The Liberal Unionists Had Their Origins in the Disastrous Split Within the Liberal Party Over Irish Home Rule in 1886

Home , Austen Chamberlain, Liberal Unionist Party

A ‘Distinction without a Difference’? The Liberal Unionist – Conservative Alliance

The Liberal Unionists had their origins in the disastrous split within the Liberal Party over Irish home rule in 1886. They participated in coalition governments with the Conservatives in 1886–92 and 1895– 1905, and eventually, in 1912, merged entirely into the Conservative Party. How close was ollowing the home philosophies. An examination of the relationship between rule election of 1886, and the troubled relationship between reluctantly at first, a dis- the two branches of the Unionist the Liberal Unionists parate group of Liberal alliance from 1886 until 1895, while and Salisbury’s aristocrats, wealthy busi- redolent of the political culture of nessmenF and radical professional the late nineteenth century, reveals Conservatives between politicians gradually coalesced the ideological and operational dif- into a political party of sorts and ficulties of maintaining a sustained 1886 and 1895? Ian attempted to maintain an independ- period of cross-party collaboration Cawood argues that ent policy whilst remaining part of in the British political system. It the Unionist alliance. After 1895 the also challenges the perception that the Liberal Unionists Liberal Unionists quickly became Liberal Unionism was a mere ‘rest- socially and politically allied with ing-place’ for Liberals en route to managed to maintain the Tories, and ever since there has the Conservative party or that the a distinct and separate been a tendency to forget that they Liberal Unionists disappeared into were a separate party. This arti- ‘a political wilderness’.1 identity until the cle intends to examine whether The origin of the Unionist alli- the absorption of the Liberal ance has conventionally been seen formation of the Unionists into the Conservative as the issuing of the ‘Hawarden coalition government in and Unionist Party was inevita- Kite’ simultaneously in the Standard ble, given the historic differences and the Leeds Mercury in December July 1895. that existed between their political 1885. The shock and surprise caused

14 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 A ‘Distinction without a Difference’? The Liberal Unionist – Conservative Alliance

by this event, the ‘earthquake and The splits within the party that If the Liberal Unionist move- eclipse’ as J. L. Garvin has it, goes had been problematic before 1886 ment was to be anything more some way to explaining the nature became intolerable once the elec- than a refusal to vote for a par- of the opposition that emerged once tion result of December 1885, which ticular measure by disgruntled Gladstone’s commitment to home gave the balance of power to the backbenchers, it needed a leader rule was confirmed. 2 Gladstone’s Nationalists, became known. Lord of national reputation and unques- sudden public conversion to home Derby wrote in his diary: tioned political seniority around rule, in December 1885, actually whom dissenting Liberals could The state of things I imagine to came from his long-term, tradi- coalesce. Although the Marquess be this – Gladstone has no time tionally Liberal attitude to national of Hartington’s position as this to spare and wants to get back self-determination. He had been leader may seem to have been to Downing St. The Whigs or troubled by his own government’s inevitable, due to his early denun- moderate section, incline in that actions in Egypt in 1882 and later in ciation of the policy of home rule direction, but with less eagerness. Sudan. By adopting a policy of home at Waterfoot on 29 August 1885, On the other hand, the Radicals, rule while in opposition, he felt he he had, in fact, been more inclined Chamberlain and co., are not in a was returning to a truer, more moral to consider resignation and retire- hurry. They had rather wait to get form of Liberalism, with which to ment from politics.5 The task of rid of Gladstone, Granville and appeal to the newly enlarged elec- persuading Hartington to take on the Whig party in general, think- torate. He had not, however, shared the task of leadership of a rebel- ing themselves strong enough to his moral struggle with his Cabinet lion fell to George Goschen, who form a purely Radical cabinet.4 colleagues, many of whom con- was unable to take on the role of sequently interpreted the Liberal Most Liberals felt ambivalent about leader due to his distance from the duty towards Ireland (and the wider Gladstone’s method of announcing Liberals since 1874 and because of Empire) in a very different fashion, the new policy, even if they sup- his unstinting opposition to any although he was supported by Earl ported the principle. However, as aspect of Chamberlain’s radicalism. Spencer who had, as Lord Lieutenant the announcement had been quite so Queen Victoria herself was united in Ireland, implemented a coercive unexpected, those who felt inclined with Goschen in her suspicion of regime from 1882 to 1885. to resist the home rule strategy took Gladstone, who she regarded as ‘a On the other hand, the sup- a long time to organise their forces half-mad … ridiculous old man’6 port that Parnell had offered to as they needed to assess the policy Left: election and she now bombarded Goschen the Conservatives in the general itself and the best cause of affecting, poster for a with letters demanding that he per- election of 1885, meant, in Angus adjusting or aborting it. Secondly, Liberal Unionist suade Hartington to act decisively. Hawkins’ memorable phrase that Liberals of all hues needed time to candidate, She encouraged Goschen to appeal ‘an extraordinary fluidity prevailed assess the attitudes of their allies. featuring (left– to ‘moderate, loyal and patriotic over the political situation.’3 In these Even Chamberlain, who might right) Salisbury, men’ and urged him to consider ‘an circumstances, with Randolph have been expected to have lead the Hartington, amalgamation or rather juncture Churchill and Lord Carnarvon revolt openly, given his role as the Chamberlain of Conservatives and Whigs.’7 She wooing Parnell, while Joseph alternative figurehead of Liberalism and Balfour never forgave the Nationalists for Chamberlain floated his Central between 1880 and 1885, chose to (reproduced their refusal to participate in the Board Scheme, some type of politi- bide his time and actually to join with permission Prince of Wales’ Irish tour of April cal reorientation seemed inevitable. Gladstone’s third Cabinet, while of Lord Clifford, 1885, when he had been abused and The only question was the extent promoting his own alternative Ugbrooke Hall, threatened. Salisbury now encour- and origin of the alteration. approach to the Irish problem. Devon). aged her as well, describing home

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 15 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance rule to her as ‘a concession to the One Con- Salisbury was clearly keen, see- concerns of the Liberals who did not forces of disorder’ and ‘a betrayal ing an opportunity of ending a wish to be publicly associated with of the Loyalists of Ulster.’8 Edward servative period of nearly forty years in ‘their hateful allies’, and were keep- Watkin, maverick Liberal MP for which there had been only one ing their profile as low as possible.16 Hythe, now urged Hartington to demanded, Conservative majority govern- After the Bill was defeated by form an alliance with Salisbury, ment, and he dissuaded his party thirty votes (ninety-three Liberals with the rousing (if rather self- ‘let no mem- from interfering in the home rule voted against it), Salisbury wrote serving) exhortation, ‘while you debate at Westminster, so that the to Goschen on 20 June to make will have saved your country, ber of the opposition to Gladstone’s bill would arrangements for the forthcom- you will be Prime Minister by come from within his own party. ing election. On the following day, the summer.’9 Henry Ponsonby, Tory party Salisbury then met Hartington on Salisbury wrote directly to Lord on the queen’s behalf, began float- assist in 2 March, and proposed a full alli- Hartington asking for his interven- ing a scheme to keep Gladstone ance between Conservatives and tion in seats where Conservatives from office, in which Salisbury returning moderates, but, as Henry James were fighting Gladstonians. would resign the premiership, but recorded, ‘Hartington declined to Although Hartington was reluc- remain Foreign Secretary, while to Parlia- do more than express the hope that tant to endorse Conservatives with Hartington took over at No. 10. they might act together in defeating whom he disagreed on a myriad Derby, described this as ‘eccen- ment any any proposition for a separate Irish of historic issues, against Liberals tric’ and suggested that Salisbury Parliament’.13 When Chamberlain with whom he disagreed on one, was behind it, in order to separate Liberal’, but and George Trevelyan resigned he did respond to Salisbury’s pleas Hartington and Chamberlain.10 from the government in March, and eventually agreed to advise There was however a possibil- it appeared Hartington was spurred into action Liberal Unionist voters to support ity that the campaign against home to prevent the radical Unionists Conservatives in seats where no rule might become associated with that in taking charge of the revolt. The Liberal Unionist was standing. the landowning elite in Ireland, Earl of Radnor recommended that Prominent Liberal Unionists, or at least fall into the hands of most con- Hartington should establish a com- such as Edward Heneage in the Conservatives. On 9 January, mittee of consultation between Grimsby, were supported by the Colonel Edward Saunderson, a stituencies the Conservatives and the Liberal local Conservatives and felt no former Liberal MP, and the Duke Unionists to discuss tactics, with restrictions on their expression of Abercorn, a leading Irish land- the Liberal a large public meeting in the west of Liberalism. One Conservative owner, re-founded the Irish Loyal end of London and a series of fur- demanded, ‘let no member of the and Patriotic Union, and organ- Unionists ther meetings across the country. Tory party assist in returning to ised a series of cross-party demon- enjoyed As a result, Salisbury wrote to Parliament any Liberal’,17 but it strations in favour of the Union. Hartington in early April propos- appeared that in most constituen- The first of these was at Chester considerable ing ‘conversations’ on future tac- cies the Liberal Unionists enjoyed on 29 January 1886, when Tories, tics.14 Derby advised Hartington to considerable Conservative support Whigs and Radicals condemned Conservative support a Conservative Cabinet but for their principled stand against home rule. He liaised with Duke to avoid a coalition, on the grounds home rule. Under the terms of the of Westminster to find ‘how far the support for that they ‘were always unpopular informal agreement, a few lead- Whigs will go with us’ – the result and seldom lasted long.’ Instead ing Liberal Unionists were forced had been a united platform and the their princi- he recommended that Hartington to stand aside for Conservatives. meeting was deemed ‘a great suc- should ‘come to an understanding The nascent alliance did man- cess.’11 Once Salisbury’s govern- pled stand with Chamberlain.’15 The future age a more cooperative approach ment fell on 25 January 1886, and Unionist alliance was thus begin- in four double constituencies, Gladstone became prime minister against ning to take shape. running Conservatives in har- again, the initiative passed back to In early May, in an attempt ness with Liberal Unionists in the dissenting Liberals and, in refus- home rule. to secure the votes of the waver- Newcastle-upon-Tyne, York, ing office, Hartington became the ing Liberals, Goschen’s close ally Northampton and Portsmouth. de facto leader of the revolt, some- Albert Grey began negotiations Some Liberal Unionists, and all what against his will. with the Conservative whip, Aretas the radical Unionists, managed to On 2 February Goschen began to Akers-Douglas, in order to secure carry their constituency associa- sound out Salisbury on the oppor- a promise that Liberals who voted tions with them, but others, such as tunity for an electoral truce. against the Home Rule Bill would Hartington were rejected by their not face a Conservative opponent caucuses and had to rely almost I acknowledged the importance in the subsequent general election. exclusively on Conservative sup- of coming to an understanding On 16 May, Salisbury and Hicks port in electioneering. In this way on the point and said it would Beach unveiled the electoral truce some Liberal Unionists emerged not be worth our while unless when they told the National Union from the election with a strong they would break definitely with of Conservative Associations that sense of independence and free- Gladstone. He admitted this: Conservatives must support Liberal dom of action in the forthcoming and further limited his proposal Unionist candidates in constituen- parliament, while others were well to those places, where, without cies where the Conservatives would aware of their position as political a split, our chances were hope- have had no chance of defeating a debtors and adjusted their rhetoric less. Without pledging myself Liberal in normal circumstances. accordingly. I gave him general hopes of an The Conservatives were there- Once the 1886 election had pro- understanding.12 fore carefully responding to the duced a hung parliament (albeit

16 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance with a Unionist majority), the keep Liberal Unionist influence to a in favour of it. For many Liberals Liberal Unionists held the position minimum, warning that ‘he could , this was the issue which finally of kingmakers. When Hartington not whip up the [Conservative] men made the breach in the Liberal asked Chamberlain his advice on for Hartington.’20 The perception Party irreversible. Henry James in whether or not to join a coalition, that the government was tottering Bury had managed to weather the Chamberlain was quite adamant was quelled by the appointment storm of criticism that followed his in his refusal and was supported of Goschen as Chancellor of vote against the Home Rule Bill by Lord Derby, who distrusted the Exchequer in January 1887, in 1886 and had been re-adopted as the Conservative leader. When he encouraged by Queen Victoria, the Liberal candidate. However, a met Hartington on 24 July, Lord Hartington and Heneage, Goschen meeting to condemn the Crimes Salisbury found that the Liberal was chosen because, although a Bill in April 1887 produced ‘sulphur Unionist leader was determined Liberal, he was barely distinguish- in the air’ and the sight of Liberal not to enter a government, as it able from the Conservatives in his Unionists ‘hissing at old friends’.24 would jeopardise his standing as economic outlook. For some Liberal Unionists who a Liberal. Hartington had to con- Of course, this was actually had made pledges against coercion, sider the effect that twenty years of another coup for Salisbury, and the alliance had served its purpose Conservative–Liberal antagonism another blow for Chamberlain. in defeating the Home Rule Bill, had had on his own supporters. The Now the Birmingham leader had but it was now being distorted by Liberal Unionists were determined lost his most useful ally in the the Salisbury–Hartington alliance. that they should be an independ- Conservative Cabinet, one who Arthur Winterbotham spoke out ent Liberal group and resolved at had expressed sympathy with for this group during the debate an executive committee meeting the idea of a new party compris- in March 1887, and led three other on 24 July to maintain a separate ing the ‘advanced’ sections of both radicals back to the Liberals. It headquarters, with subscriptions Unionist parties. He was also now a looked as if Chamberlain would be to local Liberal Associations to be member of a party which was in an left completely isolated, until W. S. broken off. Chamberlain, Lord alliance with the previously derided Caine, the champion of the temper- Wolmer, James and Derby also Conservatives, and one that would ance movement, came to his res- advised Hartington that the party most likely last for the remainder of cue and stood firm. Others, such as should continue to sit with the the parliament. As he put it, ‘we may F. W. Maclean, MP for Woodstock, Gladstonians, now on the opposi- be face to face with a Tory govern- voted in favour of the Crimes Bill, tion benches. [Fig. 1] ment whose proposals no consistent for the solidly liberal reason that it The Liberal Unionists’ Liberal will be able to support’.21 was ‘paving the way for the intro- choice masked serious ideologi- The fall of Churchill meant that a duction of remedial measures cal divisions, as Chamberlain Crimes Bill, which Chamberlain [including] a very wide measure of and Hartington held diametri- had openly denounced, would now self-government’.25 Salisbury real- cally opposed interpretations of be introduced. William Harcourt ised that he had tested the patience Liberalism and they had previously spotted that Chamberlain’s posi- of his allies too far and as a token of been the bitterest of rivals in the tion was uncomfortable, if not his constructive intentions, intro- government of 1880–85. As early untenable, and responded posi- The alli- duced a hastily devised Land Bill. as May 1886, the Birmingham Post tively to Chamberlain’s suggestion The bill was only allowed to pass described Chamberlain’s faction of a meeting at the end of 1886, ance that the Lords having been emascu- as ‘for Mr Gladstone, if he will but which eventually led to the ‘Round lated, however, leaving the land modify his plan’ and Hartington’s Table’ conference which has been emerged issue largely unresolved until the as those who ‘would refuse, at any described in such minute detail by Wyndham Act of 1903. time or under any circumstances, Michael Hurst.22 [Fig. 2] between The alliance that emerged to concede autonomy to Ireland’. When the Crimes Bill was intro- between the parties after 1887 was The article concluded, pessimisti- duced in March 1887, Hartington the parties then one of electoral and political cally, ‘the two sections … can have began to write to Salisbury, not to convenience, not born out of any no continuous ground of common criticise the measure, but to ensure after 1887 natural affinity between the par- action.’18 Hartington himself con- the distribution of honours among ties. In the subsequent eight years of fided to James that he could ‘never Liberal Unionists in exchange for was then one the alliance, before the two parties … be sure how far Chamberlain and their support. Chamberlain and his finally formed a coalition govern- I will be able to go on together’.19 followers were the crucial problem, of electoral ment in 1895, a number of ideo- Once appointed as Chancellor and but here Hartington and Salisbury logical and operational difficulties Leader of the Commons, Randolph had a rare moment of good fortune. and political therefore challenged a relationship Churchill attempted to appease John Bright roused himself to offer convenience, that had been forged by party lead- the Liberal Unionists’ conscience his support of the Crimes Bill to ers at Westminster. over Ireland, promising to imple- Wolmer on the grounds that ‘Mr not born out ment local government reform in Gladstone ought to have suppressed Ireland. When Churchill unex- the Land League five years ago’.23 As of any natu- Division pectedly resigned in December the Liberal Unionists had the choice Firstly, there were clear political 1886, the pressure for a Hartington- of whether to support the bill or ral affinity divisions between the parties. When led coalition government grew. bring the government down, the the Irish National League was However, the Tory chief whip, Conservatives could safely call their between the finally proscribed in 1887, the need Aretas Akers-Douglas, played his bluff and the bill was passed with to offer a constructive alternative first hand in his ongoing attempt to sixty-four Liberal Unionists voting parties. to home rule became paramount.

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 17 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance

avoid association with the imple- mentation of the Crimes Bill. Prior to Chamberlain’s return, Hartington took the trouble to redefine the Liberal Unionists’ position in a speech at Ipswich on 7 March 1888. He finally stated that he could not see how a reconcilia- tion between the two branches of Unionism could be achieved, and therefore (nearly two years after the formation of the first party organi- sation) conceded that ‘we have no alternative before us except to do all that is in our power to constitute a 3rd party’. He made clear that ‘while we adhere to the opinions we have always held on the Irish question we have not renounced one single Liberal opinion or Liberal principle’. Finally, to appease Chamberlain, he stated that ‘there is room within the Liberal Unionist party … for the extremest radical as well as for the most moderate whig’ and that the Unionist policy was not ‘simply one of obstruction and resistance to reform’.27 The tactic appeared to have worked, for Chamberlain at least, as he wrote to Wolmer on his return to England later that month, ‘I shall be glad to be able once more to take my place amongst you’.28 The Liberal Unionist party would remain allied with the Tories, but they would remain Liberals as well. [Fig. 3] Writing in the party newspa- per, Ebenezer Le Riche blamed the party’s defeats in the 1892 election on the overly close relationship with the Conservatives. ‘At meetings the relative merits of the Conservative and Liberal parties were pointed out, the Conservative big drum was beaten, the party colours and sentiments flaunted wholly regard- Chamberlain attempted to pre- Fig. 1: ‘Cross- tried to put pressure on Hartington, less of the 10 to 40 per cent of radi- empt the damage this would cause Roads’. Salisbury: on the ground that ‘every day brings cals who were thereby alienated to the Radical Unionists by estab- ‘Hullo! Aren’t you me letters from Liberal Unionists in and whose votes lost us the seat.’29 lishing a national association dis- fellows going all parts of the country asking me Study of the work of the chief tinct from Hartington’s in London further with me?’ what the issue is and where we still ideologues of the party, the profes- and with a speech in which he sug- (Punch, 31 July, differ from our old colleagues … I sor of Law, A. V. Dicey, the scien- gested the formation of a national 1886) am at my wit’s end to know … what tist and banker, Sir John Lubbock, progressive party to implement Fig. 2: ‘The to say to prevent the disappearance and the Irish historian, W. E. H. land and local government reform temptations of of our followers in the country’. It Lecky confirms that Liberal prin- in Ireland. Of course, for Lord Joseph’. No. 2 was at this juncture, with his allies ciples were still championed by the Salisbury and Arthur Balfour, there The Sirens. Harty: deserting him and his constituents Liberal Unionist party long into the was nothing to gain and much to ‘Come away, questioning his stance on coercion, twentieth century. What motivated lose from such a reorganisation. Joe, come away, that Salisbury handed Chamberlain Liberal Unionists was more than a This issue was only resolved by they’ll be the a lifeline, or at least a breathing mere ‘fear of socialism’ and arose Hartington’s ex cathedra pronounce- ruin of you’. (St space. The opportunity to repre- from a contrasting interpretation ment at Greenwich on 5 August, Stephen’s Review sent Britain in the fisheries dispute of Liberalism and nationalism to when he announced ‘that the time is presentation between Canada and United States that of Gladstone. It took until 1895 not yet ripe for such closer union’.26 cartoon, 26 would give Chamberlain the chance for the Liberal Unionists to find an Constantly frustrated, Chamberlain February 1887) to prove his skill as a statesman and opportunity to portray themselves

18 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance as more authentically Liberal than saw an opportunity to make trou- under pressure from Balfour, and Rosebery’s shambolic government, ble. This reflected a distrust of John Bright’s son won the subse- and a strong case can be made that radicalism that was certainly still quent by-election with a majority it was the Liberal Unionists who felt by many local Conservatives. Fig. 3: ‘Is of nearly 3,000. made the decisive contribution to In the North Buckinghamshire marriage a To ease relations on a local the Unionist landslide of that year.30 by-election in October 1889, one failure?’ [Letter level, Wolmer now urged Liberal of Evelyn Hubbard’s Conservative from a Liberal Unionist Associations to regu- supporters ‘began his speech in Unionist]. late their relations with their Antagonism the following style. “Chapter XV, ‘Dear Sir – I was Conservative allies through the At a local level in Britain in the verse 7 of the book of common divorced from creation of joint committees. late nineteenth century, Liberal– sense – ‘never trust a radical.’”’32 a Party called In West Derbyshire, for exam- Conservative animosities were The rapidly shrinking radical Liberal, and am ple, a Joint Unionist Committee enforced by religious, social and Unionist section of the party felt now united in was organised, comprising two working allegiances and these that the Birmingham seat was a the bonds of members of the Liberal Unionist proved remarkably resilient, even vital test of the party’s credibility matrimony to a Association and three members when the cause of Union and empire as an independent force. A hast- Tory Party. I do of the Conservative Association. offered a bridge between them. The ily organised party conference not like it quite This committee became the chief first of many disputes which was to was held in Birmingham at the so much as I organising body in the constitu- hamper the Unionist alliance until end of April with Hartington, expected.’ Yours, ency, meeting in 1892 before the the ‘fusion’ of 1912, took place at Lord Camperdown and the Duke ‘Much-married election and in 1893 and 1895. Joint St Ives in June 1887. Here, as in so of St Albans all attending. The man’ (Fun, 29 Unionist meetings regularly took many of the later cases, the issue of Conservative candidate withdrew, August 1888) place within the constituency, and disagreement was disestablishment. Salisbury correctly commented ‘I generally find that it is that question that makes the difficulty’.31 Local party leaders, accustomed to a simple divide between Liberal and Conservative, became increasingly restive at having to support a local Conservative candidate. Clearly the problem was becoming more serious, particularly as the position of the Liberal Unionists became more fragile as their membership haem- orrhaged back to Gladstone in the aftermath of the Crimes Bill. Some, who found their Liberalism under question, chose to remind their electorate of their principles by criticising their Tory allies. Henry James, still supported by the Liberal caucus in Bury, attended a dinner at the Manchester Reform Club and gave a speech attacking the Primrose League. Between 1887 and 1892, the Liberal Unionist party lost nineteen out of twenty three by-elections, including ones in their stronghold of western Scotland, and the Liberal Unionist Associations began to demand what they perceived as their side of the electoral bargain from the Conservatives. The growing divisions between Conservatives and Liberal Unionists at constituency level finally found public expression in the dispute over the candidate for John Bright’s seat in 1889. Chamberlain regarded Birmingham Central as his to allocate, but the local Conservatives, bitter opponents of Chamberlain long before 1886,

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 19 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance at every election until 1900 a joint from the Conservative leader in Unionists were ‘soured at the muti- Unionist manifesto was issued by the commons, Balfour, a letter of nous spirit that the Conservatives the committee. support for his chosen candidate, are showing’.40 These quickly The problematic issue of dis- the speaker’s son, George.35 Alfred receded once the election campaign establishment resurfaced however Austin in the Standard and Gerorge of 1895 was under way, but the with the ill-advised attempt to Curzon in the New Review, with at antipathy between certain Unionist debate the position of the Welsh least the tacit consent of Salisbury, Associations continued to trouble church in 1891. On 1 January 1892 took the opportunity to launch the alliance even when the cen- a correspondent of The Times noted attacks on Chamberlain’s behaviour tral Associations merged in 1912. that, although ‘there is at the present and character.36 When a public meet- The Birmingham Liberal Unionist time complete harmony so far as ing was held at Leamington Town Association held aloof and refused the leaders are concerned’, this was Hall to launch Peel’s campaign, he to amalgamate until January 1918. not the case in the rank and file of was humiliated, and Chamberlain The parties’ both parties, amongst whom ‘there hurriedly dropped him and adopted managers is a certain amount of jealousy and Alfred Lyttleton, the sporting hero Bias suspicion’.33 Shortly after becom- and a friend of Balfour’s, as a com- and organis- The parties’ managers and organ- ing party leader in the Commons, promise candidate acceptable to the isers, imbued with far greater this jealousy was expressed in an local Conservatives.37 ers, imbued authority since the expansion of area doubly close to Chamberlain The crisis of Hythe is less well- the franchise in 1884, were charged himself. At East Worcestershire, the known. Sir Edward Watkin, MP with far with enforcing a Westminster elec- unexpected resignation of Hastings, for Hythe, was seriously ill in toral pact in the constituencies and on a charge of fraud, had led 1894 and looked unlikely to stand greater they too proved less than enthu- Chamberlain to persuade his eld- again, and the Liberal Unionist siastic in working harmoniously est son, Austen, to stand as a Liberal chief agent, John Boraston, com- authority with those who had previously Unionist for the constituency that plained that the local Conservative been their bitterest enemies. After included the Chamberlain home leader had forced their candidate since the the 1886 election, in which there at Highbury. Unfortunately, the forward against the wishes of the were remarkably few disagreements chairman of the local Conservative local Liberal Unionists. When expansion of over candidatures, disputes over the Association, Victor Milward, Devonshire approached Salisbury, allocations of seats emerged, and insisted that Austen Chamberlain the Conservative leader was a lit- the franchise the Conservatives’ managers were must pledge not to vote for dis- tle taken aback. ‘Mr Boraston’s clearly intent on serving the inter- establishment in order to receive information to you is in hopeless in 1884, were ests of their own party. In the first the support of local Conservatives. disagreement with the information dispute at St Ives, Hartington wrote The Conservatives were eventu- which has been furnished to me charged with to Salisbury complaining about ally faced down when Chamberlain by Douglas.’38 As far as Salisbury enforcing a the behaviour of the Conservative suggested that if pledges against was concerned Bevan Edwards, chief agent, Richard Middleton. disestablishment were to be asked the chairman of the Hythe Westminster Middleton thought little of his new from Liberal Unionists, pledges in Conservative Association, was allies, observing in mid-1887, ‘with- favour of disestablishment might now adopted as the Unionist can- electoral out the Conservative party … no be asked from Conservatives by didate for Hythe. The rival Liberal Liberal Unionist can secure his seat Liberal Unionists. Following the Unionist was ordered to withdraw pact in the in any future election’.41 The actions crisis, Lord Salisbury held the first his candidature once a Unionist of the Birmingham Gazette in pro- joint meeting of the Unionist lead- coalition Cabinet had been formed, constituen- voking the crises in Birmingham ership that year, but the issue of dis- and Edwards won the seat at the in 1889 look particularly significant establishment continued to hinder general election. cies and they when one considers that Middleton the relations between the radical With the concatenation of was chairman of the syndicate that Unionists and the moderates and the Hythe, Leamington and too proved controlled the Gazette, a news- Conservatives. Birmingham disputes, it seemed a paper which was the rival of the At Leamington and Warwick, genuine Unionist crisis was under- less than pro-Chamberlain Birmingham Post. just outside Chamberlain’s duchy, way, and Boraston was keen to When Middleton was finally forced the most serious local crisis between encourage Chamberlain’s sense of enthusiastic to disown Randolph Churchill’s the parties of the Unionist Alliance grievance. He sent Chamberlain a attempt to contest the seat and order took place shortly before the fall letter from the honorary secretary in working the Birmingham Conservatives to of Rosebery’s ministry in 1895. 34 of a northern Association. ‘There back down, for the sake of future Here the Speaker, Arthur Peel, had is an intensely strong feeling as to harmoni- relations, the dispute was pre- represented the seat since 1865, and the questions which have arisen ously with sented as merely the work of the ill he had been counted among the at Hythe and Leamington. If the informed and malicious. Liberal Unionists as he had been matter is not settled soon and in those who In the wake of the crisis, how- opposed by the local Conservatives our favour you may rest assured ever, there was now a need to in 1885 (despite the speakership), that a good many Liberal Unionists had previ- define exactly what the relationship but not in 1886 or 1892. On the will not stir one peg at the next between the two Unionist parties announcement of his retirement in General Election’.39 Boraston con- ously been should be and to turn the verbal March 1895, the local Conservatives tinued to worry Chamberlain by ‘compact’ of 1886 into a more for- claimed the right to contest the seat. telling him of the experiences of their bitter- mal document. Hartington was Chamberlain stuck to the terms of Liberal Unionists in Barnstaple and forced to ask Wolmer, the newly the 1889 ‘compact’ and extracted Tavistock where the local Liberal est enemies. appointed party whip, whether

20 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance any agreement existed in writing. The precise Conservative majority in a future liberal achievements in the period, It clearly did not and Salisbury election, rather than a Unionist one with the introduction of free ele- only reluctantly agreed to extend nature of the and this appeared to cause little con- mentary education and the content the agreement to include the cru- cern to the Conservative managers. of the 1888 Local Government Act, cial issue of candidate vacancies. legislative As this likelihood drew nearer in both of which Chamberlain had Three heads were agreed so as to early 1895, the malicious influence demanded in the ‘unauthorised avoid any repetition of the Central programme of Akers –Douglas and Middleton programme’ three years earlier, Birmingham dispute. It is notable on the alliance became appar- but there was scant achievement that in the event of dispute over the that the ent in the Hythe and Leamington in Ireland and friction over the choice of candidate, the party lead- disputes. At Hythe, adjacent to Church. Hartington knew that ers in the Commons, W. H. Smith alliance Akers-Douglas’ Kentish fiefdom, Chamberlain could only demand and Hartington, would be con- wished to see the Conservative chief whip was so much, as ‘he knows too well sulted, not the party managers, who brazenly partisan. Devonshire that the Gladstonians hate him too were usually responsible for the enacted pre- wrote to Chamberlain complain- much ever to take him back again’.45 selection of candidates. Although ing that ‘A. Douglas seems to have When Hartington succeeded to the not explicit, it is possible to imag- sented the been acting in a very extraordinary Dukedom of Devonshire at the end ine that the Liberal Unionists now manner.’43 Chamberlain was clearly of 1891 however, the party took a distrusted Middleton to act in a most serious concerned about the behaviour of gamble, appointing Chamberlain as disinterested fashion, especially the Conservative whip, as he now leader in the Commons, in the hope where West Midland seats were challenge, began to keep detailed notes of of restraining his radical instincts, concerned. Akers-Douglas’ role in the crisis. whilst retaining his undoubted elec- Despite this document, real- especially Middleton’s role in stirring up toral appeal. At a meeting to endorse politik meant that the choice of the Conservatives in Leamington his leadership at Devonshire House candidate was largely determined with such was revealed in my article on the on 8 February 1892, rather than by Salisbury, no doubt advised by dispute,44 and he also played a role avoiding the difficult issue of dis- Akers-Douglas and Middleton to contrast in in stiffening Conservative resolve establishment, Chamberlain made give as little away as possible. In at Hythe. Less well known is that his position clear. ‘I stated my Cambridge in 1892, where there ideological a second dispute arose at his behest intention of continuing to support was a strong Liberal Unionist pres- in Central Birmingham in July by vote, and in any other way that ence among academics, Hartington heritage of 1895 when Lord Charles Beresford seemed fitting, the disestablishment tried to have Albert Grey adopted offered himself as a Conservative of the State church.’46 for the university and Montagu the parties. candidate, once Albert Bright’s Chamberlain attempted to Crackenthorpe adopted for the intention to stand down became exploit his association with radical- city constituency. Despite the aris- public. It was reported to ism in the few months before the tocratic lineage of the former and Chamberlain that Middleton took election in 1892, by returning to the strongly anti-socialist beliefs a keen interest in the affairs of the issue of social reform that had of the latter, Salisbury refused to Birmingham, and Powell Williams proved so successful at the Aston by- give way. In 1892, when the Liberal was in no doubt that the crisis was election the previous year. Bolstered Unionists lost 37 per cent of their once again of Middleton’s doing, by the increase in the majorities parliamentary strength overall, but all he could suggest was that of the six Liberal Unionist seats in while the Conservatives lost only Bright should fight the general elec- Birmingham and the four in neigh- 19 per cent of theirs, Chamberlain tion and then resign. In the end, a bouring areas in 1892, he stepped complained bitterly to Heneage, ‘I compromise Liberal Unionist can- up his attempts to persuade his am afraid we get put off with all the didate was selected, to demonstrate party and the Tories to accept a pro- hopeless seats and in this way we are Chamberlain’s willingness to meet gramme of social reform, writing to slowly edged out of existence as a the Conservatives’ concerns about James, ‘our Unionist programme of separate party’.42 the proposed candidate, Grosvenor the last 5 years is nearly exhausted The impact of the 1892 general Lee. Beresford was forced to with- … If we attempt to win on a policy election results distinctly altered draw his candidature after he came of negation, the fate of the mod- the relationship between the two under pressure from Salisbury, erates on the LCC will be ours’.47 parties. From Salisbury’s perspec- who was, as at Leamington, forced In November 1892 Chamberlain tive the result was perhaps as good to intervene to undo his principal published an article, ‘The Labour as he might have expected. His agent’s mischief. Question’ in the Nineteenth Century, party was in need of a rest after advocating an increasingly collec- the unusual experience of minor- tivist approach from the Unionists ity administration for seven years. Policy differences in order to prevent the emergence The Conservative dominance of the The precise nature of the legislative of class-based politics, which the House of Lords and the small size of programme that the alliance wished election of Kier Hardie seemed to the Gladstonian majority (depend- to see enacted presented the most presage. Despite the clear dislike ent on Irish votes) told Salisbury serious challenge, especially with for collectivism that many Liberal that a second Home Rule Bill could such contrast in ideological herit- Unionist had previously voiced, the be successfully resisted and that any age of the parties. Without a docu- party, desperate to avoid political Liberal administration was likely ment of agreed policy, the struggle oblivion, fell into line behind their to be short-lived. The dramatic for influence continually unsettled leader in the Commons. Installed decline of the Liberal Unionists the alliance. The Liberal Unionist as chief organiser by Chamberlain, now raised the prospect of a party could point to two solidly Joseph Powell Williams had the

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 21 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance

When, after the Second Home Rule Bill, Chamberlain demanded an alternative Unionist reform programme at Bradford on 2 June 1894, Balfour responded more positively, increasingly convinced by Chamberlain’s argument that such pledges were necessary for the Unionists to break through in the north and in Wales. By the time Chamberlain spoke to his constituents in West Birmingham in October, as well as an extension to the Artisans’ Dwellings Act, a House Purchase Act, employers’ liability and alien immigration, there was a call to enact temperance reform and a tribunal of industrial arbitra- tion. In his ongoing attempt to win Salisbury’s approval, the restric- tion of labour hours was explicitly limited to miners and shopkeepers (therefore excluding domestic serv- ants and agricultural labourers as Salisbury and his party wanted). As for old age pensions, Chamberlain now stated that ‘I do not propose to give everyone a pension as a matter of right; I propose to help the working classes to help themselves’.50 The first response from Hatfield was eventually made public in a speech at Edinburgh at the end of October. Salisbury admitted that he had sympathy for Chamberlain’s ‘general objectives’ but claimed to have no knowledge of the detailed programme that the Liberal Unionists party’s publicity department print Fig. 4: ‘Juggler prejudice’.48 This could not disguise were preparing. [Fig. 4] posters, pamphlets and even song- Joe and his the fact that Rosebery was attempt- By contrast, Balfour appeared books endorsing social reform. vanishing ing to occupy the same collectiv- ever more eager to endorse Speakers operating the Union Jack programme’ ist ground as the Liberal Unionists Chamberlain’s proposals whole- vans took Chamberlain’s message (Westminster and that the actions of the Lords heartedly, claiming in November throughout the country and the Gazette, 9 July in blocking these reforms would that the Unionists would have ‘a more radical party Associations 1895) undermine Chamberlain’s own monopoly of [social] legislation’. such as that of the West of Scotland programme. When Rosebery’s Buoyed by this, Chamberlain sud- filled the local press with endorse- Employers’ Liability Act was denly ceased his caution, perhaps ments. Even Devonshire was thrown out by the upper house, realising that he would never win eventually persuaded to support it Powell Williams warned Wolmer over Salisbury and began to make (cautiously) as the election of 1895 of the consequences. ‘The effect a number of wild promises to the drew near. of the loss of the Bill on the north electorate. Speaking at Heywood At first the reaction from the is very bad indeed … This is not in Lancashire later that month, he Conservatives was lukewarm. an opinion. I can give you proof.’49 made the choice for working class Although Balfour expressed his Powell Williams, now the par- voters clear. sympathy in a speech at Sheffield ty’s chief manager, encouraged You may as I have said, try to dis- in December, he was unwilling to local Associations in the north of establish the Welsh church, or you commit to specific policies. After England, the West of Scotland, may, on the other hand, try to Gladstone’s retirement, Rosebery Ulster and Cornwall to pledge become the owners of your own had signalled a new direction for their support for a sustained cam- houses. You may attempt to pass the party with the introduction of paign of Unionist reform. Although an Irish Land Bill, or you may an Employers’ Liability Bill in 1893, criticised in the Tory press continu- attempt to get old age pensions for swiftly followed by the Mines Eight ously, the campaign was supported yourselves.51 Hours Bill. Chamberlain firstly by such solidly liberal figures as strove to distance his programme Millicent Fawcett, a prime mover Balfour continued to encourage from that of the Liberals, accus- in the Women’s Liberal Unionist Chamberlain’s campaign during them of issuing ‘appeals to class Association. ing a speech in January 1895 at

22 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance

Liberal Unionist spokesman on this issue and it was left to an equally quiescent Devonshire, as Lord President, to attend a conference on the Poor Law at Derby in September 1895, where he stated that ‘a great proportion of even the industri- ous aged poor must be depend- ent for their support … [on] the Poor Law’.57 [Fig. 6] Chamberlain’s advocacy of social reform for the common good would only be res- urrected by the united party in the changed circumstances of the inter-war years, when it proved to be a valuable asset for Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain in offering an alternative to the Labour party’s collectivist programme.

Conclusion The nine years of political manoeu- vring, between 1886 and 1895, Manchester in which he claimed manifesto, although he claimed Fig. 5: ‘On demonstrated the dangers of col- that social reform came second to that ‘Unionist leaders are absolutely the altar of laborating with the Conservatives. the maintenance of the Union in the agreed in their determination … the coalition’ In a warning that Nick Clegg might Alliance’s priorities. Emboldened to devote their principal attention (Westminster heed, Arthur Pease, who had stayed by this, Chamberlain became even to a policy of constructive social Gazette, 5 July loyal to Gladstone, gave his view of more open in his programme, even reform’, he no longer enunciated 1895) the compromises that the Liberal referring to social issues as ‘the pri- specific policies.54 [Fig. 5] It cannot Unionists had had to make in these mary policy’ in his response to the be denied, however, that support for years: Queen’s Speech in the Commons in elements of the social programme I have often thought of a story February.52 was widespread among Liberal vot- I was told as a child of a Russian The campaign to convince the ers and the party’s achievement of Fig. 6: ‘The cold family flying before a pack of Conservative leadership to accept seventy seats, including nine in the water cure’. wolves, in their sledge with four Chamberlain’s programme was north of England and one in Wales, (Westminster horses. To save themselves they terminated however by the local owed much to popular expectation Gazette, 21 tried sacrificing one horse, then crises at Hythe, Leamington and of substantial reform. September 1895) Birmingham which broke out in With the election over, Salisbury spring 1895 as the prospect of elec- made it clear that ‘the condition tion victory drew close. Having of England’ would not be eagerly realised that he was in no position confronted under his premiership. to make political demands after the The Queen’s Speech of August 1895 Leamington debacle, Chamberlain contained no mention of domes- was faced with an opportunity to tic reform at all, and he did noth- distance himself from his own pro- ing to prevent an amendment to gramme when it received the sup- the speech asking for measures port of Mrs Fawcett, who spoke to address unemployment from at a meeting of the Metropolitan being defeated by 211 votes to 79. Liberal Unionist Federation in May Speaking at Brighton in November, and who proposed a motion urg- he made his caution clear, ‘how- ing the party leadership to press ever much you may desire to ben- forward measures of social reform. efit your neighbour, you do not Chamberlain, chastened by his benefit him by taking money out treatment by the Conservative of the pockets of another man.’ In press, failed to respond to Mrs contrast to Chamberlain, he prom- Fawcett’s invitation and instead ised that ‘the sufferings under which spoke of his priority as ‘the expan- agriculture is groaning are the first sion of the empire’. On the same evils to which we must apply our- day, Salisbury spoke at Bradford, selves’.55 It is difficult to dissent making it clear that ‘nothing would from David Steele’s conclusion that induce me to adopt the socialistic unlike Gladstone and Devonshire, [sic] remedies’, but he acknowl- Salisbury had successfully tamed edged, ‘there is an evil’.53 When Chamberlain.56 Chamberlain at the Chamberlain issued his personal colonial office was no longer the

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 23 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance

another, each victim reprieving ‘To be used schools in the Education Bill, he abandonment of the principle of free them for a short time from a ter- defended the Cabinet’s decision in trade, and of the legacy of Cobden rible fate, and in their desperation as the ladder a series of ill-tempered meetings and Bright, was one pill they would finally sacrificing their children, in Birmingham.59 Chamberlain’s not swallow under any circum- and all in vain … [Liberal] prin- up which Joe great achievement between 1886 stances. Between 1903 and 1906, ciples, their promises … all had and 1902 had been in secur- eight Liberal Unionist free trade to be thrown away to defeat the climbs into a 58 ing the affection of a substantial MPs left the party and rejoined the policy of conciliation and justice. body of Nonconformist Liberals Liberals.66 James, in common with Conservative though the agency of bodies such the remaining Liberal Unionist free In truth, some Liberal Unionists as the Nonconformist Unionist traders, refused to campaign for remained as committed to policies Government, Association, Now, as he wrote to Balfour and Chamberlain: such as temperance, non-denom- Devonshire, ‘our best friends are waving aloft We see the Unionist flag held inational education, state support leaving us by scores and hundreds aloft, but beneath it Protectionist for the poor, further franchise never to return.’60 This spread his banner forces are gathered. We free trad- reform and disestablishment as nationally until a major pro- ers have a right to say these are not they had been in 1885. Of course, test meeting was held at Queen’s of shoddy our friends, we will not fight on these policies posed a particular Hall, London on 10 June, where their side.67 threat to the party of the church, reform then Nonconformist Unionists were the farmer and the businessman described as those ‘who gave their The former governor of Ceylon, – the Conservatives – and were, to be thrown votes to the betrayal of their co- West Ridgeway, wrote an article as a result, a significant stumbling religionists’.61 Paul Readman has on the death of the Liberal Unionist block in the Unionist alliance. What ignomini- suggested that the Education Bill party in which he claimed that the emerged instead, was a commit- was valuable ammunition in the party had been ‘strangled by its own ment to the rule of law, a defence ously aside. A Liberal party’s post-war attempt to parent.’68 Beatrice Webb noted the of the benefits of the Union and regain ownership of liberal, patri- effect her former sweetheart had the historic mission of the British fit ending for otic constitutionalism, in the face of had upon ‘the poor, dear Liberal empire. The persistence of political the (alleged) denominational, sec- Unionists – that little company of sectarianism among party managers a company of tarian and anti-democratic bill.62 At upright, narrowly enlightened, well and among many local activists that the time, Edward Porritt considered bred men.’ was revealed by the events in Hythe, prigs!’ that ‘much of the disappearance of To be used as the ladder up which Leamington and Birmingham, led Liberal Unionism is traceable to the Joe climbs into a Conservative to the strategic decision to create a Education Act of 1902.’63 Government, waving aloft his coalition immediately prior to the Chamberlain was therefore banner of shoddy reform then to 1895 election. It was also a political desperate to reassert his Radical be thrown ignominiously aside. A decision on Chamberlain’s part, to credentials, and the tariff reform fit ending for a company of prigs!69 use the imperial mission between campaign, with its initial promises 1895 and 1903 to finally try to bring of social reform, certainly allowed a genuine affinity to the two wings him to consolidate his support in Ian Cawood is Head of History at of unionism. The party’s survival Birmingham.64 To take a more Newman University College and author was thus assured into the twenti- sympathetic view, the new policy of several articles on, and a forthcoming eth century, but eventual fusion can be seen as consistent with all history of the Liberal Unionist Party. with the Conservatives could only Chamberlain’s actions since 1886. be avoided with the active cultiva- Tariff reform was another attempt 1 V. Bogdanor, ‘Electoral pacts in Great tion of the local party’s separate to promote the interests of the Britain since 1886’, in D. Kavanagh identity by the leadership, even as nation above those of particular (ed.), Electoral politics (Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1992), pp. 165–187, at p. 179; they entered a Unionist coalition classes or national groups, just like W. C. Lubenow, Liberal Intellectuals and Cabinet. That this support was not the defence of the Union in 1886 and Public Culture in Modern Britain, 1815– forthcoming is clear from the party 1893, and the promotion of ‘con- 1914 (Boydell, 2010), pp. 192–193. records after 1895, which show little structive unionism’ in his social 2 J. L. Garvin, Life of Joseph Chamberlain opposition to Middleton’s appro- programme of 1892–1895. The (Macmillan, 1932), vol. ii, p. 137. priation of former Liberal Unionist attempt to fuse patriotism with an 3 A. Hawkins, British Party Politics, 1852– 1886 (Macmillan, 1998), p. 246. constituencies, at least outside attack on ‘the condition of England’ 4 Derby’s diary, 10 Dec. 1885, The Later the area controlled by the West had motivated his negotiations Derby Diaries: Home Rule, Liberal of Scotland regional Association. with Lord Randolph Churchill Unionism, and Aristocratic Life in late Vic- Some radicals and committed in the mid-1880s and his wooing torian England (University of Bristol, Liberals such as T. W. Russell and of Balfour after 1891 and helps to 1981), p. 44. Parry suggests that the Leonard Courtney refused to go explain his enormous popularity announcement of home rule, was, for in the Midlands.65 It also provided Gladstone, ‘a final, if flawed, attempt’ along with this and grumbled, to reconcile the disparate elements of resigned or returned to the Liberal an ideological glue to bind the two the Liberal Party. J. P. Parry, ‘Liber- Party, but Chamberlain no longer Unionist parties together as the alism and Liberty’, in P. Mandler (ed.) needed the Liberal Unionists as Conservative party had a long- Liberty and Authority in Victorian Britain much as he needed to prove his standing protectionist instinct that (Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 99. acceptability to the Tories. even Salisbury had occasionally 5 B. Holland, Life of Spencer Compton, 8th By 1902 despite being opposed indulged. To Liberals like Arthur Duke of Devonshire (Longman, 1911), vol. ii, p. 86; Hartington to Gladstone, to those clauses that provided rate- Elliot, Henry James and Sir John 8 November 1885, Devonshire Papers, payer funding for denominational Lubbock (now Lord Avebury) the Chatsworth House, 340.1826.

24 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 A ‘distinction without a difference’? The liberal unionist–conservative alliance

6 Quoted in H. C. G. Matthew, Glad- action as ‘a colossal blunder’. 61 Quoted in S. E. Koss, Nonconformity in stone, 1875–1898 (Clarendon Press, 36 Standard, 3 April 1895; Anon. (‘Z’), Modern British Politics (Batsford, 1975) 1995), p. 240. ‘Two Demagogues: A Parallel and a p. 46. 7 Queen Victoria to Goschen, 28 Jan. Moral’, New Review, 12 (April 1895), 62 P. Readman, ‘The Liberal Party and 1886, Royal Archive, Windsor Castle, pp. 364–70. Patriotism in Early Twentieth Century B66/8. 37 “Emergency” Council Meeting, 26 Britain’, Twentieth Century British His- 8 S. Lee, Queen Victoria: A Biography April 1895, Warwick and Leaming- tory, 12/3 (2003), pp. 273–281. See also A. (Smith, Elder & Co., 1904), pp. 492–493. ton Conservative Party Association Sykes, The Rise and Fall of British Liberal- See also D. Steele, Lord Salisbury: A Politi- minute book, Warwick Record Office, ism, 1776–1988 (Longman, 1997), p. 150. cal Biography (UCL Press, 1999), p. 197. CR1392. 63 E. Porritt, ‘Party Conditions in Eng- 9 E. Watkin to Hartington, 25 Dec. 1885, 38 Salisbury to Devonshire, 3 March land’, Political Science Quarterly, 21 DP 340.1871 1895, Chamberlain Papers, University (1906), p. 213. 10 Later Derby Diaries, 14 Jan. 1886, p. 55. of Birmingham, JC6/1E/6. 64 See R. A. Rempel, Unionists Divided: 11 A. Jackson, Colonel Edward Saunderson: 39 J. H. Cooke to Boraston, 25 March Arthur Balfour, Joseph Chamberlain and Land and Loyalty in Victorian Ireland 1895, JC6/6/1F/17. the Unionist Free Traders (David and (Clarendon Press, 1995) p. 90. 40 Boraston to Chamberlain, 26 March Charles, 1972) for a detailed account 12 Salisbury to Akers-Douglas, 2 Feb. 1895, JC6/6/1F/18. of the divisions between the Tariff 1886, Centre for Kentish Studies, 41 Middleton to Akers-Douglas, 9 July Reformers and Free Traders. Akers-Douglas Papers, U564 C18/6. 1887, quoted in E. Alexander, Chief 65 G. R. Searle, Country before Party: Coa- 13 Henry James, 4 March 1886, quoted in Whip: The political life and times of Are- lition and the Idea of ‘National Government P. Marsh, Discipline of Popular Govern- tas Akers-Douglas, 1st Viscount Chilston in Modern Britain, 1885–1987 (Longman, ment: Lord Salisbury’s Domestic Statecraft (Routledge and Paul, 1961), p. 135. 1995), pp. 49–50. 1881–1902 (Harvester, 1978), p. 109. 42 Chamberlain to Heneage, 6 July 1892, 66 T. W. Russell, J. Wilson (February 14 Salisbury to Hartington, 5 April 1886, JC5/41/30. 1904), I. Guest (April 1904), G. Kemp, DP 340.1961 43 Devonshire to Chamberlain, 3 March E. Hain (August 1904), E. Mitchell, J. 15 Later Derby Diaries, 23 March 1886, pp. 1895, JC5/22/85. Wood (March 1905), R. Cavendish (Jan- 64–5. 44 Cawood, ‘Joseph Chamberlain’, pp. uary 1906). E. J. Reed, MP for Cardiff 16 The Times, 30 April 1886. 568–571. Boroughs, defected from the Liberals 17 Scottish News, 13 May 1886. 45 Hartington to Wolmer, 1 Feb. 1890, in support of tariff reform in December 18 Birmingham Daily Post, 25 May 1886. Selborne MS II (4) 65–69. 1904. Russell’s defection largely handed 19 Hartington to James, 15 Dec. 1886, 46 Joseph Chamberlain’s ‘Memoir’ dated the Ulster Liberal Unionist party to Hereford Record Office, Henry James 1892, JC/8/1/1. Saunderson and Edward Carson, who Papers, M45/242. 47 Chamberlain to James, 2 Oct. 1892, founded the Ulster Unionist Council in 20 L. Courtney to A. R. D. Elliot, 31 M45/1718. 1905 to bring all the Unionist factions Dec.1886, Courtney Papers, London 48 Liberal Unionist Association Memoranda, under their centralised control. A. Jack- School of Economics, V/43. 2:3, March 1894. son, The Ulster Party: Irish Unionists in 21 Quoted in Garvin, Life of Joseph Cham- 49 Powell Williams to Wolmer, 4 March the House of Commons, 1884–1911 (Oxford berlain, vol. ii, pp. 277–278. 1894, Selborne MS II (13) 140–143. University Press, 1989), p. 104. 22 L. Harcourt’s journal, 28 Dec. 1886, P. 50 LUAM 2/11, Nov. 1894. 67 The Times, 1 Jan. 1906; 3 Jan. 1906. Elliot Jackson (ed.), Loulou: Selected extracts 51 LUAM, 2/12, Dec. 1894. and James even went as far as to attempt from the journals of Lewis Harcourt (1880– 52 LUAM, 3/3, March 1895. (unsuccessfully) to persuade Devon- 1895) (Fairleigh Dickinson University 53 LUAM, 3/6, June 1895. shire to issue a manifesto calling on vot- Press, 2006), p. 143; M. C. Hurst, Joseph 54 LUAM, 3/8, Aug. 1895. ers to support Liberal candidates, but Chamberlain and Liberal Reunion: The 55 LUAM, 3/12, Dec. 1895. Balfour had already secured a prom- round table conference of 1887 (Routledge 56 Steele, Lord Salisbury, p. 374. ise from him ‘to do as little damage to and Paul, 1967). 57 LUAM, 3/10, Oct. 1895. Unionism as possible.’ G. R. Askwith, 23 Bright to Wolmer, 24 April 1887, Bod- 58 A. E. Pease, Elections and Recollections Lord James of Hereford (Ernest Benn, leian Library, Selborne Papers, MS II (John Murray, 1932), p. 274. 1930), p. 291; Elliot to James, 23 Nov. (13) 28. 59 In particular, see reports of the meet- 1905, M45/1414; Balfour to Devonshire 24 Bury Guardian, 18 April 1887; Bury ing of the Birmingham, Aston and (copy), 27 Oct. 1905, M45/1399; Devon- Times, 30 April 1887. Handsworth LUA, 16 May 1902, The shire to James, 12 Dec. 1905, M45/1419. 25 Hansard, 3rd series, 29 March 1887. Times, 17 May 1902; Birmingham Lib- 68 J. W. Ridgeway, ‘The Liberal Union- 26 Liberal Unionist, 20 (Sept. 1887). eral Unionist Conference, 9 Oct. 1902, ist Party’, The Nineteenth Century and 27 Liberal Unionist, 27 (April 1888). The Times, 10 Oct. 1902. After, August 1905, p. 182. 28 Chamberlain to Wolmer, 13 March 60 J. Chamberlain to Devonshire, 22 69 B. Webb, Our Partnership (Longmans, 1888, Selborne MS I (8) 1. Sept. 1902, DP 340.2998. Green & co, 1948), p. 125. 29 Liberal Unionist, 80 (Sept. 1892). 30 P. Readman, ‘The 1895 general election and political change in late Vic- torian England’, Historical Journal, 42 Liberal Democrat History Group on the web (1999), pp. 467–493, at pp. 473–481; M. Pugh, ‘Working-class experience and Email state social welfare, 1908–1914: old age Join our email mailing list for news of History Group meetings and publications – the fastest and earliest pensions reconsidered’, Historical Jour- way to find out what we’re doing. To join the list, fill in the form at:http://bit.ly/LDHGemail . nal, 45 (2002), pp. 775–796, at p. 795. 31 Salisbury to Hartington, 23 May 1887, Website DP 340.2131. See www.liberalhistory.org.uk for details of History Group activities, records of all past Journals and 32 Liberal Unionist, 46 (Nov. 1889). 33 The Times, 1 Jan. 1892. past meetings, guides to archive sources, research in progress and other research resources, together 34 I. Cawood, ‘Joseph Chamberlain, the with a growing number of pages on the history of the party, covering particular issues and periods in Conservative party and the Leaming- more detail, including lists of party leaders, election results and cabinet ministers. ton Spa candidature dispute of 1895’, Historical Research, 79 (Nov. 2006), pp. Facebook page 554–577. See us on Facebook for news of the latest meeting, and a discussion forum: 35 Wolmer to Salisbury, 18 & 25 April www.facebook.com/LibDemHistoryGroup 1895, Salisbury Papers, Hatfield House. Wolmer described Balfour’s

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 25