THE WARSAW PACT and the BALKANS the WARSAW PACT and the BALKANS Moscow's Southern Flank

THE WARSAW PACT AND THE BALKANS THE WARSAW PACT AND THE BALKANS Moscow's Southern Flank

Edited by Jonathan Eyal Soviet and East European Fellow RUSI

Palgrave Macmillan ISBN 978-1-349-09943-6 ISBN 978-1-349-09941-2 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-09941-2

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1989

First published in the United States of America in 1989

ISBN 978-0-312-03151-0

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Warsaw Pact and the Balkans: Moscow's southern flank / edited by Jonathan Eyal. p. cm. Includes index. Contents: Introduction-The evolution of the Hungarian People's Army / Ivan Volgyes and Zoltim Barany-Romania: between appearances and realities / Jonathan Eyal-Bulgaria: between loyalty and nationalism / Stephen Ashley-Yugoslavia: a question mark for NATO and the Warsaw Pact / Ivo Paparela-Albanian security policies: concepts, meaning, and realisation / Klaus Lange. ISBN 978-0-312-03151-0 I. Balkan Peninsula-Defenses. 2. Warsaw Treaty Organization• -Armed Forces. I. Eyal, Jonathan, 1955- UA646.8.W366 1989 355'.0330496-dc 19 89-30604 CIP Contents

List of Maps VI List of Figures Vll List of Tables viii Acknowledgements IX Notes on the Contributors x Glossary XI Foreword xiii

INTRODUCTION

2 HUNGARY \3 The Evolution of the Hungarian People's Army Ivan Volgyes and Zoltim Barany

3 ROMANIA 67 Between Appearances and Realities Jonathan Eyal

4 BULGARIA 109 Between Loyalty and Nationalism Stephen Ashley

5 YUGOSLAVIA 154 A Question Mark for NATO and the Warsaw Pact Ivo Paparela

6 ALBANIA 209 Albanian Security Policies: Concepts, Meaning and Realisation Klaus Lange

Notes 220 Index 242

v List of Maps

1.1 The Balkans

3.1 Romania's population density 86

3.2 Romania's dual-track railways 89

4.1 Bulgaria 110

4.2 South-Eastern Bulgaria 135

5.1 Yugoslavia 155

vi List of Figures

2.1 Professional and conscripted soldiers in the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact, 1986 14

2.2 Participation of NSWP forces in joint Warsaw Pact exercises, 1961-82 57

3.1 Conscripts as a percentage of total forces per service branch in Romania 103

5.1 Elements of the defence and self-protection system 164

vii List of Tables

2.1 Professional and conscripted soldiers in the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact, 1986 14

2.2 Hours per year devoted to ideological military teaching 28

2.3 Military differences between the southern and northern tiers 45

2.4 Participation in joint exercises of the Warsaw Pact, 1961-82 58

3.1 Romania's live births 92

3.2 Romania's population growth 93

4.1 Data on manpower levels 128

4.2 Holdings of fighter aircraft 129

4.3 Holdings of tanks 130

viii Acknowledgements

This work is the outcome of long deliberations and research under• taken at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies in the area of Balkan security. My first expression of gratitude should be to the Director of the Institute, Group Captain David Bolton, who encouraged and supported this project from its inception. Thanks are also due to the Esmee Fairbairn Charitable Trust for providing financial assistance which was essential in the completion of research. Many experts provided valuable comments on the Balkan political and security scene. I would like to mention in particular the support of Dr Michael Shafir, Mrs Anneli Ute Gabanyi and Vladimir Socor in Germany, Christian Mititelu, David Mowbray, Dr Christopher Coker, Air Commodore E. S. Williams and Sebastian Payne in England, and David Lashmet in the United States. Finally, a special word of gratitude to Deborah Fisher, Helen Macdonald and John Montgomery of the RUSI for their painstaking attention to the style and format of this book.

London JONATHAN Ey AL

lX Notes on the Contributors

Stephen Ashley is Senior Analyst for Bulgaria at Radio Free Europe in Munich. He graduated in Modern History from St Catherine's College, Oxford. Between 1980 and 1982 he studied as an exchange scholar at the Klimet Ohridski University, Sofia, and in 1984 obtained a DPhil at Oxford with a thesis on 'Bulgarian Nationalism (1830-1876),.

Zoltan Barany is Graduate Research Assistant to Professor Volyges at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. He is the author of six articles on East European Affairs, specialising in military studies.

Jonathan Eyal heads the Soviet and East European Study Programme at the RUSI. He is a native of Romania, and was educated in England. After studying politics and international law, he completed a doctorate in Romania's ethnic relations in Oxford. He is the author of numerous articles on the Balkans' security problems.

Dr Klaus Lange is currently Lecturer in German and East European Ideology and Politics at the Hanns-Seidel Foundation in Munich.

Ivo Paparela is a Lecturer in Politics and Economics at the Universities of Paris and Nice. He was born in Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia. He obtained his PhD in Economics and a Master of Law and Business Administra• tion from the University of Paris, and is the author of many articles on Yugoslav and Balkan defence.

Ivan Volgyes is Professor of Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and the author or editor of 25 volumes and scores of articles on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

x Glossary

ACP Albanian Communist Party ALP Albanian Labour Party AVH AlIamvedelm Hatosag (State Security Police) BCP Bulgarian Communist Party BPA Bulgarian People's Army C 3 1 Command, Control and Communications System CC Central Committee CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation with the USSR COMINFORM Communist Information Bureau, 1947 CP Communist Party CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union D&P Defence and Self-Protection System FF Fatherland Front GF Ground Forces GOC Balkan Turks' Culture and Solidarity organisation GRU Soviet General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (Glarnoye Razveolyvatel'noye Upravleniye) HPA Hungarian People's Army HSWP Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party KISZ Communist Youth League KKE Greek Communist Party KNOJ Corps of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia MBFR Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions MPA Main Political Administration MPDA Main Political Directorate of the Anny MZ Mjesne Zajednice (Administration Sectors) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NOD New Defence Doctrine NDL National Defence Law NFZ Nuclear and Chemical Arms Free Zone NSWP Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact NWFZ Nuclear Weapon Free Zone OZN-a Organisacija Zastote Naroda (Organisation for the Protection of the People) PASOK Socialist Party of Greece PF Political FocsoportJonoskeg PPK Anti-Fifth Column PRB People's Republic of Bulgaria PVO-Strany Soviet Air Defence of the Homeland ROIAS Reconnaissance, Observation, Infonnation and Alert Service SAM Surface to Air Missile

Xl Xli Glossary

SOB Secret Police (Yugoslavia); after 1966 known as the SOS in Croat SGSF Southern Group of Soviet Forces TO Territorial Defence TST Temporarily Seized Territory TVD Theatre of Military Operations (Teatr Voyennyk Destriy) UDB-a Uprava Drazavne Bezbednosti (Administration of the State Security) YPA Yugoslav People's Anny ZINVOJ Community for the Production of Anns WTO Warsaw Treaty Organisation Foreword

A study such as this involves unavoidable delays and cannot include last-minute developments. The political events in south-eastern Eur• ope in late 1988 have certainly been momentous and, in many instances, only serve to reinforce the fundamental conclusions of the contributors to this book. The region is beset by a series of interlock• ing problems whose solution appears as far from sight as ever. The first and paramount concern is the reaffirmation of nationalist ideals and conflicts in the Balkans.· The second problem concerns the economic decline of south-eastern Europe and the third important issue relates to the future role of military blocs in the region and the possible future function of the Superpowers. Since the Second World War, the wishes of the nations in south• eastern Europe have been ignored. All local regimes have been engaged in some measure of legitimation and in most cases this has involved the most abundant and instantly recognisable commodity in the region: nationalism. President Ceau~escu's chauvinist campaigns were merely the most blatant example of a tactic which was applied to varying degrees elsewhere. From the repatriation of the Holy Crown of Hungary, to the lavish celebrations of Bulgaria's glorious past, from the precarious isolation of Albania and through Tito's attempt to forge a 'Yugoslav' identity, the message was essentially similar. Appeals to nationalism in a region which passionately debates its past history and among nations which traditionally disputed their fron• tiers were bound to be destabilising, both internally and externally. Little has changed in this respect and, as the contributors to this book make clear, territorial and ethnic disputes are the hallmark of south• eastern Europe. However, in 1988 it was the destructive potential of nationalism within each state which came to the fore. The dispute between Hungary and Romania over the fate of the Magyar ethnic minority in Transylvania is a perfect example of this case. Despite the undoubted revulsion against Ceau~escu's internal policy, Janos Kadar, Hungary's ruler until 1988, relied on quiet diplomacy and informal contacts. The agreement between Romania and Hungary reached in 1977 was touted in Budapest as the best framework for solving the dispute between the two states. As the years went by and Ceau~escu's dictatorship showed no signs of slackening, no Hungar• ian government was able to withstand the tide of public revulsion on .

xiii XIV Foreword

this subject. As protest movements intensified, relations between these two nominal allies declined and are currently at their lowest ebb since 1945. Kadar's government may have organised celebrations commem• orating St Stephen's anniversary on the Hungarian throne but its inability to protect the fate of Magyar minorities outside the nation's frontiers (and there are few European nations as scattered as the Hungarians) contributed in no small way to the tide of opinion which resulted in Kadar's removal from power. A different phenomenon took place in Romania. Like all currencies circulating in great quantities, Ceau~escu discovered that his overworked nationalist campaigns are bringing ever-diminished returns; their brief popular• ity is certainly a thing of the past. Romania is today the most oppressive state in Eastern Europe and probably the poorest as well. The Romanian dictator refuses to contemplate any change of policy; on the contrary, as the winds of change blew from Moscow and Romania's importance as a thorn in the Kremlin's flesh waned, Bucharest retreated into a hermit-like existence. The country's re• lations with all its neighbours may be classified as tense or strained. Bulgaria has also briefly toyed with nationalism in the 1980s and, as illustrated in this book, more than many previous commentators cared to admit. The conventional wisdom that Bulgaria remained Moscow's most pliant East European ally was further questioned by Todor Zhivkov's reactions to the reforms instituted in the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev. True, similar reforms were applied in Bulgaria, but they were confined more to the pages of the official law gazette than reality. The reorganisation of ministries and regional districts as well as administration were confused, contradictory and in many cases never went further than declarations of intent. For good measure, Zhivkov continues to talk about reforms; in practice, he has eliminated from the party his most obvious reformist challengers and clearly intends to continue as before. Just as Romania retreated into the fortress erected by Ceau~escu's dictatorship, so Albania made its first tentative steps into the Euro• pean arena. Dropping its previous demands, it has re-established diplomatic and trade relations with West Germany and has attempted to increase its contacts with Greece. Both Superpowers are still branded as 'hegemonistic' and, therefore as far as Tirana is concerned are still beyond the pale. Nevertheless, Albania's small opening to the West may herald a more significant shift in the future. Yet, potentially the most obvious critical event in the last few months has been the spectacular deterioration of Yugoslavia. As Ivo Paparela illustrates in Foreword xv this book, the role of the Serbian nation in the nominally federal Yugoslav state has always been a matter of dispute. The armed forces and security services, the backbone of the regime in general, were always provided by the Serbian nation. Nevertheless, lip-service was still paid to the notion of a federation, to the idea of the equality of nations under one state. This illusion was dispelled in 1988. Serbia's open bid to dominate the entire federation is very similar to the efforts of that nation before 1966, which are fully documented in this book. However, while Tito was able to impose his views, which included some accommodation with his country's other nationalities and ultimately the adoption of a few genuine federal concepts in the 1974 constitution, no person of Tito's stature could be found after his death. Without exception, the economies of the region are in trouble. Hungary is openly contemplating unemployment, Yugoslavia is in the grips of an inflation rate which has reached 250 per cent and Romania's industrial projects may be consigned to a museum. A more heady mixture of economic and social decay, superimposed on long• standing nationalist passions, can hardly be found in Europe and that much is understood in both East and West, though there is little agreement about what needs to be done. The Soviet Union has not succeeded either in solving the region's ethnic disputes or creating a measure of stability in the Balkans. Indeed, the monolithic imposition of Stalinist methods of government after 1945 only compounded the difficulties by removing the few channels of dissent still available to the people of the Balkans. Tito created a federation in name; in practice, it was a one-party state which paid little attention to the will of the governed. As controls slackened, the party broke down along ethnic and republican lines; it maintained control from above without obtaining support from below. When Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian leader, sought to strengthen his bid for power, the only method by which this could be achieved was through Serbian nationalism and chauvinism. The dangers which these methods pose for the entire Yugoslav state can hardly be overstated. In Romania Ceau~escu has also gone down this path, only to discover in the last year, as workers' troubles multiplied, that his citizens cannot obtain food out of patriotic songs and nationalist jamborees. To be sure, Moscow still has many options. During Gorbachev's visit to Belgrade in 1988, a close Soviet interest in the Serbian leadership (as opposed to the federal, Yugoslav, one) could be discerned. Yet, if the Kremlin is looking for new allies in the XVI Foreword

region, it would find that none of the choices are easy. Supporting Hungary in order to corner Romania was the tactic used by Brezhnev. It destabilised the Hungarian regime just as much as alarming Romania. Supporting Serbia would entail some hard choices vis-iI-vis Bulgaria and the Macedonian problem. The West supported Tito's Yugoslavia in the late 1940s and early 1950s precisely because it perceived the region entirely within the framework of the conflict. The Soviet Union maintained its rule in the region for similar reasons. Balkan states have shown, yet again, that their own particular prob• lems simply refuse to go away. While the region remains a pawn between two military alliances and rival ideologies, Balkan issues have their own dynamics and some of them simply defy any clear, coherent or speedy solution.

JONATHAN EYAL