Making the Right Moves: Ten Considerations in Light of President Obama's Forthcoming Visit to Israel

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Making the Right Moves: Ten Considerations in Light of President Obama's Forthcoming Visit to Israel Expert Analysis March 2013 Making the right moves: ten considerations in light of President Obama’s forthcoming visit to Israel By Yossi Beilin Executive summary President Obama’s efforts during his forthcoming visit to the Middle East to get Israel and the Palestinians to return to negotiations on a permanent peace agree- ment will be futile, may lead to more frustration, and will help support the case of those who wish to protract negotiations and who insist that the other party is unco-operative. Netanyahu’s Israel is unwilling to pay the well-known price for peace, while Abbas’s Palestine is now split between the West Bank and Gaza, so even if Abbas were to sign a comprehensive peace agreement, it would only apply to the West Bank. Since there is no chance of a permanent settlement, it would be better to move forward and agree on the implementation of the 2003 “Road Map” proposed by the Quartet, to which both sides have committed, rather than wait for the inevitable deterioration of relations. Substantively, this would mean the parties discussing recognition of a Palestinian state within provisional borders and security arrange- ments. 1. What is the ideal peace agreement? Palestine are the national homes of two peoples, without The ideal agreement between Israel and the Palestinians is prejudice to the equal rights of the minorities within their a full peace agreement based on the December 2000 borders. Security arrangements would ensure, among Clinton parameters and the 2003 informal Geneva Accords. other things, that a Palestinian state is demilitarised, but It would entail Israel retreating to its 1967 borders while would have a strong police force. minimally swapping land between the West Bank – on which an independent Palestinian state will be based – and a sovereign Israel. East Jerusalem would be divided such 2. Why can’t such an agreement be reached that Israeli neighbourhoods would be part of the Israeli in a single step? Jerusalem and Arab neighbourhoods would become part of The September 1993 Oslo Accords were supposed to lead the Palestinian capital. A similar division would take place to a permanent agreement by May 4th 1999. But this never in the Old City (which covers less than a square kilometre). materialised due to a long list of reasons, especially the The 1948 Palestinian refugees would receive compensation strong and violent opposition by extremists on both sides to for their suffering and for their property left in Israel. Most any form of compromise, which reached its peak with the would find a home in their new country, but some would murder of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by an Israeli also be offered the symbolic option of settling in Israel if extremist. Since then the interim arrangement produced by they so wish. Both sides would agree that Israel and the Oslo Accords has become a shelter for those actors NOREf Expert Analysis – March 2013 who have wanted to prevent a full agreement and who 4. The option to implement the second phase prefer to perpetuate an interim agreement while avoiding of the “Road Map” any historic decisions. The “Road Map for Peace” was recommended to the Palestinians and Israelis in 2003 by the Quartet (led by the The Israeli side is led by the recently re-elected prime U.S., with participation from the UN, the EU and Russia). minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, who is unwilling to pay the The Palestinian side accepted its provisions without well-known price for peace. He is only willing to accept a objections and the Israeli side presented a set of reserva- full two-state solution without paying the full territorial tions that were rejected by the U.S. The UN Security price and without dividing East Jerusalem, which turns his Council adopted the plan. willingness to reach such an agreement into pure lip service. This agreement deviated from the Oslo Accords because it consisted of three steps that would lead to a permanent The Palestinian side is led by Mahmoud Abbas, who is agreement in 2005. The first step dealt with regime change committed to the principle of non-violence and to reaching in the Palestinian Authority, especially the security arm, a peace agreement based on the two-state solution, as and with a stop to settlement by the Israelis. The second embraced by the international community. Yet internal step was supposed to consist of the rise of a Palestinian Palestinian conflicts prevent him from bringing Gaza to the state within provisional borders. In parallel, multilateral negotiating table and from having Hamas accept an talks dealing with regional subjects such as water, eco- agreement negotiated by the Palestinian Authority. Thus, nomic co-operation, environmental issues, refugee rehabil- even if the Israeli government were led by a determined itation and arms control, which were started after the member of the peace camp, a full peace agreement could Madrid Conference in 1991 and were halted in 1996, were only be implemented in the West Bank, while waiting for a supposed to recommence. Arab countries were asked to change of leadership in Gaza. resume contacts with Israel that were broken off on the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000. This is an option President Obama’s attempt in his upcoming visit to the that can be returned to today. Middle East to bring the hawks to negotiate a permanent agreement is bound to fail. It will be a diplomatic dance meant to prove to the U.S. that the others are to blame and 5. Obama’s role which will lead to further frustration among the public and Instead of seeking a full agreement, it is preferable that the renewal of violence. Obama suggest to both Israel and the Palestinians that they renew their commitment to the “Road Map” and immediately begin negotiations on Israeli recognition of a 3. What can the two sides agree to and why? Palestinian state based on provisional borders, security Although both sides claim to want a full agreement that arrangements, and the limits that will be imposed on will put an end to all claims, it is more realistic that they settlers residing on land under Israeli control until a might reach a partial agreement that will eventually lead to permanent agreement in the West Bank is reached. There a permanent one. Netanyahu is likely to favour such an is no point in returning to the idea of stopping the natural approach, which will take international pressure off him growth of settlements, because this is an unrealistic demand. while allowing him to avoid dealing with the most problem- On the other hand, it is certainly possible to limit construc- atic elements, i.e. Jerusalem and the refugees. Abbas will tion to agreed-upon areas. One can assume the agree to a partial agreement that will significantly improve Palestinians will not want to allow any construction in the the situation in the West Bank and will curb brewing public territories, therefore Israel and the U.S. could agree to discontent and the prevailing sense of despair among limitations on construction that would appease the Palestinians. He has publicly declared that if both a vision Palestinians. Simultaneously, Obama can try to get the and a timetable are provided for a permanent agreement, parties to resume multilateral talks that include Arab and he will not object to a partial agreement. other states that wish to be included. Thirteen Arab countries participated in the past and these discussions If the parties agree to implement the second phase of the established an “industry of peace” that included hundreds “Road Map” (see below), Abbas will get a real Palestinian of people from around the world and created a commit- state, with jurisdiction over most of the West Bank, embas- ment and willingness to invest in and contribute to the sies from all over the world, and Israeli restrictions on peace process. building beyond the green line. He might then step down as the leader who obtained for the Palestinians an unprec- edented achievement on their way towards a permanent 6. The role of the Quartet agreement. The Quartet will have to offer its vision for a permanent agreement. This should not be an Israeli or a Palestinian vision, and it is likely that neither side will want to adopt it. It will be best for both sides to record the document details 2 NOREf Expert Analysis – March 2013 proposed by the third party. The vision will no doubt be the 8. Other countries result of separate dialogues between the Quartet and each Solving the longest-running international conflict since the party, ensuring that no party will ruin the bilateral negotia- Second World War is a great challenge. Countries that want tions when the vision is formally proposed. The parties may to help and intervene have done so before and can do so have some difficulty digesting the vision (especially in the future in the context of renewing multilateral talks, Netanyahu on the Jerusalem issue and Abbas on the establishing full diplomatic relations with the new refugee issue), which will lead both to announce that Palestinian state, and investing in the Palestinian economy although they take note of the vision, they will attempt to and in joint Israeli-Palestinian projects. Intense interna- tilt it to benefit their side. tional efforts and interest will greatly help to create an atmosphere that will push both sides toward the moment The Quartet would also have to offer a schedule for of truth – i.e. that of reaching a permanent agreement. reaching a permanent settlement. It is important not to make the timetable so short that the parties will not abide by it, with a two- to four-year schedule more preferable 9.
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