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Power Changes Hands in Warsaw, Change of Course in Foreign Policy? SWP Comments Kai-Olaf Lang

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Power Changes Hands in Warsaw, Change of Course in Foreign Policy? SWP Comments Kai-Olaf Lang Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Power Changes Hands in Warsaw, Change of Course in Foreign Policy? SWP Comments Kai-Olaf Lang The traditionalist-patriotic Law and Justice Party (PiS) emerged as the winner of the Polish parliamentary and presidential elections. Its Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz now heads the ruling minority government, and at the year’s end Lech Kaczyński, a PiS leader, will take over as head of state. Since it was founded in 2001, the PiS has gone in for Euro-sceptical, national rhetoric critical of Germany that has raised doubts about the parties predictability and reliability. In stark contrast to the strong-arm overtone of recent years and the electoral campaign, for the time being, the Marcinkiewicz govern- ment and the PiS leadership have indicated to their EU partners flexibility and readi- ness to cooperate. And they have expressed the will to intensify relations with Ger- many. As long as the new political team in Warsaw remains pragmatic in its foreign and European policy and does not build a formal coalition with radical groups, Poland should be involved by its European partners rather than isolated. As expected, the previous ruling party, with the winner to provide the prime the totally discredited post-communist minister, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) lost the 25 economist and PiS politician entrusted September parliamentary elections. No less with forming a government, failed to forge predictably, two right-wing or centre-right an alliance with the PO. The main reason parties, the Law and Justice Party (PiS) and for this was the presidential election cam- the Civic Platform (PO), emerged as the paign, in which the two parties’ candidates, strongest forces from the polls. What Lech Kaczyński (PiS) and Donald Tusk (PO), came as a surprise, however, was that the were at daggers drawn. The winner of national-conservative PiS, led by twin the presidential election rounds on 9 and brothers Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński, 23 October was Law and Justice’s Lech polled 26.99% and outperformed the more Kaczyński. moderate, liberal-conservative PO, which Once it was clear there was not going to polled 24.1%. be a PiS-PO coalition, Marcinkiewicz formed Although the two parties had agreed a minority government that won a vote of before the elections to form a coalition, confidence in the Sejm on 10 November. SWP Comments 60 December 2005 1 The Marcinkiewicz cabinet was backed and Fatherland’ previously held by by PiS deputies and the national-Catholic the LPR.” League of Polish Families (LPR), the National interests. The party’s fun- agrarian-populist Samoobrona and the damental foreign and European policy Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL). objectives are outlined in its 2005 Pro- gramme. The long-term PiS aim is to “build a strong republic taking up a position in Conservative Revolutionaries the international arena that is worthy of a the Winners? great European nation.” The vision of the Results of the 25.9.2005 Statements by some PiS politicians and EU projected by the PiS is that of a “Europe Sejm Elections individual measures undertaken by Lech of nations bound by solidarity” and a Kaczyński as mayor of Warsaw have given “league of nation-states.” The sovereignty- Share of Number vote (%) of seats the party a negative image, especially conscious Euro-scepticism that lies behind abroad. More important than to analyse formulas of this kind is accompanied by PiS 26.99 155 PO 24.14 133 this image is to assure oneself of the strong suspicions of Germany. It is highly Samo- 11.41 56 programmatic cornerstones that are the significant that Germany was not even obrona hallmark of the party’s world view. They mentioned in the PiS election manifesto. SLD 11.31 55 include: “Social Poland.” The call for societal LPR 7.97 34 A marked anti-communism. Back in the cohesion and for a state that pursues active PSL 6.96 25 MN 0.29 2 early 1990s the Kaczyński brothers and economic, social and employment policies, Others 10.93 – their followers nailed to their mast calls for the demand for “poorer Poles also to Total 100.00 460 the liquidation of communist coteries of benefit from economic growth” and the old and for a process of coming to terms rejection of a linear income tax derive from with the past that amounted to more than a party programme that is centre-left on mere lip service. Scandals of the post- economic and social affairs. The successful communist Left in power after 2001 made polarisation of the party-political spectrum this issue even more explosive. The call for into a “social” camp (represented by the PiS) decommunisation and lustration was and a liberal pole (the PO) is likely to have anchored prominently in the PiS party made a decisive contribution toward Law programme. and Justice’s electoral victory. “Streamlining” the Polish state. “Over- All in all, the PiS is neither nationalist hauling” (naprawa) the state is said in the nor “reactionary,” neither integrationist party’s programme to be the overriding nor anti-European, neither anti-Semitic nor precondition “for achieving all other PiS anti-German. These attributes apply more objectives.” PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński to the LPR. The PiS in contrast embodies a summarized the guidelines for reform of social-patriotic traditionalism with a strong the state in the slogan “Clean up, Toughen, element of statism. The strategic project Reorganize!” envisaged by the party is that of setting up “Moral revolution.” Postulating social a Fourth Republic – a morally renewed and justice, accentuating Christian values (the internally consolidated “state of national “axiological bedrock of our cultural area”) solidarity” (Jarosław Kaczyński). Yet the PiS and emphasizing common national bonds is by no means “backward-oriented.” It make up the threefold standard that would like to see Poland modernised, albeit enabled the party to penetrate the reservoir a Poland bound by Christian values, a of national Catholicism. Jarosław Kurski, Polish concept of the state and the prin- commenting in the daily Gazeta Wyborcza, ciple of social balance. It is in favour of noted accurately that the PiS had succeeded Polish membership of the EU, albeit an EU with its patriotic and Catholic phraseology that is not being further consolidated, that in “breaking the monopoly of ‘God, Honour is open to further enlargement and is, SWP Comments 60 December 2005 2 above all, closely linked with the United Announcements made so far and the States. first specific moves by the Marcinkiewicz government provide two pointers. For one, the PiS agenda concentrates on domestic, Claim and Reality economic and social policy issues. In for- How is the PiS world view, which is not eign policy there are few signs of spectacu- radical yet is nonetheless rough-hewn, to be lar innovations. The focus here is on en- translated into legislative and government deavours to concentrate on continuity and activity? The party’s core competence lies a professional approach (see below, p. 5). in the wider bounds of justice, internal Meanwhile, one can but agree with a Polish security and combating crime, so it is commentator’s succinct remark that “the hardly surprising that the Marcinkiewicz PiS is not enthusiastic about ‘abroad’” government’s first measures came in this (Jacek Pawlicki). category and that leading PiS politicians For another, there are signs of a realism hold key portfolios such as home affairs that differs significantly from the wild and administration, justice and secret election campaign rhetoric, a realism that service coordination. One of its showcase is due to wide-ranging economic, financial, projects is the creation of a new “central personnel and institutional restrictions. anti-corruption agency” to report directly The government will probably seek to fade to the prime minister that is to combine out these limitations by means of symbolic competences of the police, the domestic projects or individual measures that are intelligence agency, the Audit Office and given extensive media coverage (such as the the tax police. Marcinkiewicz also plans a patriotism programme or meals for hungry fundamental reconstruction of the secret children). The fresh start in the form of a services and, especially, the dissolution of new republic as advocated by the PiS is an the controversial military intelligence unlikely prospect. That said, the assump- service, the WSI. tion of office by Lech Kaczyński might at A second focus is on economic and social least lead to stronger ideologisation, at policy. The PiS team with its slogan of a least verbally, given that the future head “social Poland” must set social, family and of state could see himself as remote from welfare policy keynotes. But the Marcin- the day-to-day business of government, a kiewicz government’s welfare package, champion of moral change and a motivat- which is geared to the socially weak (im- ing force behind a Fourth Republic. provement of children’s nutrition) and to The Marcinkiewicz government is seated families (billions to be invested in housing, fairly firmly in the saddle. The Opposition children’s allowances and one-off payments is unlikely to be in a position to topple it for new-borns), will be expensive and is by means of a constructive vote of no-con- unlikely to be financed, as initially plan- fidence. Lech Kaczyński will be a head of ned, solely by savings in the public sector. state who is interested in the well-being of To make matters even more difficult, the the government or the ruling party. He is government must see costly demands by its unlikely to block legislation, and even if nationalist and agrarian partners through difficulties arise in passing the budget he parliament.
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