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AFTER the JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN of ACTION a Game Plan for the United States

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AFTER the JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN of ACTION a Game Plan for the United States OCTOBER 2015 AFTER THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION A Game Plan for the United States By Ilan Goldenberg, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Avner Golov, Nicholas A. Heras, Ellie Maruyama, and Axel Hellman ABOUT THE AUTHORS Ilan Goldenberg is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Middle East Security Program at CNAS. Elizabeth Rosenberg is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy, Economics, and Security Program at CNAS. Avner Golov is an Adjunct Researcher at CNAS, a Research Fellow at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, and a Harry S. Truman Scholar at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Nicholas A. Heras is the Research Associate for the Middle East Security Program at CNAS. Ellie Maruyama is the Research Associate for the Energy, Economics, and Security Program at CNAS. Axel Hellman is a former Joseph. S. Nye, Jr. National Security Intern at CNAS. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to thank Richard Nephew, Barbara Slavin, Amos Yadlin, and CNAS colleague Loren DeJonge Schulman for their review of this report. They also wish to thank David Abreu, Amanda Claypool, and Ryan Ouwerkerk for research support, as well as Maura McCarthy and Melody Cook for the editing and design of this report. After the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: A GAME PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES By Ilan Goldenberg, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Avner Golov, Nicholas A. Heras, Ellie Maruyama, and Axel Hellman TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ............................................ 5 Part 1: Implications of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ....... 9 Chapter 1: Understanding the Agreement and Its Implications for Nuclear Proliferation ...................................11 Chapter 2: Regional Implications of the Agreement .................22 Chapter 3: Key Global Implications of the Agreement for the United States ........................................35 Part 2: A Game Plan for the United States – 6 Pillar Strategy ........ 45 Chapter 4: Pillar 1 - Set Conditions for Effective Long-Term Enforcement and Implementation .......................47 Chapter 5: Pillar 2 - Counter Iran’s Destabilizing Activities in Close Collaboration with Arab Partners .......................55 Chapter 6: Pillar 3 - Reassure Israel of U.S. Commitments and Deepen Cooperation on Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Behavior ..66 Chapter 7: Pillar 4 - Cooperate with Iran on Issues of Common Interest .....................................73 Chapter 8: Pillar 5 - Leverage the Agreement to Strengthen the Nonproliferation Regime ...............................82 Chapter 9: Pillar 6 - Build on the Deal to Advance U.S. Global Leadership ....................................89 Top 10 Policy Recommendations in the Aftermath of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Work with like-minded international partners and Congress to ensure effective 1 implementation and oversight of the agreement, including developing sanctions reimposition or “snapback” mechanisms beyond what is incorporated into the JCPOA. Continue to hold Iran’s nuclear program militarily at risk through planning and 2 investment for military contingency scenarios and maintaining current U.S. force posture in the Middle East. Increase coordination with Gulf Cooperation Council partners on countering Iran’s 3 destabilizing activities in the Middle East, including a new Multi-National Joint Task Force with Arab partners targeted at countering asymmetric threats from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Sunni extremists that would include joint exercises, training, intelligence, and joint actions. Use a combination of military pressure and diplomatic engagement against Iran in 4 Syria to shift the balance on the ground and set conditions for a negotiated settlement to the civil war. Reinvigorate a U.S.-Israel high-level dialogue on a joint strategy to prevent a nuclear- 5 armed Iran in the aftermath of the JCPOA, combined with professional dialogues and collaboration focused on implementation, detection of cheating, and response scenarios. Expand communication channels with Iran, including eliminating the State 6 Department’s no-contact policy and establishing a channel to the Iranian Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. Deepen cooperation with Iran on issues of common interest such as maritime security 7 and Afghanistan, but limit initial engagement on ISIS to operational de-confliction while refraining from early attempts at strategic cooperation in Syria. 8 Leverage the agreement to strengthen nonproliferation norms, most notably for monitoring and verification. Reduce the importance of Iran in the bilateral agenda with China in order to limit 9 Chinese leverage, but maintain the importance of the Iran issue in the bilateral agenda with Russia to facilitate cooperation in an increasingly fraught relationship. Insulate the U.S. economy from energy market volatility caused by the introduction of 10 increased Iranian oil supply to world markets in the aftermath of the JCPOA, including supply-and-demand side measures. CNAS.ORG Executive Summary The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed to by Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) on July 14, 2015, represents a historic moment for U.S. foreign policy. The agree- ment will have to be judged based on its ability to help further four key American objectives: • Prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon; • Increase stability in the Middle East; • Strengthen the nonproliferation regime; and • Improve America’s global standing. Leveraging the agreement to achieve these objec- tives is far from a foregone conclusion. Success will depend heavily on the policies the United States and its partners pursue in the aftermath of the agreement. Over the next 20 to 25 years, if imple- mented effectively, the agreement could succeed in permanently ending Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Alternatively, if implementation fails, the JCPOA could pave the way for an Iranian bomb in 15 years or sooner. The agreement could open up new channels of cooperation with a more moder- ate Iran and help stabilize the Middle East, or it could cause increased destabilizing competition between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The agree- ment could strengthen nonproliferation norms across the globe or result in Middle Eastern states more aggressively pursuing domestic enrichment capabilities similar to those of Iran. Finally, the deal could better position the United States in a broader geopolitical competition with China and Russia, or it could lead to the Chinese and Russians taking advantage of the new channels open to Iran while the United States reaps few, if any, benefits. This report outlines a game plan for the United States that seeks to maximize the upsides of a diplomatic breakthrough with Iran while protect- ing against the negative implications of the deal. This task inherently includes tensions that pull in opposite directions. The United States must be prepared to quickly reimpose sanctions in the event of Iranian violations even as it encourages | 5 October 2015 | After the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: A Game Plan for the United States the return of private businesses to Iran to ensure sustained oversight and support for enforcement meaningful sanctions relief. U.S. policy will have and implementation throughout the duration of to more forcefully counter Iran’s support for sur- the agreement; rogates and proxies in the Middle East while • Appoint a presidential envoy for coordinating seeking new avenues for U.S.-Iranian engagement. and implementing the JCPOA; and However, history has shown that with regional or • global competitors such as China or Russia, the Invest in increasing the capacity of the United States is indeed capable of both countering International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). and engaging at the same time and its approach to Pillar 2: Work closely with Sunni Arab partners to Iran should be no different. more forcefully counter Iranian actions that are This paper lays out such a strategy based on six against U.S. interests, most notably their support central pillars and more than 45 associated policy for surrogates and proxies in the Middle East. recommendations that support the strategy. The United States should: Pillar 1: Set conditions for effective long-term • Create a high-level defense and intelligence enforcement and implementation by taking forum at the Cabinet level that regularly meets steps outside of the JCPOA that complement the with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and agreement. Arab partners to oversee the development and The United States should: execution of a strategy to counter Iran’s destabi- lizing activities in the Middle East; • Develop additional sanctions reimposition • Form a Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) or “snapback” mechanisms, beyond what is with Arab partners targeted at countering uncon- incorporated into the JCPOA, with like-minded ventional threats from the Islamic Revolutionary international partners; Guard Corps (IRGC) and Sunni extremists. Use • Pass legislation that creates greater congressio- this task force to: nal buy-in for implementation of the agreement » Conduct joint exercises to counter Iran’s and includes additional resources for enforce- unconventional capabilities; ment of the JCPOA and new U.S. unilateral “snapback” sanctions authorities that can be » Train U.S. partners in foreign internal defense utilized in the event of an Iranian violation; and unconventional warfare; and • Create mechanisms to
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