TRANSFERRING AMERICAN MILITARY VALUES TO William Bache*

The President of the United States expressed his desire to build a democratic Iraq that could serve as an example to the rest of the Arab and Islamic nations. The American military was the instrument chosen to build an Iraqi security structure that could fight terrorism and still promote ethical leaders and democratic values. However, efforts to transfer American military values to Iraq have been a failure. The leaders of the Iraqi Joint Security Forces have politely listened to what the Americans have determined is best for them and then have gone back to doing what they feel is best for them— namely situational leadership, corruption, and human rights violations.

INTRODUCTION an Iraqi military committed to defeating terrorism that respects human rights and the There never was an Iraqi army, let alone an rule of law. They championed a diverse Iraqi Iraqi nation state, until British efforts after military led by civilian and military leaders of World War I. The purpose of this paper is to character and integrity. They also wanted a look at American efforts to recreate an Iraqi military that rejected political, sectarian, and army using American military values—values self-serving influences. This paper will look at supportive of democracy and human rights—in the success and future of the American the post-Saddam era. America has made a experience in Iraq. The Bush Administration multibillion dollar1effort to create what chose the military option over all other options President George W. Bush called a ―free Iraq at to transfer American values to a conquered the heart of the Middle East… a watershed Iraq. Therefore, it is important to investigate event in the global democratic and assess the successes and failures of the revolution.‖2American leaders said they wanted Operation Iraqi Freedom project. unethical orders. The army was under- LEADERSHIP AND VALUES IN THE resourced, as Saddam gave preferential OLD IRAQI MILITARY treatment to his more politically reliable Republican Guards and Special Republican Prior to the 2003 invasion, the purpose of Guards. His loyal Sunni officers did know how the Iraqi security services under all to tactically employ the units and weapons of governments was to ensure the survival of the what had been the fourth largest military force Sunni-dominated national government located in the world. Force quality was an issue since in Baghdad. Under Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi ―the uprisings following the Gulf War triggered Army and security services maintained internal a continuing series of purges in the Iraqi security, repressed revolts by the Kurds and military that lasted until Saddam‘s fall, while a Shi‘a, attacked Iran in 1980, invaded Kuwait in vast number of promotions inflated the ranks of 1990, and fought the Anglo-American senior officers and filled slots with loyalists and invasions of 1991 and 2003. incompetents.‖4 After the 1991 war, the Iraqi Army was The culture of the army itself was a key capable of terrorizing and intimidating problem. Assertive mid-level officers were civilians,3but it could not do much more. It was considered a threat by their superiors, and a defeated, totally corrupted force that had various secret police forces ―minded‖ the learned not to take initiative and not to question officer corps for loyalty. No Iraqi officer could

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) 54 Transferring American Military Values to Iraq afford to be a leader in a system in which the Secretary Donald Rumsfeld appointed a supreme leader, Saddam Hussein, perceived retired ambassador, Paul Bremer, as the ruling persons with leadership abilities as potential proconsul of the occupation government, threats to regime survival.5There were no known as the Coalition Provisional Authority quality standards, no ways to measure (CPA). Bremer arrived in Baghdad on May 12, competency. Graduation from service schools 2003, and within his first week in Iraq, a could be bought in a system where nepotism country he had never visited nor whose and favoritism were rampant.6One could be language could he speak,8he issued his famous qualified on paper, but the paper was not ―de-Ba‘thification order.‖ 9The results were the indicative of actual performance or capability. dismissal of all government administrators who Junior officers were also conditioned not to were members of the Ba‘th Party and had show initiative. They did not anticipate what served in the top four levels of Iraq‘s needed to be done. They did not use their non- government. To receive a top-level commissioned officers (NCOs) to support them administration position during the Saddam era, in organizing and preparing the enlisted a person normally had to be a member of the soldiers for dangerous military duties. Junior Ba‘th Party. All the dismissed government officers ended up doing what would be administrators were laid off without any considered NCO work in Western armies. The severance pay or pensions. Many were the very NCOs were not trained, not educated, and not people who had the skills and knowledge to key partners of their officers. Many were administer and operate all the ministries of the illiterate. The training of the Shi‘a and Kurdish Iraqi government, especially the security conscripts was restricted to teaching low-level services. The government and government- skills, while Sunni soldiers learned the high- owned industries were the principal employers level command and staff skills necessary to in Iraq. Revenue from domestic Iraqi oil administer one of the largest armies in the production provided 95 percent of the budget world. In the 2003 war, various Iraqi forces for the Iraqi government. With most of the resisted the Anglo-American invaders for 30 to government ministries, universities, hospitals, 40 days, but the Iraqi military did not formally utilities, and industries destroyed in a surrender to the American-led Coalition forces. multibillion dollar looting spree and with the Saddam‘s Army and Republican Guard troops government administrators dismissed from just melted away while their paramilitary duty, the economy collapsed and has never counterparts continued to resist the Coalition recovered. forces. One week later, on May 23, 2003, Ambassador Bremer ordered the disbandment DISBANDING THE IRAQI MILITARY of all Iraqi military and security services.10Arbitrary dismissal rather than After the occupation of Baghdad by rehabilitation and utilization of former American troops in April 2003, the Americans government officials and security forces left the allowed widespread looting in Baghdad and Coalition military forces without indigenous elsewhere to occur. The U. S. commanders Iraqi security forces to enforce law and order in failed to declare martial law and put a stop to Iraq during the chaos, anarchy, and criminal the chaos and disorder. The military claimed violence that followed the fall of the Saddam they did not have enough troops, and U.S. regime. The dismissed soldiers and police Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld could have been recalled to active service not explained that ―Freedom‘s untidy…. Free only to maintain law and order, but to help people are free to make mistakes and commit economic recovery by performing manpower- crimes and do bad things.‖7The Coalition had intensive public work programs.11Under no real plans on what to do with Iraq after the Ambassador Bremer, the occupation Saddam regime fell. government had no coherent plan for the demobilization, disarmament,12and

55 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) William Bache reintegration (DDR) into society of 720,000 Many Shi‘a also did not welcome the unemployed soldiers and police13whose Americans and British as liberators, but principal skill set was in conducting organized considered them as occupiers, perhaps due to violence.14All serious international post- mistrust generated from the betrayal of the conflict reconstruction and stabilization efforts 1991 rebellion against Saddam by the U.S. include DDR as a critical and early part of their government.18 reconciliation and peace-building efforts.15The Within a relatively short period of time after security of Saddam‘s storage sites for arms, the invasion, the anti-Coalition resistance ammunition, explosives, and other military movement emerged and attacked major hardware used for combat was not to be a top political targets to isolate Coalition and Iraqi priority for the Coalition occupation of allies from both the Iraqi people and the Iraq.16[16] Those unsecured ammunition and assistance and support of the international high-explosive sites were soon looted and community. The compounds of the Jordanian served as sources of supply for the Sunni embassy, the United Nations, and the resistance movement and Shi‘a militias.17 International Committee of the Red Cross were The police, like the military and the various attacked with devastating vehicle secret police forces of the Saddam regime, had bombs.19Attacks on Coalition troops continued been instruments of repression rather than to increase, demonstrating that it would take instruments of public safety, rule of law, and more than police forces to suppress terrorist justice in Iraq. They also melted away after the attacks by the resistance. attacks Coalition invasion, leaving anarchy in the grew for a year, but Secretary Rumsfeld and the streets of Iraq, since the American-led occupation government refused to admit that Coalition had insufficient troops and was the resistance consisted of anything other than unwilling to enforce law and order. The CPA‘s Ba‘thist ―bitter enders,‖ al-Qa‘ida terrorists, initial security plan was to reactivate security and foreign fighters. Without indigenous Iraqis forces for local policing, border security, and to help police their own country, the unfamiliar infrastructure security. A national army for Iraq Coalition forces were blind and failed to was not in their game plan. The mission of the provide internal security for Iraq. Their lack of new Iraqi security forces was restricted to cultural intelligence led to gross and abusive internal security—to protect the American- mistakes in counterinsurgency operations that established government (consisting of the alienated Iraqis20and played into the hands of formerly repressed Shi‘a and Kurdish political the insurgents.21The CPA spent billions of groups) from threats emerging from the dollars from seized Iraqi government accounts alienated Iraqi Sunni community. The United located at the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank and States of America vowed to protect post- from banks in Iraq; these seized monies were Saddam Iraq from any external threats, just as used to try to jumpstart the economy, without the British did when they created the first Iraqi obvious results. Millions, maybe billions, of Army in the 1920s. The dismissal of former dollars disappeared into the corrupt world of Ba‘thists and the failure of the Coalition to well-connected U.S. contractors and Iraqi secure the explosives storage sites coupled politicians appointed by the occupiers.22By with the failure to use the existing soldiers of 2006, the corruption in Iraq was so bad that the defeated Iraqi security forces immediately Transparency International rated Iraq as one of in order to maintain law and order directly the most corrupt countries in the facilitated the emergence of a significant world.23Corruption in the Iraqi military and Sunni-based insurgency in Iraq. Saddam‘s police would continually drag down the paramilitary units— soldiers from disbanded effectiveness and efficiency of the Iraqi security forces, Sunni Iraqi nationalists, and security forces.24 jihadist terrorists—eventually morphed into a major anti-American, and later anti-Iraqi government, national resistance movement.

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) 56 Transferring American Military Values to Iraq

CREATING THE NEW IRAQI ARMY recruits through their basic and specialty training. They also conducted officer training One year and three months after the 2003 and NCO development courses at various invasion, the Americans created a new regional military training centers and service Coalition command, the Multinational Security schools. Once the new recruits graduated from Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), to build training, they were assigned to existing or the ―New Iraqi Army.‖ The MNSTC-I newly created Iraqi units. Those units were headquarters were located at Camp Phoenix assigned a Coalition counterpart unit that inside the Baghdad International (Green) Zone. continued their collective training and provided It was to serve as the senior joint and combined logistical support and operational mentorship command for activating, training, equipping, until the Iraqi units were rated fully combat- and advising Iraqi military and police forces. capable and could be transferred to the Major David Petraeus, who had operational control of the Iraqi Ministry of completed a successful tour as commander of Defense (MOD). MNSTC-I also coordinated the 101st Airborne Division in northern Iraq, Coalition efforts to train and equip the non- was promoted to lieutenant general and military Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) consisting selected to command the advisory and training of the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police, effort. His mission was to rebuild the Iraqi the Facility Protection Service, and the Border Army from scratch since all their facilities and Security units as part of the transition of equipment had either been looted or destroyed security responsibilities to the Iraqi Ministry of during or after the 2003 invasion.25 Interior (MOI). The New Iraqi Army discontinued the tradition of giving Sunnis preferential treatment THE U. S. ARMY RESERVE’S TRAINING in officer selection and assignment. The Shi‘a OF THE IRAQI ARMY majority and the Kurdish minority—who had never been given the opportunity to develop the Since U. S. Army Special Forces, administrative and military skills necessary to considered the best trainers for foreign forces, organize and lead the military, security were not available to train the New Iraqi services, and government bureaucracy Army,26other training options had to be effectively during the Saddam era—were now explored.27The U.S. Regular Army did not nominally in charge of the interim government want to strip out their trainers from the Army and the military. Some senior Sunni officers Training Centers in America to send to Iraq. were certified as ―clean‖ and brought back into All active duty divisions were either in Iraq or the New Iraqi Army in 2004. The ―de- were preparing to go back and were thus not Ba‘thification‖ process continued to severely available to take over the Iraqi training base restrict which former Sunni officers could be mission.28The active Army and Marine Corps recalled to active duty to help reconstitute the have been historically reluctant to assign their New Iraqi Army. The majority of new officer best officers and NCOs to serve as advisors or cadets were either Shi‘a or Kurd. The key trainers for foreign forces.29Advisory concept for defeating the insurgency has been assignments to foreign armies are not to organize and build a new Iraqi army so it considered favorable for the career could take over the combat role of American advancement of American officers.30Therefore, units in fighting Iraqi insurgents. As sufficient the mobilization and deployment of U. S. Army Iraqi forces were trained, organized, equipped, Reserve (USAR) Training Divisions to Iraq and determined ―capable‖ of managing the was considered the best available option for counterinsurgency and counterterrorist providing American trainers. The Training campaign in Iraq, the Coalition forces would Divisions were designed to provide a surge progressively withdraw from Iraq. capability to conduct initial entry and advanced Working with their Iraqi military skills training for new American soldiers in the counterparts, MNSTC-I trainers took new event of partial mobilization. Elements of

57 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) William Bache various Army Reserve Training Divisions were READINESS OF THE NEW IRAQI rotated into Iraq on a 12-month tour of duty OFFICERS starting in 2004 and became a major manpower for the MNSTC-I training and advisory The performance of the Iraqi Joint Forces structure.31 (IJF) was disappointing in 2004-2005. Some of the battalion level units mutinied and refused to THE ROLE OF THE NATO TRAINING deploy to conflict areas or to fight.35If they MISSION IN IRAQ were going to assume greater combat responsibility from the largely American Although several of the European NATO Coalition forces, they would have to do better. allies of the United States and the United MNSTC-I conducted a survey of Iraqi military Kingdom refused to support the 2003 invasion leaders from the Ministry of Defense and the of Iraq, many of those same nations later IJF General Staff down to battalion level to became concerned about regional instability identify their own perception of their leadership resulting from the insurgency and the possible performance and acceptance of American- collapse of the new Iraqi government. They defined professional military ethics. A similar thus responded favorably to requests for NATO parallel survey was completed by their help in Iraq. The political leadership of the Coalition advisors. The surveys indicated a democratic NATO nations approved the great variance between what the Iraqis thought training of Iraqi officers inside and outside of of their own leadership performance and ethical Iraq on June 24, 2004, at the Istanbul Summit. behavior as compared to the parallel A NATO Training Mission—Iraq (NTM-I)— assessment survey completed by their Coalition was established in December 2004 to advisory counterparts. The MNSTC-I advisory coordinate training in Iraq. The commander of community recognized that the Coalition had MNSTC-I wore two hats since he also was the trained and built a large Iraqi Security Forces, NTM-I commander. The principle thrust of but not the quality force needed to defeat the NATO effort was to provide professional Sunni insurgency. Something would have to be military education and training for senior and done to improve the professionalism of the mid-level Iraqi officers and junior officer Iraqi forces.36Part of the problem was that the commissioning courses.32To support that American trainers and mentors tended to treat mission, NTM-I rebuilt the physical and their Iraqi trainees with disrespect and academic components of the Iraqi Joint Staff contempt. Personal dignity, honor, and respect College, located at the al-Rustamiyya base in are very important values to Iraqis. To be the southeastern section of metropolitan treated with disrespect or dishonor may require Baghdad. This effort was led by an Italian revenge or, at the very least, result in a subtle brigadier general with a mostly Italian staff, subversion of American-directed efforts by and it utilized instructional materials from the their Iraqi counterparts.37While MNSTC-I was Rome-based NATO Defense College.33Another able to increase significantly the production of Coalition (mostly British) effort, the trained soldiers to man the New Iraqi Army in mentorship of the Iraqi Military Academy at al- 2004-2006, it could not solve problems Rustamiyya (I-MAR) where new officer cadets associated with corruption by Iraqi military are trained, was transferred to NTM-I leaders. Starting at the Baghdad Ministry of sponsorship in 2006.34Saddam Hussein failed Defense and descending to the lower levels of the qualification exam for I-MAR when he was command, billions of dollars in U.S. military a young man and starved the Academy for assistance were wasted or siphoned off in resources when he was dictator. corrupt scams by Iraqi government officials.38

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) 58 Transferring American Military Values to Iraq

THE U.S. INSTITUTION FOR The mentorship responsibility for the Center LEADERSHIP & ETHICS was scheduled to be handed over to NATO in 2007 as part of the plan to transfer most The MNSTC-I leadership responded to the programs dealing with higher-level education dismal results of the survey with the goal of to NTM-I. Whether the Iraqis will actively ―build[ing] a formal institution focus on participate in the Center and use their own doctrinal development and education and funds to continue the Center‘s operation in training to professionalize the IJF in specific 2008 and beyond remains unknown. MNSTC-I areas of ethics and leadership.‖ 39The purpose will probably not continue to fund the Center in of the institution was to inform and influence fiscal year 2008. key leaders, the military, the public, and other When the Center was established the Iraqi ethics compliance organizations that the military did not have a functioning staff agency leadership of the Iraqi military was serious responsible for defining Iraqi military doctrine. about ensuring that their Joint Forces were Doctrine consists of fundamental principles by guided by professional and ethical leaders. It which the military forces or elements guide was assumed that serious cultural change in the their actions. It is authoritative but requires Iraqi military could take at least two judgment in application.42Therefore, without generations.40The institution was named the an accepted doctrine for military leadership and Iraqi Center for Professional Military Values, professional military ethics, the Center did not Principles, and Leadership (CMVPL) and was have a way it could help propagate the concepts located at al-Rustamiyya Base near the Joint into the Iraqi military education and training Staff College (JSC) and the Iraqi Military system. Thus the ―2004 U.S. Officership Concept Paper,‖ Academy (IMAR). The initial budget for the written by nine professors at the United States CMVPL was $8 million—more than enough to Military Academy in West Point, New York, cover personnel costs for 13 American was adapted for publication under the byline of contractors, four U.S. soldiers, some Iraqi staff Major General Mohammed Najm al-Din Zayn members and translators/interpreters, as well as al-Din Naqshabandi in the U. S. Army Military contracting costs for computers, vehicles, Review Magazine, published both in English furniture, and building rehabilitation. The and Arabic. The general, an Iraqi Kurdish Center utilized a state of the art computer officer, was designated the first commander of 43 network to prepare instructional materials. The the Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command. The seven proposal for the Center indicated that 23 Iraqi page article, entitled ―Officership in the Iraqi officers would serve as instructors and Armed Forces,‖ had only three references, and counterparts to the American contractor staff. they were all from American or British military The Americans would train the Iraqi officers so history texts. It appeared that the editors of the they could instruct and assist at the Joint Staff article universally replaced the words College, service schools, regional training ―American Army‖ with the words ―Iraqi centers, and military academies. The Iraqi Army.‖ Everything else appeared to be pure officers assigned to the Center were expected to American military leadership and officership be computer literate, English speakers, and doctrine. Joint Staff College graduates.41These were The Center‘s major activity in 2006 was to tough personnel requirements for a wartime adapt the United States Military Academy Iraqi army to support, considering that Iraq had (West Point) leadership and ethics curriculum been under a UN-directed economic embargo to what the Americans understood to be the for 12 years and that only a limited number of Iraqi context. The curriculum was broken down people had access to new computer technology into one hour multimedia classes using or opportunities to learn English. Any officer PowerPoint presentation software. The who spoke English was also jealously guarded PowerPoint classes were then translated into by his own command, which needed his ability Arabic by the Center translators. The plan was to communicate with its Coalition counterparts. that Iraqi Army officers at the Center would

59 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) William Bache teach Iraqi instructors at the service schools, (MHAT) reported that more than one-third of training centers, military academies, and Joint all soldiers and Marines surveyed responded Staff College. The ―train-the-trainers‖ approach that torture should be allowed, and less than would hopefully extend quality leadership and half the soldiers and Marines said they would ethics knowledge to the whole army. In typical report a team member for unethical ―get it done‖ fashion, the Americans had their behavior.52General Petraeus, now the senior U. own professional military doctrine translated S. commander in Iraq (Multi-National Force- into Arabic and renamed ―Iraqi military Iraq), issued a letter to all American service leadership and ethic doctrine.‖ This was done members ―to take the ‗moral high ground‘ without the participation of Iraqi officers in the when dealing with insurgents and the Iraqi process. One retired Iraqi major general, Nabil people.‖ 53Press reports and public opinion Abd al-Qadir, who had served in the old Iraqi surveys conducted in Iraq indicated the lack of Army, was hired to serve as advisor to the cultural sensitivity, unethical behavior, and Center. He remained at the Phoenix Base to excessive indiscriminate violence and human liaison with the Iraqi senior military rights violations by the U.S. military have headquarters and MNSTC-I.44No Iraqi active alienated the majority of the Iraqi public from duty officers were assigned to the Center in the Coalition.54 2006. An Iraqi brigadier and , but no The unethical behavior of the CMVPL instructors or trainers, were first assigned to the American program manager, a U.S. Army Center in 2007; a a year after the launch of the lieutenant colonel, jeopardized the success of CMVPL project. the Center even before its official The Center was charged with assisting the establishment. The officer negotiated for the Iraqis to overcome a tradition of human rights use of four of the 18 JSC and IMAR faculty abuses that had been passed down from the houses for use by the new center, but then he Saddam era and that continued under Operation occupied the whole faculty housing area, Iraqi Freedom. Influencing the ethical behavior thereby preempting Iraqi officers and their of soldiers and their military units in war have families from an on-base living area safe from been vital components of the Center‘s mission. terrorists. His unethical behavior undermined Both the Iraqi Army and the various Ministry any serious acceptance of the Center by the of Interior police forces are working to Iraqis and their Coalition advisors. The IMAR overcome a tradition of the past Saddam Iraqi staff considered the officer a liar and era.45The Center incorporated into their placed the American-led Coalition effort under curriculum existing Arabic learning resources suspicion since, from their perspective, he concerning international humanitarian law and appeared to have the support of higher the Law of Armed Conflict, available from the command. The Iraqis at IMAR renamed the International Committee of the Red Cross.46 CMVPL the ―unethical ethics‖ center. The Convincing the Iraqis that the U.S. military had most serious result of the officer‘s unethical the moral authority to lecture them on military behavior was that Brigadier General Imad, the ethics was a challenge due to instances of commandant of the Academy, was captured by sanctioned prisoner abuse,47the Abu Ghraib terrorists when commuting to his off-base prisoner torture/sexual abuse scandal,48[the home and tortured to death.55The CMVPL was killings,49and the Mahmudiyya moved out of the faculty housing area in 2007 atrocities.50The United States did take action in and relocated to the Green Zone in Baghdad. response to the by requiring all U.S. military and contractor personnel THE DESIRED END STATE serving in Iraq to receive special ethics training.51The ethical behavior of American The strategy for the United States of soldiers and Marines continued to be an item of America, like that of the British in the 1920s- great concern to the leaders of the occupation 1940s, was to build an Iraqi army that forces after a Mental Health Advisory Team supported the goals and interests of the

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) 60 Transferring American Military Values to Iraq creators. The army-building process was MEANS AND WAYS TO GET TO AN similar, but the context for building the New END STATE Iraqi Army was different. In both situations the goal was the same: to build a strong security Since the occupation of Iraq, the United force that would ensure the preservation of a States has provided about $19 billion to train, friendly united Iraqi nation-state, with its equip, and sustain 350,000 Iraqi security and central government administrative center in law enforcement personnel.58Additionally, Baghdad. The army-building context faced by 160,000 U.S. troops and tens of thousands of the Coalition was different from that of the private military contractors are in Iraq to British in the sense that the Shi‘a and Kurds, prosecute the counterinsurgency.59The ―train who had been considered the major threats to and turnover‖ strategy used since the invasion all previous Iraqi governments, constituted the has failed to bring a stable, secure, and central government in post-Saddam Baghdad. democratic society free of terrorists to The Coalition perceived the contemporary Iraq.60The growing Iraq security forces were threats to the survival of the regime to come supposed to take over the security burden from from the supporters of the former Sunni Arab- the Coalition forces so that their combat forces dominated Saddam regime, Sunni Iraqi could revert to a supportive role and nationalists, and foreign jihadists. The jihadists withdrawal as conditions improved. The have converged on Iraq to fight in what they problem is that conditions did not improve, and feel is the principal battleground in the global instead only worsened.61The strategy of killing struggle with ―Western crusaders‖ and their terrorists, training the Iraqi security forces, and local collaborators. In addition to internal and then turning over the combat mission to them foreign Sunni resistance, the majority of Iraqi was not leading to President Bush‘s victory in Sunnis and Shi‘a opposed the Coalition troops Iraq. In January 2007, he ordered a change in from almost the beginning of the occupation. American strategy, with an increase of an President Bush said his goal was to ―help the additional 21,000 American troops for duty in Iraqi people build a new Iraq with a Iraq as part of a ―surge.‖ Those additional constitutional, representative government that forces are focused on securing Baghdad—the respects civil rights and has security forces administrative, cultural, and geographical sufficient to maintain domestic order and keep center of Iraq—and surrounding providences Iraq from becoming a safe haven for from terrorists and sectarian violence. His terrorists.‖56The political-military goals of the change in strategy recognized that the people of Americans were more ambitious than simply Iraq are the ―center of gravity‖ for the war.62If organizing and training security forces to they are not secure from violence, poverty, and protect their client government; they wanted a unemployment, the nation cannot be secured. radical political change in how the country How long the American people, another would be governed. Ambassador Bremer ―center of gravity,‖ will tolerate the continued appointed a transitional government that was U.S. occupation of Iraq is a problematic factor. based on proportional representation of most Indications are that the U.S. Congress may ethnic, religious, and exiled political groups. respond to the will of the American people and That model of government was seen by the force the Bush Administration to begin a Sunni Arab minority as stacked against them, withdrawal process by setting benchmarks to since with only 20 percent of the population limit the significant continued presence of they could never compete politically with the American forces in Iraq.63 Shi‘a Arabs, who constitute 60 percent of the The ―surge‖ has been billed as an essential population.57 increase of forces necessary to secure ―victory.‖ Actually, it is necessary to stave off defeat, because even with a significant increase in Iraqi security forces and billions of dollars of aid assistance, they have proved incapable of

61 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) William Bache achieving a military solution to what is America for those capabilities and may instead essentially a political problem revolving around turn to their Iranian neighbors for training, the sharing of power and resources. General intelligence, medical, and logistical support. Petraeus, appointed in 2007 as the new senior The various factions of the Shi‘a alliance that Coalition commander, is responsible for control the Iraqi government (in cooperation implementing the new American with Kurdish parties) have been supported by counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq.64He is an Iran. The Iranians provide their Iraqi friends able and experienced leader who has provided with financial resources and covert forms of his troops with a revised counterinsurgency assistance. They provided Iraqi Shi‘as doctrine. The troops are now trained to be sanctuary in Iran from the tyranny of Saddam culturally sensitive and to help the Iraqis with Hussein for decades. The Shi‘a Arabs dominate community policing and economic jumpstart the New Iraqi Army and the Iraqi police forces. programs. He is not expected to focus the These forces are also infiltrated by Shi‘a troops on home invasions looking for militias that are supported and influenced by ―terrorists‖ to kill or capture.65Petraeus‘s task is Iranian forces.68The United States has spent a made more difficult by the fact that he considerable amount of time and effort training inherits—and is being tasked with reversing— and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces and an extremely negative legacy of American does not want to see them come under the incompetence, stupidity, and insensitivity to control or influence of Iran. However, that Iraqi needs and wants. Four years of Coalition could happen. The conflict in Iraq is strongly failure will be a difficult challenge to overcome influenced by the perception and reality that the in Iraq, if at all possible. The current partnering United States is an active supporter of the of American military units with Iraqi Army and Israel‘s occupation of Palestine, their 2006 police units may be the best way to transfer bombings of Lebanon, and their struggle with American ethical and leadership values to the Iran concerning who will be the dominant Iraqi security forces. Personal examples of regional power in the Middle East. ethical and courageous leadership by Americans officers and NCOs will have far U.S. SPECIAL FORCES SHOULD BE more influence on Iraqis than the PowerPoint THE LAST TO LEAVE IRAQ presentations shown at service schools. Iraqis value personal relationships, and ―partnering‖ The Americans will have to seek an is an effective way to facilitate trust and accommodation with the Iranians and their friendship between the Iraqis and their partners. Iraqi Shi‘a allies in order to leave Iraq without This type of partnership in combat operations having to fight their way out. If they are lucky and training was very successful in Vietnam. It and after most of the conventional forces are helped to prepare the Vietnamese security withdrawn, they might be able to leave behind forces for the eventual withdraw of the small unobtrusive contingents of Special American Army.66 Forces69to continue to train selective elements The Americans have built an Iraqi Army of the Iraqi Army and to assist in the focused on the combat aspects of counterinsurgency effort against remaining counterinsurgency. The Iraq Joint Forces need jihadist terrorists who might not accept a to develop self-sustaining logistical, medical, political solution to their demands.70The intelligence, and aviation capabilities necessary Special Forces, with their cultural knowledge, for their joint forces to fight the insurgency or language skills, and communications resist an invasion without American equipment, could also serve as a liaison support.67The Iraqis could remain dependent on between the withdrawing Coalition forces, the the American military or contractors for these Iraqi military, police, and militias, and the other resources for many years to come. One of the foreign powers—such as Turkey, which may Coalition‘s concerns is that the Iraqis may not have its own or proxy forces in Iraq. When and accept dependency on the United States of if a peace process were to emerge, they would

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) 62 Transferring American Military Values to Iraq also be an excellent tool to assess if the various are Shi‘a and Kurdish-dominated and reflect Iraqi political factions and foreign powers the interests and priorities of the Central and actually terminate their assistance to the Kurdish regional governments. Hopefully the irregular forces operating in Iraq. The Special Iraqi Shi‘a Arabs and Kurdish elites will create Forces were very successful at the beginning of the political space for a reconciliation process the occupation in empowering Iraqi with their alienated Sunni Arab neighbors. communities to help themselves, but were Such an opening to the Sunni Arabs would quickly removed from that mission.71They have to include a new respect for human rights, should be used to help phase out the American fairness, and impartiality on the part of the intervention in Iraq. Shi‘a dominated Iraqi Security Forces. The Sunni Arabs must also reject extremism and CONCLUSION respond to any serious reconciliation efforts on the part of the Baghdad government. The ISF The IJF have not embraced the American can reform and reflect the values of democracy, ―Operation Iraqi Freedom‖ project, as exhibited diversity, and human rights, but their Iraqi by their failure to suppress the Shi‘a militias or political masters must lead the way in a major to accept and promote the American-operated military ethical culture shift similar to the Iraqi Center for Military Principles, Values, desegregation of the United States military by and Leadership. The reason the IJF leadership the executive order of President Harry Truman has not supported the project is because their after World War II. political leaders do not appreciate the American-stated values of the rule of law, *William Bache is a Senior Consultant with VIM diversity, and human rights. As for the Bush Consultants. He was the civilian Deputy for Ethics at the Administration, it has lost its enthusiasm to Center for Military Values, Principles, and Leadership in bring democracy to the Middle East, as it faces Baghdad when the Center was established in 2006. He the collapse of its Iraqi project. The Americans retired from 26 years of service with the United States are losing their influence over the IJF and Army after serving in , Vietnam, Italy, Turkey, police as they assume more operational Jordan, and Egypt. In 2005, he was the leader of an responsibility from the Coalition forces. The American Red Cross Algiers Task Force in New IJF have the popular support of the Shi‘a, as Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. He has also been active exhibited by a 71 percent favorable opinion with housing solutions for the working poor in Costa Rica, poll of Baghdad Shi‘a.72The military and police El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Texas.

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NOTES Conservation Corps of the Great Depression in the United States. The CPA never gave his 1 Martin Wolk, ―Cost of Could team permission to enter Iraq and start the Surpass $1 Trillion,‖ MSNBC, March 17, program. 2006, 12 Robert Collier, ―Iraqi Troops Say US Owes http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11880954/. Them Back Pay,‖ San Francisco Chronicle, 2 President George W. Bush, ―Freedom in Iraq May 16, 2003, p. A18. and Middle East,‖ Remarks by the President at 13 Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American the 20th Anniversary of the National Military Adventure in Iraq (London: Penguin Endowment for Democracy, United States Books, 2006), p. 162. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 14 Michael R. Gordon, ―Debate Lingering on November 6, 2003. Decision to Dissolve the Iraqi Military,‖ New 3 Carl D. Grunow, ―Advising Iraqis: Building York Times , October 21, 2004. the Iraqi Army,‖ Military Review (July-August http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/21/internati 2006), onal/21war.html?ex=1256011200&en=2030c6 http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milr 80d037428b&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland eview/English/JulAug06/Grunow.pdf (accessed on March 6, 2007). (accessed on March 7, 2007). 15 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 4 Anthony Cordesman, Iraqi Security Forces: Operations, Disarmament, Demobilization and A Strategy for Success (Washington, D.C.: Reintegration of Ex-combatants: Principles CSIS, 2006), p.11. and Guidelines. (New York: United Nations, 5 Zaki Chehab, Inside the Resistance: December 1999), Reporting from Iraq’s Danger Zone (New http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/DD&R York: Nation Books, 2006), pp. 70-71. .pdf (accessed on March 4, 2007). 6 Colin Freeman, ―Iraq's 'Sandhurst in the 16 Ann Scott Tyson, ―GAO Faults U.S. Sand' Returns to Its British Roots,‖ Daily Military Over Munitions in Iraq,‖ Washington Telegraph, December 17, 2005, Post, March 23, 2007, p. A7. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml? 17 Kit R. Roane and Edward T. Pound, ―A xml=/news/2005/12/18/wirq18.xml. Mess of Missing Ordnance: In Iraq, Weapons, 7 Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Myers, Weapons Everywhere—and Free for the Department of Defense Press Briefing, April Taking,‖ U.S. News & World Report, October 11, 2003. 31, 2004. http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/Pen http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/ tagon/dod-rumsfeldmyers-041103.htm 041108/8weapons.htm (accessed on March 5, (accessed April 2, 2007). 2007). 8 Peter W. Galbraith, The End of Iraq 18 Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near (New (London: Pocket Book, 2006), p. 118. York: Henry Holt & Company, 2006), pp. 9 L. Paul Bremer III, ―De-Baathification of 195-96. Iraqi Society,‖ Coalition Provisional Authority 19 Ricks, Fiasco, p. 216. Order No. 1, May 16, 2003. 20 Cesar G. Soriano and Steven Komarow, 10 L. Paul Bremer III, ―Dissolution of Iraqi ―Iraqis Out of Patience,‖ USA Today, April Entities,‖ Coalition Provisional Authority 28, 2004, updated April 30, 2004. Order No. 2, May 23, 2003. http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/20 11 Author‘s interview with Paul G. Cerjan, 04-04-28-poll-cover_x.htm. Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, retired, April 21 Chehab, pp. 129-31. 14, 2007. General Cerjan was in Kuwait in 22 Philip Giraldi, ―Money for Nothing,‖ The April 2003 preparing a plan to utilize former American Conservative, October 24, 2005. Iraqi soldiers to perform manpower-intensive http://www.amconmag.com/2005/2005_10_24 reconstruction projects similar to the Civilian /cover.html.

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23 ―2006 Corruption Perceptions Index Table,‖ Service, May 30, 2006. Transparency International. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle. www.transparency.org/policy_research/survey aspx?id=15606. s_indices/c pi/2006, accessed on March 5, 34 Jim Garamone, ―Iraqis Adapt British 2007. Military Academy as Model,‖ American 24 ―Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Forces Press Service, May 26, 2006. Report to Congress,‖ Department of Defense, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle. Washington, D.C., August 2006, p.13. aspx?id=15647. 25 Anthony Shadid and Steve Fainaru, 35 Ricks, Fiasco, pp. 338-41. ―Building Iraq's Army: Mission Improbable,‖ 36 Shadid and Fainaru, ―Building Iraq's , June 10, 2005, p. A1. Army,‖ p. A1. 26 Thom Shanker, ―Special Operations High 37 Soriano and Komarow, ―Iraqis Out of Profile, but in Shadows,‖ New York Times, Patience.‖ May 29, 2007. 38 ―Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,‖ http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/world/mi p. 28. ddleeast/29forces.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. 39 Joint Survey of U.S. Embassy-Iraq‘s 27 Ricks, Fiasco, p. 328. Anticorruption Program, Baghdad: SIGIR-06- 28 David Petraeus, Lieutenant General, 021, July 28, 2006, pp. 17-18, note 6, Operational Leaders Experience interview http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/06- concerning ―98th Division (Institutional 021.pdf (accessed on March 7, 2007). Training) (USAR) and the Establishment of 40 Ibid, p. 5. MNSTC-I,‖ Combat Studies Institute, Fort 41 Lucia Newman, ―Leadership Center Sets Leavenworth, KS, December 11, 2006. Standard for Iraqi Military,‖ The Advisor, 29 Bing West and Owen West, ―The Advisory MNSTC-I PAO, Baghdad, July 8, 2006, p. 3. Model: We Have to Stay in Iraq for a http://www.turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semp Decade—Here's How to Do It,‖ Slate, May er_tyrannis/files/the_advisor_08_july_2006.pd 23, 2007, f (accessed March 24, 2007). http://letters.slate.com/W4RH02F76448258B7 42 The Department of Defense Dictionary of 292831F69E690. Military and Associated Terms Joint Pub 1-02 30 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a (Washington, D.C.: 2004). Knife (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2005), 43 Mohammed Najm al-Din Zayn al-Din p. 141. Naqshabandi, Major General, ―Officership in 31 James R. Helmly, Major General, Chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces,‖ Military Review Army Reserve and Commanding General of Magazine (May–June 2006), p. 52. Reserve Command, 44 Jim Garamone, ―Center Helps Iraq Shape Operational Leaders Experience interview New Army,‖ American Forces Press Service, concerning ―98th Division (Institutional May 26, 2006. Training) (USAR) Deployment to Iraq in http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle. Support of MNSTC-I in 2004-2005,‖ Combat aspx?id=15655. Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 45 Carl D. Grunow, ―Advising Iraqis: Building December 2, 2006. the Iraqi Army,‖ Military Review (July-August 32 Rick Lynch and Phillip D. Janzen, ―NATO 2006), Training Mission-Iraq: Looking to the http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milr Future,‖ Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), No. 40 eview/English/JulAug06/Grunow.pdf (1st Quarter 2006), pp. 29-34, (accessed on March 7, 2007). http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4005 46 The International Committee of the Red .pdf. Cross, Geneva, Switzerland, 33 Jim Garamone, ―NATO Personnel Shaping http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htm Iraqi Military Staff,‖ American Forces Press

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lall/section_films_humanitarian_law (accessed 54 Soriano and Komarow, ―Iraqis Out of March 22, 2007). Patience.‖ 47 Barton Gellman and R. Jeffrey Smith, 55 Lieutenant Colonel Larry Curlis, United ―Report to Defense Alleged Abuse by Prison States of America, former Director of Interrogation Teams,‖ Washington Post, Training, NMSTC-I Advisory Group, Iraqi December 8, 2004, p. 1. Military Academy at Rustamiyya, Iraq, 48 Human Rights Watch, ―More Than 600 interviews with author, April 26 and 28, 2007. Implicated in Detainee Abuse: Investigations 56 George W. Bush, ―National Strategy for Lag Two Years After Abu Ghraib Photos,‖ Victory in Iraq: Helping the Iraqi People Washington, D.C., April 26, 2006. Defeat the Terrorists and Build an Inclusive http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/04/26/ Democratic State,‖ National Security Council, usint13268_txt.htm. Washington, DC, November 2005, 49 David Cloud, ―Inquiry Suggests Marines http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_ Excised Files on Killings,‖ New York Times, strategy_nov2005.html, p. 7-8. August 18, 2006. 57 Central Intelligence Agency, ―Iraq,‖ The 50 ―Soldier Weeps Describing Role in Rape World Fact Book, May 15, 2007, and Killings in Iraq,‖ New York Times, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- February 22, 2007. world-factbook/geos/iz.html. 51 Antonio Castaneda, Kim Gamel, and Patrick 58 ―The Continuing Challenges of Building the Quinn, ―US Troops in Iraq to Get Ethics Iraqi Security Forces,‖ U.S. House of Training,‖ , June 1, 2006. Representatives, Committee on Armed 52 Mental Health Advisory Team IV, OIF 05- Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & 07 Final Report, Office of the Surgeon Investigations, June 22, 2007, p. 6, General, MNF-I and the USA Medical http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI_ISFre Command, Baghdad, Iraq, November 17, port062707/OI_Report_FINAL.pdf. 2006. The report indicated that less than half 59 T. Christian Miller, ―Private Contractors of all soldiers and Marines surveyed believed Outnumber US Troops in Iraq,‖ Los Angeles that non-combatants should be treated with Times, July 4, 2007, dignity and respect and well over a third http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wo believed that that torture should be allowed to rld/la-na- save a friend‘s life. At least 10 percent of private4jul04,0,5808980.story?coll=la-home- soldiers and Marines admitted to mistreating center. an Iraqi non-combatant when it wasn‘t 60 Thomas E. Ricks, ―U.S. Military Is Still necessary, either by destroying private Waiting for Iraqi Forces to 'Stand Up,'‖ property or by hitting or kicking them. Less Washington Post, October 1, 2006, p. A21, than half of soldiers or Marines would report a http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- team member for unethical behavior, dyn/content/article/2006/09/30/AR200609300 preferring to handle the issue at the team level. 0492_pf.html. Although reporting receiving ethical training, 61 Alissa J. Rubin, ―70 Killed in Wave of nearly a third of the soldiers and Marines Revenge in Northern Iraq,‖ New York Times, reported encountering an ethical problem to March 29, 2007. which they did not know how to respond. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/29/world/mi 53 Sara Wood, ―Petraeus Urges Troops to ddleeast/29iraq.html?_r=1&th&emc=th&oref Adhere to Ethical Standards in Recent Letter,‖ =slogin. Armed Forces Press Service, May 14, 2007. 62 George W. Bush, ―The New Way Forward http://www.mnf- in Iraq,‖ Fact Sheet in Support of Speech, iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&tas January 10, 2007, k=view&id=11869&Itemid=110. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200 7/01/20070110-3.html.

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63 Jonathan Weisman, ―House Passes Iraq Pullout Timetable,‖ Washington Post, March 24, 2007, p. A1. 64 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 15, 2006. 65 Ricks, Fiasco, pp. 231-32. 66 The author was an infantry platoon leader in Vietnam with the 101st Airborne Division in 1969-1970 and was partnered with a Vietnamese Regional Force Platoon for training and combat operations. 67 Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade, ―Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces,‖ Testimony to House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, GAO-07-612T, Washington, D.C., March 13, 2007, p. 1. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07612t. 68 David S. Cloud and Damien Cave, ―Commanders Say Push in Baghdad is Short of Goal,‖ New York Times, June 4, 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/04/world/mi ddleeast/04surge.html?_r=2&hp=&oref=slogi n&pagewanted=print. 69 Bruce Hoffman, ―Lessons from the Past for Iraq's Future,‖ San Diego Union-Tribune, July 23, 2004. 70 Thom Shanker, ―Special Operations High Profile, But in Shadows,‖ New York Times, May 29, 2007. 71 James A. Gavrilis, ―The Mayor of Ar Rutbah,‖ Foreign Policy (November/December 2005), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php? story_id=3265. 72 ―Iraq Poll 2007 in Graphics,‖ British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), March 19, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/645184 1.stm.

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