Poland Beyond Solidarity: Defining New Priorities for Polish Domestic and Foreign Policy

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Poland Beyond Solidarity: Defining New Priorities for Polish Domestic and Foreign Policy Poland Beyond Solidarity: Defining New Priorities for Polish Domestic and Foreign Policy A report reflecting the views of the Network 20/20 delegation to Poland November 2005 By Joanna Gwozdziowski with George Billard and Ion Nemerenco Additional contributors Brigitte Rajacic, Amit Vemuri and Michel Zaleski Edited by Richard M. Murphy POLAND BEYOND SOLIDARITY: DEFINING NEW PRIORITIES FOR POLISH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY A Network 20/20 initiative to reach out to our counterparts in Central Europe INTRODUCTION Seventeen years after its historic transition from communism to democracy, Poland has achieved a number of its important domestic and foreign policy goals, including the creation of a civil society and market economy, and membership in both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). At the same time, having accomplished these goals, Poland now faces the question of what’s next: what will be its priorities for the domestic challenges that the country faces, what role will it play within the European community, and what will be the nature of bilateral relations with the United States. With these issues in mind, in November 2005 a Network 20/20 delegation went to Poland seeking answers to three different questions: 1) With the recent Polish parliamentary and presidential elections, what will be the domestic priorities of the new government? 2) What economic policies will the government pursue in order to address the fiscal challenges that Poland faces? 3) What will be the government’s approach towards foreign policy, including relations with the US, NATO and the EU, and its eastern neighbors, including Russia? After an intensive week of meetings in Warsaw and Krakow with senior government officials, business leaders, parliamentarians, academics, and representatives from foundations and the non-profit world, the Network 20/20 delegation reached certain preliminary conclusions. 2 MAIN FINDINGS Poland believes that it is a loyal and reliable partner of the United States and wants to strengthen what it considers to be a strategic partnership with the US. Polish officials emphasized that Poland has historically looked to the US as the leader of the democratic world and America can, therefore, count on Polish support in the future. There is a long history of US support for Polish democracy, including during the Solidarity movement of the 1980s, and there continues to be a reservoir of good feelings between the two nations. A 2005 Pew Research poll, for example, cited Poland as one of only four nations whose population expresses favorable feelings towards America. The one issue where this is not the case is the war in Iraq. Poland’s involvement in Iraq has created a disconnect between the Polish public and the government, with 70% of the population opposed to the conflict, according to the Polish Institute of Public Affairs. Throughout our discussions, Polish officials expressed their desire for a strategic partnership with the US. They argued that Poland can offer more than just assistance in Iraq. In addition to serving as a bridge with the EU, and providing guidance on US policies towards Poland’s eastern neighbors, Polish leaders stressed that the close US- Polish relationship enables them to offer frank advice on how the US should respond to international crises. The new Polish government is likely to continue the same foreign and defense policies of its predecessors. Both the foreign and defense ministers are likely to follow Poland’s traditional policy since 1989 of cultivating strong ties with the US, pursuing military and economic integration within Europe, and remaining cautious in relations with Russia. The current Foreign Minister, Stefan Meller, was associated with Solidarity and is a professional diplomat and academic, having served as Ambassador to France, and most recently, Russia. The current Defense Minister, Radek Sikorski, is Western-educated, was also associated with Solidarity, has served previously as deputy Defense Minister, and has ties to the Bush Administration. Our Polish interlocutors emphasized that Poland will continue its attempts to define its role within NATO and the EU, and will further strengthen relations with the US. The government will face some foreign policy challenges, particularly on how to improve relations with certain members of the EU, as well as with Russia. One potential concern is whether the government will be able to execute such policies given strong Euro-skeptic and anti-Russian feelings within the governing 3 party and its allies in the Sejm, the Polish parliament. The US, therefore, should encourage and support policies by the Polish government that coincide with US national interest. It should also provide guidance or incentives in cases where the direction of Polish government policy is unclear. Poland needs to cultivate and promote its competitive economic advantages – a highly educated population, low cost labor, geographic location – and tackle effectively its challenges – excessive red tape, corruption, and a poor infrastructure. Poland is strategically situated at the center of Europe and has the largest economy of all of the former Soviet bloc countries, with a well established heavy industry base. Poland could be the assembly, warehouse, and transport hub of Eastern Europe. But after more than 15 years of pioneering free market experiments, Poland’s economy is not keeping up with many of its East European neighbors. The higher growth rates posted from 2000 to 2004 are now expected to diminish, despite an environment of increased liquidity provided by EU accession funds, stable foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, continued government spending, and a dynamic consumer services sector driven by rising incomes and improved access to credit. Moreover, high unemployment rates persist despite a continuous stream of foreign companies establishing a presence in Poland. Corruption and red tape are serious impediments to continued foreign investment as is Poland’s underdeveloped infrastructure. (See below) Poland’s new government is willing to station part of the United States anti- missile defense system on its soil, the only such base not on American territory. The US had been conducting secret basing negotiations with Poland. The new Polish government, however, prematurely made a public announcement about Poland’s willingness to base the system. This irritated Russian military leaders who stated that such a space umbrella in Central Europe would only make sense in a conflict with Russia. It is not clear what motivated this announcement, whether it was to prove Poland’s loyalty and willingness to share in US defense structures, to demonstrate to Russia that Poland is now firmly part of a Western defense system, to irritate officials in the Kremlin, or all of the above. Poland would like the United States to spend more money on the F-16 offset program. When Poland agreed to purchase F-16 aircraft from the US, Polish officials were promised that in exchange for this purchase the country would receive investment from American companies in the civilian sector, including research and development, and infrastructure. Polish officials have indicated that so far there have been many promises but little action in this regard. 4 ISSUES AND CONCERNS The minority government will have to seek alliances or a formal coalition with radical parties to help push through its agenda. A minority government was established following the Fall 2005 parliamentary elections. Two center-right parties – the Law and Justice Party (PiS) and the Civic Platform Party (PO) – had received the most votes (28% and 26% respectively), but differences between the two – mainly over economic strategies and political disagreements – prevented the anticipated formation of a coalition government. Law and Justice subsequently formed a minority government. The previous ruling party, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), which is descended from the former communist party, won only 11% of the vote. It lost largely because of numerous corruption scandals during its tenure and its failure to tackle Poland’s high unemployment rate of 18%. In the October presidential race of the same year, Lech Kaczynski (PiS) won 54% of the vote, beating his rival Donald Tusk (PO), who received only 46%. The Law and Justice Party drew much of its support from pensioners, lower-income voters, rural voters, and others who felt they had been under-represented in the past. Its platform urged welfare reforms, the strengthening of social benefits, curbing corruption, and the defense of Catholic and family values (the country is 90% Catholic). Law and Justice also played skillfully on the fears of voters who were skeptical about European integration and concerned that they would be hurt by further economic reforms. For example, PiS leaders have expressed skepticism about Poland’s plan to adopt the euro by the scheduled date of 2011. President Kaczynski has stated that Poland should hold a referendum on joining the euro zone despite the fact that Poland has already agreed to expedite euro-entry preparations. Civic Platform, on the other hand, was committed to the promotion of a free market economy, including the rapid adoption of the euro and the introduction of a 15% flat tax. It attracted well-educated, market-oriented urban voters who wished to enjoy the benefits of European integration and globalization. PiS decided to govern as a minority party because it was able to gain the support of two radical parties that shared parts of its domestic platform: the nationalist League of Polish Families (LPR) and the Farmers’ Self-Defense Party (Samoobrona). In May 2006 PiS entered into a formal coalition with the two parties. In the current coalition government, the LPR’s leader, Roman Giertych, is deputy prime minister in charge of education and Andrzej Lepper, the head of Samoobrona, is also a deputy prime minister whose portfolio includes agriculture and rural development. On the 5 international front, both these parties have Euro-skeptic tendencies and are staunchly anti-Russian.
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