A ‘Distinction witHout A Difference’? The Liberal unionist – ConservAtive AlliAnce The Liberal Unionists had their origins in the disastrous split within the Liberal Party over Irish home rule in 1886. They participated in coalition governments with the Conservatives in 1886–92 and 1895– 1905, and eventually, in 1912, merged entirely into the Conservative Party. How close was ollowing the home philosophies. An examination of the relationship between rule election of 1886, and the troubled relationship between reluctantly at first, a dis- the two branches of the Unionist the Liberal Unionists parate group of Liberal alliance from 1886 until 1895, while and Salisbury’s aristocrats, wealthy busi- redolent of the political culture of Fnessmen and radical professional the late nineteenth century, reveals Conservatives between politicians gradually coalesced the ideological and operational dif- into a political party of sorts and ficulties of maintaining a sustained 1886 and 1895? Ian attempted to maintain an independ- period of cross-party collaboration Cawood argues that ent policy whilst remaining part of in the British political system. It the Unionist alliance. After 1895 the also challenges the perception that the Liberal Unionists Liberal Unionists quickly became Liberal Unionism was a mere ‘rest- socially and politically allied with ing-place’ for Liberals en route to managed to maintain the Tories, and ever since there has the Conservative party or that the a distinct and separate been a tendency to forget that they Liberal Unionists disappeared into were a separate party. This arti- ‘a political wilderness’.1 identity until the cle intends to examine whether The origin of the Unionist alli- the absorption of the Liberal ance has conventionally been seen formation of the Unionists into the Conservative as the issuing of the ‘Hawarden coalition government in and Unionist Party was inevita- Kite’ simultaneously in the Standard ble, given the historic differences and the Leeds Mercury in December July 1895. that existed between their political 1885. The shock and surprise caused 14 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 A ‘Distinction witHout A Difference’? The Liberal unionist – ConservAtive AlliAnce by this event, the ‘earthquake and The splits within the party that If the Liberal Unionist move- eclipse’ as J. L. Garvin has it, goes had been problematic before 1886 ment was to be anything more some way to explaining the nature became intolerable once the elec- than a refusal to vote for a par- of the opposition that emerged once tion result of December 1885, which ticular measure by disgruntled Gladstone’s commitment to home gave the balance of power to the backbenchers, it needed a leader rule was confirmed. 2 Gladstone’s Nationalists, became known. Lord of national reputation and unques- sudden public conversion to home Derby wrote in his diary: tioned political seniority around rule, in December 1885, actually whom dissenting Liberals could The state of things I imagine to came from his long-term, tradi- coalesce. Although the Marquess be this – Gladstone has no time tionally Liberal attitude to national of Hartington’s position as this to spare and wants to get back self-determination. He had been leader may seem to have been to Downing St. The Whigs or troubled by his own government’s inevitable, due to his early denun- moderate section, incline in that actions in Egypt in 1882 and later in ciation of the policy of home rule direction, but with less eagerness. Sudan. By adopting a policy of home at Waterfoot on 29 August 1885, On the other hand, the Radicals, rule while in opposition, he felt he he had, in fact, been more inclined Chamberlain and co., are not in a was returning to a truer, more moral to consider resignation and retire- hurry. They had rather wait to get form of Liberalism, with which to ment from politics.5 The task of rid of Gladstone, Granville and appeal to the newly enlarged elec- persuading Hartington to take on the Whig party in general, think- torate. He had not, however, shared the task of leadership of a rebel- ing themselves strong enough to his moral struggle with his Cabinet lion fell to George Goschen, who form a purely Radical cabinet.4 colleagues, many of whom con- was unable to take on the role of sequently interpreted the Liberal Most Liberals felt ambivalent about leader due to his distance from the duty towards Ireland (and the wider Gladstone’s method of announcing Liberals since 1874 and because of Empire) in a very different fashion, the new policy, even if they sup- his unstinting opposition to any although he was supported by Earl ported the principle. However, as aspect of Chamberlain’s radicalism. Spencer who had, as Lord Lieutenant the announcement had been quite so Queen Victoria herself was united in Ireland, implemented a coercive unexpected, those who felt inclined with Goschen in her suspicion of regime from 1882 to 1885. to resist the home rule strategy took Gladstone, who she regarded as ‘a On the other hand, the sup- a long time to organise their forces half-mad … ridiculous old man’6 port that Parnell had offered to as they needed to assess the policy Left: election and she now bombarded Goschen the Conservatives in the general itself and the best cause of affecting, poster for a with letters demanding that he per- election of 1885, meant, in Angus adjusting or aborting it. Secondly, Liberal Unionist suade Hartington to act decisively. Hawkins’ memorable phrase that Liberals of all hues needed time to candidate, She encouraged Goschen to appeal ‘an extraordinary fluidity prevailed assess the attitudes of their allies. featuring (left– to ‘moderate, loyal and patriotic over the political situation.’3 In these Even Chamberlain, who might right) Salisbury, men’ and urged him to consider ‘an circumstances, with Randolph have been expected to have lead the Hartington, amalgamation or rather juncture Churchill and Lord Carnarvon revolt openly, given his role as the Chamberlain of Conservatives and Whigs.’7 She wooing Parnell, while Joseph alternative figurehead of Liberalism and Balfour never forgave the Nationalists for Chamberlain floated his Central between 1880 and 1885, chose to (reproduced their refusal to participate in the Board Scheme, some type of politi- bide his time and actually to join with permission Prince of Wales’ Irish tour of April cal reorientation seemed inevitable. Gladstone’s third Cabinet, while of Lord Clifford, 1885, when he had been abused and The only question was the extent promoting his own alternative Ugbrooke Hall, threatened. Salisbury now encour- and origin of the alteration. approach to the Irish problem. Devon). aged her as well, describing home Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 15 A ‘Distinction witHout A Difference’? The Liberal unionist–conservAtive alliAnce rule to her as ‘a concession to the one con- Salisbury was clearly keen, see- concerns of the Liberals who did not forces of disorder’ and ‘a betrayal ing an opportunity of ending a wish to be publicly associated with of the Loyalists of Ulster.’8 Edward servative period of nearly forty years in ‘their hateful allies’, and were keep- Watkin, maverick Liberal MP for which there had been only one ing their profile as low as possible.16 Hythe, now urged Hartington to demanded, Conservative majority govern- After the Bill was defeated by form an alliance with Salisbury, ment, and he dissuaded his party thirty votes (ninety-three Liberals with the rousing (if rather self- ‘let no mem- from interfering in the home rule voted against it), Salisbury wrote serving) exhortation, ‘while you debate at Westminster, so that the to Goschen on 20 June to make will have saved your country, ber of the opposition to Gladstone’s bill would arrangements for the forthcom- you will be Prime Minister by come from within his own party. ing election. On the following day, the summer.’9 Henry Ponsonby, tory party Salisbury then met Hartington on Salisbury wrote directly to Lord on the queen’s behalf, began float- assist in 2 March, and proposed a full alli- Hartington asking for his interven- ing a scheme to keep Gladstone ance between Conservatives and tion in seats where Conservatives from office, in which Salisbury returning moderates, but, as Henry James were fighting Gladstonians. would resign the premiership, but recorded, ‘Hartington declined to Although Hartington was reluc- remain Foreign Secretary, while to parlia- do more than express the hope that tant to endorse Conservatives with Hartington took over at No. 10. they might act together in defeating whom he disagreed on a myriad Derby, described this as ‘eccen- ment any any proposition for a separate Irish of historic issues, against Liberals tric’ and suggested that Salisbury Parliament’.13 When Chamberlain with whom he disagreed on one, was behind it, in order to separate Liberal’, but and George Trevelyan resigned he did respond to Salisbury’s pleas Hartington and Chamberlain.10 from the government in March, and eventually agreed to advise There was however a possibil- it appeared Hartington was spurred into action Liberal Unionist voters to support ity that the campaign against home to prevent the radical Unionists Conservatives in seats where no rule might become associated with that in taking charge of the revolt. The Liberal Unionist was standing. the landowning elite in Ireland, Earl of Radnor recommended that Prominent Liberal Unionists, or at least fall into the hands of most con- Hartington should establish a com- such as Edward Heneage in the Conservatives. On 9 January, mittee of consultation between Grimsby, were supported by the Colonel Edward Saunderson, a stituencies the Conservatives and the Liberal local Conservatives and felt no former Liberal MP, and the Duke Unionists to discuss tactics, with restrictions on their expression of Abercorn, a leading Irish land- the Liberal a large public meeting in the west of Liberalism.