The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 19 February 01st—15th 2009 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted THE ANSO REPORT on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-4 Northern Region 4-5 The attacks in Kabul on Feb 11th dominated the period. Elements consistent with Eastern Region 6-8 previous trends include the targeting of Government security ministries and the combination of BBIED and small arms within the teams. New elements included Southern Region 8-11 the coordinated deployment of BBIED to multiple sites, the apparent inclusion of Western Region 12-13 14 a non-security Ministry (Education, not assessed as intended target) and the size ANSO Info Page of the force which attacked the Justice Ministry (5 men). Afghan security forces (dominantly ANP and NDS) acted effectively to prevent YOU NEED TO KNOW more than 50% of the attacks from occurring indicating a high level of readiness. It is ANSO opinion that the attacks do not fundamentally alter the vulnerability of • Authoritative statement the city. It remains as easy to breach as it has for the last two years and attacks like made regarding AOG per- this will continue and escalate in complexity and impact. ceptions of NGO operating in Afghanistan Earlier in the report period the UN and NGO community were shaken by an arti- cle appearing on the ‘Al-Samood’ website (known for its association to the Taliban) • Kabul attacks demonstrate improved planning and coor- entitled “Foreign Organizations and their Symbolic Goals”. The well written arti- dination but no strategic cle argued that NGO in Afghanistan specifically are undermining Islam, spreading change Christianity, wasting money and working as spies of foreign embassies. A number • NGO community suffers of NGO and UN agencies were named or had their logo displayed. The piece first 2009 fatality in criminal stopped short of recommending attacks but is considered capable of inspiring case in south Nangahar such amongst radicals, criminals or anyone else with an invalidated grudge. • Use of suicide attacks esca- The 14 day period reported more than 150 AOG attacks including an unusually lating after long lull high eight (08) successful suicide attacks and more than 30 IED’s. In a particularly nasty execution on Feb 8th an AOG beheaded the Head of Refu- gee Affairs in Helmand while more than 50 ANA/ANP were killed in small arms ANSO is supported by ANSO is supported by skirmishes. Approximately 42 civilians died from the conflict in the same period. NGO DATA & TRENDS Against the backdrop of the article on the ‘Al-Samood’ website, noted above, inci- dents involving NGO continued this period with an additional seven (7) incidents bringing the annual total to 25. (13 by same period of 2008) Sadly the period saw the first fatality of the year with an INGO driver being mur- dered outside his home. The case is considered personal and criminal although the general deterioration of conditions in south Nangahar is believed to be producing a more conducive environment for crime. NGO incidents this year have already included 3 RPG/SAF attacks, 2 cases arson, 2 IED’s, 4 armed robberies and 7 abductions. AOG remain the primary cause of NGO incidents (17 vs 6 ACG) and incidents are occurring across a wide geographic area. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 3 35 This Report Period 1 30 Attention on the security situation 25 in Afghanistan has again focused and commenced using small arms 20 on Kabul, as the capital experi- fire. Following a return of fire by 15 enced co-ordinated attacks against ANP guards, one BBIED deto- 10 nated allowing the second to enter 5 government ministries on Febru- 0 ary 11. The close proximity of the the complex in the ensuing confu- ministries of Education, Justice sion. The second BBIED, once inside also detonated causing a and Interior obfuscated reporting AOG ACG of the intended targets; however it reported ten fatalities. is clear that the Ministry of Justice be the case for several reasons. was the primary objective of At the Ministry of Justice, small Firstly, security forces sealed off the Ministry AOG forces. arms fire by five AOG allowed all of Justice and the immediate vicinity and of the attackers to successfully evacuated staff in a seemingly effective man- enter the building and spread out At approximately 10:10am, AOG ner, thereby limiting the number of casualties randomly killing ten MOJ employ- wearing suicide vests and firing and containing the attackers. Secondly, the ees. The majority of casualties small arms attacked the Depart- actions of the ANP guards outside the Minis- were caused by gunfire; however a ment of Corrections in District try of Education and Interior, served to stop BBIED detonation was also re- Four and the Ministry of Justice in one and possibly two BBIEDs. Thirdly, al- ported. The attackers were killed District Two. At the same time, though parallels have been drawn with the No- by government forces after a four the ANP also engaged a BBIED vember 2008 Mumbai attacks, once inside the hour standoff. in front of the Ministry of Educa- Ministry of Justice, the attackers showed little tion, killing him with an RPG understanding of the interior of the building prior to detonation. Reports also Currently, 28 fatalities have been and were intent on randomly shooting employ- suggest that a further attacker was recorded (including the attackers) ees rather than organising a hostage situation. killed in the street of the Ministry and almost 60 casualties. The Tali- Furthermore, reports suggest that the attackers of Interior by ANP; although it ban promptly claimed responsibil- were ill prepared for a long siege, unlike the remains uncertain as to whether ity for the attacks, saying they attackers in Mumbai. this was a BBIED. were in response to the treatment of prisoners by the government. Although the attackers penetrated the heart of The two successful penetrations the Kabul establishment, further shattering the of government ministries shared a It is facile to argue that the Febru- public’s confidence in the government’s ability similar modus operandi: more ary 11 attacks are an indication of to protect its citizens, the underlying security than one attacker, the use of small the growing presence and sophis- environment remains largely unchanged. The arms fire to overpower static tication of AOG in the capital. It ability of AOG to attack targets in Kabul has guards and the intention to cause is well known that AOG activity been evidenced repeatedly in the past year with maximum casualties following the has been intensifying in Kabul the February 11 attacks and the subsequent breach. At the Department of Province over the past year and security clampdown unlikely to change the Corrections, two BBIEDs ap- furthermore that these groups fact. proached the guarded entrance have long possessed the logistical support and planning capabilities During the past reporting period, a local NGO KEY THREATS & CONCERNS necessary to carry out co- worker was the victim of a theft by an organ- !" Decreased security in and ordinated assaults. around city ised group who had punctured a tyre as a dis- !" IEDs, suicide bombings, traction. The tactic, popular in 2006 around rocket attacks It is extremely fortunate that the Taimani St, may see a resurgence and NGO !" Abduction attacks did not produce signifi- are advised to travel two or three blocks after cantly more casualties. This may being advised of a flat tyre to avoid the area. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents PARWAN PARWAN Year to Date 1 This Report Period 0 10 In Parwan, there have been four 8 comparison to no reported in- reported seizures of explosives or 6 IED caches so far this year in stances in the same period of 2008. It is difficult to discern at 4 this stage whether the seizures are 2 KEY THREATS & CONCERNS a result of increased ANP dili- 0 !" History of IED incidents on gence or a general rise in the avail- road between Chaharikar and Bamyan ability and deployment of IEDs. Contributing to the theory that !" Collateral damage from attacks on security forces the placement of IEDs may be on AOG ACG the increase in the province, there !" Demonstrations on main road ture IED detonations in Ghorband and Shin- have been two reported prema- in Ghorband wari this year. NGO Incidents DAYKONDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 0 10 This Report Period 0 8 6 In Daykundi, NGO are relatively the same period last year; however free to operate with no reports the majority of crimes are related 4 this year of attacks on ANA or to personal disputes or petty theft. 2 ANP forces. Incidences of crimi- 0 nal activity are slightly higher than The absence of AOG attacks could be explained by the scarce government security presence in KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the province, thereby providing AOG ACG !" Free AOG movement few visible targets, as well as the ernment and AOG hold Daykundi. !" Minimum security presence comparatively limited strategic !" Banditry value, with which both the gov- NGO Incidents LOGAR LOGAR Year to Date 0 This Report Period 0 30 Following a VBIED attack on an 25 IMF convoy in Kabul on Febru- was hidden behind a compound wall 20 ary 1, France suffered further and upon detonation, followed by 15 10 casualties when a French officer an ambush using SAF. A further 5 and his Afghan interpreter were French soldier is understood to have 0 killed in an IED explosion.