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The Polish–American Relationship: Deepening and Strengthening the Alliance Sally Mcnamara

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The Polish–American Relationship: Deepening and Strengthening the Alliance Sally Mcnamara No. 2010 February 27, 2007 The Polish–American Relationship: Deepening and Strengthening the Alliance Sally McNamara In 2005, President George W. Bush asserted that tions. A source of continued diplomatic angst on the “Poland has been a fantastic ally.” Since its rapid part of the Poles is the U.S. Foreign Military Financ- democratization and accession to NATO, Poland ing (FMF) program, which is heavily skewed in has shared the burden of addressing the West’s most favor of less helpful partners in the war on terror- pressing international challenges. Poland has sup- ism. For its part, the Administration believes that ported America’s global leadership role and has Poland has already received considerable U.S. helped to expand security in unstable and financing for military modernization through an unfriendly parts of the world. Wherever America is enormous program of security assistance. doing good in the world, Poland is not far behind. Under the current Visa Waiver Program (VWP), As one of the four leading countries in the coali- most visitors from 27 partner nations—primarily tion of the willing, Poland has been present in Iraq members of the European Union (EU)—are allowed from the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom and con- to enter the United States for up to 90 days without tinues to participate in stabilization and reconstruc- a visa if they have valid passports from their coun- tion efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Poland tries. Poland is not in the VWP, and this has proved maintains 900 troops in Iraq and has committed an contentious for two countries that share such warm additional 900 soldiers to fight in Afghanistan. bilateral relations. When fighting for freedom and liberty, America has With the advent of easier travel within Europe, a trusted ally in Poland; and as a medium-sized the Polish government faces a serious task in con- European power with ambitions to project power vincing Poles that the transatlantic alliance is at least globally, Poland is a friend worth having. as relevant as the EU to everyday life and its national Tensions in the Relationship. However, as with interest. Yet Poland should be wary of Brussels’ the rapid maturation of any relationship, tensions gravitational pull because closer ties with Brussels have emerged. It is essential that both sides recog- will come at the expense of its relationship with the nize that significant sources of tension exist and U.S. and, ultimately, its national interest. have the potential to become longer-term conflicts if left unaddressed. To project power internationally, Poland must This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: have a modern military that is able to participate www.heritage.org/research/Europe/bg2010.cfm fully in global affairs. Its military modernization Produced by The Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Published by The Heritage Foundation program has not, however, been without problems, 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE especially in the context of Polish–American rela- Washington, DC 20002–4999 (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflect- ing the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. No. 2010 February 27, 2007 Strengthening the Relationship. The Polish– resist any plans to divide, marginalize, or under- American relationship will require hard-edged, de- mine the NATO alliance, especially EU plans for a cisive leadership on both sides of the Atlantic to European Army or any separate military identity take it forward in a positive manner. There are cer- independent of NATO decision making. tainly areas for further cooperation. • Work with Poland to broadly explore all One of the strongest ties that bind the Polish– options on ballistic missile defense. The American relationship is mutual support for freedom United States should continue to pursue and liberty throughout the world. The absence of national missile defense and undertake the national caveats for Polish troops in combat, unlike most cost-effective options to maintain its secu- the majority of European forces in Afghanistan, illus- rity and that of its allies. trates that Poland is not just an ally of America, but a • Increase people-to-people exchanges between fighting one. This security relationship has proved the U.S. and Poland by revising the Visa mutually beneficial on a multitude of levels—strategi- Waiver Program. People-to-people exchanges cally, economically, and diplomatically. are an important element of public diplomacy, Under the current direction of Polish foreign policy, and an updated Visa Waiver Program must not the U.S. invariably benefits from Polish support in a exclude key allies like Poland. number of areas pertaining to freedom and security, • Arrange for President Bush to make an offi- including the promotion of democracy in Europe’s cial state visit to Warsaw sooner rather than near East. To maintain a working relationship with the later. Top-level bilateral contacts are critical United States that can successfully pursue a freedom and especially important to the current Polish and security agenda, Poland must continue to resist government in building trust and cooperation. pressure for deeper integration into EU structures such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Conclusion. Poland is one of a handful of EU must commit to the transatlantic security alliance, member states that understand the long-term chal- wholeheartedly approaching negotiations regarding lenges posed by the war on terrorism and has not the most cost-effective way to manage international shied away from the responsibilities facing modern missile defense. nation-states and the international community. The Bush Administration should take active steps to What the Administration and Congress Should tighten the strategic partnership with Poland, and Do. Specifically, the Administration and Congress Warsaw should seek to maximize its relationship should: with Washington. Poland is a relatively new player • Prioritize continued close political and mili- on the world stage and has some way to go before tary cooperation with Poland. Through reori- realizing its potential as a European power. The entation of the Foreign Military Financing United States can help and should reciprocate at program and extension of the International least some measure of the political capital invested Military Education and Training Program, the by Poland in upholding transatlantic interests on U.S. would ensure that Poland continues the the Continent. comprehensive modernization of its military in —Sally McNamara is Senior Policy Analyst in line with the U.S.–Polish Defense Transforma- European Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center tion Initiative, which would be propitious to for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby U.S. interests. Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at • Reemphasize NATO’s primacy as the premier The Heritage Foundation. security alliance in Europe. Washington must No. 2010 February 27, 2007 The Polish–American Relationship: Deepening and Strengthening the Alliance Sally McNamara In 2005, President George W. Bush asserted that “Poland has been a fantastic ally.”1 Looking at War- saw’s overall contribution to America’s foreign policy Talking Points priorities since 9/11, this assessment accurately re- • Washington and Warsaw must reempha- flects the profoundly shared values and common size NATO’s primacy as the premier security interests that continue to bind the Polish–American alliance in Europe and resist attempts to relationship. Since its rapid democratization and ac- divide, marginalize, or undermine the cession to NATO—due in no small part to British– NATO alliance, especially EU plans for a American leadership—Poland has helped to assume European Army. the burden of addressing the West’s most pressing in- • Poland should continue to stand up to ternational challenges. Poland has supported Amer- pressure for deeper integration into EU ica’s global leadership role and has helped to expand structures, such as the Common Foreign and security in unstable and unfriendly parts of the world. Security Policy, and resist the temptation to Wherever America is doing good in the world, Poland compromise on key elements of national is not far behind. sovereignty during the revived negotiations over the European Constitution. As one of the four leading countries in the coalition of the willing, alongside Britain and Australia, Poland • Congress should include Poland in current has been present in Iraq from the outset of Operation plans to reform the Visa Waiver Program. Poland’s continued exclusion from the Iraqi Freedom’s major combat operations and contin- VWP would be a diplomatic affront to a ues to participate in stabilization and reconstruction faithful ally. efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Poland maintains 900 troops in Iraq2 and has committed an additional • Poland and the United States should con- tinue to work together to explore all options 900 troops to fight the insurgency in Afghanistan, on ballistic missile defense. laudably without national caveats.3 When fighting for freedom and liberty, America has a trusted ally in Poland; and as a medium-sized European power with ambitions to project power globally, Poland is a friend worth having. This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: www.heritage.org/research/Europe/bg2010.cfm However, as with the rapid maturation of any rela- Produced by The Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom tionship, tensions have emerged. The relationship is no Published by The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE longer about membership, but about bold new foreign Washington, DC 20002–4999 (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflect- ing the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. No. 2010 February 27, 2007 policy challenges. The Polish–American relationship sents Eastern Europe’s largest-ever defense order will require hard-edged, decisive leadership on both and a significant boost for the U.S.
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