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Home , Austen Chamberlain, Neville Chamberlain

reviews a contrasting interpretation of deftly handled. There is plenty here Above all, whose name will forever be associ- late-nineteenth century and early- that patient non-specialist readers ated with . One could, twentieth century Liberal politics, will find enjoyable, especially as the book therefore, be forgiven for placing from the perspective of a staunchly Hattersley varies the diet of poli- Lloyd George in the ‘anti-appeaser’ Labour historian. tics with details of Lloyd George’s lacks the per- camp along with Winston Church- However, Hattersley has complicated and controversial ill, his former Liberal colleague. declined this intriguing opportu- love life. However, there are times ceptiveness Yet, Rudman argues that Lloyd nity. He does not offer any over- when Hattersley’s lack of familiar- George ‘was the first and one of the arching interpretation of Lloyd ity with the latest scholarship on and sense of most determined appeasers of Ger- George’s career. The absence of an Lloyd George leads him astray, as many’ (p. 264). Introduction and conclusion are in his treatment of Lloyd George’s commitment Rudman joins those histori- clear indications of his determi- schemes to ‘Conquer Unemploy- of Jenkins’s ans who root appeasement long nation to concentrate on a narra- ment’ in 1926–31. before ’s pre- tive of Lloyd George’s life, which But, above all, the book lacks Asquith. The miership. Although Lloyd George begins with the Welshman’s birth the perceptiveness and sense of attempted to get the best deal pos- on page 1 and ends with his funeral commitment of Jenkins’s Asquith. Great Out- sible for Britain at the Peace on page 640. This narrative is very The Great Outsider does not give Conferences, his pro-German well done, though the size of the the impression that Hattersley is sider does sympathies were already apparent. book remains a little daunting. really interested in Lloyd George. After blocking a French attempt Hattersley’s writing is clear and That he has written such a detailed not give the to annex the Rhineland, Lloyd vigorous throughout, as one would treatment of his subject is a truly George duplicitously undermined expect from such a stylish jour- remarkable testament to the energy impression Britain’s guarantee of French secu- nalist and author (this is his nine- and prolific writing powers of a rity by making it dependent upon teenth book). There are few factual senior statesman who is now nearly that Hatter- American ratification. This never errors – a situation that Hattersley eighty years old. materialised and France was left is happy to acknowledge is partly sley is really without a defensive frontier on the attributable to the book’s proof- Ian Packer is Reader in History at the Rhine or a security pact. This did reading by Lord Morgan and Pro- University of Lincoln. His publications interested nothing to calm French fears of a fessor Anthony King; and a number on Edwardian Liberalism include Lloyd German resurgence. Lloyd George of complicated political tangles, George, Liberalism and the Land in Lloyd also agreed that a preamble should like Lloyd George’s replacement (2001) and Liberal Government and be added to the peace treaty’s mili- of Asquith in December 1916, are Politics 1905–1915 (2006). George. tary clauses which maintained that Germany was disarmed ‘to render possible the initiation of the general limitation of the armaments of all nations’. When the world’s powers failed to craft a disarmament con- Lloyd George and appeasement vention, this provided Hitler’s Ger- many with a ready-made pretext Stella Rudman, Lloyd George and the Appeasement of for rearmament. Germany 1919–1945 (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011) Lloyd George’s compassionate approach developed into a failure Reviewed by Chris Cooper to implement the treaty that he had helped shape. Rudman clearly lthough Lloyd George contradictions behind his multifac- explains his apparently contradic- was absent from power eted outlook and detecting a line tory, but considered, rationale. The Aafter 1922, he ‘continued to of continuity in the Welshman’s Prime Minister’s ‘deep-seated faith wield enormous influence in Brit- thinking, Rudman, through the in the German nation as a general ish politics’ into the 1940s (p. 161). prism of ‘appeasement’, explains force for good’ reasserted itself (pp. The Welshman is best remembered how the enemy of the Kaiser 82–83). He wanted Germany to as the architect of Britain’s victory became an admirer of Hitler with- be able to pay reparations, resist a in the First World War and for his out any fundamental change in Bolshevik revolution, restore the role in splitting the Liberal Party outlook. European balance of power, and after 1916. Dr Stella Rudman’s con- As peacetime Prime Minis- help revive international trade. So- verted doctoral thesis charts Lloyd ter, Lloyd George helped draw up called ‘appeasement’, at this stage, George’s interventions in foreign the arguably punitive peace terms reflected a pursuit of what Lloyd policy after the conclusion of the imposed upon Germany. He was George perceived were Britain’s First World War, and the develop- seen at his ‘anti-appeasing best’ national interests. When consider- ment of Britain’s ultimately unsuc- as he championed the League of ing reparations, for example, ‘he cessful appeasement of Germany. Nations when attacked Abys- took a generally consistent, anti- Although Lloyd George has been sinia in 1935 (p. 214). Then, during appeasing line’ (p. 48). His Fon- the subject of numerous biographi- the celebrated ‘Norway Debate’ of tainebleau memorandum of 1919 cal studies, monographs and jour- , he delivered an indict- was lenient in warning about the nal articles, this work focuses on ment of Neville Chamberlain’s perils of placing Germans under a comparatively neglected aspect wartime ministry. The debate led foreign sovereignty but it also of his career. By untangling the to the downfall of Chamberlain, called for heavy German payment.

72 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 reviews

Lloyd George’s peacetime premier- of the Rhineland in March 1936 risky war with Italy – would have ship was also marked by his grow- the Welshman opposed retribu- stopped Mussolini or prevented a ing antipathy towards France. His tive action. Five months later the 73 strengthening of the German-Ital- conviction that the French desired year-old travelled to meet Hitler at ian axis. continental hegemony encouraged Berchtesgaden. The two men got Sympathy is also expressed further leniency towards Germany. on ‘like a house on fire’. The ‘spell- for Lloyd George’s ‘Grand Alli- Lloyd George began the process bound’ Lloyd George returned to ance’. Rudman claims that this whereby Britain’s position changed believing the Fuhrer was was ‘more realistic’ than Neville from an ally of France against Ger- ‘the greatest living German’ and Chamberlain’s approach. R. A. C. many to that of a mediator between dismissing suggestions that Hitler Parker’s conclusion, that an anti- them. planned large-scale conquests (pp. Nazi system embracing the Soviet After the collapse of his pre- 224–27). Union should have been forged, miership in 1922, Lloyd George’s The (1936– is reaffirmed (p. 241). Yet, this is a pro-German outlook became more 39) marked a defining moment in complex issue. Stalin harboured pronounced. During the delibera- Lloyd George’s outlook. The shift suspicions of capitalist Britain tions over the future of Upper Sile- in the Welshman’s thinking related and France, the Soviet Union had sia he wanted to construct a strong to France. After over a decade of recently purged its General Staff Germany rather than an enlarged suspicion, he now applauded the and its military limitations out- Poland. This, he hoped, would help French for assisting the Spanish side its own frontiers were readily Germany pay reparations. Dur- government. Nonetheless, he did exposed during the Russo-Finnish ing the remainder of the 1920s he not oppose Germany’s annexa- Winter War of 1939–40. After the advocated arbitration treaties so tion of Austria in , and Prague coup, it was a simple geo- that Germany’s territorial demands his response to the Agree- graphic fact that a ‘Grand Alliance’ could be met. He believed that Ger- ment was ambivalent. His new- to restrict German expansionism many could be satisfied and that any found faith in France, however, depended upon Polish concurrence, agreements would be honoured. allowed him to advocate an Anglo- and the Poles would not accept Giving Germany the benefit of the French-Soviet alliance to resist Soviet aid. Rudman uses Lloyd doubt while a democratic structure acts of aggression. In he George’s advocacy to suggest that existed was perhaps understand- criticised the British guarantee for there was a better alternative to able, but the rise of Hitler’s Nazis Poland, claiming that it was use- Chamberlain’s policy. On balance, ‘did not make Lloyd George more less without Soviet involvement. the evidence suggests that there cautious’ (p. 207). Although the Nevertheless, Lloyd George still probably wasn’t. appeasement of Germany began believed that a peaceful settlement The study provides a mass of to threaten Britain’s interests, not with Germany was possible. After evidence which shows that Lloyd least the balance of power that the outbreak of war he criticised George ‘had a blind spot where Lloyd George had sponsored, he Chamberlain’s administration and Germany, and especially Hit- did not modify his stance. When was sceptical of the prospects of a ler, were concerned’ (p. 261). In Hitler ordered the remilitarisation British victory, favouring a nego- , after the parti- tiated peace. He was not alone in tion of Poland, Lloyd George his pessimism, but one gasps when still thought the Fuhrer had ‘lim- reading that he refused office in ited ambitions and was a man of Churchill’s reconstructed gov- his word’ and, even in 1940, he ernment preferring to ‘wait until ‘still believed that Hitler could Winston is bust’, so that he could be appeased’ (pp. 252, 255). It is, arrange peace with Hitler (pp. therefore, surprising that Rudman 257–58). sustains the argument of Anthony Rudman’s account is readable Lentin, her PhD supervisor, that and generally well-reasoned. Her if Hitler had offered peace terms discussion of the Hitler years, 1933– Lloyd George could have made 45, is the most original part of the a lasting peace with the Fuhrer. study but it draws upon an increas- If negotiations began, Rudman ingly narrow source base and occu- holds that Lloyd George ‘might pies seventy pages, only a quarter well have been the best man for of the book. Lloyd George’s impor- the job’ (p. 263). The evidence in tant intervention in the ‘Norway this study, however, implies that Debate’ is afforded just one para- the deluded 77 year-old negotiat- graph. Rudman also offers a num- ing with Hitler would have been ber of debatable conclusions. Few a frightening prospect. The terms allowances are made for Britain’s of such an agreement would surely policy during disarmament negoti- have been intolerable and Lloyd ations or in the Abyssinian crisis. In George’s previous experience of the latter instance it is not immedi- negotiating a peace treaty had not ately obvious from Lloyd George’s been a resounding success. At this remarks or Rudman’s coverage stage Lloyd George was living in what alternative course – short a fantasy world. It is a pity that of provoking an unpopular and Rudman does not say so.

Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 73 reviews

Although the ex-Prime Rudman’s conclusions may be , Nonconformity and Minister’s influence is difficult challenged, her thought-pro- Continued from page 17 to assess, this study shows that voking study identifies more Lloyd George’s support for motives for appeasement and 9 Ffion Hague,The Pain and the Lloyd George to his wife, 3 May Hitler’s disregard for existing is a welcome addition to the Privilege: the women in Lloyd 1894 (Lloyd George Papers, agreements did nothing to halt historiography. George’s life (London, 2008), p. 31. National Library of Wales the Fuhrer’s progress or reduce 10 Lady Olwen Carey Evans, Lloyd 20412C, fo.425); K.O. Morgan, the likelihood of war. Lloyd Dr Chris Cooper was recently George was my Father (Llandysul, Wales in British Politics (second George was an appeaser, not awarded his PhD at the Uni- 1985), pp. 70–71. Cf. F.Owen, ed.,Cardiff, 1970), p. 140ff. ; because he was compelled by versity of Liverpool. His doc- Tempestuous Journey: Lloyd P. Rowland, Lloyd George, pp. Britain’s dwindling resources toral thesis analysed the political George, his life and times (London, 102–11; J. Grigg, The Young combined with the multitude career of Douglas Hogg, 1st Vis- 1954), pp. 30–31. Lloyd George (London, 1973), pp. of threats facing the British count Hailsham (1872–1950). He 11 Richard, Second Earl Lloyd- 146–49. Empire, but through a mis- has published a number of journal George, My Father, Lloyd George 18 Machin, Politics and the Churches, placed faith in German inten- articles on different aspects of mod- (London, 1960), pp. 20–21. 1869–1921, p. 212; D. Cregier, tions, whoever held power ern British history and he teaches 12 Baptist Times, 24 May 1945, p.10. Bounder from Wales: Lloyd George’s in . While some of history at university. 13 J. Grigg, Lloyd George, the peo- career before the First World War ple’s champion, 1902–11 (London, (Missouri, 1976), pp. 52–54. 1978), p. 71. 19 Machin, Politics and the Churches, 14 Lloyd George to his wife, 21 1869–1921, pp. 225–30. Lloyd George and Leadership Apr. 1911; K.O. Morgan, ed., 20 Machin, ‘Lloyd George and Continued from page 11 Lloyd George Family Letters, 1885– Nonconformity’, in Judith 1936 (Cardiff and London, 1973), Loades, ed., The Life and Times of 25 Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of 31 Ibid. p. 155, including footnote 4. David Lloyd George, pp. 37–38. Rivals. The Political Genius of Abra- 32 Lord Riddell, Intimate Diary, p. 15 Ffion Hague, op.cit., 104–06. 21 D.W. Bebbington, The Non- ham Lincoln (Simon and Schuster, 226 (24 July 1920). 16 Ibid., p. 106. conformist Conscience, pp. 106, New York, 2005), p. 669. 33 William D. Jones, Wales in Amer- 17 G.I.T.Machin, Politics and the 122–23; S. Koss, Nonconformity in 26 Lord Riddell’s War Diary, p. 135 (5 ica (University of Wales Press, Churches, 1869 to 1921 (Oxford, Modern British Politics, pp. 32–33; Nov. 1915). 1976), pp. 184ff.There is a file on 1987), pp. 210–16; copy of H. McLeod, Class and Religion 27 Keith Middlemas (ed.), Thomas this visit in the Lloyd George memorial drafted by Lloyd in the late Victorian city (London, Jones: Whitehall Diary, Vol. I of Dwyfor Papers (Parliamen- George, dated 26 June 1893, 1974), p. 178. (Oxford University Press, 1969), tary Archives, , signed by thirty Welsh Liberal 22 S. Constantine, Lloyd George p. 203 (13 June 1922); Lloyd G/165). MPs and sent to Gladstone as (London, 1992), p. 21. George, War Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 34 Text of speech, Lloyd George of premier, in S.T. Evans Papers, 23 Machin, Politics and the Churches, 2014–15. Dwyford Papers, G/165. National Library of Wales, p. 1869–1921, p. 263 (and pp. 28 Keith Middlemas (ed.), Thomas 35 , 31 Oct. 1923. 185; Lloyd George to his wife, 260–65). Jones: Whitehall Diary, Vol. III 36 Text of speech in Lloyd George 5 July, 7 Aug. 1893 (K.O. Mor- 24 Ibid., pp. 265–70; Grigg, Lloyd (Oxford University Press, 1971), of Dwyfor Papers, G/165. gan, ed., Lloyd George Family George, the people’s champion, p. 60 (27 April 1921). 37 Drinkwater’s play ‘Abraham Letters, pp. 60–61); Gladstone to 1902–11, pp. 25–30, pp. 32–34; 29 Merrill D. Peterson, Lincoln Lincoln’ was first performed in Stuart Rendel (MP for Mont- Bentley B. Gilbert, David Lloyd in American Memory (Oxford 1918. He followed it up with a gomeryshire), 5 July 1893 (copy George, a Political Life: the archi- University Press, New York, book, Lincoln: the World Emanci- in Gladstone Papers, British tect of change, 1863–1912 (London, 1994), pp. 178–80. For Wilson, pator (Houghton, Miflin, Boston Library Add.Mss.44549, fo.101; 1987), pp. 215–66; D.Cregier, see David W. Blight, Race and and New York, 1920). see also Rendel Papers, National op.cit., pp. 80–85. Reunion: the Civil War in Ameri- 38 Kenneth O. Morgan, Michael Library of Wales); T.E. Ellis to 25 W.R.P. George, Lloyd George, can Memory (Oxford Univer- Foot: the Life (HarperCollins, D.R. Daniel, 3 Sept.1893 (Dan- (Llandysul, 1983), p. sity Press, New York, 1994), pp. London, 2007), p. 9. iel Papers, National Library 355. 11–14. 39 John Vincent, The Formation of Wales, 41b); Lloyd George 26 J. Guinness Rogers, An Autobi- 30 David Lloyd George, The Truth of the Liberal Party (Constable, to William George, 24 Nov. ography (London, 1903); quoted about the Peace Treaties (Gollancz, London, 1966), p. 211 on these 1893 (W.R.P. George, Lloyd Machin, Politics and the Churches, 1938), Vol. 1, p. 232. themes. George, Backbencher, p. 122) ; 1869–1921, p. 270.

Lloyd George’s Coalition Proposal of 1910 Continued from page 23

8 ‘Cabinet Memorandum: secret’, October 1910, Balfour papers 1910, Asquith papers, vol 12. 20 Ibid, p. 23. 31 May 1910, Asquith papers, 23. Add Mss.49692. 16 ‘The Criccieth Memorandum’, 21 The National Review, June 1910. 9 The Times, 13 April 1908. 13 ‘The Criccieth Memorandum’, 17 August 1910. 22 Westminster Gazette, 28 October 10 M. V. Brett, Journal and Letters 17 August 1910, in K. O. 17 G. R. Searle, The Quest for 1910. of Reginald Viscount Esher, vol. II Morgan, The Age of Lloyd George National Efficiency (1971), (1934) p. 370. (1971), pp.150–55. pp.188–91. 11 Masterman, C. F. G. Masterman, 14 , Politics from 18 Ibid., pp. 196–97. p.160. Inside (1936), p. 293. 19 D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 12 Lloyd George to Balfour, 11 15 Crewe to Asquith, 22 October vol. I (1933), p. 21.

74 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13