REVIEWS a contrasting interpretation of deftly handled. There is plenty here Above all, whose name will forever be associ- late-nineteenth century and early- that patient non-specialist readers ated with appeasement. One could, twentieth century Liberal politics, will find enjoyable, especially as the book therefore, be forgiven for placing from the perspective of a staunchly Hattersley varies the diet of poli- Lloyd George in the ‘anti-appeaser’ Labour historian. tics with details of Lloyd George’s lacks the per- camp along with Winston Church- However, Hattersley has complicated and controversial ill, his former Liberal colleague. declined this intriguing opportu- love life. However, there are times ceptiveness Yet, Rudman argues that Lloyd nity. He does not offer any over- when Hattersley’s lack of familiar- George ‘was the first and one of the arching interpretation of Lloyd ity with the latest scholarship on and sense of most determined appeasers of Ger- George’s career. The absence of an Lloyd George leads him astray, as many’ (p. 264). Introduction and conclusion are in his treatment of Lloyd George’s commitment Rudman joins those histori- clear indications of his determi- schemes to ‘Conquer Unemploy- of Jenkins’s ans who root appeasement long nation to concentrate on a narra- ment’ in 1926–31. before Neville Chamberlain’s pre- tive of Lloyd George’s life, which But, above all, the book lacks Asquith. The miership. Although Lloyd George begins with the Welshman’s birth the perceptiveness and sense of attempted to get the best deal pos- on page 1 and ends with his funeral commitment of Jenkins’s Asquith. Great Out- sible for Britain at the Paris Peace on page 640. This narrative is very The Great Outsider does not give Conferences, his pro-German well done, though the size of the the impression that Hattersley is sider does sympathies were already apparent. book remains a little daunting. really interested in Lloyd George. After blocking a French attempt Hattersley’s writing is clear and That he has written such a detailed not give the to annex the Rhineland, Lloyd vigorous throughout, as one would treatment of his subject is a truly George duplicitously undermined expect from such a stylish jour- remarkable testament to the energy impression Britain’s guarantee of French secu- nalist and author (this is his nine- and prolific writing powers of a rity by making it dependent upon teenth book). There are few factual senior statesman who is now nearly that Hatter- American ratification. This never errors – a situation that Hattersley eighty years old. materialised and France was left is happy to acknowledge is partly sley is really without a defensive frontier on the attributable to the book’s proof- Ian Packer is Reader in History at the Rhine or a security pact. This did reading by Lord Morgan and Pro- University of Lincoln. His publications interested nothing to calm French fears of a fessor Anthony King; and a number on Edwardian Liberalism include Lloyd German resurgence. Lloyd George of complicated political tangles, George, Liberalism and the Land in Lloyd also agreed that a preamble should like Lloyd George’s replacement (2001) and Liberal Government and be added to the peace treaty’s mili- of Asquith in December 1916, are Politics 1905–1915 (2006). George. tary clauses which maintained that Germany was disarmed ‘to render possible the initiation of the general limitation of the armaments of all nations’. When the world’s powers failed to craft a disarmament con- Lloyd George and appeasement vention, this provided Hitler’s Ger- many with a ready-made pretext Stella Rudman, Lloyd George and the Appeasement of for rearmament. Germany 1919–1945 (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011) Lloyd George’s compassionate approach developed into a failure Reviewed by Chris Cooper to implement the treaty that he had helped shape. Rudman clearly lthough Lloyd George contradictions behind his multifac- explains his apparently contradic- was absent from power eted outlook and detecting a line tory, but considered, rationale. The Aafter 1922, he ‘continued to of continuity in the Welshman’s Prime Minister’s ‘deep-seated faith wield enormous influence in Brit- thinking, Rudman, through the in the German nation as a general ish politics’ into the 1940s (p. 161). prism of ‘appeasement’, explains force for good’ reasserted itself (pp. The Welshman is best remembered how the enemy of the Kaiser 82–83). He wanted Germany to as the architect of Britain’s victory became an admirer of Hitler with- be able to pay reparations, resist a in the First World War and for his out any fundamental change in Bolshevik revolution, restore the role in splitting the Liberal Party outlook. European balance of power, and after 1916. Dr Stella Rudman’s con- As peacetime Prime Minis- help revive international trade. So- verted doctoral thesis charts Lloyd ter, Lloyd George helped draw up called ‘appeasement’, at this stage, George’s interventions in foreign the arguably punitive peace terms reflected a pursuit of what Lloyd policy after the conclusion of the imposed upon Germany. He was George perceived were Britain’s First World War, and the develop- seen at his ‘anti-appeasing best’ national interests. When consider- ment of Britain’s ultimately unsuc- as he championed the League of ing reparations, for example, ‘he cessful appeasement of Germany. Nations when Italy attacked Abys- took a generally consistent, anti- Although Lloyd George has been sinia in 1935 (p. 214). Then, during appeasing line’ (p. 48). His Fon- the subject of numerous biographi- the celebrated ‘Norway Debate’ of tainebleau memorandum of 1919 cal studies, monographs and jour- May 1940, he delivered an indict- was lenient in warning about the nal articles, this work focuses on ment of Neville Chamberlain’s perils of placing Germans under a comparatively neglected aspect wartime ministry. The debate led foreign sovereignty but it also of his career. By untangling the to the downfall of Chamberlain, called for heavy German payment. 72 Journal of Liberal History 77 Winter 2012–13 REVIEWS Lloyd George’s peacetime premier- of the Rhineland in March 1936 risky war with Italy – would have ship was also marked by his grow- the Welshman opposed retribu- stopped Mussolini or prevented a ing antipathy towards France. His tive action. Five months later the 73 strengthening of the German-Ital- conviction that the French desired year-old travelled to meet Hitler at ian axis. continental hegemony encouraged Berchtesgaden. The two men got Sympathy is also expressed further leniency towards Germany. on ‘like a house on fire’. The ‘spell- for Lloyd George’s ‘Grand Alli- Lloyd George began the process bound’ Lloyd George returned to ance’. Rudman claims that this whereby Britain’s position changed London believing the Fuhrer was was ‘more realistic’ than Neville from an ally of France against Ger- ‘the greatest living German’ and Chamberlain’s approach. R. A. C. many to that of a mediator between dismissing suggestions that Hitler Parker’s conclusion, that an anti- them. planned large-scale conquests (pp. Nazi system embracing the Soviet After the collapse of his pre- 224–27). Union should have been forged, miership in 1922, Lloyd George’s The Spanish Civil War (1936– is reaffirmed (p. 241). Yet, this is a pro-German outlook became more 39) marked a defining moment in complex issue. Stalin harboured pronounced. During the delibera- Lloyd George’s outlook. The shift suspicions of capitalist Britain tions over the future of Upper Sile- in the Welshman’s thinking related and France, the Soviet Union had sia he wanted to construct a strong to France. After over a decade of recently purged its General Staff Germany rather than an enlarged suspicion, he now applauded the and its military limitations out- Poland. This, he hoped, would help French for assisting the Spanish side its own frontiers were readily Germany pay reparations. Dur- government. Nonetheless, he did exposed during the Russo-Finnish ing the remainder of the 1920s he not oppose Germany’s annexa- Winter War of 1939–40. After the advocated arbitration treaties so tion of Austria in March 1938, and Prague coup, it was a simple geo- that Germany’s territorial demands his response to the Munich Agree- graphic fact that a ‘Grand Alliance’ could be met. He believed that Ger- ment was ambivalent. His new- to restrict German expansionism many could be satisfied and that any found faith in France, however, depended upon Polish concurrence, agreements would be honoured. allowed him to advocate an Anglo- and the Poles would not accept Giving Germany the benefit of the French-Soviet alliance to resist Soviet aid. Rudman uses Lloyd doubt while a democratic structure acts of aggression. In April 1939 he George’s advocacy to suggest that existed was perhaps understand- criticised the British guarantee for there was a better alternative to able, but the rise of Hitler’s Nazis Poland, claiming that it was use- Chamberlain’s policy. On balance, ‘did not make Lloyd George more less without Soviet involvement. the evidence suggests that there cautious’ (p. 207). Although the Nevertheless, Lloyd George still probably wasn’t. appeasement of Germany began believed that a peaceful settlement The study provides a mass of to threaten Britain’s interests, not with Germany was possible. After evidence which shows that Lloyd least the balance of power that the outbreak of war he criticised George ‘had a blind spot where Lloyd George had sponsored, he Chamberlain’s administration and Germany, and especially Hit- did not modify his stance. When was sceptical of the prospects of a ler, were concerned’ (p. 261). In Hitler ordered the remilitarisation British victory, favouring a nego- September 1939, after the parti- tiated peace.