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Open Willthesisfinaldraft3.Pdf THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTIONS OF AL QAEDA AND ISIS: UNDERSTANDING THE RISE OF RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM ISAAC WILL SPRING 2019 A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for baccalaureate degrees in History and Political Science with honors in History Reviewed and approved* by the following: David Atwill Professor of History Thesis Supervisor Cathleen Cahill Professor of History Honors Adviser * Signatures are on file in the Schreyer Honors College. i ABSTRACT Having emerged only in the last century, radical Islamic terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon. This especially holds true in the world of academia where the study is far too often emotionally driven, sensationalistic, reliant on secondary sources, or focused on organizations only at their operational peak. As a result, radical Islamic terrorism has remained difficult to genuinely understand. This work seeks to further a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon through an analysis of the origins and evolutions of both Al Qaeda and ISIS – two of the most salient terror organizations to arise in the modern era. Specific attention is paid to the development of each organization’s operational objectives throughout their foundational years. After examining the environments in which they arose, the various leaders who oriented them, and the circumstances that shaped their enemies and objectives, a number of findings come to light. Radical Islamic terror organizations are not monolithic. They often vary in the most fundamental ways, a fact exemplified well through a dual analysis of Al Qaeda and ISIS. Nonetheless, a number of overarching trends can be identified. Both of these organizations proved to be leadership-driven, reactionary, and territorial (among other characteristics) throughout their developmental years. With evidence ranging from secondary to primary sources that have only recently been uncovered or presented, this work aims to contribute to the growing field of objective research on radical Islamic terrorism. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................... iii Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................ 1 Chapter 2: The Rise of Al Qaeda ................................................................................. 34 Chapter 3: The Rise of ISIS ......................................................................................... 87 Chapter 4: Conclusion.................................................................................................. 151 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................ 160 iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work would have been impossible without the advice and supervision of Professor David Atwill. I cannot thank him enough for his patience and enthusiasm in helping me narrow in on a topic. I also cannot thank him enough for the invaluable feedback that he provided me with throughout the drafting process or his brevity in responding to my numerous and difficult questions – he offered suggestions and corrections that I may never have considered regardless of how many times I returned to my original draft. Above all else, though, I cannot thank him enough for his kindness. This senior research project was never a burden and largely enjoyable due to him. Of course, I am also grateful for the support I received from my parents, Ted and Georgette – not just regarding this work in particular, but also regarding my undergraduate studies as a whole. There is no amount of words or pages that could fittingly express the support they provided me with throughout the past four years (or how genuinely thankful I am for it). The same can be said of my friends, who so often double as my own role models. 1 Chapter 1 Introduction For many Americans in the late 20th century, the United States’ interaction with the Middle East was limited to diplomatic relations with Israel, distant proxy wars with the Soviet Union, or increasingly turbulent exchanges with the leadership in Iran and Iraq. Radical Islamic terrorism did not become a salient phenomenon before the century’s last decade – a report from the University of Pennsylvania Law School notes that the term, “radical Islamic terrorism,” was used sparingly before then, perhaps only a handful of times.1 The American public’s awareness of this phenomenon was fundamentally altered after a group of Islamic fundamentalists detonated a truck bomb beneath the World Trade Center’s North Tower in New York City on February 26th, 1993. It killed six, wounded 1,042 others, and became the first of many terror attacks inspired by foreign, radical Islam that were launched against the United States of America on its own soil.2 As of October 2018, more than three thousand Americans have been killed and several thousand more have been wounded by Islamic terrorists on the U.S. mainland alone.3 This statistic excludes the vast number of individuals killed overseas since this terrorism began – a number including multiple thousand more.4 Over the past three decades, two groups have come to the forefront of radical Islam’s war with the west: Al Qaeda and ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). During their respective peaks (Al Qaeda in 2001 and the Islamic State in 2014), each has proven itself capable of destabilizing an entire region, reaping fear throughout the strongest of countries, and withstanding multinational military coalitions aimed at their destruction. Defeating these groups 2 has been a matter of upmost importance since the war on terrorism began.* Yet in December of 2014, Major General Michael K. Nagata, commander of American Special Operations in the Middle East, said of radical Islam, “We have not defeated the idea. We do not even understand the idea.”5* In one of the earliest treatises on military strategy, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, it is written, “If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.” But “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”6 Understanding Islamic fundamentalism and how it has manifested itself militantly is imperative in working to end the war on terror and in working to prevent another. It may be even more important to understand how Islamic fundamentalism has historically lead to the creation of multinational terroristic organizations and how those organizations have evolved to develop their ultimate goals. Despite this importance, however, the study has often fallen victim to rampant mischaracterization due to emotionally driven research. Fear and anger have caused many scholars to hastily jump to conclusions and to analyze only the readily accessible information. This work will examine the phenomenon of radical Islamic terrorism and its origination through a dual analysis of Al Qaeda and ISIS. Together, the two groups are capable of offering an excellent lens through which the broader issue can be examined; vastly different in both character and motive, one is able to see that radical Islam can originate in many shapes and evolve into many forms through just an examination of these two examples alone. The phenomenon is not monolithic. Even its two Middle Eastern “flagship” organizations (Al Qaeda * The United States alone has spent more than 2.8 trillion dollars in the fight against terrorism since the attacks on September 11th, 2001, according to a 2018 study by the Washington-based Stimson Center. * Major General Michael K. Nagata’s comments came an astonishing twenty-one years after the first Islamic terror attack on the United States homeland. 3 and ISIS), are littered with irreconcilable differences – so much so that they vehemently denounced one another in 2014.7 Yet this analysis also reveals some overarching trends. Both organizations, for example, are leadership-driven, territorial, reactionary, and often only quasi- religious in nature throughout the pursuit of their ultimate objectives. Understanding these groups – who each group views as the primary enemy, what each group ultimately desires, and so on – is crucial in understanding the nuanced nature of radical Islamic terrorism as a whole. After doing so, one is able to view radical Islamic organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS for what they truly are: political and militant non-state actors with generally legitimate grievances against entities stronger than themselves, who analyze their situations and rationalize their strategically chosen actions with radical interpretations of religious material. From there, one can understand how each group originated and how each group’s objectives evolved over time; this knowledge can ultimately be employed in suppressing similar organizations and stunting the spawn of others. With these overarching goals in mind, this study will focus primarily on the developmental years of both Al Qaeda and ISIS. Existing Scholarship The subject of Islamic terrorism, compared alongside many other contemporary fields of research, is young and underdeveloped. In many respects, it did not become a widely studied topic until after the September 11th, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center. Before then, only a relatively small number of individuals were conducting research on what was to become one of America’s most pressing issues in the 21st century.8
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