Special Conflict Report

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Historical and Prospective Intervention Analyses

October 18-20, 2002

Waging Peace. Fighting Disease. Building Hope. The Carter Center strives to relieve suffering by advancing peace and health worldwide; it seeks to prevent and resolve conflicts, enhance freedom and democracy, and protect and promote human rights worldwide. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Historical and Prospective Intervention Analyses

October 18–20, 2002

One Copenhill 453 Freedom Parkway Atlanta, GA 30307 (404) 420-5185 Fax (404) 420-3862 www.cartercenter.org

July 2003 The Carter Center The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Foreword

eptember will mark the 25th anniversary one environment may be useful in addressing similar of the Camp David Peace Accords. That issues in a totally different environment. In this historic moment remains the high-water report, we strive to distill the most important mark for diplomacy in the Middle East. elements that emerged from two days of discussions To this day, not one element of that agree- into a brief and useful document that may provide Sment has been violated; Egypt and Israel remain at insights on how to advance discussions regarding peace. September also will mark the 10th anniversary the final settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict of the Oslo Peace Accords, which provided the first once that stage is reached. real opportunity to resolve perhaps the most difficult I would like to express my appreciation to those of the remaining elements required for regional peace participants: Professor Mari Fitzduff from INCORE and stability: an agreement between Israel and its in Belfast; Joseph Montville, formerly director of Palestinian neighbors. Current attempts to advance the Program on Preventive Diplomacy, Center for a Road Map for peace, created through the Strategic and International Studies in Washington; combined efforts of the United States, the United Professor William Zartman from the School of Nations, the European Union, and Russia, now Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins occupy our attention, as diplomacy continues to University; Dr. Bruce Jones from the Center on compete with violence in the latest campaign to International Cooperation, New York University, move toward a lasting peace in the region. formerly chef de cabinet to the U.N. special coordi- Looking for ways to contribute to the resolution nator for Middle East negotiations; Professor William of intractable conflicts is a focus of attention for the Quandt from the University of Virginia, formerly a Carter Center’s International Council for Conflict member of the National Security Council staff during Resolution (ICCR), a body composed of leading my administration; and John Marks, president, and ex-politicians, diplomats, and academics as well as Susan Collin Marks, executive vice president, of technical experts in the field of conflict resolution. Search for Common Ground in Jerusalem. Their In October 2002 a small group that brought together contributions to this program were inspiring, and ICCR members with leading regional experts met at their continued cooperation with, and interest in, The Carter Center in Atlanta to discuss the ongoing our activities have been most gratifying. conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. The The Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution Program purpose was to examine the situation using a com- hosted this event as the first in what will be a series parative analysis of other violent struggles, seeking of small group symposia on intractable wars. Program to identify common threads of thought that could staff continually monitor the world’s conflicts, inform policy-makers engaged in peacemaking efforts large and small alike, in an effort to maintain their in the Middle East. This comparative analysis, always readiness to engage in direct mediation when called recognizing the specific concerns unique to the area, upon by the parties involved, either on their own or proved to be a fruitful point of departure for what by providing support to me. I am grateful for their turned out to be a remarkable two days of intense work, with the assistance of members of the ICCR, discussion among the participants. in holding this symposium and assembling this report. While some concepts are limited in their appli- cation to specific conflicts, others prove to be more universally applicable. Lessons learned in

2 The Carter Center The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Where Do We Stand?

By Dr. Bruce D. Jones was able to stop their rivals from influencing the Center on International Cooperation selection of party candidates for parliamentary elections. Netanyahu’s support in Likud’s Central s we enter 2003, the Israeli-Palestinian Committee enabled him to place several loyalists context is defined by a series of inter- on the Likud list, creating a list considerably more related phenomena: a continuing rightist than Sharon’s public posture. Simultaneously, Aloss of Israeli and Palestinian lives; defeated Labor leader Ben-Eliezer used his influence political turbulence (and some convergence) in to oust key doves, such as party stalwart Yossi Beilin. Israel; progress, after much debate, on the question of Adding to the confusion, Likud has become reform and Chairman Arafat’s leadership; a factional embroiled in a scandal about reported extortion struggle for dominance of Palestinian popular politics; of cash for placement on party lists. Though the devastation of the Palestinian economy, and a lesser scandal temporarily weakened Likud’s prospective but still damaging corrosion of the Israeli economy; seat gains, it had little impact on the final polls. and public attitudes on both sides defined by the The turbulence masked an important degree of concept of “tactical hawks, strategic doves”—but convergence. The Labor Party leadership race, for with trends showing a worrying erosion of support example, began as a contest between Ben-Eliezer for peaceful solutions. The international context is (who projected a tough-on-terrorism image) and defined by growing consensus on substantive issues Haim Ramon, from the dovish faction of the Labor among international, Arab, and some U.S. officials; Party. Mitzna came in as an alternative dovish some remaining tactical and presentational differ- candidate, albeit one who as a former senior Israel ences within this group; a rise of anti-Semitic and Defense Forces general was able to project a credible anti-Arab attitudes; and uncertainty about the image on security. Notwithstanding Labor’s compara- consequences of regime change in Iraq. The tively dovish stance on talks with the Palestinians, combination—alongside President Bush’s decision the result of interfactional politics within Labor to publish the Road Map following the confirmation was “a Labor list that even Sharon could lead.” 1 of the new Palestinian Cabinet—potentially Similarly, to win the leadership of Likud, Sharon represents a turning point. defeated former Prime Minister Netanyahu by staking out a position as a Likud moderate: tough on terror- Political Turbulence, Political ism but willing to make political progress with the Convergence in Israel Palestinians. Sharon has presented a moderate face on such issues as a Palestinian state and a Road Map his report is being finalized some months after for creating it (on which, more below). A Palestinian Israeli elections returned Likud Prime Minister T terrorist attack during the election led to the odd Ariel Sharon to power with a strengthened Knesset spectacle of the Labor Party head criticizing Sharon presence. In the lead-up to elections, both Sharon for the lack of a tough response. and Amram Mitzna endured bitter leadership feuds On the Palestinian issue, the main differences within their parties, revealing significant cleavages between Sharon and Mitzna, as articulated during the with their parties and considerable similarities across the parties. Though both won their contests, neither 1 Yossi Verter, Ha’aretz, 11 December 2002.

3 The Carter Center The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict campaign, related to (i) the size of an acceptable reformer; after June 24, “anti-Arafat” equals Palestinian state; (ii) the nature of its “attributes of “American agent.” (See page 6.) Of senior officials, sovereignty”; (iii) the timetable for achieving it; and only Abu Mazen has consistently been willing to (iv) the question of Palestinian sovereignty in East criticize Arafat on the use of violence and terrorism. Jerusalem. Both Likud and Labor reject any com- It was this willingness that generated both internal promise on the question of right of return. A further and external support for the campaign to appoint difference was Mitzna’s willingness to unilaterally Abu Mazen as prime minister designate—in effect withdraw from the territories if negotiations don’t creating an alternative leadership structure alongside achieve results, while Sharon has rejected unilateral Arafat. As this report is being finalized, Abu Mazen separation. The substantive differences are significant (with U.S., U.N., E.U., and Egyptian support) has but not insurmountable. During the election cam- presented Arafat with a quasi-reformist Cabinet paign, the difference on which most emphasis was which incorporates such figures as Mohamed Dahlan placed was a tactical one: that Mitzna would begin and Salaam Fayyed, now put in charge of security discussions immediately, while Sharon continued to and finances, respectively, which have traditionally insist on a prior halt to violence. been the two sources of Arafat’s power. A down-to- After the elections, efforts to forge a coalition the-wire stand-off between Abu Mazen and Arafat government revealed still further intersections and over the composition of the Cabinet gave a first cleavages—but largely on domestic issues, particu- indication of the degree of difficulty Abu Mazen will larly related to the level of state financial resources face in trying to develop a new political direction for devoted to concerns of the religious parties. Mitzna the Palestinians. early on rejected any possible coalition participation, At the popular political level, political life and despite pressure within the party, stayed firm on continues to be dominated by competition between the point. The coalition that resulted is a turbulent Fatah and Hamas for leadership of the Palestinian mix of religious, right-wing, and moderate parties national movement. In the early phase of the that appear to have, collectively, a harder line on Intifada, this competition had the ugly aspect of the Palestinian issue than Sharon has publicly taken. being defined by violent one-upmanship. In some The presence in the Cabinet of two parties that Palestinian circles, Israel’s withdrawal from southern espouse a very hard line on Palestinian issues may Lebanon was seen as a victory for Hezbollah’s tactics, constrain Sharon’s room for maneuver. leading to their adoption by factions in Gaza and the West Bank. Fatah quickly got drawn into this Palestinian Reform? dynamic. (Islamic Jihad is the leading proponent of these tactics but is less influential in Palestinian alestinian leadership politics, meanwhile, has popular politics.) Recently, Fatah has begun talks been dominated by the elaborate shadow dance P with Hamas to forge a national consensus around that led to recent changes to Arafat’s leadership. limiting their fight with Israel to the territories east Privately, many Palestinian officials have long of the Green Line. However, these talks have not admitted to deep concerns about Arafat’s leadership. produced results, and Egyptian-brokered talks in Publicly, all profess loyalty to Arafat, partially Cairo are seen by some as actually having bolstered because he has controlled the purse strings and Hamas, rather than contained them, by raising their partially because the anti-Arafat agenda has been profile and perceived legitimacy in the Arab world. “Americanized”; to be anti-Arafat before President Within Fatah, there continues to be serious debate Bush’s June 24 speech was to be a courageous over both strategy and tactics, with some factions

4 The Carter Center The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict emphasizing that to retain control over the one instance: On the day the Arab League was Palestinian national movement and to keep alive the endorsing the Saudi peace plan, which would involve prospect of peace with Israel, there may ultimately recognition of Israel, Islamic Jihad detonated a have to be a forceful confrontation with Hamas. The massive bomb in Netanya, during the Passover Seder, ultimate outcome of this factional competition killing more than 20 Israeli civilians—the suicide remains to be seen, but will be greatly influenced by bombers spoke more persuasively than did the diplo- movement toward a political process; in the absence mats at the Arab League.) More basically, Israelis of credible peace talks, Hamas retains a considerable broadly share their government’s concern that if they tactical advantage over the moderate wing of Fatah. negotiate and make concessions under pressure, while Even in the context of a renewal of dialogue, the terrorist acts continue, this will simply lead to more strength gained by Hamas in the past two years support for terrorist tactics and more attacks on will mean that they will pose a serious challenge to Israel, rather than any viable peace. any new political direction taken by the incoming At the same time, however, polls consistently Cabinet, which will ultimately have to confront show that a majority of Israelis support an eventual Hamas—a tough challenge indeed. peace deal involving the creation of a Palestinian state, based on a withdrawal of Israeli forces from Underlying Trends the West Bank and Gaza and the removal of settle- ments. It is also true, however, that the majority for mong both Palestinians and Israelis, public peace is less solid than it was a year ago, and there attitudes are currently characterized by two A are important issues that remain unresolved in the aspects, characterized by one Israeli analyst as Israeli public mind. The concept of a divided “tactical hawks, strategic doves.” Jerusalem continues to polarize public opinion, Israeli public attitudes are unsurprisingly heavily with a majority opposed to accepting Palestinian shaped by suicide bombings. Faced with continuing sovereignty over East Jerusalem in the context of a terrorist attacks in Israeli cities, a large majority of peace settlement. Moreover, there is a worrying rise Israelis support tough measures to combat terrorism, in discussion of more radical long-term options, like including reoccupation of Palestinian areas and “transfer”—i.e. the forced movement of Palestinians targeted assassinations (notwithstanding periodic from the West Bank to other parts of the Arab world, American critique of both tactics). Of vital impor- possibly Jordan. tance to understanding current dynamics is the Israeli voters are also increasingly preoccupied by fact that suicide bombings, especially the huge surge the erosion of the Israeli economy, which has been in bombings that occurred in March 2002, have badly hurt by two years of declining tourism, investor convinced many Israelis who formerly believed uncertainty, a weak shekel, recession, and rapidly otherwise that the Palestinians (or at least the rising unemployment. Businesses are being lost; Palestinian leadership) remain committed to the the number of Israeli companies listed on NASDAQ destruction of the state of Israel. This attitude is has declined dramatically (far more than can be sometimes dismissed by non-Israelis, based on a explained by NASDAQ’s overall decline). Senior belief that Palestinians by and large do not still seek Israeli officials have expressed fears of a growing a destruction of Israel. (See page 6.) However, “brain drain,” as Israeli entrepreneurs and young whether or not it is true that Palestinian violence leaders look to the United States and other constitutes an existential threat to Israel, the fact is economies for their future. that this is widely believed by Israelis, and this belief The Palestinian population also has a “tactical constitutes a critically important reality. (To take just hawks, strategic doves” aspect. Public opinion polling

5 The Carter Center The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict continues to show a popular majority in favor of the The International Dimension Intifada in its current form, i.e. including terrorism. ust as in Israel political turbulence masks an This number has grown steadily over the past two important underlying convergence, so in the inter- years, reflecting a population that is increasingly J national arena, public tensions between the U.S. being radicalized by its perception of occupation and administration and their Arab and European allies violence. The economic dimension is also acute: The divert attention from the development of a robust Palestinian economy has been so devastated by Israeli international consensus around many key dimensions closures that Palestinian living conditions are similar of the Arab-Israeli conflict—or at least, its solution. to those which prevailed before 1967. Yet it is not The consensus that has emerged was best the economy, but Israel’s reoccupation of Palestinian articulated in a speech delivered by President Bush areas that defines Palestinian resentment and anger. on June 24, 2002. The speech is widely acknowledged The fact that Prime Minister Sharon has accepted, to have had two parts: a first segment that called for in principle, the idea of a two-state solution is less the removal of Arafat and a halt to terrorism; and a persuasive than the fact that Israeli tanks have second segment that called for a two-state solution entered Beit Hanoun. Of major significance to within a three-year timetable. Most Arab and Palestinian public opinion is continued land appro- European diplomats publicly endorsed the second priation for settlement infrastructure, an ongoing half of the speech while privately agreeing with activity that seems to many Palestinians to belie the the first half (though believing that a public call Israeli government’s stated willingness ultimately to to oust Arafat was counterproductive). accept a Palestinian state. Issues on which an international consensus has Also worrying is a slow erosion of Palestinian emerged include the need for a two-state solution; support for a two-state solution. Palestinian violence regional recognition of Israel; a security package is often depicted as aimed at the eradication of Israel. for Israel, as well as Palestinians; limitations on In recent history, this has not been the case. During Palestinian sovereignty, particularly with respect the first 18 months of the Intifada, a solid majority to demilitarization; reform of the Palestinian institu- supported an end of conflict once Israel withdrew tions; and a solution for Palestinian refugees that to the 1967 borders and reconciliation with Israel is “agreed”—to use the Arab code for solutions in that context. The good news is that polling still not based on the right of return. The last point is shows a majority of Palestinians supporting a two- controversial, but even the Saudi formula for peace state solution. The bad news is that the scale of this was fairly explicit on the point (more explicit than majority is steadily slipping (from the 70s–80s in the ultimate Arab League resolution), and among 2000, to the 50s today). This erosion leads some many international diplomats, it is understood that Palestinian analysts to conclude that time is running a solution will be based on no actual return to Israel. out for a peaceful solution. Other voices have started Of course, there are important, sometimes sharp, to propagate a shift away from a two-state stance, differences between the U.S. administration and its recognizing that demographic trends will soon result allies. Many Arabs are uncomfortable espousing an in a situation in which Palestinian claims could be anti-Arafat line, though they were willing to do so achieved in a one-state solution. However, a return before the policy was adopted by the United States. to a one-state approach has so far not attracted much (See, for example, President Mubarak’s several, harsh support domestically and is well outside the bounds of comments about Arafat in spring 2002.) Arabs and what is acceptable internationally (to say nothing of Europeans are more critical of Israeli military tactics within Israel).

6 The Carter Center The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict than is the U.S. administration (in public; in private, and the tactics of negotiations, rather than the end there are frequent tensions between U.S. and Israeli goals espoused by the Quartet’s Road Map (them- officials). And while European (and some Arab) selves based on Bush’s vision). diplomats vigorously condemn terrorism against At the international level, it would be remiss not Israelis, they do not see the current conflict as having to also mention an important, though fortunately been launched by Palestinian terrorism (noting, for still limited, phenomenon: a growth in anti-Semitic example, that dozens of Palestinians and Israelis had attitudes and a lesser, but notable, rise of anti- been killed during several weeks of street clashes and Arab/Muslim attitudes. Though European officials gun battles between security forces before the first downplay the issue (correctly noting that policies terrorist attack occurred). In the U.S. administration, have not changed and that firm action has been there is greater sympathy for the Israeli viewpoint taken against those who have desecrated religious that irrespective of how the Intifada started, Arafat’s sites), there is reason to be worried about the growth decision in November 2000 to release from prison of anti-Semitic, as well as anti-Arab, language and several Hamas activists constituted a deliberate actions and, moreover, that anti-Semitic rhetoric decision on his part to use terrorism as a tool to gain has a growing role in the lexicon and media of political advantage—a move they refuse to reward. even fairly moderate Arab states. A disturbing Consensus and difference between the United theme of anti-Arab sentiment can also be discerned States and its allies are increasingly managed in American and European public dialogue. through a tool established in late 2001, namely “the Quartet,” comprised of U.S., E.U., U.N., and Russian A Turning Point? representatives. This body came into being around an ut if there is more consensus than difference initiative to orchestrate collective pressure on Arafat in the international community; if both Likud to renounce terrorism, resulting in a joint demarche. B and Labor acknowledge the need for a Palestinian In the subsequent year, the Quartet has grown into state (albeit with limitations on its attributes of a high-level body for the coordination of diplomatic sovereignty), and a majority of Israelis agree; if a positions, frequently consulting with Jordan, Egypt, majority of Palestinians still support a two-state and Saudi Arabia. The Quartet developed a Road solution; and if key international diplomats and Map to implement Bush’s June 24 speech, spelling Arab leaders are prepared to support a solution based out steps designed to produce an end to terrorism, on no actual Palestinian refugee return to Israel Palestinian reform, negotiations, and the establish- (which remains the key to Israeli popular support ment of a Palestinian state. The recent dispute for a deal); and if Bush remains committed to the between the United States and the other members Road Map—are we then at a place where we can about the timing of the introduction of the Road envisage new progress in the peace process? Far from Map was tactical and presentational, rather than it, though perhaps not as far as many would imagine. strategic—as have been most items of disagreement. Far, for two reasons. First, because even where Within the U.S. administration, the Quartet itself is there is consensus about substance and end-states controversial in some quarters, particularly because it within the international community, there is a is seen by some as representing a watering down of continuing divide over process, with the United U.S.-Israeli coordination on the peace process. It is States and Israel emphasizing security performance notable, however, that even its sharpest critics focus of the incoming Palestinian cabinet, and Arab and their differences on the membership of the Quartet European diplomats emphasizing a parallel process

7 The Carter Center The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict of reform coupled with political negotiations. Though raised by Hezbollah’s presence in southern Lebanon seemingly tactical in aspect, this dispute remains a remains, and it is possible under some scenarios key difference between the United States and its that Hezbollah’s backers will find reasons to escalate partners and has hobbled the prospects for negotia- tensions along Israel’s northern border, possibly using tions for almost two years. It may continue to do so a now substantial reserve of medium-range missiles. in context of the implementation of the Road Map; This would, without doubt, provoke Israeli action indeed, in the post-9/11 environment, the issue in Syria and possibly Lebanon, which in turn could is not tactical or procedural but strategic, as it is complicate the regional diplomatic situation. (Some increasingly viewed by the United States through Israeli strategists continue to view the risk of a the lens of the broader war against terrorism. “northern” war as far more worrying than the Second, while there are some positive elements as Palestinian conflict.) outlined above, there are also worrying trends. The Yet a resumption of political talks may not be gradual erosion of the Palestinian majority for a as far away as many would imagine. Although Sharon two-state solution is certainly worrying. So, too, is is demonized in the Arab world and has a negative the increased frequency with which one hears, in image in Europe, there are grounds for believing that Israel, language that demonizes Arabs and propagates he may take the initiative in his second term and such concepts as forcible transfer of the Palestinians move forward on the political front. He is under to Jordan. Moreover, there are growing tensions pressure to do so for economic reasons and will have between Jewish and Arab Israelis. All of this poses to commit to some concrete steps if Bush does indeed what many see as the main threat to Israel: a demo- re-engage. More negative viewpoints of Sharon’s graphic threat that arises from the fact of a growing likely attitudes are, of course, possible. But given that Arab minority in Israel west of the Green Line and Sharon represents a broad political spectrum in Israel, an Arab majority in the West Bank and Gaza. On the reality is that if there is to be political progress the left, the demographic threat is taken as reason between Palestinians and Israelis in the current enough to spur a negotiated or unilateral evacuation juncture, it is likely to happen on Sharon’s terms, from the territories. On the right, there is more if not necessarily his timetable. focus on U.S.-led pressure to oust Arafat and induce Of course, there are still major differences between democratic reform among the Palestinian institutions, the maximal Sharon position and the minimum combined with strong action against terrorism. Palestinian position. However, new international Among Palestinians, the continued expansion of discussions—for example, about the attributes of settlements and continued building of settlement interim states, and even about an international infrastructure seems to threaten the possibility of the transitional administration of an interim Palestinian eventual emergence of a viable Palestinian state, one state—may provide some useful ideas for bridging of the stated goals of the Road Map. some of these gaps. There are also regional factors. It is too early yet to In the long term, a political package based on the know fully the implications of the rapid U.S. victory international consensus spelled out above remains in Iraq. Certainly, it can be argued that removing possible, even viable. But it also remains remarkably a regime that posed a military threat to Israel, and difficult in the absence of trust between Israelis and doing so in a way that demonstrated decisive U.S. Palestinians, given the complex role played by third will and force, diminishes the prospect of any Arab parties, and in the uncertainty of the effects of the threat to Israel and thereby enhances the chances for war in Iraq. In either the short or long term, if peace. On the other hand, the destabilizing potential progress is to be possible, it will require political

8 The Carter Center The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict courage from the key state actors; full engagement must be addressed; peace versus justice issues can be from the U.S. administration, leading the Quartet very destabilizing in post-settlement stages. and the moderate Arab states; and robust supporting Peace processes are usually phasal and deliver efforts from civic actors. Here, international second incrementally, with one step forward and perhaps two track actors have a critical role to play (as they back. Evidence shows, however, that a step forward potentially do in creating more conducive conditions usually yields an additional agreement that will assist for political progress). movement toward an eventual solution. Gains are not lost, but will accumulate. Often, finding the Peace Process Dynamics solution to a conflict is not the major obstacle to an agreement; in fact, there are usually many solu- hile many view the Israeli-Palestinian conflict tions to a conflict. However, getting leaders and as not only a special case, but a hopeless W constituents to pick up the solution together can be one as well, it is important to realize that there are problematic—timing and relationships are key to existing dynamics in this conflict that are common this. The ground must be prepared for compromises to other conflicts and thus open themselves to com- to sustain a lasting peace, and this usually requires parison and observation. Careful analysis of these a lot of time. dynamics can be of use to peacemakers who seek to encourage intelligent official and unofficial diplomacy in the pursuit of sustainable resolutions. Spoilers Below are elements common to most peace processes, eace processes are often accompanied by which can readily be applied to the Israeli-Palestinian Pviolence, usually by those that feel they will case more specifically as peacemakers contemplate lose if compromises are reached. Its cessation next steps to reinvigorate and support a viable cannot be a prerequisite for peace talks, as this peace process. gives veto power to spoilers. Peace processes, instead, should include those who can destroy Process Progression them through violence, though it may be necessary to circumvent them at times, bringing them in eace processes begin when each side realizes it later to enhance sustainability. must include the opposing side in the solution. P Within the category of spoilers, there are dealers In reality, solutions are seldom win-lose or win-win; and zealots. Dealers often come on board with the more often than not, they are lose-lose with each side right incentives; it may be necessary to bypass or making concessions to reach a deal. Thus, the main contain zealots. Spoiler groups are usually best task of each side becomes to lose least on what it neutralized with the active involvement of other wants, which, in part, prolongs the nature of most former, current, or potential spoilers, such as ex- peace processes. Parties will often take every oppor- militants and settlers. tunity possible to squeeze out of peace processes and avoid compromises, but that does not negate the necessity of coming to terms with what must be Delivering Compromise given up in order to reach a deal. To this end, it is eaders’ main job is to deliver their own people to important to realize that conflicts do not end but Lthe compromises that must be made in order to change, the goal being the conflict’s movement reach a solution. Leaders should also recognize each from violence into politics so that it becomes less other’s problems and help each other to sell the destructive. In this process, however, victim needs compromises, though they rarely do, as leaders usually

9 The Carter Center The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict think the other side has the easier task. Thus, leaders Ripeness often face pressure from within their own parties to onflict evolution is characterized by problems resist making compromises. of ripeness, a necessary but insufficient condition One must realize that conflict is also functional C for negotiations to begin. Ripeness involves a per- and provides meaning and alternative meaning to ceived mutually hurting stalemate and a perceived those involved. This creates a need to find societal way out of the conflict. If a conflict is not ripe integration for both state and nonstate actors. for effective mediation, the mediator or potential However, there is usually no point in moral argu- mediator must work to ripen it. If ripening is not ments; what are often needed are political incentives. possible, the mediator must position himself for This process is lengthy, however, particularly as intervention later on. Peace processes begin when followers often elect leaders that promise that they each side realizes that it must include the other will not have to give up on their dreams. in the solution, beginning at least some minimal Groundwork level of dialogue. Parties in conflict need help. In most cases, they ccording to comparative evidence, it is clear are unable to prevail unilaterally but have a hard Athat Track 2 groups are often better able to time recognizing it, as they are so deeply engrossed deliver upon project goals when they have existing or and committed to the conflict that it becomes eventual leverage with leaders and politicians. Track overwhelmingly difficult to communicate, much less 2 work is often pre-political and helps leaders to sell reach, a bilateral solution. But for the same reasons, necessary concessions by working to increase con- parties do not welcome mediation. Mediators are stituent understanding, acceptance, and absorption often considered meddlers and have little leverage of those compromises, making this work circularly over the parties. They are at the mercy of the beneficial to both Track 1 and 2 actors. Thus, parties’ felt need for a way out, which relates facilitating a link between Track 1 and 2 strengthens back to ripeness. If a mutually hurting stalemate their respective activities. pushes parties into a mediation process, it takes It is important for leaders to identify and come to mutually enticing opportunities to pull them terms with issues that will require compromise, which toward a positive conclusion. in itself can be a difficult task. Upon identification, Track 2 groups can begin gentle, unofficial media work to gauge immediate constituent reactions and prospective movement on those issues, followed by activities that seek to create spaces and give rise to open discussions about coming to terms with what must be ceded to move peace processes forward. Unofficially working people through political options before leaders must sell them makes the politicians’ jobs a bit easier and is often something that Track 1 groups cannot undertake in the immediate attentive- ness to politics and negotiations.

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us that peacemakers come from the ranks of bold Recommendations leaders. An essential part of their job is to prepare n the following recommendations, no settlement their constituencies for compromise. This can be a proposals are put forth, but what is presented difficult task in the context of existing negotiations, are recommendations that have both long- which can move forward at a fast pace and at a and short-term implications for the Israeli- high level with little time for constituency-building I exercises. In this respect, unofficial actors can engage Palestinian peace process specifically and the Track 1 and 2 actors involved therein. These in work that contributes to filling this gap, preparing recommendations relate primarily to the ultimate the ground before, during, and after compromises. question of final status discussions. Many of the What must be present when Track 1 presents recommendations are inextricably linked both in proposals is a propensity for the Israeli and nature and results. While official Track 1 diplomacy Palestinian publics to respond positively, acknow- is the dominant stage on which the negotiations ledging positive gestures and supporting leaders to process will play out, the actors will not be per- further negotiate issues to successful conclusions. forming in a vacuum. There are clearly voids that In this context, it becomes extremely crucial for Track 2 actors can fill separately, in support of Arab states to assist the Palestinians in this process and/or in collaboration with Track 1—voids and for similar support for any bold Israeli leader that must be filled to nurture a peace process and from the United States. This makes it all the more uphold a lasting peace. It should be noted that these important to convene Arab groups as well as recommendations came before the publication of Americans and Europeans to work through political the Road Map. Potential tactical approaches to its options ahead of negotiations. This support would implementation were discussed only in general enable Palestinian leadership to pick up on positive terms during the symposium. Israeli gestures and proposals as well as pressure Official and unofficial actors from the inter- Israeli leadership to respect international momentum national community should seek to create forums toward peace as well as consensus around actions and spaces that promote brainstorming and the mandated in peace initiatives. Additionally, exchange of ideas within and between Israeli and Track 2 groups can and do engage in activities Palestinian communities with regard to peace and that, if properly exploited, can contribute to the the means to achieve it. This not only raises the type of constituency building that can ease the awareness of each other’s grievances but also allows way for leaders to take bold steps for peace. for the formation of equal and strong networks in There is also a need for leaders and communities spaces where ideas are voiced without consequence. to face the hard truths of this conflict. The basic These sessions must be facilitated in a way that levels issues, such as borders, security, Jerusalem, refugee the playing field, allowing there to be some parity return and resettlement, and prisoner releases, are in the floating of ideas. These spaces could also be not going away and must be faced in the next round used to promote the reformation and/or removal of peace efforts. Efforts must address the security of of cultural and political barriers to negotiations Israel and the finality of any agreement, making it and coexistence through informative debate and clear to Palestinians and other Arabs that it is final. discussion of historically divisive issues. The agreement must end occupation and result in Communities and leaders must be prepared for, a Palestinian state. These are hard truths, and and encouraged to make, the compromises that must leaders must admit these facts to their publics, and be made in order to achieve peace. History teaches communities must be prepared for them. This is

11 The Carter Center The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict where Track 1 and 2 can move peace efforts forward of discussions, if facilitated appropriately, would allow in a parallel and collaborative direction, through them to speak with some parity. ground preparation and the promotion of safe spaces To this end, there is work to be done with and where communities and leaders can work through through the media. Track 2 groups are currently political options before making official, binding conducting significant polling that is making its way decisions and declarations. into political discussions. In creating an environment Efforts must be extended to assist moderate that is safe for political compromises, effective polling Israelis and Palestinians to enlist and increase the and media campaigns that touch base with Israeli support of public opinion in order to mobilize a and Palestinian communities can legitimize those viable peace constituency. Tactically, it becomes compromises. While the extreme elements’ concerns important to identify and promote activities to assist need to be addressed in political negotiations, more moderate Palestinians to regain the leadership media campaigns and polling can help to marginalize of public opinion in favor of peace. Building the them with the general public, which will aid in the base for a viable solution is linked to realizing the creation of space for political leaders to address the possibility of a viable solution. This requires an compromises that will eventually need to be made. extensive investment in time and effort. Without This marginalization might also give extremists the that investment, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other incentive they need to become more aligned with similar groups can continue to play the role of mainstream views or join discussions so as not to be spoiler, seeking to build on their existing support precluded from a settlement. in the broader Palestinian community. Reconciliation should be prioritized within the There is also a generational shift occurring in Israeli and Palestinian communities as preparation Israel from which more moderate voices are emerging, for cross-cultural reconciliation, with a view toward advocating a political conceptualization of security peaceful coexistence. Historical and psychological as opposed to conceptions based only on military aspects of ethnic conflict tend to defy traditional considerations. On the Palestinian side, there are diplomatic attempts to resolve them. There is a many who are growing frustrated with current need for activities that create and supplement an Palestinian leadership and are looking for ways to environment that fosters the notions of peace and be heard so as to reform Palestinian leadership and healing in the face of existential fears and political governance in preparation for a coming peace with circumstances that make reconciliation appear a Israel. Creating more space for those who might bleak possibility. During a peace process, Track 1 seek to articulate alternative political options is actors are often not empowered or able to address desperately needed. Tapping into these new voices the deeper aspects of conflict, such as historical and engaging them on issues such as the nature of memory, not out of spite or lack of concern, but a final settlement between Israel and Palestine, because of the time-consuming nature of this work. constitutional issues for an emerging state, engaging It takes both time and commitment to achieve a in relationships with other countries, security issues, deeper understanding not only of the history of and functional interim measures for the transitional the conflict, but also how that history affects the process to a final settlement are crucial to fostering a psyches of those living in conflict today. peace between Israelis and Palestinians. These kinds

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Addressing grievances, including the senses of loss Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement and injustice, is critical to bridging the differences reiterating Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and that divide Israelis and Palestinians. It is critical to calling for an immediate end to the armed Intifada and raise the awareness of this work’s importance to the all acts of violence against Israelis everywhere. political and diplomatic levels so that leaders can •While issuing a statement of this nature is make conciliatory and symbolic gestures that might obviously necessary, such statements before have begin to address the anxieties of the Israeli and done little to curb spoiler violence. As the conflict Palestinian peoples. As several notable Track 2 exists now, Hamas is a leader of the national groups are currently undertaking this kind of work, movement, and external groups are providing official and unofficial support should be increased to incentives to further violence. These spoilers enable them to expand and amplify their activities must be accounted for in peace calculations as appropriate. and strategies developed to contain their tactics, Unofficial actors should develop and coordinate possibly including them at later stages of the peace activities in order to aggressively support Road Map process. Further to spoilers, the Palestinian ground implementation. The Quartet Road Map is coming must also be prepared to accept Israel’s right to on the heels of President Bush’s June 2002 speech exist as well as to cease violence. Forums for and is widely viewed as the newest vehicle to discussion of political options and innovative reinvigorate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The ideas must be available, and new, moderate Quartet, comprising representatives from the United voices in leadership and the communities States, the European Union, the United Nations, and must be articulated and aired. Russia, would assume the responsibility of monitoring the Road Map’s implementation. Efforts to curb GOI dismantles settlement outposts erected since hesitation among Israeli and U.S. officials to establishment of the present Israeli government and in aggressively pursue implementation need to be contravention of current Israeli government guidelines. addressed. (In the case of the Israeli government, • Though many settlers would abandon the there are ongoing efforts to renegotiate the terms.) settlements with the right incentives, others There is room in this process, however, for significant would persistently and violently hold steadfast and supportive work by both Tracks. Indeed, it to their homes. Leaders will need to sell this com- may well be advisable for Track 2 organizations, promise not only to settlers, whose homes and in order to act more effectively, to communicate communities have often been propagated by the in an ongoing effort to develop a Road Map of their Israeli government, but also to the Israeli public, activities. Clearly they will want to retain their who in the face of Palestinian violence might independence of action, but effective communication be reluctant to give up land the government has can assist in ensuring that activities are targeted to told them is theirs by birthright and sovereignty. effectively support Road Map implementation. Israeli and Palestinian leadership and communities Excerpts from the Road Map follow, though this must be prepared for possible violence and be list is neither exhaustive nor exclusive and will likely able to work through it, possibly circumventing undergo modification in the event that the Road or containing Israeli settlers that would pose as Map is officially adopted and pursued.

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spoilers to disrupt the implementation of this Revival of multilateral talks (regional water, environ- clause. Again, this would likely require recon- mental, economic development, refugees, arms ciliation through forums and dialogue, as well as control issues). effective media campaigns and polling to ensure •Work on these issues through issue-based task that moderate voices are heard. forces should proceed at official levels, but there is room for considerable assistance from unofficial Independent Commission circulates draft Palestinian actors who can provide technical expertise of a government reforms, based on strong parliamentary nonpolitical nature. This can serve to prepare democracy, for public comment/debate. leaders, as well as domestic constituencies, • The Palestinian community, after years of for compromise. economic hardship and repression, will need an articulated propensity to contemplate and respond Arab state acceptance of normal relations with Israel to sweeping governmental reforms. There is and security for all the states of the region, consistent substantive and necessary pre-political, interim, with Beirut Arab Summit. and post-political work to be done in this area. • There is a significant need for support on the This will include the creative development of a ground on this issue. Reconciliation efforts broader civil society, which will assist communities must be undertaken. Though considerably to work through political options and compro- time-consuming, there are immediate gestures mises. Educated debate and strong community of reconciliation that might crystallize the need discussions with appropriate media exposure could for reconciliation among Arabs and Israelis, not only put pressure on Palestinian leaders to see namely symbolic gestures such as Sadat’s 1977 reforms through, but also assist in the emergence trip to Jerusalem. This would obviously require of new leaders in an emerging Palestine. Equally considerable media exposure and international important at this stage is international financial support. Parallel to immediate acts of recon- support, which has been considerable but must ciliation, forums and spaces for intra- and also be sustained. intercommunity dialogues would need to be created, so as to work through pending Palestinians hold free, open, and fair elections for PLC. reconciliation. • Creative space bolstered by effective media campaigns could provide the necessary venues for the Palestinian public to voice its concerns and assist in the emergence of Palestinian leaders whose views are more closely aligned to moderate Palestinians.

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The Carter Center at a Glance

Overview: The Carter Center was founded in Donations: The Center is a 501 (c)(3) charitable 1982 by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and organization, financed by private donations from his wife, Rosalynn, in partnership with Emory individuals, foundations, corporations, and interna- University, to advance peace and health worldwide. tional development assistance agencies. Contributions A nongovernmental organization, the Center has by U.S. citizens and companies are tax-deductible as helped to improve life for people in more than 65 allowed by law. countries by resolving conflicts; advancing democracy, Facilities: The nondenominational Cecil B. Day human rights, and economic opportunity; preventing Chapel and other facilities are available for weddings, diseases; improving mental health care; and teaching corporate retreats and meetings, and other special farmers to increase crop production. events. For information, (404) 420-5112. Accomplishments: The Center has observed Internships: The Center’s internship program 45 elections in 23 countries; helped farmers double has been rated one of America’s best by the or triple grain production in 15 African countries; Princeton Review. mediated or worked to prevent civil and international Location: In a 35-acre park, about 1.5 miles east conflicts worldwide; intervened to prevent unneces- of downtown Atlanta. The Jimmy Carter Library sary diseases in Latin America and Africa, including and Museum, which adjoins the Center, is owned the near eradication of Guinea worm disease; and and operated by the National Archives and strived to diminish the stigma against mental illness. Records Administration and is open to the public. Budget: $33.9 million 2001-2002 operating budget. (404) 331-3942. Staff: 150 employees, based primarily in Atlanta. Martin Frank

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The Carter Center Mission Statement

he Carter Center, in partnership with Emory University, is guided by a funda- Tmental commitment to human rights and the alleviation of human suffering; it seeks to prevent and resolve conflicts, enhance freedom and democracy, and improve health. While the program agenda may change, The Carter Center is guided by five principles: ■ The Center emphasizes action and results. Based on careful research and analysis, it is prepared to take timely action on important and pressing issues. ■ The Center does not duplicate the effective efforts of others. ■ The Center addresses difficult problems and recognizes the possibility of failure as an acceptable risk. ■ The Center is nonpartisan and acts as a neutral in dispute resolution activities. ■ The Center believes that people can improve their lives when provided with the necessary skills, knowledge, and access to resources. The Carter Center collaborates with other organizations, public or private, in carrying out its mission.

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The Carter Center One Copenhill 453 Freedom Parkway Atlanta, GA 30307

(404) 420-5100 ◆ Fax (404) 420-5145 www.cartercenter.org