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CPC Outreach Journal #419 USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL Maxwell AFB, Alabama Issue No. 419, 30 March 2005 Articles & Other Documents: Our Allies Were Not 'Misled' $30 Million Unfrozen For Arms Destruction Illegal Nuclear Deals Alleged Report On U.S. Weapons Intelligence Is Said To Be Critical Pakistani Hints He'll Turn Over Centrifuges In Iran Seoul Denies Report On NK-Libya Nuclear Deal Investigation Toxic Indifference To North Korea Biohazard Procedures To Change Many Missiles Missing In Iraq, Review Of Reports Storage Of Nuclear Spent Fuel Criticized Shows Saving Nonproliferation Panel's Report Assails C.I.A. For Failure On Iraq Weapons Anthrax Dumped Near Saddam Palace Pakistan Denies Access To Nuke Supplier Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953- 7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved (Editor’s Note: Referenced story appeared in CPC Outreach #417.) Washington Post March 25, 2005 Pg. 18 Our Allies Were Not 'Misled' "U.S. Misled Allies About Nuclear Export," the March 20 front-page story about nuclear material exported to Libya, was flat wrong. Our allies were not "misled" by the United States about North Korea's proliferation activities. We provided an accurate account of the intelligence assessment of the most likely source of the nuclear material that was transferred to Libya through A.Q. Khan's network. The reporter asserted that "Pakistan was mentioned only once in the briefing paper, and in a context that emphasized Pyongyang's guilt." In fact, the Khan network was cited several times, but the key point is that the briefing made clear that the nuclear material transferred to Libya went through the Khan network. The U.S. government has no evidence that the transfer was authorized by Pakistan's government. Whether the intended recipient was the Khan network or Libya is irrelevant to our proliferation concerns regarding North Korea. The fact that nuclear material found its way out of North Korea to any destination is a source of serious concern for the United States and other participants in the six-party talks. That is why we brought the matter to their attention. SCOTT McCLELLAN, Press Secretary, White House, Washington http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64562-2005Mar24.html (Return to Articles and Documents List) Lexington (KY) Herald-Leader March 24, 2005 $30 Million Unfrozen For Arms Destruction Pays for preliminary work for next 6 months at Blue Grass Depot By Peter Mathews, Central Kentucky Bureau RICHMOND - The Defense Department released $30 million yesterday for design work and preliminary construction at the proposed chemical neutralization plant at Blue Grass Army Depot. The move will allow Bechtel Parsons Blue Grass, the contractor, to continue work through Sept. 30. An additional $40 million was released for the depot's sister site in Pueblo, Colo., and orders halting work on design and construction there were lifted. But one prominent critic, Craig Williams of the Berea-based Chemical Weapons Working Group, called the day's events a sign that the Pentagon has shifted its top priority from protecting the public to saving money. "Basically, this is life support," Williams said, describing the infusion of money this way: "You're buried alive in a 6-foot pit, and somebody drills a hole and puts a straw in it so you can breathe." A Pentagon spokeswoman could not be reached for comment last night. In a memorandum yesterday announcing the release of the funds, acting Undersecretary of Defense Michael Wynne called for a redesign to shave hundreds of millions of dollars off the projected cost of the Kentucky and Colorado plants. Wynne wants their costs brought in line with estimates from 2002, which were derived before any design work was done. Williams calls those figures "place-holders." "Nobody had enough information to plug a real number in there," he said. "Now they're saying it's a real number." Those 2002 estimates were $2 billion for Blue Grass and $1.5 billion for Pueblo. But after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the Pentagon ordered that the destruction of chemical weapons be sped up. One way to do that is to build a bigger, costlier plant that can destroy the stockpiles more quickly. Three years later, both projects are running well over the 2002 preliminary estimates. The Pentagon has said Pueblo is about $1 billion over budget. Estimates of the cost of the Kentucky plant range from $2.2 billion to $2.4 billion. That plant would chemically neutralize the 523 tons of mustard and nerve agent the Army stores at the depot near Richmond. A treaty requires the destruction of the entire U.S. stockpile by April 2012. Officials pledged yesterday to keep working with the public as the project evolves. "We're looking at some pretty radical design changes," said Chris Midgett, project manager for Bechtel Parsons Blue Grass. As for whether the Pueblo plant can be built for $1.5 billion, he said, "It's going to be difficult to hit that number for Pueblo, but it's possible." The money released yesterday is part of about $400 million already appropriated by Congress but frozen by the Pentagon. Wynne also authorized the release of an unspecified portion of the $160.7 million appropriated this fiscal year for research and development at the plants. But the memo also indicates that the Pentagon intends to hold firm to the $31 million budget appropriation proposed by President Bush for next year, far below what had been anticipated earlier. Similar funding levels are proposed for the next four fiscal years. http://www.kentucky.com/mld/kentucky/news/11215907.htm (Return to Articles and Documents List) Los Angeles Times March 26, 2005 Pg. 1 Illegal Nuclear Deals Alleged Investigators say Pakistan has secretly bought high-tech components for its weapons program from U.S. companies. By Josh Meyer, Times Staff Writer WASHINGTON — A federal criminal investigation has uncovered evidence that the government of Pakistan made clandestine purchases of U.S. high-technology components for use in its nuclear weapons program in defiance of American law. Federal authorities also say the highly specialized equipment at one point passed through the hands of Humayun Khan, an Islamabad businessman who they say has ties to Islamic militants. Even though President Bush has been pushing for an international crackdown on such trafficking, efforts by two U.S. agencies to send investigators to Pakistan to gather more evidence have hit a bottleneck in Washington, said officials knowledgeable about the case. The impasse is part of a larger tug-of-war between federal agencies that enforce U.S. nonproliferation laws and policymakers who consider Pakistan too important to embarrass. The transactions under review began in early 2003, well after President Pervez Musharraf threw his support to the Bush administration's war on terrorism and the invasion of neighboring Afghanistan to oust Pakistan's former Taliban allies. "This is the age-old problem with Pakistan and the U.S. Other priorities always trump the United States from coming down hard on Pakistan's nuclear proliferation. And it goes back 15 to 20 years," said David Albright, director of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security. Albright, a former United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq, favors getting tougher with Pakistan. U.S. and European officials involved in nonproliferation issues say they recently discovered evidence that Pakistan has begun a new push to acquire advanced nuclear components on the black market as it tries to upgrade its decades- old weapons program. Current and former intelligence officials said the same elements of the Pakistani military that they suspected of orchestrating efforts to buy American-made products may also have worked with Abdul Qadeer Khan, the so-called father of the Pakistani nuclear program who supplied weapons know-how and parts to Iran, North Korea and Libya. Abdul Qadeer Khan and Humayun Khan are not related. The scheme U.S. investigators are trying to unravel involves Humayun Khan and Asher Karni, a South African electronics salesman and former Israeli army major. Aided by Karni, who pleaded guilty to violating export control laws and began cooperating with U.S. authorities shortly after his arrest 15 months ago, investigators have traced at least one shipment of oscilloscopes from Oregon to South Africa and on to Humayun Khan.
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