Januari 1999 13 Military Withdrawal from Politics: Discourse and Reform Agenda By : I Ketut Gunawan* Abstrak Di jaman Orde Baru, intervensi militer dalam urusan-urusan non-militer sangat intensif dan ekstensif. Bagi kehidupan demokrasi, costs yang ditanggung jauh melebihi benefits yang diperoleh. Karenanya, tuntutan penarikan intervensi militer dalam bidang non-militer semakin lama semakin kuat dan memuncak belakangan ini. Di tengah-tengah besarnya gelombang tuntutan reformasi total atas format politik Indonesia di Orde Reformasi ini, respons pemerintah terhadap tuntutan reformasi sistem dan kelembagaan sipil cukup “akomodatif” walaupun upaya-upaya mempertahankan pola rezim lama masih terlihat kuat. Di sisi lain, tuntutan reformasi atas posisi dan peran militer dalam bentuk penarikan intervensi militer dalam politik disikapi dengan resistensi berbau romantisme sejarah. Tulisan ini berusaha menelusuri agenda reformasi peran sosial-politik militer melalui telaah diskursus penarikan intervensi militer dalam politik. Dalam “membawa” diskursus ke agenda praksis, kendala yang ditemui tidak sedikit. Namun demikian, kejadian-kejadian dramatis setelah Orde Reformasi ditegakkan, seperti penghapusan tiga jalur dalam Golkar (ABRI, Birokrasi, Golkar) serta tuntutan luas pemisahan Korps Polisi dari ABRI, telah memberi entry points dan dukungan luas ke arah itu. Tapi jalan yang mesti dilalui masih panjang dan berliku. Pada titik inilah concern dan peran reformis dan kelompok pro-demokrasi menjadi imperatif. he Indonesian armed forces has been The pervasive role of the military in playing a significant role in Indone- Indonesian political life is justified espe- Tsian politics since at least 1957 when cially by dwifungsi doctrine, the doctrine the martial law was enacted. For many years that the military has a dual or twin function, after Soeharto assumed power in 1966, the that is, as a military force and a socio- army intervened in all aspects of people’s political force. As William Liddle observed, political life; it “dominated the country’s dwifungsi has been government almost completely ... decisively used to justify: appointment of large overshadowing and controlling –– if not in a numbers of military officers to Par- functional sense subsuming –– all others.”1 liament, the MPR, and regional legis- lature; the placement of first serving, * Graduated from the Department of Politics, Monash then retired officers in controlling University, Melbourne, Australia; lecturer at the Fa- positions in Golkar; military supervi- culty of Social and Political Sciences, Mulawarman University, Samarinda. 1 George McT. Kahin, “Foreward,” in Harold Crouch, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Revised Edition p. 9. 13 Jurnal Sosial-Politika No. 2 sion of the internal workings of other In this reform era, proposed reforms in parties and of the general elections; political parties, election system, restruc- military intelligence surveillance of the ture of Parliament have been paid serious press, legitimated through a doctrine of attention. Reform agenda in the socio- a ‘free and responsible’ press; and the political role of the military, however, is appointment of many officers to cabi- still unclear whereas such a reform would net and sub-cabinet positions.2 be a cornerstone of the success of total Prior to the resignation of Soeharto, it reforms in Indonesian political format as has become common to see the legitimacy was intended by many sections of the problems of the Indonesian government as communities. having two separate aspects, one to do with The socio-political role of the military the regime as such (and President Soeharto take forms military “participation” in non- specifically), and one to do with the armed military sectors. Reforms in the socio- forces (and the army in particular). With the political roles thus mean reforms in the fall of Soeharto, the military is now a military role in non-military tasks. This subject of scrutiny. This article focuses on work examines proposed reforms in mili- the later. tary “participation” in politics,3 and the The legitimacy problem can be traced discussion would focus on discourse and back. With the growing concern of many reform agenda on military withdrawal Indonesians about democratisation in poli- from politics. tics and economics, there has emerged a gro- wing challenge toward military intervention Concept and Factors Leading to in non-military sectors. Over time the Military Withdrawal challenges intensify. While prior to the There are many similar terms which 1990s the challenges were mostly presented can be used to refer to “military with- in political trials or underground publica- drawal from politics.” That is, “return to tions or debated half openly by reform- the barracks,” “military exit from politics,” minded groups within the military, in the and “military disengagement.” “Return to first half of 1990s civilians, particularly pro- the barracks” according to S.E. Finer democracy groups, openly demand the refers to “abdication” and “re-civiliani- reduction of military intervention, and even zation.” “Abdication” or the “military’s the abolition of dwifungsi doctrine. The disengagement from overt rule” refers to demands become more daring and so open the termination of military rule and since Soeharto was forced to step down by replacing it with civilian rule. Finer argues students. that the military would return to the barracks if three problems occurred, 2 R. William Liddle, “Politics 1992-1993: Sixth Term namely, conflict between the military and Adjustments in the Ruling Formula,” in Chris Manning and Joan Hardjono (eds.), Indonesia Assessment 1993, Labour: Sharing in the Benefits of 3 Military “participation” in politics is the most crucial Growth? (Canberra: Research School of Pacific one as it is a driving force for “participation” in other Studies, Australian National University, 1993), p. 29. fields (e.g. economic activities). 14 Januari 1998 conspiratorial civilians, growing friction (usually technocrats). In such circum- within the military, and economic and stances, the military is the dominant political difficulties faced by military partner and the civilians play an rulers.4 “Re-civilianization” on the other auxiliary role.6 hand deals with the concern, decision, and Thus, the difference between these terms struggle of civilian elements of the society, lies in the degree of civilian rule vis-à-vis not under the dictation of the military military rule or the position of military in junta, to have civilian rule. The military the government. In “military withdrawal or leaders may have some influence in this disengagement” the role of the military is political movement but such influence is auxiliary, whereas in “de-intervention or minor since the principal decisions and civilianization” its role is still dominant in actions are taken by civilian leaders. the system. The former, therefore, can be Facing growing pressure from civilians, regarded as (relatively) total/complete or the military is often in a dilemma substantial withdrawal whereas the latter is concerning whether to remain in office or limited or partial withdrawal return to the barracks. If the military Another expert, Talukder Maniruzzaman, decides to disengage from politics, “the defines military withdrawal from politics as: men on horseback” would re-civilianise the return of the intervening army to the government and concentrate on en- the military barracks, with the military hancing their professionalism.5 playing only an instrumental role, In distinguishing between “military with- leaving the civilian political leadership drawal or disengagement” and “de-interven- in an unfettered position to determine tion or civilianization,” Danopoulos says political goals and make all “decisions that : of decisive consequence” for the state. Withdrawal or disengagement can be Under this model, the army does have defined as the substitution of praeto- influence on decisions affecting de- rian policies and personnel with those fense and foreign policies of the state, advocated by the recognized civilian but in this respect the military performs authorities. De-intervention or civilia- only staff functions. It provides expert nization on the other hand, refers to advice but does not challenge the limited or partial disengagement and authority of the civilian political denotes a situation in which the mili- tary coopts and/or forms coalitions 6 Danopoulos, quoted by Suvarnajata Supaluck, The with a selected number of civilians Thai Military Coup D’Etat: Origins, Withdrawal/ Civilian Control, and Perspectives, Ph.D. Thesis (Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI Dissertation Service, 1995), p. 4 S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the 157. For Danoupoulus’ prominent work, see Military in Politics, Second, enlarged edition Constantine P. Danoupoulus, “Civilian Supremacy in (Ringwood: Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 173-174. Changing Society: Comparative Prespectives,” in 5 Ibid., pp. 179-186. Regarding the dilemmas faced by Constantine P. Danoupoulus (ed.), Civilian Rule in the military, see also Christopher Clapham and George Developing World: Democracy on the March? Philip (eds.), The Political Dilemmas of Military (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, Regimes (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985). 1992). 15 Jurnal Sosial-Politika No. 2 leadership even if the decision of the ruling class use the military as a power base civilian authorities is contrary to the in governing