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Security Council Distr.: General 12 April 2010

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Security Council Distr.: General 12 April 2010 United Nations S/AC.44/2007/10 Security Council Distr.: General 12 April 2010 Original: English Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) Letter dated 21 December 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee I have the honour to respond to your letter, dated 17 October 2007, on behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), and to enclose an update to the 2004 United States report to the Committee (see annex). The enclosed report is a comprehensive update of United States laws, policies, projects, and initiatives to prevent illicit trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials, and in particular to prevent terrorist acquisition of such items. It is intended to supplement and not replace the 2004 report and incorporates input from numerous United States Government agencies. The report presents a picture of steps taken since the initial report of United States efforts related to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), as well as steps the United States intends to take. Separately, the United States will contact the members of the Committee’s panel of experts to discuss United States revisions to the matrix. Once the United States matrix has been revised and completed, the United States would like to request that the Committee post it on the Committee’s website as a public document. The United States looks forward to continued cooperation with the Committee. (Signed) Zalmay Khalilzad 10-31900 (E) 110610 *1031900* S/AC.44/2007/10 Annex to the letter dated 21 December 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee United States update to the 2004 United States report to the Committee 1. Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery; Towards these ends, the United States completed its National Action Plan on 31 May 2006, consistent with the Committee’s April 2006 report (S/2006/257 and Corr.1), and has subsequently relied on the Plan as a working document and invaluable way to coordinate the inter-agency process for implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Although the United States completed its Plan in 2006, the objectives of its Plan are consistent with the presidential statement issued in connection with the Council’s February 2007 debate on resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006) (S/PRST/2007/4). An important element of the United States implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), as envisioned in resolution 1673 (2006) and the 1540 Committee April 2006 report to the Security Council (S/2006/257 and Corr.1), has been outreach to other Member States, on a bilateral basis, and in the context of existing regional or subregional organizations. Through this outreach, the United States has sought not only to encourage Member States to submit reports to the 1540 Committee, but to highlight the role that regional organizations can play in promoting the discussion of their Members’ experiences in implementing resolution 1540 (2004), disseminating best practices, and helping participating States to present more and better reports in support of the resolution. The United States has initiated and participated in the following activities in regional and subregional organizations since 2004 and plans to continue these efforts: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) On 8 November 2006, the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) held a workshop on implementation of the resolution in the OSCE region. This was the first meeting by a regional organization devoted to exploring ways that participating States could work together to build capacities in meeting the goals of the resolution. On 30 November, the FSC adopted Decision 10/06 “Supporting National Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540”, by which participating States decided to provide, as and if appropriate, additional information to the 1540 Committee on national implementation as part of the ongoing process of resolution 1540 (2004) implementation, including, inter alia, in the form of a road map or action plan, as recommended in the 1540 Committee’s April 2006 report to the Security Council (S/2006/257, para. 136 (c)), taking into account the analysis provided by the 1540 Committee. 2 10-31900 S/AC.44/2007/10 Following on these developments, the United States has led efforts in the FSC towards producing a Best Practices Guide for OSCE participants regarding the implementation of the resolution. The OSCE Ministers welcomed further work on the Best Practice Guides in their Decision taken at the 2007 Madrid Ministerial (MC.DEC.3/07). The Ministers also issued a statement supporting the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which takes into account further efforts to implement resolution 1540 (2004) (MC.DOC/3/07). ASEAN Regional Forum On 14 and 15 February 2007, the United States, Canada and Singapore hosted a workshop on implementation of the resolution in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The workshop included participants from nearly all ARF members, as well as from the 1540 Committee, the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, INTERPOL, and the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific. The workshop included discussions on the utility of national implementation plans, and offered information on how such plans might be drafted. Building on the success of the workshop, at the 14th ARF Ministerial Meeting in Manila, Philippines, ARF Foreign Ministers adopted a statement in support of the resolution, by which ARF participants were encouraged to provide, as and when appropriate, additional information to the 1540 Committee on national implementation as part of the ongoing process of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including, inter alia, in the form of a road map or action plan, as recommended in the 1540 Committee April 2006 report to the Security Council (S/2006/257 and Corr.1). The United States continues to sponsor and participate in annual meetings of ARF members aimed at building capacities of ARF participants in meeting non-proliferation obligations, including those in the resolution. Organization of American States On 11 December 2006, the Committee on Hemispheric Security of the Organization of American States (OAS) held a special meeting on preventing the spread of nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and their means of delivery. The special meeting included discussion of the utility of national implementation plans relating to resolution 1540 (2004). On 5 June 2007, the General Assembly of the OAS adopted a statement (AG/RES. 2333 (XXXVII O/07)) reaffirming the goals of the resolution; urging Member States to provide additional information to the 1540 Committee on efforts under way to implement resolution 1540 (2004), including road maps or action plans, as recommended by the 1540 Committee’s April 2006 report to the Security Council; and resolving to hold a regional workshop on the implementation of the resolution in early 2008, in order to examine reporting by the Member States to the 1540 Committee and other ways in which States of the hemisphere might contribute, from a subregional perspective, to the implementation of that resolution. 10-31900 3 S/AC.44/2007/10 2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them; Nuclear weapons Through the enactment of two recent statutes, the United States has addressed the threat of nuclear material being used to construct an “improvised nuclear device”, a nuclear weapon, or sabotage of a nuclear facility. United States law now explicitly prohibits any person from knowingly constructing, possessing, exporting, importing, or using a nuclear weapon or radiological dispersal device (see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332h, 832(c)). Attempts and conspiracies to build such devices are also criminally barred. Radiological weapons The United States, along with 89 other nations, has made a political commitment to follow the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. The Code of Conduct calls for laws and regulations for the life-cycle control of high-risk radioactive sources — materials potentially usable in a radiological dispersal device, or so-called “dirty bomb”. The Code provides for enforcement actions to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements and includes provisions for export controls, national materials-accounting registries, enhanced physical protection measures, prompt notification and recovery of lost or stolen sources, and plans for emergency preparedness and response. The United States has enacted laws and regulations in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Conduct. These include orders for enhanced security measures and laws for a real-time national source tracking system and for enhanced export controls for radioactive materials. Biological weapons Under United States law, a person may not develop, produce, stockpile, transfer, acquire, retain, or possess any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a weapon, or knowingly assist a foreign State or organization to do so. Depending on the circumstances, a person convicted of such an offence faces up to life imprisonment (18 U.S.C. § 175a). United States law also criminalizes the possession of biological agents, toxins, or delivery systems of a type or quantity that, under the circumstances, is not reasonably justified by a prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful purpose (18 U.S.C.
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