total/substantial) military withdrawal since of politicians, must be continuously developed,” he the true ruler is still the military or the adds (Supaluck, op. cit., pp. 165-166). On this matter, he quotes India as a case in point in that the military can be effectively controlled by civilians “simply 7 Talukder Maniruzzaman, Military Withdrawal From because of the political skills of its politicians and the Politics: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, Massa- arts of administration” (ibid., p. 166). chustts: Balinger Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 19- 11 Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military 20. Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, New 8 Ibid., p. 20. Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 139.

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Columbia in 1957, and Venezuela in 1958. tion to the military establishment or military The main motive of the military in restoring rule. This opposition may be as a reaction to civilian rule is to eliminate destabilising the oppressive nature of the military regime countercoups. Another motive is to maintain or to the failure of the army in fulfilling its the unity of the military corps.12 Thirdly, promise to solve economic or political voluntary disengagement, brought about by crises. The opposition can also be as a result unexpected difficulties the military faces as of successful efforts in economic develop- politicians, a willingness to promote demo- ment, thus creating critical groups such as cracy, and/or the desire to create and the middle class and the working class. maintain military reputation and professio- Sundhaussen argues that “new middle nalism.13 classes and a new industrial proletariat will In his study on military withdrawal in seek more participation, or even demand the developing worlds between 1945-1984, right to govern.”16 Thirdly, are factors Talukder Maniruzzaman found that, firstly, exogenous to the state. In this case, foreign 36 percent of military withdrawal took place pressure, intervention, and even invasion “through planned elections held under the can stimulate or force the military to hand auspices of the outgoing military regimes.”14 power to civilians.17 Secondly, 27 percent of the withdrawals Sundhaussen’s categorisation thus super- were because the military rulers abruptly or sedes that of Nordlinger and Maniruzzaman. suddenly decided to hand power to civilians. Nordlinger’s second and third factors (mili- Thirdly, foreign intervention or invasion tary coups and voluntarily withdrawal) and caused 12 percent of withdrawals. Fourthly, Maniruzzaman’s first and second factors 18 percent and 7 percent of such disengage- (election under the auspices of the military ments were due to social revolution and and sudden military decision to withdraw) mass uprising respectively.15 can be included amongst the endogenous Meanwhile, Ulf Sundhaussen proposes factors. Nordlinger’s first factor (extensive three factors contributing to military with- civilian opposition) and Maniruzzaman’s drawal. First of all, the endogenous factor, fourth factor (social revolution and mass that is the willingness of the military to withdraw. This can happen peacefully (vo- 16 luntarily withdrawal) or through internal Ulf Sundhaussen, “Military Withdrawal from Government Responsibility,” Armed Forces & Society, military conflict (inner contraction) and Vol. 10, No. 4, Summer 1984, p. 548. even through coups and counter coups (after 17 See ibid, pp. 545-554; Ulf Sundhaussen, “The staging a coup the military may return Durability of Military Regimes in South-East Asia,” in power to civilians). Secondly, are factors Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch (eds.), exogenous to the military, namely, opposi- Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia (Singapore, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 272; Ulf Sundhaussen, “The Inner 12 Ibid., pp. 140-141. Contraction of the Soeharto Regime: a starting point 13 Ibid., pp. 141-147. for a withdrawal to the barracks,” in David Bourchier 14 Talukder Maniruzzaman, Military Withdrawal from and John Legge (eds), Democracy in Indonesia 1950s Politics, op. cit., p. 206. and 1990s (Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian 15 Ibid, pp. 22-23, 206. Studies, Monash University, 1994), pp. 272-284.

17 Jurnal Sosial-Politika No. 2 uprising) are factors exogenous to the mili- vernment under military control is iden- tary. Meanwhile, Maniruzaaman’s third fac- tical with authoritarianism, the abuse of tor (foreign intervention or invasion) is in- power, human rights violation, and anti- cluded amongst factors exogenous to the 21 18 democracy. This is because the military state. monopolises arms22 and most military In a praetorian state, one main purpose of regimes “definitely rule by force and the movement to minimise military power is 23 to promote democracy. A declining military violence.” Because of the frequent use role, however, is not identical with demo- of violence, violence itself even has cratisation, and the existence of civilian become a tool of military’s “legitimacy” control does not necessarily mean democra- to rule the country. By minimising mili- cy. In Singapore, Malaysia, and in commu- tary power the possibility of using force nist countries such as Vietnam, China, and will be reduced. This certainly could the former Soviet Union, where civilian pave the way for greater opportunity of supremacy exists, the performance of demo- the people to express their opinions and cracy is not impressive. One could even call freedoms without much restriction or them authoritarian or totalitarian. surveillance from the military. Recent However, it is wrong to say that civi- military withdrawal in the rest of the lian supremacy means nothing in relation world supports this argument. After the to democratisation. Rather, “placing the military returned to the barracks the de- military under the authority of the elec- velopment of democratic political sys- ted [civilian] government is a key facili- tems in Thailand, South Korea, Argen- tating condition for democratic consoli- 19 tina, Brazil and so on has been notable. dation.” It is true that in some “civilian” countries democracy does not Dual Function : Doctrine, work, but democracy only works in a Implementation and Institutionalisation country which uphold the notion of The Indonesian military is unique due to civilian control, not in a country under a its doctrine called dwifungsi (dual function). military regime.20 Conversely, the go- The origins of dual function doctrine came from Nasution’s Middle Way speech on 12 November 1958. He said that: 18 There is actually an alternative theory or explanation known as the capitalist development approach, however I am unable to present due to limited space. control is implemented.” See Eric A. Nordlinger, op. 19 J.S. Valenzuela, quoted by Young-Chul Paik, cit., p. 8. “Political Reform and Democratic Consolidation in 21 In relation to this, Nordlinger says that “All military Korea,” in Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 4, regimes are authoritarian in that they eliminate or Winter 1994, p. 736. extensively limit political rights, liberties, and 20 In Nordlinger’s words, “The values of political competition, at least until the officers are getting ready equality, liberty, freedom of opposition, and to return to the barracks.” See ibid., p. 25. constitutionalism are thought to be realizable only 22 S.E. Finer, op. cit., p. 5. where civilian supremacy is respected and civilian 23 Suvarnajata Supaluck, op. cit., p. 31.

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We do not and will not copy the situ- would eschew violence to prevent discrimi- ation as it exists in several Latin Ame- nation against its officers.”28 rican states, where the military acts as There were two main purposes of a direct political force; nor will we Nasution’s speech. Firstly, he wanted to jus- emulate the Western European model, tify the increasing military intervention in where armies are the dead tool [of non-military sectors since the enactment of government].24 martial law in 1957. Secondly, he wanted to Rather, he argued, the military was “one of clarify the military position in the National the forces of the people’s struggle which Council.29 In regard to the latter, it was was at the same level and which fought because the National Council “did not shoulder to shoulder with other forces, such specifically include the army as one of the as parties.”25 The armed forces themselves functional groups.”30 Rather, they were would stand between those two extremes, included as “ex-officio Presidential appo- neither politically active nor apathetic. Due intees in the same category as appointed to its contribution in the struggle for inde- cabinet ministers in the Council.”31 If the pendence, the military, he claimed, “had the military was recognised as a functional right to participate in the decision-making group, their presence in political institutions processes determining the destiny of the would have a legal basis and it could be country.”26 To exercise this right, the armed used as a stepping stone for entering other forces “must have a place in all the insti- political institutions. tutions of the state, not just in the National In November 1958 the Parliament and Council and the cabinet…but also in the Cabinet finally accepted the military as a National Planning Council, the diplomatic functional group. The main reason for this corps, parliament, and elsewhere in the “major concession from political parties,”32 government.”27 Should this right not be was because the politicians were worried respected by politicians, Nasution warned, that the military would stage coups as was “it could not be guaranteed that the army 28 Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959 (Ithaca 24 This speech was published in Pos Indonesia, 13 and London: Modern Indonesian Project, Cornell November 1958. See Ulf Sundhaussen, “The Military: University, 1966), p. 192. Structure, Procedures, and Effects on Indonesian 29 Ibid., p. 193. Society,” in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye, 30 Yong Mun Cheong, “The Indonesian Army and Political Power and Communications in Indonesia Functional Groups, 1957-1959,” Journal of Southeast (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of Asian Studies, Vol. VII, No. 1, March 1976, p. 96. California Press, 1978), p. 47. 31 Ibid., p. 96. The National Council recognised just 25 David Jenkins, “The Evolution of Indonesian Army ten functional groups, that is, workers, youths, farmers Doctrinal Thinking: The Concept of Dwifungsi,” in and peasants, co-operatives, intellectuals, journalists, Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, Vol. 11, religious leaders, women, veterans, and naturalised No. 2, 1983, p. 20. citizens. For Nasution’s thinking of the military as a 26 Ulf Sundhaussen, “The Military: Structure, functional group, see Herbert Feith and Lance Castle, Procedures, and Effects on Indonesian Society,” loc. Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965 (Ithaca and cit. London: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 428-431. 27 David Jenkins, loc. cit. 32 Young Mun Cheong, op. cit., p. 65.

19 Jurnal Sosial-Politika No. 2 the cases in many developing countries in paralleling every level of civilian bureau- this era, such as in Burma, Thailand, Pakis- cracy. Because of such a structure many tan, and Sudan.33 experts, such as Harold Crouch,36 argued Nasution’s next manoeuvre was to that the position of the military command is launch the idea of returning to the 1945 no less than a shadow government at every Constitution, giving as a reason that the level of government. The structure along parliamentary system under liberal democra- with military-dominated bureaucracy not cy created instability, disunity, and econo- only provided the military with a formidable mic stagnation. However, this move can also capacity to control civilian bureaucracy and be seen as “a part of Nasution’s strategy of direct the result of, for instance, elections, giving the military a legitimate socio-poli- but also provided opportunities to spy and tical position in the country.”34 By the return control people’s political activities in any to the 1945 Constitution, which guarantees region. the existence of functional groups in the Secondly, through the military’s “partici- MPR, the military — if it continued to be pation” in political institutions. In the early accepted as a functional group — would 1980s, 20,000 military officers37 occupied have a more secure position. civilian positions in the executive, MPR (the In April 1965, the army held a seminar, highest institution in Indonesia), DPR (par- where it formally adopted the doctrine of liament), BPK (Supreme Audit Board), DPA dwifungsi, according to which the army (Advisory Council), and MA (Supreme claimed that it had a dual role or function, Courts). In recent times, the number of namely as a military force and as a socio- military ministers decreased. Their number political force. As a military force, the army heading departments and non-departments is responsible for defence and security, as well as a state secretary declined from13 whereas as a socio-political force the in 1981 to 8 in 1988. In the1993-1998 activities of the military cover ideological, Cabinet their number levelled off, 38 and political, economic, socio-cultural, and spi- decreased significantly in the Habibie’s ritual and religious fields.35 Cabinet. Even though this figure shows a Dwifungsi has been implemented in four downward trend, strategic posts such as the main ways. Firstly, through the restructure Department of Defence and Security (which of territorial management. To do so, the could control the Department of Foreign military re-designed its territorial manage- Affairs), Home Affairs, Coordinating Minis- ment, establishing territorial commands ter (responsible for “coordinating” many

33 Ibid. 36Forum Keadilan, 23 October 1995. 34 Salim Said., Genesis of Power: General Sudirman 37 Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 May 1995. and the Indonesian Military in Politics 1945-1949 38 See Ben Anderson, “Current Data on the Indonesian (Singapore: Instiitute of Southeast Asian Studies, Military Elite,” especially The Fifth Development 1991), p. 136. Cabinet, Indonesia, No. 45, April 1988, pp. 161-162; 35 Nugroho Notosusanto, The National Struggle and and The Editors, “The Sixth Development Cabinet the Armed Forces in Indonesia (Jakarta: Department Announced March 17, 1993,” Indonesia, No. 55, of Defence and Security, 1975), pp. 70-71. April 1993, pp. 167-176.

20 Januari 1998 departments) were still dominated by the feared agency of the regime,”41 is also in- military. cluded. Through these mechanisms the mili- Thirdly, through its “presence” in the tary not only had power to interfere with the political arena. In the New Order era, appointment of the leaders of political besides being in Parliament, the most ob- parties and mass organisations and to screen vious example of military penetration of the the campaign topics, but also to interfere in political arena is their presence in the go- worker disputes and to arrest labour leaders, vernment party, Golkar (Functional Group). dissidents, NGO activists, and even intellec- Golkar consists of three elements, that is, tuals and former generals. the armed forces, civil servants, and civilian Fourthly, through its involvement in eco- politicians/activists. As for the military posi- nomic activities. Military economic or tion, Sudomo (former Chief of Kopkamtib) business activities existed before the birth of asserted that “ABRI [the armed forces] was dwifungsi; the creation of dwifungsi can absolutely Golkar and a key member of the even be regarded as justifying such activi- Big Golkar Family.”39 ties. One main reason for this is because the To control the political arena the Soe- weak and ineffective government during the harto government also created mechanisms early 1950s failed to allocate sufficient to justify military intervention. The exis- budget for the military’s operations, basic tence of the worker-employer relations code, needs, and amenities of its personnel “to the law on political parties and Golkar, the enable members of the armed forces to live anti-subversion law, the (political) criminal in a style to which they felt entitled.”42 The code, and other repressive laws were part of military claimed that such business activities the mechanism. The establishment of Kop- were a part of its role as a stabiliser, kamtib,40 “the most oppressive and most especially to prevent social jealousy among military personnel and therefore to prevent military rebellion. With the creation of 39 An Asia Watch Report, Human Rights in Indonesia dwifungsi in 1958, the military has a and East Timor (USA: The Asia Watch Committee, 1989), p. 34. legitimate tool to “participate” and spread 40 As the criticism of this extra constitutional its activities in business, not only in the big institution was so strong, in 1988 the government state enterprises but also in petty companies. attempted to “humanise” this body by replacing it with Bakorstanas (Coordinating Board for Assisting in the Consolidation of National Stability) whose permanent Indonesian State,” in Arief Budiman, (ed.), State and members consisted of the Coordinating Ministers’ Civil Society in Indonesia (Clayton: Centre of Secretaries, representatives from ABRI Headquarters, Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994), the Army, Navy, Air Forces, National Police, Attorney pp. 220-221; and Richard Tanter, “After Kopkamtib: General’s offices, and the intelligence service. Indonesia’s Intelligence and Security Apparatus,” Although the authority of the new body was reduced, Inside Indonesia, No, 18, April 1989, pp. 4-6. Bakorstanas (or Bakorstanasda at regional level) is 41 Ulf Sundhaussen, “The Military: Structure, still frightening as it still “has a right” to undermine Procedures, and Effects on Indonesian Society,” op. worker strikes, screen political candidates, arrest cit., p. 64. activists, interrogate dissidents, and so on. See ibid., 42 Harold Crouch, “Generals and Business in pp. 44-48; Richard Tanter, “The Totalitarian Indonesia,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 4, Winter Ambition: Intelligence Organisations in the 1975-76, p. 520.

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With the establishment of the New succeeded, generally their business ex- Order, the military role in business ex- panded during the oil boom. panded rapidly because most of high Since the dismissal of Ibnu Sutowo in ranking military officers became members 1976, the business of the military had of the ruling group which commanded declined significantly, especially when in “almost unlimited access to expanding fi- the mid 1980s the oil prices collapsed nan-ial resources in the economy.”43 They drastically, followed by rationalisation of were assigned to supply a constant flow of the Indonesian economy. The Economist funds to the army and were allowed “to reap reported that: off part of the proceeds as a reward for their The generals are losing their hold on efforts, provided they did not take ‘too Indonesian business. The armed forces’ much’.”44 The most important source of business empires are being ratio- funds was Pertamina. nalised, their string of corporations The military also established business brought to heel, and retired officers’ empires by forming fund raising bodies, sinecures are being turned into real either in the form of military-owned fund jobs under civilian managers.46 raisers, such as enterprises, cooperatives, or The trend of Chinese businessmen to yayasan (foundations) or in the form of joint eschew military business partners was also ventures with Chinese businessmen and fo- responsible for such a decline.47 This appa- reign investors.45 Even though not all rently related to government policy in the military economic activities/enterprises post oil boom period, namely to encourage the expansion of the private sector to replace 43 Jon Ormur Halldorson, State, Class and Regime in dependence of the economy on oil produc- Indonesia: Structural Impediments to Democratisa- tion. In this new environment, the rigid, in- tion, Ph.D. Thesis (Canterbury: University of Kent, capable, and conservative nature of military 1991), p. 181. 44 management was regarded as hampering Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, ambitious business expansion. op. cit., p. 275. 45 Inkopad, Inkopal, Inkopau, and Inkopak are Finally, the opening of diplomatic rela- examples of co-operatives established by the Army, tions with China in 1989/1990 and the the Navy, the Air Force, and the Police Force opening up of East Timor in early 1989 had respectively. The Army headquarters had PT. Tri implications as well. As a result of direct Usaha Bakti under Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi (YKEP) and Kostrad had Yayasan Dharma Putra. trade relations with the communist China, Meanwhile, local commands had PT. Propelat the businessmen no longer needed to con- (Bandung), Bank Brawijaya (Surabaya), Bank Bukit tact, and therefore to pay tribute, to the Barisan (Medan), and so on. In joint venture Ministry of Defence. The monopoly of mili- enterprises, the military had shares in PT. Berdikari, Bank Dharma Ekonomi, Bank Windu Kencana, Hotel Borobudur, Hotel Kartika Plaza, and so on. See 46 The Economist, 8 October 1988. Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital 47 Yuri Sato, “The Development of Business Groups in (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 250-268; Harold Indonesia 1967-1989,” in Takashi Shiraishi (ed.), Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, op. cit., Approaching Soeharto’s Indonesia from the Margins pp. 273-303; Editor, 19 September 1992; Forum (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. Keadilan, 28 August and 25 September 1995. 132.

22 Januari 1998 tary-owned business enterprises in East In short, although military business has Timor, such as in the coffee trade, had been declined compared to the Ibnu Sutowo era, undermined by the new comers.48 it is still significant in maintaining the finan- The decline of military business, and cial resources of the military. Meanwhile, therefore profits, forced the military to re- the military’s commitment in economic acti- structure its enterprises. Deregulation, ma- vities remains high. nagerial reform, and so on were conducted As dwifungsi is a tool of legitimacy of to optimise the performance of its business. military “participation” in non-military sec- These attempts certainly succeeded; their tors, the military is very concerned to pre- results have appeared in the early 1990s.49 serve this doctrine. The statement that This success caused the army to encourage dwifungsi will be adjusted depending on the its officers to increase their managerial situation does not mean that dwifungsi will skills by employing military officers in the disappear. Conversely, the military claims Department of Finance, taking short that dwifungsi is permanent. To realise this courses, or obtaining MBA degrees. 50 claim the military has institutionalised the doctrine in all aspects : in legislation,51 in education system (both civilian and military 48 Cf. The Economist, 8 October 1988 and see Herb education curriculum),52 and in development Feith, “East Timor: The Opening-up, the Crackdown 53 and the Possibility of a Durable Settlement,” in Harold programs (“ABRI Enters the Village”). Crouch and Hal Hill (eds.), Indonesia Assessment Dwifungsi is institutionalised by govern- 1992: Political Perspectives on the 1990s (Canberra: ANU, 1992). 49 In 1992, for example, military business rose when 51 Bilveer Singh, Dwifungsi ABRI, The Dual Function YKEP joined in the project of the Sudirman of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Origins, Centre Business District (SCBD) worth Rp 7,5 Actualization and Implications for Stability and trillion (US$ 3,7 billions). In the area of Development (Singapore: Singapore Institute of construction, the military joined with Tommy International Affairs, 1995), pp. 50-51. J.C.T. Winata and Sugianto Kusuma in establishing PT Simorangkir and B. Mang Reng Say, Around and Jakarta International Hotel and Development About The Indonesian Constitution of 1945 (Jakarta: (JIHD). YKEP with Tommy Soeharto’s Penerbit Djambatan, 1980), p. 24. For Law 20/1982 Humpuss Group remanaged Sempati Air, and today it see Article 26, 27, 28 and their elucidation; for Law has become the largest private airflight enterprise in 2/1988 see Article 6 and its elucidation. Indonesia. YKEP is also conducting a joint venture 52 See Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional (Lemhanas), with Mitsubishi to build a power station worth US$ Kewiraan Untuk Mahasiswa (Jakarta: PT. Gramedia, 500 million. In banking, YKEP ran Bank Artha Graha 1980, 1991; David Bourchier, “The 1950s in New (formerly Bank Propelat). In 1994, the assets of this Order Ideology and Politics,” in David Bourchier and bank were Rp 482 milliard (US$ 241 million) with an John Legge (eds.), op. cit, pp. 52-53; Charles Donald annual profit of Rp 4,6 milliard (US$ 2,3 million). The McFetridge, “Seskoad – Training the Elite,” bulk of YKEP’s profit comes from the military Indonesia, No. 36, October 1983, p. 95; David business in timber; in 1994, the military-owned timber Jenkins, Soeharto and His Generals: Indonesian company, PT. ITCI, which subordinates nine Military Politics 1975-1983 (Ithaca, New York: enterprises, earned a profit of Rp 200 milliard (US$ Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, Cornell 100 million). PT Timah is also reportedly more University, 1984), p. 264. efficient (healthy). See Forum Keadilan, 28 August 53 David E. Weatherbee, “Indonesia’s Armed Forces: 1995. Rejuvenation and Regeneration,” Southeast Asian 50 Editor, 19 September 1992. Affairs, 1982, p. 152.

23 Jurnal Sosial-Politika No. 2 ment discourse as well. Dwifungsi is called from political parties. The opposition grew an Indonesian culture and therefore it should significantly from the enactment of martial be preserved. In the meantime, with the con- law (1957) concomitant with the rise in cept of the family principle (kekeluargaan), military penetration of non-military posts. the government has claimed that all Indo- Even though the military was finally nesian citizens (civilian or military) have accepted as a functional group in 1958, the equal rights to participate in politics. The acceptance was qualified by significant most crucial development is the govern- opposition from political parties. ment’s attempts to make dwifungsi sacred In the era of Guided Democracy (1959- by linking it to Pancasila, especially Panca- 1965) opposition from political parties be- sila Democracy.54 It is said that dwifungsi is came stronger, as a reaction to the rapid a part of the implementation of Pancasila or expansion of military involvement in non- Pancasila Democracy.55 military fields. In this period, its doctrine was identified as a source of corruption, Discourse and Reform Agenda rising workers’ unemployment, and a barrier In Indonesian history, opposition to to civil servants’ careers. As the political military intervention in politics existed parties rejected the implementation of before the birth of dwifungsi doctrine in dwifungsi as well as its doctrine, opponents 1958. In the period of Liberal Democracy of the military demanded the reduction of (1950-1957), the military’s attempts to military intervention in non-military sectors intervene in politics (such as the 17 October and even the military’s return to the 1952 Affair)56 had raised strong opposition barracks.57 In the New Order era, the seed of oppo- 54 R. William Liddle, “Politics 1992-1993: Sixth Term sition to dwifungsi was sown very early, Adjustment in the Ruling Formula,” op. cit., p. 29. signalling an end to the political honeymoon 55 The New Order government often says that between the military and civilians. In April “Dwifungsi is an implementation of Pancasila or a part 1969, for example, one year after Soeharto of Pancasila Democracy” or “One characteristic of Pancasila Democracy is the existence of dwifungsi of took on full Presidential powers, Indonesian ABRI”. According to government, these statements students started to question military inter- are based on the fourth principle (sila) of Pancasila vention in non-military sectors, such as the (Five Principles); this fourth sila is said to adhere to bureaucracy, trade and industry, agriculture, the principle of familiness (kekeluargaan) and is 58 becoming the core of Pancasila Democracy (democra- husbandry, publishing, and so on. The cy based on consultation and consensus). It is argued students claimed that the military lacked the that in this type of democracy, all Indonesian citizens, including the military, are one family; they have equal positions and rights to participate in all aspects of 57 See A.H. Nasution, Kekaryaan ABRI (Djakarta: people’s life. Thus, the dwifungsi doctrine claiming Seruling Masa, 1971), p. 121-142; Nugroho Noto- that the military has rights to participate in all fields of susanto (ed.), Pejuang dan Prajurit, op. cit., pp. 328- state affairs is said to be the implementation of or part 329; and David Jenkins, “The Evolution of Indo- of (the fourth sila of) Pancasila or Pancasila nesian Army Doctrinal Thinking,” op. cit., pp. 15-23. Democracy. 58 Imam Yudotomo, ”Partner Bagi ABRI: Suatu 56 In this affair, the army attempted to force Soekarno Masalah,” Mahasiswa Indonesia, No. 147, Th. IV, to dissolve the existing Parliament. Minggu ke-I, April 1969.

24 Januari 1998 knowledge and ability to manage their non- was “totally anti-Golkar and antimilitary.”62 military tasks, and as a result, many enter- The second period, 1977-1980, coincided prises under military management became with the 1977-1978 student movement and bankrupt and were liquidated, the produc- President Soeharto’s speech in 1980 in tion of state farms declined sharply, the Pakanbaru (the Petition of 50). In this se- public administration was in disorder, the cond wave, the opposition groups, who were reputation of government officials degraded, either civilians or retired military officers, and democratic life was not developed but urged a significant reduction of military eroded.59 presence in civilian posts and in day-to-day Opposition to the military persisted political life, and the ending of corruption. throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. Waves Some radicals, moreover, demanded the of opposition emerged in three periods. The abolition of military doctrine.63 Thirdly, first period was 1973-1974, with opposition from 1987 onward was the period of the centring around the Malari Affair.60 In this resurrection of the student movement. Even period, dwifungsi was criticised and though this movement was not as strong as opposed by students, intellectual, and its two precursors (the 1973/74 and 1977/78 activists.61 Military business activities and student movements), students displayed a corruption were also the targets. Shortly be- strong anti-military intervention in politics. fore the climax of the affair (15 January In this period, Ali Sadikin, retired ABRI 1974), it was reported that the opposition (Admiral) officer and former governor of Jakarta, also made a statement that “the army’s dwifungsi (the doctrine and practice of military involvement in politics) must 64 59 Ibid. disappear.” 60 Malari (Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari, the 15 Although opposition to military interven- January Affair) was the first and biggest demonstration tion and dwifungsi doctrine, both from after 1966, which took place during the visit of the civilians and the military itself, existed over Japanese PM Tanaka. In this movement, students focused mainly on foreign capital, development strategy, the President’s special assistance (ASPRI), 62 David Jenkins, Soeharto and His Generals, op. cit., and the corruption of the top-ranking government p. 54. officials. In this affair, 11 people were killed, 800 63 The most comprehensive and systematic criticism – arrested, 100 buildings burnt down, and 800 cars – which used historical, constitutional, political, and destroyed. See Gary Hansen, “Indonesia 1974: A philosophical approaches –– demanding the abolition Momentous Year,” Asian Survey, Vol. XV., No. 5, of dwifungsi can be found in Sukmadji Indro February 1975, p. 149. Tjahjono, Indonesia di Bawah Sepatu Lars (Bandung: 61 One student, for example, argued that dwifungsi was Komite Pembelaan Mahasiswa ITB, 1979). Other “a primitive philosophy, as in the modern era we need documents criticising military doctrine include and rely upon specialisation.” See Yusuf Abdullah Lukman Hakim, Kudengar Indonesia Memanggil Puar, KAMI, 30 August 1973, in Sukmadji Indro (Jakarta: Badan Kerjasama Mahasiswa Indonesia, Tjahjono, op. cit., p. 119. Meanwhile, an intellectual 1980), and Ibrahim G. Zakir, Dari Jenggawah ke and NGO activist, Adnan Buyung Nasution, argued Siria-ria (Jakarta: Badan Kerjasama Mahasiswa that “the creation of dwifungsi was a fault, and Indonesia, 1980). therefore it must be finished.” Tempo, 15 December 64 Ali Sadikin’s interview, Inside Indonesia, October 1973. 1988, p. 4.

25 Jurnal Sosial-Politika No. 2 many years, formal debate over military should be reduced in phases.”66 The move of withdrawal occurred between 1977-1980. these academics was surprising as it had not As the debate was initiated by the military, happened before. The proposal was the debate was mainly between serving launched openly in a hearing with the DPR officers and retired generals, with little members and covered widely by the Indo- participation by civilians. In some cases nesian media. The Jakarta Post called the their opinion was ignored by the ruling initiative a controversial proposal.67 The generals. Only half of the debate was made academics’ daring behaviour in blatantly public, whereas the remainder was not questioning the military establishment in covered by the media.65 The debate over Indonesian politics has been described as military withdrawal from politics focused on breaking a long-standing taboo.68 During the three main issues. Firstly, the idea that isolation of members of the Petition of 50 ABRI must be above all groups in the for eleven years (1980-1991), no one had community; secondly, the need to reduce dared to openly question military interven- numbers of military men in political tion in politics. It is true that opposition had institutions; and finally, the issue of military emerged and grown since 1987, but it was withdrawal from involvement in the not given much coverage by the public political arena. media. The academics seemed to use the In the early 1990s Indonesian politics momentum of political openness to channel became more dynamic after receiving “fresh their concerns. blood” from the government’s discourse in The most interesting point with regard to 1989 on political openness. In these the proposal was its rationale, that is, the favourable circumstances, many issues have improvement of democracy. The academics been debated and many areas have become said that “a reduction in the number of the targets of criticism. Inevitably, the appointed DPR members would promote criticism and debate moved to a “restricted democracy in the political system.”69 area,” i.e. the role of the military establish- Miriam Budiardjo added that “if the number ment. of ABRI members in the DPR could be The debate in this period was triggered reduced in phases, it would represent by an event on 8 July 1992 when two ‘progress’ in the democratization process.”70 political scientists, Miriam Budiardjo and This is because, Arbi Sanit argued, “the Arbi Sanit, and a constitutional law acade- larger the number of appointed DPR mem- mic, Sri Soemantri, proposed a cut in bers, the less democratic the political military legislative seats. They said that the system.”71 The proposal for the reduction of “100 ABRI members in the legislative body numbers in phases meant that one day in the [DPR] was too many and that this number 66 The Jakarta Post, 9 July 1992 67 Ibid., 11 July 1992. 68 Ibid., 9 July 1992. 65 The debate which was not covered by the media was 69 Ibid., 10 July 1992 best captured by David Jenkins, Soeharto and His 70 Ibid., 9 July 1992. Generals, op. cit. 71 Ibid.

26 Januari 1998 future, military representatives in the DPR dwifungsi and the existence of military re- would disappear.72 Sanit implicitly proposed presentatives in the DPR.”78 the total abolition of DPR appointments in On this point, Arbi Sanit argued that “the 4-5 general elections (20-25 years time).73 large ABRI role in the DPR was relevant The political scientists’ proposal irritated only in the past when Indonesia was in a many sections of the military. The former state of political and social uncertainty.”79 governor of Jakarta and Vice Speaker of the Since the situation had returned to normal, MPR, Gen. (Ret.) Soeprapto, for example, the military must reduce its role in the rebutted the argument that the (ABRI) political system. He insisted that ABRI’s appointments reduced democracy. In con- presence in political institutions, especially trast, he argued that the ABRI faction in the in the MPR/DPR, had no constitutional DPR has played a significant role in the basis.80 “ABRI only had historical relations process of democratisation such as provi- with the people because its role in politics ding the momentum for political openness. began long ago. The Armed Forces could According to him, the existence of military use its influence without entering the representatives must be maintained. “It is system,”81 he continued. In this regard, Sri impossible to phase out ABRI members Soemantri stated that according to the from the DPR because it would mean with- Constitution, the MPR members consisted drawing them to the barracks.”74 of DPR members, regional representatives Another military representative, Adi Su- (Utusan Daerah) and functional groups trisno, also deplored such a proposal, asking (Utusan Golongan). In the Constitution, he “Are you sure democracy will grow better argued, it is clearly stated that functional without us being here? We always support groups refer to bodies such as cooperatives, democratization.”75 He also claimed that labour unions and other economic collective “the acceptance of dual function had been bodies. Therefore, Soemantri and Sanit strengthened by the armed forces’ sociolo- asserted that the military is not included in gical, legal and historical relations with the this category as functional groups refers to people.”76 He continued that “to question economic groups.82 They implied that the the existence of ABRI representation in the position of the military in the DPR was DPR meant negating history.”77 Roekmini more “vulnerable” than that of the MPR as from the ABRI faction also asserted that “it the DPR is the legislative body which was irrelevant and unrealistic to debate represents the people and the people’s day- to-day sovereignty, not such groups (golongan) as the military. Bintang Pamung-

72 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 73 Forum Keadilan, 30 March 1995. 79 The Jakarta Post, 10 July 1992. 74 The Jakarta Post and Angkatan Bersenjata, 10 July 80 Forum Keadilan, 6 August 1992. 1992. 81 The Jakarta Post, 10 July 1992. 75 The Jakarta Post, 9 July 1992. 82 For Sri Soemantri’s opinion see Kompas, 9 July 76 Ibid. 1992, and for Arbi Sanit’s analysis, see Forum 77 Media Indonesia, 10 July 1992. Keadilan, 6 August 1992.

27 Jurnal Sosial-Politika No. 2 kas added that the Constitution stipulates and intensive demands to abolish dual that the President is the Commander-in- function doctrine. Chief of the armed forces and the highest The issues raised in this reform era are executor of government, thus the military is not new; only scope of supports (wider under the control of the President either as a supports), means of protests (direct, made in head of government or a head of state. With public, and so daring),85 and their intensities this position, Bintang Pamungkas then distinguish recent demands to those of in the argued that military interest should be past. channelled through the President, not by From discussion above one can see that occupying the DPR. Thus, he continued, the many sections of Indonesian society pro- existence of the armed forces officers in the posed total reforms in the socio-political DPR contravene the Constitution.83 This is a role of the military in the form of total or view of the military as an arm of the state, substantial military withdrawal. This reform part of the government employee structure, agenda, interestingly, is not a monopoly of rather than as part of civil society. pro-reform and pro-democracy activists in Since Soeharto was forced to step down this Reform Order but has existed since the by students in May 1998 and Reform Order early times of the military intervention in was enacted, there emerged a rising demand non-military fields. on military withdrawal. Students, political scientists, activists, politicians, military Impediments pensioners, intellectuals and former political Although many sections of the commu- prisoners are no longer afraid to speak out nities are so concerned with military with- concerning total reforms on the socio- drawal, there are some constraints in the political role of the military. They do not efforts for reforms in the socio-political role only urge the military to withdraw from of the military. There are three main impe- political institutions and daily political life diments, that is, the existence of dwifungsi but also openly demand the abolition of the doctrine itself, the government’s discourse dual function doctrine.84 Recently, due to in defining Indonesian (political) culture, the shootings-to-death of students of Tri- sakti University and of students in Semanggi 85 For example, if Bintang Pamungkas Bridge as well as the abduction of pro- consistently and frequetly proposed the abolition democracy activists by Army Special Force of dwifungsi, Ismail Sunny said that “DPR stands (Kopassus), the armed forces kept silence for People’s Representative Assembly, meaning from popular condemnation and from wide that all of its members must be elected; thus if the armed forces continue to propose the appointment of seats in the DPR, this means the armed forces intend to disobey and break the 83 See Forum Keadilan, 30 March 1995. With this Constitution, and this must be stopped.” He opposition, the military then cut its seats in the Parliament from 100 to 75. continued “if the armed forces would like to 84 Kompas, 1 July 1998; Manuntung, 9 July 1998; maintain its seats in the DPR, change the Forum Keadilan, 13 July 1998; Kompas, 22, 23, 24 Constitution first.” RCTI’s panel discussion on Juli 1998. 27 July 1998 at 23.10 WIB.

28 Januari 1998 and the military’s desire to protect its eco- asserting that dwifungsi lasts forever, nomic interests.86 meaning that the right of the Indonesian The Indonesian military is rather unique army to “participate” in politics is perma- in its doctrine of dwifungsi, as is fully nent, not temporary. This is a serious matter, recognised by the army leaders. Judging as can be seen by the preparation made by from the experiences of other countries the military to realise it. One crucial step is where militaries voluntarily withdraw after that the Indonesian military has “trans- occupying national politics, it seems that planted” dwifungsi into the Indonesian without having a specific ideology to justify “body.” That is, dwifungsi has been incor- their long-term presence in politics military porated as a part of Pancasila Democracy, regimes do not usually last very long. The treated as Indonesian culture and said to be absence of this ideology has traditionally rooted in Indonesian history. Another pro- made them promise to restore civilian power minent factor, as mentioned above, is that (civilian control/supremacy) within a certain dwifungsi has been institutionalised in all time. For example, the army usually pro- aspects of people’s political life, either in mises to withdraw after it has restored order legislation, political institutions, the educa- or installed a trustworthy (uncorrupted) tion system, or government programs (e.g. civilian government. Thus, their involve- ABRI Enters the Village). As a conse- ment in politics is usually temporary. quence, the military (internal factor) feels In the Indonesian case, however, the that there are no reasons to withdraw to the dwifungsi doctrine fairly much eliminates barracks as the legislation “orders” them to these possibilities. Firstly, in its dwifungsi participate in politics to secure national inte- doctrine, the Indonesian military has a rests. This also puts the opposition groups legitimate tool to justify its intervention in (external factor) in a difficult position, at politics. This is because dwifungsi provides least in the near future, as dwifungsi or the the military equal rights to civilians in all military intervention has been justified by respects, including the right to intervene in much legislation88 and their struggle to un- politics. With these rights, the Indonesia’s dermine such a doctrine can be regarded as military politicians “feel no need to anti-Indonesian state ideology. Secondly, in apologize for their power or to promise that dwifungsi doctrine, the concept of civilian they will return it to democratically-elected supremacy is abolished or ignored. This civilians.”87 Such a notion has become more relates to the notion that the military has prominent as a result of the military rights equal to those of civilians. With these

86 There is actually another crucial factor, namely 88 As the Constitution does not recognise dwifungsi, structural impediments; owing to, again, limited space, this also creates the possibility for easy abolition of I am unable to discuss it in this chance however. dwifungsi in the future, depending on the political will 87 R. William Liddle, “Indonesia is Indonesia,” in of the future ruling elite. On this issue, Ben Anderson Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (eds.), The said that “dual function is not recognised in the 1945 Politics of Middle Class Indonesia (Clayton : Centre Constitution, therefore, if the armed forces would like of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, to maintain dual function, the Contitution should be 1990), p. 57. changed first.” Kompas, 20 July 1997.

29 Jurnal Sosial-Politika No. 2 rights, it is said that the position of the national culture. For, example, intellec- military and the civilians is equal; the tuals frequently complain that the military is not below the civilians, and the national culture is only defined by what civilians are not above the military. Thus, it is not; not theocratic but not secular, the military claim, there is neither civilian not liberal democratic but not supremacy nor military supremacy,89 albeit totalitarian, not capitalist but not in reality this political jargon is highly socialist....90 questionable. As a result, in view of the The adherence to this ideology paved the “equal” position, the military insists, there way for the government’s theory of cultural are no reasons to demand the establishment relativism,91 whereby it is said that Indone- of civilian control/supremacy. Given this sia has a right to solve its problems (e.g. notion, the intention to establish military human rights issues) with its own ways. It is withdrawal is regarded as irrelevant and also said that Indonesia does not need to unnecessary. adopt Western ideology, notions, and so on In short, the existence of dwifungsi has as Indonesia has a specific ideology or stymied external factors in the struggle for notion which is claimed to be rooted in its substantial military withdrawal. Dwifungsi cultural tradition and practices. This finally is also responsible for internal factors arrives at the point that the concept of “sleeping.” civilian supremacy or civilian control does In regard to the government’s discourse not fit with Indonesian culture but is in defining Indonesian (political) culture, regarded as a Western Liberal Democracy one should see the legacy of the New Order idea. Ironically, many politicians and aca- government –– which is still adhered –– in demics accept this notion without question. making Indonesian culture contrast with that Accordingly, there is little room for of Western countries. The Indonesian go- discussion on the establishment of total vernment claims that Indonesian political military withdrawal. Any efforts to establish culture is unique. It is said that Indonesia civilian control are regarded as trying to adheres to Pancasila Democracy which is Westernise Indonesia or destroy Indonesian neither Liberal Democracy nor Guided culture. As a result, the struggle of reform- Democracy, neither based on capitalism nor minded groups (external factor) is always communism, and so on. According to condemned. The military (internal factor), William Liddle, this discourse is called the on the other hand, stands firm with its government’s adherence to the ideology of in-betweenness: 90 ....incompleteness and inbetweenness In Todung Mulya Lubis, In Search of Human are still defining characteristics of the Rights: Legal-Political Dilemmas of Indonesia’s New Order, 1966-1990 (Jakarta: PT. Gramedia and SPES Foundation, 1993), p. 175. 89 The military have even claimed that there is no 91 Cf. Richard Robison, “Indonesia: Tension in State concept of “civil-military relations” in Indonesia. See and Regime,” in Richard Robison, Kevin Hewison and Ian MacFarling, The Dual Function of the Indonesian Gary Rodan (eds.), Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Armed Forces: Military Politics in Indonesia Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies, 1996), p. 166. (Sydney: Allen & Unmwin, 1993), p. 42.

30 Januari 1998 attitudes to counter any anti-opposition to the young military leaders are socialised dual function on the pretext of preserving with recent strong opposition to dwifungsi national culture. due to, inter alia, recent military involve- Another factor against military with- ment in the killings of students and abduc- drawal is the military’s desire to protect its tion of pro-democracy activists. This would economic interests through political power. force the future military leaders to re-think This is important for the military as its their doctrine. The more professional the budgets are insufficient to fulfill such military, there would emerge conscious-ness military needs as the need to build barracks. regarding contradiction between dwifungsi The study of Jon Halldorsson shows that the and professionalisation of the military, as military’s firm stance in relation to retaining Ulf Sundhaussen maintained: the status quo is a result of the military With professional specialisation be- interest of access to economic resources.92 coming increasingly time-consuming it becomes almost impossible to train a Conditions person in two professions, namely as a Such impediments made factors leading military expert as well as an expert in to military withdrawal impotent. However, non-military fields. But much more this is not the end of the world. Rather, important are the difficulties expe- certain conditions do not exist yet in rienced by professional soldiers, socia- Indonesia to optimise the “performance” of lised into giving and obeying orders, such factors. Thus, to “tame” dual function, when their next assignment places government cultural relativist discourse, and them in a political position requiring military economic interests, or to make the them to argue and persuade.93 internal and external factors perform best, So far, this condition does not yet exist. certain conditions are needed. In fact, the current young military genera- The first condition is the emergence of tion is still controlled, if not dictated to, by young independent military leaders. As long the military generation who still have old as the old and transitional generation still values and historical claims to intervene in exist or control the young military genera- politics. Their views on the future role of tion, substantial change will be unlikely to the military are still unclear. As Harold happen. Change can only be hoped for Crouch noted, “there is no indication that when the young military generation takes younger officers are inclined to abandon the over power, and especially when they can military’s political role but there appears to act and think independently. There are two be no clearcut consensus on what precisely hopes here. First of all, the young inde- that (political role) should be.”94 Crouch’s pendent military leaders do not have his- argument brings up two possibilities. One torical claims to "participate" in politics. Without such claims they do not have legitimation to intervene politics. Secondly, 93 Ulf Sundhaussen, “The Inner Contraction of the Soeharto Regime,” op. cit., pp. 277-278. 94 Harold Crouch, “Military-Civilian Relations in 92 Jon Ormur Halldorson, Ph.D Thesis, op. cit. Indonesia in the Late Soeharto Era,” op. cit., p. 97.

31 Jurnal Sosial-Politika No. 2 possibility is that the younger generation the unemployed. The earnings of politicians, will continue the status quo. This is not on the other hand, are relatively high. This impossible, as they are indoctrinated with situation makes them concerned to advance dwifungsi in military training school. On the their own economic interests rather than to other hand, there is also the possibility of advance abstract ideals. But they alone change as the behaviour of human beings cannot be blamed as the New Order regime (the military) cannot be guessed. also contributes to this situation; the military The achievement of substantial with- under Soeharto regime has played a drawal also depends on the civilian situa- significant role in blocking the emergence of tion. What is needed here is the existence of strong civilian politicians, as they can rival “high calibre” civilian politicians or leaders the military. to provide a viable governmental alternative It is true that the establishment of multi to the regime. This involves not only their party system in the Reform Order has capabilities, political maturity, broadmin- provided chances for the emergence of dedness, and solidity among civilians but strong civilian politicians. To arrive at such also their attitudes which always “respect a calibre, however, it needs time. the individual, corporate and ideological Another condition needed is a significant interests of officers.”95 If the civilian increase in the military budget, especially an politicians show that they are capable, increase in salaries, social security, and respect military interests, and can convince amenities for military officers. This is the military that they will preserve and because most Indonesian soldiers are under- maintain Pancasila, political stability, eco- paid. In many civilian rules, of course with a nomic growth, and so on, the armed forces few exceptions, one way to keep the military will be more inclined to compromise. in the barracks is to increase the salaries or The civilian situation is so far unclear. standard of living of military officers. Hopes for the emergence of high calibre Meanwhile, as Huntington has suggested, civilian politicians or leaders are still far the increase in military budget should also from reality. One explanation is that they are be directed towards the enhancement of its not yet politically mature. Selfishness and capabilities in defence matter. For example, opportunism have characterised Indonesian the government should allocate a sufficient politicians causing them to pursue narrow budget for regular military war exercises, or interests. One main reason for this is that the purchase of new military “toys,” such as most Indonesian politicians come from new and fancy tanks, aircrafts, armoured lower-middle class families or they do not cars, sophisticated electronic equipment, have sufficient financial resources to new computerised systems, and so on.96 support their families if they are not elected These efforts would have a significant as the MPR members or national/local MPs. impact. With sufficient military budget for This is significant as the state does not pay its operation in defence matters and the

95 Ulf Sundhaussen, “The Inner Contraction of the 96 Huntington, The Third Wave Democratisation in the Soeharto Regime,” op. cit., p. 281. Late Twentieth Century, op. cit., pp. 251-253.

32 Januari 1998 existence of new “toys,” the military per- “divorce” of the armed forces faction from sonnel would be busy and happy so that Golkar is regarded as having great impli- most of their time would be spent doing cations since their formal political arm their jobs and mastering such “toys.” Along would be cut off. Nevertheless, the firms with their satisfaction in salaries and social stance of the military to maintain its seats in security, there would be relatively no strong the Parliament in the 1998 MPR Special reason to be involved in business. This in Session –– which is now being attempted to turn could make the military more commit- justify in the election and MPR/DPR ted to the ethic of professionalism. membership laws –– as well as the absence So far the state budget is insufficient to of military's formal response to the deadline cover military operations and the life of its set by Ciganjur Group to withdraw from the officers, so that the military as an institution Parliament98, even though mass demon- and the officers as individuals remain stration, uncompromised students' demands strongly committed to economic activities. and bloodshed occurred, are efforts to pre- An increase in the military budget, however, serve its other political arms. would not necessarily mean the military Secondly, wide supports for separation leave their activities in business. Rather, it agenda of the Police Force from the armed could create the conditions for waning its forces. This issue is prominent as the sepa- involvement in such activities. ration means the police force would regain its “grabbed” tasks and autonomy in up- Epilogue holding civil order. With significant auto- Based on the above “requirements” nomy, the police force could develop its needed for military withdrawal, the fate of professionalism as a civil force as was the total or substantial military withdrawal pro- case of police forces in many democratic posed by many sections of the communi-ties countries. Meanwhile, the separation would appear rather blurred. Conditions needed for leave the military responsible only for such withdrawal do not yet exist. defence matters. This means, as a supporter One may argue, however, recent situa- of this separation, Gen. (Ret.) Kunarto, tions provide entry points. Firstly, Golkar’s agenda on the abolishment of three factions in its body, that is, the armed forces (ABRI), 97 ments as recently, is significant. Will this be bureaucracy, and Golkar politi-cians. The trully changed in the Reform Order? 98 Ciganjur Group, consisting of Abdurrachman Wahid, Megawati Soekarnoputri, Amien Rais, 97 The intention of Golkar leaders to still and Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, declared the maintain its "historical links" to the armed forces deadline of six years for the miltary to withdraw even though the armed forces insisted that they from the Parliament. Students were however would keep distance to all political parties, raises disappointed with this declaration as they questions on reforms in Golkar. The fact that the demanded the group to propose the abolishment armed forces always took sides with Golkar in of military seats in the Parliament and dwifungsi any elections under New Order regime, even doctrine at that time, when the MPR Special though the armed force issued the same state- Session took place in November 1998.

33 Jurnal Sosial-Politika No. 2 pointed out, “the military must return to the who enter politics would still regard barracks.”99 themselves or are regarded as part of the This agenda is, however, should be armed forces, and therefore are of opinion thoroughly observed as the armed forces that they would or should represent, plan to "transfer" the police force from channel, or be concerned with the armed under ABRI's command to under the Depart- forces’ aspirations and interests. Secondly, ment of Defence and Security's command in Pepabri under Soeharto government was April 1999. This transfer is said to be used as an instrument to control and channel transitional, but when, how and where the retired military officers into the occupation police force would be brought afterward is of civilian posts (retired officers who not clear yet. occupy civilian posts should come from or Thus, military withdrawal from political join Pepabri). It is true that in the Reform institutions, particularly from the Parliament Order many retired generals are now –– a symbol of democracy –– and the forming or joining political parties outside separation of the police force from the Golkar and they seem to disobey "Pepabri armed forces are two crucial issues in the rules," yet without official reforms on Reform Order. Another critical issue is that serving-retired military officers relations, the serving-retired military officers rela- the old practices would continue to exist –– tions. This is because the abolishment of in different forms. three factions in Golkar does not necessarily There are actually many other issues mean the armed forces would terminate its concerning substantial or total military with- previous role. The still-presence of retired drawal as discussed earlier, but those three – military officers associated with Pepabri – withdrawal from parliament, police force (Association of ABRI Retired Officers) in separation and serving-retired military Golkar, political institutions and bureau- officers relations –– are the most crucial and cracy is a case in point as Pepabri belongs to strategic ones as they function as driving the Big ABRI Family. The problem is, forces for total military withdrawal process. firstly, the military has a notion “sekali Reforms in these fields are therefore a mini- prajurit tetap prajurit”100 (once a soldier mum step or agenda that should be carried always a soldier), regardless of retirement. out to establish such withdrawal. Consequently, pensioners regard themselves In sum, efforts to establish civilian con- or are regarded as “the men on horseback” trol of politics or civilian supremacy in or at least as part of ABRI (the Big ABRI modern Indonesia are complex. They need Family). Thus, in contrast to many other time and involve many issues. The roles of democratic countries where pensioners who pro-reform and pro-democracy groups are enter politics leave aside their attributes as thus imperative since they are the most military men/women and become common dynamic factors in this regard –– these people, Indonesian retired military officers groups can “play” at both grassroot and elite levels.

99 Forum Keadilan, 13 July 1998. 100 Tempo, 25 May 1991.