Transferring American Values to Iraq
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TRANSFERRING AMERICAN MILITARY VALUES TO IRAQ William Bache* The President of the United States expressed his desire to build a democratic Iraq that could serve as an example to the rest of the Arab and Islamic nations. The American military was the instrument chosen to build an Iraqi security structure that could fight terrorism and still promote ethical leaders and democratic values. However, efforts to transfer American military values to Iraq have been a failure. The leaders of the Iraqi Joint Security Forces have politely listened to what the Americans have determined is best for them and then have gone back to doing what they feel is best for them— namely situational leadership, corruption, and human rights violations. INTRODUCTION an Iraqi military committed to defeating terrorism that respects human rights and the There never was an Iraqi army, let alone an rule of law. They championed a diverse Iraqi Iraqi nation state, until British efforts after military led by civilian and military leaders of World War I. The purpose of this paper is to character and integrity. They also wanted a look at American efforts to recreate an Iraqi military that rejected political, sectarian, and army using American military values—values self-serving influences. This paper will look at supportive of democracy and human rights—in the success and future of the American the post-Saddam era. America has made a experience in Iraq. The Bush Administration multibillion dollar1effort to create what chose the military option over all other options President George W. Bush called a ―free Iraq at to transfer American values to a conquered the heart of the Middle East… a watershed Iraq. Therefore, it is important to investigate event in the global democratic and assess the successes and failures of the revolution.‖2American leaders said they wanted Operation Iraqi Freedom project. unethical orders. The army was under- LEADERSHIP AND VALUES IN THE resourced, as Saddam gave preferential OLD IRAQI MILITARY treatment to his more politically reliable Republican Guards and Special Republican Prior to the 2003 invasion, the purpose of Guards. His loyal Sunni officers did know how the Iraqi security services under all to tactically employ the units and weapons of governments was to ensure the survival of the what had been the fourth largest military force Sunni-dominated national government located in the world. Force quality was an issue since in Baghdad. Under Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi ―the uprisings following the Gulf War triggered Army and security services maintained internal a continuing series of purges in the Iraqi security, repressed revolts by the Kurds and military that lasted until Saddam‘s fall, while a Shi‘a, attacked Iran in 1980, invaded Kuwait in vast number of promotions inflated the ranks of 1990, and fought the Anglo-American senior officers and filled slots with loyalists and invasions of 1991 and 2003. incompetents.‖4 After the 1991 war, the Iraqi Army was The culture of the army itself was a key capable of terrorizing and intimidating problem. Assertive mid-level officers were civilians,3but it could not do much more. It was considered a threat by their superiors, and a defeated, totally corrupted force that had various secret police forces ―minded‖ the learned not to take initiative and not to question officer corps for loyalty. No Iraqi officer could Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) 54 Transferring American Military Values to Iraq afford to be a leader in a system in which the Secretary Donald Rumsfeld appointed a supreme leader, Saddam Hussein, perceived retired ambassador, Paul Bremer, as the ruling persons with leadership abilities as potential proconsul of the occupation government, threats to regime survival.5There were no known as the Coalition Provisional Authority quality standards, no ways to measure (CPA). Bremer arrived in Baghdad on May 12, competency. Graduation from service schools 2003, and within his first week in Iraq, a could be bought in a system where nepotism country he had never visited nor whose and favoritism were rampant.6One could be language could he speak,8he issued his famous qualified on paper, but the paper was not ―de-Ba‘thification order.‖ 9The results were the indicative of actual performance or capability. dismissal of all government administrators who Junior officers were also conditioned not to were members of the Ba‘th Party and had show initiative. They did not anticipate what served in the top four levels of Iraq‘s needed to be done. They did not use their non- government. To receive a top-level commissioned officers (NCOs) to support them administration position during the Saddam era, in organizing and preparing the enlisted a person normally had to be a member of the soldiers for dangerous military duties. Junior Ba‘th Party. All the dismissed government officers ended up doing what would be administrators were laid off without any considered NCO work in Western armies. The severance pay or pensions. Many were the very NCOs were not trained, not educated, and not people who had the skills and knowledge to key partners of their officers. Many were administer and operate all the ministries of the illiterate. The training of the Shi‘a and Kurdish Iraqi government, especially the security conscripts was restricted to teaching low-level services. The government and government- skills, while Sunni soldiers learned the high- owned industries were the principal employers level command and staff skills necessary to in Iraq. Revenue from domestic Iraqi oil administer one of the largest armies in the production provided 95 percent of the budget world. In the 2003 war, various Iraqi forces for the Iraqi government. With most of the resisted the Anglo-American invaders for 30 to government ministries, universities, hospitals, 40 days, but the Iraqi military did not formally utilities, and industries destroyed in a surrender to the American-led Coalition forces. multibillion dollar looting spree and with the Saddam‘s Army and Republican Guard troops government administrators dismissed from just melted away while their paramilitary duty, the economy collapsed and has never counterparts continued to resist the Coalition recovered. forces. One week later, on May 23, 2003, Ambassador Bremer ordered the disbandment DISBANDING THE IRAQI MILITARY of all Iraqi military and security services.10Arbitrary dismissal rather than After the occupation of Baghdad by rehabilitation and utilization of former American troops in April 2003, the Americans government officials and security forces left the allowed widespread looting in Baghdad and Coalition military forces without indigenous elsewhere to occur. The U. S. commanders Iraqi security forces to enforce law and order in failed to declare martial law and put a stop to Iraq during the chaos, anarchy, and criminal the chaos and disorder. The military claimed violence that followed the fall of the Saddam they did not have enough troops, and U.S. regime. The dismissed soldiers and police Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld could have been recalled to active service not explained that ―Freedom‘s untidy…. Free only to maintain law and order, but to help people are free to make mistakes and commit economic recovery by performing manpower- crimes and do bad things.‖7The Coalition had intensive public work programs.11Under no real plans on what to do with Iraq after the Ambassador Bremer, the occupation Saddam regime fell. government had no coherent plan for the demobilization, disarmament,12and 55 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) William Bache reintegration (DDR) into society of 720,000 Many Shi‘a also did not welcome the unemployed soldiers and police13whose Americans and British as liberators, but principal skill set was in conducting organized considered them as occupiers, perhaps due to violence.14All serious international post- mistrust generated from the betrayal of the conflict reconstruction and stabilization efforts 1991 rebellion against Saddam by the U.S. include DDR as a critical and early part of their government.18 reconciliation and peace-building efforts.15The Within a relatively short period of time after security of Saddam‘s storage sites for arms, the invasion, the anti-Coalition resistance ammunition, explosives, and other military movement emerged and attacked major hardware used for combat was not to be a top political targets to isolate Coalition and Iraqi priority for the Coalition occupation of allies from both the Iraqi people and the Iraq.16[16] Those unsecured ammunition and assistance and support of the international high-explosive sites were soon looted and community. The compounds of the Jordanian served as sources of supply for the Sunni embassy, the United Nations, and the resistance movement and Shi‘a militias.17 International Committee of the Red Cross were The police, like the military and the various attacked with devastating vehicle secret police forces of the Saddam regime, had bombs.19Attacks on Coalition troops continued been instruments of repression rather than to increase, demonstrating that it would take instruments of public safety, rule of law, and more than police forces to suppress terrorist justice in Iraq. They also melted away after the attacks by the resistance. Insurgency attacks Coalition invasion, leaving anarchy in the grew for a year, but Secretary Rumsfeld and the streets of Iraq, since the American-led occupation government refused to admit that Coalition had insufficient troops and was the resistance consisted of anything other than unwilling to enforce law and order. The CPA‘s Ba‘thist ―bitter enders,‖ al-Qa‘ida terrorists, initial security plan was to reactivate security and foreign fighters. Without indigenous Iraqis forces for local policing, border security, and to help police their own country, the unfamiliar infrastructure security. A national army for Iraq Coalition forces were blind and failed to was not in their game plan.