Chronology of Events in Afghanistan, October 2003*
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26 August 2010
SIOC – Afghanistan: UNITED NATIONS CONFIDENTIAL UN Department of Safety and Security, Afghanistan Security Situation Report, Week 34, 20 – 26 August 2010 JOINT WEEKLY SECURITY ANALYSIS Countrywide security incidents continued to increase compared to the previous week with the NER, NR, SR and SER, recording higher levels of security incidents. In the ER a minor downward trend continues to be observed over the last three weeks, in the WR and CR records dropped. The dynamics along the south and south-eastern belt of the country vary again with the SR reasserting as the most volatile area. Security incidents were more widespread countrywide with the following provinces being the focus of the week: Kunduz, Baghlan in the NER; Faryab in the NR, Hirat in the WR, Kandahar and Helmand in the SR; Ghazni and Paktika in the SER and Kunar in the ER. Overall the majority of the incidents are initiated by insurgents and those related to armed conflict – armed clashes, IED attacks and stand off attacks - continue to account for the bulk of incidents. Reports of insurgents’ infiltration, re-supply and propaganda are recorded in the NR, SR, SER, ER and CR. These reports might corroborate assumptions that insurgents would profit from the Ramadan time to build up for an escalation into the election and pre-election days. The end of the week was dominated by the reporting of the violent demonstration against the IM base in Qala-i-Naw city following a shoot out at the entrance of the base. Potential for manipulation by the local Taliban and the vicinity of the UN compound to the affected area raised concerns on the security of the UN staff and resulted in the evacuation of the UN building. -
The First Six Months GR&D
Governance, Reconstruction, Jan 15, GR&D & Development 2010 Interim Report: The First Six Months GR&D Governance, Reconstruction, & Development “What then should the objective be for this war? The aim needs to be to build an administrative and judicial infrastructure that will deliver security and stability to the population and, as a result, marginalize the Taliban. Simultaneously, it can create the foundations for a modern nation.” -Professor Akbar S. Ahmed Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies American University Cover Captions (clockwise): Afghan children watch US Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Di- vision conduct a dismounted patrol through the village of Pir Zadeh, Dec. 3, 2009. (US Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Dayton Mitchell) US Soldiers from 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division conduct a joint patrol with Afghan National Army soldiers and Afghan National Policemen in Shabila Kalan Village, Zabul Prov- ince, Nov. 30, 2009. (US Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Efren Lopez) An Afghan elder speaks during a shura at the Arghandab Joint District Community Center, Dec. 03, 2009. (US Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Francisco V. Govea II) An Afghan girl awaits to receive clothing from US Soldiers from 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, Boragay Village, Zabul Province, Afghanistan, Dec. 4, 2009. US Soldiers are conducting a humanitarian relief project , "Bundle-up,” providing Afghan children with shoes, jackets, blankets, scarves, and caps. (US Air Force -
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs June 5, 2009 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS21922 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance Summary The central government’s limited writ and widespread official corruption are helping sustain a Taliban insurgency, and have fed pessimism about the Afghanistan stabilization effort. However, ethnic disputes remain confined largely to political debate and competition, enabling President Hamid Karzai to focus on trying to build Afghan institutions, and on his bid for re-election in presidential elections slated for August 20, 2009. Karzai has faced substantial loss of public confidence, in large part due to widespread official corruption, but his opponents—divided by ethnicity and personal ambition—were unable to form a strong electoral coalition as the presidential election registration process closed on May 8, 2009. At the same time, U.S. officials have been shifting away from reliance on building the central government and toward promoting local governing bodies and security initiatives. That trend is to accelerate, according to the Obama Administration’s review of U.S. strategy, the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009. The core of the new strategy is a so-called “civilian surge” that will virtually double, to about 900, the number of U.S. civilian personnel to deploy to Afghanistan to help build its governing and security institution, and to increase economic development efforts. The Administration also says it will develop “metrics” by which to judge the performance and legitimacy of the Afghan government, including its efforts to curb official corruption, although the Administration and many in Congress appear reluctant to tie any U.S. -
The Politics of Disarmament and Rearmament in Afghanistan
[PEACEW RKS [ THE POLITICS OF DISARMAMENT AND REARMAMENT IN AFGHANISTAN Deedee Derksen ABOUT THE REPORT This report examines why internationally funded programs to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militias since 2001 have not made Afghanistan more secure and why its society has instead become more militarized. Supported by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) as part of its broader program of study on the intersection of political, economic, and conflict dynamics in Afghanistan, the report is based on some 250 interviews with Afghan and Western officials, tribal leaders, villagers, Afghan National Security Force and militia commanders, and insurgent commanders and fighters, conducted primarily between 2011 and 2014. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Deedee Derksen has conducted research into Afghan militias since 2006. A former correspondent for the Dutch newspaper de Volkskrant, she has since 2011 pursued a PhD on the politics of disarmament and rearmament of militias at the War Studies Department of King’s College London. She is grateful to Patricia Gossman, Anatol Lieven, Mike Martin, Joanna Nathan, Scott Smith, and several anonymous reviewers for their comments and to everyone who agreed to be interviewed or helped in other ways. Cover photo: Former Taliban fighters line up to handover their rifles to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan during a reintegration ceremony at the pro- vincial governor’s compound. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. j. g. Joe Painter/RELEASED). Defense video and imagery dis- tribution system. The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. -
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs March 25, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS21922 Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance Summary The capacity, transparency, and legitimacy of Afghan governance are considered crucial to Afghan stability as U.S.-led NATO forces turn over the security mission to Afghan leadership. The size and capability of the Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but the government remains weak and rife with corruption. The government has struggled to widen its writ, even though substantial powers are concentrated in the elected presidency through powers of appointment at all levels. President Hamid Karzai has served as president since late 2001; he is constitutionally term-limited and will leave office after presidential and provincial elections scheduled for April 5, 2014. Several major figures—some close to Karzai and others opposed—have registered to run for president; many of their slates include faction leaders long accused of human rights abuses. Some observers are concerned that Karzai might try to use state machinery to favor a particular candidate, and he appears to have tilted toward his longtime confidant and former Foreign Minister, Zalmay Rasoul. If a run-off is needed, it is possible that the new president would not take office until some time in July 2014. Fraud in two successive elections (for president in 2009 and parliament in 2010) was extensively documented, but Afghan officials, civil society organizations, and key donor countries have taken substantial steps to limit the potential for systemic manipulation and fraud in the upcoming vote. -
Strategic Insight
Strategic Insight The Loya Jirga, Ethnic Rivalries and Future Afghan Stability by Thomas H. Johnson Strategic Insights are authored monthly by analysts with the Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC). The CCC is the research arm of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. August 6, 2002 On June 24 the Afghan transitional government and administration of Hamid Karzai was installed during formal ceremonies in Kabul. Karzai had easily won the June 13 election at a national political assembly, or loya jirga. The loya jirga consisted of 1500 representatives, elected or appointed from 32 provinces, and debated the political future of Afghanistan over a seven-day period. The Karzai government is supposed to rule Afghanistan through 2003. During the ceremony, Karzai and his new cabinet took an oath in both major Afghan languages (Pashtu and Dari), vowing to "follow the basic teachings of Islam" and the laws of the land, to renounce corruption, and to "safeguard the honor and integrity of Afghanistan."[1] How successful they are in achieving these vows will be critical to the near term future of Afghanistan, its reconstruction, and possibly the stability of the entire region of Central Asia. This transitional government was the result of an Emergency Loya Jirga and part of the Bonn Agreement (of November-December 2001). While not explicitly stating so in the Bonn Agreement, Lakhdar Brahimi, the Special Representative of the U.N. -
19 October 2020 "Generated on Refers to the Date on Which the User Accessed the List and Not the Last Date of Substantive Update to the List
Res. 1988 (2011) List The List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council res. 1988 (2011) Generated on: 19 October 2020 "Generated on refers to the date on which the user accessed the list and not the last date of substantive update to the list. Information on the substantive list updates are provided on the Council / Committee’s website." Composition of the List The list consists of the two sections specified below: A. Individuals B. Entities and other groups Information about de-listing may be found at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson (for res. 1267) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/delisting (for other Committees) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/list (for res. 2231) A. Individuals TAi.155 Name: 1: ABDUL AZIZ 2: ABBASIN 3: na 4: na ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻌﺰﻳﺰ ﻋﺒﺎﺳﯿﻦ :(Name (original script Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1969 POB: Sheykhan Village, Pirkowti Area, Orgun District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: Abdul Aziz Mahsud Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: na Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 4 Oct. 2011 (amended on 22 Apr. 2013) Other information: Key commander in the Haqqani Network (TAe.012) under Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani (TAi.144). Taliban Shadow Governor for Orgun District, Paktika Province as of early 2010. Operated a training camp for non- Afghan fighters in Paktika Province. Has been involved in the transport of weapons to Afghanistan. INTERPOL- UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices- Individuals click here TAi.121 Name: 1: AZIZIRAHMAN 2: ABDUL AHAD 3: na 4: na ﻋﺰﯾﺰ اﻟﺮﺣﻤﺎن ﻋﺒﺪ اﻻﺣﺪ :(Name (original script Title: Mr Designation: Third Secretary, Taliban Embassy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates DOB: 1972 POB: Shega District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Afghanistan Passport no: na National identification no: Afghan national identification card (tazkira) number 44323 na Address: na Listed on: 25 Jan. -
Afghanistan's Parliament in the Making
The involvement of women in Afghanistan’s public life is decreasing. Attacks, vigilantism, and legal processes that contradict the basic principles of human and women’s rights are the order of the day. The security situation is worsening in step with the disenchantment E MAKING H arising from the lack of results and functional shortcomings of existing democratic structures. In the face of such difficulties, we often forget who should create the legal underpinnings for the power in Afghanistan: the women and men in parliament who are working to build a state in these turbulent times of transition. To what extent will these elected representatives succeed in creating alternatives to established traditional power structures? What are the obstacles they face? What kinds of networks or caucuses are they establishing? This book, which is based on interviews of male and female members of parliament held in Kabul in 2007 and 2008, examines the reali- IN T pARLIAMENT ANISTan’s H ties of parliamentary work in Afghanistan. It shows how varied and G coercive the patterns of identification prevalent in Afghanistan can AF be, and it provides a rare opportunity to gain insights into the self- images and roles of women in parliament. ISBN 978-3-86928-006-6 Andrea Fleschenberg Afghanistan’s parliament in the making Andrea Fleschenberg Gendered understandings and practices of politics in a transitional country .) ED BÖLL FOUNDATION ( BÖLL FOUNDATION H The Green Political Foundation Schumannstraße 8 10117 Berlin www.boell.de HEINRIC Afghanistan’s parliament in the making Andrea Fleschenberg, PhD, currently works as research associate and lecturer at the Institute of Social Science at the University of Hildesheim, Germany. -
Research Report
RESEARCH REPORT Playing the Hard Power Card. Pakistan’s fencing of its Afghan border By Siegfried O. Wolf 18 April, 2020 - ISSN 2406-5633 Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf, Director of Research at SADF (Coordinator: Democracy Research Programme); he was educated at the Institute of Political Science (IPW) and South Asia Institute (SAI), both Heidelberg University. Additionally he is member (affiliated researcher) of the SAI as well as a former research fellow at IPW and Centre de Sciences Humaines (New Delhi, India). Abstract For decades a simmering conflict in the ties between Kabul and Islamabad, the issue of the Afghan- Pakistan border resurfaced after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 (Shah, 2013, p. 85) and the subsequent international engagement in Afghanistan. It is now gaining further momentum through the start of a unilateral border fencing project by Pakistan - which apparent last phase of implementation coincides with the U.S.-Taliban Deal (U.S. Department of State, 2020), the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the launch of negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government regarding the future of the country (intra-Afghan dialogue). Against this background, one must ask: what explains the construction of such a fence by Pakistan - particularly since the target country chose not to pursue such a project - and what is to be thought of its timing? In this SADF Research Report, it is argued that Pakistan’s border fencing is not just a part of a larger border management project intended to undermine the movement of cross-border terrorists, smugglers and drug traders. It has a clear geopolitical dimension reaching far beyond the officially proclaimed border control function - which by itself is a legitimate undertaking of any sovereign state. -
Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions
AGREEMENT ON PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN PENDING THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan, In the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Determined to end the tragic conflict in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights in the country, Reaffirming the independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, Acknowledging the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice, Expressing their appreciation to the Afghan mujahidin who, over the years, have defended the independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the country and have played a major role in the struggle against terrorism and oppression, and whose sacrifice has now made them both heroes of jihad and champions of peace, stability and reconstruction of their beloved homeland, Afghanistan, Aware that the unstable situation in Afghanistan requires the implementation of emergency interim arrangements and expressing their deep appreciation to His Excellency Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani for his readiness to transfer power to an interim authority which is to be established pursuant to this agreement, Recognizing the need to ensure broad representation in these interim arrangements of all segments of the Afghan population, including groups that have not been -
Report 2013–1124
Prepared in cooperation with the Afghan Geological Survey under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense Task Force for Business and Stability Operations Topographic and Hydrographic GIS Datasets for the Afghan Geological Survey and U.S. Geological Survey 2013 Mineral Areas of Interest Open-File Report 2013–1124 U.S. Department of the Interior U.S. Geological Survey Cover: Photo showing mountainous terrain and the alluvial floodplain of a small tributary in the upper reaches of the Kabul River Basin located northeast of Kabul Afghanistan, 2004 (Photograph by Peter G. Chirico, U.S. Geological Survey). Topographic and Hydrographic GIS Datasets for the Afghan Geological Survey and U.S. Geological Survey 2013 Mineral Areas of Interest By Brittany N. Casey and Peter G. Chirico Open-File Report 2013–1124 U.S. Department of the Interior U.S. Geological Survey U.S. Department of the Interior SALLY JEWELL, Secretary U.S. Geological Survey Suzette M. Kimball, Acting Director U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia: 2013 For more information on the USGS—the Federal source for science about the Earth, its natural and living resources, natural hazards, and the environment, visit http://www.usgs.gov or call 1–888–ASK–USGS. For an overview of USGS information products, including maps, imagery, and publications, visit http://www.usgs.gov/pubprod To order this and other USGS information products, visit http://store.usgs.gov Any use of trade, product, or firm names is for descriptive purposes only and does not imply endorsement by the U.S. Government. Although this report is in the public domain, permission must be secured from the individual copyright owners to reproduce any copyrighted materials contained within this report. -
Afghanistan Orbats
Coalition Combat Forces in Afghanistan AFGHANISTAN ORDER OF BATTLE by Wesley Morgan January 2013 This document describes the composition and placement of U.S. and other Western combat forces in Afghanistan down to battalion level. It includes the following categories of units: maneuver (i.e. infantry, armor, and cavalry) units, which in most cases are responsible for particular districts or provinces; artillery units, including both those acting as provisional maneuver units and those in traditional artillery roles; aviation units, both rotary and fixed-wing; military police units; most types of engineer and explosive ordnance disposal units; and “white” special operations forces, described in general terms. It does not include “black” special operations units or other units such as logistical, transportation, medical, and intelligence units or Provincial Reconstruction Teams. International Security Assistance Force / United States ForcesAfghanistan (Gen. John Allen, USMC)ISAF Headquarters, Kabul Special Operations Joint Task ForceAfghanistan / NATO Special Operations Component CommandAfghanistan (Maj. Gen. Raymond Thomas III, USA)Camp Integrity, Kabul1 Combined Joint Special Operations Task ForceAfghanistan (USA)Bagram Airfield; village stability operations, advisors to Afghan Defense Ministry special operations forces, and other missions2 Special Operations Task ForceEast (USA)Bagram Airfield; operating in eastern Afghanistan Special Operations Task ForceSouth (USA)Kandahar Airfield; operating in Kandahar Province Special Operations Task ForceSouth-East (USN)U/I location; operating in Uruzgan and Zabul Provinces Special Operations Task ForceWest (USMC)Camp Lawton, Herat; operating in western Afghanistan and Helmand Province TF Balkh / 2-7 Infantry (Lt. Col. Todd Kelly, USA)Camp Mike Spann, Mazar-e-Sharif; operating in northern Afghanistan 3 TF Paktika / 3-69 Armor (Lt.