BOSHIN WAR SOMA XLV CRISIS COMMITTEE BACKGROUND GUIDE

Unto the children, Born in these progressive years At which we wonder, First of all the tales of old, Full in glory, should be told. - Emperor Meiji, Tanka ​

SOMA XLV Boshin War Crisis Committee Background Guide⎟ 2

INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the Southern Ontario Model United Nations Assembly’s Boshin War Historical Crisis. This war marked the resurgence of imperial power against the vestige of Tokugawa feudalism. At stake beyond the political and military struggle are the more far-reaching questions of modernisation, social reform, and industrialisation. We hope you are as excited for this year’s crisis as we are.

For those of you unfamiliar with Crisis, this committee differs significantly from the other Model UN committees. Instead of representing countries, you represent people, each with your own individual agenda. We try to simulate every aspect of a historical conflict from the economics and politics to religion and military conquest. You will each play the role of someone who lived and held power during the early Meiji Restoration era, and will have a chance to reshape history. As your characters, you will manage taxes and trade, lead armies on campaigns and on the field of battle, and respond to envoys from foreign imperial powers who will have their own interests in Japan. Above all, you will be trying to win the war while advancing your own standing as much as possible.

This background guide is meant to provide a general overview of the war and its causes. It is meant to provide a starting point for your position paper research; however in order for your experience to be as fulfilling as it can be, it is necessary that you devote time and effort into conducting your own independent research for this Crisis. It is also highly recommended that you review the political structures of the Edo Period as well as the military technology and strategies in use at the time. We recommend that this research be used in your position papers. Lastly, it is recommended that all delegates read the entire background guide, and especially that they review the sections pertaining to Committee Structure and Procedure.

We wish you the best of luck,

Helen Kwong Alec Sampaleanu Ernest Li Crisis Director Crisis Director Crisis Head

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POLITICAL CONTEXT

For over two and a half centuries, fifteen successive members of the Tokugawa clan have ruled Japan as Shogun and de facto rulers, exercising political orders in place of a puppet emperor. ​ The Edo Period, as this period is named, centred around the bakufu government located in the capital Edo, and lasted approximately from 1600 when Tokugawa Ieyasu seized power from the emperor and named himself Shogun three years later, to 1868 when Emperor Meiji proclaimed in the Charter Oath his intention to have personal rule. Each side had its supporters and detractors; and in the aftermath of the so-called Meiji Restoration, shogunal forces broke out in open and hostile opposition against the reformed Imperial Court, leading to beginning of this year’s crisis, the Boshin War.

TOKUGAWA DECLINE

By the mid-nineteenth century, Tokugawa Japan was in rapid decline. Foreign influence pervaded domestic affairs, while military and economic disasters severely discredited the prestige and prowess of the bakufu. Social fragmentation by the centralisation of power in the shogunate further impaired Japan, as tensions rose between a reactionary bakufu that was reluctant to relinquish its control, a class of commoners and peasants that were displeased with drought and negligence, and a foreign presence that was intent on pressuring the shogunate to Westernise. For centuries, Tokugawa policy focussed on restricting samurai power and preventing mutiny or political insurrection. The most well-known and perhaps the most effective of these was the system of sankin-kōtai (‘alternate attendance’), which forced the samurai to spend alternate years ​ in Edo under the shogun and severed ties between lord and his feudal lands, thereby undermining the ability of the samurai and daimyo to keep watch over a growing peasant class. Dire consequences for the nineteenth century shogunate followed. Economic growth coupled with the absence of a strong bureaucratic class in the peripheries became an ideal condition for the rise of a wealthy and powerful middle class, descended from peasant roots.1 The ambitious provincial élite was soon joined by young nobles who had Western education; in the years before the Restoration, the shogunate was plagued with large and powerful prefectures rising in revolt against the bakufu. Two remedial campaigns sent to Chōshū in 1866 were successful in controlling the volatile crowd, and only served to worsen their ferment and expose weaknesses in the bakufu.2

Japan under the Tokugawas was thus extremely fragile, especially throughout the 1860s as half-hearted attempts at reform did little to offer solutions for the underlying problems. Peasant unrests in the provinces were becoming more numerous and more frequent, so much that the urgency of reforming various systems—taxation, in particular—became a point of great controversy in the court. The bakufu suffered in the face of near bankruptcy and the shogun’s

1 W. G. Beaseley, Meiji Restoration, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), 24 ​ ​ 2 C. Totman, The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu 1862-1868, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1980), 317. ​ ​

SOMA XLV Boshin War Crisis Committee Background Guide⎟ 4 personal power over political affairs continued to erode. This was, nonetheless, an opportunity for the emperor to regain personal authority. Emperor Kōmei’s open disapproval of Tokugawa Iemochi’s submission to foreign pressure added further fervour to the anti-shogunate (tōbaku) movement. Their conflict reached an eventual truce after the defeat to rebel forces in Chōsū in 1866, but by this point the events of recent year had already significantly undermined the traditional hierarchy from Tokugawa Japan’s greatest years: the shogunate was clearly unable to resist a strongly-armed resistance, and the imperial court was prepared to regenerate. The deaths in 1866 were followed by a last set of reforms as the bakufu introduced the Keiō Reforms, intended to Westernise aspects of economy, trade, and society. These developments fuelled, however, the conviction of rebels in Chōshū and subsequently Satsuma that the shogunate was acting out of selfish self-preservation, and the reforms were short-lived once the Boshin War began.

THE MEIJI GOVERNMENT

From its inception, the Meiji government was intended to serve as a departure from the feudalism that persisted throughout Japanese history. Devising a new form of government was, however, a point of consternation. It was a well-known fact by 1868 among intellectuals, many of whom had a Western education, that the Court nobles would be incompetent members of a new bureaucracy, and that the Emperor, after centuries of rule under the guise of greatness, was alienated by an domain that was increasingly difficult to control.3 Thus the Meiji government’s primary goal was to re-establish the prerogative of the emperor and correct abuses that had hitherto been ignored; the emperor needed a strong public presence. In December of 1868, this was formalised into a system of three levels of local administration: cities, prefectures, and domains.4 Nonetheless, in reality, the Meiji political system was more similar than different in character to the Tokugawa feudal state, only that the Emperor was the new Shogun.

Moreover, the new political regime did not provide immediate relief from peasant rebellion. Following the trend of growing social unrest from the last Tokugawa years, records suggest that there were 343 incidents of peasant protest between 1868 and 1872 , with 1869 yielding a record number of 110.5 Conditions became more peaceful in 1870 with the revival of agriculture and a successful harvest, though this little to do with policy enacted by the new government.6 Nor did the Meiji Restoration considerably improve on opportunities for great political participation among the peasant class. In many instances, the replacement of feudal lords as intermediate powers with a centralised bureaucracy limited the efficacy of traditional protest methods.7 Thus, although the Meiji Restoration supposedly ended the state of neglect left

3 Beaseley, Meiji Restoration, 326. ​ ​ 4 Ibid., 328. 5 S. Vlastos, “Opposition movements in early Meiji,” in Cambridge History of Japan, edited by M. B. Jansen, ​ ​ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 368. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid., 372.

SOMA XLV Boshin War Crisis Committee Background Guide⎟ 5 by the Tokugawa period, it did so in such a way that change was largely restricted to the upper political class of society. Moreover, even if the agricultural landscape became more peaceful following 1870, the social atmosphere did not. The promulgation of the Conscription Act in January 1873 provoked caused hostility from both samurai and peasant classes: the former, because it displaced them from their traditional role as an élite militia; and the latter, because it displaced them from their land and imposed a further economic burden.8 Furthermore, the idea of a military draft conflicted with the well-established Tokugawa principle of conservatism and rigid social hierarchy. In any case, the Meiji government was hesitant to disturb the existing order; in taxation, raising funds, and wider reform. The rise of popular rights movements under the influence of Western political theory served as another source of instability in the 1870s.9

SOCIAL STRUCTURES

The Tokugawa system was able to remain in power for such a long time, even by the standards of East Asian History, partly because of the highly structured social order that it adopted from its predecessors. A rigid class system based on inherited position kept the Emperor, the Court nobles (kuge), the Shogun, and the daimyo safely at the top of the social ​ ​ hierarchy, followed by classes of samurai, farmers, artisans, and merchants.10

Because the Shogunate derived its power from the feudal principle of duty and loyalty, political ideology throughout the Tokugawa period into the nineteenth century emphasised complete subordination to the class system. The Bakufu was at the top of the hierarchical structure and all lower classes owed their allegiance to the shogunate; this included even the Emperor and the Imperial Court, and among scholarly circles it was a common sentiment that if the Shogun and Court should have conflicting interests, it was the duty of feudal lords to respect the bakufu.11

ECONOMY

The early Edo Period in Japan was one of constant–although perhaps not rapid–economic growth up until the early 19th century. The country had achieved relative peace ​ for the first time in hundreds of years, and the fractured nation began to rebuild itself. The same can not be said of the final years of the Tokugawa shogunate, which were highlighted by a stagnating economy and growing social unrest.

8 Ibid., 371. 9 Ibid., 407. 10 Beaseley, Meiji Restoration, 22. ​ ​ 11 Ibid., 34.

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ECONOMIC HISTORY

In the last years of the Sengoku Jidai,12 Toyotomi Hideyoshi embarked on his Taikou ​ ​ ​ Kenchi, a land survey that restructured the land ownership system in Japan.13 Each region was ​ measured by its rice production, and Daimyō were expected to pay a certain percentage of this ​ value as taxes to the government. This system was known as the kokudaka-sei, or rice standard ​ ​ currency, and was the basis of the Edo period economy. It was a break from the convoluted feudal system of earlier periods, and was accompanied by sweeping social changes. Hideyoshi carried out a Katanagari (sword hunt) which formally separated the civilian and military classes by ​ confiscating all civilian weapons.14 The new Samurai class were forbidden from engaging in ​ ​ civilian matters such as commerce and business. Their only income was a salary of rice they received from the Bakufu, a policy that tied the Samurai to the central government. Meanwhile, ​ ​ ​ the civilian class was forbidden to own weapons, and were further stratified into smaller sub-classes. Social mobility was virtually non-existent.15

The kokudaka-sei was an effective policy for the first half of the Edo period, when Japan ​ was able to import most commodities from China and Korea. Japan had been traditionally rich in silver and copper, which it exported in large numbers in exchange for goods such as cotton, silk, sugar, and tea.16 By the middle of the 18th century, however, the Japan’s rich mines were ​ severely depleted. This forced the Bakufu to begin import-substitution, whereby previously ​ imported commodities were now cultivated or produced within Japan.17 This led to the devaluation of rice as a currency in comparison to gold and silver. Interestingly, the Tokugawa government never introduced paper money. The kokudaka-sei was too integral a part of the ​ economic and governing structure of the nation. What this all amounted to was that the Japanese economy was greatly weakened by the beginning of the nineteenth century.

JAPANESE SOCIETY AND THE ECONOMY

Japanese society was drastically different from that of most other countries in the mid 1800s. Eighty percent of the population was directly involved in the farming of rice.18 Of the remaining, most were artisans or merchants. A small percentage of the population was the Samurai class. Japan differed from contemporary European nations in that the aristocracy was not especially rich. Only a few Samurai held any amount of land, and while regional provinces ​

12 Literally “Age of Civil War,” this is most often translated into “Warring States,” and describes the 150 year period of Japanese history where the country was not ruled by a central authority, after the fall of the Ashikaga Shogunate. 13 Toshiaki Tamaki, “Japanese Economic Growth during the Edo Period,” Kyoto Sangyo University Economic Review 1 ​ ​ (March, 2014): 259. Accessed January 30, 2016, https://ksurep.kyoto-su.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10965/1042/1/KSUER_1_255.pdf 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid, 260. 17 Ibid. 18 Susan B. Hanley and Kozo Yamamura, Economic and demographic change in preindustrial Japan, 1600–1868 (Princeton: ​ ​ Princeton University Press, 1977), 69.

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(Han) were ruled by powerful Daimyō, most military, economic, and political power was still ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ centralized in the Shogunal court at Edo. The powers of the Samurai were constantly restricted, ​ ​ and by the end of the Edo Period, most Samurai served as courtiers, bureaucrats, and ​ administrators.19 Most scholars and artists hailed from the Samurai class.20 The Samurai were ​ ​ ​ forbidden from owning lands. Their only income was a monthly rice stipend from their lords that did not increase according to the rate of inflation. Furthermore, the policy of Sankin-kōtai, ​ ​ implemented by Tokugawa Iemitsu in 1635, further impoverished the Daimyō and their Samurai ​ ​ ​ retainers.21 Sankin-kōtai, literally translated as “alternate attendance,” mandated that all Daimyō ​ ​ ​ were forced to spend every second year in Edo. While the exact details of the policy changed throughout the Tokugawa rule, the effect was that the Daimyō were forced to spend lavishly to ​ ​ furnish their estates in the capital. This influx of wealth is part of what made Edo the economic centre of Japan. Furthermore, the yearly travels of the Daimyō and their large retinues ​ necessitated the construction of inter-city highways all across Japan, stimulating to increased trade and commerce.22 What this amounted to was that by the end of the Edo, Samurai were ​ ​ forced to go into ever-increasing amounts of debt in order to furnish their extravagant lifestyles, while the lower classes were given more opportunities to enrich themselves and their families. Such was the stage set for the ascendancy of the merchant and artisanal classes.

During late Tokugawa Japan, the merchant class, ostensibly the lowest class on the social pyramid, rose in prominence.23 Merchants and, to a lesser degree, artisans, began to live much more luxurious lifestyles. Although there were strict regulations on how members of each class should eat, dress, and even entertain themselves, a wealthy middle class began to develop. This middle class would fuel much of Edo Japan’s economic growth. Whether by increasing trade or manufacturing, the middle classes changed the face of Japan. Yet this was not an industrial revolution like the one in Europe several decades earlier. Japan never embraced industrialisation till after the Meiji Restoration. Nevertheless, the nation still saw huge increases in productivity and income.24

FOREIGN TRADE AND COMMERCE

It is a common misconception that Tokugawa Japan was completely isolated from the world around it. While it is true that with the Japanese policy of Sakoku trade with foreign ​ nations was heavily restricted, the power of the merchant class proves that commerce was alive and well in Japan. Inside the nation, the construction of large roads between cities and increased coastal development led to large amounts of trade between different regions of Japan. Japan had

19 Tamaki, “Japanese Economic Growth during the Edo Period,” 262. 20 Conrad Totman, A History of Japan (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), 200. ​ ​ 21 Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 127. ​ ​ ​ ​ 22 Tamaki, “Japanese Economic Growth during the Edo Period,” 262. 23 Tetsuji Okazaki, "The role of the merchant coalition in pre-modern Japanese economic development: an historical ​ ​ institutional analysis," Explorations in Economic History 42 (2005): 184–201. Accessed January 30, 2017, ​ ​ doi:10.1016/j.eeh.2004.06.005. ​ ​ 24 Tamaki, “Japanese Economic Growth during the Edo Period,” 263.

SOMA XLV Boshin War Crisis Committee Background Guide⎟ 8 traditionally traded with nations across the Pacific. Although Tokugawa Iemitsu had heavily restricted international trade with his closed country edicts in the 1630s, he did not ban it. All Western nations but the Netherlands were banned from Japan. Dutch traders were restricted to Dejima, an artificial island in Nagasaki harbour where the central government could closely monitor foreign imports. Dejima was also the only place where Chinese traders could purchase Japanese goods. Far to the north, trade with the Ainu people of Hokkaido was controlled by the Matsumae clan of Ezo Domain. Trade with the Joseon Dynasty of Korea was controlled by the Sō clan of Tsushima Island. Finally, the Satsuma Clan of southern Kyushu controlled trade with the Ryūkyū kingdom. These four “mouths” of Japanese trade were some of the only contact that Japan had with the world beyond its waters for two hundred years.25 Through these mouths, however, flowed thousands of pounds of metals, goods, and commodities. When Commodore Perry opened up Japan to the outside world in 1853, the Japanese economy was forced to adapt to free trade, which it had never experienced. Between 1860 and 1865, Japanese exports quadrupled, and imports increased by over eight-fold.26 The economy was thrown into shambles, and while some enterprising businessmen were able to amass vast fortunes by constructing railroads, laying telegraph lines, and venturing into Western business markets, others went out of business entirely. Inflation continued to increase, and widespread famines led to increased food prices. The Japanese gold standard was eroded by foreign exchanges, further impoverishing the nation.27 By 1860, over seventy tons of gold had left Japan, crippling the economy.28

What all this meant was that by the end of the Bakumatsu, or late Edo period, Japan’s ​ ​ economy was in a laughable state. What had been a model of domestic economic policy was now a backwards nation mired in debt and unemployment. The Meiji Restoration ended this period of Japanese economic struggles, and ushered in a Japanese economic revolution.

MILITARY

The Western view of Japanese warfare is one warped by romanticized misconceptions. There is an image of honourable Samurai lining up across the battlefield, bowing to each other, ​ ​ and then facing each other head on in single combat. The reality is that Japanese warfare was never as simple as that. It was a constantly evolving art, one that adapted to changes in technology and society.

SOCIETY AND WARFARE

25 Ibid, 264. 26 Ibid. 27 John W. Bower, Yokohama Boomtown: Foreigners in Treaty Port Japan (1859-1872) (Cambridge: MIT University Press, ​ ​ 2008), 2.2. 28 Mark Metzler, Lever of empire: the international gold standard and the crisis of liberalism in prewar Japan (Berkeley: ​ ​ University of California Press, 2006), 15.

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It was during the early Heian period, during the late eighth and early ninth centuries, that ​ ​ the role of the Samurai began to be at the center of Japanese society.29 With the weakening of the ​ ​ Imperial court, more and more power was vested into the hands of the military class. This was a time of valour and honour, when Japanese warfare most closely resembled that which is seen in today’s media.30 As the Imperial title continued to lose its significance and became more ceremonial, the importance of the Samurai was strengthened, until they ruled the nation under ​ ​ the title of Shogun. However, with this military regime came conflict, and eventually the fracturing ​ ​ of the nation.

At the start of the Sengoku Jidai, Japan was divided into a multitude of small domains, ​ ​ each ruled by its own feudal lord, called a Daimyō. These lords often disagreed with each other, ​ ​ and the vacuum of central authority meant that the nation was embroiled in constant warfare for over one hundred and fifty years. This conflict required more than just small, professionally trained armies of earlier times. Daimyō began to levy large armies composed of cheap, lightly ​ ​ armed soldiers called Ashigaru,31 to fight opposing domains. With the ascension of the Tokugawa ​ ​ Shogunate, however, peace finally returned to Japan. And with it came a change in the role of the Samurai. ​ The Samurai, once warriors and leaders, were now primarily administrators and ​ ​ bureaucrats. To be sure, they were still trained in combat and strategy, and they followed a strict lifestyle that ensured they were still ready to put down any insurrections or defend the nation from foreign incursions.32 Nevertheless, the importance of warfare in Japanese society was reduced for most of the Edo period. Commodore Perry’s actions in ending Japanese seclusion forced military development to the forefront of the Japanese consciousness. Japan was facing threats both inside and outside the country, and was forced to adapt its armed forces to match them.

With Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s Katanagari, the lower classes were removed from the military ​ ​ hierarchy. For two hundred and fifty years, the Japanese peasantry was not permitted to touch a weapon. With the arrival of Western merchants and diplomats, so came Western weapons and tactics. Southern domains such as the Satsuma and Chōshū began to train their armies in the ​ ​ ​ ​ Western style of conscripted riflemen, raised from the peasantry of Japan. The Shogunate and their allies were quick to follow suit.

The Shogunate had the support of the French Empire, led by Napoleon III, and was very interested in modernizing its military. The Imperial allies of Satsuma, Chōshū, and Tosa ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ domains (among others) were mainly equipped and trained by the British government. This

29 Karl F. Friday, "Teeth and Claws, Provincial Warriors and the Heian Court," Monumenta Nipponica (Summer 1988): ​ ​ ​ 155–170. 30 Karl F. Friday, Samurai, warfare and the state in early medieval Japan, (Abingdon-on-Thames: Pyschology Press, 2004). ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ 31 Stephen Turnbull, Warriors of Medieval Japan, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007), 99. ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ 32 Jonathan Clements, A Brief History of the Samurai, (Philadelphia: Running Press, 2010). ​ ​ ​

SOMA XLV Boshin War Crisis Committee Background Guide⎟ 10 meant that both European powers had a vested interest in providing better military support, even if supposedly they were completely neutral in the conflict.33

WEAPONRY AND EQUIPMENT

The most iconic image of Japanese warfare is the Katana. A long, curved sword, wielded ​ ​ ​ ​ with two hands, the Katana was a deadly and effective weapon in the hands of a Samurai knight. ​ ​ ​ ​ It was also, however, never the primary weapon used by Japanese armies.34 In the times of the Sengoku Jidai, Samurai mainly fought with long spears called Yari. Samurai were also skilled ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ archers, and could use longbows called Yumi effectively. Samurai cavalry was also armed with Yari ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ or with longswords such as Katana. During the 1560s, the Portuguese arrived, and with them ​ ​ came firearms. Matchlock arquebuses were used to devastating effect by Toyotomi Hideyoshi in the Battle of Nagashino, where he introduced the tactic of repeating volleys. But the rise of the Tokugawa Shoguns ended any further import in Western weaponry, and it was only in the 1850s that new weapons began to reach Japan.35

The forces of both the Imperial and Shogunate sides were a mix of traditional Samurai ​ and modern conscripted infantry. Both sides were equipped with a variety of smoothbore guns and rifles. The majority of Shogunate line infantry used the German made Büchse rifle, which had ​ ​ been exported to Japan since the 1840s.36 These antiquated weapons had slow rates of fire and limited range. While a few Shogunate vassals had more modern rifles at their disposal, and the Shogun’s personal guard was personally equipped with state-of-the-art Chassepot rifles provided ​ ​ by France.37 On the Imperial side, most troops were armed with French made Minié rifles, which ​ ​ greatly outranged the Büchse rifles but still suffered from a low rate of fire. The forces of the ​ ​ Chōshū domain had access to some American Snider repeating rifles, while Tosa domain soldiers ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ made use of the American Spencer repeating rifle.38 Troops of the Satsuma domain used American ​ ​ ​ ​ revolvers. In terms of artillery, both sides made extensive use of both wooden cannons and more modern cast-iron Armstrong guns which fired explosive shells. ​ ​ Japan had once been a major naval power in East Asia. During the Sengoku Jidai, many ​ ​ Daimyō invested in large coastal fleets to do battle with their enemies. In fact, some of the first ​ ironclads in the world were developed in Japan, when Oda Nobunaga commissioned the construction of 6 iron-plated galleys.39 Toyotomi Hideyoshi built vast fleets to transport troops for his invasion of Korea.40 But as the years progressed, Japanese naval technology lagged behind that of Western powers. As ships of the line were invented, and then eclipsed by steamships,

33 Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 303-305. ​ ​ ​ 34 Stephen Turnbull, Katana: The Samurai Sword, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2011), 22. ​ ​ ​ 35 Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan. ​ ​ 36 Ibid, 287. ​ ​ 37 Conrad Totman, Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1862–1868, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1980), 344. ​ ​ ​ 38 Ibid. ​ ​ 39 Georges Sansom, A History of Japan, 1334–1615, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 309. ​ ​ ​ 40 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: strategy, tactics, and technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941, ​ ​ ​ (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 4.

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Japan was more focused on building a merchant navy to ply trade with China. Thus when Commodore Perry sailed into Edo Bay in 1853, the Japanese navy did not have the strength to resist his advances, and so started a period of intense naval development. The Shogunate, with Dutch assistance, built its first steamship, the Kankō Maru, in 1855.41 By the beginning of the ​ ​ Boshin War, it had acquired a total of eight steamships and numerous auxiliaries.42 Many of the domains also built up their own fleets. In particular, Satsuma domain, in the south of Kyushu, ​ ​ had a large fleet of nine warships and numerous auxiliaries.43

While neither side in the conflict was fully modernized, by the end of the civil war the Imperial side was undoubtedly the superior force. Possessing a larger army, better weapons, and superior leaders, the domain armies supporting the Emperor would lay the groundwork for the Imperial Japanese Army.

FOREIGN POWERS

In the fifteen years between the forced opening of Japan in 1853 by Commodore Perry and the onset of the Boshin War, many occidental powers entered diplomatic relations with Japan. Often accompanying diplomatic missions, Western military advisers, equipped with advanced firearms and a fluent knowledge of European tactics and military strategy, helped educate the Japanese forces in their unique military style. The Western powers that delegates should consider include the United States, France, and Great Britain. Although the war was primarily fought between Imperial and Tokugawa combattants, these Western nations worked in the shadows, providing military support in the form of weaponry to both the Shogunate’s forces and the Imperial Army.44

GREAT BRITAIN

By this time in the nineteenth century, the British Empire was at its height with colonial possessions stretching from British Guyana to India. After its decisive victory over the French at the Battle of Trafalgar (1805), the Royal Navy was indisputably the strongest navy in the world. Following Perry’s visit, Britain played an extensive role in the modernization of Japan. A permanent British naval base and military garrison was stationed in Yokohama from 1862 onwards.45 Those troops taught Japanese forces in Yokohama modern British drills and formations.46 The instruction of the Japanese by the British was not limited to just the area around Yokohama; the British were training Japanese soldiers in the British style of warfare in

41 Ibid, 5. ​ ​ 42 J. Charles Schencking, Making Waves: Politics, Propaganda, And The Emergence Of The Imperial Japanese Navy, ​ ​ 1868–1922, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 15. ​ 43 Ibid, 16. ​ ​ 44 Diana Wright, “Female Combatants and Japan’s Meiji Restoration: The Case of Aizu,” War in History 8, no. 4 ​ ​ ​ ​ (2001): 396-417. 45 Chihiro Hosoya and Ian Nish, The history of Anglo-Japanese relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 9. ​ ​ ​ 46 Ibid., 19.

SOMA XLV Boshin War Crisis Committee Background Guide⎟ 12 domains all across Japan,. For instance, the Tracy mission, lead by Commander Richard Tracy, was dispatched to Japan in 1867 with the purpose of setting up a naval academy to train Japanese soldiers.47 Naturally, the extent of the training varied from domain to domain. The British training had a particularly strong influence in the Satsuma and Saga domains, which made up a fair portion of the emperor’s army. In fact, during the Boshin War, warriors from the Satsuma domain were armed with British equipment and even wore British Army uniforms.48 As a result, the anti-shogunate forces employed the British military standard.49

Officially, the British were neutral for the majority of the war, after neutrality was declared between all foreign forces, but it is impossible to underestimate ignore the impact of British support for the anti-shogunate troops on the outcome of the war.50 It would not be wrong to call British neutrality a “benevolent neutrality” in favour of Emperor Meiji’s forces.51 Most notably, Sir Harry Parkes, the Envoy Extraordinary and Consul-General of the Great Britain to Japan, convinced the Shogunate to surrender a castle without bloodshed using only the tremendous influence he had as a foreign diplomat.52 On another occasion, he persuaded all of the other foreign diplomats to abandon their policies of neutrality.53 Although there was still fighting going on, Parkes argued that the war already had a clear victor: the forces under the command of Emperor Meiji. Because of Parkes’ efforts to end neutrality, Meiji’s forces received the CSS Stonewall, an American Civil War era battleship which was permanently impounded by ​ ​ the Americans on account of their neutrality. Parkes and his entourage were also the first Europeans to meet Emperor Meiji in person.54

Cordial relations between Meiji and the British did not stop at the finale of the Boshin War. In 1869, weeks after the end of the Boshin War, Alfred, Duke of Edinburgh, became the first European prince to set foot on Japanese soil and to have an audience with Emperor Meiji.55

FRANCE

The court of Emperor Napoleon III was very friendly to the Tokugawa Shogunate. Similar to the British, the French provided military support to the Shogunate prior to the war. A French garrison and naval force was stationed in Yokohama to rival the English garrison and navy.56 These soldiers helped train the Japanese in the French method of war. In addition to the impromptu training given by forces that were stationed in Japan, the French sent multiple

47 Ibid., 19; the Tracy mission was recalled at the beginning of the Boshin War because of British neutrality. 48 Donald Keene, Emperor of Japan: Meiji and his world, 1852-1912 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 125. ​ ​ 49 H​ osoya and Nish, The history of Anglo-Japanese relations, 21. ​ ​ 50 Keene, Emperor of Japan, 166. ​ ​ ​ 51 Hosoya and Nish, The history of Anglo-Japanese relations, 21. ​ ​ 52 Keene, Emperor of Japan, 143. ​ ​ 53 Ibid., 166. 54 Ibid., 172. 55 Ibid., 184. 56 Meron Medzini, French policy in Japan during the closing years of the Tokugawa regime (Cambridge: East Asian Research ​ ​ ​ Center, 1971), 102.

SOMA XLV Boshin War Crisis Committee Background Guide⎟ 13 training missions to educate Japanese forces. The most notable of these was Captain Chantoine’s mission in 1867, which brought 71 pieces of artillery with them as instructional tools. Because the extent of the mission was too large for the space in Yokohama, Chantoine moved the camp to Edo, so that he could train cavalry forces and artillery as well as infantrymen. However, the impact of the mission was minimal because it was cut short by the inception of the Boshin War and subsequent French neutrality. Captain Tracy, the commander of the British mission also present in Yokohama, duly noted that “the progress made in the instruction of the army has not been so great as the instructors at first hoped it would be.”57

There was a great deal of trust between the Shogunate and the French government. To illustrate his trust, the Shogun allowed the French to oversee the purchase of American warships on behalf of Japan. The French trust in the Shogunate is also palpable. From the beginning of the Boshin War, although France was formally neutral, the Tokugawa Shogunate staunchly received the “moral support of France.”58 Even after the disastrous defeat at Toba-Fushimi, the French continued to support the Tokugawa, believing that the Shogunate would regain power.59

During the Boshin War, Leon Roches, the French ambassador to Japan, feared that there was negative sentiment towards French soldiers in Meiji held territory because the French supported the Tokugawa. His concern may have been correct as eleven French sailors were killed in an incident by samurai who were from a domain loyal to the emperor.60

Despite the animosity shown towards the French during the Boshin War, the anti-French sentiment soon dissipated . The Iwakawa mission visited France in 1872 and met with Adolphe Thiers, the French president.61 Moreover, France played a crucial role in the military development of Japan, sending a mission which lasted from 1872 to 1880 that fulfilled what the Chantoine mission sought to accomplish: reorganizing and revolutionizing the entire Imperial Japanese Army.

AMERICA

America was less than one hundred years old at this time in history; however, it had already cemented itself as one of the leading world powers. Having defeated the Mexican forces in the Mexican American War (1846-1848) as well as having fought a bloody civil war, the

57 Ibid., 132. 58 Ibid., 164. 59 Keene, Emperor of Japan, 129. ​ ​ 60 Ibid., 133. ​ ​ 61 The Iwakura embassy was a grand tour of America and Western Europe that left Yokohama in 1871 and returned a year and 10 months later. Marius B. Jansen, The making of modern Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, ​ ​ 2000), 360.

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American army was experienced and well versed in the art of modern war. In 1860, a Japanese delegation took a tour around America, journeying from San Francisco to New York.62

Although the United States was the world power directly responsible for opening up Japan, its role in Japan from 1861 onwards was diminished because of the aforementioned American Civil War (1861 - 1865). Furthermore, the USA was one of the parties that agreed to remain neutral for most of the war. Nevertheless, the Americans sold firearms and other weaponry to both forces.63 Additionally, like the British, American neutrality was geared in favor of the anti-shogunate forces.

America’s influence on the war was less than Britain’s influence. Prior to the war, in 1868, the CSS Stonewall, a French built American civil war-era ship, was ordered by the ​ ​ Tokugawa Shogunate to supplement its navy. At the outbreak for war, the Americans impounded the vessel in the name of “neutrality.” Because of this grounding, the anti-shogunate forces eventually came into possession of the CSS Stonewall and used it to help the war effort. ​ The congenial relations with the Meiji government persisted after the war. After the war, the Iwakura embassy spent 205 days in America, travelling from San Francisco to Chicago to Boston. In their time in America, the Japanese learned crucial lessons from a recently developed nation.

CRISIS PROCEDURES

Crisis differs greatly from other Model UN committees. It lacks the usual topics, resolutions, speakers’ lists, speaking times, and strict procedures, and this makes it considerably more organic and efficient. That being said, Crisis’ fluid nature makes it very easy for it to spiral out of hand, thus there are a few guidelines that have been developed to ensure that the committee remains focused, organized, and on-task.

SPEAKING IN COMMITTEE SESSIONS

There will be a Chair in each committee that retains absolute control over who is allowed to speak, and for how long. The Chair will be rigorously trained, and understands not to abuse his/her privilege. He/she will remain impartial and will exert minimal influence over the delegates’ decisions and strategies.

There is no speakers’ list, delegates need only raise their placard, and the Chair will acknowledge them. There is no maximum speaking time, however the Chair will cut off delegates if the speech becomes excessive; there will be no filibustering in committee. If a delegate wishes to respond to another delegate’s points, they do not need to declare a Point of Information or Right of Reply: again, they must raise their placard and wait for the Chair to call

62 Alistair Swale, The Meiji Restoration: monarchism, mass communication and conservative revolution (Basingstoke: Palgrave ​ ​ ​ Macmillan, 2009), 40. 63 Wright, “Female Combatants and Japan’s Meiji Restoration: The Case of Aizu,” 400. ​

SOMA XLV Boshin War Crisis Committee Background Guide⎟ 15 on them. When desired, the committee can motion for an un-moderated caucus. This is essentially a 5-10 minute period during which any delegate can speak freely, without raising their placard.

CRISIS DIRECTIVES

The Committee’s decisions are articulated to Crisis Central via Directives. These state what the committee wishes to do with its resources. Directives can include anything from troop movements and hirings, to the management of resources and food supplies, to asking for an envoy from another state, etc. Committee Directives must receive a majority vote in order to be passed to Crisis Central.

There are also Personal Directives, which describe what a delegate’s character wishes to do that is independent of the Committee. These are top secret, and they allow characters to communicate individually with other characters from their Committee and the opposing Committee, as well as with Crisis Central. These will be passed using slips of paper handed to the Pages that will be waiting in the Committee rooms.

Crisis Central will use its discretion in evaluating whether or not the instruction on the Directive (both Committee and Personal) is physically possible and historically probable, and thus whether or not it will be processed. If a Directive is processed, it will be acknowledged as “fact.” Committees and individuals will receive frequent updates on the statuses of their directives. The members of Crisis Central have been very well trained, and have Crisis experience. Thus, we kindly ask that the delegates do not object to any of the decisions that the SOMA Crisis Staff will make.

POSITION PAPERS

Delegates are expected to supplement their knowledge of the Boshin War with a position paper on their assigned characters. These papers should be 400-600 words with citations in Chicago format.

The topic is fairly open ended, but generally speaking, all position papers should outline the specific character’s background, motivations, goals, resources, and other details that might be relevant for committee sessions. Delegates are strongly recommended to start working on these position papers as soon as possible. Delegates must submit a position paper to be considered for a delegate award and the papers will factor into those award decisions.

Position papers will be due on April 10 at midnight. Please send them as a .pdf attachment to [email protected]. ​ ​

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Akamatsu, P. Meiji 1868: Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Japan. Translated by M. Kochan. ​ ​ London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1972. Beaseley, W. G. Meiji Restoration. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972. ​ ​ ———. The Modern History Of Japan. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963. ​ ​ Bower, John W. Yokohama Boomtown: Foreigners in Treaty Port Japan (1859-1872). Cambridge: MIT ​ ​ University Press, 2008. Clements, Jonathan. A Brief History of the Samurai. Philadelphia: Running Press, 2010. ​ ​ Friday, Karl F.. Samurai, warfare and the state in early medieval Japan. Abingdon-on-Thames: ​ ​ ​ ​ Pyschology Press, 2004. Friday, Karl F.. "Teeth and Claws, Provincial Warriors and the Heian Court." Monumenta ​ Nipponica. Summer 1988. ​ Harotunian, H. D. Toward Restoration: Growth of Political Consciousness in Tokugawa Japan. Berkeley: ​ ​ University of California Press, 1970. Hanley, Susan B. and Kozo Yamamura. Economic and demographic change in preindustrial Japan, ​ 1600–1868. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977. ​ Hosoya, and I. Nish. The history of Anglo-Japanese relations. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000. ​ ​ Jansen, M. B. and G. Rozman, ed. Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa to Meiji. Princeton: Princeton ​ ​ University Press, 1986. Jansen, M. B. The making of modern Japan. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University ​ ​ Press, 2000. Keene, Donald. Emperor of Japan: Meiji and his world, 1852-1912. New York: Columbia University ​ ​ Press, 2002. Medzini, Meron. French policy in Japan during the closing years of the Tokugawa regime. Cambridge: East ​ ​ Asian Research Center, Harvard University; distributed by Harvard University Press, 1971. Metzler, Mark. Lever of empire: the international gold standard and the crisis of liberalism in prewar Japan. ​ Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006. Okazaki, Tetsuji. "The role of the merchant coalition in pre-modern Japanese economic development: an historical institutional analysis," Explorations in Economic History 42. ​ ​ 2005. Accessed January 30, 2017. doi:10.1016/j.eeh.2004.06.005. ​ ​ Swale, A. The Meiji Restoration: monarchism, mass communication and conservative revolution. ​ ​ Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Tamaki, Toshiaki. “Japanese Economic Growth during the Edo Period.” Kyoto Sangyo University ​ Economic Review 1. March, 2014. Accessed January 30, 2016. ​ https://ksurep.kyoto-su.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10965/1042/1/KSUER_1_255.pdf Totman, C. Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu 1862-1868. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, ​ ​ 1980. ———. A History of Japan. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005. ​ ​ Turnbull, Stephen. Warriors of Medieval Japan. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007. ​ ​ ​ Turnbull, Stephen. Katana: The Samurai Sword. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2011. ​ ​ ​ Vlastos, S. “Opposition movements in early Meiji.” In Cambridge History of Japan, edited by M. B. ​ ​ Jansen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

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Wright, D. 2001. "Female Combatants and Japan’s Meiji Restoration: The Case of Aizu." War in ​ History 8 (4): 396-417. doi:10.1177/096834450100800402. ​ http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/09683445/v08i0004/396_fcajmrtcoa. ​