Joint Force Quarterly

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JFQ JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY FORCE JOINT ITR20–3/NME 33 NUMBER / 2002–03 WINTER TENTH ANNIVERSARY YEAR Score covers 1& 4no greater than 3/16”from the bind Aerial Vehicles Unmanned Transformation Military Operations Information Challenge Millennium Afghanistan Army SOFin JFQ Uses ofSpace The Military JOINT FORCEQUARTERLY A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL o Trim 83/8”x107/8” Cov 1 Winter 02 03

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JFQ JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY FORCE JOINT ITR20–3/NME 33 NUMBER / 2002–03 WINTER

TENTH ANNIVERSARY YEAR Score covers 1& 4no greater than 3/16”from the bind Aerial Vehicles Unmanned Transformation Military Operations Information Challenge Millennium Afghanistan Army SOFin

JFQ Uses ofSpace The Military JOINT FORCEQUARTERLY A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL o Trim 83/8”x107/8” Cov 1 Winter 02 03

3 pi 4 pi The essence of strategic leadership is the process of examining events in their many dimensions, testing immediate issues in the context of broader long-term goals, establishing priorities based on balance among importance, urgency, and achievability—then pursuing policies in the near term aimed at securing the long-range objectives. —Donald E. Rumsfeld 0333 Prelims.qxd 4/21/04 3:37 PM Page 1 JFQ AWord fromthe Soldiers preparing for mission in Afghanistan.

Chairman U.S. Army (Milton H. Robinson)

oint warfighting is constantly evolving in well as foreign nations and perhaps even non- theory and practice. Military and defense governmental organizations. professionals train for and expect opera- The global war on terrorism ushered in an Jtions to be joint. To win, we must fight as a era of enhanced jointness in which coalition and team. And combatant commanders plan on joint interagency participation is the norm. Profes- operations as a matter of course. Recently, the sional military education promotes integration term joint has begun to assume a broader com- among services, agencies, and allies, who are all mon definition and an air of expectedness. routinely included in exercises and operations. It is routine for more than one service to per- Within the Government, we find consider- form together in experiments, exercises, or bat- ably more common, comprehensive, and impor- tles. Joint operations are our baseline. Yet in distant interagency cooperation. Warfighting com- cussing jointness we tend to envision far more mands and various agencies must be aware of than just two services working together. We see a joint team functioning with other agencies as (continued on page 4)

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CONTENTS

1 A Word from the Chairman 16 Army SOF in Afghanistan: by Richard B. Myers Learning the Right Lessons by Frank L. Jones 9 A Quiet Revolution: Nuclear Strategy for the 21st Century 23 Millennium Challenge 2002—

JFQ by James J. Wirtz and James A. Russell Setting the Mark by Grover E. Myers

JFQ FORUM 31 The Military Uses of Space

32 National Security Space— Enabling Joint Warfighting by Peter B. Teets

38 Forging Space Warriors by Lance W. Lord

44 Architecting Space Programs by Stephen J. Ferrell and Hal E. Hagemeier

50 Space and Missile Defense by Donald R. Baucom

56 Some Propositions on Spacepower by Michael V. Smith

65 Globalizing Space Security by Simon P. Worden and Joan Johnson-Freese

72 Finding a Path to Spacepower by John M. Logsdon

PHOTO CREDITS

The cover shows lift off of Delta II rocket from Cape 78 Canaveral (Boeing). The front inside cover features Unity of Effort in Joint [clockwise] soldier, Enduring Freedom (55th Signal Information Operations Company/Leopold Medina, Jr.); sailor aboard USS Harry S. by Synthia S. Jones, Bernard Flowers, and Truman, Iraqi Freedom (USS Harry S. Truman/Danny Ewing, Jr.); marine during live fire exercise (Fleet Combat Karlton D. Johnson Camera, Pacific/Michael Sandberg); and airman monitoring air traffic, Iraqi Freedom (U.S. Air Force/ 84 Stefan Alford). The table of contents depicts universe Deterring Attack: The Role of seen from Hubble Space Telescope (AP/Wide World Information Operations Photo/NASA); and Global Hawk UAV at air base in by Gregory Schulte Australia (U.S. Air Force/Jeremy Lock). The back inside cover captures USS Providence sailing home to New London (U.S. Navy/Nicole Hawley).

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WINTER 2002–03 / NUMBER 33

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 119 Educating Foreign Officers 90 Joint Doctrine—Engine of by Douglas M. Gibler and Change? Tomislav Z. Ruby by Stephen J. Cimbala and James J. Tritten OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN 124 Creighton Williams Abrams, Jr. 96 Transforming Joint Exercises and Readiness THE JOINT WORLD by Stephen J. Mariano 125 Doctrine 102 Intelligence Support for Military Operations OFF THE SHELF by Markus V. Garlauskas 126 War and the Human Psyche: A Review Essay 109 Unmanned Combat Aerial by Ian Roxborough Vehicles and Transformation by John J. Klein 127 Great Power Struggles: A Book Review by George C. Herring 114 An Israeli Military Innovation: UAVs 128 The Chiefs as Policymakers: by Ralph Sanders A Book Review by Samuel J. Newland

129 Soldiers as Governors: A Book Review by Audrey Kurth Cronin

Joint Force Quarterly

Stephen J. Flanagan Robert A. Silano Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hays, USAF Director Director of Publications Executive Editor Institute for National Strategic Studies Institute for National Strategic Studies Editor-in-Chief Editor

Martin J. Peters, Jr. Calvin B. Kelley William A. Rawley Production Coordinator Copy Editor U.S. Government Printing Office Art Director

JFQ is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted topics of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 132 by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National De- without permission of copyright proprietors. An acknowledg- for details). Please direct all editorial communications to: fense University, to promote understanding of the integrated ment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever mate- Editor, Joint Force Quarterly employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations rial is quoted from or based on its contents. ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, This publication has been approved by the Secretary of De- 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62) contingency planning, combat operations conducted by the fense. All previous issues have been published electronically Fort Lesley J. McNair unified commands, and joint force development. and are available over the Internet at the address indicated Washington, D.C. 20319–5066 The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations ex- below. Paid subscriptions to JFQ are offered through the U.S. pressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do Government Printing Office. Telephone: (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220 not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint Fax: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219 or any other agency of the Federal Government. Copyrighted warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and e-mail: [email protected] http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm ISSN 1070–0692 April 2003

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Joint Force Quarterly A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF (continued from page 1) Publisher each other’s plans and coordinate actively. Intelli- ADVISORY COMMITTEE gence sharing, homeland defense, and synchronizing instruments of power are necessary to win VADM Paul G. Gaffney II, USN National Defense University Chairman the global war on terrorism. Moving from service competition to routine BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) Office of the Chairman joint operations has been accompanied by a sig- LTG George W. Casey, Jr., USA The Joint Staff nificant cultural change. We must continue this

MG Reginal G. Clemmons, USA National War College evolution to embrace a new concept of enhanced joint operations—changes in the Armed Forces, A. Denis Clift Joint Military Intelligence College governmental agencies, and allied nations. RADM David R. Ellison, USN Naval Postgraduate School History not only tells us where we have BG Mark P. Hertling, USA The Joint Staff been; it offers clues about where we need to go. To illustrate the evolution of jointness, let me BG James T. Hirai, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College touch on just a few examples, from tentative co- Col Craig S. Huddleston, USMC Marine Corps Command and Staff College operation among services to the enhanced joint MG Robert R. Ivany, USA U.S. Army War College warfighting required to combat terrorism. Col Ronald R. Ladnier, USAF Air Command and Staff College Experimenting in Wartime Maj Gen Edward L. LaFountaine, USAF Joint Forces Staff College Interestingly, the tradition of joint warfight- MajGen Harold Mashburn, Jr., USMC Industrial College of the Armed Forces ing can be traced to the early days of the Nation. For example, by April 1863, General Ulysses Grant Maj Gen Bentley B. Rayburn, USAF Air War College had been trying to take Vicksburg for months. But RADM Rodney P. Rempt, USN Naval War College nature provided an obstacle, spring rains. Union Col John H. Turner, USMC Marine Corps War College forces had to move quickly down the Mississippi River past the deadly Vicksburg defensive batteries EDITORIAL BOARD to attack from the east—Grant’s preferred ap- Stephen J. Flanagan National Defense University proach. After seeking the counsel of Admiral Chairman David Porter, they elected to sail Union troops and supplies down the Mississippi. Richard K. Betts Columbia University With cavalry raids as a distraction, the river- Col John M. Calvert, USAF Joint Forces Staff College borne transport scheme worked. The Union lost Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies only one ship to the batteries. Grant was able to isolate Vicksburg from the east. Confederate Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University forces finally surrendered July 4. Experimenting COL Robert A. Doughty, USA U.S. Military Academy with joint warfighting helped the Union turn the LtCol Thomas J. Felts, USMC Marine Corps War College tide of the Civil War. This series of events fore-

Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University shadowed the importance of jointness to later military successes. Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces

COL Timothy S. Heinemann, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College A Costly Lesson

CAPT Chester E. Helms, USN Naval War College The defeat at the Kasserine Pass exemplifies the poor integration and communication that led Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College to tragedy during Operation Torch in February Daniel T. Kuehl Information Resources Management College 1943. The operation was designed to drive Axis Thomas L. McNaugher The RAND Corporation forces out of North Africa, but our troops were inexperienced and untested. American leaders tried Kathleen Mahoney-Norris Air Command and Staff College to use airpower simultaneously as artillery and an William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr. Joint Military Intelligence College umbrella for ground units. Unfortunately, inade- John J. Mearsheimer The University of Chicago quate communications, planning, and synchronization plagued the Allied forces. LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) Hudson Institute The Allies ceded air superiority, leading to in- Col Thomas C. Skillman, USAF Air War College sufficient air support for ground operations in the COL Robert E. Smith, USA U.S. Army War College pass. Unable to achieve control of the air over the battlefield, ineffective air support combined with LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) Harvard University inexperienced American troops and poor battle- Col Gary West, USAF National War College field communications led to a costly defeat by troops under General Erwin Rommel. A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

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Myers

F/A–18C taking off, Iraqi Freedom. U.S. Navy (Philip A. McDaniel)

However, the Allies learned from their mis- objectives, the war was often a segregated affair— takes and issued new orders for Allied airpower to more deconflicted than integrated. strike interdiction and rear echelon targets. This Desert Storm introduced new concepts of op- allowed airpower to decimate Axis support logis- erations and innovations that previewed the mili- tics in Tunisia and helped turn the balance in tary transformation of the 1990s. Perhaps the favor of the Allies. greatest was effects-based operations. This con- With a more focused and synchronized air cept promoted an attempt to control an enemy, campaign, fortified Allied surface forces pushed as opposed to traditional warfighting strategies of the Axis back. Adolf Hitler all but abandoned his attrition or annihilation. African army. And in May The Coalition commander would restrict 1943, the Axis lost North enemy decisionmaking processes in order to take Desert Storm highlighted Africa and the Allies pre- away options. In Desert Storm, the Coalition was the role of precision and ad pared for a push north able to accomplish this without entirely crushing through Italy. Iraq’s infrastructure or annihilating its army. hoc innovations in the area The North African Precision, speed, and superior intelligence of time-sensitive targeting campaign illustrated that allowed the Coalition to target the enemy by Allied combined arms war- disrupting its command and control and deci- fare could be inefficient sionmaking. Countrywide military pressure all and dangerous when planned poorly. Allied com- but paralyzed the Iraqi leadership, and a crush- manders quickly learned the importance of coor- ing ground assault pushed dug-in enemy troops dinated and integrated planning between compo- from Kuwait. nents and nations. Desert Storm highlighted the role of precision and ad hoc innovations in the area of time- Jointness in the Storm sensitive targeting. The Scud hunting operations In 1991, Operation Desert Storm showed un- in western Iraq particularly reflected a new capa- precedented jointness on a theater-wide scale. Yet bility, leading to a decade of experimentation while successful in achieving U.S. and Coalition with joint time-sensitive targeting procedures and technology.

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A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

The Scud hunt saw Special Operations Forces The importance of this new jointness be- (SOF) closely collaborating with the air compo- came evident after 9/11 and was reinforced by nent on near real-time strikes. In one case in American successes in Afghanistan. SOF and in- 1991, a team was bracing for assault by an enemy teragency assets were integrated and integral to helicopter in western Iraq. The team radioed an the plan and the operation. And in preparing airborne F–15E and passed their position and situ- lessons learned while the operation was unfold- ation. The fighter launched and guided a 2,000- ing, the services, joint components, and combat- pound laser guided precision bomb, destroying ant commands shared notes and experimented the hovering helicopter. with improvements in strategy, technology, and This type of SOF-airpower coordination was operational coordination. desperate, unplanned, and impractical, but it worked. As a result, nascent collaboration between Millennium Challenge Special Operations Forces and joint aerospace In summer 2002, U.S. Joint Forces Command power became a preview of hugely effective tactics conducted Millennium Challenge, a large experi- used in Afghanistan. However, despite some lim- ment that generated thousands of data points ited successes in Desert Storm, the potential of and hundreds of ideas. Participants examined special operations was largely unrealized. dozens of concepts, initiatives, and warfighting issues. One highlight was the joint fires initiative Enduring Freedom for time-sensitive targets, a Web-based, collabora- After the atrocities of 9/11, Operation En- tive tool that allowed land, maritime, and air during Freedom showed the inherent flexibility commanders to share awareness and knowledge of the U.S. joint force and the importance of a simultaneously. Allies also participated. new style of coalition operations. Special opera- All components knew the priority targets se- tors of all services, and lected by the joint force commander. They had coordination with ele- access to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- during Millennium Challenge, ments of several U.S. sance assets of other components to find targets. and allied governmental Once found, they chatted in real time on which the decision and execution agencies, were common- component could engage those targets. At the process in time-sensitive place and critical. same time, they decided which assets could best targeting often took less SOF teams collabo- conduct post-strike battle damage assessment. rated successfully with During Millennium Challenge, the decision than an hour Coalition air compo- and execution process in time-sensitive targeting nents and together deliv- often took less than an hour. By sharing informa- ered bombs and shared tion and fostering trust, the joint team got the satellite communications, navigation, and a host job done with considerably improved timelines. of intelligence assets. The result reinforced the They had developed a faster decision cycle—and importance of even more effective integration history shows that those who make better deci- and new operational concepts. The services had sions faster usually win. gone to school on Desert Storm experiences in Scud hunting and integrating sea, air, space, and Iraq and the War on Terrorism SOF assets. The joint fires initiative and the time sensi- Afghanistan demonstrated a new paradigm tive targeting tested and refined in Millennium where select U.S. forces, supported by joint air- Challenge and in Afghanistan continued to and spacepower, could act as force multipliers. In evolve during Iraqi Freedom. An attack against Enduring Freedom, 21st century technology Saddam Hussein in a hotel took 45 minutes— paired cavalry charges—right out of the 14th cen- from the time we received the intelligence to tury—with the most advanced weapons to defeat bombs hitting the target. Our time to attack can a larger army of well-equipped fighters. In fact, be under an hour, but we need to push for a the force multiplication capability of air- and faster response. spacepower teamed with Special Operations The common operating picture is also a Forces was unprecedented. In December 2001, great example of the type of integration and in- when the Taliban fell from power, only about formation sharing that speeds decisionmaking 1,500 American military personnel were on the and is truly transformational. In Desert Storm, ground. However, their combat effectiveness sur- the air component commander had a reasonably passed traditional views of their capabilities. good battlefield picture. During the battle in Afghanistan, the air component commander had a much better picture, with considerably more real-time sensor information conveniently dis- played in addition to the blue force positions.

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Myers

Marines refueling near Az Zubayr, Iraq. Marine Division Combat Camera (Kevin C. Quihuis, Jr.) st 1

But throughout the 1990s, and even in Afghan- months of focused and deliberate psychological istan during Enduring Freedom, the ground com- operations against Iraqi military commanders, troops, ponent had poorer connectivity and a less com- and regime supporters plete picture. years of sanctions on the regime and terrorist For Iraqi Freedom, however, U.S. Central leaders preparation for humanitarian and civil emer- Command insisted that all the components share gencies a very similar picture of the battlefield and the- maritime control of the Arabian Gulf ater. Information sharing enabled the component in due course, a closely coordinated and flexi- commanders to provide reachback support to for- ble, 24/7, all-weather land-sea-air and SOF component ward tactical units and to coordinate and inte- blitz that crushed the Iraqi military. grate their plans. The ground command opera- But what won the war was the ability of the tions center in Doha, Qatar, was as sophisticated Coalition to remove the enemy sanctuary in time as the combined air operations center in Saudi and space. This was done by integrating a range of Arabia. And just as importantly, the corps com- combat and other capabilities, as well as overcom- mander and division commanders shared this ing unique logistic challenges. Iraqi Freedom has common operating picture as well. illustrated the importance of enhanced joint- Iraqi Freedom portended a crucial trend use- ness—with shared intelligence and coordinated ful for fighting the global war on terrorism: the informational, diplomatic, economic, and military increasing importance of multiple agencies and actions contributing to an unprecedented success. nations combining efforts over an extended pe- The combatant commander achieved superi- riod. It demonstrated the effectiveness of long- ority in all areas of space and time, which led to term, multifaceted relationships between organi- Coalition success in the major combat phase. He zations and allies geared toward achieving was able to make better decisions faster than the common goals. In the case of Iraq, this meant: enemy. Well understood rules of engagement and diplomatic efforts at coalition building exceptional red teaming and planning for what- years of weapons and tactics improvements in ifs made the most of Coalition flexibility—and all the components gave friendly forces a tighter decision cycle. He reducing Iraqi air defense and command and control capabilities through months of targeted airstrikes

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A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

be better integrated. Financial services, law en- B–52 heading for Iraq. forcement, diplomatic efforts, and commercial activities both at home and abroad, as well as humanitarian and civil organizations, must be included in all appropriate phases, from planning to combat to the transition to a lasting peace. As Iraqi Freedom moves into the stability phase, we will continue to fight the global war on terrorism. This requires continuing to coordinate and share information across agency, component, and command lines. We must do better in synchronizing current operations with all instruments of national power and in sharing intelligence to anticipate and deny future attacks. To fully integrate the Armed Forces, we must breach institutional stovepipes and establish effective lines of communication. For the most Communications Squadron (RichardCommunications Squadron Freeland)

th part, culture will also have to change with regard 30 to classified intelligence—need to know must give way to the need to share. We must calculate the risk of exchanging intelligence in this new en- gained air and space superiority. And joint air- hanced environment with other agencies and and spacepower enabled persistent surveillance countries. I bet that careful calculation will indi- and strike operations. A rapid maneuver cam- cate that it is safer to share information to pre- paign by the ground component was supported clude terrorist attacks than retain overclassified by air and psychological operations, as well as by information that no one acts on. I know this will space navigation and communications. Though be a big change, but a new risk calculus reflects the fighting was intense, Coalition ground forces our enhanced joint world. were able to push quickly to Baghdad with skill Historical lessons are anecdotes, not prescrip- and determination. tions for the future. The only thing we can be When some pundits erroneously stated that sure of after the recent war in Iraq is that our next the ground advance was bogged down or stalled major operation will be quite different. Therefore, during a blinding sandstorm, they missed the we must be prepared for a variety of contingen- deadly precision attacks and incredible all- cies. The enhanced joint environment I have de- weather capability of the joint and combined scribed will encourage sharing information and team. During that sandstorm, Coalition airpower deliberately coordinating the instruments of worked in concert with precision ground maneu- power in planning and in execution. vers to decimate two Republican Guard divi- This flexibility accompanied by operating sions—breaking the back and crushing the across organizational seams will ultimately make morale of the Iraqi military. Coalition precision the United States and its allies stronger and safer. attack and C4ISR capability was the result of years We can be certain that in moving from a segre- of research and development, exceptional gated to an integrated approach, the whole be- weapons, shared knowledge between component comes greater than the sum of its parts—just as and combatant commanders, and appropriate our forebears found in fighting the Nation’s wars rules of engagement. of the distant past. Effectively, integrated components did the fighting in Iraqi Freedom. Commanders and RICHARD B. MYERS planners included allied and American personnel Chairman from other agencies from the start. This en- of the Joint Chiefs of Staff hanced capability, whereby components integrate and include allies and interagency personnel in planning and execution, must be a key characteristic of combatting terrorism. Unlike Iraqi Freedom, most battles in the global war on terrorism will not be conventional. As a result, all elements of national power must

8 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 North Korean nuclear fuel rods, Yongbyon.

A Quiet Revolution Nuclear Strategy for the 21st Century By JAMES J. WIRTZ and JAMES A. RUSSELL

AP/ Wide World Photo

here is a quiet revolution underway in assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, defense, and U.S. nuclear strategy. It is overshad- denial articulated in the Quadrennial Defense owed by the global war on terrorism, Review in 2001. Both reviews set priorities for T questions over homeland security, and formulating defense and foreign policy, develop- chaos in the international order. It is revolution- ing a strategic relationship with Russia, and ary because it reflects many changes in threats, countering proliferation of nuclear, biological, capabilities, and doctrine that have preoccupied and chemical (NBC) weapons and long-range nuclear planners since the 1950s. It also high- ballistic missiles. lights the way the Armed Forces prepare for future conflicts. New Threats, New Opportunities The vision found in the Nuclear Posture Re- Nuclear policy reflects strategic, political, view (NPR) is part of a wider endeavor to de- and technological trends that emerged over the velop new policies.1 It embraces the concepts of last decade. The collapse of the Soviet Union presented an opportunity to foster a new strategic relationship. The United States concluded that mas- James J. Wirtz is the chairman and James A. Russell is Office of the sive nuclear arsenals, which had produced the Secretary of Defense fellow in the National Security Affairs Department concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD), at the Naval Postgraduate School. arms control agreements, and many views of the

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 9 NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Dismantling Tu-160 in Ukraine. AP/ Wide Photo (Efrem World Lukatsky)

Cold War, were no longer relevant. Moreover, missiles and hinted at this new threat. A na- both countries would benefit by reducing defense tional intelligence estimate issued in 1995, budgets. During the 2000 Presidential campaign, Emerging Missile Threats to North America during supporters of George Bush noted that the arms the Next Fifteen Years, posed relatively benign control regime prevented adjustments to meet fis- threats. It was discredited by the Rumsfeld Com- cal realities and new threats. Arms control was mission Report and the North Korean test of the the source of acrimony; the time had come to Taepo-Dong missile in 1998. The sarin attack in stop regarding Russia as an enemy and to develop the Tokyo subway in 1995, Indian and Pakistani a more cooperative approach to managing strate- tests of nuclear weapons in 1998, the end of gic relations. U.N. inspections in Iraq, and the terrorist attacks Though many observers marveled at the ef- on 9/11 have turned weapons of mass destruc- fectiveness of precision-guided air strikes in the tion (WMD) into a salient danger. In a report to Persian Gulf War, advances in technology did not Congress, the Central Intelligence Agency iden- stop. The information revolution of the 1990s tified nine states that were developing or seek- continued to transform military capabilities. ing to acquire such weapons. According to the Sometimes called the revolution in military af- Nuclear Policy Review, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North fairs, it involved integrating sur- Korea, and Syria could be involved in a nuclear commanders can use data veillance and reconnaissance contingency. Various nonstate actors and terror- sensors, information processing, ist groups such as al Qaeda, which are reportedly from myriad sensors tactical and operational commu- seeking NBC and radiological weapons, also are to acquire a picture of the nications, and precision-guided depicted as posing a serious threat to the United battlespace in real time munitions. Today, commanders States. By contrast, the review does not charac- can use data from myriad sen- terize Russia as an immediate or potential con- sors—generically known as the cern to national security. global command and control system—to acquire Recent trends present a challenge. On one a picture of the battlespace in real time, a capabil- hand, there is a strategic capability optimized for ity that did not exist ten years ago. The Pentagon a danger that no longer exists and is considered wants to use advances in command, control, the stumbling block in Russian-American rela- communications, computers, and intelligence tions. On the other, failures in nonproliferation (C4I) to integrate nuclear and conventional forces confront planners with relatively small-scale so they can be responsive on short notice. threats that could become serious problems with Concern has grown over the proliferation little warning. Although the Armed Forces may of NBC weapons and related delivery systems. confront an enemy willing to use NBC weapons, The conflict between Iran and Iraq and the Gulf War highlighted the danger posed by long-range

10 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Wirtz and Russell

Destroying Pershing II missiles in 1989. DOD (Jose Lopez, Jr.)

the revolution in military affairs provides ways of framework. As the United States has repeatedly employing conventional weapons for missions noted, the treaty stood in the way of missile de- once reserved for nuclear forces. fense as well as more cooperative relations with Moscow. The agreement signed by Presidents The End of MAD George Bush and Vladimir Putin in May 2002 is The Nuclear Posture Review and the Qua- part of this new framework. Though the treaty drennial Defense Review indicate that mutual as- limits deployed nuclear warheads to a maximum sured destruction is not an acceptable basis for a of 2,200 by 2012, it is more of a political docu- strategic relationship. According to the former re- ment than a vehicle for arms control and strate- view, the United States “will no longer plan, size, gic stability. The treaty reflects changes in force or sustain its forces as though Russia presented structure discussed in the Nuclear Policy Review merely a smaller version of the threat posed by and fulfilled Russian requirements for concrete the Soviet Union.” In other words, because Russ- evidence of this new partnership. ian nuclear arms are seen as a waning threat, de- In fact, bilateralism was helped by pragma- terrence will no longer dominate nuclear doctrine tism. By declaring peace, Bush and Putin have un- and targeting. dermined the strategic rationale for sustaining the Although the current administration has not military, institutional, and diplomatic status quo. articulated a clear plan to transform strategic rela- The United States made it difficult for Russia to as- tions, policy changes are creating a new bilateral sume a Cold War approach because it is willing to framework. Washington took the initiative by an- reciprocate. Putin found it possible to live with a nouncing a shift in nuclear doctrine, negotiating limited ABM system in return for a U.S. nuclear ar- strategic force reductions, and introducing confi- senal reduced to Russian levels, which are based dence-building measures that were intended to not on doctrine but on a weak economy. The reduce tension and foster relations. Viewed in American approach challenges traditional arms this light, withdrawing from the Antiballistic Mis- control and disarmament policies. Many treaties sile Treaty becomes a positive step because it de- may become obsolete as bilateral relations im- livered a lethal shock to an outdated strategic prove. Cooperative efforts to foster peace, reduce forces, and safeguard materials do not pose a danger to other nations and need not be codified by treaties to ensure a stable world order.

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 11 NUCLEAR STRATEGY

The New Triad employed against targets able to withstand non- The Nuclear Posture Review offers a pathway nuclear attack (for example, deep underground toward a new strategic triad that is aided by en- bunkers or bio-weapons facilities). hanced command and control and intelligence Advanced command, control, and intelli- systems with offensive strike systems (nuclear and gence will integrate the triad, facilitating flexible nonnuclear), defenses (active and passive), and a operations. The new strategic triad will rely on revitalized infrastructure. It assumed that nuclear adaptive planning to meet emerging threats and weapons are only one of contingencies. Emphasis on adaptive planning advanced command, control, the capabilities that can differs from the traditional way of developing the address threats from prolif- and intelligence will integrate nuclear war plan—the single integrated opera- eration of NBC weapons tions plan—which was a deliberate process that the triad, facilitating flexible and ballistic missiles. This often took months or even years to generate a fi- operations triad represents a departure nite number of options for consideration by the in strategic doctrine, with President as Commander in Chief. deterrence, defense, and Administration officials suggest that the new counterforce acknowledged as components. It can triad would allow reductions in operational nu- be best supported by a new force structure, al- clear forces from current START I levels of approxi- though the concepts and planning for this ad- mately 6,000 warheads for each country. The vance remain undefined. Treaty of Moscow in May 2002 made a reality of The new triad is intended to integrate capa- these levels when the signatories agreed to reduce bilities (like missile defense), nuclear weapons, strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by and nonnuclear strike forces into a seamless web 2012. Reductions in the U.S. arsenal will result from retiring MX Peacekeeper ICBMs (which began in 2002), removing four Trident submarines from strategic duty, and eliminating the requirement that B–1 bombers have nuclear capabilities. The administration will maintain a response force (sometimes known as a reserve force) of warheads that could be brought back into service. Planners probably have not finalized the size of this force, but in all likelihood it will number in the thousands. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations have maintained that it makes sense to count only warheads that either are deployed or can be available for use in days. By contrast, the response force would become available only after an extended regeneration and redeployment, which could take months or years. The reduction in warheads will be accompanied by the development of new capabilities. The DOD (Helene C. Stikkel) centerpiece will be missile defense, a multi- Briefing Nuclear layered protection against accidental launches or Posture Review. to assure allies and friends, dissuade potential en- relatively limited strikes. No longer constrained by emies from mounting military challenges against treaty, the United States is building on work initi- the United States, deter enemies, and fight and ated more than a decade ago. The current pro- win wars when deterrence fails. The Nuclear gram includes boost-phase interceptors that attack Posture Review notes that strike elements: ballistic missiles over enemy territory. There is can provide greater flexibility in the design and con- special interest in the airborne laser, a speed-of- duct of military campaigns to defeat opponents deci- light directed energy weapon, and research on sea, sively. Non-nuclear strike capabilities may be particu- air, and space-based boost phase systems to defeat larly useful to limit collateral damage and conflict missiles in the highly visible and vulnerable initial escalation. NPR emphasizes technology as a substi- stage of flight. The plan enhances the mid-course, tute for nuclear forces that are withdrawn from serv- ground-based interceptor program with an ex- ice. Global real-time command and control and recon- panded testbed. Additional support for the ad- naissance capabilities will take on greater importance vanced Patriot missile will bolster terminal and in the new strategic triad. Nuclear weapons could be point defense. This system is intended to protect land forces against cruise and tactical ballistic missile attack. The Pentagon also appears interested in a mobile tactical high-energy laser, which will

12 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Wirtz and Russell Communication Squadron (ScottCommunication Squadron H. Spitzer) th 305 Unloading weapon from C–141. provide ground forces with a directed energy warheads, deploying missile defenses, shifting to weapon to counter rockets, cruise missiles, and ar- adaptive nuclear planning, and developing con- tillery and mortar munitions. ventional precision-strike capabilities suggest a The new triad highlights profound changes new era in strategic thinking and the relationship in strategic doctrine. First, it makes clear that de- among nuclear weapons, deterrence, and war. The terring an all-out nuclear war with Russia is no review identifies new targeting priorities for nu- longer a feature of war plans. Policymakers be- clear weapons: hardened facilities for command lieve that to be an extremely remote possibility. centers, underground facilities associated with Second, the triad embodies an effort to increase NBC weapons, and mobile targets, such as NBC- the credibility of strategic deterrent threats by in- armed missiles. It cites some 1,400 underground creasing available options. The old triad was sites around the world that require targeting be- intended to pose a massive response to nuclear cause conventional weapons cannot destroy them. attack, while the reconfigured triad guarantees an Thus there is a need to develop an earth-penetrat- appropriate way to respond to other forms of aging capability to place these targets at risk. gression, thereby bolstering deterrence. Third, the The review calls for greater yield flexibility new concept sidesteps bureaucratic resistance to for both stockpiled weapons and warheads that reconfiguring longstanding doctrine—the sanc- reduce collateral damage. By identifying new tar- tity of the old triad and focus on assuring a mas- gets and missions for nuclear weapons, it would sive response under any circumstances. This ap- appear that the United States must design and proach paves the way for further reductions in build arms—a process that was made difficult by U.S. strategic nuclear forces. the moratorium on testing. Given the unlikeli- hood that the moratorium would be abandoned Proliferation, Counterforce, and War under present circumstances, the way to over- Although there is little doubt that the United come this basic inconsistency in the policies and States wants to eliminate nuclear deterrence as the capabilities advocated by the review is unclear. basis for a strategic relationship with Russia, it is clear that the Nuclear Posture Review is not a blueprint for disarmament. But reducing operational

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 13 NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Precision-guided weapons are clearly the pre- Launching ICBM from ferred option for preemptive attacks against Vandenberg Air Force WMD infrastructure and delivery systems. Al- Base. though it is difficult to justify employing nuclear weapons in order to prevent their use by an enemy, the arsenal provides escalation dominance. U.S. nuclear superiority makes doing nothing and being disarmed by a conventional counterforce attack the only rational response available to an enemy. A range of nuclear options makes it more likely that an enemy with a small WMD arsenal will lose rather than employ NBC capabilities. And using such weapons might generate a nuclear response by the United States, a perception that reduces incentives for initial escalation. The- ater and national missile de- missile defenses backstop fenses backstop conventional counterforce attacks by destroy- conventional counterforce ing incoming warheads. This is attacks by destroying a form of nuclear warfighting incoming warheads and troublingly is not merely hypothetical. It has played out repeatedly in the case of Iraq, though many observers fail to pay attention to preventive war in counterproliferation strategy.

The message for both state and nonstate ac- (AmandaU.S. Air Force M. Edwards) tors seeking WMD is unambiguous—America ac- cepts that it cannot prevent proliferation. In- stead, it is preparing to target nuclear, biological, be overhauled to meet new targeting needs. This and chemical arsenals with conventional and, if change will require reviewing nuclear programs, necessary, nuclear forces. Preemptive attack has retiring old systems, and fielding new weapons. not been ruled out. The President announced at Conversely, while the Nuclear Posture Review West Point in June 2002 that U.S. security “will proposed greater reliance on conventional require all Americans to be forward-looking and weapons to perform strategic missions, the process resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when of operationalizing this concept is ill defined. In- necessary to defend our liberty and to defend creased reliance on conventional munitions as a our lives.”2 substitute for nuclear weapons calls for a new targeting methodology, which will require criteria for Warfighting Issues targeting. Doctrine must be developed for substi- While the Nuclear Posture Review makes in- tuting conventional weapons to strike targets once teresting reading, its implementation falls on the covered by nuclear weapons. Moreover, varied warfighter. Because of internal inconsistencies, conventional munitions must be designed, built, some challenges may take years to resolve. For ex- and integrated into the force structure. ample, there is a mismatch between force struc- Another targeting issue flows from the re- ture and the new missions given to nuclear duction in nuclear force levels. Fewer warheads weapons. The review proposes that the weapons translate into a reduced number of targets that be used to hold at risk hardened underground can be struck by nuclear weapons. Redundancy in bunkers containing WMD or command and con- coverage has played an important role in counter- trol facilities. Yet there are no nuclear weapons in force strategy. But making serious reductions in the arsenal that are optimized to meet this re- arsenals could force the United States to confront quirement, although there are plans to modify nuclear scarcity: by definition counterforce could the B–61 gravity bomb for earth penetration. And become primarily a mission for conventional if enemies simply decide to dig deeper, the length weapons, while nuclear weapons are held in re- of time that modified B–61s can hold this target serve for countervalue missions. The new threat set at risk is uncertain. The force structure must environment, however, suggests that nuclear weapons might be more in demand, not less—to hold hardened underground facilities at risk.

14 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Wirtz and Russell

have to establish a command and control infrastructure for the components of the new triad and determine mechanisms for these command relationships.

The Nuclear Posture Review represents a departure in thinking about deterrence. First, it abandons mutual assured destruction as the basis of the Russian-American strategic relationship and eliminates Russia as the benchmark for sizing nuclear forces. Second, it seeks to substitute conventional for nuclear capabilities as a strategic deterrent; the objective in the past was finding ways to combine conventional and nuclear force structures to function in a mutually supportive way to bolster conventional and nuclear deterrence. Third, the integration of offense and defense to bolster deterrence by denial is a departure, even if mechanisms and organizations to integrate these forces are still on the drawing board. Despite the critics, the paradox of the review U.S. Marine Corps (I.M. Gilbert) is that while it appears to make nuclear use more M93A1 NBC reconnais- likely, it reflects the practice of nonuse that sance system. emerged after World War II. Factors other than ef- Conventional counterforce, under such circum- ficiency or military utility shape policy on weak stances, could be extremely demanding in terms states with NBC weapons. The United States of force structure, doctrine, and operations. could have addressed proliferation and long- Although assigning forces to particular tar- range delivery systems as a simple threat. It could gets is challenging, there is a broader mismatch have stated that any use of WMD, conventional between the nuclear force structure and the inter- strike, or unconventional attack would be met by national environment. What are the benefits of a massive use of nuclear weapons. Instead, plan- the D–5 SLBM or Minuteman III against al Qaeda ners are searching for options to deter and defeat or other transnational/terrorist threats? Would WMD-armed enemies with far less force than an the United States contemplate using the Minute- all-out nuclear attack. man III against WMD sites? This imbalance in ex- The problems of implementing the Nuclear plosive yield and targets to hold at risk is a major Posture Review and operationalizing concepts in challenge that takes on greater urgency given that document will eventually reach warfighters. emerging doctrine, which emphasizes either pre- This is a sobering challenge that will require emptive strikes or war to check such threats. But decades to meet. But by destroying the paradigm developing a new generation of nuclear weapons that informed nuclear strategy in the Cold War, to match this threat will be difficult as long as the the review provides an opportunity to develop United States honors a moratorium on testing. nuclear strategy for the 21st century. JFQ There is also a mismatch between calls for a new generation of nuclear weapons and the abil- NOTES ity of the nuclear infrastructure to meet that re- 1 Excerpts from the classified version of the report quirement. While the Nuclear Posture Review were published in The New York Times and Los Angeles draws attention to the deterioration of the infra- Times. Most of the text is posted at http://globalsecurity. structure, scientists who designed the weapons org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm. This cite is taken are leaving the scene. The source of a new gener- from the executive summary released by the Depart- ation of scientists to design weapons to respond ment of Defense. Other quotes come from the global se- to future threats is unclear. And even if scientists curity Web site, although the authors have no way of are found, it is uncertain how they will design, confirming their authenticity. 2 construct, and certify weapons, particularly low- Remarks by the President at the U.S. Military Acad- emy on June 1, 2002 (Washington: The White House, yield and earth penetrating systems, without re- June 1, 2002). suming nuclear tests. Another major issue facing nuclear planners is the integration of offensive and defensive components of the strategic deterrent. The Pentagon is entering uncharted waters, and planners will

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 15

PSYOP unit patrolling Afghan village.

Army SOF Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic (Eric Lippman) in Afghanistan Learning the Right Lessons By FRANK L. JONES

he role of Special Operations Forces basis for military transformation and an impor- (SOF) in Afghanistan is currently being tant element in future strategic planning. scrutinized for lessons on fighting the There are lessons to be learned—the chal- T global war on terrorism. Initial assess- lenge is identifying the right ones. Some might ments suggest that coordination between land conclude that Afghanistan offered prescriptions and air forces signals a revolution in military af- for combating terrorism or shaping conventional fairs and perhaps a recipe for defeating terrorists. warfare. This idea stems from the success of spe- Some contend that these lessons will become the cial reconnaissance, which aided precision air strikes and direct action missions, but neglects unconventional warfare. In other words, leaders might seek to conventionalize future conflicts. Frank L. Jones is professor of defense policy at the U.S. Army War Unconventional warfare capabilities were essen- College and previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense tial in routing Taliban forces and al Qaeda and for special operations policy and support. will be crucial in defeating enemies elsewhere.

16 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Jones

victory by retaining power. Nonetheless, uncon- Hunting for weapons in Afghanistan. ventional warfare is an accurate term of art, a form of conflict for which Special Operations Forces are uniquely qualified and must maintain a high level of readiness. Within the Army, Special Forces claim unconventional warfare as their primary mission. The international environment the Nation is likely to face over the next ten to twenty years will remain a gray area between political conflict and total war. Under such conditions nonstate actors could threaten stability. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of the intelligence community. Testifying before Congress, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency stated: “The 1990s were a time of transition and turmoil as familiar Cold War issues, precepts, structures, Signal Company (Todd M. Roy)Signal Company (Todd

th and strategies gave way to new security para- 55 digms....I expect the next ten to fifteen years to be at least as turbulent, if not more so.”1 Technological and information-age innova- Unconventional Warfare tions can be used to produce weapons of mass de- It is prudent to reexamine unconventional struction and manipulate financial markets. Fur- warfare as the Armed Forces begin to wrestle with ther, globalization may run counter to cultural military transformation and wage a global war on norms and national impulses and result in en- terrorism. While the term unconventional warfare mity. In addition, transnational actors like terror- has found its way into various military lexicons ists can undermine sovereignty by operating for decades, Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense across frontiers and establishing networks for sup- Dictionary of Military and Associ- port. There is also a proliferation of dual-use and understanding asymmetric ated Terms, defines it as: military technology. Other factors include disaf- fected individuals and groups as well as global de- warfare leads to the view . . . military and paramilitary operations, normally of long dura- mographic trends that can result in social stratifi- that time horizons are tion, predominantly conducted by cation, which breeds resentment and hostility. Unconventional warfare can succeed in this envi- undergoing change indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, ronment because it can enable weaker parties to supported, and directed in varying take on stronger ones. degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla If one can perform tasks associated with un- warfare and often direct offensive, low visibility, conventional warfare—the most demanding mis- covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indi- sion conducted by Special Forces—other SOF mis- rect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence sions (such as special reconnaissance and direct gathering, and escape and evasion. action) can be conducted successfully. According to this view, unconventional warfare as defined Unconventional warfare is often regarded as traditionally proves so demanding and compre- synonymous with guerrilla warfare, thereby ob- hensive that other missions are subsumed under scuring its role in counterterrorism. This ignores it. The skills required for unconventional war are the fact that it seeks political ends which affect applicable across the board, from military opera- the stability of nations. Unconventional warfare tions other than war to high intensity conflicts. is a type of political and socioeconomic conflict Special operations missions can be mounted in with psychological elements. Moreover, although situations where a small force is required because they can be protracted, unconventional wars are of the sensitivities to operational and strategic cyclical in nature. Variations in intensity may not missions in support of joint campaign plans dur- equate to holding territory or imposing military ing wartime. government, which are associated with sustaining forces on the ground for extended periods. Un- Strategic Context derstanding asymmetric warfare leads to the view National security strategy articulates Ameri- that time horizons are undergoing change. Events can policies as well as interests and objectives in the last decade enabled protagonists to claim around the globe. It also recognizes threats and challenges. Two aspects of protecting interests

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 17 ARMY SOF IN AFGHANISTAN

system. They can act with speed and surprise. They have unique abilities to work with surrogate and indigenous forces, including foreign languages, regional expertise, and interpersonal skills, particularly in teaching military tactics and techniques. Nonetheless, other means complement these competencies and are valuable in conducting unconventional warfare. One is psychological operations (PSYOP), the planned use of communications to influence the attitudes of foreign target audiences to achieve strategic objectives. Another complementary activity is civil affairs. In the last decade, civil affairs units have repeatedly been called on to support humanitarian assistance and peace operations. Skills honed in these operations are transferable to unconventional warfare. Although structured primarily for theater warfare, civil affairs teams can help local Fleet Combat Camera Group, Atlantic (Michael Sandberg) Fleet Combat Camera Group, governments and conduct civic action projects, a Loading leaflet necessary component in securing support from dispenser. the local populace in an unconventional warfare and attaining objectives crystallized after 9/11, environment. They can restore basic services after and both are related to unconventional warfare. a conflict like Afghanistan, where civil affairs First, potential enemies fall into two major cate- units are surveying the needs of local people so gories: nations with traditional forces and nontra- international organizations can provide aid. They ditional or nonstate actors that resort to terrorism can also assist new governments and inexperi- or asymmetrical warfare. Both sorts of threats are enced leaders in public administration, thus less likely today to engage in force-on-force con- molding the post-conflict situation. Such efforts frontations. Instead, they may resort to asymmet- are directed toward promoting conciliation with ric or asynchronous strategies to inflict damage important levels of society to maintain stability. on friendly forces and undermine national will, These skills are also required in the global exploiting ethical constraints as well as the obses- war on terrorism. Unfortunately, preliminary les- sion with declared endstates. sons gleaned from Afghanistan may narrow their The second aspect is the interagency dimen- use to the application of technology in future sion of conflict. The military has learned over the warfare or relegate SOF assets to roles that under- last decade through peace oper- mine their unconventional warfare capability. Afghanistan may relegate ations and humanitarian assistance that it is no longer the Future Operations SOF assets to roles that only instrument of national se- As previously noted, the future of uncon- undermine their unconven- curity employed for these mis- ventional warfare was debated prior to 9/11. In tional warfare capability sions. It must deal with civilian view of the success of Special Operations Forces agencies, foreign governments in Afghanistan and its influence on perceptions and militaries, nongovernmen- of policymakers and unified commanders as a tal and international organizations, and other ac- capability for combating terrorism, the demand tors during and after a conflict. Afghanistan for such assets is growing dramatically. In turn- called for extensive coordination between Special ing to this resource, strategic leaders must exam- Forces and paramilitary assets from the Central ine the part it should play in troubled regions of Intelligence Agency. Both considerations make the world. Special Operations Forces not only the units of A number of considerations which bear on choice for the future but demand an understand- the experience of Special Operations Forces in ing of unconventional warfare as an essential Afghanistan have implications for missions and component of national security strategy. force structure. Some leaders may assume that special operators are only effective in combating Instruments of Unconventional Warfare terrorism when performing limited conventional Special operators possess skills for unconven- support missions as part of combined arms teams. tional warfare which are politico-military in na- This view has a long history in defense circles, ture. They leave a small footprint and have the adaptability to operate without a huge logistic

18 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Jones

Afghanistan and Its Neighbors

KashK shihi UZBBEKISTSTATANTAANN TAJIKISTANTATAJIKISTANAJ ISSTASTANTANAN CHINAHINA DuDushanDusshanbehanbee TURKMENISTANURK

Mazar-e sharif MashM shhahadd Meymaneh

Kabul IsIslamslamalamamababadabaaadd Herat Jalalabad SrinSrSrinannaagagaagarar RawRawalpindiR ndi AFGHANISTAN

GujranwalaG nwala Qalat FaFaisalabaa salabbad Qandahar Lahorehor IRARANRRAN INDIA PAKISTAPAKISTANAK N MultanM QuettaQuettaetta 0 250 miles ZZaahedanah dan

0 250 kilometers New Delhi

where synchronization is the accepted norm. Se- could also adulterate the quality of the force and nior civilian officials and military officers hew to reorient it from unconventional warfare to a form this rule out of fear that Special Operations Forces of elite infantry, which it is not. may become either too independent or eclipse Third, aside from the belief that success in conventional forces. Yet unconventional opera- Afghanistan is a model for other applications, de- tions certainly complement conventional opera- cisionmakers may want to use SOF assets to com- tions and must support joint planning when bat terrorism in ill-advised ways. They may seek practicable. While the effects of SOF assets may to deploy them with other agencies, such as intel- not be as precise as armored formations or as pre- ligence and law enforcement, to form joint inter- dictable as deliberate attack, the benefits of em- agency task forces. Although SOF personnel can ploying them in a limited capacity far outweigh work in an interagency environment, they would the issue of control, because less flexibility seri- be reduced to staff responsibilities of marginal ously erodes their capabilities. This approach has utility, given that such task forces would be fo- often been disregarded in the past because of the cused on intelligence analysis, interrogating de- need for unconventional capabilities. However, it tainees, and freezing assets. There are fewer than is a lesson that senior leaders seem willing to 30,000 SOF personnel in the Army, many within learn repeatedly. the Reserve components such as civil affairs and Another consideration may be increasing the psychological operations units. Interagency as- size or expanding the range of SOF assets. There signment is not a judicious use of scarce assets. has been speculation in the media that airborne Another approach would be using SOF assets units could be transferred to U.S. Special Opera- to train foreign armies in counterterrorism, which tions Command. Such proposals ignore the facts that make special operators successful. They

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 19 ARMY SOF IN AFGHANISTAN

is the only form of U.S. presence some countries will tolerate. Though worthwhile, treating counterterrorism as a one-dimensional mission, as seems to be the situation in the Philippines, may be a mistake. Terrorism is not an end in itself, but rather a technique to create fear and destabilize regimes. Groups such as al Qaeda seek to overthrow governments and are insurgent. This sort of threat is reactionary-traditionalist or spiritual in nature. It tries to restore an arcane political order, which is romanticized. Terrorism is a political tool that is used because no other instrument is available or the situation has not matured to the point where guerrilla warfare is feasible. Insurgency is fostered by popular resentment of authority. This disaffection gives rise to resistance or violence against existing regimes. There- fore, foreign militaries must be trained not only in civil disturbances and hostage rescue, but also counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, and procedures. For example, parts of the Philippines are becoming unstable and Muslim extremist groups are expanding. Meeting this challenge will require more than training local forces, which are identified with social inequality and a failed justice system. Insurgents survive because of weak control by national authorities and sympathetic populations. Manila requires better tools to counter in- Fast rope training in surgents, and Washington—calling on civilian Afghanistan. Signal Company (Robert Hyatt)

and military capabilities—can assist when not lim- th ited to teaching hostage rescue techniques. 55 On the Right Path Underpinning special operations in SOF personnel are models of proper behavior Afghanistan was the concept of engagement— among local populations and do not create that is, enhancing national security through sys- enemy sympathizers. Such conduct also aids in tematic and integrated collecting intelligence. In some nations, relation- unconventional warfare must global leadership to influ- ships may include helping form local militias or not be limited to hot wars or ence state or nonstate ac- civilian defense forces, thus strengthening com- tors. SOF personnel are ef- munities as well as respect for human rights. This large-scale operations fective because of area fact was recognized by policymakers as an emerg- expertise, which is honed ing post-Cold War role. If a crisis erupts while over many years. They routinely deploy overseas special operators are deployed, they provide in- and develop close relationships with foreign stant presence for unified commanders. In addi- counterparts. For instance, Uzbekistani support tion, both psychological operations and civil af- of operations in Afghanistan was facilitated by fairs on the strategic and tactical levels must be the earlier visit of a Special Forces training team. emphasized since they clarify foreign policy ob- SOF political-military efforts promoted long-term jectives through favorable impressions of U.S. objectives. Such an approach must be sustained military activity in a region. not only for the sake of counterterrorism, but to Unconventional warfare also puts demands ensure that Special Operations Forces are capable on the operational skills of both civilian and mili- of conducting unconventional warfare. tary organizations. DOD must augment SOF mis- Moreover, SOF assets are global scouts. Some sions in those areas plagued by insurgency. Em- of their critical work is performed prior to a cri- phasis must be placed on agricultural and sis. Such efforts, often in the context of foreign economic efforts sponsored by the U.S. Agency internal defense, are linked to proper conduct in for International Development—objectives con- dealing with civilians where insurgency is likely.2 sistent with the global alliance, which is the model for the 21st century. Such development is crucial to U.S. strategic interests. Unconventional

20 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Jones

Searching for hidden arms cache. Signal Company (Fred Gurwell) th 55 Civil Affairs personnel with village elders. Signal Company (Marshall Emerson) th 55

warfare must not be limited to hot wars or large- instruments of national power, including public scale operations. A judicious admixture of train- diplomacy and psychological operations as well ing and development may lead to a lasting vic- as civic action conducted. The lessons of the Viet- tory without dramatic headlines. nam War are pertinent. Interagency relations Next, the military must analyze irregular and must be enhanced to offset the lack of an inte- revolutionary warfare, not only by revisiting past grated counterinsurgency strategy and national conflicts but also in projecting future confronta- mechanism to coordinate it. This effort must tions, which include political, economic, and so- focus on the Department of State (especially pub- cial views as well as cultural and religious biases lic diplomacy); the intelligence community, be- of potential enemies. The importance of area ex- cause human intelligence, counterintelligence, pertise cannot be overestimated. Understanding and area expertise are critical (SOF personnel who operational environments must form part of return from overseas are a trove of information); training for SOF personnel, such as intelligence and the U.S. Agency for International Develop- analysts and operatives. Equally significant are ment, which must act as a full partner in working the strengths and weaknesses of allies and with local populations. friends. Anecdotal evidence from Afghanistan Even superpowers can lose asymmetric wars. suggests that SOF personnel must be proficient in The ideal response to such conflicts requires several languages within their area of operations. preparing for engagements despite technological DOD must consider innovations for use in advantages. Committing forces may cause public various environments, such as urban warfare, and opinion to become a center of gravity, a vulnera- the means to accomplish missions, from non- bility that insurgents exploit. In addition, when lethal weaponry to sophisticated communication forces are committed, counterinsurgency mis- equipment. There must also be an appraisal of sions must be entrusted to those especially SOF capabilities for the future. trained and equipped for them. Winning hearts A counterterrorism or counterinsurgency strategy must integrate military and information

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 21 ARMY SOF IN AFGHANISTAN

Checking for munitions outside Kabul. Combat Camera Squadron (Bethann Hunt) Combat Camera Squadron st 1

and minds is integral to forces, too much emphasis can be put on coordi- defeating insurgency, an nating ground and air attacks while recruiting axiom initially invoked anti-Taliban fighters is underestimated. The latter during the emergency in capacity resulted from employing SOF assets in Malaya—the model of a unconventional warfare. Comprehending this successful counterinsur- subtlety will be critical in future operations. gency campaign.3 While there are not many Afghanistans in the Finally, emphasiz- world, potential alliances abound. The rise of ining one mission over an- surgent and irredentist movements (sometimes other does not come equated with terrorist initiatives exclusively), cou- Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic (Michael Sandberg) without friction. Allo- pled with asymmetric threats, demands a strate- Preparing PSYOP cating resources is diffi- gic vision for unconventional warfare. JFQ leaflets. cult, and upgrading unconventional warfare will require personnel as well as resources that are not NOTES included in the current budget. U.S. Special Oper- 1 Thomas R. Wilson, “Global Threats and Chal- ations Command must reexamine planning and lenges,” statement before the Senate Armed Services budgeting processes to determine if the uncon- Committee, March 19, 2002, http://www.dia.mil/ ventional warfare mission, in its broadest sense, is Public/Press/statement04.html. amply supported. 2 Anthony J. Joes, America and Guerilla Warfare (Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 2000), The successes of military operations in pp. 330–32. Afghanistan are being jeopardized by misreading 3 Michael Howard, “Mistake to Declare This a War,” them. Although Special Operations Forces are RUSI Journal, vol. 46, no. 6, (December 2001), p. 2. credited with defeating Taliban and al Qaeda

22 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Airmen tending F–15E, Nellis Air Force Base.

Briefing Millennium Challenge. Combat Camera Squadron (Aaron D. Allmon II) (Aaron Combat Camera Squadron st 1 Combat Camera Squadron (Lisa Zunzanyika) Combat Camera Squadron st MILLENNIUM 1 CHALLENGE 2002 Setting the Mark

By GROVER E. MYERS

ew enemies with old grudges are using 2002, was the pinnacle of this effort thus far. innovative ways to challenge Ameri- JFCOM believes this multilevel exercise was suc- can leadership around the world. To cessful enough to warrant immediate implemen- N meet this threat, the Secretary of De- tation of some of its recommendations. fense has given the task of transforming the mili- Equally important as decisions on change for tary to U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). Mil- those who must confront emerging enemies are lennium Challenge, conducted in the summer of the lessons of recent operations and deliberate experimentation. New adversaries are not likely to Lieutenant Colonel Grover E. Myers, USAF (Ret.), is an analyst at U.S. wait as we adapt to fresh tactics and threats in the Joint Forces Command and previously served at the Air Force Doctrine traditional methodical Cold War fashion. And the Center. lessons from transformational experiments need

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 23 MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE

to be immediately recognized and incorporated right set of capabilities to control the circum- into plans and, more importantly, into doctrine. stances and the enemy and conclude conflicts as As one observer noted, “Experience in the private quickly and resolutely as possible at minimum sector demonstrates that successful corporations cost in lives and treasure. do not plan to transform in the distant future: Since JFCOM was assigned the mission to they transform constantly.”1 lead joint experimentation, the command has worked a robust program of experimentation and The Challenge wargames to initiate and develop key warfighting The United States finds itself in a unique his- concepts. For example, Unified Vision, an experi- torical position that is both highly perilous and ment conducted in May 2001, assessed the value full of opportunities. With the end of the Cold added of a standing joint force headquarters in a War it is the most powerful nation on earth. After rapid decisive operation. From its findings and in- some forty years of superpower confrontation and sights, the RDO concept was further developed a nuclear standoff, many Americans believe that through a series of smaller limited objective ex- the country has earned a respite from the burden periments so that a mature concept with support- of global leadership. But its role in the world pres- ing systems, procedures, and tools was ready for ents new challenges to national interests. rigorous analysis when Millennium Challenge Technological advances offer unprecedented was conducted. capabilities to friendly and enemy forces alike. Paramount in rapid decisive operations is the Political, economic, cultural, and other pressures idea that one must think differently about plan- in the post-colonial, post-Cold War environment ning and executing military operations. That is make conflict more the overarching theme of JFCOM concept devel- for the force to carry out effects- likely. Globalization opment and experimental activity, which has em- based action, it must have seeds unrest in distant phasized a fully networked joint force with a su- lands that is potentially perior, knowledge-focused joint organization detailed knowledge of an enemy damaging to national ready to implement effects-based operations in interests. The possible rapid decisive operations. Along the way, the consequences of future conflict were brought command has used input from the field and fleet home when the United States came under terror- in the form of findings from experimentation ist attack in September 2001. and wargaming. The latest defense planning guidance ac- The RDO concept emerged from four charac- knowledged new challenges and recognized that teristics of future joint operations: coherently current forces and operational concepts designed joint, fully networked, effects-based, and knowl- for symmetrical warfare against similarly armed edge centric. Together they provide a framework enemies were inadequate. Thus it tasked JFCOM for examining joint concepts and exploring capa- to develop joint operational concepts to support bilities—an approach to thinking differently about military transformation while exploiting asym- military operations. Moreover, since they are metric advantages and emerging joint capabilities. closely interrelated, these characteristics must not be viewed in isolation. For example, to be coher- A Response ently joint means that all components of the force The rapid decisive operations (RDO) concept must be fully networked with integrated, collabo- developed by JFCOM responds to defense plan- rative command and control structures. And for ning guidance and to the new operational reali- the force to carry out effects-based action, it must ties driving it. Fostered by the requirement to have detailed knowledge of an enemy, itself, and meet a wider range of enemy capabilities, this the environment, thus being knowledge-centric. concept presents new ideas on achieving national objectives and is centered on effects-based meth- Testing New Concepts ods and processes. It describes a way to apply mil- Millennium Challenge tested the RDO con- itary capabilities in conjunction with the other struct and the ability of the joint force to conduct instruments of national power—diplomatic, in- such operations in this decade. It employed formational, and economic—in a campaign cen- newly developed concepts and stressed them in tered on the effects required to achieve national the new world environment. The command mis- objectives. Unlike traditional military operations, sion was not only to demonstrate the ability to an effects-based campaign does not focus prima- conduct rapid decisive operations, but to produce rily on attrition of an enemy, although that op- comprehensive recommendations as part of the tion remains, but on affecting the will and ability of opposing leaders to resist U.S. objectives—on creating desired actions or reactions or even an inability to act at all. The goal is to apply the

24 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Myers

SEALs emerging from HH–60, Desert Rescue X. Combat Camera Squadron (AaronCombat Camera Squadron D. Allmon II) st 1

JFCOM role as a leading agent for joint force Effects-based operations. Unlike traditional transformation. The command has begun making campaigns, an effects-based campaign is not pri- recommendations based on more than two years marily focused on attrition but rather on creating of joint experimentation. effects—desired enemy actions, reactions, or in- Millennium Challenge enabled JFCOM to abilities to act—that force compliance with na- develop specific recommendations to transform tional objectives. The goal is to apply the right set joint operations and provide a pathway for future of capabilities that will conclude the conflict as experiments. It was the largest as well as the most quickly and resolutely as possible at minimum comprehensive joint force experiment ever con- cost in lives and treasure. Effects-based operations ducted. This $250 million undertaking was pre- provide a process for obtaining the desired strate- ceded by 23 workshops and 16 limited objective gic outcome through the precise application of all experiments. In addition, it facilitated the explo- national capabilities—economic, information, ration of 11 joint service concepts, 27 joint initia- and diplomatic as well as military. On the operatives, and 46 service initiatives, and also evalu- tional level of war, effects-based campaigning is ated 22 warfighting issues based on concerns of concerned with controlling or influencing the be- combatant commanders. Some 13,500 personnel havior of a complex, adaptive enemy by creating at 25 locations across the United States were in- specific conditions and disrupting its ability to volved in this experiment, which incorporated a adapt to those conditions in any way other than rich mix of live and simulated forces, current and the desired outcome. future capabilities, an aggressive and asymmetric Effects-based operations are prefaced on un- opposing force, and a new federation of 42 mod- derstanding an enemy as a complex adaptive sys- els and simulations. tem and identifying the key nodes and links in The RDO concept is not a stand-alone con- that system where effects are to be concentrated. struct; it relies on component concepts to achieve It also aims to achieve effects that cannot always its objectives. The most prominent concepts ad- be attained with weapons—political, information, dressed during Millennium Challenge were ef- and economic. It focuses the collective effects to fects-based operations, standing joint force head- take away what an enemy most values. quarters, the collaborative information To the soldier on the ground, effects-based environment, the joint interagency coordination operations are transparent—what he does and group, and operational net assessment.

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 25 MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE

composed of representatives of only one service who are untrained in joint task force procedures. By contrast, a fully trained standing headquarters of 50 to 60 personnel from all services located in the regional commander’s headquarters can begin much of the planning almost immediately and can be augmented as the situation requires. JFCOM is convinced that standing joint force headquarters can provide faster stand-up of a joint task force headquarters during a crisis where every minute counts, and that once established the headquarters has a better awareness of the intent of a combatant commander and the operational situation. This approach also provides the organizational construct for applying the remaining concepts described below. Collaborative information environment. Using newly available high-speed information connectivity and electronic collaborative tools, the collaborative information environment facilitates immediate information exchange among members of the joint force and its supporting and sup-

U.S. Army (Sara Wood) ported organizations. It contributes to achieving Operating tactical decision superiority by rapidly and simultane- satellite radio at ously sharing information and ideas to all who Fort Erwin. how he does it will change little; however appli- need it, reducing planning times and enhancing cation of its principles directly against enemy will operational effectiveness. and capability to resist mitigates the risks to that The environment used during Millennium soldier. Its effectiveness rests on friendly advan- Challenge was a command, control, and intelli- tages in new information technology and the gence system that simultaneously linked com- knowledge of the enemy, oneself, and one’s envi- manders at many levels and locations and their ronment. Of all the emerging concepts, it best sources of vital information both within and represents the idea of looking at things from a outside military channels. Collaborative infor- different perspective. mation environment uses the global informa- Standing joint force headquarters. Located tion grid as its information management and within a combatant command, the standing joint dissemination backbone, which will allow oper- force headquarters is a permanent command and ational commanders to collaborate with sup- control element that: porting organizations wherever they are located. The operational net assessment and joint intera- operates and trains together on a daily basis, gency coordination group concepts discussed creating permanent, habitual working relationships below rely heavily on collaborative information participates in planning and executing the commander’s long-term security cooperation program environment in that each uses collaborative conducts operational net assessment and con- applications to permit supporting staffs, sepa- tingency planning for potential crises in the comman- rated by geography and organizational bound- der’s area of responsibility aries, to develop products collectively. is enabled by the collaborative information Additionally, the new joint en route mission environment planning and rehearsal system-near term was in- reduces ad hoc staff adaptation and augmenta- tegral to the collaborative information environ- tion in time of crisis. ment in Millennium Challenge. This command Traditionally, task-specific headquarters have and control tool allowed the operational com- been organized and deployed only when a crisis mander to continue to participate in the collabo- has begun or political/senior military authorities rative environment with his staff and subordinate identify a need. In such cases, a commander must commanders even while on the move at great dis- then be identified and a staff assigned to manage tances from his headquarters. the operation. Often the tasked headquarters is Joint interagency coordination group. Both military leaders and civilian officials recognize the persistent shortfall in synchronizing military and agency efforts toward common goals. When the Nation undertakes operations to influence, deter,

26 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Myers

or defeat an enemy, the Armed Forces are only environment of an enemy. That is effects-based one component. Achieving national goals is a co- thinking. Key is the difference between tradi- operative endeavor involving many Federal agen- tional objective-oriented operations, which are cies. The joint interagency coordination group focused on destroying physical objectives, and ef- provides civilian representatives to combatant fects-based operations, in which the cohesion of commands and facilitates rapid information shar- the environment, capability, and will of an ing across the interagency enemy is attacked through full simultaneous inte- the joint interagency community. It fosters mutual gration of all aspects of national power. understanding by developing The first understanding of the situation is coordination group provides collaborative day-to-day the job of the operational net assessment—pro- civilian representatives to working relationships be- viding a full understanding of an enemy, the bat- tween civilian and military tlespace environment, and friendly resources as combatant commands operational planners. In seen by an enemy. This type of insight is called a keeping with the intent of system-of-systems analysis. rapid decisive operations, this group allows the- Finally, it was recognized early on that the ater commanders to bring all elements of na- current process of managing the way the military tional power to bear—harmonizing diplomatic, views the world and the operational challenges it information, military, and economic activities presents was not achieving the goal of decision within their areas of responsibility. These ele- superiority. The processes and formal relation- ments can best be applied together to rapidly re- ships were out of date. The Armed Forces were sult in the collapse of an enemy. still organized like Napoleonic armies while oper- Operational net assessment. Harnessing recent ating in a world of cyberwar. advances in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and procedures as well as in An Assessment communications and information management, Millennium Challenge was judged by most operational net assessment provides commanders participants as a success in determining the abil- with comprehensive analysis of the potential ef- ity to conduct rapid decisive operations in this fects of both friendly and enemy actions. This decade and in rigorously analyzing component study extends beyond traditional military means concepts. The central ideas presented earlier fall to provide a range of options that can decisively into two camps. The characterization of these po- influence enemy will. sitions—either invest now or in need of refinement— Operational net assessment relies on habit- is determined by the readiness of a concept or ini- ual, persistent, institutionalized collaboration and tiative for implementation in the joint force. integration among as many concerned parties as Several significant insights from this experiment possible (largely provided by the collaborative in- call for immediate investment. formation environment). The intent is to leverage DOD should first select a common collabora- a wide variety of experts from multiple organiza- tive capability for an interim joint command and tions to build a coherent knowledge base. This as- control tool; JFCOM, with support from unified sessment links potential effects to critical leverage commands, services, et al., should develop joint points within a political, economic, information, command, control, communications, computers, and military system and to a range of options and intelligence (C4I) architecture. Then the Joint necessary to achieve those effects. Requirements Oversight Council should approve a base prototype incorporating both key enablers Linking the Pieces of a collaborative information environment and The central hypothesis tested in Millennium evolving concepts of operational net assessment Challenge involved three concepts that will en- and effects-based operations. Finally, a capability large joint force capability to conduct a rapid de- should be fielded to combatant commands; cisive operation. If an enhanced joint headquar- JFCOM should collaborate with the Office of the ters is informed by an operational net assessment Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and unified com- and employs effects-based operations that utilize mands to refine roles, responsibilities, business the full range of national capabilities, the 2007 rules, and a reachback capability. joint force will be able to conduct rapid decisive In addition, two main areas need refine- operations against a determined 2007 enemy. ment. JFCOM should revamp the concept of ef- The hypothesis can best be understood in fects-based operations. The Joint Forces Staff Col- terms of the desired outcome, which is achieved lege should be assigned to JFCOM and tasked by gaining decision superiority over an enemy. with joint professional military education aligned Such decisions are based on altering the perceived with changing operational art. Moreover, the De- fense Advanced Research Projects Agency, in concert with JFCOM, industry, other agencies, and

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 27 MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE

Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary Changing the Conduct of Warfare and Conflict of Military and Associated Terms, doctrine is “Fun- Traditional Future damental principles that guide the employment Deconflicted Operations Fully Integrated Joint Operations of forces of two or more services in coordinated action toward a common objective.” Interoperable service-based Integrated joint-based Advances that lead to change are not con- Interagency coordination Interagency integration fined to the world of science and technology. It is Complementary multinational Coordinated multinational often stated that developments in warfare stem from technological innovations such as the long- Continuous information/data generation Continuous actionable knowledge bow, stirrup, machine gun, tank, stealth aircraft, generation and management and unmanned aerial vehicle. While Joint Vision Target effects Effects-based 2020 clearly acknowledges the role of technology Platform-based Networked in such advances, it states that it is not the sole Engagement-centric Effects-centric driver of change within the Armed Forces. The document places greater importance on the “de- Massive force application Precise force application velopment of doctrine, organizations, training, Sequential and segmented Simultaneous and parallel and education, leaders and people.” Regional battlespace perspective Global battlespace perspective It is not a coincidence that doctrine heads Contiguous (in contact) Noncontiguous (not in contact) this list since it is an authoritative statement of the best way of doing business. It also drives edu- Combat focus primarily threat-based Combat focus on capabilities-based cation and training. Concepts such as rapid deci- system of systems sive operations represent much of the future of military doctrine. Ideas on better ways of doing things, properly developed, tested, sponsored, and presented, can become part of the driving headquarters, should develop enabling technolo- paradigm of military might. Rapid decisive opera- gies to support the operational net assessment tions, standing joint force headquarters, and ef- initiative. Work should begin on a prototype with fects-based operations could be seen as the source the Office of the Secretary of Defense and com- of doctrine. They forward ideas that may eventu- batant commands, and a DOD fusion/knowledge ally become part of the doctrinal construct. advantage capability should be created. Experiments such as Unified Vision and Mil- From these and other more detailed observa- lennium Challenge can enable JFCOM to capture tions throughout the three-week event some con- emerging trends in the American way of war and clusions can be drawn present new constructs for operations. The ac- experiments can enable JFCOM about near-term U.S. force companying figure depicts how command experiments on new concepts and effects-based opera- to capture emerging trends in capabilities and the RDO concept. The bottom line tions might eventually change the nature of st the American way of war is that while there is more military operations to meet 21 century needs. to be done, transforma- These emerging trends have already fostered tion to a force capable of achieving its objectives change in the way we view military operations in the post-Cold War environment at any place and will result in far more in the next few years. any time seems to be on track. But as of this writing, most do not yet have a conceptual foundation in joint doctrine; there is Experiment Findings very little doctrinal description of their effects on Today the joint force cannot conduct rapid how national goals are achieved. decisive operations across the entire force or on Rapidly developing concepts such as effects- the scale desired. However, if the recommenda- based operations, the interagency campaign, col- tions are implemented, it will be able to conduct laborative information environment, and the them over the course of this decade. standing joint force headquarters are four exam- Several combatant commands have already ples of new national security concepts being de- incorporated and are using concepts and tools veloped across the diplomatic, information, and developed for Millennium Challenge. Joint ex- economic as well as military elements of national perimentation, training, and integration are power. But it can be argued that for the military moving the Armed Forces in the right direction— component, the level of interest and the time and toward military transformation. energy spent on their development, test, and ini- It is time to apply ideas derived from the tial use in the field make them ideal candidates JFCOM experimentation process to doctrinal pre- for near-term doctrinal review. scriptions. In this context, and as defined in Joint

28 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Myers

Afghanistan. A JFCOM pamphlet entitled Bridging the Gap Between Concepts and Doctrine makes this point: “Even a concept focused on 2015 and based on matériel capabilities not yet available can contain process and organizational constructs that could improve today’s operations.” Such is the case, especially with effects-based operations and collaborative information environment, where the main thrust centers on changing thinking rather than building new systems. Concepts are developed to solve pressing needs. Traditionally they have been validated by testing and experimentation, at times even in the cauldron of conflict. The emerging principles are then submitted to joint and service doctrine development authorities for review and eventual in- clusion in doctrinal publications. But converting proven ideas into viable pre- Combat Camera Squadron (John Houghton) Combat Camera Squadron st 1 scriptions is a lengthy process. The life cycle of a Marines patrolling, doctrine publication from development through Millennium Challenge. approval can take two years or more as parochial JFCOM is including a list of doctrine devel- differences among the various parties are worked opment issues in its formal recommendations for out. The publication is then assessed for revision change in the wake of Millennium Challenge. For after five years and the process begins again. example, one recommendation suggests that the This approach to consensus management Joint Staff and JFCOM assess the impact of the might have been acceptable during the Cold War, concept of effects-based operations and the re- when basic strategic and doctrinal precepts rarely sults of the experiment on joint publications and changed and the focus was on a confrontation in on the joint pub assessment and publication Western Europe similar to World War II. But since schedule. But this is no simple task, as any such the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Armed Forces have analysis must consider the relationship between experienced a tremendous expansion in military effects-based operations and the collaborative in- operations—Desert Storm, Deliberate Force, Allied formation environment, operational net assess- Force, and Enduring Freedom—as well as relief ment, standing joint force headquarters, and and peacekeeping missions, each with its own set joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- of circumstances and objectives. As a result, les- sance concepts, which reinforce each other. sons are being learned faster than doctrine can be Moreover, Millennium Challenge revealed developed. The same phenomenon applies to that standing joint force headquarters—formed in new concepts being generated by the forms of peacetime, organized to manage information and warfare encountered in those operations. plan for contingencies in advance of events, and ready to deploy as crises escalate—significantly The goals of military transformation will not improves the readiness of combatant commands. be fully accomplished until joint doctrine takes They can provide up-front contingency planning related changes into account. Millennium Chal- and the ability to rapidly establish an operational lenge made significant progress in validating sev- joint task force headquarters that is battle ready eral new concepts and paved the way for others. as the first soldiers hit the ground. But achieving It established the initial mark for joint force the full effectiveness of the headquarters requires transformation. Now the onus on the joint com- it to incorporate the effects-based operations munity is incorporating new concepts into doc- process through use of collaborative information trine in order to conduct true rapid decisive oper- environment and operational net assessment. ations in 2007. The question is whether doctrinal The question now becomes when a concept development will be able to keep apace of change is ready for incorporation into doctrine. The obvi- and meet that deadline. JFQ ous answer is when it has been thoroughly evalu- ated through test and experimentation. But even NOTE concepts being developed for use in the distant 1 Douglas A. Macgregor, “Resurrecting Transforma- future may refine doctrine in the near term, as tion: A New Structure for Post-Industrial Warfare,” De- seen during Enduring Freedom when ideas such fense Horizons, no. 2 (September 2001), p. 1. as effects-based operations and operational net assessment were applied to operations in

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 29 The Tenth Anniversary Collection

Joint Force Quarterly on CD–ROM . . . available in late 2003

This compact disc will be searchable and cross-indexed by author, title, and subject area. To obtain a copy, send an e-mail request to [email protected] or write: Editor, Joint Force Quarterly, ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ, 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62), Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319–5066

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

30 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 The Military Uses of Space

How the United States develops the potential of space for civil, commercial, defense, and intelligence purposes will affect the Nation’s security for decades to come. America’s interests in space are to: promote the peaceful use of space use the Nation’s potential in space to support U.S. domestic, economic, diplomatic, and national security objectives develop and deploy the means to deter and defend against hostile acts directed at U.S. space assets and against the uses of space hostile to U.S. interests.

—from The Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 31

Atlas II AS rocket arriving at Vandenberg Air Force Base.

National Security Space Enabling Joint Warfighting

U.S. Air Force (Steve Schester) By PETER B. TEETS

lthough less than fifty This did not happen overnight. In years have passed since the early stages of the space age, only a man ventured into space, limited group of users on the most A the constellations of satel- strategic level used the great majority lites in orbit have fundamentally of space capabilities, and those systems changed life on Earth. Moreover, the were highly classified. The recently de- exploitation of space, like that of land, classified Corona program of the Na- sea, and air, has often had an unrecog- tional Reconnaissance Office is an ex- nized impact on modern warfare. ample of such a development. Distinctions among military, national intelligence, civil, and commer- The Honorable Peter B. Teets is Under Secretary of the Air Force and Director of the cial programs are being increasingly National Reconnaissance Office; previously he was president and chief operating blurred and in some cases are virtually officer of Lockheed Martin Corporation. seamless. The same overhead imagery

32 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Teets used by an analyst inside the beltway could be downloaded and exploited by a soldier in Afghanistan. The same global positioning system (GPS) satellites providing a navigation signal to fighters on patrol over Iraq could guide hikers in the Rockies or provide timing to an electric power grid. Space capabilities are woven deeply into the fabric of modern society. Commerce relies on them for the swift flow of information and transac- tions, and the national security arena depends on them for joint warfighting and protection of the homeland. It is clearly within this context that the defense and intelligence communities are striving to provide the right space capabilities to meet present and future national security challenges. Space Capabilities The Armed Forces are currently waging a conflict across the spectrum of warfare. Operations range from defending against a variety of unpre- dictable threats against the homeland to thwarting aggression by projecting national power to the farthest reaches of the globe. At the same time, the capabilities, strengths, and exploitation of space have never been so pivotal to warfighting success. Without question, space assets form the backbone of the global information and intelligence networks that gather and disseminate data, coordinate efforts, guide forces and weapons, and assess results. They are key enablers of the precision war- Pentagon from fare that not only reduces risk to Amer- 432 miles. ican troops, but saves innocent lives by Space Imaging minimizing collateral damage. Who would have predicted that aging B–52s could provide close air support with the help of precision tar- space, and the current war against new These included a separate four-star geting via satellite communications threats, that we find ourselves at an commander of Air Force Space Com- and global positioning? Or that Special historic point in the way the Nation mand (in addition to the combatant Operations Forces mounted on horse- organizes and advances its national se- commander of the former U.S. Space back would download intelligence curity space capabilities. Command), realignment of the Air onto laptops via satellite or navigate Force Space and Missile Systems Cen- by GPS devices? One can only begin to Executive Agent ter into Air Force Space Command, imagine the endless ways in which The Commission to Assess U.S. and combining acquisition milestone space will be critical to warfighters to- National Security Space Management decision authority for all space sys- morrow. Space capabilities are no and Organization recognized security tems with the responsibilities of the longer just nice to have—they are in- dependencies on space, identified vul- Under Secretary of the Air Force and dispensable. It is against this backdrop nerabilities in the space arena, and the Director of the National Recon- of the ever-increasing importance of laid out a roadmap for improved or- naissance Office. ganization and execution of the range of national security space activities.

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 33 JFQ FORUM

The Space Commission gave the Baghdad in Air Force a significant challenge in rec- October 2002. ommending that the service be the designated DOD executive agent for space, “with department-wide responsibility for planning, programming, and acquisition of space systems.” This is certainly not a set of tasks that one service can accomplish. The Air Force is working with the Departments of the Army and Navy, defense agencies, joint warfighters, the intelligence community, and civil and commercial users to ensure a comprehensive approach to national security space stew- ardship. Unity of vision and execution is needed to fulfill the mission of ensuring strong and capable space systems for national security needs. In this age with its many requirements, competition for resources is high, and systems—especially space capabilities—are in demand by the widest spectrum of users. Success is virtually impossible without a true unity of effort among all stakeholders. Restoring Faith The national security space team faces a number of challenges. One is to restore confidence in space acquisition programs. For various reasons recent Space Imaging Middle East problems have brought the credibility of the acquisition community into question in the minds of the defense To fix these problems, the team such a clause will be implemented on leadership and Congress. Despite se- has implemented some changes, but all major new national security space vere reductions in defense budgets more are required. The commander of contracts. over the past decade, the appetite for the Space and Missile Center has been These steps are only the first of capabilities remained, especially space dual-hatted with the duties of the Air many to vector space acquisition in Force program executive officer the right direction. The national secu- the Air Force is working to ensure for space, reporting in the latter rity space team is committed to mak- a comprehensive approach to capacity directly to the Under ing further changes across the spec- Secretary of the Air Force. The trum of acquisition, with emphasis on national security space team has also taken steps to adequate fiscal reserves and schedule streamline the overall process flexibility, more focused management capabilities. The tolerance for risk went by reducing acquisition decisionmak- attention, discipline in requirements, up, and the team changed the way it ing time, including independent cost and openness throughout the leader- did business, seeking to cut costs and assessments. ship chain. These efforts are essential if levels of government involvement. It Accountability is another area of the team is to deliver the critical space delegated too much responsibility to emphasis. The contract recently capabilities needed for joint warfight- contractors, reduced the flexibility of awarded on the tri-agency national ing in the years ahead. program managers by giving them ex- polar-orbiting operational environ- tremely small and heavily restricted mental satellite system included a new Assured Access management reserves, and fell short in twist: an executive compensation Another key challenge is ensuring budgets for research and development, clause. It states that the board of direc- access to space when it is needed. Like a practice that can strangle leading tors of a company must consider pro- a warship in port or an aircraft in the edge technology programs, yield insuf- gram performance when determining hangar, a spacecraft on the launch pad ficient options, and increase risk in de- the amount of compensation to award veloping those actually available. its top executives. It is the intent that

34 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Teets

Transforming Capabilities as the forward eyes for strike platforms In view of the threats of the 21st and other intelligence, surveillance, century, it is vital across DOD to strive and reconnaissance (ISR) assets by de- JDAMs under wing tecting surface movers (ground mov- of B–52, Enduring to meet the President’s mandate to ing target indication) and rapidly im- Freedom. renew and rebuild warfighting concepts, organizational constructs, and aging stationary targets (synthetic force structure. The efforts in the na- aperture radar). With a day/night, all- tional security space arena are not weather ability to look deep into de- meant to transform space systems in nied territory, multiple theaters, and themselves but to produce those new broad ocean areas, we hope to observe capabilities that enable transformed and predict adversary activities before, warfighting as a whole. during, and after conflict. The poten- One key initiative underway is de- tial of space-based radar for more pre- velopment of a transforming commu- cise and timely terrain mapping—high nications architecture. The vision is resolution terrain (elevation)—may eliminating bandwidth and access as yield benefits for mission planning constraints for warfighters. Such a fric- and rehearsal, particularly for Special tionless global communications net- Operations Forces or other assets that work will certainly rely heavily on ter- may be inserted behind enemy lines restrial communications pathways. But or borders. truly global coverage, anytime, any- Beyond transforming communica- U.S. Air Force (GregU.S. Air Force M. Kobashigawa) where, for anyone, will rely on space tions and radar, we are pursuing new for a considerable amount of this capa- sources and methods of information bility. It is the only way warfighters in and intelligence collection and ex- contributes little to joint warfighting remote locations—and the Navy at sea ploitation that will yield transforming and national security. To wield space anywhere—will be able to plug into capabilities for national security. Sys- power effectively, the Nation needs re- such a network. tems that perform hyperspectral imag- liable and responsive means to get crit- This increasing need for commu- ing or exploit measurement and signa- ical space systems into the fight; and nications is widely recognized. Last ture intelligence in ways as yet that means getting them on orbit. year the National Security Space Archi- unexplored exemplify such initiatives. Legacy launch systems were ex- tect led a study to outline a vision for Truly transformational capabilities will pensive, with launch schedules meas- an integrated communications net- exponentially increase existing asym- ured in months or years. The team has work that included both laser and metric advantages in warfighting, en- worked to change that. The past year radio frequency communications ca- suring that any clash would be as one- has seen successes with the maiden pabilities. The study confirmed that sided as possible. launches of two launch vehicles, the the baseline program plan Science and Technology would not meet forecast another effort that could benefit joint requirements and the ar- Transforming warfighting and intelligence calls for continued invest- warfighters is space-based radar chitecture needed for transformation. It also ment in space science and technology suggested that there is efforts. Everything accomplished in na- Atlas V and the Delta IV, both part of now a critical window of opportunity tional security space to date stems from the evolved expendable launch vehi- to provide an architectural framework past investments and developments in cle program. These new launchers her- for a compatible communications sys- this area. Apportioning resources can ald a new era of less expensive, sim- tem across the defense establishment, be difficult since it requires stable, pler, and more reliable means to the intelligence community, and the long-term investment and typically deploy space systems. National Aeronautics and Space Ad- does not provide immediate benefits to But the expendable launch vehi- ministration that increases capabilities current programs. But we cannot shy cle is only the first step toward true as- by a factor of ten. The mission of the away from the responsibility to invest sured access to space. We are exploring new Transformational Communica- today for future capabilities—we must follow-on possibilities for responsive tions Office is developing the architec- push the technology envelope. launch, from advanced and highly ture and acquisition strategy to make Investments alone will not guar- versatile reusable launch systems to this communications goal a reality. antee that the defense and intelligence small, low-cost expendables with ex- Another effort that could benefit communities obtain preeminent future tremely short response times. The goal joint warfighters is space-based radar. space capabilities. Science and technol- is getting into orbit inexpensively, reli- It is envisioned that this radar will act ogy planning must be improved to en- ably, and on schedules measured in sure that we encourage an operational days or hours. pull that conveys a clear vision of the

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 35 JFQ FORUM

MOAB, largest nonnuclear precision- guided weapon. DOD

capabilities needed for the future, ad- industry workforce will need space pro- among organizations across and down dress the full spectrum of future needs fessionals to exploit space in the inter- all sectors of government. There has in a balanced and well-thought-out est of national security. been great progress; the range of those manner, and determine ways to The goal of developing a team of exploiting space capabilities has ex- demonstrate and spin-out promising space professionals has bold implica- panded from a small set of strategic technologies to programs. tions. It is not simply creating a career users to multiple government agencies Another critical ingredient is col- field or developing an area of expert- and virtually the entire warfighting laboration. A number of organizations ise. It involves steps that will eventu- force. But more is needed. contribute to science and technology, ally lead to an entirely new kind of The conduct of intelligence, sur- including the Air Force Research Labo- warfighter that may ultimately trans- veillance, and reconnaissance is an ex- ratory, Naval Research Laboratory, and form the landscape of war. This process ample. Airborne and spaceborne assets the National Reconnaissance Office. demands new ways of thinking. It will each have unique performance charac- The more these agencies work to- take time to nurture a space team—as teristics that complement one another. gether, and the more they involve it did with the development of land, Advances in unmanned aerial vehicle other actors such as the Defense Ad- sea, and air professionals before them. technology are impressive, and the vanced Research Projects Agency and Space capabilities are not ends in characteristics of these vehicles make the National Aeronautics and Space themselves. The objective is the ability them extremely valuable in environ- Administration, the more productive to exploit the high ground of space to ments such as Afghanistan. But space- science and technology efforts become. conduct decisive joint operations and borne ISR assets have their own natural enhance national security. That cannot advantages, especially swift global Fostering Professionalism be achieved without mission success in reach and access. The requirement At the end of the day, developing space. It means maintaining achieve- today is global. There is not a divot or a new professional culture among space ments in launches, keeping on-orbit puddle we do not want to access—and professionals may prove the most deci- capabilities at their peak, and ensuring space capabilities are what reach those sive step. All the space capabilities that space support—missile warning, areas denied to other platforms for in- imaginable will prove useless without intelligence, weather data, and com- telligence collection. Successful integra- the leadership, vision, motivation, and munications bandwidth—is readily tion simultaneously leverages all these skills to employ them effectively. available for whoever needs it. advantages to benefit warfighters. Air Force Space Command is spear- We will have achieved effective heading efforts to develop the process Integration integration when the way we collect of growing space professionals within Another essential ingredient to information is unimportant; where the the service. But these efforts must not enabling effective joint warfighting is be limited to the Air Force alone. The integration—among land, sea, air, and Armed Forces as well as the civilian and space; between old and new platforms; of new requirements and systems; and

36 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Teets machines, regardless of type or loca- enemy spaceborne imagery collectors, have on warfare today. But we must be tion, are talking to one another; where commercial or home-grown, identify open to any and all possibilities that intelligence and information are easily and target the Armed Forces? What would save lives, benefit warfighters, obtained, whether the user is an intel- will be the response in a decade when and protect the Nation. ligence analyst in Washington or a sol- an enemy leverages the global posi- dier in the field; where fixing, tracking, tioning system to launch an attack The extent to which space has and targeting data are passed easily with precision? been used for military and other needs from platform to platform. The mission of space control has is phenomenal, and its uses in the fu- not been at the forefront of military ture seem limitless. The Nation has Controlling the High Ground thinking because an enemy using space embraced the potential for space-based Gaining and holding the high capabilities has not yet put our own capabilities, and the Armed Forces do ground has been a prescription for mil- people at risk. That will change. Plan- not wish to fight without them any itary success since the dawn of time. ners not only need to think about the more than the civil sector would be Space is the ultimate high ground, and mission and implications of space con- willing to give up satellite communica- although space exploration has gone trol, but it is fundamentally irresponsi- tions, direct broadcast, global position- on for almost half a century, the need ble not to consider them. Space is the ing, or weather services. Accordingly, to protect vital space capabilities is ultimate high ground. The military ad- planners must ensure that space sys- only now becoming accepted as com- vantage requires maintaining an edge tems and architectures are available for parable to control of the land, sea, and over opposing capabilities, and Ameri- joint warfighters. air. The national security needs to can doctrine and capabilities must keep Space is inherently global and dominate space will only increase. pace in meeting that challenge. uniquely capable of supporting global The first ingredient for control is interests. The ability to know about awareness of the space environment: Future Warfighting events, shape relations among states, natural phenomena, spacecraft traffic, As space capabilities mature, inte- project power, and deter or compel en- and natural or manmade threats to gration into warfighting on land, at emies will increasingly depend on space systems. Steps have been taken sea, and in the air is essential, and con- space. These factors present challenges to increase situation awareness capabil- trolling the high ground of space is to the United States in accomplishing vital. But are there its national security objectives. JFQ the need to protect vital space capabilities new and more inno- is only now becoming accepted as compa- vative ways to exploit that medium rable to control of the land, sea, and air to achieve desired warfighting effects? ities, including the standup of the Are there ways these capabilities can Space Situation Awareness Integration affect global strike operations in forms Office in Air Force Space Command we can scarcely imagine today? Are and funding for surveillance assets there ways to use space capabilities to over the next five years. affect the enemy decisionmaking cycle Control also requires protecting or produce other effects to achieve capabilities. The Nation must not take campaign objectives in ways land, sea, space capabilities for granted, nor can and air forces cannot? Perhaps some- it ignore the increasing role they will day a lethal synergy of space position- play against friendly forces. If enemies ing and tracking systems (global posi- recognize the value of space capabili- tioning and space-based radar) and ties in modern warfare, they will not high-ground weapons (the proposed only seek to use them but to deny space-based laser) will prove decisive in their use to others. These are the sorts some circumstances. Or coupling space of issues the Space Commission had capabilities with information warfare in mind when it warned of a “Space will shut down an enemy command Pearl Harbor.” and control system before it can Achieving effective space control launch an attack. also requires denying the high ground We can no more perceive what to enemies. With the integration of contributions space will make to space capabilities across the spectrum warfighting in future decades than mil- of its warfighting operations, the itary leaders a hundred years ago could United States is paving the road of 21st foresee the impact airpower would century warfare, and others will follow. What will occur in five years when Americans are put at risk because

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 37 U–2 returning from mission, Enduring Freedom.

Arming B–1 with 2,000-pound JDAM. Combat Camera Squadron (Reynaldo Ramon) Combat Camera Squadron st 1 U.S. Air Force (DaveU.S. Air Force Nolan)

By LANCE W. LORD

n Enduring Freedom, U–2s are flying over Afghanistan, collecting data, and then sending it back to I 9th Intelligence Support Squadron at Beale Air Force Base, where the imagery is analyzed and potential target coordinates are mensurated. The coordinates are passed along to the Combined Air Op- erations Center at Prince Sultan Air Base to prioritize and include in the air tasking order. Coordinates and imagery sent FORGING from the United States are used to match weapons with targets. This reliance on reachback is key to expeditionary culture and has reduced the number of Space Warriors deployed personnel. The capabilities provided by Air Force Space Command are an indis- pensable but nearly transparent part of what makes reachback possible. In one of the most decisive battles in Western history, Aetius defeated Attila the Hun at the Battle of Châlons in 451, in part because of a considerable advantage gained by seizing high ground on the enemy flank in an initial battle. After many centuries and General Lance W. Lord, USAF, is Commander, Air Force Space Command, and myriad technological advances, that also has served as Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, as well as Commander, Air University.

38 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Lord tactic is still valid. Joint Publication Milstar satellite on 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, Titan IV at Cape highlights the fact that space is the ul- Canaveral. timate high ground, because it provides global access and extensive advantage. Within the Air Force, those capabilities and their battlefield effects are the responsibility of Air Force Space Command, which organizes, trains, and equips space and missile forces to exploit and control the high ground of space. The joint force relies on space capabilities that were not envisioned at the start of the 1950s. Military capabilities originally developed for strategic purposes have evolved to be employed on the operational and tactical levels. Space provided both satellite communications and weather data to operational-level commanders in Vietnam. The Phu Lam Signal Battalion was one of the first units in the Army to deploy satellite capabilities, and the Air Force brought the defense meteorological satellite program out of the black world to support warfighters. In Desert Storm, a range of space capabilities was employed, from navigation and timing to missile warning. Space assets are key enablers in the process of finding, fixing, tracking, targeting, engaging, and assessing an enemy—the so-called kill chain. Con- trolled through satellite relays, unmanned aerial vehicles attack targets on the ground. Satellite-guided weapons such as the joint direct attack munition are used with devastating effect while minimizing collateral damage. Capabilities in space have become critical to military effectiveness. In his testimony before Congress, the Com- mander of U.S. Central Command, General Tommy Franks, USA, remarked that much of the success of Enduring Freedom would not have been possible without those assets. Lockheed Martin Space Systems (Russ Underwood) Providing and Enabling Air Force Space Command is both roles. First, it organizes, trains, and Command must be versed in land, sea, a force provider and a force enabler. It equips joint warfighters in the space and air operations to provide capabili- is an integrated organization of 40,000 and missile business. Second, it places ties to combatant commanders when military, DOD civilian, and contract great emphasis on its componency and where needed. And third, the personnel who ensure that the systems role, not only on expertise in intercon- command is helping to make the new designed, built, and operated by the tinental ballistic missiles and space. As role of the Air Force as executive agent command provide capabilities for the part of the joint team, Air Force Space for space a resounding success. Armed Forces to generate battlefield ef- These three roles are critical to de- fects. The command has three main fending the Nation through the control

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 39 JFQ FORUM

Force Enhancement Mission Areas, Primary Orbits, and Current and Planned Systems

Mission Areas Primary Orbits Current and Planned Systems Environmental Monitoring Polar Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) Defense Meteorological Support Program (DMSP), National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) Communications Geostationary Orbit (GSO) Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) II, DSCS III, Global Broadcast System (GBS), Wideband Gapfiller System (WGS), Advanced Wideband System (AWS), Transforma- tional Communications System, Milstar, Advanced Extremely-High Frequency (AEHF) System, Ultra-High Frequency Follow-on (UFO) System, Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) Position, Velocity, Time, Semi-synchronous Orbit Global Positioning System (GPS), GPS II/IIA, GPS IIR, GPS IIR–M, GPS IIF, GPS III and Navigation Integrated Tactical Warning Polar Low-Earth Orbit and Defense Support Program (DSP), Space-Based Infrared System and Attack Assessment Geostationary Orbit (SBIRS) High, Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) Intelligence, Surveillance, Various Legacy Systems, Future Imagery Architecture (FIA), Integrated and Reconnaissance Overhead Signals Intelligence Architecture (IOSA)

Source: Joint Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, and Air Force Magazine, Space Almanac edition.

and exploitation of space. In support of the military utility of balloons, predict- Squadron at Cheyenne Mountain to that broad mission, systems and capa- ing that they would be employed for detect, identify, characterize, track, and bilities are grouped into four areas. spying, dropping bombs, and ferrying catalog high interest space objects. The invading armies across Space Situation Awareness Integration space superiority—the freedom to enemy-dominated seas. Office was also recently established in Eleven years after those Colorado Springs to work on a number conduct operations without significant first tests, the French of initiatives. For example, an effort is interference from enemy forces—must used a tethered balloon underway to identify system require- to observe the battlefield ments for sensors and communication be achieved in future conflicts and direct fire against the links among satellites to determine Austrian forces at the Bat- whether a spacecraft is the target of in- First, the counterspace mission area ad- tle of Fleurus. The Austrians took ex- tentional interference. The office will dresses the need to gain and maintain ception to what they regarded as a vio- move the command beyond simple space superiority—control of space—as lation of the Napoleonic code of war, space surveillance, fusing information an initial step in space operations. As and on the second ascent fired artillery with intelligence, reconnaissance, and history has demonstrated, the ability to at the balloon. environmental data to provide an inte- exploit a medium comes with control Just as the Austrians challenged grated operational picture. of it. Space force enhancement and ap- the French after identifying a new cen- In terms of defense, the Air Force plication are mission areas that utilize ter of gravity, those who are dependent has added protective (survivability) exploitation capabilities. Finally, space on space should expect to be tested. countermeasures on a case-by-case support is a mission area that provides The United States holds an asymmetric basis to satellite systems to protect the foundation of space operations. advantage in space, and if history is against jamming, signal interception, These four areas match the core compe- any indication, potential enemies are and nuclear detonation. Active defen- tencies that were recently refined by watching and learning. Space superior- sive counterspace measures include both the Secretary of the Air Force and ity—the freedom to conduct opera- satellite maneuvering and advanced the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. tions without significant interference antennas. Improvements are being from enemy forces—must be achieved made in detecting, characterizing, lo- Counterspace in future conflicts. The counterspace cating, and assessing attacks or intru- The military has historically mission area relies on space situation sions into friendly operations. Work is evolved to exploit new means of awareness, defensive counterspace, and also being done to negate counter- warfighting. The Montgolfier brothers offensive counterspace. space systems and prevent enemies tested the first hot-air balloon in 1783. Air Force Space Command uses a from exploiting U.S. capabilities. Last, Benjamin Franklin observed some of space surveillance network that com- spacecraft survivability is being en- the trials in Paris and wrote home of bines ground-based radars and optical hanced by improved tactics, tech- sensors to perform the space surveil- niques, and procedures. lance portion of space situation aware- The conventional offensive coun- ness. It enables 1st Space Control terspace capability to negate enemy use

40 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Lord

monitoring to the joint warfighter. Geosynchronous communications These capabilities, and perhaps more satellites. importantly integrating them with other assets, were demonstrated in En- during Freedom. Coalition forces used unmanned aerial vehicles, precision guided munitions, laser spotting equipment, and secure satellite radios, combined with veteran B–52s and horseback riders. This unprecedented integration had devastating effects. Currently, space provides the capabilities to gather and disseminate timely, highly accurate information to enable situation awareness and effective command and control (C2) on all levels. Air Force Space Command missile warning capabilities consist of defense support program satellites and ground-based radars to warn of missile attacks on the United States and Canada as well as theater missile attacks. The global positioning system (GPS) provides precision-positioning, navigation, and timing information, from basic navigation and synchronization of communications to basing, targeting, and terminal guidance of precision weapons. Air Force Space Command operates the Milstar constellation and provides day- to-day command and control of the defense satellite communications system (DSCS) to provide the voice, data, and video links essential to military operations. With the National Oceanic and At- mospheric Administration, Air Force weather satellites (including defense mete- Boeing Satellite Systems orological satellite program satellites and terrestrial and space environment sensors) provide battlespace environment forecasts of space consists of physical attacks sponsored by Air Force Space Com- vital to military planners and operators. against a terrestrial node. The near- and mand. Another is an attack detection Systems are being replaced and mid-term strategy for improvement in and reporting architecture that can de- upgraded to provide even better these capabilities includes fielding ini- tect, characterize (identify and geo-lo- warfighting support while making the tial ground-based assets like mobile cate), and report attacks on space sys- systems more efficient, easier to main- countercommunications systems and tems as well as assess the mission tain, and more survivable. counter-ISR systems to deny and dis- impact. Other concepts include active In the near term, Air Force Space rupt enemy use of satellite communica- protection capabilities and full-spec- Command will sustain the defense support tions and optical sensors respectively. trum space-based systems to prevent program and field the space-based infrared A growth area, the counterspace unauthorized use of friendly space system to modernize and ensure an uninter- mission is being transformed by revo- services and negate those of an enemy. rupted and improved missile launch warn- lutionary space-based capabilities in ing capability. The first segment of this new the mid and long term. One example Space Force Enhancement capability, the ground-processing segment, is a space-based surveillance system Many space systems critical to just declared initial operational capability. that can provide details of space ob- warfighting fall within the force en- The enhanced launch detection and impact jects unattainable by ground-based sys- hancement mission area. In this en- point prediction the system provides will greatly improve response options for the- tems. This development will expand abling role, they provide missile warn- ater missile threats. on lessons learned from the mid- ing, navigation and timing, vital course space experiment, an advanced communications, and environmental concept technology demonstrator

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 41 JFQ FORUM

moving target indication capability is being considered is the common aero Checking elevation with GPS in Persian being planned for the midterm that in- vehicle, a conceptual maneuvering Gulf. tegrates with air-breathing assets such reentry system launched by a ballistic as the joint surveillance and target at- missile or space launch system, deliv- tack radar system, unmanned aerial ve- ering a payload from a suborbital or hicles, and the multimission command orbital trajectory. and control aircraft. This will enable global strike forces to identify and track Space Support moving targets anywhere. Access to space or spacelift as well as on-orbit satellite operations is pro- Space Force Application vided through space support. For ex- In addition to being a force en- ample, a DSCS satellite was recently abler, Air Force Space Command serves launched on a Delta IV from Cape as a force provider, operating space Canaveral that will provide wideband force application capabilities that focus communications for U.S. Central, Eu- on nuclear deterrence and warfighting ropean, and Pacific Command areas of with both Minuteman III and Peace- responsibility over the Indian Ocean. keeper ICBMs and the infrastructure to Operationally, 1st Satellite Control Bat- talion has responsibility for the in addition to being a force Army communications payload enabler, Air Force Space Command and uses the Air Force satellite control network to relay com- serves as a force provider mands to the satellite via a remote ground station like that maintain and protect them. Interconti- operated by 50th Space Wing on Diego

Communications Squadron (DeborahCommunications Squadron K. Alvarado) nental ballistic missiles were designed Garcia. This combination of spacelift th

100 to deter attack and remain critical to and satellite control illustrates the mis- global stability. The Air Force was sion of space support. charged under the Nuclear Posture Re- Getting into space today requires GPS satellites will be replaced with view to “extend the life of Minuteman launch systems—with medium- and follow-on systems that feature additional III until 2020, while beginning the re- heavy-lift expendable boosters—and military and civil signals with improved quirements process for the next-gener- the ranges used for launch and testing. performance. ation ICBM.” Existing nuclear strike The Eastern Range is controlled from Requirements for satellite commu- forces are undergoing modernization, Cape Canaveral and the Western nications already exceed the capability. The which will be critical to the offensive Range from Vandenberg Air Force Base. transition from DSCS and Milstar to an in- strike leg of the triad—offensive strike In the near term, the transition is tegrated system-of-systems approach for fol- systems (nuclear and nonnuclear), de- being made to evolved expendable low-on wideband and extremely high-fre- fenses (active and passive), and respon- launch vehicles, the Atlas V and Delta quency networks will significantly increase capacity and data rates. Together with the sive infrastructure. IV, which represent a significant step Transformational Communications Office, The command is also developing toward a more responsive spacelift ca- efforts are underway to define an integrated an advanced, flexible, and responsive pability for both routine and time-sen- defense and intelligence transformational global deterrent force as it explores sitive military operations. satellite communications and relay system ways to transform strike capabilities In addition to spacelift, space sup- (part of the larger architecture) to support through the use of new types of port includes satellite operations. The the intelligence, surveillance, and recon- launch systems and nonnuclear muni- command operates a network of world- naissance information needed for informa- tions. Options for conventional, wide ground stations that monitor and tion dominance and operational awareness prompt global strike would provide a control satellites and their payloads. and to provide flexibility to support net- range of selective lethality and could This allows on-demand operations of work-centric operations. The evolution of the integrated be fielded in the midterm. This capa- government space assets supporting the command and control system for combat- bility from and through space will full spectrum of military operations. ant commands will combine the missions transform space force application. Modernization includes implementing of North American Aerospace Defense Com- Most notably, a conventional strike ca- a strong operational training capability mand and U.S. Strategic Command into a pability will provide the President and and work on an integrated client/server single system rather than replace a mission- Secretary of Defense with space power network with global connectivity unique, stovepiped collection of systems. options for deterrence and flexible re- shared by all the space organizations in In addition, transformational ef- sponse when time is critical or other both the civil and military sectors. forts have been initiated to provide im- options are too risky. One option Moreover, Air Force Space Com- proved support to Air Force Space Com- mand is currently transforming space mand. An initial space-based ground support capabilities by exploring

42 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Lord

recommendations of the Space Com- Building GPS SV11. mission and the direction by the Secre- tary of Defense provide an opportunity to more deliberately focus on space professional development. To implement this vision, a structured approach to developing space professionals has been established. It provides a comprehensive blueprint to address training, education, and experiential needs while recognizing the roles of military and civilian personnel. Additionally, it considers the disci- plines represented by the space professional cadre, which accomplishes complex functions to take interconti- nental ballistic missiles and space systems from concept to employment. The harder task of implementing initiatives on the education, training, and experiential needs of the force will begin soon. Given the importance and complexity of professional development, this will constitute a long-term commitment. The Nation has the best space and missile operators and acquir- ers in the world and the Air Force will continue to improve on that standard.

Space superiority is essential to the vision of controlling and exploiting space to provide the Armed Forces with an asymmetric advantage. Although Enduring Freedom has provided the first opportunity for a fully integrated space presence on all levels of warfare, the mission of Air Force Space Com- mand goes beyond any single operation. Improved missile and space systems, as well as concepts for their employment, will have greater results. As the security environment changes, more must be done to maintain the Lockheed Martin Space Systems (Russ Underwood) military advantages of the Nation. At the same time, achieving asymmetric advantage through a capabilities-based launch systems, rapid satellite check- Combat Capabilities air and space force must be enabled. To out, and other technologies to provide Success in any mission area is im- meet that challenge, Air Force Space quick-turn, on-demand, assured space possible without capable people. As de- Command will ensure unparalleled access for time-sensitive operations. pendence on space grows, the Air Force space capabilities for joint forces when The goal is an order of magnitude re- must meet the challenge of acquiring, and where they are needed. JFQ duction in costs. There are also efforts operating, and employing space assets. to examine the development of orbital A proactive space professional develop- transfer vehicles to reposition or boost ment program safeguards national on-orbit assets and improve space- leaders in space and develops airmen based elements of the launch and test as the heart of that combat capabil- range to increase coverage while reduc- ity—an Air Force core competency. The ing costs associated with the ground- based infrastructure.

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 43 Horizontal takeoff and landing vehicle model.

Architecting U.S. Air Force Space Programs

By STEPHEN J. FERRELL and HAL E. HAGEMEIER

n complex military and intelli- difficulties increase, policymakers con- gence operations, senior leaders tinue to seek approaches that better must make difficult choices on support their decisions. I employing existing capabilities, One popular technique is archi- improving them, and developing new tecting—considering end-to-end capa- capabilities. Decisions are becoming bilities in the context of related capa- more intricate because of costs, tech- bilities to meet expected needs. It is nology, operational utility, threat un- essentially focused on the big picture certainty, system complexity, and sys- to provide insight on the utility and tem-of-systems relationships. As relationships of the components. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council realizes the importance of identifying Brigadier General Stephen J. Ferrell, USA, serves as director of the office of the the way that capabilities fit into an op- National Security Space Architect and Colonel Hal E. Hagemeier, USAF (Ret.), is erating concept as implemented under assistant director of that office for strategy and initiatives.

44 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Ferrell and Hagemeier

Major National Security Space Architect Efforts

CY97 CY98 CY99 CY00 CY01 CY02 CY03 CY04 Communications and Information Management MILSATCOM Mission Information Management Communications Information Management Transformational Communications Sensing Space Weather Hyper-Spectral Integrated Spectral Strategy SBR Integrated ISR Assured Access to Space Satellite Operations Space Control Back-up Mission Space Sit Awareness Space Protect Control Station Launch on Responsive Demand Impact Space Operations Program Assessment FY04 FY05 FY06

a joint integrated architecture. More- strategies, and enterprise-wide plans. These architectures are long-range over, the defense acquisition process is Architecting, in this sense, is the goals and objectives expressed in terms being revised to include architectures process of defining national security of a framework for system develop- space far-term objec- ment. They represent what the com- the Secretary of Defense and the Director tives, planning near- munity believes will provide capabili- of Central Intelligence established the and mid-term steps to ties in the far term. Starting with accomplish them, and existing architectures and examining National Security Space Architect implementing in- future ones that will be available in the formed decisions. Pro- near and mid term based on planned as means of characterizing relation- ducing space architectures requires a investments, they also analyze alterna- ships among various capabilities in dedicated effort to consider end-to-end tives to determine the best long-term order to guide systems development capabilities across multiple organiza- course, given technologies, operational and associated investments. tions to achieve integrated results. concepts, needs, threats, and resources. Architectures are the structure, re- The resulting recommendations are lationships, and principles that govern The Space Architect supported by an investment strategy the design and evolution of elements The Secretary of Defense and the and roadmap. that are linked in accomplishing a spe- Director of Central Intelligence estab- Architecture recommendations cific purpose. They inform choices well lished the National Security Space Ar- often advocate actions necessary to en- before they have to be made. They chitect to develop and integrate secu- sure that the national security space help explain the possible and the prac- rity space architectures for the mid and community develops desired capabili- tical. It is important to note, though, long term across the full range of de- ties. They are neither point designs nor that architectures exist on multiple fense and national space missions. This specific system designs—stakeholder levels: from specific, existing systems organization is uniquely positioned to organizations are capable of designing such as global positioning and its develop architecture over the next 15 and building specific systems with the many components to far-term archi- to 25 years for the entire national secu- best available technology. Architec- tectures for an entire enterprise such as rity space enterprise. Recently, it has tures define capabilities, principles, communications. been tasked to assess trade-offs be- and relationships for achieving the Although space architectures exist tween space and nonspace solutions as overall desired capability in the future. on multiple levels, this analysis focuses well as the appropriate integration of The National Security Space Archi- on the mid and far term. Such archi- space with land, sea, and air solutions, tect develops these architectures col- tectures are potentially the most im- and to report on the consistency of im- laboratively with the representatives of portant in developing mission capabil- plementation of national security other interested agencies, spanning the ities by providing a broad context for space programs with policy, planning military, intelligence, civil, and com- decisionmakers. Yet they are probably guidance, and architectural decisions. mercial sectors. It does not develop, the least understood because they ex- build, buy, or operate space systems; tend well beyond the future years de- consequently, the organization can be fense program. They are vectors to vi- objective in considering various com- sion statements, capabilities-based peting concepts and capabilities. The

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 45 JFQ FORUM

Space tracking and surveillance system. Northrop Grumman Northrop

agency ensures that all relevant ideas, when appropriate. Stakeholders then program assessments. Communications opinions, and concerns are thoroughly develop transition plans to implement and information management efforts analyzed and considers both space and approved architecture and study rec- include military satellite communica- nonspace perspectives. It is as inclusive ommendations. tions, communications, and informa- as possible in all architectures, studies, As a result of the Space Commis- tion management architectures, and and activities it leads and relies heavily sion, the National Security Space Ar- the transformational communications on stakeholders and other participants chitect will function as a multiagency study. Sensing includes space weather to bring their considerable expertise organization that reports to the Under and integrated spectral architectures, and knowledge to the table. Although Secretary of the Air Force. It expects the hyperspectral strategy and space- it strives for consensus, the goal is to continued review from the national se- based radar studies, and one architec- determine the best way ahead for fu- curity space community to represent ture under development—integrated ture national space capabilities. stakeholder organizations, provide ad- intelligence, surveillance, and recon- Past recommendations have been vice, vet equities, and recommend op- naissance. Assured access to space in- approved by the National Security tions for reconciling major differences cludes space control and satellite opera- Space Senior Steering Group, which is among stakeholders. tions architectures, the launch on composed of agencies with a stake in demand impact and back-up mission the architecture or study. It is co- Architecture Results control station studies, and the other chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Since 1995, the National Security architecture currently under develop- Defense for Command, Control, Com- Space Architect (and its predecessor or- ment, space situational awareness. munications, and Intelligence, the ganization, the DOD Space Architect) Communications/information man- Deputy Director of Central Intelli- has completed architectures and studies agement. The goal of mission informa- gence for Community Management, and conducted the first national secu- tion management was developing the and the Director for Force Structure, rity space program assessment for fiscal architecture and strategy to guide Resources, and Assessments, Joint Staff year 2004. It is currently developing technology investment, acquisition (J-8). The group has also directed tran- two architectures and preparing to as- planning, and program execution for sitional planning to guide implemen- sess the program for the next fiscal national security information manage- tation of architecture and study results year. The architecture and study prod- ment capabilities in the 2010–2025 ucts fall into four areas: communications and information management, sensing, assured access to space, and

46 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Ferrell and Hagemeier era. Completed in 2001, it encom- Launching defense passed all aspects of providing mis- support program sion-essential information to execut- satellite. ing organizations and included DOD services and agencies, the intelligence community, civilian agencies (com- prising the civil applications committee), and other offices concerned with national security. Mission information management was split into two related areas: an information management architecture and a communications architecture. The information management architecture contained recommendations to better integrate information needs across communities, provide cross-do- main satisfaction management, encourage smart delivery of information, and develop common information standards. It developed a concept for providing the structure to integrate information technology capabilities, thereby combining information needs across the national security community into a common needs picture—a concept known as national security information management (NSIM). This concept helps make efficient and effective use of information to au- tomatically deliver it when generated while protecting sources and methods. It is designed to analyze user information needs to determine commonalities and maintain the association of those needs to individual users. The national U.S. Air Force security information management function has been organized under chief information officers drawn from Guard (high seas drift net concept of National Aeronautics and Space Ad- the defense and intelligence communi- operations), the Department of State ministration, developed an architec- ties to guide management architectures (noncombatant evacuation operations), ture for the 2010–2025 era that recom- and 14th Air Force (information mended an integrated network over the communications achitecture flow for Joint Air Operations space, air, and terrestrial environments Center generation of products with dynamic routing, prioritization, team recommended an integrated such as the air tasking order). and bandwidth allocation; an airborne network over space, air, and As information manage- communications network; an inte- terrestrial environments ment architecture took the grated government space relay system; means of managing the infor- interoperable space cross-links; and the mation in the pipes into consid- necessary interfaces to terrestrial opti- by identifying resident developing ca- eration, communications architecture cal networks. These capabilities will pabilities (such as the multi-intelli- examined the pipes themselves far provide both more bandwidth and gence acquisition program and the more comprehensively than the archi- more accesses to the user. DOD horizontal fusion effort) and pro- tecture for satellite communications The vision created by the commu- viding feedback to achieve the infor- had done. The communications archi- nications architecture in turn became mation management architecture vi- tecture team, consisting of 30 stake- the inspiration for a study that out- sion. This office has paid dividends by holders from across the defense estab- lined a relatively near-term plan for a providing assistance in changing the lishment, intelligence community, and truly transformational capability, in- operations concepts for managing increasing the bandwidth available to formation for users such as the Coast support the anticipated explosion of

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 47 JFQ FORUM user requirements by using long-de- Earth from outer sired technologies, some with great space. technical risk. It incorporated interoperable laser communications and other technologies to meet the growing needs in the defense and intelligence communities. The study examined broadcast, relay, and point-to-point military satellite communications, including low probability of intercept/ low probability of detection/anti-jam protected communications to ensure that future capabilities are as good as or better than the advanced extremely high frequency capabilities planned for 2010. It also affirmed the feasibility of these efforts and outlined a roadmap to attain them. The recently organized transformational communications office is preparing the groundwork in architecture for the acquisition community to develop a network-centric capability to eliminate bandwidth constraints and connect more users to satellite communications. This is a clear example of long-term space archi- DOD tecting affecting near-term acquisition. Sensing. If communications provide the how, then sensing technolo- The Road Ahead are significant, but candidate systems gies provide much of the what. The in- The integrated spectral architec- have either been considered too ex- tegrated spectral architecture and ture considered that all five capabilities pensive or the necessary technologies space-based radar studies established should be included to realize the full are seen as immature. That picture important groundwork for the ongoing benefit of technology. It has also laid seems to be changing. A study by the integrated intelligence, surveillance, out a roadmap for achieving them be- National Security Space Architect in and reconnaissance architecture. fore 2020. Some aspects of the plan are 2001 outlined a capabilities roadmap The integrated spectral architec- underway while others remain un- for the military, intelligence, and civil ture generated an integrated end-to- funded. From a military perspective, communities. It assessed the state of end spectral remote sensing architec- one of the most important capabilities technologies required to realize radar ture for the 2020 timeframe across is area search. A proposed program that for ground moving targets and related DOD and the intelligence and civil demonstrates this capability is the en- missions and identified the critical communities. For the first time it iden- hanced hyperspectral experiment technologies for a capable, affordable tified fundamental capabilities where (Noble Eye), which would allow space-based radar. The study also ad- an integrated spectral remote sensing warfighters to detect vehicle-size targets dressed an approach to satisfy as many architecture might have utility: over a broad area and cue other sensors common needs from across the communities as possible to prevent multi- periodic Earth coverage for detect- to characterize the objects. This would ple competing acquisitions. ing both materials and changes confirm or deny the existence of targets periodic area search of theater-sized in an area of operations and help opti- Spectral remote sensing and regions to detect and classify facilities, vehi- mize lethal targeting capabilities. The space-based radar represent aspects of a cles, and equipment other critical consideration, which broader mission area: intelligence, sur- focused in-depth target characteriza- must be developed as sensor capabili- veillance, and reconnaissance. The in- tion ties are fielded, is creation of an infor- tegrated architecture for this mission near-continuous worldwide persist- mation environment where users have area that is currently being developed ent surveillance direct control of much of their own has a cross-community investment a user-directed, network-centric en- product generation. strategy, with air and space study tasks vironment where the user has direct control being incorporated into the transfor- over most of the information product gen- Another potential capability of in- mational space and airborne project. eration. terest to military and intelligence planners is space-based radar. Its benefits This study supports military, intelligence, and civil needs integrated across space and nonspace solutions for the

48 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Ferrell and Hagemeier

2015 timeframe and beyond. A major The responsive space operations leaders received information on which thrust is exploring new operational architecture, expected to begin in late to base decisions on final adjustments concepts and technologies and ad- 2003, will examine the proper blend of to service and agency program costs dressing the objective of persistence space assets and capabilities encom- prior to the budget submittal to Con- and achieving it in a mix of air and passing launch, infrastructure, and gress. The goal is ensuring unity of ef- space capabilities. The architecture is payload designs to provide space capa- fort in acquiring and operating preemi- expected to be complete this year. bilities for rapid response to world nent space capabilities. Assured access to space. To collect events, technological advances, evolv- and provide data through space, one ing military doctrine, and other factors Systems tend to be developed in must first have assured access. The Na- which drive changes in national secu- an evolutionary and often stovepiped rity needs. This architecture fashion, with each version an improve- situational awareness is the basis of will provide an integrated ment on the last. The exceptions are space control, the ability to ensure end-to-end solution as a usually represented by new technology foundation for more respon- or operational concepts—or a combi- that the Nation can take advantage sive, inherently flexible space nation of both. But as the cost of sys- of space capabilities operations and acquisition tems has escalated without comparable concepts providing transfor- increases in spending, the Nation can- mational capabilities and as- not settle for the next generation to be tional Security Space Architect is com- sured support to defense, information simply better in incremental terms or pleting a space situational awareness community, and civil users. exploit each new technology or opera- architecture and will begin architec- Program assessment. Evaluating tional concept, however revolutionary. tures for space protection and respon- progress in planned architecture capa- Various systems must work in concert sive space operations. bilities is essential. In 2002 the Na- and provide capabilities to achieve the Space situational awareness is ad- tional Security Space Architect as- desired effects. dressing every aspect of the space envi- sessed the national security space Leveraging the synergy among ca- ronment, including tracking and cata- program in the FY04–FY09 program pabilities offers the best opportunity to loging space objects, charactering the objective memoranda. This assessment achieve the highest possible utility and objects (size, shape, payloads, capabili- emphasized end-to-end architecture to perhaps compensate for inadequate re- ties, and activity), gathering informa- determine if the programmed capabili- sources. Mid- and far-term architec- tion on the space environment, and ties would satisfy major civil, defense, tures are key to developing integrated managing related data. This effort will and intelligence policies and guid- capabilities based on technical feasibil- develop an end-to-end architecture for ance. Based on the recommendations ity, the operational concepts within 2020 that provides space situational of the Space Commission, the defense which the capabilities will be em- awareness to a wide range of cus- and intelligence communities identi- ployed, and expected policy and re- tomers. Situational awareness is the fied the elements that made up their source constraints. They also focus sci- basis of space control, the ability to en- respective space and space-related pro- ence and technology on ensuring that sure that the Nation and its allies can grams, referring to them as the virtual future capabilities are available to joint take advantage of space capabilities major force program for space. The as- warfighters. and deny them to potential enemies. sessment used these programs, to- Senior policymakers realize that This architecture is scheduled to be gether with other relevant programs, long-term architectures provide a bet- completed in summer 2003. including key civil capabilities, for the ter understanding of relationships af- Protection architecture will follow FY04 assessment. fecting complex decisions. Perhaps this the space situational awareness effort. The program assessment high- is particularly true for space capabili- As dependence on space capabilities lighted areas of interest to senior poli- ties given their absolute dependence has increased, the requirement for cymakers, including the Under Secre- on technology, interdependencies protection has grown. However, exist- tary of the Air Force and Director of the among systems, long lead times, and ing approaches for mission assurance, National Reconnaissance Office, Direc- numerous relations with terrestrial ca- risk assessment, and protection are tor of Program Analysis and Evaluation pabilities. The National Security Space usually focused on individual systems within the Office of the Secretary of Architect provides a unique perspec- or segments, constrained by limited Defense, and Deputy Director of Cen- tive and cross-community approach to budgets, or overridden by a desire for tral Intelligence for Community Man- enable informed decisions. JFQ utmost system performance. This ef- agement, to better synchronize funding fort will develop an architecture that across the space community. With the optimizes space system mission assur- benefits of the space program assess- ance for national, warfighting, and ment architectural perspectives on ca- civil users across the range of space as- pabilities and other program reviews, sets and establish a priority for protecting those assets.

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 49 Artist’s rendering of Brilliant Pebbles.

Space

Courtesy Missile Defense Agency and Missile Defense By DONALD R. BAUCOM

ince the dawn of the space established in October of that year age, developing space-based when Sputnik went into orbit. Soon systems has never been a Washington and Moscow opened talks S purely technological matter. on restricting space-based military op- The first orbital satellites raised ques- erations, with the United Nations pro- tions on the legality of overflights and viding the venue for creating a legal activities in space. The world commu- framework on the international gover- nity turned by habit to treaty negotia- nance of space. tions and international law to resolve With American prodding, the the implications of such issues. United Nations organized a Commit- Overflights were assumed away as tee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space the United States and the Soviet Union in late 1958, which became a major launched scientific satellites to mark forum for developing international the International Geophysical Year in principles. The work of this commit- 1957. De facto rights on overflight were tee, together with diplomatic efforts by the major nuclear powers, produced a Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Baucom, USAF (Ret.), is historian of the Missile number of agreements on military ac- Defense Agency and the author of The Origins of SDI, 1944–1983. tivities in space.

50 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Baucom

In August 1963, the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty in Moscow. This agreement, which eventually had over a hundred signatories, prohibited nuclear testing in space. Two months later, the United Nations adopted a resolution that banned nuclear weapons in space and in Decem- ber 1963 passed a resolution establishing a set of general rules on the use of space. While this document included a requirement for “international consultations” before a nation took actions that might interfere with the peaceful use of space, it did not ban military systems. The terms of the resolution effectively allowed the United States and the Soviet Union to deploy military satellites. This result was not surprising: deployments had already become central to the space programs of the two superpowers. The next major U.N. space-related agreement, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, received unanimous approval from the General Assembly. Signed by 66 nations, it mustered a vote of 88–0 in the Senate. Its provisions did little more than consolidate the terms of the earlier resolutions and recast them in the form of a binding treaty. The superpowers remained free to deploy military satellites as long as they did not interfere with peaceful activities in space.

Space-Based Missiles Signing Limited Test When the Senate ratified the Ban Treaty. Outer Space Treaty, the Pentagon had been pursuing missile defenses for two AP/ Wide Photo World decades, starting with the discovery of German wartime plans for an intercon- tinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that (ARPA) was established as a response to work indicated that it might become could have reached New York by 1946. the launch of Sputnik. Among its first possible to develop an interceptor that At the outset of the program, limita- efforts was Project Defender, the search could destroy targets by physically col- tions in sensors, missile controls, and liding with them. The en- guidance systems required interceptors the Advanced Research Projects ergy released by such an to be nuclear-tipped in order to de- Agency was established as a response impact would be six times stroy relatively small, high-speed tar- that of exploding TNT gets presented by long-range missiles. to the launch of Sputnik equal to the mass of the in- The first American missile defense interceptor. As one study interceptor, the Nike-Zeus, was a large, for a defense against ballistic missiles. dicated, this hit-to-kill (HTK) concept ground-controlled projectile that car- Previously, space-based missile de- “removes the necessity of using a nu- ried a multimegaton warhead. fenses were considered impractical be- clear warhead and replaces it with a While the Nike-Zeus was in the cause of the on-orbit mass associated simple, cheap, lightweight mechanical initial stages of development, the Ad- with a constellation of nuclear-tipped device.” That meant weight in orbit vanced Research Projects Agency interceptors. However, when re- could be reduced by about two orders searchers gathered in 1960, that perception had begun to change. Their

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 51 JFQ FORUM

Other obstacles included achieving sta- Marking SDI anniversary. bility in satellites, dealing with countermeasures, reducing launch costs, and improving the reliability of space- based systems. Technology in the early 1960s was incapable of reifying space-based concepts that emerged from Project De- fender. Nevertheless, the project spawned a stream of research and development efforts that eventually fed into the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), launched in 1983. Hit-to-Kill While Project Defender was examining missile defense concepts, the Vought Corporation began focusing on the homing interceptor-terminal (HIT). Sponsored by ARPA and the Army, this program aimed at producing “a small and lightweight, spin stabilized, opti- cally guided interceptor that achieves hypervelocity direct impact kill of reentry vehicles in the exoatmos- phere.” The effort continued into the 1970s when HIT technology was applied to the miniature system project (MSP), the development of an antisatellite (ASAT) capability for the Air Force. MSP led to the miniature homing vehicle (MHV), which was virtually identical to earlier HIT vehicles. MHV would serve as the kill vehicle in the ASAT system to be launched from the F–15 fighter. The program culminated in 1985 when MHV destroyed an orbit-

AP/ Wide Photo (Charles World Tasnadi) ing satellite. As HIT technology was transition- ed into the Air Force ASAT program, in magnitude. Boost-phase intercept 1-gram pellets fixed along the radial the Army Safeguard missile defense was no longer mere fancy; it was a wires. Although the pellets could dam- system began a short operational life concept regarded as “sufficiently age ICBM nose cones, causing them to span. Safeguard was a layered system promising to warrant increased study.” burn up on reentry, they were de- with two types of nuclear-tipped inter- Several of the concepts for space- signed to attack vulnerable fuel tanks ceptors. The long-range Spartan, an based interceptors (SBIs) advanced in in the booster. Striking at velocities up outgrowth of the Nike-Zeus program, 1960 were capable of boost-phase kill to sixty thousand feet per second, they was designed to attack incoming war- and were collectively known as ballis- would inflict catastrophic damage. To heads at the edge of the atmosphere. tic missile boost intercept (BAMBI). ensure system effectiveness, 500 satel- Warheads that got past Spartan would One of them was the space patrol ac- lites would be orbited at an altitude of be destroyed inside the atmosphere by tive defense (SPAD). It included a 30- 250 miles above the earth. the high-speed, short-range Sprint. ton satellite with an infrared scanner Among the challenges of develop- Safeguard, which became opera- to pick up boosters, a computer to cal- ing such a system was using infrared tional in 1975, had a major disadvan- culate their tracks, and 140 intercep- sensing devices to detect missile tage; the detonation of the nuclear tors weighing 300 pounds each. Fired launches and guide interceptors to warheads on Spartan and Sprint would from the host satellite, each intercep- their targets. If the former seemed blind its radars. It was further limited tor would deploy a wire web with a ra- manageable, the latter did not. “Sev- dius of 15 to 50 feet containing many eral magnitudes of improvement” were required for the second function.

52 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Baucom by the ABM Treaty and the 1974 proto- Dummy missile target col to that agreement, restricting signa- launched from tories to a single missile defense site USS Lake Erie. with a hundred interceptors. Moreover, it prohibited deployment, if not development, of space-based missile defense systems. Since Safeguard could only defend ICBM silos near Grand Forks in North Dakota, and could itself be over- whelmed by a Soviet attack, Congress acted to terminate the system in 1976. With the end of Safeguard, the Army focused missile defense on exoatmospheric hit-to-kill interceptors. Work on this program culminated in 1984, when a homing overlay experiment (HOE) test vehicle collided with an unarmed reentry vehicle over the Pacific Ocean, verifying the principles behind exoatmospheric HTK interceptors. HOE success pointed toward a revolution in interceptor design; nuclear warheads were no longer required to achieve a reasonably high kill-probability. The accomplishments of this program, along with earlier work on HIT, provided a strong technology base AP/ Wide Photo World for the space-based interceptor programs pursued under SDI. with Brilliant Pebbles (BP). Since each in 1990 and became the principal The Role of Interceptors interceptor had a sensor, on-board weapons system in a modified SDS President Ronald Reagan an- computer, and communications capa- phase I architecture. Since BSTS was nounced the decision to begin the SDI bility, it could operate autonomously originally taken from the Air Force to program in 1983. After a year of study without the large supporting satellites be part of SDI, and since the service and two and a half years of research of SBI. Furthermore, BP interceptors still required an early warning and and development, the Secretary of De- would be mass produced, using off-the- tracking capability, BSTS and SSTS were fense approved the acquisition of the shelf components that were largely turned over to the Air Force and phase I architecture for the strategic evolved into the current space- defense system (SDS). the Cold War ended as Brilliant based infrared system program. The principal weapon system in The Cold War ended as Bril- the SDS architecture was a constella- Pebbles was being integrated into liant Pebbles was being inte- tion of several hundred SBIs. Similar to the strategic defense system grated into the strategic defense SPAD, it included large garage satellites system architecture. A subse- with up to ten interceptors and two commercial grade, making them rela- quent review advocated a new focus space-based infrared sensor systems. tively inexpensive. Moreover, replacing for SDI—limited missile attacks. In the The boost surveillance and tracking SBI with Brilliant Pebbles meant that new world order, it would no longer be system (BSTS), an Air Force program instead of dealing with only a few hun- necessary to defend against a massive absorbed under SDI, would detect dred large, lucrative targets (SBI satel- Soviet ICBM attack. The most likely launches and track missiles throughout lites containing multiple interceptors), threat against the American homeland booster burn. The space surveillance Soviet ASAT systems would have to would be an unauthorized or acciden- and tracking system (SSTS) would track find, attack, and destroy thousands of tal attack by one or two hundred So- buses and then follow warheads once small, inexpensive interceptors. Attack- viet warheads. Another was the prolif- they separated from the buses. ing these interceptors with ASATs was eration of missile technology and The SDS phase I architecture had not cost-effective. weapons of mass destruction, which two major deficiencies: it was too Because of on-board sensors, Bril- made it increasingly important to pro- costly and space-based assets, especially liant Pebbles undercut requirements tect deployed U.S. forces and allied SBI, were vulnerable to Soviet ASAT sys- for BSTS and SSTS when it replaced SBI populations and forces from shorter- tems. To overcome these problems, the range missiles. SDI Organization (SDIO) replaced SBI

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 53 JFQ FORUM

interceptors, became the basic ap- Assembling component of satellite. proach to missile defense under Presi- dent Clinton. A major reason for this tack was the commitment of his administration to the ABM Treaty. Under Reagan, and to a lesser extent under Bush, the United States attempted to use arms control negotiations to transition from offense-based nuclear deterrence to relying increasingly on strategic defenses. The ultimate goal was eliminating strategic nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the Clinton administration considered arms control at least as important to guarantee- ing the nuclear peace as strategic weapons. According to the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), administration policy sought “to protect us first and foremost through arms control. . . .” 1 Under that position, it followed that strengthening the ABM Treaty enhanced national security. In line with this view of arms control, ACDA denounced the inter- pretation by the previous administration of the ABM Treaty, which would

DOD (Michael Savell) have allowed development and perhaps deployment of space-based interceptors. Moreover, since space-based The central element in the archi- half a loaf to treaty supporters and half systems were not compatible with ef- tecture would be a thin constellation to those who considered rapid deploy- forts to strengthen the treaty, it is not of several hundred BP interceptors, ment of missile defenses to be an ur- surprising that the Secretary of De- providing an overarching upper tier to gent national priority—and neither fense removed Brilliant Pebbles from complement both deployed theater side was fully satisfied. the demonstration-validation phase of missile defenses and a limited national After it interpreted the Missile De- the acquisition process and reduced it missile defense system. As such, Bril- fense Act, DOD pursued a vigorous to a technology base program. By the liant Pebbles became the key integrat- GPALS program that included substan- end of 1993, the Ballistic Missile De- ing element of a concept known as tial funding for the space-based BP sys- fense Organization (BMDO), formerly global protection against limited tem. This provoked a strong reaction SDIO, was forced to completely cancel strikes (GPALS). from Democrats, who considered Bril- the eviscerated program. Paradoxi- An America-led coalition was liant Pebbles a threat to the ABM cally, the greatest triumph of Brilliant fighting a war against Iraq in less than Treaty and beyond the pale of the law. Pebbles came after the death of the a year. In the midst of that conflict, When the Democrats gained control of program in a joint BMDO–National which featured the first operational en- Congress in 1992, they passed legisla- Aeronautics and Space Administration gagements between ballistic missiles tion that severely reduced spending on (NASA) mission. and missile defenses, the President an- Brilliant Pebbles and prohibited in- By January 1992 it had become nounced that GPALS would be the ar- cluding it in GPALS architecture, apparent to SDIO that the agency chitecture for SDI. Following the Gulf thereby fracturing an integrated global would not be allowed to demonstrate War, Congress passed the Missile De- missile defense concept into separate the effectiveness of the technologies fense Act of 1991. This law appeared to components for national and theater developed under Brilliant Pebbles. support the expeditious deployment of missile defense. Since NASA had earlier approached the GPALS system, including Brilliant DOD about the possibility of using Pebbles. But it was a compromise be- Post-Cold War Realities SDI-developed technologies in its own tween Republican advocates of missile Bifurcation of missile defense, program, SDIO agreed to use BP com- defense and Democratic defenders of along with elimination of space-based the ABM Treaty. In effect, the law gave

54 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Baucom ponents in a space probe known as over, all three segments will be inte- space-based laser project. And work on Clementine. The mission called for the grated into a single ballistic missile de- space-based HTK interceptors is in- probe to orbit the moon for over two fense system (BMDS) through both cluded under a broader research and months and then depart the cislunar battle management and command development project for kinetic energy region for a rendezvous with the aster- and control systems. boost phase interceptors. oid Geographos. To ensure the best technical and Although the concept of space- The probe was launched in early operational options in developing based missile defenses using HTK inter- 1994 and completed the lunar portion BMDS, Bush withdrew the United ceptors emerged in 1960 from Project of its mission. But while maneuvering States from the ABM Treaty. Now, in- Defender, two decades of low-level ef- for its flight to Geographos, a com- stead of designing a system to mini- forts were required to bring this con- puter failure caused an extended burn mize violations of the treaty and then cept to fruition in the BP interceptor of the altitude control system, deplet- that was integrated in SDS ing fuel and leaving the vehicle inca- to ensure the best technical and phase I architecture. The tech- pable of completing the second part of operational options, Bush withdrew nologies developed for Bril- the mission. Nevertheless, Clementine liant Pebbles were successfully served as a viable test in which 23 mis- from the ABM Treaty demonstrated in the Clemen- sile defense technologies performed tine probe after the Clinton successfully, including many derived negotiating changes to preserve the administration killed the former pro- directly from Brilliant Pebbles. agreement (the approach of the previ- gram. Thus, in a sense, Clementine Clementine was the high water ous administration), MDA is drawing was the climax of space-based missile mark in space-based missile defenses. on the potential of all systems based on defenses in the United States. During the remaining years of the land, at sea, and in the air and space. Clinton administration, space-based Although withdrawal from the Space-based missile defenses have missile defense programs were largely ABM Treaty ended the legal strictures not achieved a comeback under the limited to preparations for a far-term on developing space-based missile de- Bush administration despite the U.S. test of a high-power, space-based laser fense systems, it did not assure that withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. and the development of sensors that such systems would rebound to the Given the potential of space-based could cue ground-, sea-, and air-based position accorded to them in the SDI weapons as boost-phase missile killers, missile defense systems. program. Indeed, the emphasis of the it seems unlikely that BAMBI-like con- George W. Bush assumed the pres- present administration on early deploy- cepts will completely lose their luster. idency determined to deploy effective ment of the most effective defenses Rather, they are likely to wait in the missile defenses in the shortest possi- possible means that the immediate wings until better technologies and a ble time. In support of this goal, the focus in the program must be on new strategic setting call them back to Secretary of Defense reorganized ground-based systems, mid-course and center stage. JFQ BMDO and renamed it the Missile De- terminal, since work on these systems fense Agency (MDA) to prepare a set of has been steadily sustained by four NOTE options to reorient the missile defense Presidents. Thus the first operational 1 John D. Holum, “Remarks to a Confer- program. These options were not to ex- system based on work that flowed from ence Cosponsored by the Center for Na- clude ideas that conflicted with the the SDI program will be the Patriot Ad- tional Security Law and the ABA Standing ABM Treaty; they would be judged vanced Capability-3 terminal system, Committee on Law and National Security,” strictly on their technical merit. Fur- which is currently being operational- June 10, 1994. thermore, to end the bifurcation of ized. This will be followed by the missile defense into theater and na- ground-based midcourse system, which tional systems, a division that seem- should provide a limited defensive ca- ingly pitted U.S. interests against other pability in the form of an Alaskan test nations, MDA would plan an inte- bed system, scheduled to be opera- grated, layered defense to protect both tional in late 2004 or early 2005. America and its allies against ballistic Under these conditions, space- missiles of all ranges. based systems have been put on the The system that emerged from back burner. The space-based laser pro- this restructuring divides the missile gram, which included a 2012 space- defense mission in three segments: based experiment under the last ad- boost, mid-course, and terminal—the ministration, has now become a major phases of ballistic missile flight. technology program focused on proj- In theory, each segment could incor- ects related to low power laser applica- porate land-, sea-, air-, and space- tions (tracking, imaging, and weapon based elements in the future. More- guidance) and to high-power technologies that might feed into a future

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 55 ■ Some Propositions on Spacepower

NAVSTAR global positioning system satellite.

DOD

By MICHAEL V. SMITH

t the turn of the 21st cen- has not found a definitive way of con- tury, spacepower remains ceptualizing space. It vacillates between on unsure theoretical and the terms aerospace and air and space to A doctrinal footing. Despite describe operating environments be- more than forty years as the dominant yond the earth’s surface. Indeed, this actor in military space, the Air Force distinction gives rise to heated debate among the members of two schools of thought. One holds that air and space Lieutenant Colonel Michael V. Smith, USAF, serves in the Air and Space Operations operations form a single dimension of Directorate on the Air Staff and previously taught in the Space Division at the military power. The other sees them as Air Force Weapons School. separate and distinct.

56 JFQ /Winter 2002–03 Smith

The case for airpower as an au- into space is difficult, and a substantial Spacepower assets form a national tonomous dimension of military infrastructure is required to generate center of gravity. More and more seg- power is convincing and generally un- programs. Spacefaring is most likely in ments of society turn to space-based as- derstood; however, the same cannot be the case of wealthy nations that have sets, which makes the relatively few said of spacepower, especially inside abundant natural resources, a stable satellites in orbit lucrative targets for an the Air Force. The propositions that political environment, a solid educa- enemy with the means to strike them. follow describe the nature of space- tional system that stresses the sciences, Although access to satellites is seldom a power and serve as a foundation for a and the political will to make the com- single point of failure, losing access to working spacepower theory. mitment to a space program over the the vital information they collect and long term. carry will increase the fog, friction, and Ten Propositions Spacepower must be centrally con- cost of operations, which could turn Space is a distinct medium of opera- trolled by space professionals. Worldwide the tide against spacefaring states. tions. Space is physically separate and missions set off spacepower from Space control is not optional. A quite different from all earthly media. other dimensions of military power. growing reliance on spacepower assets Orbital operations are constrained by Because space assets operate globally, by governmental agencies and the the laws of physics, which creates a they cannot be managed on the the- business community makes it essential wall of misunderstanding between ater level like land forces, which to secure access to satellite services. It space professionals and those who do would handicap spacepower in the is equally important to deny access to not understand orbital mechanics. same way airpower was limited at the unfriendly users. Because an enemy is outbreak of World War II likely to compete for relative control of space professionals must centrally under the Army. Space pro- the space medium, states must take control spacepower to balance scarce fessionals must centrally measures to secure national interests. control spacepower to bal- Space professionals require career- resources across theaters ance scarce resources across long specialization. Spacefaring contin- theaters. At the same time, ues to present daunting technical These physical qualities heavily influ- space professionals must take charge challenges. Moreover, space opera- ence operational methodologies and of the battle for space control rather tions differ so radically from opera- planning for space activities. Most im- than leaving it to other commanders tions on earth that highly specialized portant, space was cast diplomatically with different priorities. training, recurring education, and ca- as a separate medium during the Eisen- Spacepower is a coercive force. The reer management are required to de- hower years. And the international presence of space assets such as recon- velop experts. community observes entirely different naissance and surveillance satellites in- Space weaponization is inevitable. legal standards for space as well. Every fluences and will increasingly influ- Wherever humankind goes weapons U.S. administration has reaffirmed the ence actors who seek to conceal certain follow. There are genuine reasons for belief that it is a separate and distinct activities. This situation arises from the not weaponizing space, but they fail to operational medium. deterrent potential of collection assets take into account the imperatives that The essence of spacepower is global that are designed to serve as national often drive nations in ways that are be- access and global presence. The reason technical means of treaty verification. yond rational thought. When weapons for moving earthly capabilities into Some actors are likely deterred from will be placed in space is uncertain, orbit is exploiting the global nature of certain actions in the presence of spy but pragmatists must assume that it spacepower. Access to denied areas was satellites. Increasingly, spacepower as- will happen—and act accordingly. the initial rationale for reconnaissance sets are integrating into the sensor-to- satellites, and it is still a compelling shooter loop of combat operations. Not a Single Dimension motivation. But the ability to conduct This development, plus the emergence Spacepower directly affects other missions globally with limited assets is of weapons in orbit, signals the expan- instruments of national power and in- crucial not only for the military and sion of spacepower for compellence as creasingly shapes the daily lives of or- civil sectors but also for the commer- well as deterrence. dinary people. Its military importance cial world. In the vernacular of space, Many actors can exploit commercial is growing because it forms a global in- global means more than access to the space assets. Commercial vendors who formational infrastructure that the entire surface of the earth, as airmen sell military-related space products armed forces of advanced nations in- might use the term; it may mean ac- constitute a new breed of mercenary. creasingly rely on. In the future, space- cess to all locations simultaneously, in Any asymmetric advantage held by the power will likely include counterspace war and peace, such as navigation and superpowers based on their space weapons and systems that attack ter- communications services. prowess is eroding because anyone restrial targets. Space will become a Spacepower is comprised of a total who can pay the tariff can obtain place to pre-position combat power for national space activity. Activity in space space support. Military and law en- immediate execution against terrestrial outstretched its defense and intelli- forcement planners must take into ac- targets anywhere around the globe. gence roots as states developed civil count the potential for an enemy to (continued on page 60) and commercial sectors. Venturing exploit these capabilities.

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 57 Military Uses of Space

Attributes of Space Operations

ADVANTAGES LIMITATIONS • Global access • Inhospitable environment – High vantage point – Difficult and costly to access – No overflight restrictions – Very difficult to maintain or reconfigure systems

• Longevity of systems • Predictable orbits – May be vulnerable to attack • Persistent operations

Highly elliptical Altitude: varies from 660 to 24,000 statute miles or more Period: about 12 hours Inclination: Ϯ 64 degrees

Types of Orbits and their Ground Trace

Low earth Medium earth Altitude: about 100 to 1,000 statute miles Altitude: about 1,000 to 12,000 statute miles Period: about 90 minutes Period: about 12 hours Inclination: various Inclination: various

Geosynchronous Altitude: 22,300 statute miles Period: 24 hours Inclination: 0 degrees Polar Altitude: about 1,000 to 12,000 statute miles Period: about 12 hours Inclination: close to 90 degrees

58 JFQ /Winter 2002–03 Inclination of Satellites Uses of Satellites

• Angle of orbit relative to • Intelligence and Weather the equator

orbit

angle of inclination equator

• Comparison of inclination 90 degrees 60 degrees • Reconnaissance 30 degrees 15 degrees 0 degrees

• Surveillance

• Communications

• Navigation

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air component commanders while Meteorological satellite atop launch space-based assets are controlled glob- vehicle. ally by commanders inside the conti- nental United States. The aviation community has repeatedly tried to make aircraft that can do what spacecraft do. There have been many efforts to develop a space plane, but none has become operational, in part because of technical problems, but mostly because no one could justify the great expense of making an aircraft to duplicate satellite capabilities, with the exception of serving as a reusable spacelift and recovery vehicle. Some argue that America needs a combat-capable space plane to deliver ordnance more rapidly than aircraft without forward bases in the combat zone. These are compelling ends, but justifying the means will likely be as difficult today as it was at the height of the Cold War when such a vehicle was first postulated. An Independent Theory A spacepower theory can serve political and military practitioners with a framework for assessing space issues and guide related decisionmaking. It must be rooted in broader theories of statecraft and warfare. Students of spacepower should build, in particular, on The Art of War by Sun Tzu and On War by Carl von Clausewitz. The former describes the nature of statecraft and war in a world where states constantly compete.1 The latter work, while often misinterpreted, captures the premise of armed conflict: “War is nothing but the continuation of Lockheed Martin policy with other means...the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be (continued from page 57) created the first global utility. Some considered in isolation from their pur- Despite evidence to the contrary, many satellites perform intelligence gather- pose.”2 Simply put, spacepower does persist in arguing that spacepower is ing missions similar to those of air- something in space to support policy. not separate and distinct from aircraft, but reconnaissance planes loiter These classic sources and an apprecia- power on the theoretical basis that it over theater-specific areas while recon- tion of the ten propositions outlined delivers similar products, as if aircraft naissance satellites transit the globe in above set the stage for a working theory. can do what spacecraft do. This is not minutes, collecting and disseminating The military uses of space provide the case. Aircraft cannot survey more data in virtually every theater along global capabilities to assist in achieving than 80 percent of the earth with three the way. Moreover, basic differences political and military objectives. This is vehicles or fly over denied airspace. A create professional mindsets. Airmen an independent dimension of power few satellites can provide persistent ca- have a theater perspective and space that can be used alone or in concert pabilities worldwide. While the global professionals have a global view, as evi- with other forms of power to achieve positioning system uses only 24 satel- denced by the fact that airpower is desired ends. Space is an expanse where lites in its nominal constellation, it has controlled by theater-level joint force humans place systems to resolve problems. It begins above the surface of the earth at the lowest altitude at which a

60 JFQ /Winter 2002–03 Smith satellite can sustain a circular orbit Satellite and micro- (some 93 miles) and reaches to infinity. wave commercial Eventually, man’s interests may extend news vans. beyond near-earth space. Military spacepower is likely to be used to protect those interests. Someday in the future, populations and political entities may migrate into space as well. But for now, humans live on the surface of the earth, and spacepower in this context refers to terrestrial struggles. The reason for going into near- earth space is gaining access to regions where terrestrial forces either cannot go or loiter as economically as some satellites. A relatively small number of similar satellites extended in orbital space can survey the entire surface of the earth, which gives space-based constellations the ability to perform missions on a global scale. In the opening years of the 21st century, space U.S. Navy (Dick Cole) missions are primarily informational— by providing command, control, communications, and computer support as Space Control Enemy counterspace weapons well as intelligence, surveillance, and The first and most enduring mis- could rapidly destroy space systems. reconnaissance support to terrestrial sion of space forces is to gain relative Therefore it is vital to acquire the abil- forces. Land, sea, and air forces also space control over enemies, enabling ity to quickly find, fix, track, target, perform such missions, but only space the space offensive while protecting and destroy counterspace weapons. systems (and some terrestrial commu- friendly forces from hostile space ac- Such systems may reside on land, at nications networks) perform them tions. This requires continuous situa- sea, in the air, or in space. It is equally around the globe all the time. These tional awareness about what is happen- imperative to restore lost satellite capa- space networks create a global infor- ing and acting to ensure friendly access bilities in orbit before their loss affects to extraterrestrial capabilities political, economic, and military operations. Restoration may be achieved by space networks create a global while denying the same to any enemy. Control has both defen- activating in-orbit spares, leasing com- informational infrastructure that sive and offensive components. mercial services, launching new satel- links expeditionary forces with Defensive control must en- lites to replace capabilities lost through sure that friendly forces and their attrition, or gaining access to allied their leaders at home political leaders can continue to services. The ability to repair or replace exploit space. It is necessary to lost satellite ground control systems is mational infrastructure that links expe- support theater operations where com- also essential, and methods may in- ditionary forces deployed anywhere in bat is underway and to continue ob- clude transferring ground control re- the world and connects them with serving activities in all other theaters sponsibility to another location (either their leaders at home. to assess additional threats requiring fixed or mobile), leasing commercial Space-based weapons will not diplomatic or military intervention. support, or obtaining ground assis- only be used to gain control of space Space control also enables a state to tance from allies. in the future, but against targets on sustain such services from space as Offensively, space control does land, at sea, and in the air. With a sus- communications and global position- not have to be total to be effective. An tained commitment to technological ing data, upon which users in all the- enemy may have satellites that do not advancement and investment of re- aters are increasingly reliant. At the especially affect its warfighting capabil- sources, space will provide a vantage same time, commercial assets require ity. Circumstances and strategy will point from which to observe, support, protection. Ideally, all satellites should dictate the degree of offensive space and influence human events. But space be hardened against attack, but com- control required. Considerations will systems will require a vigorous defense. mercial investors are reluctant to be the time and place where control spend the money, placing a burden on must be gained, how rapidly it is defense planners to defend commercial needed, the number of satellites or systems, which are important to domestic and allied economies.

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Saddam International Airport. Space Imaging

62 JFQ /Winter 2002–03 Smith ground control targets to be negated, needed to eliminate third-party sup- employing forces. The initial look from how long control must be sustained, port, but friendly forces must be ready space may suffice in some cases, but and the desired level and reversibility to expand the conflict by striking sup- terrestrial assets are usually needed. of negation (deception, disruption, de- port wherever it originates. If diplo- During combat, space-based intelli- nial, degradation, and destruction). macy fails, and policy does not allow gence, surveillance, and reconnais- Satellites are global assets whose striking third-party targets, an enemy sance sensors continue to provide data, value is proportional to the interests of has a sanctuary it will likely exploit. filling gaps in theater coverage. More- their state or nonstate owners. It may over, they can also cue terrestrially- be politically untenable to perma- Situational Awareness based sensors, as happened during nently damage an unfriendly vehicle In an era of precision targeting, Desert Storm, when missile warning for various reasons. For example, al- situational awareness must be equally satellites directed Patriot batteries to though an imagery satellite may precise. Bombs are only as accurate as Scud missile launches. threaten to disclose friendly troop the coordinates available to planners, Perhaps most important, in war movements in one region, it might warfighters, and munitions them- and peace, spacepower provides an perform treaty verification or other selves. Precision targeting is well un- 80-percent first look on a global scale. missions on the opposite side of the derstood, but the demand for precision It allows analysts to watch the world globe. In many scenarios, offensive intelligence, surveillance, and recon- and report factors that give the flexibil- space control might best be limited to naissance is not. ity to political and military leaders to localized and temporary effects. Multiple intelligence, surveillance, employ terrestrial forces more expedi- One way of denying access to and reconnaissance sensors in all tiously and confidently. Spacepower space is destroying hostile launch facil- media characterize the modern battle- literally watches the backs of forces to ities. But an enemy may acquire space space. Some collect signal intelligence make sure no threat is sneaking up be- lift from other states. Thus the best while others gather photoreconnais- hind them. Thus commanders can way of denying space support is negat- sance data and still others accumulate allow greater concentrations in theater radar information. Sensors and because space-based assets act as a kind commanders can allow greater their operators not only identify of global sentry. Space systems have targets but also determine exact unimpeded access, and relatively few concentrations in theater because coordinates. The precision of assets are required to sustain worldspace-based assets act as a kind sensors varies, but airborne de- wide intelligence, surveillance, and re- vices can be more effective than connaissance missions. of global sentry space-based sensors because By increasing the number of low- satellites are usually farther from earth orbiting sensors, improving their ing the satellites directly. Though some targets and satellites in low orbits have capabilities, and developing the means satellites may be particularly suscepti- relatively short dwell times. Satellites in to maintain them, that 80 percent rule ble to the destruction of ground sta- higher orbits are more distant and gen- of thumb will approach 100 percent. tions, others may degrade gracefully in erally less able to precisely refine coor- But although space systems will be- the absence of ground control. An dinates. Also, satellite sensors degrade come more capable, they will not re- enemy could use mobile ground sta- over time and there is no effort to keep place terrestrial forms of inteligence tions for tactically critical space sys- them in prime condition. Finally, given collection and other functions. Aerial tems that need frequent control from the relatively small number of satellites reconnaissance did not obviate the the ground. This fact not only makes in low-earth orbit, continuous coverage need for land and sea forces to conduct targeting ground stations more diffi- is currently impossible. And though reconnaissance and space assets will cult—it highlights the need to negate aircraft have several distinct advantages not totally usurp such missions. unfriendly satellites in orbit. It is also over spacecraft in collecting informa- possible to attack space use by jam- tion within theater, data gathered from The Proverbial Toolbox ming or spoofing receivers, which has space is critical. The synergism created by space- the benefit of localized and temporary Space-derived assets offer the first power and other military forces yields effects. A combination of attacks on all look at the battlespace and help iden- new capabilities. Its continuous global segments of a system—ground sta- tify targets before they enter the area. coverage is a new contribution to war- tions, satellites in orbit, and user As a rule of thumb, intelligence, sur- fare. The various command, control, equipment—as well as on their link- veillance, and reconnaissance derived communications, computers, intelli- ages may sometimes be needed to from space are useful in finding 80 per- gence, surveillance, and reconnais- achieve the desired effect. cent of targets and can determine their sance capabilities—weather observa- Control will be complicated if an location with 80 percent of the accu- tion, missile warning, and navigation enemy uses launch facilities, satellites, racy required for precision strikes. broadcasts—provide a distinct infor- or ground control systems provided by With this information, civilian and mational edge to the military. This ad- commercial firms, international con- military leaders can make decisions on vantage will evaporate as other actors sortia, or allies. Diplomatic efforts are on the world stage develop, lease, or borrow similar capabilities.

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Landpower, seapower, airpower, While some overlap exists be- tide against friendly forces. There may and spacepower bring different capa- tween spacepower and other dimen- be certain forms of limited warfare bilities to the table. The Armed Forces sions of military power, this is a pru- wherein information gleaned from train in highly specialized ways, the dent investment. Just as bombers, space or strikes delivered from space objective being to dominate operations submarines, and missiles were designed may achieve the political and military in their respective media. Operations to prevent an enemy from gaining a aims of an operation. in each dimension require centralized significant advantage if it countered control in coordination with each serv- one leg of the triad during the Cold Analyzing spacepower reveals that ice to ensure optimum management of War, redundancy today prevents an air and space—or airpower and space- resources for joint warfare. enemy advantage should space-based power—differ. It also provides a foun- It is a fallacy that airpower mis- systems or terrestrial forces be coun- dation for a working theory of space- sions will eventually migrate to space. tered. Some adjustments in force struc- power, which supports the principles This presumes that joint commanders tures will be required as space capabili- of statecraft and warfare. Moreover, it would trade highly flexible organic air- ties become stronger, but no mission complements rather than competes power for less flexible and capable should be moved entirely to space. with other dimensions of military space systems that others would likely power. The Nation has much unfin- manage as global assets. Economic con- Combined Arms ished business in building spacepower, siderations may lead to such a compro- In peacetime, spacepower assets especially in matching the ambitious mise, but a more prudent approach monitor the globe, helping to identify vision presented above. As the Air would be to develop robust spacepower and characterize potential threats. Force matures in its role as the execu- capabilities that complement land- When a danger arises, political and tive agent for military-related spacepower, seapower, and airpower assets. military leaders can send terrestrially- power, it should be expected to prom- The difference between space and ter- based sensors into the area for a closer ulgate spacepower theory and doctrine restrial systems is that the former pro- look. If hostilities break out, space separate and distinct from its treat- vide global access and presence. Terres- forces will gain the degree of space ment of airpower. JFQ trial systems must be developed as control needed and help in providing theater assets to fill voids in coverage intelligence, surveillance, and recon- NOTES and offer more flexible and precise in- naissance and strike capabilities. They 1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by telligence, surveillance, and reconnais- must watch the rest of the world, look- Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder, Colo.: Westview sance as well as strike capabilities. ing for tipoffs, warnings, and indica- Press, 1994). Assuming that space systems will tors of other threats in any theater. 2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited eventually be able to target any loca- Force application from space will and translated by Michael Howard and tion on earth with conventional take many forms, but it seems likely Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University bombs or other weapons does not that space-based weapons will fill spe- Press, 1976), pp. 69, 87. mean they should simply replace air- cific niches, ideal for some missions craft for such missions. Space opera- during certain phases of operations. tions are expensive, and economic No claim is made that spacepower by considerations alone will likely require itself can be decisive in conventional air delivery of many munitions. Excep- warfare, but it may help set the conditions include times when cost is not a tions for victory under some circum- consideration, such as combat in de- stances. Conversely, if spacepower nied areas, situations when aircraft forces are defeated, that could turn the cannot quickly respond, targets best engaged by specialized weapons delivered from space, or conditions where surprise is vital.

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Navstar global positioning system.

Boeing Globalizing Space Security

By SIMON P. WORDEN and JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE

he Nation is losing the in- to Washington and its agenda. Even formation war against traditional allies and friends have re- global terrorism. Many au- sponded negatively to the perceived T diences abroad regard the American intent of going it alone. One United States as the aggressor despite key factor is the widening gap between the unprovoked attacks visited on New U.S. and foreign military capabilities, York and Washington in September which is largely attributable to superior 2001. Moreover, most of the Islamic and more integrated use of global in- world is growing increasingly hostile formation, in particular space-derived information. The United States has shown little inclination to work with allies to inte- Brigadier General Simon P. Worden, USAF, is director of development and grate the military uses of space in mul- transformation in the Space and Missile Systems Center at Air Force Space tilateral planning and operations. The Command and Joan Johnson-Freese chairs the National Security Decision Making well-financed European effort to build Department at the Naval War College. an independent space-based global

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when anticipated benefits went unreal- Network system ized. And when successful, costs to na- supervisors, Lions tional culture and sovereignty were Wrath. often high. Globalization intensified a fragmenting nationalist counterreac- tion. The need to include security in the globalization equation has become evident. Nations are no longer the only actors involved in security. In the global war on terrorism, the United States is focused on al Qaeda, a group of individuals. Globalization gives rise to economic, cultural, political, and security considerations, both positive and negative. The most useful definition of globalization may be the simplest: the impact of events beyond national borders and often regions.1 With the primary difference in globalization today being information technology, rapid U.S. Air Force (Karen F. Silcott) (KarenU.S. Air Force F. change becomes critical. Many terrorists do not fight for recognition or political goals. They are navigation system (Galileo) is a clear Few factors dominate the security instead apocalyptic or nihilistic, negat- reaction to U.S. intentions regarding environment like globalization. But ing the premises of deterrence. In addi- the global positioning system (GPS). the term has become a buzzword that tion, rogue states often seek to perpet- Space and information can be forces of ultimately adds little value to discus- uate regimes rather than serve national integration rather than the causes of sions. Immediately following the col- interests, ignoring the balance of fragmentation in global security. They lapse of the Soviet Union and renais- power premise. Such actors are techno- can present security opportunities. In- sance in Eastern Europe, globalism—or logically astute and have been empow- ternationally, this debate is especially ered by previously unavailable in- important given the U.S. commitment the need to include security formation through the Internet to missile defense and military space and other advanced communica- programs and resulting perceptions in the globalization equation has tions capabilities, particularly abroad that the Pentagon is working to become evident those relying on space assets. De- acquire sword and shield capabilities mocratization of information pro- in space. vides unimaginable opportunities globalization—had essentially an eco- for linkages, but not without becoming Globalization nomic connotation, signifying a rush a transnational threat. An unprece- If globalization is not the domi- to create an integrated market-oriented dented electronic attack in October nant trend of the 21st century, it will system. While the network had devel- 2002 temporarily crippled nine of thir- only be neglected at great peril. As an oped earlier, between 1989 and 1991 teen worldwide servers critical to the integrative force it creates networks the last major holdouts not only be- Internet, serving notice that cyberter- that draw individuals, organizations, came true believers in market rorism is real and that cooperation to and nations closer together while si- economies but devout capitalists. Be- thwart it is both necessary and possi- multaneously driving them toward di- fore long, however, the downside of ble. The attack was halted in an hour minishing units of identification. The economic integration began to appear. through cooperation among root major difference between globalization Though initially regarded as a pos- server operators and authorities. today and in the past is the role of in- itive force that would level the eco- Globalization can become a com- formation technology, which increases nomic playing field and dissolve na- plementary factor in security planning. both the influence of networks and tional barriers, globalization sometimes Shared interests in maintaining the In- speed of change. Moreover, technology actually widened the gap. Moreover, ternet, for example, have created a democratizes information, providing posturing for success in a globalized large unofficial and official coalition of access to previously sequestered mate- world required obeisance to interna- parties for which uninterrupted access rial. Transparency becomes another tional institutions and norms, which is vital. The United States serves as the dual-edged sword demanding the at- were often viewed as U.S.-sponsored link among all cyberspace-vested inter- tention of security planning. and even neocolonialist, especially ests and other technically based domains, including space.

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Worden and Johnson-Freese

Satellite operations center, Schriever Air Force Base. U.S. Air Force (LonoU.S. Air Force Collars)

Protecting space assets can be- Integration overlay and interfere with U.S. military come an international rather than an Nations must cooperate more ac- signals. Finally, vulnerability also exclusively U.S. interest. With its over- tively to thwart the dark side of glob- means that America has the greatest whelming capabilities and advantages alization, and they must work not interest in protecting space assets, lead- for force enhancement, America is only with each other but also with the ing to further resentment abroad over viewed with mixed feelings by many private sector. Multilateralism is the the implied movement toward weap- countries. Potential enemies are keenly only option, but network-centric con- onizing space. aware that reliance on space assets cepts and plug-and-play assets are A new approach to protecting makes the Nation vulnerable to inter- more elusive. space assets seems warranted. Ideally it ruption. Global positioning provides The gap in space-based assets would contribute to multilateralism an interesting example in this regard. among nations presents special prob- and increased interoperability. Two With airlines dependent on space ca- lems: interoperability, vulnerability, critical factors in exacerbating the gap pabilities for navigation, and diversi- and disparities in military capabilities. between the United States and other fied civilian utilization expanding ex- The Japanese investment of some nations have been technology transfer ponentially, the system serves as a $2 billion in an information gathering concerns and economics. With ad- global utility that warrants interna- satellite system, which provides one- vances in microsat technology and re- tional protection. Few countries be- meter resolution images (the same as sulting reduced costs, there may be op- sides the United States, however, have commercial sources), demonstrates in- portunities to work together in space, a the capabilities to defend it. dependent decisionmaking. Distrust win-win formula for both America and among allies has reached such a level its partners. that Europeans are working to initiate at least one Galileo signal that could

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Emerging Capabilities Internet via wireless connections such Dependence on global positioning The Internet became the most sig- as cellular telephones or other broad- for precision guided munitions is a de- nificant global utility in the last cast signals. Many of these access links cisive advantage. Consequently, special decade. It gave rise to two issues: the run through or totally rely on space- new military-only signals are being de- unclassified (versus classified defense provided communications. ployed on satellites that are relatively only) system, which is an indispensa- Global time standards. Most ex- resistant to conventional interference. ble part of national security opera- perts regard global positioning as a However, because the Armed Forces tions, and the increasing potential of central global utility. However, its rely heavily on global positioning sig- wireless accesses. value as a global time standard rather nals, the United States has resisted in- While U.S.-only secure Internet than as a navigation aid is more im- volving foreign actors—even its most remains essential to military opera- portant. It is virtually the only global trusted allies. tions, its very classified nature and source for accurate timing. An error Global communications. The origi- nonaccessibility to allies have meant broadcast over one satellite in 1996 for nal global utility was satellite-based increasing military use of the unclassi- a few seconds caused massive cell communications. While much high fied Internet. Critical functions such as phone outages across the eastern bandwidth international communica- logistics are conducted via this link, United States. Multiplexed systems tion travels via land and undersea op- which is used for virtually all allied co- such as telephones require accurate tical fiber cables, satellite communica- ordination. DOD Internet concerns tions systems are significant have grown. A joint task force was or- employing space assets to gather for two applications. The first ganized in 1999 for computer network information in denied areas was an is bandwidth on demand for defense under U.S. Space Command. short-term needs and the In 2002 this organization was redesig- important feature of the Cold War second is free-space commu- nated Computer Network Operations nications where little or no (JTF/CNO), given added responsibility timing to calculate exactly when to infrastructure exists. Such communi- for network attack functions, and send signals in a given direction and cations are particularly important op- transferred to U.S. Strategic Command. on which channel. The precision of erationally. The primary function of JTF/CNO the timing signals at send-and-receive It is significant that new global is protecting Internet use within DOD. locations contributes to the efficient communications systems are direct As threats such as computer worms use of communications channels. Tim- broadcast radio systems. The Asian and and viruses increase, it has instituted ing errors at one site can disrupt an en- African service of Worldspace has great increasingly vigorous defenses. But the tire well-oiled communications system. potential as an influential tool in the organization has two drawbacks. First, With increasing bandwidth global war on terrorism. Beyond the though it interacts directly with the demand on existing channels, im- control of local authorities and also National Infrastructure Protection provements in efficiency have great difficult to jam, the distribution of Center, it is not charged with protect- economic payoffs. Future global posi- Worldspace direct broadcast receivers ing non-DOD channels and systems. tioning systems with prospective im- to provide balanced news and globally- Moreover, many of its methods would provements in timing accuracy can oriented distance learning programs be considered intrusive or totalitarian add one to two orders of magnitude has utility in combating terrorism in to commercial or public Internet sys- and can significantly increase eco- remote areas. tems. Second, JTF/CNO is not involved nomic returns. Not just cellular com- But these commercial space sys- with coalition-wide use of or defense munications systems but the Internet tems are vulnerable. The accidental of the Internet. Meanwhile, global ter- itself relies on accurate timing. If accu- loss in 1998 of a single pager satellite rorists have increasingly turned to the racy increases two orders of magnitude halted much of North American elec- Internet as the command and control to a tenth of a nanosecond (one ten tronic commerce for a few days be- and recruiting tool of choice. Organi- billionth of a second), a radically dif- cause not only were pagers inoperable, zations such as al Qaeda have used it ferent and more efficient Internet be- but also services such as credit card to circumvent efforts to crush them. comes possible, with the entire world payment systems at service stations. Moreover, Web sites that recruit terror- linked to a single massive computa- Moreover, the Armed Forces rely on ists have remained online by hopping tional web. commercial systems for long-distance from nation to nation and provider to The increased dependence on ac- communications, which could encour- provider. curate timing also means a greater eco- age an enemy to attempt denial. One major development in ex- nomic vulnerability to outages—acci- Situational awareness. Employing panded Internet access that promises dental or deliberate. For example, the space assets to gather information in both great opportunities for informa- Leonid meteor storm that occurs every denied areas was an important feature tion operations and potential pitfalls is 33 years last peaked in 1999. It had the of the Cold War. With technological the growth of systems linking to the potential to knock out much of the advancements, a growing commercial global positioning constellation, which would have caused a massive disruption of life on Earth.

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Situational awareness includes de- Tactical communications tecting and tracking hazardous near- shelter. Earth natural objects such as asteroids. Currently, the most productive resource is a refitted military space surveillance sensor. Systems capable of searching for and detecting asteroids can also be used to locate Earth- orbiting satellites. Some thirty objects approximately a few meters in diameter strike the Earth’s atmosphere annually and release energy comparable to nuclear blasts of several kilotons. As nuclear weapons spread there is concern that nations such as India and Pakistan, both nuclear armed and lacking sophisticated sensors to distinguish between nuclear blasts and asteroid impacts, might mistake a natural explosion for an attack, triggering a nuclear exchange. The United States is the only nation that possesses sophisticated space-based sensors able to rapidly distinguish natural from manmade explosions in the upper atmosphere. There are no provisions for sharing such data. Access to space. Getting capable systems into space has been expensive until recently. Only well-funded government efforts could field launch systems because each launch costs tens of millions of dollars. Corresponding satellite costs for deployed systems ran to hundreds of millions of dollars. With such large investments there has been little incentive to enter into cooperative ventures. U.S. Army (Claude Stallings) Access to space is growing with the emergence of so-called microsatellites. These systems weigh only tens to constellation of optical imaging satel- likely be ineffective in denying infor- several hundred kilograms and usually lites has been developed. These sys- mation to an enemy. cost under $10 million to develop and tems can now obtain sub-meter resolu- Air Force space surveillance net- build. Most can ride as auxiliary pay- tion imagery comparable to aircraft work and contributing sensors monitor loads on large primary launches, and overhead imagery formally mo- and obtain virtually all Earth orbit adding as little as $1 million per nopolized by the superpowers. DOD is event data. This information is vital in launch. The most impressive develop- the biggest consumer of these capabili- protecting assets and determining the ment of this technology has been ties. Conversely, the government is status of foreign space systems in dis- achieved by the Space Centre at the worried about enemy access to such tress. Other nations, notably Canada, University of Surrey. This facility has data and has utilized multiple ap- France, and the United Kingdom, are built and launched over 25 microsats proaches to avoid unwanted disper- developing space tracking systems. performing a range of scientific mission, from legal restrictions and shut- Space-based sensors are needed to ac- sions, including Earth surveillance, ter control to buying up all available quire optimal space situation aware- and it markets affordable capabilities imagery. However, as foreign suppliers ness. Some users, such as Canada, are to nations such as Algeria, Chile, proliferate, particularly in the all- planning surveillance systems. Egypt, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Taiwan. weather, day/night synthetic aperture radar regime, these maneuvers will

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■ JFQ FORUM

One growing concern about mi- reason the military has avoided coop- both high costs and security sensitivi- crosat technology is its potential to in- erative space efforts. ties. That could change with the pro- terfere with the use of space by other Preventing hostile use of U.S. liferation of low-cost microsatellites. nations. China has worked closely space systems is one of the four pillars Recent thinking suggests that it may with the University of Surrey and has in the emerging field of space control, be time to use space cooperation as a also developed its own capability. Bei- along with space situational aware- key element in future U.S. Govern- jing has suggested that it might use ness, protection of friendly assets, and ment influence activities.2 this technology to deny the United denial of enemy use of their own One area of potential cooperation States from using space in a conflict. space systems. It is generally thought is protecting global utilities because Other nations could develop similar to be unwise to assist other nations or they are critical to the international capabilities. And microsats are difficult groups in this effort. With experience economy. The Internet is a good place to detect and track because of their in the use of space systems proliferat- to start. Threats to it abound and size. Any enemy which possesses them ing, the difficulty of preventing hos- global calls for action grow with each could mount an effective surprise de- tile exploitation grows—an added new worm or virus. As noted before, nial of essential commercial and mili- incentive to eschew international co- DOD has developed a reasonable tary space resources. operation on use of space data for regime for protecting its cyber systems. security purposes. But to safeguard the American econ- Space Threats Another reason to avoid space omy, the measures needed are neither The political dimension is a signif- and cyber systems cooperation is the available nor generally accepted be- icant concern to space professionals. economic argument. The United cause of their intrusiveness. Almost no National security space efforts were States has seen its competitiveness regimes exist to protect the Internet, highly classified throughout the Cold erode across the aerospace industry. though there has been consideration War. Near the end of the Soviet Union, International cooperation invariably of such arrangements. The use of cy- the Strategic Defense Initiative, includ- leads to foreign technology develop- berspace by terrorists conjures up ing the proposed use of space-based ment that in turn can lead to commer- wider concerns. It may be feasible to missile defenses, caused controversy cial competition. consider cooperation in Internet secu- over the military use of space, particu- Finally, there is the issue of se- rity as a bilateral and multilateral issue larly on weapons. Many members of crecy. The military seeks to preserve its rather than a law enforcement matter. the national security space community advantage in space through strict classi- That could circumvent subsequent dif- fication procedures and sharing in- ficulties by establishing a genuinely it may be time to use space formation on a need-to-know basis. global regime at the outset and serve as Because space information is critical a template for space cooperation. cooperation as a key element in denied areas, it is among the Global communications circuits in future influence activities most secret of U.S. capabilities. The have already come under attack. Amer- National Reconnaissance Office, ica must cautiously protect them in realize the advantages of space for se- which safeguards space intelligence order to deny use of global and re- curity purposes yet are fearful of public data, remains among the most power- gional communications to an enemy. outcry. Extensive exchanges with for- ful agencies for maintaining classifica- One limited option is reaching agree- eign partners about routine use of tion on space capabilities. Similarly, the ments on defensive schemes, perhaps space to support security operations organization with responsibility for including on-orbit arrangements such would be inherently less classified and much information intelligence, the Na- as mandating that commercial pay- thus relatively open to public discus- tional Security Agency, strictly controls loads carry routine attack and interfer- sion. Foreign cooperation with the emerging cyber capabilities. ence sensors. Armed Forces is likely to generate even The most critical capabilities to more opposition since people abroad Opportunities protect may be global positioning, are more antimilitary on space issues Whereas much of the attention in navigation, and timing networks. Only than those at home. the past on the military use of space the United States and Russia maintain The United States enjoys a virtual has been placed on supporting mili- them, with Galileo to follow within monopoly in the use of space for military operations, the situation is chang- the next decade. Defending these sig- tary operations and almost total domi- ing rapidly. With the advent of U.S. nals—including when and to whom nance over Internet use. This offers an Strategic Command and its focus on service should be denied—could be a easy means to reconfigure space and global missions, perspectives on space crucial bilateral concern. information systems. Since capabilities and information systems must also such as global positioning have a large change. Influence in military affairs Combating Terrorism economic impact, international discus- was often gained through high-tech- The nature of the global war on sion of what is actually an American nology cooperation, which involved terrorism demands worldwide capabil- military system would only slow deci- high-performance aircraft. Space coop- ities to respond. It requires the close sions and constrain flexibility, another eration was generally not considered within most partnerships because of

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economy, particularly those of the Is- only comprehensive system of its type. lamic world. While mere access to the DOD space-based early warning sen- Internet and modern education may sors already gather data that distin- not cure this problem, it will help. guish near-earth asteroid impacts on Sharing and even providing access to the atmosphere from nuclear detona- the global information grid could also tions. Finally, the capability to deflect contribute to a long-term solution to objects on a collision course with Earth terrorism by promoting economic de- is under development for other mili- velopment and opportunities for many tary missions. regions around the globe. The foremost need is surveying the skies for threatening objects. Sys- Force Multiplier tems to track satellites can also detect The military use of space prima- and track objects. If the United States Tethered picosatellites. rily provides a force multiplier for assumed the lead in a project to in-

Aerospace Corporation Aerospace other systems. Direct communications, crease these capabilities, it could not surveillance, intelligence and target- only leverage foreign efforts—which ing, weather, and position, navigation, are growing because of public fear of integration of global surveillance sys- and timing are key advantages for the asteroids—but also maintain a lead in tems, including the Internet, with Armed Forces. But global issues de- space situational awareness. local and regional information sys- mand global responses. It is in the na- tems. Local governments that may be tional interest to seek means to pro- Space and information are the reluctant to cooperate often control vide space and information force first authentic global capabilities. Secu- the latter systems. Global surveillance multipliers to allies. Developing low- rity is a global as well as regional or na- systems, especially space-based, can be cost space systems and access through tional concern. The establishment of effective in detecting terrorist activi- microsatellites and leveraging commer- U.S. Strategic Command with over- ties. Moreover, the availability of such cial capabilities can provide others sight for these capabilities, along with systems to local governments can be a most of the advantages enjoyed by the other worldwide military assets, recog- strong incentive for cooperation. It United States. nizes this reality. Global space and in- would be sensible to consider new Some caution that encouraging formation capabilities are essential to low-cost space-based surveillance sys- even close allies to strengthen their use solving these problems. A cooperative tems that are less capable but have of high-technology force multipliers approach on the part of the United more comprehensive coverage. A net- such as space could backfire. Transfer- States to their development and em- work of antiterrorist sensors would be ring systems could threaten American ployment is essential to building a bilaterally negotiated. The current U.S. lives. But it is important to note that coalition to meet common threats all early warning regime involving shared the Nation is likely to expand its con- nations face. JFQ missile launch warning data has been trol over space and cyberspace in a cri- an effective pathfinder which has sis. Thus it is improbable that any ally NOTES gained influence with minimal threat will have access to sophisticated infor- 1 Franklin Kramer, “Is Security Possible to national security. mation if the United States deems it a in a Globalized World?” U.S. Naval Institute New systems that survey large ter- threat to national security. Proceedings, vol. 27, no. 10 (October 2001), restrial areas and provide unfettered pp. 50–52. information access from space also Planetary Defense 2 Stephen N. Whiting, “Policy, Influence, have economic benefits. Direct access Some consider the ultimate dan- and Diplomacy: Space as a National Power and interaction with the global infor- ger to mankind to be near-Earth aster- Element,” masters thesis (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: School of Advanced Airpower mation grid opens opportunities for oids. The impact of a 10-kilometer di- Studies, June 2002). economic development. Collaborative ameter asteriod 65 million years ago efforts in space have been seen in the wiped out the dinosaurs and 90 per- past as dangerous to American inter- cent of the other species on the planet. ests. However, as the successful mar- Global concern over this threat, fueled keting of microsat capabilities demon- by blockbuster movies, has increased strates, far from migrating capabilities the call for action. The possibility that overseas, joint ventures result in one of the numerous small annual im- greater product use and growing mar- pacts on the upper atmosphere may be kets for all concerned. mistaken for a nuclear attack adds to Of particular importance to long- the anxiety. term global stability is the need to in- The United States is unique in the tegrate isolated areas into the global world in being able to address the threat of asteroids. It operates the Air Force space surveillance system, the

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 71 Finding a Path to

Delta II soaring over Spacepower Florida. U.S. Air Force (Lee A. Osberry, Jr.) (LeeU.S. Air Force A. Osberry,

By JOHN M. LOGSDON

lthough there has been Why the Concern? considerable activity The report issued in January 2001 among specialists in na- by the Commission to Assess U.S. Na- A tional security space since tional Security Space Management and the Bush administration took office, Organization, chaired by Donald there has only been limited debate on Rumsfeld, focused on how best to as- space weapons and their effects. Deci- sure that the United States got maxi- sions regarding spacepower capabilities mum national security value from its are important domestically as well as investments in space capabilities. It internationally and should be made was careful in its discussion of space only after thoughtful analysis and dis- weapons but recommended that the cussion.1 United States “should vigorously pursue the capabilities...to ensure that the John M. Logsdon is director of the Space Policy Institute at The George Washington President will have the option to de- University and the author of The Decision To Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and ploy weapons in space to deter threats the National Interest. to and, if necessary, defend against

72 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Logsdon

least reasonable to conclude that the George W. Bush administration would indeed move quickly toward enhancing spacepower, going beyond traditional space support and force enhancement missions to increased emphasis on space control and even force application from space. Given these factors, it is not surprising that those people in the security policy community traditionally skeptical of increasing military capabilities as the best approach to conflict resolution, became concerned that the Nation would pursue space weaponization without challenge. They have now mobilized to present that challenge. Thinking About Weapons Recently a number of public policy centers have added space weaponization to nuclear proliferation and U.N. Conference on ballistic missile defense on their agen- Disarmament. das. These groups traditionally focused AP/ Wide Photo (Donald World Stampfli) on diplomatic, legal, and multilateral approaches to international security affairs rather than the development of attacks on U.S. interests.” To those op- also be available for strategic attack on unilateral military capabilities. Among posed to extending armed conflict into ground-based targets. In the same year, them are the Council on Foreign Rela- space, the report seemed to be a call Senator Robert Smith staked out a po- tions, Eisenhower Institute, Federation for movement toward making outer sition as a congressional advocate of of American Scientists, Henry L. Stim- space the next battlefield. spacepower, stating “America’s future son Center, Cato Institute, Center for This was a plausible interpreta- security and prosperity depend on our Defense Information, and Monterey tion. In the years preceding the com- constant supremacy in space.”3 Smith’s Institute of International Studies. mission’s work, there had been a high call for a separate military service dedi- In addition, some members of level of advocacy of the potential of cated to spacepower led to establish- Congress have become concerned space capabilities and the military ment of the Space Commission. In the about the implications of weaponizing power they could provide. Force appli- private sector, the Center for Security space. In 2001 and again in 2002, Rep- cation capabilities were a central focus Policy took the lead in pushing for resentative Dennis Kucinich introduced of this advocacy. In 1996 U.S. Space stronger national security space capa- the Space Preservation Act, which bilities in the final years of the called on the President to “implement recently a number of public Clinton administration. To the a ban on space-based weapons...to policy centers have added space arms control community and oth- destroy or damage objects in space that ers opposed to moving conflict are in orbit, and immediately order the weaponization to their agendas into space, the report of the Space termination of research and develop- Commission seemed a logical ex- ment, testing, manufacturing, produc- Command issued Vision for 2020, tension of those arguments; it sup- tion, and deployment of all space- which projected that “during the early ported developing space weapons and based weapons of the United States.” 21st century, spacepower will...evolve was closely linked to the highest levels into a separate and equal medium of of national security policy. Other Space Priorities warfare.” 2 Two years later, the com- Spacepower advocates pretty As efforts to assess space weapon- mand released a long range plan that much had the stage to themselves at ization reach fruition, an informed dis- dramatically portrayed how space- the start of 2001. The opposition to cussion on future national security based capabilities, including force ap- weaponization was primarily on the space policy will become more likely. plication systems, are key to national instinctive level. In the United States, Just as a loyal opposition has emerged, security objectives and could be used there was no organized criticism or in- spacepower advocates have been to disable or destroy enemy space sys- depth thinking on the validity or wis- tems. The report noted that force ap- dom of spacepower advocates. It was at plication systems based in space could

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 73 JFQ FORUM

Unloading satellite from C–17, Kennedy Space Center. NASA

silent. Senator Smith was defeated for shaping an organizational structure to collapse of the commercial launch reelection in 2002, and the last Center integrate the best aspects of Depart- market. Dealing with these issues has for Security Policy statement on space- ment of Defense and National Recon- required an investment of time and ef- power was issued more than two years naissance Office (NRO) practices and fort by Teets and his colleagues. In ad- ago. Few senior officials or military of- programs in support of national secu- dition, they seem to have raised ques- ficers have been willing to discuss rity and warfighting objectives. Given tions in the mind of the Secretary of questions on space weaponry in pub- the entrenched nature of the agencies Defense on the wisdom of such de- lic. With only one side participating, involved, this is proving to be a daunt- pendence on space systems, given the there is no debate. ing task and it will be difficult to as- problem of achieving their operational There are understandable reasons sign priorities to long-run doctrinal status on schedule and within budget. for the official silence on longer-term and capability issues until the success A recent DOD task force chaired by security space issues. As Secretary of the organizational transitions now Thomas Young, a retired industry ex- Rumsfeld has remarked, the Space underway becomes clearer. ecutive, has addressed both the pro- Commission report was not primarily There are also major problems in grammatic problems and the issue of about space weapons, but about how the short run with key national secu- future dependence. best to organize and manage national rity space programs. Future imagery security space efforts. In response to architecture of NRO and DOD space- Beginning the Debate the report, the Air Force has been des- based infrared systems have encoun- The silence regarding future plan- ignated the executive agent for space, tered cost, schedule, and technical ning on the part of the national secu- with the Under Secretary of the Air problems. Moreover, operators of the rity space leadership appears to be end- Force, Peter Teets, taking the lead in Delta IV and Atlas V launch vehicles, ing. In particular, Teets has begun to which are intended to provide assured access to space, have sought government support to compensate for the

74 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Logsdon speak out on the importance of supe- have been approved with an over- First lunar landing, rior space capabilities to meeting na- 1969. whelming margin, usually with no optional security needs, addressing issues position and only the United States related to the exercise of force applica- and Israel abstaining. tion as part of maintaining space con- The Space Commission report trol. For example, in fall 2002 he told called on the U.S. Government to “par- the Air Force Association: ticipate actively in shaping the [inter- The need to continue our thinking about national] regulatory and legal environ- space control is not just doctrinal rhetoric, ment” and “review existing arms but military reality. Controlling the high control agreements in light of a grow- ground of space...will also require us to ing need to extend deterrent capabili- think about denying the high ground to ties to space.” But Washington has thus our adversaries....The mission of space far resisted attempts to begin discussing control has not been at the forefront of our the regulation of the various uses of military thinking, because our people have space, including as a medium for projecting national power. not yet been put at risk by an adversary NASA using space capabilities. That will change. Other nations could begin negotiating a new regime for outer space over He also noted the need to apply the U.S. objections to pressure Washington new capabilities to every possible form defunct. No other significant interna- into participating. The opponents of of warfighting and asked: “Are there tional agreements limit stationing space weaponization, assuming that ways we can use space capabilities to force application capabilities in space. agreements in the framework of the affect the decisionmaking cycle of an In the past several years, a num- Conference on Disarmament are im- adversary, or produce other effects to ber of international nongovernmental possible since the United States can achieve campaign objectives in ways organizations have studied the issue, block action, have suggested a process 4 air, land, and sea forces cannot?” stimulated by their understanding of similar to that which led to the treaty With Teets in a leadership posi- U.S. plans as set forth in Space Com- banning antipersonnel landmines, tion, advocates of enhanced space- mand documents and other statements which was signed in December 1997 power appear ready for public ex- and by the deadlock related to steps to by 121 nations. That process was char- change. Many who are skeptical of prevent an arms race in outer space acterized by a partnership among gov- proposed in the U.N. Conference ernmental and nongovernmental ac- no other significant international on Disarmament in Geneva. That tors and multilateral negotiations agreements limit stationing force issue has been on the conference outside the framework of the confer- agenda since the mid-1980s. In ence. If such a process emerged at the application capabilities in space recent years, China and Russia initiative of antiweaponization inter- have advocated banning space ests, the United States would have to space weaponization are also reaching weapons. Moreover, Canada has taken participate in the negotiations, as rec- preliminary conclusions and will soon a leading role in support of a ban. The ommended by the Space Commission, seek to gain broader attention. Thus United States has held to its position or remain outside of the process. If coming months may finally bring on the grounds that “existing multilat- Washington took part in discussions what Theresa Hitchens of the Center eral arms control regime adequately and eventual negotiations on an inter- for Defense Information has called protects states’ interests....There is national space regime, it could influ- “one of the most important global se- simply no problem in outer space for ence the outcome in a manner that is st curity policy debates of the 21 cen- arms control to solve....We see no consistent with national interests. tury . . . whether the United States need for further outer space treaties.”6 needs to develop and deploy space- Since any action by the Conference on Issues for the Agenda 5 based weaponry.” Disarmament requires the agreement What might be the leading issues of all participants, the U.S. position in a debate over space weaponization? International Dimension has effectively blocked movement First, priority should be given to un- Space weaponization is not just a there on the space weapons issue. derstanding, in the context of the next national security policy issue but a The U.N. General Assembly has 10–25 years, how actual decisions to global concern. The Outer Space Treaty passed an annual resolution in the past develop and deploy force application of 1967 prohibits stationing weapons several years that calls on nations to capabilities might be made, and then of mass destruction either in space or avoid an outer space arms race. These assessing the positives and negatives of on celestial bodies, but it is silent on resolutions, which express the views of specific decisions. This is preferable to other weapons in orbit. The ABM members but have no legal standing, arguing from unexamined assump- Treaty of 1972 banned the testing or tions, as both advocates and oppo- deployment of missile defense components have too often done. nents or systems in space but is now

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 75 JFQ FORUM

space superiority, and national security policy should debate whether and at what pace the United States should develop and deploy antisatellite weapons and space-based force application capabilities. Candid exchanges may reveal whether there are achiev- able international agreements that might be preferable to unilateral space weaponization. There appears to be time for debate. One analysis of the military use of space concluded: there is a better than even chance that the primary use of space will remain force enhancement through 2020–2025 . . . the strategic logic of spacepower argues that weapons will one day be based in near- Earth space because nations will eventually feel compelled to defend their strategic interests there....The odds are that this logic will not drive nations, including the United States, to deploy weapons in orbital space by 2025.7 If this judgment is valid, it is appropriate to proceed slowly in developing space weapons capabilities as alter- nate approaches are explored. Other aspects of space superiority—such as improved situational awareness— should have higher priority. Two paths could lead to the pur- poseful choice that it is in the national interest to develop space weapons. One path would follow from the judgment that space weapons are required to carry out the space control mission, which involves not only assuring full U.S. use of space but also denying that use to an enemy. It is not clear that there is a basis for such a judgment. As the head of the space control division on the Air Staff has suggested: For the time being, this country can achieve space superiority without deploying weapons in space and without the use of weapons that create permanent effects NASA on the commons of space. The United States should use space-based weapons only as a last resort but should not con- One such assumption is that free of armed conflict. Individuals and sider such use an unthinkable option.... space weaponization is inevitable, and organizations holding strongly to ei- Certainly, one would prefer to control the thus the United States should act now ther position are unlikely to be pro- future through peaceful agreements that to ensure that it is first to develop ductive participants in discussing how are in the mutual interests of the parties space weapons. An opposing assump- best to proceed. involved. At the same time, the United tion is that it is in the national as well Those observers who hold more as global interest for space to remain nuanced views of the relationship among space weapons, spacepower,

76 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Logsdon

States must prepare itself to deal with a time for a real debate on pursuing such wide spectrum of potential conflicts in a course. The issues involve a range of space by developing and testing a number political, economic, strategic, and mili- of military capabilities—up to and includ- tary considerations. It is unlikely that a ing space-based weapons, preferably those consensus will emerge, but policymak- with temporary/reversible effects.8 ing on the U.S. approach to 21st cen- This perspective seems sound. If tury spacepower will be much better the Nation can control space for the informed by airing these issues. JFQ foreseeable future without space NOTES weapons, it makes no sense to rapidly deploy them, given the implications of 1 See John M. Logsdon, “Just Say Wait to both domestic and international oppo- Spacepower,” Issues in Science and Technol- sition to militarizing space. ogy, vol. 17, no. 3 (Spring 2001), p. 36. Noting the military advantages 2 U.S. Space Command, Vision for 2020, that spacepower confers on the United 1996, p. 4, www.gsinstitute.org/resources/ extras/vision_2020.pdf. States, it is highly likely if not certain 3 Robert Smith, “The Challenge of Space- that other countries will develop mili- power,” Aerospace Power Journal, vol. 18, no. tary space capabilities. At some point, 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 32–39. the lives of military personnel may be 4 Remarks by Teets are found at www.af. put at risk by an enemy with space- mil/news/speech/current/sph2002_21.html. based observation and navigation ca- 5 Theresa Hitchens, “ Weapons in Space: pabilities. Current policy calls for tem- Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette?” a paper porary and reversible means to deny for The George Washington University that advantage in a conflict, and those Security Space Forum, p. 1, www.gwu.edu/ means are being developed. Whether ~spi/spaceforum. 6 Eric Javits, “A U.S. Perspective on the ability to permanently neutralize Space” in James Clay Moltz, ed., “Future Se- or destroy satellites is also desirable is Launching V–2 from curity in Space: Commercial, Military, and the kind of issue that requires continu- Arms Control Trade-Offs,” Occasional Paper ing discussion. White Sands Proving Ground, 1949. no. 10 (Monterey: Center for Nonprolifera- A space Pearl Harbor—a surprise tion Studies, Monterey Institute of Interna- attack on important space assets—is Laboratory Jet Propulsion tional Studies, July 2002), pp. 52–53. the sort of concern the Space Com- 7 Barry Watts, The Military Use of Space: A mission addressed. The Nation must Diagnostic Assessment (Washington: Center prepare for such an eventuality with crossed. This is therefore another for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, the goal of deterring an attack and choice where the political and military 2001), pp. 108–09. 8 John E. Hyten, “A Sea of Peace or a then responding appropriately if it dimensions should be debated. Theater of War? Dealing with the Inevitable should occur. Conflict in Space,” Air & Space Power Jour- A second path to space weapon- For forty-five years the countries nal, vol. 16, no. 3 (Fall 2002), pp. 78–92. ization follows from the conclusion of the world have refrained in the that effective defense against ballistic main from developing capabilities for missile attack on the United States or conflict in space. While the United States and the Soviet Union if the Nation can control space tested and deployed antisatellite weapons, a widespread percep- without space weapons, it makes tion arose that using outer space no sense to rapidly deploy them as an arena for warfare is undesir- able. By contrast, some believe its allies requires some form of space- that space will inevitably become a based boost phase intercept. The archi- battleground and that it is vital for the tecture being proposed by the Bush ad- Nation to ensure dominance in that ministration does not have space- area. Those who hold this position based intercept capabilities. In the have succeeded in creating an impres- event of a decision that space basing of sion, at variance with current realities, antimissile capability was preferable to that Washington is moving rapidly ground basing, the space weaponiza- along a path that will lead inexorably tion threshold would have been to space weaponization. The decisions that would lead to such a path have not been made. It is

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 77 Reviewing intelligence, Northern Edge ’02.

U.S. Air Force (Adrian Cadiz) Unity of Effort in Joint Information Operations

By SYNTHIA S. JONES, BERNARD FLOWERS, and KARLTON D. JOHNSON

lthough information operations have There is a legal dimension to information long existed, it was only recently that operations that is critical to their use. The United joint doctrine began including such States has signed various bilateral and multilateral A multidimensional operations in a agreements that affect information operations. As systematic manner. In addition, the Nation has Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Information Operations, states: yet to conduct joint information operations (JIO) “[information operations] may involve complex utilizing a full range of capabilities—public af- legal issues requiring careful review and national- fairs, civil affairs, psychological operations, opera- level coordination . . . planners should under- tions security, and deception. stand the limitations that may be placed on [campaigns] across the range of military operations.” Beyond such statements, however, there is little Commander Synthia S. Jones, USN, is assigned to the Defense help for joint planners in maneuvering through Information Systems Agency; Major Bernard Flowers, USAF, is with the legal maze and even less training available to the Joint Information Operations Center; and Lieutenant Colonel facilitate this information effort. Karlton D. Johnson, USAF, is serving at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.

78 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Jones et al.

Today there is a perception that the joint community does not exercise this vital segment of the process. In fact, many engagements in which joint information operations have been used were only instances of piecemeal implementation. Cur- rent U.S. laws prohibit computer network attack and perception management or limit their use. Thus potent capabilities remain unexploited. A comparison of the service doctrine with Joint Pub 3-13 reveals that each has considered information operations in terms of its doctrine. FM-100-6, Army Information Operations, assumes a land operations perspective—seeking information dominance by tactical advantage on the digital battlefield. Naval Doctrine Pub 6 views information operations in terms of command and control warfare for fleet operations. Even the Air Force, which adopts a more enlightened vision, has an air focus and uses doctrine to control the dimensions of air and space. The Armed Forces view information operations in terms of the comfortable and the familiar, which is consistent with findings that service efforts fall short of an integrated services apply the principles joint approach.1 One reason Fusing target data, for this lack of integration is of their military doctrine to Joint Expeditionary oulined in the concept known Forces Experiment ’00. information operations as the politicization of strategy.2 According to this process, (Lee E. Rogers) U.S. Air Force those charged with developing strategic ideas in the services are rarely objective; their job is promoting service interests. This phenomenon is evi- argued that joint forces information warfare com- dent in the development of both service and joint ponent commanders are needed to resolve plan- information doctrine. The politicization of doc- ning problems and execute multifaceted informa- trine means that the services are expert within tion operations. However, an information their domains, and each conceives of doctrine in operations command structure alone is not the accordance with its worldview. One effect is that answer. New threats and ubiquitous information services apply the principles of their military doc- technology have changed the limits of informa- trine to information operations. Such operations tion operations. Although joint commanders will transcend the traditional boundaries of modern play a critical role in information campaigns, a warfare. single command does not have the resources, The problems of effective joint information competencies, or partners to meet the enormity of operations are compounded by the challenges of the task. It could have the opposite effect. If one coordinating information-centric activities. U.S. command is responsible for joint information op- Strategic Command is responsible for computer erations, others may defer problems to that com- network operations because the preponderance of mand rather than collaborating. Turf wars could space-based and computer-centric systems reside erupt if funding becomes associated with particu- within its scope. It also has responsibility for the lar commanders. In sum, a single command could Joint Information Operations Center at Lackland marginalize the effort and diminish its impor- Air Force Base. However, it would not be appro- tance in operational planning. Every combatant priate to refer to Commander, Strategic Com- commander needs a role in the JIO process, but mand, as the commander of information opera- they are not the only critical players. tions, which raises the issue of who is in charge. Involvement on national, state, and local Some believe that only combatant com- levels as well as in the private sector complicates manders could provide the vision, focus, and span matters. Attacks using information operations of control necessary to protect national infrastruc- may not be limited to military targets. As identi- tures from information aggression.3 Moreover, it is fied in Presidential Decision Directive 63, the national infrastructure is a prime target. The attacks on 9/11 proved that the minds of the public are

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subject to assault. Consider the crash of the first think and disassociates information operations airliner into the World Trade Center. Few people from service-specific control. Joint leadership saw the original impact or caught it on film. But must work together to overcome parochial barri- many watched the second plane impact and send ers and guide the services towards a more authen- a clear message that it was an act of terrorism. tic form of joint information operations. Joint The psychological effect was significant: the air- Pub 3-13 is a good start, but it is conceptual and line industry nearly went under, stocks plum- not directive in presenting the forms of a syn- meted, and Americans were traumatized. It is un- chronized operation. But should joint doctrine certain whether the Nation immediately realized provide direction down to service level? That the second attack was an information operation. could be a valid concern to the extent that the It is also unclear what countermeasures could authority of the combatant commander is in- have minimized the dreadful impact of 9/11. Evi- fringed. Nevertheless, there must be a better ap- dence suggests that there should have been signif- proach to leveraging service competencies. Com- icant collaboration among pub- manders are the key and must guide their teams if the Nation conducts lic and private organizations, to break down service barriers to develop a more the military, media, et al. to appropriate process for the times. information operations, deal with the consequences of In parallel with the combatant commanders, the military would not be an attack. But in practice, the the joint community should expand its efforts. If Armed Forces have few capabili- the Nation conducts information operations, the the only actor on the scene ties available to combat asym- military would not be the only actor on the metric attacks on this scale. scene. The National Security Agency, Central In- Both Joint Vision 2020 and Joint Pub 3-61, Public telligence Agency, and other organizations would Affairs, encourage commanders to use the media facilitate activities. Effective operations would to shape the battlespace, but what relationships also require partnering with the courts to ensure and procedures exist to achieve that objective? that actions taken are legal as well as capable of From a joint perspective, leaders know that withstanding public scrutiny. Links with the information operations are critical to the future. media would be needed to provide accurate ac- And while there has been an attempt to forge the counts of events to both domestic and interna- necessary joint doctrine, something quite differ- tional audiences. By leveraging such relation- ent had occurred. The doctrine drafters applied ships, the joint team would be able to design traditional ways of fighting to the JIO strategy. cross-functional responses and thus have a role in Based on the evidence, this has not been the most influencing the entire operational landscape. effective approach. Tried and true battle strategies These arrangements would provide a more realis- will not win future wars fought in the continuum tic condition for jointness; they could enlarge the between the human mind and ephemeral cyber- team to include stakeholders and employ the full space. Warfare has been transformed in moral, range of natonal capabilities against the threat. physical, and cybernetic terms. Moreover, technology has radically changed, decreasing the bat- Unity of Effort tle rhythm to a matter of seconds rather than Joint information operations need unity of days, thereby enabling a degree of influence un- effort. Old models no longer work, and the joint known in the past. The so-called CNN effect re- community must reconsider the problem to ob- flects this change. Joint warriors must think differ- tain a workable solution. The information revo- ently about battlefields, doctrine, and actors. lution requires an inclusive concept of the various elements of national information power. A New Response National security in the information age and the Cyber attacks against the United States by development and exercise of the information other nations are increasing at an alarming rate. component of national strategy require a new Terrorist groups and foreign governments are paradigm of jointness that incorporates and syn- using information operations in an effort to level chronizes policies and activities in the informa- the playing field. Some thirty countries have ag- tion realm. Others have also advocated the need gressive offensive information warfare programs, for harmonization. with America as a primary target. To survive such A survey of extant theories and practice sug- threats, the ways in which information opera- gested the construct for what the authors have tions are conceived and executed must change. called the joint information operations synchro- Representatives of combatant commands nization team (see figure 1). This model also relies and services will come to the table with doctrine on a pioneering study that introduced the con- on information operations based on their individ- cepts of strategic intent, strategic architecture, ual worldviews. Effective change will only occur when service doctrine evolves beyond group

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Figure 1. Synchronizing Joint Information Operations

Create and Manage Implement Service Focus Learning and and Execution Experimentation verage

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Set Operational Standards and Policies

and core competency.4 In redefining strategic suc- with industry or the media; yet the challenge to cess, it emphasized that organizations must shape train as we fight is applicable. All players must be rather than respond to the future. In the case of included in the deliberate and crisis action plan- information operations, that means fostering a ning process (with consideration for the security revolution in expertise through the formation of of sensitive information) to properly synchronize the synchronization team. Appointed by the Sec- efforts in the event of an attack. Exercises should retary of Defense and headed by the Chairman, be planned and executed jointly and their lessons the team includes representatives of the military, shared. As teams form the necessary relation- intelligence community, industrial sector, media, ships, lines of communication will develop and et al. The team would accomplish various facets the United States can shape the future. The of this model. It would function between the op- knowledge gained will prove invaluable in identi- erational and strategic levels to shape campaigns fying vulnerabilities across the board: technology, by acquiring and exploiting competitive advan- partnerships, competencies, and other factors. tages. Its role would include facilitating defensive Forming these relationships will be the most information efforts for the joint community, such daunting task. as detecting information operations, assessing their impact, synchronizing the joint response, Global Strategic Development and engaging other players. The strength of the According to Sun Tzu, the apex of strategy is team would rest on shaping the strategic informa- winning a fight without fighting. The experts tion battlespace. While a joint information opera- have already highlighted cases where other nations center would interface with the services, the tions are training and planning information oper- team would develop gateways to other players. ations against the United States. Reacting to the threat is a certain path to failure. Instead, the Learning and Experimentation team must force an enemy into designated kill- Current joint doctrine does provide for gov- boxes. The team is the focal point for synergizing ernment-wide exercises. However, key industry this effort by shaping information operations, players are not included in the scenarios. Knowl- edge assets, procedures, and plans are not shared

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PSYOP supporting multinational forces, Tradewinds ’02. U.S. Army (Joseph Bonet)

synchronizing community efforts by mapping a Americans should become experts in global per- strategic architecture, and helping to build that fu- ception management. ture. A strategic architecture is defined as a “high- level blueprint for the deployment of new func- Core Competencies tionalities, the acquisition of new competencies Shaping the battlespace also involves acquir- (or migration of existing ing both the right skills and technologies to field a shaping the battlespace competencies), and the re- solid information capability. The joint informa- configuring of the inter- tion operations synchronization team would be involves acquiring the right face for those who receive responsible for setting the strategic intent of infor- skills and technologies to field the benefit of said compe- mation operations. This intent implies a particular tencies.”5 The joint infor- point of view on the long-term environment in a sold information capability mation operations syn- which an organization hopes to build a competi- chronization team would tive position over time. Considering strategic ar- use this blueprint to influence other nations in chitecture the brain and strategic intent the heart the development of tactics, techniques, and proce- of the effort implies significant stretch for the dures for information operations. team. The intent would then translate into a dis- Since the United States is the world leader in cussion among the team, learning institutions, technology infrastructure, it has leverage over and technology firms to determine what core how others use technology and information con- competencies would be needed for the future. cepts. However, that lead is quickly diminishing. These parties would help develop those compe- During the Persian Gulf War, for example, Iraq tencies, matching them to the strategic architec- used information operations as an asymmetric ture previously discussed. The result would be a tool to influence international opinion. America joint effort to secure the intellectual leadership, must set the pace and establish the standard. It influence the strategic landscape of the battle- must also rethink how national security strategy space, and preempt any advantages of use to po- is developed. Chinese strategists have extensively tential enemies. used U.S. doctrine and guidance to formulate their conclusions.6 The United States can use such Effective joint information operations can be documents to guide the rest of the world down its achieved through unity of effort that redefines chosen road, simultaneously forging ahead on a views of jointness and rethinks the process for different vector. Since perception management is shaping the strategic battlespace. Each step in this a critical component of information operations,

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jointness will be expanded to include a larger Figure 2. Joint Information Operations Value Chain community of public and private interests working to define core competencies for conducting effective information operations campaigns. Infrastructure: planning, budget, and policy Uniting joint information operations efforts

ADVANTAGE could stimulate discussion so policymakers can Human resource management: skills, research, beliefs, relations attack the problem more effectively. Making complex issues understandable will provide a Technology: technology support and research framework for the questions posed in this analysis. Additionally, taken to its logical conclusion, Logistics/procurement: resource management/acquisition the construct presented above can address IO (enemy) •Establish •Educate •Design/secure •Define the future joint and interagency collaboration issues •Threats lines of the team technology •Shape IO future that remain among the most prevalent chal- •Capabilities communication •Synchronize •Provide •Build strategic AGE lenges to information operations. It is time to •MO/TTPs •Identify cultures exercises communications architecture seek unity of effort in the arena of joint infor- •Determine •Identify barriers and scenarios •Create the mation operations. JFQ needs/design •Link processes strategic shape of the systems/policies intent ADVANT NOTES future 1 Randall C. Lane, Information Operations: A Joint Per- Explore and Synchronize Train Equip Shape spective (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Army Command and Understand General Staff College, 1998). 2 Stephen M. Walt, “The Search for a Science of Strat- egy: A Review Essay,” International Security, vol. 12, no. 1 (Summer 1987), pp. 140–60. 3 Robert F. Gaines, “Future Information Operations in the Military: Is It Time for a CINC IO?” student paper construct adds layers of improved value to the (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Command and Staff process, which take the joint information opera- College, April 2000). tions synchronization team to higher levels. 4 Gary Hamel and C.K. Prahalad, Competing for the Based on the work of various consultants and re- Future (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1994). searchers, the JIO value chain can be constructed 5 Ibid. (see figure 2 above).7 6 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare The joint information operations synchro- (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, nization team would affect infrastructure, human 1999). 7 resource management, technology, and logistics. Michael Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance (New York: The Free These must be harmonized to produce some Press, 1985) and Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy: value that facilitates the effective employment of Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors (New joint information operations and gains a compet- York: The Free Press, 1980). The value chain model was itive advantage in this discipline. As the team actually developed by McKinsey and Company. works through the JIO construct, it will be mindful of the need to establish a competitive advan- This article is an abridged version of an essay prepared tage and continually strive for enhanced value in by the authors while attending the Joint Forces Staff every activity. The value chain serves as a visual College. queue that addresses how an action creates a greater advantage for the United States and whether that value exceeds the real or implied costs of producing it. This aspect of the construct is what separates it from other constructs for information operations. There are myriad options for the United States with regard to joint information operations. Nonetheless, there are some evident truths: information operations will be both a strategic asset and a liability in coming years a competitive advantage will be achieved by shaping rather than reacting to the future

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 83

Milosevic leaving dock at U.N. War Crimes Tribunal. AP/ Wide Photo (ICTY World TV) Deterring Attack The Role of Information Operations By GREGORY L. SCHULTE

he overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic in and civil disobedience inflicted on the regime by October 2000 was a turning point in student activists. The United States, European Balkan history. It set Serbia on a course governments, and nongovernmental organiza- T to political and economic reform and tions bolstered opposition forces while working also boosted international efforts to build peace to isolate the regime, undermine its legitimacy, in Bosnia and Kosovo. And it helped turn the and attack its power base. Even Milosevic con- Balkans away from nationalist violence and to- tributed to his own demise by holding elections, ward European integration. which he could not successfully rig. Milosevic fell from power for many reasons. Before his downfall, Milosevic was president Chief among them were the unexpected unity of of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which for- Yugoslavian opposition parties and the ridicule mally consisted of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro. However, his real authority was limited to Serbia less the province of Kosovo, which Gregory L. Schulte is executive secretary of the National Security was administered by the United Nations after the Council and previously served as its senior director for Southeast intervention by NATO in 1999. The small repub- European Affairs. lic of Montenegro was increasingly independent

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and played a principal role in undermining Milo- continued use of violence, combined with its re- sevic’s autocratic rule. As he came under more jection of a political settlement at Rambouillet, and more pressure, Washington policymakers be- led NATO to carry out its threat of air strikes start- came concerned that Serbia might launch a spoil- ing in March. These attacks, Operation Allied ing attack on Montenegro and use it as an excuse Force, were initially foreseen as lasting days or to call off elections and suppress the opposition. perhaps weeks. Milosevic’s intransigence meant This would have been a major blow to Western they continued for nearly three months. hopes of bringing democracy to Yugoslavia and Allied Force did not aim explicitly to oust stability to the region. Milosevic, but the Alliance did seek to weaken his Defeating a Serbian attack would have been political control. In the midst of air strikes, Presi- difficult without a preemptive deployment of dent Bill Clinton called for a democratic transi- American or NATO ground forces to Montenegro. tion, saying that “the region’s democracies would Political leaders in Washington and Europe were never be safe with a belligerent tyrant in their reluctant to commit ground forces, and chose to midst.” At the Washington summit in April 1999, deter an attack rather than defeat one. held to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Information operations to influence Milose- NATO, Allied leaders joined the call for demo- vic and his military advisors were a key part of cratic change. the deterrent strategy. Those operations were The air strikes included regime-related tar- broadly successful and re- gets such as leadership, security forces, and mili- in 1998, the Milosevic regime inforced previous lessons tary-related factories owned by Milosevic cronies. cracked down on the Albanian about the importance of Some of the latter were hit after the cronies had starting early, clearly artic- been warned about their support for the regime. majority population in Kosovo ulating objectives, coordi- A precision attack on Milosevic’s residence, leav- nating domestically and ing a hole in his bedroom wall, was perhaps the internationally, and developing and monitoring most pointed. The Joint Warfare Analysis Center measures of effectiveness. helped design this effects-based targeting. Allied Force was complemented by diplo- Ousting Milosevic matic efforts, economic sanctions, and informa- In 1998, the Milosevic regime cracked down tion operations designed to isolate Milosevic and on the Albanian majority population in Kosovo, a undermine his support. The United States helped restive province of Serbia. While the crackdown establish broadcasting facilities in neighboring was prompted in part by violent provocations by countries. The so-called “Ring around Serbia,” the Kosovo Liberation Army, Serb security forces augmented by broadcasts from Commando Solo employed the same heavy-handed tactics that had aircraft, allowed the Serbian public to hear inde- caused widespread death and suffering elsewhere pendent media which Milosevic had tried to sup- in the Balkans. A quarter million ethnic Albanians press. In one incident, Yugoslav army draftees de- fled to the mountains by September and faced serted when they heard from the Voice of death from starvation and exposure. Only Ameri- America that state riot police were violently sup- can diplomacy backed by a threat of NATO air- pressing peaceful protestors in their home towns. power convinced Milosevic to withdraw his forces In June 1999, after 78 days of air strikes, and allow the Albanians to return to their villages. Milosevic conceded to NATO demands. The rea- The United States had previously tolerated son for his decision remains a matter of debate, Milosevic’s presence despite his reputation as the though political survival surely weighed in his butcher of the Balkans after the conflict in Bosnia. calculations. But after the atrocities in Kosovo His campaign of violence in Kosovo and the asso- and his indictment for war crimes, Allied govern- ciated risks to regional stability now convinced ments could not countenance his rule. Bringing Washington to begin creating the conditions for a peace and stability to the region could not suc- change in regime. Washington adopted a new ceed with Milosevic in power. strategy which sought to strengthen democratic Working with its allies in Europe, Washing- forces by providing resources and advice to the ton stepped up its efforts to undermine the political opposition, student movement, and inde- regime. The targeted sanctions remained in force, pendent media. The strategy also sought to under- and Belgrade was kept isolated internationally. At mine the three pillars of Milosevic’s power base— a meeting in Sarajevo to inaugurate the Stability the security services, a network of cronies, and Pact for Southeast Europe, U.S. and European control of the media—with targeted sanctions and leaders used the occasion to underscore Yu- other means to encourage dissent. goslavia’s isolation under Milosevic as well as the Renewed attacks by Serbia on Kosovo Albani- place reserved in Europe for a democratic Yu- ans in early 1999 made American policymakers goslavia without him. more determined to unseat Milosevic. Belgrade’s

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Mission in Kosovo acted in concert to uncover and defeat the regime’s efforts at electoral fraud. Finally, after Milosevic refused to accept Kostu- nica’s success at the polls, Serb security forces ig- nored their orders to move against the crowds of citizens mobilized by the opposition. After meeting with the Russian foreign minister on October 6, 2000, Milosevic went on Ser- bian television and acknowledged defeat. Eight months later, he was arrested and flown to The Hague to stand trial for war crimes. Montenegro From late 1998 until Milosevic was ousted in October 2000, Montenegro played a pivotal role in the strategy to remove him. America sought to bolster the president of Montenegro, Milo Djukanovic, as a counterweight to Milosevic and to use that country as a springboard for a variety of democratization efforts. While Serbia remained under international sanctions, Montenegro benefitted from U.S. aid and advice. It soon received bilateral assistance rivalling that of any other country on a per capita basis. Encouraged by Washington, Mon- tenegro became increasingly independent of Bel- grade, issuing its own currency, building its own institutions, and providing a haven for political opponents and independent media suppressed by Milosevic. With help from the West, Djukanovic became a direct threat to the legitimacy of Milose- vic, both at home and abroad. Milosevic was ban- ished from international events and reduced to contacts with rogue and obscure states. That was a shock to a national leader who had signed the Dayton Accords and regularly hosted heads of state and their envoys. Meanwhile, Djukanovic enjoyed widespread attention. At the invitation of the President of the United States, he went to New York for the Millennium Summit. Indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal, Milosevic stayed home. AP/ Wide Photo (Lefteris World Pitarakis) Though not sanctioned by Washington, pe- Demonstrating riodic calls by Djukanovic for a referendum on against Milosevic in independence also posed a threat to Milosevic. Montenegro. Despite his public defiance, Milosevic was The president portrayed himself as the only per- feeling the political pressure. In July 2000, Milo- son capable of keeping the remnants of Yu- sevic called for elections to be held within two goslavia together, but the defiance of Montene- months in an ill-calculated attempt to bolster his gro suggested otherwise. legitimacy at home and abroad. That was a fatal Milosevic sought to neutralize this threat mistake that allowed Washington to shift from a from Montenegro. During the NATO air cam- strategy aimed at discrediting his rule to one that paign in 1999, allied officials worried that Milo- sought to depose him from power. sevic would use the conflict as cover for an at- With international encouragement and assis- tack on Montenegro. To forestall such an tance, the opposition coalition threw its full sup- exigency, the Alliance reaffirmed strong support port behind Vojislav Kostunica, the strongest challenger to Milosevic. In the elections held on September 24, the opposition parties, local and international electoral observers, and the U.N.

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Deterring Attack The Balkans Washington recognized that decapitation of the government of Montenegro would dramati-

D cally set back peace efforts in the Balkans. And it an HUNGARY ub e R iver would mean a major defeat for NATO. Thus vari- Zagreb ous steps were taken to protect the Djukanovic ROMANIA CROATIA government, and options were developed for diplomatic, economic, and military responses. Defeating an attack was determined to be prob- lematic without a deployment of either U.S. or Da nu er BOSNIA b e Riv Belgrade NATO forces to Montenegro. That option was not and favored by Washington, let alone in Europe. HERZOGOVINA As a result, U.S. policymakers recognized SERBIA that effective deterrence was the key. Their strat- Sarajevo egy was intended to dissuade Milosevic from attacking Montenegro, weaken his legitimacy and power in Serbia, and maintain international isolation and sanctions on Belgrade. Policymakers agreed that the desired endstate was preserving MONTENEGRO the Djukanovic government as a platform for Pristina democracy and undermining and ultimately re- Podgorica KOSOVO moving Milosevic from the scene. The U.S. strategy, which was interagency in BULGARIA Skopje nature and in execution, included: Adriatic Sea diplomatic and economic support to the MACEDONIA Djukanovic government coupled with private warnings to avoid actions that could provoke an attack Tirane approaches to Moscow encouraging the Rus- ALBANIA sians to both warn Milosevic and use their influence ITALY with the Yugoslav military and Serb security services information operations designed to keep Milo- sevic and the Yugoslav military uncertain about the Western response to an attack GREECE close consultations with NATO and European allies to promote a common approach. The Pentagon took the lead in conducting information operations. In the case of Montene- gro, these operations focused on influencing the for the Djukanovic government and warned Bel- perceptions of the leadership in Belgrade and grade that any attempt to undermine it would were part of a larger information campaign over- have grave consequences. That threat probably seen by the Department of State. had an impact in the midst of an extended cam- Information operations used deployments paign, but its credibility receded when air strikes and exercises conducted in the region to demon- ended in June. strate U.S and NATO capabilities and keep Milose- There were clear indications by 2000 that vic and the Yugoslav military uncertain about Al- Milosevic was laying the groundwork for an as- lied responses to an attack on Montenegro. The sault on Montenegro. He was concept was simple: to make Milosevic and his there were clear indications good, although not always advisors understand that their planning and successful, at operating just preparations were being carefully monitored and by 2000 that Milosevic was below the threshold that that an attack, even with minimal warning or laying the groundwork for would elicit a strong interna- force, would elicit a strong response. The intent was to leave Belgrade uncertain about the nature an assault on Montenegro tional response. Milosevic probably assumed that an all- of the response but fearful that one was in- out attack would lead to an evitable, even if the United States and United Allied response, particularly after the bombard- Kingdom had to act on their own. ment in 1999. But he may have thought that a Information operations took advantage of coup de main, relying on the thugs of 7th Mili- U.S. military activities in the region. These in- tary Police Battalion in Montenegro, would only cluded port visits, the deployment of a Marine elicit a flurry of diplomatic activity.

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 87 DETERRING ATTACK AP/ Wide Photo (Lefteris World Pitarakis) Montenegrin police training in May 1999. Expeditionary Unit, and an amphibious exercise. video with the planning cell at U.S. European They also took advantage of NATO exercises such Command and the core group in Washington. as Dynamic Response 2000 in Kosovo and de- The deployment of a British carrier to the ploying the strategic reserve for Stabilization Mediterranean in September had a particularly Force (SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) in March significant informational impact in Belgrade. and April. Detailed planning took place in cells both Achieving Success on the Joint Staff and at U.S. European Com- Milosevic never launched an attack on Mon- mand. An interagency core group on informa- tenegro, and the desired endstate was achieved. A tion operations in Washington, which was ini- good information operator would claim that the tially established for the Kosovo campaign, deterrence strategy, backed by information opera- provided weekly guidance and deconflicted other tions, had succeeded. But it is also possible that, aspects of the campaign. It also monitored intel- as some believed, an attack was never likely in ligence on actions by Belgrade and sought to the first place. judge the effectiveness of various themes and Uncertainty aside, there were multiple indi- methods of delivery. cations that information operations did help alter The United Kingdom was integrated into the perceptions of the intended audiences. The planning and operations at an early stage and exercises and deployments were noticed in Bel- made major contributions. British officers were grade, and the Yugoslav military became con- fully involved, often by participating over secure vinced that NATO would respond to an attack on Montenegro. Milosevic was well aware of the differences in Brussels that might keep the Alliance from acting but was nonetheless concerned about

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a military response by the United States and disparate views of the meaning, utility, and rele- United Kingdom. vance of information operations. Public affairs of- The concerns of the regime were reflected in ficers were wary that information operations an article published by the state-run press in Sep- aimed at influencing foreign leaders could inad- tember 2000. It warned that the United States vertently mislead both the media and public at and its NATO partners “have feverishly sought home. This risk of blowback was minimized by and still seek a pretext...to justify a new mili- the exclusive use of truthful information. Even tary intervention” and cited four exercises in the then, it took some effort to shift the guidance on region. It also cited a statement by the com- public affairs from a passive to an active footing mander of NATO air forces in Europe that the Al- to ensure that the military activities, rather than liance was looking at a full range of options being downplayed as routine, received added at- should Milosevic move against Montenegro. tention across the region. Information operations were also success- Integrating NATO allies, with the exception fully integrated into a larger information cam- of the United Kingdom, was also difficult, reduc- paign. That thrust, led by the Department of ing the overall coherence of the operations. There State, was aimed at influencing foreign audiences were many reasons for allied reluctance to partici- both inside and outside pate in the information operations, including information operations were Yugoslavia. It targeted their underestimation of the threat, the lack of also successfully integrated into Milosevic and the Sep- NATO doctrine and organization, and the aver- tember elections in ad- sion on the part of many diplomats to military a larger information campaign dition to Montenegro. action that smacked of propaganda. Similar fac- Broad themes and daily tors had stymied NATO information operations messages were distributed interagency and during the air campaign in the previous year. shared with allies at NATO headquarters, where Finally, measures of effectiveness were not the public warnings of the Secretary General, established or monitored on a regular basis. As a Lord George Robertson, played an important de- result, there was never a satisfactory mechanism terrent role. to evaluate performance or help determine when The information campaign was successfully messages or their conduits required adjustment. coordinated with diplomatic efforts. When Presi- Policymakers found themselves relying on occa- dent Clinton met with President Putin in early sional intelligence or press reports to get a sense September, Montenegro was at the top of the of whether the information operations were hav- agenda—and their meeting was used to signal ing any impact. American seriousness and international support. U.S. diplomats helped arrange for Djukanovic to Information operations in Montenegro rein- meet with the British prime minister, French pres- forced the lessons from Kosovo. Such operations ident, and German foreign minister in a show of must be based on a clear articulation of objectives support. The Secretary of State publicly warned and strategy. Interagency and international coor- Milosevic to “keep his hands off Montenegro” dination are essential. Information operations while refusing to discuss the motives for an exer- should be integrated from the outset into contin- cise by the Marine Corps in Croatia. gency planning and must start as early as possible to have maximum effect. For each operation, a Areas for Improvement single agency should be responsible for develop- Despite an early decision to initiate plan- ing and monitoring measures of effectiveness that ning, information operations did not start in employ a broad range of indicators, from sensi- earnest until the middle of August 2000 and then tive intelligence to public polling. only after a push by the White House. The late Done right, it is clear that concerted efforts start reduced the chance to shape the thinking of on the operational level to influence enemy per- key audiences. It meant that some activities sup- ceptions can have strategic impact, protecting porting information operations, such as the Ma- U.S. interests and reinforcing or obviating the use rine Corps exercise, ran up against the September of force. This was the case in Montenegro, where elections in Yugoslavia. As a result, Milosevic was U.S.-led information operations helped to deter able to cite these events in his campaign rhetoric, attack and created conditions for democratic claiming that the Allies were using military force change and a more stable region. JFQ to threaten Serbian voters. An earlier start could have avoided these problems. Once the operations began, their execution was complicated by the mix of players and their

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 89 MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY

Joint fires and effects system open terrain module.

U.S. Army (Fred W. Baker III) Joint Doctrine— Engine of Change?

By STEPHEN J. CIMBALA and JAMES J. TRITTEN

considerable effort is being doctrine. Yet doctrine and its relation made to foster military to change receive less attention than transformation, much of other aspects of transformation. A which is related to the rev- Some leaders have acknowledged olution in military affairs (RMA) and the role of doctrine. As the Chairman its implications for defense policy and told Congress, “transformation must strategy. How the military thinks, include training and education, doc- learns from experience, and trains trine, and organizational changes.”1 presents major challenges to transfor- Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, USN mation. Such concerns are the stuff of (Ret.), director of the Office of Force Transformation, indicated that the Stephen J. Cimbala teaches at Penn State Delaware County and is the author of process will result in changes in leader- Shield of Dreams: Missile Defenses and Nuclear Strategy; Commander James J. ship, decisionmaking, experimenta- Tritten, USN (Ret.), is a former member of the Joint Warfighting Center at U.S. tion, organizations, matériel, readiness Joint Forces Command. reporting, planning (which often will

90 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Cimbala and Tritten not precisely fit existing doctrine), fight with them? Americans assume doctrine itself, and training.2 that technological innovation automat- Doctrine is vital to developing ically confers military superiority. But concepts of war, education, training, history has recorded the defeat of nu- organization, and warfighting. The de- merous militaries holding that belief. velopment of AirLand Battle in the Technology must be exploited for bat- Army provides a case study of doctrine tlefield effect in a faster decision cycle as an engine of change. Moreover, doc- than a potential enemy. Preparing for trine is more than the sum of its parts. the optimal use of technology requires It lives and breathes into future plans clear organization, planning, and train- and battles, beyond the visions of ing to impact all aspects of doctrine. those who developed and produced it. One analysis of the transforma-

Success in doctrine is about victory in tion of the German army during World TRANSFORMATION MILITARY future war. War I highlights the necessity of taking the new idea through its logical end- Doctrine and Change state of implementation in the field: Despite its importance, the rela- The initial theory developed by [Oberst] tion of doctrine to change remains Bauer and [Hauptman] Geyer was beyond controversial among military officers Acquiring satellite the capabilities of the German army to put and defense analysts alike. There are signal, Blue Flag ’02-4. into practice. It demanded commanders at

reasons, based on American culture and (MichaelCommunications Squadron A. Kaplan) d every level to direct their forces with mini- 2 military tradition, for skepticism about mal guidance from above and required the impact of doctrine on military troops to perform complex manoeuvres on thinking, organization, training, and their own initiative while under heavy fire. fighting. First, doctrine is often prom- society, and other aspects of the envi- The skepticism of many officers was not ulgated in a one-size-fits-all framework ronment pertinent to preparing for unfounded. It was only through a major that belies the experience of opera- and waging wars. Evidence that joint programme of training, in which everyone tional and tactical commanders. Sec- doctrine is playing a part in transfor- from private to general was taught how to ond, it has a natural tendency toward mation implies that personnel will at fulfill their own part in the doctrine, that least have been edu- the Germans were able to bring that doc- transformation occurs when the military cated/trained in some trine into effective reality.3 new joint doctrine masters new methods of warfare and/or joint tactics, The Army has invoked the term techniques, and proce- engine of change in referring to the role abstraction and generalization that dures (JTTP) and perhaps have some of doctrine in transformation. In a frustrates attempts to draw particular new equipment. pamphlet issued by U.S. Army Training conclusions. Third, once put into play Joint Vision 2020 uses the term and Doctrine Command in 1994, Force it takes on an inertia that can defy doctrine eleven times in phrases such as XXI Operations, doctrine is identified as changes in the geopolitical, technologi- “development of doctrine, organiza- an engine of change, implying that it cal, and social environments of war. Fi- tions, training and education, leaders, influences training, equipment, and nally, each service has its own unique and people that effectively take advan- organization and serves as a concep- doctrine; thus joint doctrine must be tage of the technology” and “a vision tual basis for growth. It also states that negotiated across the sovereign bound- for integrating doctrine, tactics, train- the Army would use doctrine to shape aries of service ways and means of or- ing, supporting activities, and technol- the ongoing RMA with a visionary ganizing, thinking, and fighting. ogy into new operational capabilities.” statement on the future battlespace. Its Despite the obstacles to develop- The Joint Vision Implementation more recent plans for transformation ing doctrine that can promote change, Master Plan explains how to achieve suggest that doctrine is regarded as the it is already used in that way. If we in- the goals outlined in the vision state- voice rather than the engine of tend to transform the Armed Forces, ment. It states that changes in joint change, but include a comprehensive the real issue for joint doctrine is to es- doctrine will be recommended but part for doctrine in driving modifica- tablish its role in the process. Transfor- does not indicate how or detail its role tions in training. mation occurs when the military mas- in transformation. Many identify AirLand Battle as ters new methods of warfare and can There is a role for doctrine in ex- the quintessential example of doctrine exploit an advantage on the field. ploiting RMA breakthroughs. What driving change. When the Army de- Broad transformations are driven by good are innovations in technology cided to revolutionize the way it major changes in technology, culture, when the military is not trained to use fought, it used new concepts and doc- them to their fullest advantage? What trine to engineer a thorough overhaul good is training with new weapons when there is no doctrine on how to

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 91 JOINT DOCTRINE

Marines supporting Task Force 51.8. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY Joseph Krypel) U.S. Navy (

of methods and equipment. The service the military forces or elements thereof their ideas, doctrine experts must en- published a new edition of Field Man- guide their actions in support of na- sure that concept developers are kept ual 100-5, Operations, in 1982 to be the tional objectives.” It is a codification of informed of other recommendations to catalyst for matériel requirements, professional norms and practice. On the improve doctrine in the same area. changes in education and training, re- other hand, a tactical concept is “a Recommendations to improve organization, and leader development. statement, in broad outline, which pro- doctrine come from many sources, but While joint doctrine is not the vides a common basis for future devel- ultimately those with new ideas need means of transformation, a review of opment of tactical doctrine.” Thus con- to interact with the keepers of the its influence reveals that it plays a role cepts are future doctrine—ideas that flame. Doctrine organizations are that should not be overlooked. It can might become doctrine when validated likely to have a wider knowledge of best support transformation through and supported. Joint concept develop- suggested improvements than a single concept development, programming, ment focuses on activities associated concept developer. and joint tactics, techniques, and pro- with operational art. The development process suc- cedures (JTTP); both service and multi- ceeds when concepts are validated and service doctrine and tactics, tech- The Causal Matrix recommended for incorporation in niques, and procedures (TTP); and Before it can be improved, doc- doctrine. The final step takes place education and training. trine must be understood as a baseline when a concept is accepted by Although the two terms are often from which those who develop new warfighters in the field and fleet. In used interchangeably, doctrine and con- concepts depart. Such ideas may be the case of the AirLand Battle, while it cepts do not have the same meaning. conceived in the form of concept pa- was conceived at Headquarters, U.S. According to Joint Publication 1-02, De- pers, experimental doctrine, draft doc- Training and Doctrine Command, at partment of Defense Dictionary of Military trine, or other think pieces. Lest con- and Associated Terms, doctrine means cept developers work in isolation on the “fundamental principles by which

92 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Cimbala and Tritten

Fort Monroe, the new version of FM 100-5 actually emerged from Fort Leav- What Doctrine Affects What Affects Doctrine enworth. Regardless of who prepares the change, there are necessary staffing Policy and Strategy Existing Doctrine actions. The current process of some Organization Threat twenty-one months is about right to Programming and Force Geography/Demographics introduce a new idea that has not been Structure validated but probably is too long for a Technology concept that has been vetted. Planning • Resources • Strategy/Military Culture Hypothetical concepts that have Concepts Education and undergone lengthy examination and Training/Exercises Other experimentation, then further analysis • Policy Local Tactical Directives and and approval by the Joint Require- TRANSFORMATION MILITARY Rules of Engagement • Concepts ments Oversight Council, serve as an • Tactics, Techniques, and example. If such concepts are endorsed Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures by unified commands, services, and Procedures • Strategy and Campaign Joint Staff, what would be the purpose Other Doctrine Concepts of considering them at action officer • Change of Government level through the existing joint doc- • History/Lessons Learned trine process? The procedure should be replaced by an accelerated track of a few months rather than the twelve- and-a-half month fast-track schedule. Nothing precludes the introduction of Toward Doctrinal Consistency Joint doctrine determines joint changes to doctrine based on analysis As a transformational concept is tactics, techniques, and procedures prior to a formal council decision. That developed, it could become joint doc- and also the approach of the Armed would be fitting when concepts do not trine. To expedite this process, concept Forces to joint warfare. Thus if trans- depend on the procurement of new advocates may want to disseminate the formation is intended to enhance matériel. doctrine across the Armed Forces, jointness, doctrine and subordinate When appropriate, joint and serv- which will take time. Whenever new tactics, techniques, and procedures ice doctrine under accelerated or fast- doctrine is issued, parallel changes must change. Such change will be eas- track change can support the procure- must be made in other publications at ier to accomplish if joint doctrine is ment of matériel for transformation. In the same time. For example, a major written and promulgated in an elec- the case of AirLand Battle, concepts change in Joint Publication 3-0, Joint tronic form. While unwritten doctrine that were codified as doctrine became Operations, can affect many other titles. exists and is equally valid, its consis- instrumental in changing tank, in- Moreover, service doctrine must be tent implementation is difficult at fantry fighting vehicle, and helicopter consistent with joint doctrine; hence a best. The record of the Air Land Sea design. A conscious decision was made new concept in joint doctrine can im- Application Center suggests that con- pact on service doc- sistency among individual service tac- new concepts are generally developed as trine as well as both tics, techniques, and procedures can service and multiser- be achieved. part of the acquisition of new hardware vice tactics, tech- There is power to be derived from niques, and proce- addressing doctrinal consistency, espe- to modify existing programs instead of dures. This cascading effect occurred cially when the effort is intended to canceling or starting new initiatives, when the Army developed AirLand enhance warfighting capabilities, an which saved time. Battle in FM 100-5. Subordinate implied goal of military transforma- New concepts are generally devel- branch and functional publications tion. Joint doctrine and JTTP should oped in conjunction with the acquisi- such as FM 71-2 (for battalions) and first be made internally consistent. The tion of new hardware and other assets, FM 71-100 (for brigades and divisions) importance of constancy is best but existing doctrine may be sufficient had to be revised to reflect new opera- demonstrated by the NATO definition and a partner in transformation rather tional-level concepts. of commonality: “The state achieved than an obstacle to overcome. Most JTTP are defined as “actions and when the same doctrine, procedures, important, new hardware must often methods which implement joint doc- or equipment are used.” be accompanied by new doctrine to trine and describe how forces will be The Joint Staff, joint publication explain how it will be used and as the employed in joint operations. They will primary review authorities, and Joint basis for training. be promulgated by the Chairman...in Warfighting Center at U.S. Joint Forces coordination with the combatant com- Command are tasked to impose consis- mands, services, and Joint Staff.” tency, and new management tools

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 93 JOINT DOCTRINE

Exercises and terrain walks, in the case of AirLand Battle, played a key role in retraining senior officers in new doctrine that did not match what they were exposed to earlier. Any plan to transform the Armed Forces should incorporate these approaches or their equivalent and a vigorous lessons learned program to ensure feedback on how well the force actually follows new doctrine. Helmuth von Moltke (the elder) and Alfred von Schlieffen

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY emphasized staff rides and walks over terrain as important means to test Ger- man doctrine for ground truth. The observed results of training, exercises, and operations can serve as the baseline for future programs to improve the force. When those results re- Brigade subscriber flect doctrinally approved actions, rec- node integrated management system. ommended changes in matériel, doctrine, or both can be compared

Fort Gordon (Claude Stallings) Fort Gordon against current force capability. A sound lessons learned process that cor- relates lessons to existing joint doc- such as the joint doctrine electronic who at that time believed that he trine can help justify the need for information system will help provide could not win despite his best efforts. transformation. that support. With the shift to paper- Efforts such as accreditation of Doctrine education includes less doctrine, revising joint pubs will joint education, self-certification of building support for new ways of be timely and changes in other sources joint courses, and joint lessons learned doing business. In the case of the Air- could quickly follow. The services will are critical in monitoring transforma- Land Battle, a dedicated marketing complete the codification of existing tional doctrine and enhancing joint program was developed to ensure that unwritten doctrine to facilitate what culture. Although not fully realized, Congress, the Army, and the Air Force needs to change as transformation joint culture is an acceptable goal for were persuaded that they were moving takes place. the Armed Forces. Joint Pub 1 envi- in the right direction. The importance sions a “common joint culture from of this task cannot be overestimated. Training and Doctrine which to integrate service cultures and Education also provides the It is no coincidence that U.S. doctrines.” Indeed, any attempt to at- Armed Forces with an opportunity to Army Training and Doctrine Com- tain such a vision to integrate joint reach members of the public, who in- mand has responsibility for education culture and doctrine is itself transfor- creasingly lack any military experi- and training as well as doctrine. When mational. ence. Doctrine awareness programs a new joint concept is adopted, it must Doctrine is also the basis for joint such as the doctrine networked educa- be translated into doctrine. In turn, exercises and operations. Exercises in tion and training modules and the that doctrine must be incorporated in peacetime and, to a certain extent, ac- joint force employment wargame, educational curricula and training pro- tual operations can be monitored to es- which are available via the Internet or grams—learning is necessary for trans- tablish the relationship between the on CD–ROM, will need to be updated formation to reach its full potential. doctrine employed in exercises and to reflect the new doctrine associated Doctrine is a prime means for mem- practice. The lessons learned process with transformation. bers of one service to learn about the could determine how far extant doc- Joint publications can explain capabilities of other services. trine is exercised or followed. When a military culture to civilians in an un- Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare concept is introduced and then be- derstandable language. If doctrine is of the Armed Forces of the United States, comes part of joint doctrine, it will authentic, explicit, and comprehen- envisions joint culture as a common take time for the old habits to die. sive, it will enable the public to be bet- goal. Changing military culture is a Eventually differences between what ter informed about military affairs. The lengthy task that requires constant re- should have been and what was ob- strength, roles, and employment of the inforcement. When the Army used Air- served should be diminished. Armed Forces are decided by voters Land Battle as an engine of change, it through their elected representatives, consciously sought to challenge the and not by military professionals. On average soldier stationed in Europe,

94 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Cimbala and Tritten the other hand, to enable this level of joint force commanders and JFACCs. As new concepts emerge, both awareness to exist, the military must The Navy built the concept into the joint doctrine and joint tactics, tech- explain itself with clarity and avoid contingency theater automated plan- niques, and procedures will evolve to the use of neologisms and jargon. ning system. reflect the American way of war. Exist- ing processes and programmed infor- Organization A Joint Process? mation management tools will facili- A reciprocal relationship exists be- Implied in analyzing the role doc- tate this role for joint doctrine. Finally, tween doctrine and organization. The trine can play in transformation and as new doctrine will be the basis for course of revising doctrine must find an engine of change is the recognition changes in education, training, and ex- its way into plans, programs, and pol- of a joint doctrine process that in- ercises to develop professionals who icy by means of organizational adop- cludes more than publishing manuals. will lead the Armed Forces into action. tion (someone must own it) and direc- At a minimum, the process takes into Without inserting new doctrine into tion (someone must drive it). But if account all possible influences on joint schoolhouses, exercises, and the actual TRANSFORMATION MILITARY doctrinal rethinking implies substan- doctrine, the existing publication conduct of operations, it will become tial change in organizational behavior, process, and other matters that doc- an unfulfilled vision of how to oper- one or more elements may resist. Orga- trine can or should influence. ate—a book on the shelf. Flawed doc- nizations inherently oppose change The process described above is not trine is more than irrelevant. History that threatens to diminish their auton- without limits. The best doctrine can- records many highfalutin doctrinal ex- omy. The persistence of the horse cav- not compensate for flawed policy, pressions that paved the way for mili- alry well into the 20th century is exem- poorly defined objectives, or opera- tary failures. JFQ plary. Joint doctrine has the burden, tional/tactical approaches that are one from the perspective of the services as step behind those of an enemy. Doc- NOTES trine can help to pre- 1 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the course of revising doctrine must find pare for deterrent and Fiscal 2003 Department of Defense Budget defense missions. But its way into plans, programs, and policy Testimony (transcript), as delivered, before hollow doctrine that the House Armed Services Committee, Feb- fills glossy publications ruary 6, 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/ organizations, of making the case for but is not realized in the field and fleet speeches/2002/s20020206-secdef.html. cooperation based on convergent mis- is worse than useless: it conveys an 2 Arthur K. Cebrowski, Special Briefing on sions and objectives, despite diverse or- image of preparedness that is as mis- Force Transformation, November 27, 2001, ganizational interests and constraints. leading as it is superfluous. Finally, true http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2001/ tll272001_t1127ceb.html. Speaking at a One innovation was the adoption believers must drive doctrinal innova- conference on defense excellence sponsored of the joint force air component com- tion as an element of military transfor- by the American Institute of Aeronautics mander (JFACC) concept. Prior to pas- mation, often in the face of consider- and Astronautics on February 19, 2002, in sage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, U.S. able adversity. There is no road to Washington, Cebrowski apparently also Air Forces Europe had developed TTP salvation without dedicated apostles. made an off-hand remark that “doctrine, as that included JFACC for use within we know it, is probably dead, along with theater. A similar idea was proposed for Joint doctrine can be an engine of the process which creates it.” See David NATO. U.S. European Command change. Improving doctrine is a neces- McGlinchey, “Officials Say Afghanistan Ops placed the concept in a local theater sary condition, albeit an insufficient Showed U.S. Can Adapt In New Situations,” counterair publication and became one, for military transformation. It can Inside the Army, February 25, 2002, p. 2. 3 Martin Samuels, Command or Control: lead agent for JCS Publication 26. The support the development of new ideas Command, Training and Tactics in the British Joint Staff later designated this docu- and advance validated concepts and German Armies, 1888–1918 (London: ment as Joint Publication 3-01.2, Of- through doctrinal publications. More- Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 196–97. fensive Counterair. over, it can expedite future transforma- JFACC was then used by U.S. At- tion. Improving doctrine helps pro- lantic and Central Commands in oper- gramming and fielding of new ational plans and exercises and U.S. hardware. This role can be reactive or European and Central Commands in proactive. As the Secretary of Defense actual operations, particularly Desert has pointed out, “All the high-tech Shield/Desert Storm. JFACC became a weapons in the world will not trans- regular feature of joint organization as form the U.S. Armed Forces unless we other areas of joint doctrine were af- also transform the way we think, the fected. Service programs were adjusted way we train, the way we exercise, and to support this expectation: the Army the way we fight.” battlefield coordination element was expanded to be a battlefield coordination detachment to better support

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 95

Landing Swedish marines. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY U.S. Navy (George Sisting) Transforming Joint Exercises and Readiness By STEPHEN J. MARIANO

n recent years transformation has understanding the nature of war. More- largely replaced the term revolu- over, the initial focus on the military- tion to describe change in military technological aspects of revolutionary I affairs. Although assertions about change has expanded to include doctri- doctrine, organization, and technology nal and organizational change. that fueled the debate over the revolu- The military has embraced trans- tion in military affairs have been mod- formation and begun to examine fu- erated, they remain fundamental to ture ways of training, organizing, and equipping forces to deliver transformed capabilities to commanders in Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Mariano, USA, is assigned to the International the field. Some innovation is driven by Military Staff at NATO headquarters and previously taught strategy at the technology, but its implementation U.S. Military Academy. largely results from the struggle to

96 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Mariano modernize. While technology influ- UH–60s transporting ences military developments and the multinational force. services manage their assets, combatant commanders must employ the forces provided to them and integrate doctrine, organization, and technology to accomplish complex missions. Fighting and winning wars is the priority of unified commands, but training and readiness are primary peacetime objectives. U.S. European Command (EUCOM) reviewed training, exercise, and readi- TRANSFORMATION MILITARY ness within its region and found that transformation depends on well- aligned military objectives, structures, and forces as well as good relations with allies. Although the review focused on operating and personnel tempo rather than technological or 30th Communications Squadron (Scott Wagers) doctrinal change, it fit squarely into the broader framework of the transformation project. How Training Failed ranges, unique deployment prospects, When EUCOM began examining Increased operating and person- solid coalition/interoperability train- its training and exercise program be- nel tempo and decreasing resources ing, and operational use of geostrategic fore 9/11 because of a concern over led EUCOM to examine training. High sites. Opportunities to fly with and tempo was considered to against MiG–29s, train with live-fire rockets from attack helicopters, or de- exercise planners are working to have a negative impact on readiness, and it was liver ordinance at night are attractive. replace the legacy of the Cold War, thought that an overex- At sea, commanders and crews of including so-called campfire exercises tended exercise program American vessels openly maneuvered, contributed to the prob- signaled, and tracked Allied or PFP lem. The review identified ships in northern and eastern waters. waning readiness, several major points requirements and compared them to But other exercises were important po- emerged: exercises to determine if the existing litically and provided visible support of NATO or other treaty obligations, af- training and exercises must be trans- program decreased readiness. It found forded rare opportunities, or were di- formed from a schedule based on legacy that several exercises did have a dele- events; rather they must be based on con- terious effect. rected by the Secretary of Defense, temporary joint and combined warfighting Although it initially seemed that Joint Staff, or combatant commander. requirements there were too many exercises with the It also became clear that other ex- NATO exercises are important indi- same objectives, a closer look indicated ercises remained on the schedule be- cators of Alliance cohesion as well as sub- that there were too many requirements cause of the inertia in budgets, plan- stantial joint and combined training venues for available forces and budgets. And a ning, and bureaucracy. Exercises but are often based on antiquated require- detailed survey revealed that the ra- dropped off the NATO schedule but re- ments mained on the U.S. calendar as bilat- tionale for legacy events was complex. Partnership for Peace (PFP) exercises eral or single-service events. Others, are vital security cooperation events but Many were classified as readiness exer- like PFP exercises conceived in 1994, often fail to provide quality coalition inter- cises but were designed to improve ca- operability training pabilities. Still others were dubbed as had outgrown their usefulness. In increased collaboration with NATO security cooperation events and were some cases only a few Americans par- force and exercise planners is essential to largely designed to improve political- ticipated, but the services expended a improving the exercise program for U.S. military relations between the United disproportionate level of resources in forces. States and other nations. While it was supporting deployment, participation, Exercise planners on the strategic, oper- known that some exercises focused on protection, sustainment, and redeploy- ational, and tactical levels are working readiness and others on the campfire, ment. Some events, like exercises based to replace the legacy of the Cold War, neither the events nor the require- on contingency operations plans, were including so-called campfire exercises. ments were created equally. based on Soviet-era threats that appear U.S. forces participated in most anachronistic. European tactical level exercises because of the access to excellent training

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 97 JOINT EXERCISES

F–15s and MiG–29s, Sentry White Eagle. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY U.S. Air Force (JerryU.S. Air Force Bynum)

One complicating factor was de- satellite access, precision approach and the EUCOM joint task force train- termining the service-level, joint, bilat- radars, aerial refueling, Patriot missiles, ing model. Both concepts have been eral, and combined nature of exercises. Apache Longbow helicopters, EA6–B developed on parallel tracks for several Many nominated by EUCOM for inclu- Prowler aircraft, or Marine expedi- years but have never been coordinated sion on the CJCS-directed list were not tionary units not only reduced training or sequenced. purple. They were service-oriented realism, but also strained Mons- NATO and EUCOM exercises are events that received CJCS-dedicated Stuttgart and Brussels-Washington rela- capstone events for both commands. funding but offered little joint train- tions. The Armed Forces were reluctant They are approximately equal in size, ing. Often exercises were combined in to use these capabilities only as training train to similar objectives, and are name only or were classified as such by aids for the less capable members. closely timed each year. On one hand, virtue of the presence of Allied liaison Another difficulty arose as a result the JTF model is based on delegating officers. Furthermore, several bilateral of changes in the NATO command authority through a service component exercises were not joint and combined structure in 1999, which reduced the command and usually passed down to in nature. As a result of these findings, number of commands, reorganized a one-, two-, or three-star headquarters. EUCOM discontinued such events as second level headquarters, and divided On the other hand, the CJTF headquar- command-sponsored exercises to re- Europe into northern and southern re- ters derives from an existing joint lieve the high-tempo problem. gions. Although these changes were a headquarters. While command JTF missions focus on a full Factors and Obstacles American participation in CJTF exercises spectrum of operations, from warfighting to There has been an almost manda- is usually limited due to the competition tory commitment of critical resources noncombatant evacua- and capabilities by the United States in for resources tions, CJTF scenarios NATO exercises. In the case of PFP ef- are uniformly based on forts, participation extends access to positive step toward recognizing the corps-sized crisis response operations. Warsaw initiative funds. Without sub- new international security environ- American iterations are at least one sidies for travel, rations, and supplies, ment, exercises were not reduced in generation of technology ahead of Al- the involvement of these members proportion to headquarters. New sub- lied exercises and are experimenting would often be limited. Without their regional joint commands were created, with simulated and live forces even participation there would be no exer- and training their commanders and though the computer and information cises since security cooperation with staffs added events to the schedule. system support for both programs is such nations is a primary objective. This misalignment resulted in ineffi- substantial. American participation in A different situation surrounds cient participation by the United States CJTF exercises is usually limited due to NATO-only exercises, where Allied in the overall exercise program. the competition for resources and the planners must factor high demand/low A further complication is competi- perceived cost-benefit ratio for poten- density U.S. assets into the equation. tion between the NATO combined and tial U.S. participants. The American inability or unwillingness joint task force headquarters concept to share deployable communications,

98 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Mariano

USS Kearsarge in Mediterranean. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY U.S. Navy (Martin Maddock)

The exercises have common train- crisis response operations over tradi- employed, these forces should be bet- ing objectives and demonstrate that tional warfighting operations. It calls ter suited to cope with the crisis re- there is room for increased cooperation for more rapidly deployable forces but sponse missions envisioned in the despite differences in levels of com- has been slow in eliminating old for- strategic concept. mand, operational reach, scenario, and mations and establishing responsive One challenge will be adjusting technology. Under the right leadership, capabilities. Consequently, U.S. forces the NATO exercise program to meet exercises could inform each other, are exercising against old concepts and the requirements of eight corps-sized share assets, and go a long way toward requirements until NATO gets its vi- headquarters. They must be trained transforming Alliance and U.S. capabil- sion of the future worked out. before integrating them into the com- ities to command multinational forces. In addition, no consensus exists mand and control structure, which between the national and NATO plan- will add to an already full schedule. Ready for What? ners on the primacy of crisis response Training all eight on a range of possi- The problems went beyond man- versus Article 5 missions. Collective de- ble missions will take not only time, aging resources or synchronizing exer- fense is the raison d’être for NATO, but support and large budgets. Until cise cycles. One lies in a misalignment and it did not go away when the crisis headquarters and force structures are between NATO objectives, headquar- response mission was introduced. Its synchronized with the NATO strategic ters structures, force capabilities, and nature has changed, however, and concept, exercise planners must work the subsequent inability of the exercise 9/11 destroyed preconceptions about on the margins of an outdated model program to reflect changes. U.S. com- traditional Article 5 missions. and will be unable to deliver trained, mitment to NATO through the force But the path to improved readi- ready, and transformed headquarters planning process is a prime example. ness is marked by promising signs and forces. The United States and other mem- about NATO force structure and the bers of the Alliance offer forces for fu- graduated readiness force concept. In Transforming Exercises ture operations through a structured its land-based form, eight member na- Because canceling exercises while process, which works in support of Ar- tions have volunteered corps-sized for- awaiting force and command structure ticle 5-based collective defense plans, mations at varying levels of readiness realignment is not feasible, EUCOM designed to defend NATO from the as a multinational contribution. Prop- has focused on more realistic ap- Warsaw Pact. Clearly, this process has erly trained, organized, equipped, and proaches. The first major step in get- not kept up with new concepts and ting the exercise program to better threats. The current strategic concept, support readiness was reducing the for example, envisions out-of-area and number of exercises that were not

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 99 JOINT EXERCISES

clearly traceable to a EUCOM or com- Austrian tank during ponent joint mission essential task Strong Resolve ‘02. (JMET), a treaty obligation, or an event directed by the Secretary of De- fense, Joint Staff, or combatant command. This scrub of non-JMET exercises revealed only a few events with little or no training value. As a result, EUCOM eliminated six of its 82 CJCS exercises. To make further reductions, it became necessary to decrease exercises based on other criteria, including

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY the inability to address multiple training objectives or audiences. Withering resources—both service-specific incremental funds intended for joint exercises and the strategic lift resources that combatant commanders draw on to execute their programs—helped U.S. Navy (George Sisting) focus this effort. The second step was working with Allied planners to forecast and deter- PFP exercise with a primary objective most command-led, owned, and oper- mine a priority for U.S. resources in- of developing PFP squad- and platoon- ated exercises, it became clear that side the NATO program. A concurrent level tactics, techniques, and proce- many had lost their luster. In several objective was the modernization of dures. This exercise is atypical for a cases the host countries had gained both programs based on the realities of joint exercise focus and thus threat- entry to NATO (and needed integra- the mission spectrum. Once EUCOM ened further U.S. participation. Ulti- tion into pure Article 5 exercises) or approached NATO with its shrinking mately, that training allows PFP mem- evolved their militaries beyond the bers to interoperate campfire and to the point where they the reduced bilateral, single-service, and with other nations dur- warranted regional exercises focused PFP exercise program succeeded because ing peace support oper- on more complex tasks and scenarios. ations such as those in With some countries, like Ukraine, the there was a parallel NATO program Bosnia, Kosovo, and command has little room to modify Afghanistan. Recogniz- the program. resources, the latter was helpful in pro- ing that most members have moved viding preferences on U.S. participa- beyond campfire exercises by con- EUCOM–NATO Relations tion and capabilities. This also allowed tributing to security commitments has The reduced bilateral, single-serv- NATO to examine its program. It helped in retaining a few unique exer- ice, and PFP exercise program suc- should be noted that EUCOM partici- cises. NATO has recognized the pro- ceeded because there was a parallel pated in only 15 out of a hundred gression of the PFP program and re- NATO program into which it could be scheduled exercises. In most of them, cently called for a more operationally integrated. Although the Alliance pro- U.S. headquarters and forces were not focused partnership, allowing more gram does not meet all command re- needed because other members could vigorous training. quirements, the decision to work furnish a similar contribution. In some Other NATO or PFP exercises within it for improved readiness was instances, Alliance capabilities, like the without immediate connections to perhaps unique to European security. airborne warning and control system current operations were less fortunate. The reduction also was possible be- (AWACS), offered the same trained and Exercises with an overly service- cause of increased collaboration be- ready asset at a lower cost. unique or specific focus lost support. tween U.S. and Allied exercise planners Closer collaboration with NATO Maritime logistic, communication, or on all levels. This approach has solid planners also included coordinating medical interoperability training, for capacity to influence readiness in the with the partnership coordination cell. example, is obviously needed, but context of the Alliance but has its lim- It became obvious that the United given the reduction in resources these its. U.S. participation in the program States was often a key participant and stand-alone exercises are being forced could overwhelm other NATO mem- could not withdraw from cooperation into often unwilling cooperation with bers, but EUCOM realizes its shortcom- exercises because it was more often on larger, multiobjective, multiechelon ings. The remaining issue will be the the giving than receiving end of qual- training events. speed with which organizations adapt ity training. One example is a NATO/ The final significant decision re- to changes precipitated by the new duced PFP and bilateral exercises. After strategic outlook, headquarters, and examining the cost and benefit of force structure.

100 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Mariano

input on both Alliance and multina- AH–1W on artillery range, Alexander the tional issues as well as receive the ben- Great. efits of national transformation. Finally, the recent NATO decision to create a functional strategic command to deal with transformation may provide the missing piece in the exercise and readiness puzzle. Along with the decision to separate the responsibilities of the Commander, Joint Forces Command, from his duties as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic came an

initiative to create another headquar- TRANSFORMATION MILITARY ters with similar functions. The NATO transformation command could provide a formal mechanism to transform a range of military capabilities. It is a

U.S. Navy (Martin Maddock) work in progress, but this organization will go well beyond the scope of joint exercises and training. Consequently, there are three within their constructs has proven Because of the dual-hatted role of areas where EUCOM could team with vital to military capabilities and politi- its commander and unique relation- NATO efforts: cal cohesion on which militaries build ship between staffs in Belgium and examining CJTF requirements, ex- programs and accomplish missions. Germany, the Chairman assigned ploring synchronization, defining national Developing training and exercises to EUCOM the coordination and integra- roles on CJTF staffs, and exercise require- support the strategic concept of a com- tion task for “U.S. participation in Eu- ments mand may seem fundamental to de- ropean NATO exercises and exercise-re- integrating future readiness force fense planning, but the path linking lated studies.” These events are small exercises into existing NATO exercise pro- strategy to structures to forces and fi- steps in transforming readiness and de- grams nally to an exercise program is ridden pend on aligning forces, structures, reviewing PFP exercises to include with fiscal and bureaucratic obstacles. and strategic objectives. As the Com- more complex readiness and interoperabil- Perhaps the most interesting im- mander, European Command, testified ity scenarios as national capabilities develop. plications of the EUCOM effort in- before the House Armed Services Com- volve U.S. Joint Forces Command mittee, “Transformation is an ongoing EUCOM is supporting efforts to exam- (JFCOM). Millennium Challenge ’02 process, however, not an endstate. It ine exercise and training requirements; furthered the transformation of the spans decades of innovation and ex- and by leveraging his dual role, the warfighting capabilities of combatant perimentation. It is also not limited to Supreme Allied Commander Europe commanders. Many issues arose in the technology, but includes change in our and Commander, European Com- exercise: creating multiechelon and organizational structure, operational mand, can continue or even accelerate multifunction training venues, organ- concepts, and business practices.” transformation. The efforts outlined izing headquarters to deal with trans- above may result in a European solu- formation, mixing live and simulated U.S. European Command is trans- tion but will likely have limitations forces, conducting collaborative plan- forming its exercise programs to reflect outside the theater. ning, matching different hardware contemporary mission requirements and software, and establishing more by continuing to deepen relations be- Command Implications responsive headquarters and decision- tween its staff and NATO planners. Besides its implications for NATO making processes. JFCOM is also tack- Further work is needed to modernize leaders, several U.S. commands draw ling the commensurate rise of techni- the requirements in light of ongoing on the EUCOM experience. Comman- cal problems such as trained operations. Although the initiatives in ders on all levels should be mindful personnel, increased bandwidth re- the EUCOM exercise and training pro- that vigilance in reviewing objectives quirements, and space systems sup- gram review are evolutionary rather and requirements is integral to transport, areas in which the United States than revolutionary, they represent tan- forming capabilities. Only in this way has a clear advantage over its allies. gible evidence of military transforma- can they ensure that their programs The exercise did not answer every tion in preparing for the next war, not are improving readiness. question it posed, but the command is the last one. JFQ Respecting allied or coalition engaged in transformation and should member requirements and working deliver improved capabilities to combatant commanders. In particular, EUCOM can provide JFCOM with

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 101 Intelligence Support for Military Operations By MARKUS V. GARLAUSKAS MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY

Refueling U–2, Iraqi Freedom.

1st Combat Camera Squadron (Matthew Hannen)

oint operations will demand an capabilities could compromise the abil- unprecedented level of intelli- ity of the joint force to successfully con- gence support in the future. Like duct a full range of operations. J other aspects of jointness, this Statements by various proponents asset will not only require improvement of intelligence support have created but transformation. Moreover, it will re- great expectations. The Quadrennial quire more than keeping ahead of po- Defense Review (QDR) identified ex- tential enemies. If the obstructive pat- ploiting intelligence advantages as one terns found in the system are not of the four pillars of military transfor- overcome, the gap between needs and mation. Senior leaders and defense specialists anticipate that commanders will be able to receive markedly faster Markus V. Garlauskas is an intelligence specialist with the Department of the and more detailed intelligence on a sit- Army assigned to Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea. uation, which is known as information

102 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Garlauskas

“[A support] system designed by intelligence experts, rather than military operators, would most likely be based on the information that can be provided, and it could be ignorant of what information is actually needed for operational decisionmaking.”2 Since the Cold War, commands have sought intelligence from outside their organizations to an unprecedented degree. Intelligence staffs on the tactical level derive limited benefit

from intelligence that originates in TRANSFORMATION MILITARY higher headquarters because senior- level staffs increasingly turn to agencies on the national level to meet the demands of their commanders. This change was accelerated by the Persian Gulf War. The massive re- CIA headquarters, quirements of the air campaign led Langley, Virginia. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) DOD (Ken Hammond) to depend on the national agencies for an unparalleled level of support. Na- tional agencies offered considerable in- superiority. Joint Vision 2020 states that made, but time is running out. Trans- telligence resources, but the results information superiority is fundamental formation is continuing, and expecta- were less than satisfactory. That experi- to achieving the necessary capabilities. tions for support are increasing daily. ence may have led the services to in- Thus it is vital to examine the chal- vest more in intelligence capabilities, lenges to making that vision a reality. The Military Role but budget constraints produced the The Armed Forces must assume a Some regard transforming intelli- opposite result. central role in transforming intelligence as synonymous with military As the Cold War ended, national gence. An increased reliance on na- transformation, with the same dynam- intelligence agencies demonstrated tional intelligence agencies has denied ics, goals, and characteristics. Because their capability and willingness to in- control to commanders and limited of this mistaken belief, many propo- crease the emphasis on support to mil- input by fielded forces. Those leaders nents of military transformation ex- itary operations as they sought post- pect the intelligence com- Soviet missions to protect budgets. a heavy reliance on national agency munity to lead the way in Military leaders were meanwhile look- the evolution of intelli- ing for ways to cut spending in order support will hamper the command gence support. As Admiral to minimize the impact on force struc- and control of supported commanders William Owens, USN ture and combat power. Expecting in- (Ret.), a former Vice Chair- creased support from the intelligence man, viewed the situation, community to mitigate any shortfalls, responsible for transformation must “The U.S. intelligence community the services drastically cut intelligence establish realistic expectations for fu- must either seek to lead and promote assets. The intelligence community, ture support based on the resources the on-going transformation of the with the support of the President, provided. In the past, military expec- military or bear much of the responsi- made supporting military operations tations have been exaggerated given bility for a U.S. failure to seize the op- its top priority in response. the means at hand, setting the stage portunities provided by our lead in Despite budgetary benefits, this for failure. Moreover, transformation military technologies.”1 arrangement will present problems for must create an anticipatory support This approach must change or the the joint force if it continues. First, system, which is prepared both geo- Armed Forces may be left without in- painful resource conflicts between com- graphically and functionally for vari- telligence support to meet their needs. manders and other national intelli- ous missions. Intelligence often does National intelligence agencies—which gence customers are becoming in- not adequately support military opera- are neither commands nor part of the evitable. Second, a heavy reliance on tions other than war or deployments military intelligence apparatus—have national agency support will hamper to unexpected environments. Finally, various customers, interests, and prior- the command and control of supported institutional inertia must be over- ities beyond direct support to joint op- come. The necessary changes can be erations. In addition, as the National Reconnaissance Office has reported,

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 103 INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY

Counterair briefing aboard USS Harry S. Truman. Fleet Combat Camera Group, Atlantic (Michael W. Pendergrass) Atlantic (MichaelFleet Combat Camera Group, W.

commanders, who cannot normally di- support to force protection for U.S. resources must be quickly pulled away rectly task most national resources. units deployed overseas will increas- from other tasks. More generally, overreliance on na- ingly take a back seat to warning of ter- Even if conflicting requirements tional agencies will limit the desire and rorist attacks at home. A moderately in- only rarely lead to unexpected drops in ability of the military to shape the re- creased top line in the intelligence national agency support, a similar sponse to increased intelligence sup- budget will do little to offset resource problem arises from the inability of port needs. conflicts generated by realignment. commanders to fully control that sup- The impact of these issues was As the new priorities come into port. According to joint doctrine, com- minimized when the military was the play, commanders will find that they manders are expected to coordinate unrivaled number one customer of the actually exercise very limited control and control support. While national national intelligence agencies. However, over national intelligence support. In agencies are central to the intelligence those days are now numbered if not the past, unified commanders have effort, it is difficult to achieve such over. As far back as 1996, the IC21 con- been able to use voluminous and insis- control in practice. During the air cam- gressional study concluded that a heavy tent submissions of intelligence require- paign in Yugoslavia, the Supreme emphasis on support for military opera- ments and requests to national agencies Allied Commander Europe, General tions was crowding out other intelli- to exercise de facto control over na- Wesley Clark, USA, exercised no con- gence customers. With the global war tional assets. Commanders may find trol over organizations that recom- on terrorism, many of those customers that the information which is expected mended targets for the Allied Force. now have increased priority. National is unavailable because applicable na- When the Chinese embassy in Belgrade agencies will be expected to support law tional resources have been devoted to was attacked, Clark had to deal with enforcement agencies and coalition other strategic priorities on short no- the consequences. If a joint force com- partners hunting terrorists as well as tice. Unlike the military, the national mander does not control the conduct enemy units. Similarly, national-level intelligence agencies do not have signif- of intelligence support, how can he icant uncommitted resources for crises, so when a new requirement emerges,

104 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Garlauskas control operations? Obviously this World War II. The military opinion of decade after the adoption of AirLand issue must be addressed and better intelligence improved rapidly after Battle before assets such as the joint arrangements must be worked out Pearl Harbor. The postwar lifting of se- surveillance target attack radar system even if military dependence on na- crecy brought some intelligence coups (JSTARS) aircraft made it possible to tional agency support is reduced. to light, including the breaking of monitor movements deep behind Transformation leaders cannot enemy codes. Decisive victories at Mid- enemy lines in near-real time. But im- expect exponential increases in re- way, the Battle of the Atlantic against provements in technical collection did sponsive and effective intelligence German U-boats, the invasion of Sicily, not solve every problem, as Desert support while leaving it solely to the and even the Normandy landing were Storm showed. national intelligence community. If attributed to superior intelligence. The comments of senior leaders the joint force of the future needs When military doctrine was re- during the Gulf War illustrated the more operational intelligence support, vised in the 1950s, this optimistic view level of expectations. General Norman it must be paid for out of service budg- of intelligence would be apparent. Pen- Schwarzkopf, USA, and General Charles TRANSFORMATION MILITARY ets. More capable military intelligence tomic doctrine envisioned battlegroups Horner, USAF, admitted that success organizations must be equal partners dispersed to minimize their vulnerabil- would not have been possible without with national agencies, enabling them ity to nuclear strikes, with the gaps unprecedented intelligence support. covered by improved sur- But in virtually the next breath they joint forces will be expected to select, veillance and intelligence said that expectations were not met in spot, identify, track, and strike targets directing long-range fire- key areas. Horner, who directed air op- power. Meanwhile, doc- erations, lambasted poor intelligence that will achieve decisive effects trine shifted from retalia- support for targeting. Similarly, tion against cities to rapid Schwarzkopf testified before Congress to better represent their interests in strikes against hard-to-find targets, in- that the BDA system was abysmal. transforming intelligence community cluding delivery systems. Desert Storm revealed that effec- capabilities. This may lead the Armed At the time new doctrine was tively tracking key mobile targets, a Forces to exercise more control over adopted, U.S. intelligence could not major component of AirLand Battle, some national resources as necessary. meet targeting support requirements. A was a remote goal. After launching Military leaders must show that they massive improvement program di- hundreds of missions against mobile are equal to this challenge by paying rected by President Dwight Eisenhower Scud launchers, it is still impossible to careful attention to the intelligence as- led to revolutionary overhead cameras, confirm if any were destroyed. Years pects of transformation. new platforms, and more photo- later, during the NATO bombing of interpreters—but only partially solved Kosovo, U.S. forces still did not receive Expectations the problem. U-2 aircraft and the support to consistently identify and Intelligence failures draw popular Corona satellite provided some ability strike mobile targets from the air, attention. What goes unsaid, however, to find and track strategic targets inside while indications from Afghanistan is that flawed expectations can lead to the Soviet Union; however, no assets are that the problem has yet to be failure. If expectations are unclear, or were deployed to meet the tactical tar- fully resolved. unachievable based on available re- geting needs of Pentomic doctrine be- High expectations for intelligence sources, military transformation will fore it was abandoned years later. to support targeting and BDA has con- not achieve its promise, which proba- Such problems were often re- tinued with the focus on precision en- bly will be proven on the battlefield. peated, most notably in developing gagement in Joint Vision 2020. Joint Identifying such a setback as an intel- AirLand Battle doctrine, which re- forces of the future will be expected to ligence failure would be small consola- quired quickly finding and selecting select, spot, identify, track, and strike tion. To avert this situation, military targets deep in enemy territory in rap- targets that will achieve decisive ef- leaders must exert a leading role in idly changing situations. AirLand Bat- fects, assess the results, and then setting expectations for their intelli- tle anticipated strikes on mobile high quickly reacquire and reengage surviv- gence support. payoff targets such as command and ing targets as necessary. Further, the History has provided transforma- control vehicles. Moreover, it expected joint force is expected to accomplish tion leaders with ample warning. Each highly accurate bomb damage assess- these tasks with overwhelming speed successive iteration of U.S. warfighting ment (BDA) to allow rapid reengage- and throughout a full range of military doctrine since World War II has held ment of surviving targets without operations—while minimizing collat- out higher expectations which were wasting deep strike capabilities. eral damage and fratricide. not fully met. With the heavy reliance The intelligence capabilities re- The main condition to achieving current transformation efforts place on quired were not in place, and unlike in this vision of precision engagement is intelligence, the emerging generation the 1950s there was no crash program intelligence. The Armed Forces have of doctrine could be the worst example to develop them. It was almost a developed and proven the capability to of this pattern yet. strike targets rapidly, once identified. The roots of excessive confidence However, experience with precision in intelligence support are found in strikes in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 105 INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

inventory. It is impossible to adequately cover every location where forces may be deployed. Therefore, increasing coverage in a crisis leads to sacrificing attention elsewhere and pos- sibly missing warnings of other crises. As with platforms, there are fewer people to go around than before budgetary cuts began. More importantly, analysts are not universally inter- changeable between regions and spe- cialties. Specialized expertise on de-

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY ployment areas or the surrounding regions is vital for good collection and analysis. This knowledge has normally been in short supply when unexpected events cause forces to be deployed be- UAV operator stations cause most intelligence personnel have inside tactical control been trained and conditioned to deal shelter.

Combat Camera Squadron (John Houghton) Combat Camera Squadron with just a few longstanding threats. st 1 When North Korea invaded the South in 1950, the U.S. intelligence system was unprepared to meet the Afghanistan have demonstrated that Anticipatory Support human requirements for operations on the joint force can hit targets more The Armed Forces have made the peninsula because it had been fo- consistently and quickly than it can great strides in the physical ability to cused on Europe. A study of lessons identify and select targets. Poor BDA rapidly project power over vast dis- learned during the Korean War re- has also meant that no one knows tances as well as deploy and sustain vealed a critical shortage of trained lin- 3 what was really accomplished in a forces in areas with little preexisting guists in the Army. The National Secu- given strike for months if ever. In infrastructure. They have made far less rity Agency (NSA), which provides short, doctrine is ahead of intelligence progress toward rapidly meeting intel- signal intelligence to the military, had support again. ligence support needs for operations in only one analyst tasked to cover Ko- It will require tempered expecta- all but the highest priority locations rean message traffic and only one tions and increased capabilities to and missions. To address this problem, trained Korean linguist at the outbreak bring the two factors into closer align- the Armed Forces must build a system of the conflict. ment. If the military allocates suffi- that anticipates and prepares for, not Forty years later, little had cient resources and attention, intelli- reacts to, the challenges of an increas- changed. When Iraq invaded Kuwait gence capabilities may be able to ingly diverse threat. in 1990, DIA had only one analyst as- realize the expectations of Joint Vision Since World War II, U.S. forces signed to Iraq fulltime. When forces 2020 by the appointed year. However, have been frequently deployed to were deployed to Somalia the follow- in the intervening years, doctrine must places regarded as low intelligence pri- ing year, CIA had to send case officers reflect—and commanders must esti- orities until the outbreak of a crisis, who did not speak the language and mate—goals for intelligence support. which has meant that intelligence or- had little knowledge of Somali history Transformation leaders must also ganizations were unprepared to pro- or the clans which ran the country. be specific in communicating their vi- vide support. Similarly, the intelligence Military intelligence units were so sion of the future. This will mean as- support system has had problems short of trained personnel that they re- sessing intelligence support needs for meeting the unique demands of mis- lied on Somali civilians as interpreters, various contingencies in doctrinal sions other than the full-scale tradi- some of whose backgrounds tainted terms rather than in terms of the tech- tional warfare for which it was de- the resulting intelligence. nological capabilities available for ex- signed. These shortcomings have Even after troops are deployed ploitation. Without precise guidance become obvious in non-war military and an area becomes an intelligence on future needs, the national intelli- operations in various parts of the priority, experience demonstrates that gence agencies will choose to build ca- world since the Cold War. it can take a long time to overcome a pabilities based on their priorities, Both the breadth and flexibility of lack of advance preparation. Intelli- while military organizations will not be U.S. intelligence is currently limited. gence organizations will quickly assign able to optimize structures, doctrines, The increasing cost of collection plat- collectors and analysts, but recruiting and training programs to best accom- forms results in fewer entering the and training area experts and linguists plish their missions. can require years, and building an effective human intelligence (HUMINT)

106 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Garlauskas network calls for patience and persist- recruiting and training area specialists budgets. Similarly, the defense estab- ence. Cultivating, placing, and evaluat- and better monitoring lower-priority lishment has a strong tendency to ing the reliability of human sources is areas may provide substantially im- equate fielding advanced technology best done over a long period. Rushing proved support when the time comes with transformation. As a result, intel- the process to support operations to deploy on short notice. By careful ligence transformation has focused which are underway can compromise analysis, areas that may become crisis largely on using new technologies to effectiveness, as became clear in Soma- spots can be identified to receive gather and distribute a flood of raw in- lia. Among other issues, HUMINT sup- greater attention with enough lead formation, which the United States al- port for Task Force Ranger led to hit- time to put the groundwork in place. ready does fairly well. ting the wrong targets several times, There will be resistance to this Leaders insist that the intelligence including a pro-U.N. Somali general. anticipatory approach. It would take focus is moving toward more person- Reliance on HUMINT in Somalia resources from other concerns and nel and analysis, but technology and also illustrated that various types of op- training from conventional warfight- collection still receive most of the TRANSFORMATION MILITARY erations call for different requirements ing support. In addition, most of the funds—along with the power and pres- and present unique challenges. Such assets would come from the military. tige. Of nine programs cited as key missions can be best addressed with The national agencies are focused on transformation initiatives by the Trans- methods, structures, and equipment current requirements and cannot ded- formation Study Report in 2001, only optimized for the task at hand. For ex- icate more than a token effort to areas the Army distributed common ground ample, requirements in Somalia could that might only potentially be critical system was not a technical sensor or only be effectively met by human to military customers. platform. Designed to improve intelli- agents, leading the U.S. military to de- Despite the expense, if a predic- gence processing, analysis, and dissem- pend on comparatively weak HUMINT tive approach is not pursued, joint ination, this system was only assigned capabilities. In other situations, such as forces will find it difficult to achieve as a C list priority.4 large-scale conventional wars, elec- information superiority in the future. When combined with the tradi- tronic sensors might be more useful. Local and regional threats have a sig- tionally secondary status of intelligence nificant home ground in the military, this bias can have dam- intelligence transformation has focused advantage that has his- aging effects on transformation. One torically overcome the has been the funding and attention de- largely on using new technologies to U.S. intelligence advan- voted to enhancing sensor-to-shooter gather and distribute raw information tages alluded to in the links, such as connecting fighter pilots QDR report. Transfor- with real-time imagery from platforms. mation leaders cannot This approach to the transformation of The full spectrum dominance in- afford to concede information superi- the targeting process wastes limited re- voked by JV 2020 means the intelli- ority to an enemy at the outbreak of a sources and is partially driven by the gence system must be able to support crisis because of reluctance to pay the desire of shooters to limit reliance on any type of operations on short notice. costs of better preparing for a wide va- intelligence personnel. But the system is trained and organ- riety of contingencies. Shooters already have sensors, ized today to support large-scale con- and providing more raw unanalyzed ventional warfare and can only be Overcoming Inertia sensor data will solve few of their prob- temporarily or marginally modified to In meeting these challenges, lems. Linking warfighters directly to support other missions. The Armed transformation leaders will encounter additional sensor information means Forces are beginning to make signifi- cultural, budgetary, and organizational little without the analytical capability cant changes, such as the increased inertia. Many patterns must be to accurately determine what the sen- HUMINT capabilities of the Stryker changed to achieve transformational sors are actually looking at. Trained brigade combat team within the Army. advances in intelligence support of imagery analysts who had ample time Further progress will require broader military operations. Some have already were deceived in Iraq, Kosovo, and training and more flexible organiza- been considered, while others may Afghanistan, and shooters under im- tions, as well as units that can support only have a minimal impact on trans- mediate threat will be far less effective particular missions and be ready for at- formation. Yet two problems require analysts. Worse, the transmission of all tachment to deploying forces. special attention: the preference for this data will place huge and unneces- Moreover, the joint force must lay high-tech collection and communica- sary demands on overburdened com- the intelligence groundwork for sup- tion over other forms of intelligence munications networks, not to mention porting operations in areas that may and the relatively low priority intelli- the attention of the shooter. not be priorities today. In many places gence is assigned within the military. It would be more useful to focus where the military will be deployed, It has long been part of the intelli- technological resources on helping and some where they are currently de- gence culture to prize collection over those personnel who now see sensor ployed, there are insufficient HUMINT analysis, and technical means of col- and other specific resources. A rela- lection in particular have dominated tively small long-term investment in

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 107 INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

all raw intelligence and finished products. Once the obstacles to sharing among agencies are overcome, this shared knowledge would help resolve many problems inherent in interagency cooperation without sacrificing organizational independence. Military intelligence could get increased value from national agency resources without contesting control. Analysts could continue to provide analysis tailored for their organizations but without

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY having access to only part of the information collected on the subject.

Transformation will be a difficult process unless the Armed Forces accept intelligence as an equal partner of other aspects of joint operations. Dur- Analyst checking ing successful military transforma- U–2 images. tions, new relationships are formed

Combat Camera Squadron (ReynaldoCombat Camera Squadron Ramon) among the various arms of each serv- st 1 ice. The current situation is no exception. A sustained effort will be required to substantially increase the level of at- data to identify targets more accu- while it is clear that intelligence organ- tention and resources that intelligence rately. Substantially more effective au- izations lack the manpower to thor- receives within the military. If intelli- tomatic target recognition software oughly examine even a small fraction gence support is becoming more vital, and hardware would enhance data ex- of the information currently collected. it must assume an increased priority ploitation from existing sensors and A more appropriate approach would across the defense establishment. The platforms, improving intelligence ap- redirect resources to building a system challenge can be met—and intelli- plication across the board. At the same that more efficiently uses the collec- gence can fulfill its promise as the time, more effort should be devoted to tion capacity. That would focus tasking foundation of military success. JFQ improving analyst-shooter links for more tightly on areas likely to contain warfighters to get valuable finished in- vital pieces of information, improve NOTES telligence more quickly. processing to speed their identifica- 1 William Owens, “Intelligence in the Even when technology connects tion, and provide the analytical re- 21st Century,” American Intelligence Journal, shooters with virtual or human im- sources to interpret what they mean vol. 19, nos. 1 and 2 (Spring 1999), p. 15. agery analysts to help identify targets more reliably and completely. That 2 Thomas Behling and Kenneth Mc- in real time, sensor-to-shooter links do would provide better intelligence with- Gruther, “Planning Satellite Support to Mili- not resolve the targeting support prob- out increasing the amount of informa- tary Operations,” Studies in Intelligence lem. Effective targeting in an age of tion collected. (Winter 1998–99) n.p., http://www.cia.gov/ precision warfare is more complicated Technology may find its optimum csi/studies/winter98-99/art10.html. 3 th than simply finding things that belong contribution in streamlining the labor- 8 U.S. Army Military History Section, Intelligence and Counterintelligence Problems to an enemy and designating them for intensive task of information process- During the Korea Conflict, reprint of 1954 re- attack. U.S. precision strike capabilities ing. Deploying improved automatic port (Washington: U.S. Army Center for are finite and must be directed at the target recognition, electronic language Military History, 2002), p. 1. most important targets to be decisive. translation, virtual collaboration, and 4 Jim McCarthy, Transformation Study Re- As Joint Vision 2020 states, “success de- data mining technologies would yield port: Transforming Military Operational Capa- pends on in-depth analysis to identify savings in manpower and time and re- bilities (Washington: Government Printing and locate critical nodes and targets.” sult in greater effectiveness. Ultimately, Office, 2001), p. 57. Improvements in processing, the processing, analysis, production, analysis, and tasking—not more raw and storage of intelligence can and data—are the keys to achieving trans- should be far more automated. formational improvements in intelli- The final transformational step gence. Billions of dollars are to be would be creating a common intelli- spent on more unmanned aerial vehi- gence knowledge base to allow ana- cles, satellites, and advanced sensors, lysts from different organizations to se- curely, quickly, and efficiently access

108 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Enduring Freedom andcurrently isafellowattheBrookings Institution. Lieutenant Commander JohnJ.Klein,USN, servedonboard Thrust ’01. Tandem Australia, in Global Hawk and Transformation Aerial Vehicles Unmanned Combat S By on greaterimportance manned vehiclesofallkindswilltake We have enoughunmannedvehicles. “ the resultoftechnologicalinnovation: termine theirstrategiccapabilities to mustde- implies thattheseaservices naval UCAVs currently exist,thisshift with Hellfiremissiles.Althoughno ployed Predatorunmannedaircraft erations inSouthwestAsiathatem- (UCAVs) wasillustratedbyrecentop- for unmannedcombatairvehicles land, intheair, andatsea. Now it is clear the military doesnot Now itisclearthemilitary ’ re enteringanerainwhichun- JOHN J. KLEIN ring intheArmedForces as the changesthatareoccur- President GeorgeBushnoted peaking inDecember2001, USS Enterprise — in space,on ” Theneed during for navalcombat operations.Finally, is feasibleto use unmannedvehicles ogy hasadvancedtothepoint whereit ployed inAfghanistan.Also, technol- Hellfire air-to-groundmissiles andem- UAV wassuccessfully modified with UCAVs. ThePredatorreconnaissance to theanticipatedboominnaval the 2002budgetlevel. 2003, anincreaseof$8millionover quested $50millionforitsprogramin $1.1 billionin2003,andtheNavyre- purpose. Overallfundingismorethan sources havebeenearmarkedforthis meet thedeadline,significantre- Pentagon indicatedthatitcannot manned by2010.Andalthoughthe third ofdeepstrikecapabilitybeun- be moreappropriate. craft orotherweaponsystemsmight avoid usingthemwhenmannedair- Several factorshavecontributed Congress hasmandatedthata itr20–3/ Winter 2002–03 JFQ 109

U.S. Air Force (Jeremy Lock) MILITARY TRANSFORMATION UNMANNED COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES

naval vehicles have an advantage over and is designed to operate at 35 knots manned aircraft. For instance, if land-based counterparts since the In- with an endurance of one hour. Its UCAVs perform a similar mission for termediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty one-pound sensor payload can provide the same price, with twice the en- of 1988 prohibited certain land-based day, low light, or night infrared sensor durance as their manned counterparts, cruise missile-like systems but not imagery to ground operators. After they can be considered transforma- ship-based systems. combat operations in Afghanistan, the tional. In addition, if an unmanned Marine Corps sought to use Dragon vehicle carries out missions similar to Current Initiatives Eye to support security forces within manned aircraft but at half of the cost The Navy leveraged innovations Kabul, and current plans call for field- or less, that could be transformational. in unmanned programs by the Air ing over 300 systems. An exception occurs when one capabil- Force and the Defense Advanced Re- ity is improved and another is less- search Projects Agency. Presently, naval Quantifying the Qualitative ened. If a vehicle has twice the en-

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY requirements address carrier-based Military transformation is a revo- durance as a manned strike aircraft but UCAVs to suppress enemy air defenses, lutionary or significant improvement costs twice as much, this is not trans- perform strike missions, and conduct in hardware, tactics, or doctrine. In a formational since two sequential sor- intelligence, surveillance, and recon- period of technological breakthroughs, ties of the cheaper manned aircraft naissance (ISR). A notable difference slowly evolving militaries run the risk would provide the same coverage as of being overtaken by ene- the longer endurance UCAV. Therefore, requirements call for vehicles with a mies that risk all on revolu- improving the performance of un- tionary changes. These vi- manned aircraft at any price is not in strike radius of 1,000 nautical miles sionaries seek a force that is keeping with the objectives of military and a payload of 2,000 pounds lighter, more mobile, and transformation. more easily deployed to An exception to quantifying hotspots around the world. transformation occurs when the novel among service requirements is that While the military has climbed aboard capability of unmanned vehicles can- Navy specifications include such capa- the transformation bandwagon, the not be quantitatively compared to bilities, while those of the Air Force do term has been misapplied and even manned aircraft. For example, Dragon not. One reason for this disparity is tied to acquisition programs as a way Eye is man-portable and uses sensors that the Air Force utilizes other vehi- of avoiding criticism and budget cuts. to accomplish its mission. While there cles such as the ISR-proven Predator Overuse and misuse have understand- are manned surveillance aircraft with and Global Hawk. ably obscured the intended meaning. more sophisticated sensors, portability The Office of Naval Research and Some claim that UCAVs are not allows this vehicle to provide urban the Defense Advanced Research Pro- transformational but rather the next surveillance and operate in a manner jects Agency have selected Boeing and step in the incremental evolution of manned aircraft cannot; thus it can be Northrop Grumman to produce the aircraft. To prevent pundits from argu- considered transformational. UCAV advanced technology program ing which programs are transforma- demonstrator. This program will lead tional and to decide if the vehicles UCAV Attributes to the development of a system that have a significantly improved capabili- The Navy, Defense Advanced Re- could become operational by 2015. Re- ties over manned aircraft, it is desirable search Projects Agency, and contractors quirements call for vehicles with a to put a stake in the ground and quan- are designing UCAVs to meet perform- strike radius of 1,000 nautical miles tify this nebulous claim. Borrowing ance specifications based on suppress- and payloads of 2,000 pounds (includ- from engineering and the applied sci- ing enemy air defenses, strike, and ISR ing joint military munitions and new ences, which routinely perform numer- missions. Regardless of mission-specific small diameter bombs). Naval guide- ical calculations, the equivalent to design traits, there are basic capabili- lines also require UCAVs to perform a transformation is likened to an order of ties that all naval UCAVs should 12-hour ISR mission and operate up to magnitude change, which denotes sig- demonstrate to be operationally viable. altitudes of 35,000 feet. These vehicles nificant or notable measurable change. Maintainability and reliability. At a will be the same class as F/A–18C air- Taking the most conservative approach minimum, future vehicles must be craft and should have a unit cost one- to quantifying transformation, an order readily maintainable and operationally third that of the joint strike fighter of magnitude change with the base 2 reliable as contemporary manned air- and an operational support cost half numbering system will be used to de- craft. This ensures that they can be re- that of an F/A–18C squadron. fine transformation, thus denoting a paired and accomplish the missions While the Marine Corps has no measured doubling or halving. they were designed to perform. A state- current UCAV programs, it has several Applying this thesis, unmanned of-the-art unmanned vehicle benefits under development. The requirements vehicles are considered transforma- no one if it is inoperable the majority call for a family of inexpensive, man- tional if they achieve at least a twofold of the time due to maintenance issues. portable vehicles for the battlefield. improvement in cost or capability over Some argue that survivability Dragon Eye, for example, weighs four must be an attribute. While desirable, pounds, has a three-foot wingspan, the ability for UCAVs to survive battle

110 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Klein damage should be considered secondary, especially if they have a fractional cost compared to manned aircraft. De- signing a vehicle to be highly survivable adds expense and weight; and weight reduces endurance. Also, incorporating inexpensive stealth technology into the design reduces the probability that enemy surface-to-air radar systems will detect vehicles, thus miti- gating the need for survivability. Once the technology matures and costs are reduced, minimal combat survivability TRANSFORMATION MILITARY can be considered acceptable due to the throw-away cost. Air traffic control standards. UCAVs must be able to operate within the same air traffic control standards as manned aircraft. For the Navy, this means carrier-based vehicles operating within the constraints of the normal operational launch and recovery cycle. Marines guiding Furthermore, carrier-based unmanned Dragon Eye, Enduring vehicles must be able to fly day Freedom. and night landing patterns within the same timing and airspace requirements as their manned counterparts. Imposing different rules on UCAVs and manned aircraft reduces carrier operational effectiveness and efficiency. Whether or not an aircraft is manned should be transparent when operating within carrier controlled airspace. Marine Division (Kenneth E. Madden) st Organic capability. Naval 1 unmanned vehicles should remain organic to the battle group, which means taking off premier fighting force in the and landing on board ships. world, deploying naval UCAVs For example, if vehicles are tactically working alongside air wing strike plan- runs the risk of decreasing combat ef- viable in the strike mission or sup- ners to develop and understand the fectiveness. Furthermore, substantial pressing enemy air defenses, operators mission, contingencies, and last research and development costs are as- who control vehicles must perform re- minute changes. It is not operationally sociated with designing future un- quired strike planning alongside air- viable for UCAV mission planners to manned vehicles, and these funds crews flying manned aircraft. All play- stay on carriers when unmanned air- could be used to build additional com- ers must understand the mission craft are based at nearby fields. A case bat proven manned aircraft. Therefore, timeline, aircraft flight routes, and air- in point is the war in Afghanistan, for the Navy and Marine Corps, future space restrictions. when Saudi Arabia stipulated that vehicles need to provide a significantly Some may argue that naval un- strike aircraft—as opposed to support improved capability or advantage to manned vehicles should operate from aircraft such as tankers—could not op- offset the risks and costs associated nearby foreign airfields when carriers erate from its airfields. The Navy can- with unmanned programs. Returning are deployed in-theater. The advantage not afford to have foreign governments to what constitutes transformation, of land-basing vehicles would be re- dictate the use of naval aircraft during this necessitates that UCAVs demon- moving the requirements for heavier wartime operations. strate a twofold improvement over carrier landing gear, thus increasing air- Significant cost or performance ad- manned aircraft. craft endurance. Nevertheless, land-bas- vantage. Since the U.S. military is the Multimission capability. Current ing would reduce combat effectiveness manned naval aircraft routinely per- because mission planners would not be form multiple missions during a single

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 111 UNMANNED COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES

sortie and are retaskable once airborne, which commanders have come to anticipate. Future UCAVs should demonstrate this same multimission capacity to provide decisionmakers with real- time options. Moreover, considering that naval vehicles are being designed for endurance up to 12 hours and that tactical priorities can quickly change during combat, unmanned aircraft need to provide mission flexibility. For example, marines might need a recon-

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION MILITARY naissance capability to detect armor. Once located, they could target it with onboard weapons, and after the enemy is engaged sensors onboard UCAVs Predator UAV landing, could be used to assess bomb damage. Desert Rescue VIII.

Secure information relay. Finally, DOD (Steven M. Turner) UCAVs need a secure and reliable means to transmit tactical information to ground stations, ships, or other air- will excel in performing complex mul- targets. The advantage is that the sys- craft. Naval communication systems timissions with unplanned contingen- tem is relatively unsophisticated; tech- must be encrypted to prevent intercep- cies since aviators adapt to evolving sit- nology to remotely pilot aircraft has ex- tion and exploitation. If nonencrypted uations. While computers can perform isted for years. The ground station signals are intercepted, enemies can de- certain functions better than aviators, operator can decide and react to the sit- termine whether their mobile assets are they do not demonstrate the ability to uation and direct the next action for being targeted and in turn their forces react to unplanned or unprogrammed the vehicle. Significantly, the system to expedite movement to a safe area. contingencies. includes a man-in-the-loop who is re- Relaying (bouncing) vehicle tacti- Notwithstanding their advan- sponsible for releasing live weapons. cal transmissions is a strategic neces- tages, manned aircraft have disadvan- Rules of engagement follow a chain of sity. Since vehicles are being designed tages when compared to their un- command to determine if circum- for an over-the-horizon capability, manned counterparts. The former are stances warrant an attack and collateral control stations and aircraft would more expensive to operate while one damage is a concern. This system sup- soon reach a relative distance that pre- ground operator can monitor and con- ports the rules since accountability cluded reception and transmission. trol several unmanned vehicles simul- resides with decisionmakers. The disad- However, incorporating the ability to taneously. In addition, in performing vantage is that it depends on a con- use ground stations, ships, aircraft, or missions deep within enemy territory, stant communications link, which may satellites to relay information between aviators risk death or capture. Prisoners be susceptible to jamming or interfer- UCAVs and control stations would of war create political and operational ence. Moreover, a remotely piloted sys- greatly increase the effective range of concerns because it is necessary to tem requires dedicated personnel, these vehicles. avoid targeting sites where friendly which is costly and time consuming personnel are being held. UCAVs can during lengthy missions. Getting the Job Done perform similar missions with only a Autonomous systems. On the other There are three ways to control material loss if shot down. end of the spectrum is the au- unmanned aerial vehicles: by remote Remotely piloted systems. Predator tonomous control system, which uses piloting, autonomously, and semiau- unmanned vehicles that engaged tar- an onboard computer to locate, iden- tonomously, each with relative advan- gets in Afghanistan used a man-in-the- tify, track, and expeditiously attack tar- tages and disadvantages. loop control—that is, they were re- gets. A control station is only used to Manned systems. If unmanned ve- motely piloted. In such a system, the receive sensor imagery and aircraft hicles are such a great innovation, one vehicle has a communications link flight information. The foremost ad- might ask why the skies over Afghani- with a control station and receives con- vantage of an autonomous system is stan aren’t teeming with them? Com- trol inputs to dictate flight path and that it does not require a constant bat missions often must react to un- sensor operation. Imagery from sensors communications link with a control foreseen circumstances. Critics doubt is transmitted to the control station, station, and therefore jamming or in- that computer-brained UCAVs can and the manned operator then locates, terference of the aircraft’s communica- compete with pilots in taxing situa- identifies, and decides when to engage tions link is not detrimental to the tions such as air-to-air combat, when it mission. Also, autonomous systems re- is necessary to assimilate information quire minimal man-hour support and and act immediately. Manned aircraft are thus less expensive to operate.

112 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Klein

The disadvantage of the control Corps has no program underway, it with their own weapons system. The system is that it has not been combat seems doubtful that they will get a dedi- 24-hour patrols over New York and proven. Autonomous systems have cated vehicle in the near future; how- Washington after September 11 were been used for reconnaissance and sur- ever, it may be possible to modify a ended because of reduced threat and veillance, but none has performed in land-based Predator for use with close expense. The Navy and Air Force flew combat. That is due in part to the air support and surveillance missions. A more than 19,000 combat air patrols biggest challenge facing autonomous near-term plan is in place, but what will over American cities at a cost of $500 systems: accountability for making naval UCAVs look like in the future? million. If the need to reinstate these weapons release decisions. Even if tech- Minesweeping. While not specifi- combat air patrols arises again, air-to- nology advances to allow autonomous cally found on unmanned aircraft, the air UCAVs could perform the mission combat, operational commanders Defense Advanced Research Projects at a substantially reduced cost and free would likely oppose it because if school Agency has used a chemical sniffer to aircrews for other missions. buses are misidentified as troop carriers, detect buried landmines. With similar Amphibious support. Current Navy TRANSFORMATION MILITARY who would be held accountable—the technology, a swarm of miniature UCAV plans only cover employment software programmer, UCAV squadron UCAVs could fly over amphibious land- from carriers; however, future vehicles commander, or leader who authorized ing areas or minefields to locate buried can be housed in artillery shells. Once unmanned aircraft? A purely au- landmines. A single vehicle would fired, the vehicles could penetrate de- lightly land next to the land- fended beachheads, then UCAVs it may be possible to modify a land- mine. All of these vehicles would separate and begin powered would detect individual flight. Imagery of enemy defenses based Predator for use with close air mines, and once the swarm could be relayed to ships or amphibi- support and surveillance missions had detected them all, they ous units. And when targets are de- would detonate onboard in- tected, UCAVs would be remotely pi- cendiary devices in unison, loted to detonate on impact. Such tonomous system should not be used in destroying themselves and the mines. vehicles must have a small, inexpen- combat because of this dilemma. A signal to detonate would come from sive, and durable design to survive Semiautonomous systems. While a single manned control station, pre- being fired from a naval gun. certain phases of UCAV missions are re- cluding unintentional detonation and motely piloted, others are under au- collateral damage. Through advancements in tech- tonomous control, blending man-in- Smart grenade. As the Marines em- nology and increased funding, naval the-loop and autonomous operations. ploy Dragon Eye for reconnaissance variants of unmanned combat air vehi- For instance, time-consuming tasks and surveillance, small UCAVs will cles will soon be deployed to suppress such as aircraft station keeping and serve a tactical benefit in the field. enemy air defenses and conduct strike searching for enemy targets are accom- Miniaturized variants of Dragon Eye and other missions. Moreover, these plished autonomously using onboard could carry small incendiary devices. vehicles promise to conduct some mis- sensors and computers. Once potential Forces on the ground could remotely sions more effectively and less expen- targets are located, decisionmakers ver- pilot the aircraft while using onboard sively than manned aircraft. A result ify their identity and ensure conditions sensors to look for enemy troops or could be fewer joint strike fighters in exist to release weapons. The advantage ground vehicles. Once a target is de- the near term. Some have even pre- is that the most dynamic phase has a tected, a marine could pilot the aerial dicted that this fighter might be the man-in-the-loop, increasing the likeli- vehicle, then cause it to detonate. In last manned strike aircraft built. hood of success while maintaining its simplest form, this miniature aerial As unmanned combat air vehicles rules of engagement and minimizing vehicle would be used like a grenade become more autonomous, it can be the chance of misidentification and en- that can fly around corners and down expected that a man-in-the-loop sys- gagement of noncombatants. The dis- passageways. tem will be used to preclude misidenti- advantages are that communications Air-to-air. The Air Force is consid- fication of targets and loss of innocent links are susceptible to jamming or in- ering putting an air-to-air version of lives. They must not be employed in terference and that a decisionmaking the Stinger missile, originally designed combat simply because they are avail- process involving several people in- as a handheld ground-to-air missile, on able, but rather because they offer sig- creases the time required to authorize the Predator. UCAVs performing air-to- nificant advantages over manned air- weapons release and engage targets. air missions are a logical next step. craft. Since their future application is While personnel aboard command and virtually limitless, unmanned combat Gazing into the Future control aircraft can determine if the air vehicles will help maintain the su- From the descriptions of naval hostile identification and rules of en- premacy of the U.S. military. JFQ UCAVs on the drawing board, it appears gagement are being met using beyond- likely that these vehicles will incorpo- visual-range criteria, air-to-air UCAVs rate long-range surveillance sensors, could easily engage enemy aircraft electronic surveillance equipment, and precision weapons. Since the Marine

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 113 An Israeli Military Innovation

UAVs By RALPH SANDERS

t should not be surprising that Israel has be- replace air crews but to augment them for certain come a leader in military innovation given missions. the demands of national security. Among UAVs are relatively simple and sturdy, taking I the technologies that it has advanced are off and landing conventionally under the control unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Even though of rated pilots located on the ground. They are other nations have conducted experiments with sometimes preprogrammed and range in design these vehicles, Israel developed and fielded them from modern aircraft to missiles. Israel and Amer- as battlefield systems. UAVs are non-rocket-pro- ica have invested heavily in these vehicles be- pelled aircraft that fly within the atmosphere cause of their combat performance, versatility, and do not require humans on board to operate and low cost; thus UAVs are entering a new phase them. With aerodynamic features that enable in their development. them to lift and carry lethal as well as nonlethal Certain advantages were sought by using payloads, unmanned aerial vehicles perform mis- these vehicles. Because of their relatively small sions such as reconnaissance, command and population, Israelis have always been particularly control, and deception. They are not intended to sensitive to loss of life. The Merkava tank, for example, was designed with the engine in front to protect the crew. Likewise, UAVs avoid risks to Ralph Sanders was J. Carlton Ward, Jr., Distinguished Professor at the airmen. Israel recalled the plight of its prisoners Industrial College of the Armed Forces and is the author of Arms of war and the way their enemies exploited them Industries: New Suppliers and Regional Security.

114 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Sanders

for propaganda. Resource constraints also de- These vehicles played a significant role while manded optimum results from military innova- Israel occupied a security zone in southern tions. Consequently, Israel sought the most effi- Lebanon. For example, a UAV squadron served cient technologies. For the most part, and despite before and during the Grapes of Wrath Operation certain limitations, UAVs are becoming more eco- to find concentrations of terrorists and the homes nomical, making them attractive to political and of their commanders. With forward-looking in- military leaders alike. frared radar cameras, unmanned aerial vehicles Given the fact that Israel has fought six wars saw at night, removing darkness as a cover for and is engaged in counterterrorist operations of Hizbollah fighters. major proportions at present, its defense officials can employ UAVs across a range of missions. It Defense Industrial Base should be stressed that these vehicles represent The emergence of unmanned vehicles resem- only one of several innovations developed to bles the early stage of developing computers in meet security challenges. Yet advocates are opti- the United States. It began when an American, mistic because of the advent of lightweight com- Alvin Ellis, decided that unmanned flight could posite structures, reliable digital flight control sys- have a military role. In 1967 he moved to Israel tems, miniaturized sensors, and strong data links. and joined Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI). After analyzing the Yom Kippur War, he found that a The Relevant History drone equipped with a television camera offered During Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982, clear battlefield advantages. With an IAI colleague, Israeli aircraft flew over the Bekaa Valley in the Yehuda Manor, he built a prototype UAV in a Syrian-occupied area of Lebanon to destroy sur- garage, not unlike Steve Jobs and Stephen Woz- face-to-air (SAM) missile batteries. Earlier, UAVs niak, who assembled the first Apple computer. had fingerprinted Syrian surface-to-surface radars After being rejected by IAI, the pair sought by gathering their electronic frequencies. The Is- backing from a government-owned company. raelis then programmed the frequencies into anti- Ellis approached Tadiran, a private electronics radiation missiles. When the assault began, UAVs conglomerate, which funded the project. Once cruised the battlespace the prototype was flown in 1973, Tadiran signed the Israeli military learned vital emitting dummy signals. a contract to develop an operational model Syrian radar operators known as Mastiff, with a pusher-propeller twin- lessons regarding UAVs during thought that Israeli boom configuration, a feature that would become the Yom Kippur War in 1973 planes were attacking standard for combat surveillance. While this un- and launched most of manned vehicle attracted little attention for some their SAMs against un- time, the Israeli military eventually became inter- manned vehicles. As the Syrians reloaded and ested. Tadiran and IAI engaged in bitter competi- were vulnerable to air attack, Israeli fighters tion for a defense contract to develop and pro- struck with telling effect. duce the vehicle. In addition, Syrian radars that tracked UAVs Soon the Israeli defense ministry was acquir- alerted the Israelis to devices which emitted sig- ing Mastiffs from Tadiran while IAI supplied its nals. With previously gleaned electronic signa- Scout model, which had a configuration similar tures, Israeli aircraft with antiradiation missiles to the Mastiff. With UAVs providing critical re- and supporting artillery fire destroyed the enemy connaissance information on the Bekaa Valley, missiles. Israel does not use unmanned vehicles America took an interest in unmanned vehicles. in isolation. It fielded sophisticated jamming sys- Tadiran teamed with IAI and then submitted a tems and precision bombs in 1982, which neu- proposal in 1984 for a model to meet U.S. mili- tralized 19 enemy batteries. Free of SAMs, Israeli tary requirements. As a result, IAI formed a divi- aircraft attacked Syrian aircraft. In what unfolded sion known as Malat to produce UAVs. as the largest air battle since the Korean War, Is- IAI has become a leader in finding solutions rael claimed 22 kills without a single loss. for integrated UAV-related problems. It has a sys- The Israeli military learned vital lessons re- tem for virtually every scenario from tactical to garding UAVs during the Yom Kippur War in medium-altitude, long-endurance vehicles. The 1973 and applied them smartly in 1982. In fact, firm has focused on tailoring advances in pay- in both Lebanon and Syria, Israel was among the loads, data links, and mission control centers to first nations to employ such vehicles regularly for meet customer needs. reconnaissance in combat, demonstrating that Malat later consolidated production of Mas- when used effectively they can help achieve com- tiffs and Scouts and continued to sell slightly dif- bat objectives. ferent versions for over a decade. Both models have fixed landing gear and generally operate

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 115 MILITARY INNOVATION

Pioneer UAV, Paris Air Show.

PhotoLink (Michael Vines)

from runways, performing short landings with an and commercial applications of UAVs during the arresting-wire hook. However, they can also be previous autumn. A private sector firm, Elisra, launched from a hydraulic catapult mounted on produces electronics systems for use in UAVs op- a truck and recovered by a net. The two models erating in hostile environments. In joint ven- carry imaging sensors in a turret under the fuse- tures undertaken with IAI, Elisra has proven a lage. The Mastiff and Scout remained in service valuable partner. until the early 1990s, when the Malat Searcher became the preferred UAV. Similar to the Scout Operational Dimensions but over twice its size, the Searcher has a more UAVs ease the tasks of commanders on the powerful engine, updated avionics and sensors, battlefield and have the potential to become force greater endurance, and improved survivability. multipliers—that is, devices that improve effec- First deployed in 1998, it can fly at 20,000 feet for tiveness in combat without requiring more forces 14 hours, carrying advanced video cameras for or that enable commanders to accomplish mis- daylight and night observation. sions with fewer forces. In military operations, In addition, Malat has explored a smaller force multipliers relate to providing commanders UAV, Eye-View, which has fixed landing gear, with information to make timely decisions. They pusher propeller, and a distinctive tail-boom on include battlespace surveillance radar, remotely the rear fuselage. IAI is promoting Eye-View in piloted vehicles, and UAVs. civilian markets for detecting forest fires. An- Yet the future role of unmanned vehicles other firm, Silver Arrow, a collaborative project triggers debate. Some experts suggest that they of Elbit and Federmann Enterprises, offers large have a promising future with their potential to UAVs and two smaller versions, including the revolutionize conventional military operations by Sniper and Micro-V. The former resembles a con- the end of the decade. On the other hand, the ventional private aircraft and has an unusual up- Center for Defense Information argues that these right vee-shaped tail. The latter is too small to platforms will not greatly change warfighting. At carry a full sensor turret but is equipped with a present many commanders find them helpful, miniaturized imager in a transparent section but they have brought only incremental improve- within its fuselage. ment, enabling forces to do what they already do IAI/Malat has delivered more than 600 UAVs only more effectively. They do not yet give prom- to the Israel Defense Forces and customers over- ise of revolutionizing the art of war. seas. Sales totaled some $200 million in 2001, and the firm held a workshop to advance civil

116 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Sanders

Specifically, UAVs contribute in several ways. decisions on time. The United States has con- They can fly for extended periods without refuel- cluded that using UAVs for boost-phase intercept ing. Moreover, they can loiter at length; the may prove to be too great a technical and finan- longer they hover over a target, the better the cial challenge. photographs. In addition they are economical to Israel later used UAVs to destroy launch vehi- build and operate, though precautions are in cles on the ground, specifically in hunting down order because the cost advantage can evaporate as Scud missiles. For its part, America has explored acquisition bureaucracies inevitably attempt to incorporating them into missile defense for war- develop larger, more complex, and more capable head detection and monitoring. These vehicles models. Third, if an unmanned vehicle is either may employ infrared sensor and data collection downed or destroyed, as previously emphasized, systems, hoping to track missiles during their no pilot is killed or captured. midcourse flight. Thus far, UAVs have been used chiefly for The verdict on using UAVs for theater missile surveillance and reconnaissance. But lately they defense is still moot. In the meantime, the Israelis have been employed as weapons appear willing to pursue the matter, in the hope UAVs can loiter at length; platforms to destroy selective that additional research and development will the longer they hover, the targets. Unmanned vehicles are someday provide the knowledge that will make smaller, lighter, and less expen- them effective antiballistic missile weapons. better the photographs sive than their manned counterparts. To take full advantage of Counterterror Role these and similar innovations, the military must Terrorism gave prominence to unmanned develop new operating concepts and change aerial vehicles because of their reconnaissance, mindsets on how to fight wars in the future. surveillance, and target acquisition capabilities. Constraints on Israeli defense spending re- For example, since they can see at night, darkness quire a turn toward force multipliers. A growth in no longer cloaks attacks by Hamas, Hizbollah, Palestinian violence has reversed a downward and other groups. In particular, the role of UAVs trend in the defense budget in recent years. The on the urban battlefield that terrorists prefer has expenditure of $8.9 billion in 2001 has no doubt become important. With aerial photography, been increased. UAVs will help get more use out these vehicles offer an effective way of finding of existing military equipment. snipers and generating street plans and relief maps of enemy positions. That information in Missile Defense turn can be relayed to commanders in real time. Five years ago the Israelis began promoting Unmanned vehicles have become a necessity be- the Moab system, in which unmanned aerial ve- fore sending troops into a city. hicles counter ballistic missiles during their boost Israeli success in employing UAVs prompted phase. This effort involved using UAVs armed both U.S. military and intelligence agencies to with Python 4 air-to-air missiles. Planners argued use the same tactics. In November 2002, the CIA that an ability to operate at high altitudes and deployed a vehicle as a hunter-killer asset. It loiter for days virtually immune from attack by helped destroy a vehicle carrying al Qaeda opera- either surface-to-air missiles or fighters made tives after they launched a Hellfire air-to-surface them especially useful for engaging theater ballis- missile near the Yemeni capital. One of the men tic missiles soon after launch. in the car had participated in the attack on USS Analysts found that high-altitude, long-en- Cole that killed 17 Americans. durance UAVs could complement terminal mis- Unmanned vehicles were also used in sile defense systems cost-effectively. They began Afghanistan as coalition forces pursued the Tal- developing the HA–10, a stealthy, long-endurance iban and al Qaeda terrorists over mountainous unmanned vehicle, but never built it, concluding terrain. But they have their limitations, as that since American support for such a venture demonstrated by the failure to locate Osama bin was unlikely, the required financing for the proj- Laden. As the Israelis learned, UAVs may identify ect would not be forthcoming. an enemy, but the target often disappears by the One American defense official expressed the time a helicopter or fighter aircraft arrives. reluctance to support the project in the following words: “Targeting a fast-moving missile could be Capability and Limitations extremely difficult, especially if the UAV is going Compared with high-performance aircraft, to see it and then catch it in the first minute or so UAVs move more slowly over hostile territory to of its flight.” According to critics, communica- collect information, exposing them to enemy fire. tions among vehicles and command and control Unmanned vehicles also lack the instinct of self- centers would not be fast enough to make launch preservation that piloted aircraft possess when evading enemy defenses. Although the number of

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 117 MILITARY INNOVATION

vehicles which Israel lost over the Bekaa Valley in their potential for urban warfare. IAI has recently 1982 or during other operations is unknown, teamed with Raytheon Missile Systems to pro- NATO lost 22 during the war in Yugoslavia. In ad- mote a combat unmanned target locate and strike dition, UAVs cannot use terrain for protection system called Cutlass. against hostile fire. Once damaged, they lack re- Both India and Israel face hostile neighbors. dundant onboard systems like other aircraft. As India confronts Pakistan over Kashmir, Israel Unmanned vehicles have restricted data-link has become one of its major weapons suppliers. technology, which limits both their range and A report in Asia Times suggests that India is Is- flexibility in activities such as terrain masking. rael’s second largest defense customer. In fact, an Moreover, as operational experience grows and article published in Iansa, an Indian journal of the vehicles become better strategic studies, claimed that Israel may replace known, new instruments will Russia as the principal source of military hard- be designed to counter them. ware. Whatever the validity of these reports, Tel Israel is developing measures to Aviv is becoming a major arms dealer in New correct such problems. When Delhi. Washington is concerned that such sales their signatures are reduced, can have an adverse effect on the region. Conse- UAVs are more difficult to lo- quently, the United States asked Israel to down- cate. New multispectral sensors play these transfers. will enable them to operate in After India opened its mission in Israel, a inclement weather. When the delegation from Malat visited India to discuss the range of their sensors is in- sale of military technology. A short time later, Is- creased, unmanned vehicles rael offered to sell third-generation Searcher long- MAZLAT SCOUT MAZLAT MASTIFF can remain at some distance endurance multi-role UAVs to India as well as from threats. Changing their multipurpose tactical unmanned vehicles. The flight profiles makes them less predictable as well Searcher can remain airborne for 16 hours and as harder to hit. Finally, other innovations—in- has a range of 159 kilometers, which makes it cluding countermeasures which interfere with air suitable for operations in the Himalayas. defense guidance systems—will improve their After being caught offguard by incursions in overall UAV performance. the Kargil region of Kashmir, India decided to buy unmanned vehicles from Israel. Specifically, New Foreign Military Sales Delhi wanted to stop infiltration along the line of Israel must sell arms to other nations to sub- control and reportedly acquired 100 UAVs for sidize its own defense industrial base. With the $750 million, a deal that some indicate could be downturn in the global demand for military doubled. In late 2000, the Indian army deployed hardware, it must carefully select which products its first group of 25 Searcher Mark IIs on its fron- to market. UAVs are likely candidates for foreign tier with Pakistan and China. It may also order military sale for a variety of reasons. They meet more expensive Searcher IIs, which are capable of general security needs, performing missions such operating at 15,000 feet. as counterterrorism, protection against theater ballistic missile attacks, and conventional war- Many militaries around the world have be- fare. They can be designed for a range of military come enthusiastic over unmanned vehicles. They roles, from overhead surveillance to launching have seen the Israelis develop UAVs to meet their lethal weaponry. Finally, they are not as costly as security requirements from missile defense and many other systems. Among the countries that conventional operations to counterterrorism. have become Israeli customers are Chile, India, These vehicles enable commanders to see more of Singapore, and the United States. the battlespace, and knowing an enemy goes a America has long collaborated with Israel in long way toward defeating it. Moreover, no one defense matters. But because the Pentagon is reluc- can be killed or injured flying them. As enemies tant to buy weapons from overseas, foreign manu- become familiar with the strengths and limita- facturers normally team with U.S. firms. For exam- tions of these vehicles, they will find the means to ple, AAI Corporation is making the Israeli-designed reduce their effectiveness in some environments. Pioneer UAV for both the Army and Navy. IAI has Yet Israel is convinced that such systems improve assisted TRW Avionics and Surveillance Group to military capabilities at a modest cost. Unmanned produce the Hunter UAV, which was originally de- aerial vehicles will certainly continue as a major veloped by IAI. Since this cooperation began, export item for its defense industries. JFQ Malat has developed more advanced battlefield UAVs in collaboration with U.S. partners. The Marine Corps has also been testing Is- raeli UAV prototypes. It is especially looking into

118 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 NDU international fellows on class trip. Educating Foreign Officers National Defense University

By DOUGLAS M.GIBLER and TOMISLAV Z.RUBY

n editorial published in a British conducted by the United States. Far more charac- newspaper in 2001 lamented the fact teristic is the example of the war college graduate that the School of the Americas at from Central Europe who went on to an assign- A Fort Benning had trained a string of ment at NATO headquarters or another from the military dictators in recent decades: Roberto Viola Middle East who returned home to educate fellow and Leopoldo Galtieri of Argentina, Manuel Nor- officers. Professional military education (PME) iega and Omar Torrijos of Panama, Juan Velasco acts as a stabilizing factor that provides officers Alvarado of Peru, and Guillermo Rodriguez of from many nations with the opportunity for Ecuador—as well as the leaders of death squads in study and exposure to the democratic values Peru and Honduras, among other notorious grad- while attending senior- and intermediate-level in- uates.1 And other programs operated by the stitutions in America. Armed Forces have been cited for training In- donesians prior to the repression in East Timor as Terra Aliena well as future Taliban leaders during Afghan re- Half a million foreign officers have attended sistance to Soviet occupation. programs in the United States—nine thousand However, such cases are unrepresentative of from over a hundred countries in 2000—and of the international military education programs that number, some two hundred annually attend year-long courses with their American counterparts at PME institutions. Douglas M. Gibler is an assistant professor of political science at the Professional military education differs from University of Kentucky and Lieutenant Colonel Tomislav Z. Ruby, USAF, specialty training, which defines career fields for has taught at the Air Command and Staff College. officers. Each service operates both a senior and

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 119 EDUCATING FOREIGN OFFICERS

STHE SCHOOLHOUSES

Each service operates professional military education institutions on the senior (war college) and intermediate (staff college) levels. In addition, the National Defense University administers three colleges under the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, was founded in 1901 and has graduated more than 700 international fellows from almost 100 nations since 1978. On the intermediate level, more than 6,000 officers from over 140 countries have attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, since the early 1900s. With some 90 students representing 75 countries per class, the college lists 23 alumni who have become heads of state in their respective countries. The Naval War College was established at Newport, Rhode Island, in 1884. It operates two institutions for international officers, the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College. The Naval Command College was organized in 1956 and parallels the College of Naval Warfare, which educates U.S. students. It has graduated more than 1,500 senior officers from almost 90 nations—over half of whom have reached flag rank and approximately one in ten have become chiefs of their navies. The Naval Staff College was established in 1973 and has graduated over 1,400 mid-level officers from some 120 nations. This institution is being integrated into the College of Naval Command and Staff, which is attended by U.S. students. On the senior and intermediate levels, the Marine Corps War College and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, are constituent institutions of the Marine Corps University, which is located at Quantico Marine Base, Virginia. Some two dozen international students are enrolled each year in the latter institution. The Air War College and the Air Command and Staff College were both organized in 1946 and are administered by Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The former college is attended by foreign students from 45 nations and the latter enrolls some 80 officers from abroad. The National Defense University was established in 1976 and is comprised of two senior-level institutions, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the National War College, which are located at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington. Approximately 36 international fellows attend these two colleges each year. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces is the successor to the Army Industrial College, which was organized in 1924; the National War College was founded in 1946. The Joint Forces Staff College (formerly the Armed Forces Staff College) was incorporated into the National Defense University in 1981 and is located in Norfolk, Virginia. It enrolls approximately 50 foreign students each year in courses on joint planning and warfighting on the operational level, and traces its lineage to the Army-Navy Staff College, which was created during World War II. JFQ

an intermediate-level PME institution (or war and these programs. Educating international officers staff college). In addition, the National Defense develops channels of communication with other University administers the Industrial College of nations and promotes democratic ideals around the Armed Forces and the National War College the world. Resident programs build familiarity on the senior level as well as the Joint Forces Staff with American officers to forge lasting friendships College, which are joint institutions operating and an affinity for democratic values. under the auspices of the Chairman (see the ac- companying insert, “The Schoolhouses”). Emerging Democracies In general, war college programs primarily The road to democracy is prone to violence. focus on national military and national security Embattled elites may attempt to manipulate na- strategy while staff college programs are devoted tionalistic tendencies and create an alternative to to theater-level operational art. The Chairman is mass democracy movements. These elites are eas- required to ensure that curricula are current, ier to coordinate, often have better political ac- standardized, and compliant with Goldwater- cess, and are better able to use the weak institu- Nichols. Many countries send officers to the tions of emerging democracies to their advantage. United States on a reimbursable basis under the Rising nationalism then turns to a fait accompli Foreign Military Sales program, much as they that sends a state to war. The elites favor war be- purchase equipment. Developing nations that cause during wartime democratic rule can be dis- cannot afford the cost of education are provided pensed with in favor of authoritarian measures. with military assistance by the Department of As one analysis pointed out, most great powers State under the International Military Education have been belligerent during democratic transi- and Training (IMET) program. tions because of this elite competition.2 Phrases such as supporting security assis- Although war may be more likely in transi- tance, international involvement, lasting rela- tioning states, the probability of conflict is quite tions, and the like are common in descriptions of small even when there may be elite competition. Absent a divisionary war, strong elite interests often use the military to displace a transitioning

120 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Gibler and Ruby

Senior Malaysian officer, Fort Stewart. Fort Stewart (Michael Lemke)

regime. A more elite-friendly regime then appeals responsibility in the officer corps provides valu- to authoritarian means to quell mass democratic able lessons. For many foreign officers, this edu- movements. This is why coups are more likely in cational opportunity is their first exposure to periods of transition, and it is not a coincidence graduate-level study, making PME an important that most originate in military mutinies. Elites path toward developing truly professional mili- can ensure that democratic transition does not taries for their countries. happen by capturing the military. Study at an intermediate or senior college Fear of military intervention in politics may also exposes foreign officers to American society. prompt some governments to educate soldiers. By They do not simply live abroad for a year; many emphasizing technical expertise, professional mil- are accompanied by family, and their children go itary education can break to local schools and spouses attend culture professional military education down the corporate iden- classes. They learn about their U.S. counterparts tity and parochialism of through intramural sports and social events. In can break down the corporate armed forces. Profession- fact, as one study reveals, “Of all the experiences identity and parochialism of alism can isolate officers foreign military students remember, contact with from undue interest in the American culture stands out....Curiosity armed forces the civil sector. As one re- about the United States and how free market searcher argues, this is democracy functions today is greater than ever.”4 one of many strategies that repressive regimes Alumni of the National Defense University adopt to ensure their power.3 include several foreign officers who assumed criti- But coup-proofing need not be limited to au- cal roles in political change. Pro-democracy grad- thoritarian governments; it can benefit at-risk uates overthrew a 23-year-old dictatorship in Mali regimes, and often the least stable regimes are un- and rallied pro-democracy demonstrators in Thai- dergoing or have recently completed transitions land, while others put down attempted coups in to democracy. The political tensions experienced Venezuela. But education alone will not stabilize in such regimes, and the susceptibility of their the situation in each case. For example, some militaries to elitism, makes professionalization graduates were forcibly retired in Yugoslavia, re- and democratization of the military essential tools moving officers who might oppose undemocratic in the liberalization of their political systems. practices. The issue then becomes whether the In addition to the primary focus of their cur- educational experience can overcome illegitimate ricula, PME institutions offer another level of ex- regime change in transitioning countries. pertise. The emphasis on civilian control of the Because test cases can be anomalies rather military, democratic decisionmaking, and social than representing trends, Argentina, Greece, and Taiwan provide insights on the influence of professional military education. Despite differences

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 121 EDUCATING FOREIGN OFFICERS

in history, culture, and national policies, all three army has given sufficient proof during the past nations have experienced a democratic transition 18 years about our steady assimilation into a since 1970, been an ally or friend, and sent offi- democratic society.”5 cers to study at institutions in America. Although some observers identify foreign Hellenic Republic military programs with would-be dictators, this is Like the experience of Argentina, democrati- not the experience of PME institutions. Based on a zation came to Greece only after the failure of a survey of students between 1950 and 1999, only military regime. Seizing power in 1969, the armed two officers were charged with any form of forces organized a junta that became more au- malfeasance out of 114 Ar- thoritarian as economic conditions worsened. like the experience of gentines, 203 Greeks, and Some 150 officers were purged through forced re- 331 Taiwanese educated in tirement and dishonorable discharges. Two of the Argentina, democratization the United States. Both were highest ranking officers had been graduated from came to Greece only after the charged with abuses in Ar- institutions in the United States. Threatened by a failure of a military regime gentina. However, neither Turkish invasion during the Cyprus crisis of 1973, of them led a coup or junta. the junta transferred power to civilian authority. This amounts to only 4 per- Elections followed and Greece became fully dem- cent—two out of more than fifty graduates prior ocratic by 1975. American graduates returned to to 1983—and was far below the estimated number service and rose to the highest ranks in the Hel- of Argentine officers (20 percent) who took part in lenic armed forces. the so-called dirty war. The disgrace of the junta helped maintain civilian authority, but the threat of coups took Argentina longer to extinguish. One observer noted that In the wake of the Falklands/Malvinas War, “the overwhelming majority of both retired pro- the Argentine military underwent a profound and anti-junta officers interviewed” agreed that change that included massive demobilization, military intervention might have been necessary budgetary cuts, a volunteer force, and profes- if the external threat increased or if domestic sional military education similar to the U.S. politicians made “terrible mistakes,” which helps model. The armed forces had traditionally explain why coup attempts continued until the guarded the type of education officers received by mid-1980s.6 The attitudinal change for the Greek managing curricula and exposure to civil virtues. military finally came with the restructuring of its This level of control ensured domestic autonomy PME system. for the military, but it also contributed to the de- In 1983 a Socialist government began a re- bacle at the hands of the more advanced profes- form of the military academies. Admission was sional force. integrated with nationalized university exams, Realizing the need for professionalism, the and background investigations were discontin- military encouraged officers to attend university ued. Curricula were modeled on the U.S. profes- either at home or abroad. High-ranking officers sional military education system to inculcate were selected for programs in the United States at democratic values. As a result, attendance was a rate of about five per year beginning in 1988, more than doubled and changes in selection cri- and every Argentine officer had earned a college teria ensured that senior officers went to Ameri- degree of some kind by 1997. The American in- can schools. These developments combined to fluence became apparent in 1991 when Argentina guarantee that liberal education dominated the established a new command staff college that has academies and effectively altered the mindset of become one of the most renowned educational the officer corps. institutions in the country. The curriculum is explicitly based on the U.S. model, emphasizing re- Republic of China spect for and subordination to the constitution Before the revision of sedition laws on Tai- and the law. wan, the armed forces dominated a vital aspect of Professionalization has been guided by edu- civilian life. The military was responsible for con- cation. Argentina has experienced several major ducting trials of accused spies. The number of tri- shocks in response to financial crises in recent als and political prisoners, combined with author- years—upheavals that once would have led to itarian rule, suggested that the armed forces were coups and countercoups—but the military stayed agents of the ruling elite, but the conduct of the in the barracks. As the Army Chief of Staff, Gen- military courts pointed to something else. Al- eral Ricardo Brinzoni, stated: “The Argentine though government political trials were secret, military trials were open. Defense lawyers had time to prepare their cases and the transcripts of court proceedings were published. While those

122 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 Gibler and Ruby

half with the involvement of graduates, despite the strength of alliances, Cold War mindsets, and changes in wealth. The evidence of education as a stabilizing force is convincing. Prior to World War II, Ecole Superieure de Guerre in France offered an elite experience for officers from many nations. It graduated professional, better-educated students who tended to become Francophiles after their year-long course. Today, the U.S. professional military education system is the standard by which other countries educate officers. The United States has encouraged a greater number of officers from abroad to attend PME institutions as part of the global war on terrorism. The FY03 budget has projected a 27.5 percent growth in IMET funds over FY01 as well as a similar increase in the number of students. However, the traditional emphasis of professional military education institutions on democratic values should not be subsumed to the challenge of countering terrorism. JFQ

NOTES 1 George Monbiot, “Backyard Terrorism,” The Guardian (London), October 30, 2001. 2 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack S. Snyder, “Democ- ratization and the Danger of War,” International Security, vol. 20, no. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 5–38. 3 James T. Quinlivan, “Coup-Proofing: Its Practices and Consequences in the Middle East,” International Se-

AP/ Wide Photo (Alik World Keplicz) curity, vol. 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999), pp. 152–53. The Chairman with 4 John A. Cope, “International Military Education Polish army chief. and Training: An Assessment,” McNair Paper 44 (Wash- ington: National Defense University Press, October practices do not guarantee fair trials, they are not 1995), chapter 8. characteristic of kangaroo courts. 5 Jose C. D’Odorico, “Chief to Chief,” Armed Forces As one of the largest beneficiaries of profes- Journal International, vol. 138, no. 10 (May 2001), p. 62. sional military education with 331 graduates, Tai- 6 Neovi Karakatsanis, “Do Attitudes Matter? The Mil- wan was able to democratize without a coup. itary and Democratic Consolidation in Greece,” Armed These officers greatly influenced military courts Forces and Society, vol. 24, no. 2 (Winter 1997), pp. and have been called upon to redress corruption 289–313. in the armed forces. In 1985, a crime investiga- tion led investigators to believe that the ring included military officers, and several senior members of the Military Intelligence Bureau were arrested and tried for murder. Although none had attended U.S. institutions, graduates were placed in command positions during the ensuing reor- ganization of the intelligence hierarchy. They were tasked with cleaning up the bureau. The role that graduates have played within the armed forces, and the removal of the military from political competition, suggests that professional military education is working on Taiwan. The experiences of Argentina, Greece, and Tai- wan bear witness to the benefits of the U.S. professional military education system. In addition, research supports this finding across all nations: the likelihood of coup attempts drops by more than

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 123 OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN

General Creighton Williams Abrams, Jr. (1914–74) Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

VITA

orn in Springfield, Massachusetts; graduated from U.S. Military Academy (1936) and assigned to 1st Cavalry Division (1936–40); company commander, 1st Armored Division (1941–42); battalion commander, 37th Armored Regiment (1942–43); commanded 37th Tank Battalion and Combat Command B, 4th Armored Division (1943–45); served on Army General Staff and with war plans section, Army Ground Forces B(1945–46); director of tactics, Armored School (1946–48); attended U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (1948–49); commanded 63d Tank Battalion, 1st Infantry Division (1949–51); commanded 2d Armored Cavalry (1951–52); attended U.S. Army War College (1952–53); served successively as chief of staff for I, X, and IX Corps, U.S. Army Forces, Far East (1953–54); chief of staff, Armor Center (1954–56); deputy assistant chief of staff for Reserve components (1956–59); assistant division commander, 3d Armored Division (1959–60); deputy chief of staff for military operations, U.S. Army, Europe (1960); commanded 3d Armored Division (1960–62); assistant deputy chief of staff and director of operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (1962–63); assistant chief of staff for force development (1963); commanded V Corps (1963–64); acting Vice Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff of U.S. Army (1964–67); Deputy Commander and then Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (1967–72); Chief of Staff of U.S. Army (1972–74); died in Washington.

Abrams spent considerable time in Germany, where he developed his appreciation for classical music with which he relaxed after busy days. His clenched cigar (of good quality), determined scowl, and occasional outbursts of profane rage over some malfeasance gave the image of a tough, fighting tanker—which he liked to project. Beneath this surface, however, was a man highly sensitive to subtleties, particularly able to relate to and respect allies of different backgrounds, and always willing to take a secondary position...if it in some way could advance the cause his country was supporting. In short, he was more the Eisenhower than the MacArthur or the Patton.

—William Colby, Lost Victory (1989) U.S. Army Center of Military History Portrait by Herbert Elmer Abrams

124 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 THE JOINT WORLD

negation—and provides descriptors for Doctrine the escalating five Ds of negation: deception, disruption, denial, degrada- CONTROLLING THE tion, and destruction. HIGH GROUND The publication also offers a tuto- rial on how space can enhance joint Although Joint Pub 3-14, Joint Doc- force effectiveness by supporting intel- trine for Space Operations, became out- ligence, surveillance, and reconnais- dated only 52 days after its issuance sance and integrated tactical warning with the deactivation of U.S. Space and attack assessment such as missile Command and the assumption of defense and nuclear detonation detec- space responsibilities by U.S. Strategic tion, environmental monitoring, and Command in October 2002, it is a valu- the benefits of global positioning, able reference for military professionals including further information on these who seek to understand the impact of areas in appendices. space capabilities on joint warfare. In The last chapter provides a look at particular, the volume covers military space planning. Specifically, it describes space operations, organizations and the integration of space forces and missions, command and control of capabilities into deliberate planning, forces, and considerations for deliberate crisis action planning, and possible and crisis action planning. flexible deterrent options. The first chapter summarizes mili- capabilities and the principles of objec- Current plans to revise Joint Pub tary operations and three interrelated tive, offensive, mass, economy of 3-14 call for consolidating it with the ideas: that space is a significant force force, maneuver, unity of command, as yet unpublished Joint Pub 3-14.1 on multiplier, that the United States is security, surprise, and simplicity. The space control. This revision is slated to increasingly dependent on space capabili- volume presents a concise review of begin in April 2004 with an updated ties, and that this dependence results the four space mission areas: space version of Joint Pub 3-14 to be issued in a potential vulnerability. The next control, force enhancement, space sup- in April 2006. JFQ chapter looks at organization, mis- port, and force application. It articu- sions, duties, and responsibilities for lates space control missions—surveil- military space. In addition to the out- lance, protection, prevention, and of-date discussion of U.S. Space Com- mand, service competency has also changed and is not as clear cut as in the past. Components are listed in the current version of Forces for Unified Commands, but only an interim set is identified. Resolution of a more endur- Missing an issue? ing set of components is pending. The organizational description under the rubric of theater support remains largely correct and provides an indication of who’s who in space support. The discussion in chapter three of the command and control of space forces would almost be correct if the references to U.S. Space Command were credited to U.S. Strategic Com- mand. Unfortunately, that replace- ment would still not be completely accurate because the components that served the former command are not components of the latter. The strength of Joint Pub 3-14 is its discussion of both space and the Copies of back numbers of JFQ are available in limited principles of war and space mission quantities to members of the Armed Forces and public areas. Joint warfighters must under- institutions. Please send your request to the Editor at the stand the relationships between space address or FAX number listed on the masthead.

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 125 OFF THE SHELF

WAR AND THE Gettysburg, July 1863. HUMAN PSYCHE A Review Essay by IAN ROXBOROUGH

On Killing: the Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society By Dave Grossman Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. 366 pp. $14.95 [ISBN: 0–316–33011–6]

A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century by Ben Shephard Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. 487 pp. $27.95 [ISBN: 0–674–00592–9] Department (TimothyWar O’Sullivan)

An Intimate History of Killing: frightened, they stop thinking with their accepted scientific discipline. He details Face-to-Face Killing forebrains—which distinguishes them the divisions between soldiers and psy- in Twentieth-Century Warfare from animals—and start to rely on their chiatrists over treating mental disorders by Joanna Bourke midbrains. “They are literally scared out brought about by combat. New York: Basic Books, 1999. of their wits.” Using pop-up targets and The military was forced to deal with 509 pp. $30.00 [ISBN: 0–465–00737–6] other training devices, Western armies mental problems to stem the loss of conditioned soldiers to shoot reflexively. fighting men while civilian authorities By the Vietnam War, the percentage of were concerned with reducing the cost ar is a realm of exhaustion, hor- combat troops who fired their weapons of psychiatric disabilities, which indeed W ror, and at times madness. The had risen to 95 percent. In this way, using were immense. In the battle of the three books reviewed here attempt to modern psychology techniques, the Somme in 1916, as many of 40 percent come to grips with what might be called reluctance to kill had been reduced. of the casualties were caused by shell the psychic dimension of combat: why Reducing nonshooters has not shock. At the end of the war, 11,600 men kill and what happens to their taken the terror and stress from the bat- British servicemen were committed to minds in the process. tlefield. In American wars of the 20th cen- mental asylums. Some 40,000 Britons On Killing: The Psychological Cost tury, the chance of becoming a psychi- were receiving pensions for war-related of Learning to Kill in War and Society atric casualty was greater than being mental disorders as late as 1939. The begins with the well-established belief killed by enemy fire. The sustained United States spent almost a billion dol- that “man is not by nature a killer.” The tempo of military operations gives the lars on the psychiatric illness of veterans author, Dave Grossman, quotes the stressed soldier little respite. Grossman in the interwar years. The pressure to claim by S.L.A. Marshall that fewer than concludes that “our physical and logisti- understand madness in war and develop 20 percent of the soldiers who fought in cal capability to sustain combat has com- treatments was enormous. Both psychol- World War II shot at the enemy. Some pletely outstripped our psychological ogists and psychiatrists, with their mili- fired consistently, but others failed to capacity to endure it.” The result is that tary sponsors, gradually learnt more either aim their weapons or pull the trig- combat can literally cause madness in about the mind under the stress of bat- ger, demonstrating a human inhibition the ranks. “Fear, combined with exhaus- tle. Eventually, instead of evacuating against killing. tion, hate, horror, and the irreconcilable psychiatric cases to hospitals at home, These findings by Marshall, though task of balancing these with the need to methods of rapidly treating men and subject to dispute, were taken to heart. kill, eventually drives the soldier so deep returning them to the front evolved, Since the war, Western militaries have into a mire of guilt and horror that he though not without controversy and undertaken a training revolution consist- tips over the brink into that region that experimentation. This has been effec- ing largely of techniques to enable greater we call insanity.” tive. Today most soldiers are immedi- numbers of soldiers to fight more effec- Ben Shephard examines those who ately treated in the combat zone and tively. When people become angry or study and treat the mind in A War of sent back to fight after a few days rest. Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the But the increased ability to kill Twentieth Century. It is a history of the comes with the cost of increased post- diagnosis and care of the traumas associ- traumatic stress as combat veterans seek Ian Roxborough holds dual appointments ated with battle. The author recounts the in history and sociology at the State story of psychiatry as it became an University of New York at Stony Brook.

126 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 OFF THE SHELF to deal with guilt. Researchers still know America has traditionally regarded itself little about the long-term impact of GREAT POWER as standing apart from Europe, and real- killing and the reintegration of veterans ists (including George Kennan and Hans into society. Moreover, the study of psy- STRUGGLES Morgenthau) scorned idealism and utopi- chiatric casualties is bedeviled by inade- anism. Yet Mearsheimer regards the A Book Review by quate and contradictory statistics. Esti- Nation as an exemplar of offensive real- mates of the number of Vietnam veterans GEORGE C. HERRING ism. The United States has sought suffering from post-traumatic stress dis- regional hegemony since its was founded order range from half a million to three and is the only nation to achieve that The Tragedy of Great Power Politics times that number—or between 18 and elusive goal in modern times. Concerned 54 percent of those who served. by John J. Mearsheimer over Japan, Germany, and the Soviet New York: W.W. Norton and Company, An Intimate History of Killing: Face to Union as threats to the international 2001. Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare 576 pp. $27.95 order, America became an offshore bal- by Joanna Bourke tackles many of the [ISBN: 0–393–02025–8] ancer, intervening in conflicts in key same issues, but in a different spirit and strategic regions of the world. with a quite different approach. The Mearsheimer insists that the real author reacts to what she perceives as he events of 9/11 jolted Americans world remains a realist world. The inter- sanitizing and wants to “put killing back T out of the triumphalism, insularity, national system is anarchic, and power into military history,” stating that “the and complacency that marked the post- politics will continue to drive great pow- characteristic act of men at war is not Cold War era like nothing else. The ers. He predicts that new benign power dying, it is killing.” In this regard, Tragedy of Great Power Politics by John structures in Europe and Northeast Asia Bourke is at one with both Grossman Mearsheimer was written before those cannot be sustained, and the result may and Shephard. But although the latter attacks but claims that the hopes of the be unbalanced multipolarity. According authors regard the act of killing as trau- 1990s were illusory anyway. The author, to The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, the matic, Bourke argues that men get pleas- who teaches political science at the Uni- foremost threat is Beijing. If its economy ure from taking life in war. Drawing on versity of Chicago, rejects the idea that grows at the same rate as the last two a wealth of published sources to support the end of the Cold War and rise of dem- decades, China could exceed Japan and this contention, she believes that many ocratic capitalism led to the end of his- rival the United States. It has the poten- or most servicemen were “intoxicated tory, an era in which states would play a tial to become a regional hegemon and by ‘violence for its own sake’: fighting less critical role and conflict would disap- pose a greater threat than during the last was fun.” The personalization of the pear. An unabashed realist, he insists that century. The prescriptions that enemy enabled them to kill. “It vali- nations will continue to compete and Mearsheimer offers for the future are dated combatants as moral men.” great power conflict will be the norm. keeping U.S. troops in Europe and North- Bourke argues that soldiers make Mearsheimer depends on history to east Asia, and in particular responding to moral sense out of butchery through sto- buttress a theory of offensive realism. setbacks in the Chinese economy. Above ries, which place them at the center of Displaying a mastery of the historical lit- all, the Nation must not abandon the the narrative as willful, moral agents. To erature, he analyzes the patterns and realism that has served it so well over the do this, they must adopt a positive atti- records of great power conflict over the course of its history. tude toward killing. To overcome the last two centuries to explain the behavior Readers may find much to quarrel horror of war and retain a sense of them- of nations and their reasons for going to with here. By focusing on European great selves as moral beings, they come to war. He concludes that the international powers and the United States and Japan, glory in war. Eventually, soldiers derive system is basically anarchic and that Mearsheimer leaves out much of the pleasure from it. states thus seek wealth and power to gain world, including the regions of preemi- This assertion may not seem plausi- preeminence in their regions, the most nent concern at the moment. Indeed, a ble to many readers. Nor is the evidence certain way of advancing their security. work on great powers seems strangely that Bourke presents convincing. Regret- Other nations, faced with a regional out of place as those states seek to coop- tably, she is vague on the hypothesis she hegemon, will seek to balance that power erate in waging war against terrorism seeks to prove: is it that all men enjoy and encourage other nations to do so by across international boundaries. More- killing, that most men enjoy killing, or passing the buck or acquiescing. over, he plays down to the point of simply that some men enjoy killing? If War often results from the structure exclusion the role of personality, ideol- her point is that under certain circum- of the international system. It occurs ogy, and to some degree economics in stances some men derive pleasure from when power is dispersed among states in international conflict. Some will chal- killing, then she is right. (As Grossman unbalanced multipolarity. Conflict is lenge the simplistic claim that America reminds us, about 2 percent of the male least likely when bipolarity or a rough intervened in 1917 to uphold the Euro- population, when pushed or given a balance exists between two powers, as pean balance of power. And liberals who legitimate reason, will kill without characterized by the Cold War. dream of a better world will object to his remorse.) But if Bourke is claiming some- Even in the nuclear age, armies deep pessimism and predictions. thing more, her technique of rehearsing remain critical means of expansion and The Tragedy of Great Power Politics quotations from fictional and biographi- vital instruments of national power, sets out a provocative thesis which is cal accounts—without any attempt to an argument that naval and airpower underpinned by powerful arguments. determine whether they are representa- enthusiasts may well dispute. Moreover, Written in a clear, forceful style, devoid tive—is simply not compelling. JFQ of jargon and obscure language, it will be widely read and seriously debated. JFQ George C. Herring is professor of history at the University of Kentucky.

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 127 OFF THE SHELF

Combined Chiefs in THE CHIEFS AS Cairo, December 1943. POLICYMAKERS A Book Review by SAMUEL J. NEWLAND

Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II by Mark A. Stoler Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 379 pp. $37.50 [ISBN: 0–8078–2557–3]

he last decade has been a busy period T for military historians. Since the 50th anniversary of World War II, there have been myriad publications on different aspects of the conflict. Some are schol- arly works while others are memoirs by a dwindling generation of veterans. Within this new body of literature is an intriguing new book by Mark Stoler, Allies and U.S. Army Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II. A professor of history at the Uni- According to Stoler, this had been an greatest discord was with Moscow, versity of Vermont, the author offers an interest of the Armed Forces for a long which evolved from ally into adversary. excellent read for students of history and time. Once America entered the war, two Military planners increasingly worried national security affairs. The book is a additional factors favored increased mili- about Soviet intentions in 1944, yet significant analysis of the emergence of tary participation. First, as Secretary of they felt it necessary to maintain good America as a global power and the entry State, Cordell Hull maintained an artifi- relations since the Soviets were needed of the Armed Forces into the realm of cial distinction between military and first to help defeat Germany, then to aid policymaking. political affairs. Thus as the war pro- in the downfall of Japan. The thesis of Allies and Adversaries is gressed, the military had a primary role The Joint Chiefs concluded that that change in civil-military relations in policy development with diplomats in conflict with the Soviet Union was arose during World War II. Routine mili- the background. Hull, the author claims, inevitable. The role of the Red army in tary involvement in policy was minimal focused on postwar policy. Secondly, the occupation of Europe and the desire prior to that conflict. Other than a brief President Franklin Roosevelt relished of the President to include the Kremlin foray into world politics at the end of running his own foreign policy, which in the postwar equation promoted cor- World War I, the focus of the Armed also made the Department of State a sec- dial relations despite misgivings. Con- Forces before 1939 was on defense of the ondary player. cerns were validated when the Soviets homeland, overseas possessions, and the Roosevelt was instrumental to the violated the Yalta agreement almost Western hemisphere. During and imme- military entrance into the foreign policy before the ink was dry. diately after the war, however, the role of arena because of his reliance on the By the end of the conflict the mili- the military expanded dramatically. By Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although it had no tary was entrenched in foreign policy for- the time the National Security Act of statutory charter or mandated roles, mulation. This role starkly contrasted to 1947 was passed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Stoler notes the close relationship the pre-war years. The development of had entered the policymaking arena. between the President and these offi- the Joint Chiefs during the war and its As World War II progressed, it cers. This affiliation increased the influ- evolution into a politico-military entity became obvious that the conflict was ence of the Armed Forces on foreign is intriguing. Stoler helps explain how global. Projecting power incurred sub- policy. But the new power of the Joint this came to pass. This excellent book is stantial foreign policy implications. The Chiefs came at the expense of the Secre- highly recommended. JFQ scope of warfare involved the military in taries of War and the Navy, and particu- formulating international security policy. larly the Secretary of State. This was a difficult period in terms of policy, not only for the Axis but also the Allies. There was friction with Lieutenant Colonel Samuel J. Newland, Britain over various issues, including ARNG (Ret.), is professor of military Churchill’s fixation on Greece as the education at the U.S. Army War College. route to the European heartland. The

128 JFQ / Winter 2002–03 OFF THE SHELF

diplomatic support that facilitated its intelligence based on the identified threat. In SOLDIERS AS postwar recovery. turn, [the American] reporting method jus- American inflexibility drove occupa- tified concerns over Soviet intentions with a GOVERNORS tion policy, according to Carafano. U.S. tendency to reinforce existing preconceptions. forces were preoccupied with warfighting A Book Review by For the Army, peacetime was just another long after the last shot was fired and neg- battlefield. And the lines had been drawn. AUDREY KURTH CRONIN lected peacetime duties. They were con- The strength of this book is a careful cerned over disarming, demobilizing, and analysis of military policy toward Aus- countering upheaval—without evaluating Waltzing into the Cold War: The tria. There was a lack of national guid- the political situation, coordinating with Struggle for Occupied Austria ance, especially in the early days of occu- the Allies, and planning to address civil- pation, which was reflected on the by James Jay Carafano ian needs. “Lack of experience, inade- College Station, Texas: Texas A&M ground. Thus Carafano argues that policy quate skills in interagency operations, University Press, 2002. emanated from below rather than from 288 pp. $44.95 unimaginative doctrine, poor training, above. Indeed, he emphasizes the influ- [ISBN: 1–58544–213–5] and shallow professional education thor- ence of U.S. high commissioners, in par- oughly exacerbated...limitations in men ticular General Geoffrey Keyes, who had and equipment.” These problems unnec- virtually unlimited freedom of action hile overshadowed by the more essarily complicated a return to civilian because attention at home was directed Wfamiliar account of postwar Ger- government and may in the longer run toward Germany. Commissioners and many, the occupation of Austria is a fas- have delayed signing of the four-power their staffs wielded tremendous influ- cinating study in Cold War history, Austrian State Treaty in 1955. ence, transforming Austria into a front- replete with Allied friction, civil disorder, One unproductive habit of the line state. It must be noted, however, clandestine operations, bureaucratic Army was drawing black and white dis- that these observations may not be infighting, and political reversals. Of the tinctions between friends and enemies. entirely fair since they reflect a detailed works that have appeared on this subject Although declared the first victim of the study of the U.S. military, not the twists in the intervening decades, few have had Aunschluss in 1945, Austria had been and turns of Soviet policy. Final judg- the access to the historical records cited integral to the Nazi war machine. Occu- ment on the claim that the Army was an in Waltzing into the Cold War: The Struggle pation policy in the early postwar years important factor in militarizing the Cold for Occupied Austria. reflected this ambiguity. U.S. forces alien- War must await detailed examination of The author, James Jay Carafano, has ated Austrians with clumsy nonfrater- the other major players. taught military history at West Point and nization rules and unfair requisitioning Carafano is a good storyteller, mak- served as executive editor of Joint Force of housing from resistance members ing the characters and the events of post- Quarterly. His story of the U.S. military while Americans expected to be quar- war Austria as engrossing as a novel. It is role in Austria fills out an understanding tered and treated as liberators. Two years well worth picking up his book for its of what happened on the ground after later the military shifted to a different description of the Army at a critical point World War II. Particularly engaging is the view, influenced by the Soviet threat, in its history. Waltzing into the Cold War struggle of the Army to carry out an even as declassified intelligence reports is not limited to technical problems in occupation for which it was ill prepared. reflected no change in local events. With one quarter of Europe but treats larger This work is not only a contribution to the Soviet Union as the enemy, the themes: civil-military relations, occupa- the scholarship on postwar Austria and American military essentially recast every tion government, humanitarian relief, et the origins of the Cold War, but a case Austrian as a friend, naively ignoring al. There is much that resonates with study of post-conflict operations and signs of right-wing influence in the gen- recent operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, civil-military relations. darmerie, which Washington was secretly Afghanistan, and Iraq. But, as the author The central argument of the book is arming. Indeed, with respect to postwar observes, “The most powerful force of that American policy in Austria was dom- intelligence, Carafano pulls no punches: habit shaping the U.S. effort was a tradi- inated by security concerns—often at the United States Forces Austria did not provide tion of forgetting.” One can hope that expense of broader interests—which unbiased and critical analysis. Following the policymakers who read this book avoid reflected the strengths and weaknesses of rhythm of habits, the command generated perpetuating that tradition. JFQ a military woefully unprepared to win the peace. U.S. thinking was influenced by habits that were locked in a warfighting doctrine with little capacity to shift toward nuanced political concerns when hostilities ended. The militarized nature Online of policy led to mixed results: it compli- JFQ cated and prolonged the occupation but also gave added importance to a state in Copies of back numbers of JFQ are which America had historically held little available in limited quantities to interest, ensuring the economic and members of the Armed Forces and public institutions. Please send your request to the Editor at the address Audrey Kurth Cronin is the author of Great or FAX number listed on the masthead. Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria, 1945–1955.

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 129 U.S. Air Force (Efrain Gonzalez)

U.S. Navy (David C. Mercil) U.S. Marine Corps what they’ve said in JFQ ...

it is hard to think of a nonmilitary role without precedent for such roles are as American as apple pie —Samuel P. Huntington

the mission and the Rwandans fell victim to inflated expectations that the United Nations could not fulfill —R.A. Dallaire and B. Poulin

Roosevelt knew that generals could make disastrous military mistakes, not merely political ones —Eliot A. Cohen

evolutionary innovation depends on organizational focus over time rather than guidance by one individual —Williamson Murray

to achieve more efficient use of defense resources, Congress looked to the Chairman —James R. Locher III

advanced courses on proliferation and counterproliferation reach only a small fraction of students —Robert G. Joseph

military power can sometimes be brought to bear when it is applied without first defeating defending enemy forces —Carl H. Builder

the system of systems is intelligible and applicable to an enemy through its component parts —James Stavridis

lack of detailed intelligence on Grenadian defenses compelled planners to opt for a sudden attack with overwhelming force —Ronald H. Cole TENTH130 JFQ / Winter 2002– 03ANNIVERSARY YEAR 55th Signal Company (Cory Montgomery)

1st Combat Camera Squadron (Jim Varhegyi) 786th Communications Squadron (Edward D Holzapfel)

the higher careerists rise, the more they see their role as protectors of service traditions, doctrine, and loyalties —William A. Owens

to tackle the fog and friction of war is not akin to exploring unknown terrain —Colin S. Gray

despite the recognition that graduated pressure was fatally flawed, the Joint Chiefs were unable to articulate their objections or alternatives —H.R. McMaster

interdependent maneuver calls for a fully joint approach, generating synergy between fire and movement —Antulio J. Echevarria II

with micronavigation components, many dumb munitions could be transformed into PGM-like weapons —Shannon L. Callahan

history suggests that the denial of military experience increases the long-term suffering inherent in combat —Barry R. McCaffrey

if there ever was a function worthy of civilianization and privatization, civil affairs is it —Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

gradualism may be here to stay if U.S. leaders opt to fight more wars for amorphous interests with a disparate set of allies —Benjamin S. Lambeth

an active, sustained partnership between the public and private sectors will be essential in the case of bio-defense —Michèle A. Flournoy . . . a reprise in the next issue TENTH ANNIVERSARYWinter 2002YEAR–03 / JFQ 131