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Home , Road map for peace

Expert Analysis

March 2013

Making the right moves: ten considerations in light of President Obama’s forthcoming visit to By Yossi Beilin

Executive summary

President Obama’s efforts during his forthcoming visit to the Middle East to get Israel and the to return to negotiations on a permanent peace agree- ment will be futile, may lead to more frustration, and will help support the case of those who wish to protract negotiations and who insist that the other party is ­unco-operative. Netanyahu’s Israel is unwilling to pay the well-known price for peace, while Abbas’s Palestine is now split between the and Gaza, so even if Abbas were to sign a comprehensive peace agreement, it would only apply to the West Bank.

Since there is no chance of a permanent settlement, it would be better to move forward and agree on the implementation of the 2003 “Road Map” proposed by the Quartet, to which both sides have committed, rather than wait for the inevitable deterioration of relations. Substantively, this would mean the parties discussing recognition of a Palestinian state within provisional borders and security arrange- ments.

1. What is the ideal peace agreement? Palestine are the national homes of two peoples, without The ideal agreement between Israel and the Palestinians is prejudice to the equal rights of the minorities within their a full peace agreement based on the December 2000 borders. Security arrangements would ensure, among Clinton parameters and the 2003 informal Geneva Accords. other things, that a Palestinian state is demilitarised, but It would entail Israel retreating to its 1967 borders while would have a strong police force. minimally swapping land between the West Bank – on which an independent Palestinian state will be based – and a sovereign Israel. would be divided such 2. Why can’t such an agreement be reached that Israeli neighbourhoods would be part of the Israeli in a single step? Jerusalem and Arab neighbourhoods would become part of The September 1993 were supposed to lead the Palestinian capital. A similar division would take place to a permanent agreement by May 4th 1999. But this never in the Old City (which covers less than a square kilometre). materialised due to a long list of reasons, especially the The 1948 would receive compensation strong and violent opposition by extremists on both sides to for their suffering and for their property left in Israel. Most any form of compromise, which reached its peak with the would find a home in their new country, but some would murder of Prime Minister by an Israeli also be offered the symbolic option of settling in Israel if extremist. Since then the interim arrangement produced by they so wish. Both sides would agree that Israel and the Oslo Accords has become a shelter for those actors Noref Expert Analysis – March 2013

who have wanted to prevent a full agreement and who 4. The option to implement the second phase prefer to perpetuate an interim agreement while avoiding of the “Road Map” any historic decisions. The “Road Map for Peace” was recommended to the Palestinians and in 2003 by the Quartet (led by the The Israeli side is led by the recently re-elected prime U.S., with participation from the UN, the EU and Russia). minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, who is unwilling to pay the The Palestinian side accepted its provisions without well-known price for peace. He is only willing to accept a objections and the Israeli side presented a set of reserva- full two-state solution without paying the full territorial tions that were rejected by the U.S. The UN Security price and without dividing East Jerusalem, which turns his Council adopted the plan. willingness to reach such an agreement into pure lip service. This agreement deviated from the Oslo Accords because it consisted of three steps that would lead to a permanent The Palestinian side is led by , who is agreement in 2005. The first step dealt with regime change committed to the principle of non-violence and to reaching in the Palestinian Authority, especially the security arm, a peace agreement based on the two-state solution, as and with a stop to settlement by the Israelis. The second embraced by the international community. Yet internal step was supposed to consist of the rise of a Palestinian Palestinian conflicts prevent him from bringing Gaza to the state within provisional borders. In parallel, multilateral negotiating table and from having accept an talks dealing with regional subjects such as water, eco- agreement negotiated by the Palestinian Authority. Thus, nomic co-operation, environmental issues, refugee rehabil- even if the Israeli government were led by a determined itation and arms control, which were started after the member of the peace camp, a full peace agreement could Madrid Conference in 1991 and were halted in 1996, were only be implemented in the West Bank, while waiting for a supposed to recommence. Arab countries were asked to change of leadership in Gaza. resume contacts with Israel that were broken off on the outbreak of the in 2000. This is an option President Obama’s attempt in his upcoming visit to the that can be returned to today. Middle East to bring the hawks to negotiate a permanent agreement is bound to fail. It will be a diplomatic dance meant to prove to the U.S. that the others are to blame and 5. Obama’s role which will lead to further frustration among the public and Instead of seeking a full agreement, it is preferable that the renewal of violence. Obama suggest to both Israel and the Palestinians that they renew their commitment to the “Road Map” and immediately begin negotiations on Israeli recognition of a 3. What can the two sides agree to and why? Palestinian state based on provisional borders, security Although both sides claim to want a full agreement that arrangements, and the limits that will be imposed on will put an end to all claims, it is more realistic that they settlers residing on land under Israeli control until a might reach a partial agreement that will eventually lead to permanent agreement in the West Bank is reached. There a permanent one. Netanyahu is likely to favour such an is no point in returning to the idea of stopping the natural approach, which will take international pressure off him growth of settlements, because this is an unrealistic demand. while allowing him to avoid dealing with the most problem- On the other hand, it is certainly possible to limit construc- atic elements, i.e. Jerusalem and the refugees. Abbas will tion to agreed-upon areas. One can assume the agree to a partial agreement that will significantly improve ­Palestinians will not want to allow any construction in the the situation in the West Bank and will curb brewing public territories, therefore Israel and the U.S. could agree to discontent and the prevailing sense of despair among limitations on construction that would appease the Palestinians. He has publicly declared that if both a vision ­Palestinians. Simultaneously, Obama can try to get the and a timetable are provided for a permanent agreement, parties to resume multilateral talks that include Arab and he will not object to a partial agreement. other states that wish to be included. Thirteen Arab countries participated in the past and these discussions If the parties agree to implement the second phase of the established an “industry of peace” that included hundreds “Road Map” (see below), Abbas will get a real Palestinian of people from around the world and created a commit- state, with jurisdiction over most of the West Bank, embas- ment and willingness to invest in and contribute to the sies from all over the world, and Israeli restrictions on peace process. building beyond the . He might then step down as the leader who obtained for the Palestinians an unprec- edented achievement on their way towards a permanent 6. The role of the Quartet agreement. The Quartet will have to offer its vision for a permanent agreement. This should not be an Israeli or a Palestinian vision, and it is likely that neither side will want to adopt it. It will be best for both sides to record the document details

2 Noref Expert Analysis – March 2013 proposed by the third party. The vision will no doubt be the 8. Other countries result of separate dialogues between the Quartet and each Solving the longest-running international conflict since the party, ensuring that no party will ruin the bilateral negotia- Second World War is a great challenge. Countries that want tions when the vision is formally proposed. The parties may to help and intervene have done so before and can do so have some difficulty digesting the vision (especially in the future in the context of renewing multilateral talks, Netanyahu on the Jerusalem issue and Abbas on the establishing full diplomatic relations with the new refugee issue), which will lead both to announce that ­Palestinian state, and investing in the Palestinian economy although they take note of the vision, they will attempt to and in joint Israeli-Palestinian projects. Intense interna- tilt it to benefit their side. tional efforts and interest will greatly help to create an atmosphere that will push both sides toward the moment The Quartet would also have to offer a schedule for of truth – i.e. that of reaching a permanent agreement. reaching a permanent settlement. It is important not to make the timetable so short that the parties will not abide by it, with a two- to four-year schedule more preferable 9. What about the Gaza Strip and Hamas? than a mere year. The problem thus far has stemmed from Hamas should not be given the right to veto the partial the fact that there was no “punishment” for failing to meet agreement. The agreement should offer Hamas an oppor- the schedule. Instead of offering sanctions in case of tunity to be part of the process and to turn the Gaza Strip failure, it would be better to provide positive incentives into an integral part of the Palestinian state that will be such as diplomatic or semi-diplomatic relations at an early referred to as part of the sovereign Palestinian territory so stage that can be limited or taken away from the parties if long as Hamas accepts the conditions of the Quartet: the they do not reach an agreement. renunciation of violence, recognition of Israel and accept- ance of agreements signed by the Palestine Liberation Organisation. This may not happen immediately, but only 7. The role of the after the establishment of the Palestinian state, once the In 2002 the Arab League proposed the “Arab Initiative”, Palestinian public understands that there is no point in marking one of the most dramatic developments in supporting Hamas, which opposes any agreement with relations between the Arab world and Israel. The bottom Israel. line was that the Arab world would normalise relations with Israel if it made peace with its neighbours. Later, other Islamic countries also endorsed the initiative. This 10. Is there a chance that with the end of the time the Arab League should adapt its proposal to an ­second phase Netanyahu will agree to pay the interim arrangement. Such an adjustment may be mani- price of a permanent agreement? fested in Arab countries returning to multilateral talks or This is a difficult question to answer. Perhaps the success- sending commercial or consular representatives to Israel. ful implementation of the second phase of the “Road Map” In light of the “Arab Spring”, the U.S. will need to confirm may lead the Israeli public to favour a permanent agree- the willingness of the Arab League to help resolve the ment and apply pressure to achieve it or elect a different Israeli-Palestinian conflict. leadership willing to pay the price for peace. Twenty years after the Oslo Agreement Accords, their terms have effectively become a sort of permanent arrangement. We must not allow the next partial agreement to remain stagnant in this way again.

3 The author

Yossi Beilin taught political science at Tel Aviv University, was a member of the Knesset for 11 years and has held ministerial The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre positions in several Israeli governments. He initiated the secret talks Norsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging that resulted in the 1993 Oslo Accords and in 1995 concluded the guidelines for a permanent peace agreement with Palestinian leader Abu Mazen. He headed the Israeli delegation to the multilateral peace The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) is a ­resource centre integrating knowledge and experience to strengthen process working groups between 1992 and 1995, was a negotiator at peacebuilding policy and practice. Established in 2008, it collaborates the 2001 Taba talks and is a promoter of the Geneva Accords. with and promotes collaboration among a wide network of research- ers, policymakers and practitioners in Norway and abroad.

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