#187 31 July 2002

USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL Air University Air War College Maxwell AFB, Alabama Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Lt Col Michael W. Ritz, ANG Special Assistant to Director of CPC or Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved

CONTENTS

At anthrax base, 'space suits' and haze of suspicion Iraq seeks steel for nukes Fails so far to buy equipment Rumsfeld Says Destroying Nuclear Warheads Is Irresponsible, Despite Security Concerns Rumsfeld: Arms Reduction Treaty’s Simplicity And Flexibility Fit New Realities Scientists Worry Journals May Aid Terrorists Argentine To Head Group Seeking To Ban Chemical Weapons Senate Panel Backs Chemical Safeguards Army Aims to Correct Anthrax Methods Iran's Emerging Nuclear Plant Poses Test For U.S. Russia Will Submit Bids To Supply Iran Reactors Russian Nuclear Forces, 2002 Link Possible Between Some Anthrax Vaccine, Symptoms Rumsfeld Says Air Strikes Won't Disarm Iraq Iraq Chemical, Biological Weapons Elusive Target, Rumsfeld Says Air Power Alone Can’t Defeat Iraq, Rumsfeld Asserts In Assessing Iraq's Arsenal, The 'Reality Is Uncertainty' Rumsfeld Targets Saddam, But Not Other 'Axis' Regimes U.S. Moves To Head Off Russia-Iran Nuke Pact

At anthrax base, 'space suits' and haze of suspicion BY FAYE BOWERS | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor FT. DETRICK, MD. – Col. Erik Henchal can't wait to begin. Before he's even finished striding from his desk to a conference table, he launches into a tirade – without provocation – on his lab's mission. That mission, he says, is defensive. Henchal and his fellow scientists at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases – known by the ungainly acronym USAMRIID – have long been the nation's chief line of defense against anthrax and other, more deadly viruses. For 32 years, USAMRIID has delved into the secrets of the deadliest bugs known to humankind, all in the name of developing vaccines, detection methods, and other countermeasures. But then came last year's deadly string of anthrax letters in the US – just the sort of attack this lab aims to prevent. Worse, it turns out that the bugs used in the envelopes were derived from a strain developed here in the 1980s. In fact, the FBI is now focusing its search for the anthrax culprit among past and current USAMRIID workers. Once they were silent heroes. Now, they're possibly dangerous saboteurs. No one here is immune from scrutiny – not even the commander. "Oh yes, I've been questioned," says the red-faced Col. Henchal, seated in his office during a rare interview. The FBI has questioned all of the scientists here at this huge, low tan building about a hour north of Washington. Some have been interrogated more than once. Several have been polygraphed. And at least one, sometimes two, FBI agents are on the premises every day. Henchal was interrogated like everyone else because he had access to the lab rooms where anthrax was present. "No one wants the perpetrator to be caught more than USAMRIID.... The best thing for the FBI to do is to remove all reasonable doubt," he says, "We have gotten used to the enhanced oversight." The military set up USAMRIID in the early 1970s, shortly after President Nixon ordered the US offensive biological weapons program to close. Today, USAMRIID employs 650 people. About 125 are scientists with doctoral degrees, mainly in virology, microbiology, and veterinary medicine. The work they do here, Henchal says, is critical to America's national security. He says more than 20 countries already have biological warfare capabilities, and are working on methods of disbursing them. At least 10 other countries are developing them. Then there's the threat from terror groups. A dangerous line of work Currently, scientists at USAMRIID have diagnostics – the capability to quickly identify – some 85 agents; it's their priority to develop countermeasures against 40 of those. And they are currently in various stages of working on vaccine development programs for 10, including anthrax, and the Ebola and Marburg viruses. "We know the Russians were looking at weaponizing Marburg," Henchal says. The labs where USAMARIID does this very dangerous work are reached from the office suites through a long, tan wallpapered hall and a metal door that opens only after a worker scans a magnetic identification card. Ahead are labyrinthine halls and labs – 50,000 square feet at biosafety level 3, where agents like anthrax, plague, and Venezuelan equine encephalitis are studied, and the 10,000 square feet at biosafety level 4, where research is done with the most deadly agents, like Ebola and Marburg. To get into any of those, the worker needs to re-enter the magnetic card, along with a four-digit number that's only issued after the worker has been immunized against that particular bug. The doors are also keyed in to central security, so there is a master list of who enters and exits the labs. Lisa Hensley splits her time between developing treatments and more effective vaccines for Ebola at USAMRIID and smallpox at the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta. The work is carried out in the biosafety level 4 suites. She enters an outer area, where she strips off her street clothes and shoes and dons hospital-like scrubs and socks. Then, she puts on what they call a blue "space suit," a 12-pound pressurized and ventilated suit that provides filtered breathing air. After she enters the actual lab – a small, square cinderblock room lined with petri dishes, incubators, centrifuges, pipets, an inverted microscope, and other scientific paraphernalia – she plugs in her lifeline – a yellow, spiral air hose that hangs from the ceiling. The actual work – growing cell cultures, infecting them, observing what proteins come out of those cells, then injecting animals with the bug – usually takes two to five years, Dr. Hensley says. She's worked at USAMRIID for four years; she came here as a post doctoral fellow and stayed. She says the work is not only vital to the biodefense of this country, but part of the larger public health picture. "That's what drives us to put in as many hours as we do." On the smallpox project, where she divides her time between this lab and the Center for Disease Control labs in Atlanta, she puts in an average of 60 to 80 hours per week. When the scientists at this lab worked to identify the anthrax bacteria from the letters mailed last fall, scientists here put in 100-hour weeks. Some slept in their cars, others in their labs. "Between 11 Sept. and May, USAMRIID processed over 31,000 samples and 260,000 assays in our forensic-based lab." Henchal says. Under normal conditions, they process four to six samples per month. Questions for everybody Hensley wasn't interrogated, because she didn't work on the anthrax letters project. But she did receive a call from the FBI because she had been inoculated against the disease. Everyone who had access to inoculation has at least been questioned. "I understand that any lab involved in this type of work would naturally be suspect," Hensley says. "From a personal point of view, though, I think it was very difficult. These scientists' hearts are in the right place. We could go someplace else and make a lot of money." Many others agree with this assessment. David Franz, former commander of USAMRIID says he left four years ago "with tears running down my chin." He, as well as many others in the scientific community, say the scientists at USAMRIID are unfairly taking heat. They point out that the Ames strain of the anthrax virus was developed and worked on here. But it's also been sent out to at least five other laboratories. "If some scientist wanted to work on anthrax in a university, they could get it," Dr. Franz says. Moreover, "any country with first-rate science could have this," says Joseph Foxell, director of information security for New York City. He lists several that are capable: almost all of the European countries, Japan, Israel, Egypt, and Pakistan. Maybe Iraq. http://www.csmonitor.com/search_content/0725/p01s01-usmi.html

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July 26, 2002 Iraq seeks steel for nukes Fails so far to buy equipment By Bill Gertz THE WASHINGTON TIMES Iraq's government is trying to buy special equipment used in producing fuel for nuclear weapons, The Washington Times has learned. Procurement agents from Iraq's covert nuclear-arms program were detected as they tried to purchase stainless-steel tubing, uniquely used in gas centrifuges and a key component in making the material for nuclear bombs, from an unknown supplier, said administration officials familiar with intelligence reports. U.S. intelligence agencies believe the tubing is an essential component of Iraq's plans to enrich radioactive uranium to the point where it could be used to fashion a nuclear bomb. Efforts by Iraq to build nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles are a key reason that the Bush administration has called for the overthrow of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. The covert nuclear-acquisition effort was detected in mid-June, and reports about the activities were then circulated to senior Bush administration policy officials. "This is only one sign that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear-weapons program," one official said. Officials say other evidence exists that Iraq is rebuilding its nuclear program, which was to have been dismantled under U.N. sanctions imposed after the 1991 Persian Gulf war. Earlier this year, Turkish military intelligence informed the Pentagon that Iraq was believed to have at least one nuclear device. Officials said the report could not be confirmed. A senior Bush administration official said intelligence reports of the efforts by Iraq to purchase stainless-steel tubing were a troubling sign. "We know they are trying to obtain this material but so far have not been successful," the official said. A CIA spokesman declined to comment. Intelligence reports in recent months have stated that Iraq also is building up its chemical and biological weapons arsenal, the officials said. Iraq's missile program also is continuing within U.N. guidelines. Iraq expelled U.N. weapons inspectors after U.S. bombing raids in 1998, and its nuclear program has been restarted and accelerated. Baghdad recently broke off talks with the United Nations about restarting weapons inspections. "Although we were already concerned about a reconstituted nuclear weapons program, our concerns increased in September 2000 when Saddam publicly exhorted his 'Nuclear Mujahidin' to 'defeat the enemy,'" stated a CIA report to Congress made public in January. "The Intelligence Community remains concerned that Baghdad may be attempting to acquire materials that could aid in reconstituting its nuclear weapons program." British Prime Minister Tony Blair said earlier this week that Saddam is attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, saying the evidence of the Iraqi weapons-of-mass-destruction program would be presented "if the time comes for action" to oust Saddam. "But be in no doubt at all that he is certainly trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction, in particular a nuclear capability," Mr. Blair told Prospect magazine in an interview. Asked Monday what would provide justification for a military attack on Iraq, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said he would not talk about specific countries but warned about the growing danger of weapons of mass destruction. "In the 21st century, we're dealing with weapons of mass destruction — chemical, biological, nuclear, radiation — that can kill not just hundreds or thousands, but they can kill hundreds of thousands or millions of people in the case of, for example, contagious biological agents," Mr. Rumsfeld told reporters at the Pentagon. "Now we're living in a world with weapons of mass destruction proliferating rather rapidly to a variety of nations, a variety of non-state entities potentially that have already indicated their appetite for the weapon," he said. "They've indicated their willingness to kill as many innocent men, women and children through terrorist acts as they can." The defense secretary said a debate is under way worldwide about whether to wait for an attack that could kill hundreds of thousands of people, or to act pre-emptively in self-defense against the threat. "I think you're finding people starting to think about it, starting to talk about it, starting to recognize what the benefits and what the burdens are of different courses of action," Mr. Rumsfeld said. According to the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Iraq in the past has sought to create enriched uranium through the use of high-speed centrifuges, which spin uranium hexafluoride gas. The spinning separates out uranium isotope gas that is highly enriched and can fuel a crude nuclear bomb. Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, said in an interview that stainless-steel tubing would be essential to building such gas centrifuges because the radioactive gas is extremely corrosive. The Iraqi nuclear-arms program had planned to build a 100-centrifuge "cascade" plant, Al Furat, that would be capable of producing 55 pounds of highly enriched uranium per year, enough for about 1½ nuclear bombs per year, according to a Wisconsin Project report on Iraq's nuclear program. Mr. Milhollin said that while "not much" is known about Iraq's continuing efforts to build nuclear arms, "we do know that if they were to reconstitute their nuclear program they would need stainless-steel piping." According to a Wisconsin Project database on Iraq's nuclear program, several German companies attempted to sell special steel and tubing to Iraq for centrifuges in 1990. In 1989, Iraq also obtained Swiss-made equipment used to power centrifuges. Khidhir Hamza, a former Iraqi nuclear-weapons official who defected in 1994, said Iraq's nuclear program is based on enriching uranium. He said Iraq had about 400 locations in the country where uranium-enrichment work could be carried out in secret. Mr. Hamza also has said Iraq purchased 130 classified reports from Germany during the 1980s that show how to manufacture centrifuges for uranium enrichment. http://www.washtimes.com/national/20020726-23093280.htm

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InsideDefense.com July 25, 2002 Rumsfeld Says Destroying Nuclear Warheads Is Irresponsible, Despite Security Concerns Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told Senate lawmakers today that although he is worried about the security of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons and fissile material, he does not believe the United States and Russia should commit to destroying warheads removed from missiles or bombers. He warned that since the United States no longer produces nuclear warheads, it would be irresponsible to destroy decommissioned warheads rather than have them available in the event there is a problem with the safety or reliability of some element of the U.S. arsenal, or if some significant change in world events poses a threat to U.S. security. Moreover, "the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains an important part of our deterrence strategy," because it dissuades potential competitors by "underscoring the futility of trying to sprint towards parity with us or, indeed, superiority," Rumsfeld said during a Senate Armed Service Committee hearing. The hearing evaluated the national security implications of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, known as the Moscow Treaty, which President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed on May 24. Bush submitted it to the Senate for approval on June 20. The treaty calls for each country to reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons from about 6,000 to between 1,700 and 2,200. The reduction process is to be completed by December 31, 2012. Senators questioned Rumsfeld at length about complaints the treaty still permits a great number of nuclear weapons to exist and does not require removed warheads to be destroyed, which has led many Capital Hill law makers to question whether this leaves the United States even more vulnerable to attack if the nuclear material gets into the hands of terrorist states. Rumsfeld dismissed this logic, saying "this charge is based on . . . a flawed premise that irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons are possible." He added that every reduction is "reversible, given time and given money." However, Rumsfeld did admit that the United States has little visibility into what the Russians are doing to secure their nuclear stockpile and that he worries "about the security of weapons while they're waiting to be destroyed or while they're waiting to be redeployed or replace an unsafe or an unreliable weapon." Alluding to the Baker-Cutler task force's report, committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI) said, "the greatest threat to our security is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the presence of nuclear weapons and nuclear material on Russian soil, because of the fact that they are unable to secure it to the extent that it should be secured." The Baker-Cutler task force was a bipartisan effort led by former Senate Majority Leader and current U.S. Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler. The report concluded that in order to protect U.S. interests, the government should spend $30 billion over the next 10 years in nonproliferation activities. Referring to the report's recommendation, Rumsfeld said, "I think it's important for all of the countries of the world to recognize that it is not just the United States that has the obligation to destroy Russian nuclear weapons." "Russia has an obligation, and they have to make priorities and choices. And they have people who are potentially every bit as vulnerable as anyone in the United States to the mismanagement or mishandling or lack of security of their weapons," he said, adding, "But so, too, do the countries in Western Europe have an obligation and an interest." The committee will hold a second hearing on the Moscow Treaty on Aug. 1. The senators will hear testimony from U.S. Strategic Command chief Adm. James Ellis and a representative from the National Nuclear Security Administration. In a separate hearing held today by the House International Relations Committee, lawmakers and experts testified on proposals to use Russia's Soviet-era debt to fund strengthened nonproliferation programs in Russia. During her opening statement, Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) endorsed the theory that restructuring Russian debt would ultimately advance U.S. interests, stating, "debt-for-security swaps are the ideal investment." Tauscher is a consistent supporter of the debt relief concept. On March 4 she introduced the "Russian Federation Debt Reduction for Nonproliferation Act of 2002, " with co-sponsor John McHugh (R-NY). The bill would enable Russia to restructure its debt with the United States, if Moscow takes actions to better safeguard its nuclear materials. -- Malina Brown

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DefenseNews.com July 25, 2002 Rumsfeld: Arms Reduction Treaty’s Simplicity And Flexibility Fit New Realities By Emily Woodward U.S. Secretary Donald Rumsfeld July 25 rebutted Senate lawmakers’ concerns that the new U.S.-Russian arms control agreement did not contain sufficient guidelines for reducing the nations’ operationally deployed nuclear weapons, arguing that language of the treaty provided the flexibility required in the post-Cold War era. "There are those who … would have preferred a voluminous, legalistic arms control agreement, with hundreds of pages of carefully crafted provisions a nd intrusive verification measures," Rumsfeld said in his July 25 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. "These critics operate from a flawed premise," he argued, since Russia and the United States are independently committed to "deep reductions in their deployed nuclear weapons." In marked contrast with the Cold War era, "the idea of an arms race between the United States and Russia today is ludicrous," Rumsfeld said, a fact that eliminates the requirement for a detailed verification scheme for arms reductions. Even if such a scheme were needed, he said, it would be all but impossible to carry out. "There simply isn’t any way on earth to verify what Russia is doing with all those warheads." U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed May 13 to reduce their respective operationally deployed strategic nuclear arsenals by roughly two-thirds, to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads, by the end of 2012. Their agreement, dubbed the Moscow Treaty, was submitted to the Senate for review June 20. During a July 9 hearing on the treaty, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden, D-Del., said that while he would support ratification of the treaty by the end of the year, he was concerned the agreement did not specify a detailed timetable for the strategic reductions. Biden’s reservations were echoed by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, D-Mich., during his opening statement at the July 25 hearing. Levin also expressed concern that the new treaty didn’t contain provisions for actually destroying the number of warheads each side maintained, but merely called for the removal of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons from high-alert status, where they could be stockpiled for later redeployment. Rumsfeld dismissed this complaint, arguing that since "the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons exists—and there is no possibility that knowledge will be lost every [arms] reduction is therefore reversible, given time and money." The secretary further asserted that the lack of a timetable was a crucial element of the new treaty, which would provide the United States and Russia with the necessary flexibility to safeguard their national interests in an increasingly uncertain world. Given the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to a growing number of terrorist sects and so-called rogue states, posing a threat to "hundreds of thousands or millions" of U.S. and Russian lives, the world’s two reigning nuclear powers should "retain the ability to level off their draw-down" of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons at any time, Rumsfeld said. "My guess is there will be an uneven draw-down," of weapons leading up to the 2012 treaty end-date, he said. "If we had pursued the path of traditional arms control," by engaging in "lengthy, adversarial negotiations" on issues of verification, timing and reversibility of arms reductions, Rumsfeld added, "we would still be negotiating today."

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BIOTERRORISM Scientists Worry Journals May Aid Terrorists By NICHOLAS WADE The leader of a national scientific organization has sought the advice of the National Academy of Sciences on whether scientific journals should withhold information that may aid bioterrorists or countries contemplating biological warfare. In a letter to the academy, Dr. Ronald Atlas, president of the American Society for Microbiology, wrote, "We are now being asked to allow authors to withhold critical information because of concern that significant data could be misappropriated or abused." The issue is a hard one for scientific journals; many of them insist that scientific articles must include the information necessary for others to reproduce the findings. The request to withhold information, Dr. Atlas said, has come from individual scientists submitting articles for publication in the 11 journals published by the American Society for Microbiology. Though some of the scientists work for government laboratories, the requests were all made on the basis of individual judgment, so far as he is aware, Dr. Atlas said. Several requests, he said, concerned DNA primers, the snippets of DNA used to extract specific genes from an organism. One application of primers is in sensors designed to quickly detect microbes in a biological attack. An adversary's genetic engineers could foil the sensors if they knew what primers were used. But Dr. Atlas said he feared that if authors were allowed to withhold information, the journals might find themselves publishing papers that could not be reproduced. He said he was leaning against the proposal but felt it was important enough to bring to the academy, asking that it convene a conference of journal editors. Dr. Eileen Choffnes, the academy staff member who is planning the conference, noted a precedent in the concern by physicists in the late 1930's over articles about uranium. In June 1940, she said, the academy secured the cooperation of 237 journals in withholding papers on uranium and related matters, resulting in "the almost total cessation of publication on nuclear physics." The academy, however, circulated the articles privately among American physicists. Dr. Donald Kennedy, the editor of the journal Science, said he doubted if a conference of journal editors would include the necessary expertise on national security to decide what should or should not be published. He noted that the government could require prepublication review of any federally financed research that might raise concerns, and universities could then decide if they wished to accept such grants. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/26/science/26RESE.html

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New York Times July 26, 2002 Argentine To Head Group Seeking To Ban Chemical Weapons By Judith Miller The international organization charged with ridding the world of chemical weapons appointed a senior Argentine diplomat today as its new chief, and he immediately pledged to be responsive to the concerns of the agency's members, including the United States. By acclamation, the 145-member Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons chose Rogelio Pfirter, 53, a lawyer and Argentina's former under secretary for foreign policy, to replace José M. Bustani, a Brazilian diplomat who was voted out as director general of the organization last April after the Bush administration announced it had lost confidence in him. American officials accused Mr. Bustani of "mismanagement," "ill-considered initiatives" and failing to consult with Washington about sensitive issues, including his effort to persuade Iraq to join the organization. Mr. Bustani had denied the American allegations and fought hard to keep his job, accusing Washington of jeopardizing the group's independence and neutrality. But he was defeated by growing resentment of his unilateral management style and threats from Washington to sever financial support for the organization, which is based in The Hague. Without American financing, which accounts for 22 percent of the group's $60 million annual budget, the agency would most likely be forced to close. In an interview today, Mr. Pfirter struck a cautious tone, vowing to work closely with the United States and other members to address their concerns about how best to carry out the 1997 treaty that bans chemical weapons. Indeed, he said, his first meeting was with Donald A. Mahley, Washington's chief negotiator on biological weapons and the United States representative to the organization. Mr. Pfirter said that the two of them were "on the same wavelength" with respect to putting the organization on a more secure financial footing. For its part, the United States quickly applauded Mr. Pfirter's appointment. Richard A. Boucher, the State Department spokesman in Washington, said Mr. Pfirter had "an outstanding record on nonproliferation" and that the Bush administration believed he would do an "excellent job in leading the organization" in a "positive" direction." Asked in a telephone interview whether he would press Iraq to join the organization, Mr. Pfirter said that while all nations should join, "we should be very aware that there are United Nations resolutions in effect" and that membership in the organization should not be "at the expense" of pledges to other international organizations. The Bush administration had resented what it viewed as Mr. Bustani's efforts to "meddle" in the United Nations' efforts to persuade Baghdad to honor its disarmament pledges and submit to international arms inspection. Mr. Pfirter said that his first priority would be to "get the organization back on its feet and make it fully operational." The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, created to verify the treaty that bans chemical weapons, has helped eliminate an estimated 7 percent of the world's chemical agents and 15 percent of its chemical weapons. But the organization is in poor financial shape. Employing about 500 people, it ran a deficit of $4 million in 2000 and managed to conduct less than half the inspections of chemical weapons stockpiles and production plants scheduled for 2001. Amy E. Smithson, a chemical weapons expert at the Henry L. Stimson Center, a private group in Washington, said that because of budget shortages, the organization had not been able to conduct 35 percent of the planned inspections at chemical weapons storage facilities and 43 percent of those scheduled at production plants last year. Mr. Pfirter is one of Argentina's most seasoned diplomats. Between 1995 and 2000, he was Argentina's ambassador to Britain under former President Carlos Menem, a sensitive post since the 1982 Falkland Islands War between London and Buenos Aires. He was in charge of nonproliferation issues for Argentina from 1992 to 1994 and again in 2002. In Washington, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld removed a major obstacle today to the construction of a giant plant in Russia that will enable Moscow to carry out its pledge to destroy the world's largest declared stockpiles of chemical weapons. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mr. Rumsfeld announced that the Bush administration "either has or will be asking for" a permanent waiver in a law to permit the construction of a plant at Shchuchye, near the Kazakhstan border, to proceed. Roughly 13.6 percent of all of Russia's declared chemical stockpile of 40,000 metric tons, is stored there. Congress had approved $50 million for financing for the project for this fiscal year, but it has been delayed by a requirement that President Bush certify that Russia is complying fully with its treaty obligations. The administration has been unwilling to do that. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/26/international/americas/26CHEM.html

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Senate Panel Backs Chemical Safeguards Bill Would Compel Government to Create Standards for Securing 15,000 Plants By Eric Pianin Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, July 26, 2002; Page A06 A Senate committee yesterday approved a measure to beef up security in the nation's chemical industry, signaling lawmakers' impatience with the Bush administration's handling of security questions affecting thousands of plants near populated areas. The bill, approved 19 to 0 by the Environment and Public Works Committee, would require the government to develop safety standards and to identify "high priority" plants producing or handling hazardous substances that are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Plant operators would have 18 months to certify their compliance with prevention- and-response plans developed by the government. Government officials and lawmakers moved swiftly after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks to address security lapses at airports, municipal water facilities and food processing facilities. But the administration has done little to shore up security at chemical plants, leaving it to industry leaders to adopt their own security code. But the industry's guidelines for assessing and correcting vulnerabilities cover only 1,000 plants, a fraction of the facilities with potential security problems. Sen. Jon S. Corzine (D-N.J.) and committee Chairman James M. Jeffords (I-Vt.), chief authors of the bill, blamed the Bush administration for relative inaction. Corzine said it has left a "gaping hole" in the security of thousands of chemical plants. Corzine and Jeffords enhanced the prospects for passing their bill this year by making numerous concessions to the chemical industry and key Republicans, including Sens. Robert C. Smith (N.H.) and Christopher S. Bond (R-Mo.). The bill would govern security operations at 15,000 industrial chemical sites instead of the 40,000 plants and refineries covered by an earlier version. Corzine and Jeffords also agreed to drop proposed regulations governing the transportation of hazardous chemicals, and they softened a section that would have imposed stronger criminal penalties on sites that failed to meet security standards. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Joseph I. Lieberman (D-Conn.) said the measure may be offered as an amendment to legislation creating a Homeland Security Department when that bill reaches the Senate floor. "I don't want the homeland security bill to become a Christmas tree for people to keep attaching things to," Lieberman said. "On the other hand, this certainly seems relevant to the goals of [the homeland security] bill." Chris VandenHeuvel, a spokesman for the American Chemistry Council, said chemical manufacturers fear the legislation could undermine steps the industry initiated in January to assess and correct problems with plant security. "Our main concern is that we get recognition for the work we already have underway and that the bill doesn't slow down or stop that effort," he said. The committee also approved a bill to toughen security at nuclear power plants and facilities. It would require the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review security plans at each of the nation's 103 commercial reactors and design a system of threat levels. The bill, drafted by Senate Majority Whip Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.), also would allow hired security guards at nuclear plants to carry automatic weapons and arrest terrorist suspects. Some states now prohibit armed guards. Experts and lawmakers say there is little doubt that plants storing large amounts of toxic chemicals are potential terrorist targets. But sharp divisions within the administration and strong opposition from the industry have frustrated efforts to approve legislation or new regulations. The Environmental Protection Agency has repeatedly put off announcing its own "principles" for chemical plant security. "The EPA has been negligent in taking real action on this issue for 10 months," said Rick Hind of Greenpeace. EPA spokesman Joe Martyak disputed the criticism, saying his agency has been "very active" in studying chemical site security and is close to issuing guidelines. "We've been looking carefully at what can and can't be done under current law," Martyak said. "There are always questions raised as to what is the extent of the authority at EPA on numerous issues." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2507-2002Jul25.html

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Army Aims to Correct Anthrax Methods By David Dishneau Associated Press Writer Saturday, July 27, 2002; 12:14 AM HAGERSTOWN, Md. –– Anthrax spores found outside the supposedly secure areas of a biological warfare defense laboratory last spring apparently were released through carelessness and not an intentional act, the Army said Friday. In response, commanders have ordered weekly environmental sampling for contaminants both inside and outside the containment labs in the biodefense center at Fort Detrick in Frederick, spokesman Charles Dasey said. He said the sampling, which have never been done in the past, is among a number of tightened procedures at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. "The scenario that people thought was the likely cause of those spores being outside the lab was just sloppy methods," Dasey said. "The sense of the institute is that it was poor laboratory techniques and not an intentional act." The changes follow an internal investigation prompted by the discovery of anthrax spores last April in three locations at the institute outside the sophisticated labs that are designed to keep microbes from escaping. The spores were found by a scientist doing some unauthorized sampling, Army officials said in April. More than 40 people, including Detrick workers and seven employees of a local laundry that washes USAMRIID's towels and clothing, had nasal swabs taken after the discovery. All tested negative for anthrax. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8320-2002Jul27.html

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Washington Post July 29, 2002 Iran's Emerging Nuclear Plant Poses Test For U.S. By Dana Priest, Washington Post Staff Writer For the past seven years, U.S. and Israeli spy satellites have swept regularly over Iran's Persian Gulf coast, snapping pictures of Russian and Iranian construction crews working to complete a nuclear power plant at Bushehr. This year, the satellites beamed back images of a round reactor dome, cooling pipes, pumping equipment and what some intelligence analysts believe to be antiaircraft missile battery sites. Bushehr has become the subject of debate in Washington and Tel Aviv over whether the plant should be allowed to come on line as scheduled in the next two or three years. Part of the discussions involve pressuring Russia to voluntarily cease construction. But as the plant moves closer to completion, it also has emerged as a potential test case of the Bush administration's new doctrine of preempting threats to U.S. national security. In the process, it has highlighted the complexities involved in executing a policy of preemption: What impact would a preemptive strike have on U.S. relations with Moscow? What effect would eliminating a civilian nuclear power plant have on Iran's covert nuclear weapons development program, which U.S. intelligence says is ongoing at dozens of other less-prominent sites throughout the country? And perhaps most significant, what would be the consequences of what Iran almost certainly would believe to be an act of war? Bush has labeled Iran a part of the "axis of evil," and some U.S. defense officials argue that Bushehr should be destroyed before it receives its first load of nuclear fuel from Russia. "There is some support for preemption within the administration," said Anthony H. Cordesman, a leading Middle East expert and one of several proliferation specialists who described the debate within the administration. Others in the administration argue that if Iran agrees to international safeguards, the plant does not pose a security risk. Besides, they say, while destroying Bushehr will not eliminate Iran's nuclear weapons program, it could antagonize Iranians at a time when the administration is trying to reach out to them. Iran is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors have visited the Bushehr construction site. Whatever path the administration chooses could be overshadowed by a key U.S. ally in the region: Israel. Although a preemptive strike appears to be supported by only a minority in the administration and has not been discussed at the top levels of government, Israel has suggested it will not allow the plant to open. "Does Israel have a military option?" said a government official in Washington who is familiar with the Israeli position. "The answer is yes." On June 7, 1981, Israeli F-15s and F-16s destroyed the French-built Osirak light-water nuclear reactor near Baghdad. The attack was criticized by the United States at the time but is now regarded by many U.S. policymakers as a milestone in efforts to prevent Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from obtaining nuclear weapons. In recent weeks, Israel has publicly warned Iran that it considers the Bushehr plant -- which Germany began building for Iran in 1974 and Iraq bombed three times in the mid-1980s during the Iran-Iraq war -- a threat to its national security. There is some evidence, though not conclusive, that Iran is positioning antiaircraft missile batteries around the plant and a nuclear research facility near Tehran, according to analysts who have looked at high- resolution satellite images of those sites. Last month, the Hebrew daily Haaretz reported that Israel's National Security Council was conducting an urgent review of its policy toward Iran and quoted one official as saying "that everything must be done, including, if necessary, using force to prevent Tehran from achieving nuclear weapons capabilities." The Bushehr plant, on Iran's southwestern coast, is set to be completed in 16 months and operational 18 months later. Iran, which is paying Russia $800 million for its assistance, says the 1,000-megawatt light-water reactor is for peaceful energy production only. Neither the technology nor the spent fuel from the Bushehr plant could, by itself, be used to make a nuclear bomb. But the same technology used in the plant is necessary to manufacture enriched fuel for nuclear weapons. Also, weapons-grade plutonium could be extracted from the spent fuel for a nuclear bomb. The CIA estimates Iran is seven years from having a nuclear bomb. Israeli intelligence estimates five years. Within the next few years, experts agree, Iran will have acquired enough know-how and technology to produce a long-range nuclear missile capability without further foreign assistance. The Clinton administration devoted considerable energy to its efforts to forestall construction of the plant and curtail Iran's nuclear weapons program. But the issue has recently emerged as a top priority in U.S.-Russian relations, as the Bush administration has increased pressure on Moscow to voluntarily cease construction. But the Russians have given no sign they will comply. Indeed, the Russian government announced last week that it plans to dramatically increase its cooperation with Iran in the energy field, including a proposal to build five more nuclear reactors. The plan envisages a total of four Russian-built reactors at Bushehr, including the reactor being built, and two at Akhvaz, where construction has yet to begin. High-level talks with Russia on the subject will take place in the next few weeks, an administration official said. For now, the administration's strategy is to ratchet up public criticism of Russia and to warn Moscow that failure to cooperate will have "a negative impact on U.S.-Russian relations." "We continue to have concerns that technology and know-how for nuclear weapons are flowing to Iran," the U.S. ambassador to Russia, Alexander Vershbow, said in remarks outside Moscow on Monday. "Russia has to avoid letting its desire for commercial gain end up hastening the day that these countries can pose a threat that could not only destabilize their own region, but undermine the security of the entire world." Bush has raised the issue of Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran the last several times he has met with President Vladimir Putin, most recently in Moscow in May. Russian officials have said repeatedly that the reactor is meant only for energy production and that they are not abetting Iran's nuclear weapons research. "I'd like to point out that cooperation between Iran and Russia is not at all a character which would undermine the process on nonproliferation," Putin said during Bush's visit to Moscow. Putin said Western companies, not Russian entities, have furnished Iran with missile and nuclear technology. "We do have such information," he said, "and we stand ready to share it with our American partners." In recent meetings, Russian officials, including Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev, have promised U.S. officials that they will not allow the Iranians access to the spent fuel. The Russian legislature changed the country's laws last year to allow for the return and storage of the spent radioactive material on Russian soil. More important, according to proliferation experts and U.S. officials, are Iran's ongoing ties with Russian scientists. Russia's help on Bushehr creates a "convenient cover for interaction" between Iranian and Russian scientists involved in nuclear weapons development, said Gary Samore, a senior nonproliferation official in the Clinton administration. It also provides a cover to transfer sensitive, hard-to-track, weapon-related components. The construction project and follow-up maintenance requirements "would legitimize all the trade between Russia and Iran," said David Albright, president of the Institute of Science and International Security and a proliferation expert. "It makes it difficult to control other things going on." The CIA says it has considerable evidence that Russian scientists have been actively helping Iran acquire the technology, know-how and material to build a bomb. "Russia continues to supply significant assistance on nearly all aspects of Tehran's nuclear program," CIA Director George J. Tenet told the Senate Armed Services Committee in March. "It is also providing Iran assistance on long-range ballistic missile programs." To many in and out of the administration who warn about the implications of Russia's expanding commercial and scientific relationship with Iran, the construction site at Bushehr remains the most ominous development. With construction slated to be completed by late 2003 or early 2004, they say the window for action will soon begin to close. "Within the next year, either the U.S. or Israel is going to either attack Iran's [nuclear sites] or acquiesce to Iran being a nuclear state," said John E. Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, a nonpartisan military and intelligence research center. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14185-2002Jul28.html

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Wall Street Journal July 29, 2002 Russia Will Submit Bids To Supply Iran Reactors By Guy Chazan, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal MOSCOW -- Russia says it will make bids to supply five nuclear reactors to Iran, disregarding U.S. concerns that Russian technology exports could help Tehran develop weapons of mass destruction. The move could sour the U.S.-Russian partnership that has evolved since President Vladmir Putin gave his backing to the U.S.-led war on terror in the wake of Sept. 11. Washington has long been irked by Russia's close ties to Iran, a state that the White House has declared part of the "axis of evil" and repeatedly accused of sponsoring terrorism. Russia and the U.S. have frequently squabbled about Moscow's role in the construction of a 1,000-megawatt nuclear reactor at Bushehr on the Gulf coast, which Washington says could help Iran build nuclear bombs. The issue introduced a rare discordant note into the summit between Mr. Putin and President Bush in Moscow in May. The Bush administration has tried to pressure Russia into breaking off work at Bushehr. Russia, reluctant to abandon an $800 million project that has injected badly needed new funds into its struggling nuclear-power industry, insists the reactor will be used for civilian purposes only. The plan for new nuclear plants was part of a 10-year draft program of economic cooperation with Iran posted on the Russian government's Web site Friday. It appears to contradict earlier statements by officials in Moscow that Russia would comply with U.S. demands to curtail its nuclear program with Iran once work on the Bushehr reactor was complete. The 12-page government resolution, signed by Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, envisages the construction of another three reactors at Bushehr and two more 1,000-megawatt units at a planned power station in Ahvaz, close to the Iraqi border. The resolution also outlines plans to develop Iran's oil and gas deposits, jointly build a gas pipeline between Iran and India, and cooperate in metallurgy, aircraft construction and telecommunications. Russia's OAO Gazprom is already developing Iran's South Pars gas condensate field along with France's TotalFinaElf SA and Malaysia's Petroliam Nasional Bhd. Other projects listed in the program include joint work on the Hengam gas condensate field between Iran and Oman in the Strait of Hormuz, and cooperation between Russia's OAO Slavneft and the National Iranian Drilling Co. to increase output at existing Iranian oil wells. On the nuclear plans, Russian officials said Moscow was just as concerned as the White House that Iran didn't acquire a bomb-making capability. They said all necessary safeguards were in place to prevent proliferation, with frequent monitoring of the Bushehr project by the International Atomic Energy Agency. "Neither Russia nor the U.S. wants other countries to use civilian nuclear technology for military purposes," said Dmitry Rogozin, chairman of the Russian Parliament's foreign-affairs committee. The plan is expected to be on the agenda when Spencer Abraham, the U.S. energy secretary, arrives in Moscow this week for talks.

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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists July/August 2002 Pg. 71 NRDC Nuclear Notebook Russian Nuclear Forces, 2002 As of mid-2002, Russia was believed to have an arsenal of approximately 8,400 operational nuclear warheads: almost 5,000 deployed on strategic nuclear weapons systems, and nearly 3,400 non-strategic and air defense warheads. This reflects a decrease over the past year of more than 600 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warheads, and approximately 200 operational non-strategic nuclear weapons. We estimate the actual number of Russian warheads to be around 18,000. The remainder are nonstrategic and strategic weapons kept in storage—some destined for dismantlement, others possibly kept as a reserve for re- deployment. December 2001 was the START I Treaty deadline for Russia to meet the accountable-warhead level of 6,000. It has surpassed that goal: According to the State Department, approximately 5,520 warheads are attributed to deployed Russian ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. In 2000, President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was interested in reducing strategic warheads to 1,500 or fewer. In May 2002, Presidents Putin and George W. Bush agreed to reduce the number of "operationally deployed" warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of 2012. It is likely that Russia’s strategic forces will decline to those levels—or below—even earlier, because it is shifting resources from nuclear to conventional forces. Last June, the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), long the lead service of Soviet and Russian armed forces, was downgraded to a branch of the armed forces. There were further indications that SRF troops might be subordinated to the air force. Intercontinental ballistic missiles. SS-18s. The September 1990 START I memorandum of understanding (MOU) stated that 204 SS- 18s were deployed in Russia: 30 at Aleysk, 64 at Dombarovskiy, 46 at Kartaly, and 64 at Uzhur. Another 104 were deployed in Kazakhstan at two missile fields. The treaty called for the number of warheads on heavy ICBMs to be reduced to 1,540 by December 2001. This meant that the number of SS-18s had to be halved. Russia has exceeded this obligation. Sixty SS-18s have been removed from service, leaving 144: 52 at Dombarovskiy, 46 at Kartaly, and 46 at Uzhur. After 37 years of service, on April 27, 2001, the Strategic Missile Troops Division at Aleysk was disbanded, and its 30 silos were destroyed. The missiles in Kazakhstan and their warheads were shipped back to Russia by April 1995. The START II Treaty banned all MIRVed (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) heavy ICBMs. But because the treaty never entered into force, and the new, more laissez-faire agreement of May 2002 has superceded it, Russia may retain its MIRVed SS-18s, although the missiles are unlikely to remain in service indefinitely due to their limited service life. Two variants of the SS-18 are currently deployed: the older RS-20B and the newer RS-20V. While START counts all SS-18s as carrying 10 warheads, the RS-20B can carry a single warhead, and a few of these may be deployed. The range of a fully MIRVed SS-18 is 11,000 kilometers; the single-warhead missile has a range of 15,000 kilometers. The yield of warheads on the RS-20B is estimated at 500–550 kilotons, and on the RS-20V, 550–750 kilotons. SS-19s. The September 1990 START I MOU stated that 170 SS- 19s were in Russia: 60 at Kozelsk, 110 at Tatishchevo. Another 130 were at two bases in Ukraine; these were removed from service by mid- 1996. Thirty- three SS-19s at Tatishchevo have been withdrawn from service to make way for new SS-27 missiles, which are deployed in SS-19 silos. Under START II, Russia could have kept as many as 105 SS-19s downloaded to a single warhead (from the current six). Now Russia can retain its MIRVed SS-19s, although their service life is limited. Two SS-19s were launched in 2001 from Baikonur: one on June 27, and one on October 26 (to test a downloaded version and confirm the reliability of the SS-19’s service life extension). SS-24s. According to the December 1994 START I MOU, 46 SS-24s were in service in Russia: 10 silobased and 36 rail-based. Another 46 were in Ukraine; these were removed from service by mid-1996, and the last silo was destroyed in 2001. The 10 silo-based missiles were removed from service in 2000 to accommodate the deployment of new SS-27 silo-based missiles. The 36 rail-based SS-24 M1s remain at garrisons at Bershet, Kostroma, and Krasnoyarsk, though plans are underway for their removal from service. SS-25s. Russia’s road-mobile, single-warhead SS-25 missile system is known as the Topol. There are 360 SS-25s deployed at 10 basing areas in Russia. The deployment of new regiments of SS-25s (nine missiles each) ended by 1997, when Russia shifted to producing and deploying the followon to the SS-25—the Topol-M, or SS- 27. Three SS-25s were test-launched in 2001, all from Plesetsk, one on February 16, one on October 3 (a training launch of a 15-year-old missile), and another on November 1. SS-27s. Flight-testing of the SS-27 began on December 20, 1994. Two silo-based SS-27s were put on "trial service" in December 1997 at the Tatishchevo missile base. One regiment of 10 missiles was declared operational in December 1998, and a second regiment with another 10 missiles in December 1999. In December 2000, a third regiment was activated, but with only four missiles out of the planned 10 because of a funding cut. Another five missiles were deployed in 2001, bringing the number of deployed SS-27s to 29. The SS-27s are housed in former SS-19 and SS-24 silos at Tatishchevo. In 1998, the SRF hoped to deploy 20–30 new SS-27s per year over the next three years and 30–40 per year for three years after that, but deployments have fallen far short of this schedule. Six SS-27s may be deployed this year. By the end of 2005, it is likely that 50–60 SS-27s will have been deployed—considerably fewer than the 160–220 previously anticipated. Nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The September 1990 START I MOU listed 62 SSBNs. At the end of 2001, only 14 were considered operational: six Delta IIIs, six Delta IVs, and two Typhoons. All Yankee, Delta I, and Delta II SSBNs have been withdrawn from operational service. Of the original six Typhoon submarines, one was scrapped in 2001, another will be scrapped, and two are apparently not in service. Unless funding is found or a replacement developed for the aging SS-N-20 SLBMs, the remaining Typhoons may be retired. Of the original 14 Delta IIIs, seven have been removed from service, and one has been converted to a Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle. Of the original seven Delta IVs, one has been removed from service. To keep the remaining Delta IVs in service, in 1999 it was decided to restart the SSN- 23 production line. There are reports that a new variant of this SLBM is being considered that can carry as many as 10 warheads. It currently carries four. Steps are also being taken to extend the service life of the deployed SS-N-23s. Operational SSBNs in the Northern Fleet are based on the Kola Peninsula (at Nerpichya and Yagelnaya) and in the Pacific Fleet (at Ry- bachiy, 15 kilometers southwest of Petropavlovsk) on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The keel of the first new Boreyclass SSBN was laid in November 1996. However, construction has been intermittent and was suspended altogether in 1998 while the submarine was being redesigned to accommodate a new SLBM. The Russian Navy hopes to have the first boat in commission in 2005, but it is unclear whether enough funding can be provided to finish it by then. Economic constraints, a shrinking SSBN fleet, and safety concerns after the August 2000 Kursk sinking have led to substantial decreases in the number of SSBN patrols—as well as patrols of nuclear-powered generalpurpose submarines. According to the U.S. Navy, in 1991 there were 37 SSBN patrols; in 2001 there was one. It should be noted, however, that some SSBNs can launch their SLBMs while in port. Bombers. Strategic bombers are part of the Russian Air Force’s 37th Air Army. According to the January 31, 2002, START I Treaty MOU, Tu-95 Bear bombers are deployed at three airbases: Ukrainka (16 Bear H16s and 25 Bear H6s), Engels (13 H16s and five H6s), and Ryazan (two H16s and two H6s). The MOU lists 15 Tu-160 Blackjack bombers at Engels. Eight of these were sent from Ukraine to Russia in late 1999 and early 2000 in partial payment of Ukrainian natural gas debts to Russia. The operational status of these bombers is unclear, but reports indicate that they need moderate to extensive overhaul and modernization. The Kazan Gorbunov production plant delivered one new Tu-160 to the Russian Air Force in May 2000. The Tu-160 force may increase slightly if production can be sustained. Although funds were short in 2001, three more Blackjacks are under construction, one of which may be delivered late this year or in early 2003. There are plans to modernize and extend the service lives of the older Tu-160s, according to Air Force Commander in Chief Vladimir Mikhaylov, which would allow them to carry "new types of missiles with conventional and nuclear warheads." On February 14, 2001, two Tu- 160 Blackjack bombers flew along Norway’s northern border, and approximately four medium-range Tu- 22 Backfire bombers flew near Japanese airspace. These exercises caused Norway to dispatch interceptor aircraft and Japan to lodge a protest over possible violation of its airspace. As part of the same exercise, two days later a Tu-95 Bear bomber launched a strategic cruise missile, and two Tu-22M Backfire bombers launched non-strategic cruise missiles. (The exercise included the previously mentioned February 2001 ICBM and SLBM launches.) A large, Pacific-area air exercise involving Tu-160, Tu-95, and Tu-22 strategic and theater bombers was to have begun on September 10, 2001. Blackjack bombers were spotted at Anadyr, and additional U.S. and Canadian interceptors were moved to the area to monitor the exercise, but at the U.S. government’s request, the Russian Defense Ministry cancelled the exercise after the September 11 terrorist attacks, to ensure that there would be no accidental incidents involving Russian aircraft flying near U.S. borders. Non-strategic forces. In October 1991 and January 1992, as part of the U.S.–Russian Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, Russia announced that it would take several unilateral steps to withdraw and eliminate some non- strategic nuclear weapons. The navy removed non-strategic nuclear weapons from surface ships and submarines and placed them in regional or central storage sites. Nuclear weapons deployed on naval aircraft, or at front-line storage facilities servicing naval airbases, were also moved to regional or central storage sites. By 1996, one-third of the navy’s non-strategic nuclear weapons were eliminated. The number of ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons has declined from about 400 in 1990 to about 100 in 2001. One-half of the Russian Air Force’s inventory of nuclear airbombs has been eliminated, and one-half of the warheads for surfaceto- air missiles were also destroyed. All nuclear weapons are thought to have been withdrawn from the Russian Ground Forces’ operational forces by 1998 and consolidated at storage sites. Although final elimination of Ground Forces nuclear weapons was expected before the end of 2001, Russia announced in April 2002 that the destruction of nuclear warheads for tactical missiles, nuclear artillery shells, and nuclear mines is still ongoing. If there is sufficient funding, Russia will eliminate all Ground Forces nuclear weapons by 2004. Russia reiterated in April what Boris Yeltsin declared in 1992: that production of nuclear warheads for ground-launched tactical missiles, nuclear artillery shells, and nuclear mines had been "completely stopped." Non-strategic forces Air defense: SAMs (SA-5B Gammon, SA-10 Grumble) -- 1,200 launchers, 1,200 warheads Bombers & fighters: Tu-22M Backfire (105), Su-24 Fencer (280) -- 385 launchers, 1,540 warheads Naval Aircraft: Tu-22M Backfire (45), Su-24 Fencer (50) -- 95 launchers, 190 warheads Naval Cruise missiles: SS-N-9, SS-N-12, SS-N-19, SS-N-21, SS-N-22 -- 240 warheads Naval Anti-submarine: SS-N-15, SS-N-16, torpedoes -- 210 warheads Total -- 3,380 (An additional 8,000–10,000 non-operational strategic and non-strategic warheads may be in reserve or awaiting dismantlement.) Strategic forces ICBMs SS-18 (Satan) -- 144 launchers, deployed: 1979, warheads x yield (kiloton): 10 x 550/750 (MIRV), 1,440 total warheads SS-19 (Stiletto) -- 137 launchers, deployed: 1980, warheads x yield (kiloton): 6 x 550/750 (MIRV), 822 total warheads SS-24 M1 (Scalpel) -- 36 launchers, deployed: 1987, warheads x yield (kiloton): 10 x 550 (MIRV), 360 total warheads SS-25 (Sickle) -- 360 launchers, deployed: 1985, warheads x yield (kiloton): 1 x 550, 360 total warheads SS-27 (n.a.) -- 29 launchers, deployed: 1997, warheads x yield (kiloton): 1 x 550, 29 total warheads Total -- 706 launchers, 3,011 total warheads SLBMs SS-N-18 M1 (Stingray) -- 96 launchers, deployed: 1978, warheads x yield (kiloton): 3 x 200 (MIRV), 288 total warheads SS-N-20 (Sturgeon) -- 40 launchers, deployed: 1983, warheads x yield (kiloton): 10 x 100 (MIRV), 400 total warheads SS-N-23 (Skiff) -- 96 launchers, deployed: 1986, warheads x yield (kiloton): 4 x 100 (MIRV), 384 total warheads Total -- 232 launchers, 1,072 total warheads Bomber/weapons Tu-95 MS6 (Bear H6) -- 32 launchers, deployed: 1984, warheads x yield (kiloton): 6 AS-15A ALCMs or bombs, 192 total warheads Tu-95 MS16 (Bear H16) -- 31 launchers, deployed: 1984, warheads x yield (kiloton): 16 AS-15A ALCMs or bombs, 496 total warheads Tu-160 (Blackjack) -- 15 launchers, deployed: 1987, warheads x yield (kiloton): 12 AS-15B ALCMs, AS-16 SRAMs, or bombs, 180 total warheads Total -- 78 launchers, 868 total warheads Grand total -- ~5,000 warheads ALCM—air-launched cruise missile; AS—air-to-surface missile; ICBM—intercontinental ballistic missile, range greater than 5,500 kilometers; MIRV—multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles; SAM—surface-to-air missile; SLBM—submarine-launched ballistic missile; SRAM— short-range attack missile Nuclear Notebook is prepared by Robert S. Norris of the Natural Resources Defense Council, William M. Arkin, Hans M. Kristensen of the Nautilus Institute, and Joshua Handler. http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/ja02nukenote.pdf

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Air Force Times August 5, 2002 Pg. 27 Link Possible Between Some Anthrax Vaccine, Symptoms Same antibodies found among Gulf War veterans By Deborah Funk, Times staff writer Researchers say they have found mounting evidence of a possible link between certain lots of anthrax vaccine and the types of ailments afflicting some Persian Gulf War veterans. A study by Tulane University and Autoimmune Technologies LLC of New Orleans showed a cluster of medical symptoms or antibodies to squalene, a compound sometimes used experimentally to boost vaccines, among troops inoculated from four lots of anthrax vaccine under the Pentagon’s mandatory vaccination program. In June 1999, Food and Drug Administration regulators found small amounts of squalene in the vaccine itself from three of those four lots, plus two others. "The antibodies indicate there is something immunologically going on in these patients," said cellular and molecular biologist Russell Wilson, president of Autoimmune Technologies. The results are similar to ones the researchers found in a study on Gulf War illnesses published in February 2000. Squalene occurs naturally in the body and has been used experimentally as an adjuvant to boost the immune response vaccines are designed to create. Defense officials insist they did not add squalene to anthrax vaccine. The source of the squalene found in the five vaccine lots by the FDA in 1999 is unknown, according to the study published in the August issue of Experimental and Molecular Pathology, a professional journal. In the earlier 2000 study, 95 percent of participants with Gulf War illnesses showed antibodies to squalene, while none of the healthy Gulf War veterans had the antibodies, which are found in 1 percent of the general population, Wilson said. "What needs to be done is an epidemiological study in concert with a determination of antibodies to squalene so that the observation of the linkage between [Gulf War illnesses], the antibodies and lots of anthrax vaccine can be confirmed," he said. In the latest study, researchers found a cluster of symptoms or antibodies to squalene among those who received anthrax vaccine from four lots. Three of those lots were known to contain squalene, the researchers wrote. Some 47 percent, or eight of 17, of the people receiving anthrax vaccine from one of the four lots showed antibodies to squalene, "while none receiving other lots was positive," the study said. Four people who received anthrax vaccine from the lots known to contain squalene did not show squalene antibodies but did show some illnesses found in those with the antibodies: arthritis, chronic fatigue, seizures and rashes. Another patient had joint pain, chronic fatigue and memory loss but did not test positive for antibodies, nor did he receive vaccine from the contaminated lots. That participant received shots from the same lot used on another test participant who did test positive for the antibodies. Troops who received vaccine from lots that apparently did not contain squalene "reported no reactions to the shot at the time of administration, were not diagnosed with any related clinical disorders, and had no demonstrable antibodies to squalene," researchers wrote.

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Washington Times July 30, 2002 Rumsfeld Says Air Strikes Won't Disarm Iraq By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said yesterday that air strikes alone cannot destroy Saddam Hussein's buried and mobile sites for weapons of mass destruction. "The Iraqis have a great deal of what they do deeply buried," Mr. Rumsfeld said after a tour of U.S. Joint Forces Command in the Norfolk area. The command is staging the military's largest exercise in history as it plans for new 21st-century threats. "So the idea that it's easy to simply go do what you suggest ought to be done from the air — the implication being from the air — is a misunderstanding of the situation," he said to a reporter who asked whether bombs and missiles alone could do the job. Mr. Rumsfeld has previously said he does not believe a new round of United Nations arms inspections could find Iraq's arsenal of chemical and biological weapons or all its nuclear weapons components. The defense secretary's implication is that if air strikes and inspectors cannot do the job, the United States must find a way to remove Saddam from power — an objective that is likely to require a ground invasion or an insurrection by key Iraqi military leaders. President Bush has said he wants Saddam out of power. The administration's argument is that Saddam will eventually gain nuclear weapons, which could fall into the hands of terrorists and be used against the United States. U.S. Central Command, which oversees military operations in the Persian Gulf, has drawn up a number of possible invasion scenarios. Mr. Bush has authorized the CIA to use covert means to oust Saddam. Mr. Rumsfeld said American turncoats have helped Baghdad by providing information on how the United States collects intelligence. "The Iraqis have benefited from American spies defecting to the Soviet Union or Russia and providing information as to how we do things, and they proliferate that information on how another country can best achieve denial and deception and avoid having the location, precise location, actionable locations of things known," the defense secretary said. "They have chemical weapons," he added. "They have biological weapons. They have an enormous appetite for nuclear weapons. They were within a year or two of having them when Desert Storm got on the ground and found enough information to know how advanced their program was." http://www.washtimes.com/national/20020730-83465321.htm

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Bloomberg.com July 29, 2002 Iraq Chemical, Biological Weapons Elusive Target, Rumsfeld Says By Tony Capaccio Washington -- Iraq produces and stores its chemical and biological weapons in mobile labs or deep underground, making them hard to find and destroy, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said. "The Iraqis have a great deal of what they do deeply buried," Rumsfeld told a press conference in Norfolk, Virginia. "A biological laboratory can be on wheels in a trailer and make a lot of bad stuff -- and it's movable and it looks like any other trailer," he said. U.S. President George Bush says Iraq faces unspecified military action unless it allows United Nations weapons inspectors to return. Most scenarios for toppling Iraqi president Saddam Hussein include air strikes to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Rumsfeld said that wouldn't be easy. "The idea that it's easy to simply go from the air is a misunderstanding of the situation," he said. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee this week has slated two days of open hearings on U.S.-Iraq policy. Iraqi scientists "are continuing to work" on nuclear weapons," Rumsfeld said. "There is an enormous flow of things across the Iraqi border. They've got billions of dollars from their `oil-for-food" program. Instead of buying food for children, they are buying weapons." The UN allows Iraq to put money earned from legitimate oil sales into a fund to buy medicine and food. Iraq also has purchased dual-use equipment that can be used for legitimate manufacture of pharmaceuticals as well as biological weapons, Rumsfeld said, repeating another long-standing concern of U.S. military and United Nations weapons inspectors. "They have chemical weapons, they have biological weapons, they have an enormous appetite for nuclear weapons," he said. CIA's Views Rumsfeld's remarks go farther than the U.S. intelligence community, which has stopped short of saying Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. "Iraq continues to build and expand an infrastructure capable of producing weapons of mass destruction," CIA Director George Tenet told the Senate Intelligence Committee in February. "Baghdad is expanding its civilian chemical industry in ways that could be diverted quickly to chemical weapons production," Tenet said. "We believe it also maintains an active and capable biological weapons program." The CIA also believed Iraq "retains a significant number of nuclear scientists, program documentation and probably some dual- use manufacturing infrastructure that could support a reinvigorated nuclear weapons program." Tenet said. U.S. information is hampered because United Nations weapons inspectors were expelled from Iraq in December 1998 and have not returned.

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New York Times July 31, 2002 Air Power Alone Can’t Defeat Iraq, Rumsfeld Asserts By Eric Schmitt and James Dao WASHINGTON, July 30 — Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said today that Iraq now has mobile biological- weapons laboratories that would be very difficult to bomb, an example, he said, of why air power alone would not destroy all of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Even if Iraq ultimately agreed to allow international inspectors back into the country, President Saddam Hussein has taken such steps to conceal his weapons program that inspections would be ineffective, Mr. Rumsfeld said at a news conference this afternoon. He added that many of the sites are buried deep underground and that weapons are produced in factories that also make legitimate commercial products. His remarks were the most extensive he has offered on the challenges facing the Pentagon in planning to unseat President Hussein and eliminate his arsenal, though he also made it clear that the administration had not settled on a specific plan. In recent weeks Mr. Rumsfeld has stepped up his campaign to warn of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, a strategy that some military and other officials say is meant to begin laying the groundwork for a war with Iraq, if President Bush makes that decision. Under repeated questioning, Mr. Rumsfeld stopped short of saying the administration had little option but to invade Iraq with ground troops. But other military officials said today that short of a coup, that may be the only sure way to topple Mr. Hussein and eliminate Iraq's weapons. In fact, within the Pentagon, senior officers are engaged in active debate over whether ground troops should be used — and if so, how many, and how they would be deployed. Senate hearings on Iraq begin on Wednesday, with experts on Iraq from outside the administration to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee. One witness, Gen. Joseph Hoar, a retired head of the Central Command, expressed wariness about using military force to oust Mr. Hussein before all diplomatic and economic avenues were exhausted. "It can be done," General Hoar said in a telephone interview tonight. "But the risk is, how many lives will be lost?" A growing number of lawmakers from both parties are voicing concern that the administration is heading precipitously toward war. Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., the Delaware Democrat who is chairman of the committee, told reporters today that administration officials had assured him that they would not begin an attack this fall and were still considering a range of options. But each of those options has drawbacks. Mr. Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul D. Wolfowitz, have repeatedly scorned the idea of pressing for the resumption of the international inspections, which Mr. Hussein barred in 1998. Senator Biden, however, said resuming the inspections could slow Baghdad's weapons production and build international support for additional measures against Iraq. Many intelligence analysts say it is unlikely that a coup would succeed, noting that at least six attempts failed in the 1990's. The current policy of containing Iraq has many supporters in the military and the State Department. But other senior administration officials argue that even with the constraints, it is only a matter of time before Mr. Hussein develops the weapons and the means to launch them — or provides them to terrorist groups. Various strategies remain under consideration. One is an attack on Baghdad and other command centers in an effort to cause a quick collapse of the government; another is an all-out air and land war, involving as many as 250,000 troops. Asked today about the choices, Mr. Rumsfeld said, "We don't talk about specific plans." Several Mideast allies have warned the administration against an attack. King Abdullah II of Jordan is to meet with Mr. Bush on Thursday, probably to voice concern about hawkish officials pressing for action. In Baghdad today, Mr. Hussein dismissed as a "tall story" assertions by American and British leaders that Iraq was again well on the way to developing weapons of mass destruction. But in the past few weeks, Mr. Rumsfeld has been briefing lawmakers, NATO allies and former defense secretaries on the threat posed by countries, including Iraq, that the United States believes have biological, chemical or nuclear capacities. In the briefings, participants said, Mr. Rumsfeld explained how state-sponsored weapons programs are proceeding menacingly, while terrorist groups are becoming more sophisticated in their efforts to obtain such weapons. In the briefings, Mr. Rumsfeld has not taken the next step — to say the United States and its allies should use military force to eliminate this threat. But some participants said that was the impression he left. And while, in the briefings, Mr. Rumsfeld mentions other countries of concern, including North Korea and Syria, in his public comments he has singled out Iraq. "They have chemical weapons and biological weapons, and they have an appetite for nuclear weapons and have been working on them for a good many years, and there's an awful lot we don't know about their programs," he said today. He also explained why he believed weapons inspections would be ineffective, saying, "It would take such a thoroughly intrusive inspection regime, agreed to and then lived up to by Iraq, that it's difficult to comprehend — even begin to think — that they might accept such a regime." Mr. Rumsfeld's remarks built on comments he made on Monday during a brief news conference at the United States Joint Forces Command in Suffolk, Va., where he was asked why the United States did not just bomb Iraq's weapons sites. "The idea that it's easy to simply go do what you suggested ought to be done from the air, the implication being from the air, is a misunderstanding of the situation," Mr. Rumsfeld said. "The Iraqis have a great deal of what they do deeply buried." Mr. Rumsfeld added today, "They move around a lot of things to avoid detection or if not detection, at least to avoid having them attacked." http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/31/international/middleeast/31MILI.html

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Washington Post July 31, 2002 Pg. A01 In Assessing Iraq's Arsenal, The 'Reality Is Uncertainty' Details of Bioweapons Lab Emerge, but Not Proof By Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer U.S. intelligence analysts have been closely examining satellite images of the west bank of the Tigris River in Baghdad for signs of a laboratory rumored to exist there. Called Tahhaddy, or "Challenge," the lab is purported to have 85 employees and a top-secret mission: making biological weapons for Iraq's military. Details about the lab have trickled out of Iraq in recent months in accounts from defectors and Iraqi exiles opposed to President Saddam Hussein. They tell of underground test chambers, heavy security and a viral strain code-named "Blue Nile," which sounds suspiciously like the Ebola virus. If confirmed, the very existence of the lab could fuel the debate over whether the United States should attack Iraq. But confirming the lab's presence from satellite photos has proved difficult, so the laboratory today remains a mere shadow in the U.S. government's intelligence assessment -- an unknown threat in a landscape filled with others just like it. "It sounds credible. It is certainly plausible," a Pentagon intelligence analyst who specializes in Iraq said of the facility last week. "But proving it is another matter." The search for the laboratory illustrates one of the more vexing challenges facing White House and congressional leaders as they weigh military action against Iraq. Two days of Senate hearings on the topic open today. The decision about war hinges largely on a single issue: whether Iraq is actively seeking biological, chemical and nuclear weapons that could pose a threat to the United States and its allies, and how to respond if so. President Bush has declared that Iraq belongs to an "axis of evil," countries that are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and has threatened to carry out "regime change" in Iraq. Senior administration officials have said Iraq's threat is grave enough to warrant a military invasion. But intelligence officials and military experts on Iraq, both in the United States and abroad, express caution. While many analysts are convinced that Iraq is rebuilding its stockpile of weapons, the White House has not publicly offered evidence of a single factory or lab known to be actively producing them. Congressional officials who receive classified briefings on Iraq say the case has not yet been made there, either -- in part because of what some officials perceive as a lack of reliable intelligence-gathering on the ground. "The central reality is uncertainty, and the defectors' stories only reinforce that," Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.) said in an interview after a recent tour of the Middle East, where he discussed Iraq with regional leaders. "None of the people we met claimed to have conclusive knowledge of the status of Iraq's weapons program," said Graham, chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence. According to interviews with dozens of analysts in government, the military, intelligence agencies and academia, Iraq has a reservoir of knowledge, technology and equipment to create weapons of mass destruction. These specialists also agree that Iraq still has a residual arsenal from the 1991 Persian Gulf War, including stocks of chemical agents and possibly biological weapons that were hidden from the United Nations during seven years of inspections. The experts also note that Hussein is clearly determined to preserve whatever capability he has. Iraq attempted to conceal its weapons infrastructure from U.N. inspectors throughout the 1990s, and for the past four years it has refused to allow the inspectors back into the country, even at a cost of continuing international sanctions. Beyond that, the evidence that Iraq is actively rebuilding its arsenal consists of a mosaic of defector stories and intriguing intelligence data, including satellite images showing new construction in bombed-out industrial parks where weapons were once made, and documented attempts by Iraq to purchase specialized equipment and supplies. But the intelligence reports and defector claims also leave some large questions unanswered. If an active weapons program exists, it is far from clear how extensive it is or how a serious threat it poses. Before the 1991 war, Iraq struggled with faulty weapons designs, and weapons often backfired on Iraq's own troops. The military also has not yet managed to marry its weapons with a reliable missile system that can accurately deliver warheads to distant targets. The intelligence about Iraq is cloudy enough to lead to differing interpretations. Iraq experts who favor an aggressive response said the data add up to a compelling, if largely circumstantial, case. "It's as clear as these things get," said R. James Woolsey, director of the CIA from 1993 to 1995. "If defectors are all you've got, that's a problem. But you can triangulate -- you get more than one source." But others, including some former U.N. weapons inspectors, say the evidence is simply inconclusive, underscoring the need for the inspectors' prompt return to Baghdad. "I'd be the first to admit I have no idea what has gone on inside Iraq since 1998," said Scott Ritter, a former Marine Corps intelligence officer and chief U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq, who accused the Clinton administration of not aggressively seeking the country's full disarmament. "If someone can demonstrate that Iraq has [weapons of mass destruction] and continues to develop them, then Iraq is a rogue nation and I would be the first to sign up for that war. But no one has made that case yet." Congressional leaders are pressing the White House for better intelligence -- and a public airing of the existing evidence -- as reports circulate that the administration is preparing plans for a possible strike against Baghdad. "There's an important role for the Iraqi opposition, but we should be doing more than simply trying to confirm its stories," said Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., (D-Del.) chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. "My attitude is we should be like the Missourians: Show me." Biological Weapons The Tahhaddy lab, if it exists, could point to an Iraqi biological weapons program that was kept secret from Western intelligence agencies for more than 15 years. Iraq's known bioweapons labs were so carefully hidden that U.N. officials failed to discover them until 1995 -- four years after the start of inspections. Only after the defection of the program's chief, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamal, did inspectors find secret laboratories that were producing lethal bacteria by the ton. Iraq eventually acknowledged making three types of biological weapons using anthrax bacteria and two kinds of biological toxins: botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. But Iraq is also known to have conducted extensive research on at least three other pathogens that attack humans or crops, and it dabbled with a half-dozen others, U.N. inspection reports show. In its final three years in Iraq, the U.N. Special Commission, or UNSCOM, destroyed all of Iraq's known biological munitions, and much of the equipment needed to make new ones. But the inspectors didn't get it all. "UNSCOM didn't destroy everything," said Richard Spertzel, a retired Army biological warfare expert who oversaw the dismantling of Iraq's bioweapons program. "Iraq still has enough equipment, material, people and know-how to make biological weapons." Spertzel said he observed industrial fermenters, spray dryers and other equipment that could be used today to mass- produce viruses and bacteria -- equipment that UNSCOM could not legally destroy because it had no proof the machines were being used to make weapons. He concludes that Iraq can now produce biological weapons without any help from abroad, which it could not have done a decade ago. Iraq may still possess actual biowarfare bombs, as well. In a report to the U.N. Security Council in 1999, UNSCOM concluded that Iraq had concealed nearly 160 bombs and more than two dozen missile warheads filled with anthrax or other pathogens. While Iraq insists it destroyed the weapons unilaterally, it has offered no proof. Iraq also never handed over its "cookbooks" of instructions for making biological weapons, or accounted for its seed stock of lethal pathogens or hundreds of pounds of imported nutrient broth used to grow the germs in bulk. While conclusive proof remains elusive, there have been persistent reports since the late 1990s suggesting that Iraq has continued biological weapons research using small labs built underground or concealed inside specially modified trucks. Detailed accounts of what were described as secret labs were given to U.S. intelligence officials last fall by Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, an engineer specializing in constructing dust-free "clean rooms" needed for certain types of laboratory work. After fleeing Iraq in early December, he reported that as many as 300 secret weapons facilities had been "reactivated" since the withdrawal of U.N. inspectors. The engineer is being kept in a safe house by the Defense Intelligence Agency, which declined requests to interview Saeed. But according to a transcript of his debriefing session, which was made available by the Iraqi National Congress, a leading opposition group, Saeed said most of the facilities were small and cleverly disguised. "In some areas, houses or a small factory would get converted into labs," Saeed said. He also described a visit to an underground biological lab on the grounds of one of Hussein's Baghdad palaces, and his account is similar to reports of the Tahhaddy biological site offered by the Iraqi National Congress, which claims to have investigated the facility using informants. A document provided to The Washington Post by the group gives directions to the lab, lists its senior officers and describes a layout that includes above-ground offices and rooms for a special security detachment assigned to the building. Most of its 85 employees work in a small underground lab that conducts research on deadly pathogens, including a mysterious Blue Nile strain, officials of the opposition group said. Biowarfare experts suggested the name may refer to Ebola, a disease that strikes in the Blue Nile region of East Africa. The Iraqi National Congress officials said they have been unable to learn whether the lab had successfully produced viruses in a weaponized form. Several intelligence and UNSCOM officials described the group's report as credible but none could verify it independently. Under UNSCOM, inspectors investigated several reports of underground weapons facilities but found none. Chemical Weapons Chemical agents are the oldest and most technologically simple component of Iraq's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. They were used to put down a rebellion by Iraqi Kurds in 1988. Experts interviewed for this article said there is convincing evidence Iraq still has chemical weapons stockpiles. In their seven years in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, U.N. inspectors destroyed hundreds of chemically armed warheads and artillery shells. UNSCOM's incinerator ran for months, burning tons of mustard gas and nerve agents as well as the precursor compounds used to make them. Yet, a vast amount of Hussein's chemical stockpile was never found and remains unaccounted for, U.N. inspection records show. Among the more worrisome items: at least 3.9 tons of highly lethal VX, an advanced nerve agent so powerful that a few drops on the skin can kill. Iraq acknowledged making the VX and reported acquiring at least 600 tons of precursor chemicals. Iraq claims to have destroyed the chemicals, along with about 550 mustard-gas shells and 107,000 special artillery shell casings, the U.N. documents show. But no evidence was offered, and UNSCOM dismissed the claim as a lie. "Even while we were monitoring, Iraq was conducting activities right under our noses," said Charles A. Duelfer, former deputy executive chairman of UNSCOM and a resident scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Duelfer and other UNSCOM veterans say Iraq could, without much difficulty, resume modest-scale production of chemical weapons -- and there is scattered evidence that it already has. In a report to Congress two years ago, the CIA said Iraq was rebuilding factories at which it once made chemical weapons, and installing dual-use equipment that can be employed to make new ones. More construction was spotted by spy satellites last year at a massive former chemical site known as Falluja, said Kelly Motz, weapons specialist at Iraq Watch, a research group in Washington that tracks arms-control issues. Iraqi opposition officials and recent defectors such as Saeed contend that chemical munitions work is underway at such sites, but their accounts could not be independently confirmed. The leader of the Iraqi National Congress, Ahmed Chalabi, citing informants within the Iraqi intelligence community, contends that Hussein's VX stockpile is far larger than the 3.9 tons Iraq reported -- something UNSCOM inspectors have long suspected. Chalabi also says that the VX had been converted into a dry salt for long- term storage and was positioned in various sites across Iraq for use in the event of a foreign attack. UNSCOM officials said the account seemed credible, given what was learned about Iraq's VX program in the final months of weapons inspections. Nuclear Weapons Hussein was astonishingly close -- perhaps as near as a few weeks, some experts say -- to completing a nuclear device when the United States and its allies launched Operation Desert Storm against him in 1991. Weeks of bombings followed by years of intrusive inspections obliterated Iraq's nuclear program and wiped out its capacity for converting uranium into nuclear fuel, according to a broad cross-section of analysts. Most agreed that Iraq's nuclear program is nowhere near its prewar status. Far less certain -- even to Iraqi opposition leaders -- is whether Iraq has made significant strides since 1998. Although former UNSCOM officials are skeptical of recent defector accounts about secret uranium-enrichment facilities inside Iraq, many say Iraq retains enough equipment, detailed blueprints and scientific expertise to build a bomb quickly. All Iraq needs is nuclear fuel -- enriched uranium or plutonium, which could be bought or stolen abroad if not made at home. Hussein "is doing everything he can do without special [nuclear] material, and [he is] betting on acquiring the material outside Iraq," said David Kay, leader of three inspection missions to Iraq for the International Atomic Energy Agency. "There are places they can go and find it on sale. And when that happens, they'll be ready to surprise the world with a finished weapon." Even during the UNSCOM inspection years, Iraq conspicuously kept teams of nuclear scientists together and employed them at various make-work tasks, said Timothy V. McCarthy, a former deputy chief inspector and a senior analyst at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif. "Our belief is that they are working on technical projects" related to the bomb, McCarthy said. "There are lots of things they can do on paper. We know they have a bomb design; how could they refine it?" There is as yet no firm evidence that Iraq has mastered the technically difficult feat of manufacturing its own nuclear fuel, but a few recent intelligence reports suggest that it is trying. Building a cascade facility for enriching uranium requires large amounts of highly specialized metals and machinery -- some of which has shown up in recent years on lists of goods Iraq has sought to import. Iraq's shopping list contains no "smoking guns," according to experts on Iraq's past nuclear weapons program. Most, if not all, of the listed items have multiple industrial uses apart from uranium enrichment, the sources said. But one person with intimate knowledge of Iraq's earlier attempts to build a bomb said he believes the real evidence of Iraq's nuclear efforts will not show up on official shipping manifests. Khidhir Hamza, a U.S.-trained Iraqi nuclear scientist who defected to the West in 1994, said a decade of trade sanctions has taught Hussein to become much better at getting what he needs through a combination of smuggling, bribery and improvisation. "Any watch list you have becomes meaningless," said Hamza, who describes Iraq's prewar nuclear program in an autobiography titled "Saddam's Bombmaker." "Iraq is increasingly able to manufacture what it needs locally." Hamza contends that Iraq will eventually acquire a nuclear bomb if Hussein is allowed to remain in power long enough. "No one who has ever gone this route has backed away because of political pressure alone," Hamza said. "The only way to stop him is by changing the regime." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23545-2002Jul30.html

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Washington Times July 31, 2002 Rumsfeld Targets Saddam, But Not Other 'Axis' Regimes By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said yesterday that the United States is not seeking to oust the dictatorial regimes in Iran, North Korea and other states in the same way it wants to overthrow Iraq's Saddam Hussein. "The policy of the government of the United States has been regime change for Iraq," Mr. Rumsfeld told reporters at the Pentagon. "That's the Congress and the executive branch both. It has not been that for some other countries, and I guess life's just untidy." Mr. Rumsfeld noted that the other countries identified by President Bush in his January State of the Union speech as members of a three-nation "axis of evil" — Iran and North Korea — share "similar characteristics," but the current effort focuses on Iraq. Mr. Rumsfeld also said during a meeting with reporters that it is possible Saddam could be ousted by a barracks military coup. The defense secretary said not all scenarios for ousting the Iraqi regime require sending U.S. ground troops or launching air strikes. "I already know of one instance: If the Iraqi military turned on them, it probably wouldn't require anything," he said. Amid public speculation that the United States is preparing a military attack on Iraq, Mr. Rumsfeld on Monday and yesterday said Iraq's government poses a clear danger to the United States because of its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs and its ties to terrorists. Mr. Rumsfeld said nations like Iraq are "burrowing underground" to hide facilities related to weapons of mass destruction, making the task of finding and stopping the arms very difficult. Even when U.N. weapons inspectors worked in Iraq, they had a difficult time finding the arms and facilities, he said. Mr. Rumsfeld said Iraq has chemical and biological weapons and "an appetite" for building nuclear weapons and has been working on the arms for many years. He noted that "there's an awful lot we don't know about their programs." Meanwhile, Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., Delaware Democrat and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said yesterday that he does not expect a military attack against Iraq before early next year. Mr. Biden, who will lead hearings on Iraq that begin today, said he does not believe the Bush administration has decided how and when to overthrow Saddam. "They may have made up their mind on regime change, but I'd be very, very surprised if the president has made a decision on how he intends to change the regime," Mr. Biden told reporters. "I'd be even more surprised if there's any such attempt in the near term, meaning between now and the first of the year." Regarding "regime change" in Iran and North Korea, Mr. Rumsfeld said it would be a "good thing" if the people of Iran rose up and overthrow the radical Islamic government in Tehran. "I have a feeling that the people of Iran know that," he said. "And I have a feeling that in my adult lifetime we may still see the people of Iran do something about that regime." North Korea, which is run by a totalitarian communist dictatorship, presents more difficult challenges for changing the government, he said. "If you think of the people that are starving in that country, the people that are fleeing that country, the people that are in prison camps in that country, one can't help but feel great empathy for the people of Korea," Mr. Rumsfeld said. "It's a terrible, terrible thing." The defense secretary was asked whether the al Qaeda terrorists who carried out the September 11 attacks had "state assistance"; he said there is "no question" that Afghanistan provided that kind of support to the group. As for other state support to al Qaeda, Mr. Rumsfeld said both Iran and Iraq have permitted al Qaeda members to reside in those countries, showing that the governments in Tehran and Baghdad "tolerate" their presence. Asked whether Iraq has a relationship with al Qaeda, Mr. Rumsfeld said, "sure" but conceded that the evidence of the ties is not clear. "Well, life's murky," he said. "I mean, we're not on the ground down there. But are there al Qaeda in Iraq? Yes. Are there al Qaeda in Iran? Yes. Are there al Qaeda in the United States? Yes." Mr. Rumsfeld sought to dispel news reports about Pentagon planning for military operations in Iraq as the normal business of the military. "One of the responsibilities of the Department of Defense is to see that we have thought through a host of different contingencies and possibilities," he said. The Pentagon regularly draws up war plans for various scenarios, but Mr. Rumsfeld said he has never seen a plan implemented without being modified to conform to circumstances. http://www.washtimes.com/national/20020731-94716048.htm

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Washington Times July 31, 2002 U.S. Moves To Head Off Russia-Iran Nuke Pact By David R. Sands, The Washington Times Iran sounded a defiant note yesterday as senior U.S. officials arrived in Moscow on a mission to curb Russia's plans for a dramatic expansion of nuclear cooperation with Tehran. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and Undersecretary of State John Bolton are meeting with their Russian counterparts just days after the Kremlin announced a surprise long-term cooperation package with Iran that included the construction of up to six nuclear reactors. Russia's $800 million deal to build a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power plant near the southern Iranian port town of Bushehr has already emerged as a prime irritant in U.S.-Russian relations, with the Bush administration contending that the Iranians could use the expertise and contacts from the deal to build nuclear bombs. State Department deputy spokesman Philip Reeker yesterday dismissed as "totally hypothetical" press reports that the United States and Israel have considered a pre-emptive military strike against Bushehr. A commentary in the state-controlled Tehran Times, an English-language newspaper, said Iran's government would respond in kind to any military action against the Bushehr plant, which is scheduled to come on line within five years. "Iran will definitely not sit by idly if its nuclear installations are attacked," the paper said, defending the project as intended for civilian power needs. "It is a matter of national pride and security." The Washington Times reported in May that Iran had placed batteries of U.S.-made Hawk surface-to-air missiles around the Bushehr installation. Mr. Reeker took a low-key view of the Russian government's announcement of expansion of economic and nuclear cooperation with Iran. "Contributing to Iranian nuclear ambitions," he said, "would be counterproductive, I think, to Russia's broader strategic interests." But the Pentagon has been more pointed in its public comments. "This is a pressing matter that has very much got the administration's attention," Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Marshall Billingslea told a Senate hearing Monday. He argued that Iran, with vast oil and natural gas reserves, is using Bushehr "as a pretext for the creation of an infrastructure designed to help Tehran acquire atomic weapons." "If we were upset about one reactor at Bushehr, you can imagine how upset we would be at the prospect of five or six," he added. The Moscow trips by Mr. Bolton and Mr. Abraham had been scheduled long before last week's Russian announcement. The State Department gave no details of the talks, but the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement that Mr. Bolton and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov yesterday discussed a $20 billion program financed by the Group of Eight industrial nations to protect Russia's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons arsenals dating back to the days of the Soviet Union. The two officials are also preparing the inaugural September meeting of a joint U.S.-Russian security commission in Washington. The commission grew out of a summit between President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin in May that clinched a deal for sharp cuts in the two countries' nuclear stockpiles. Mr. Abraham meets today with Alexander Rumyantsev, Russia's top nuclear-energy official, to discuss a Russian fuel and energy summit to be held in Houston in October. http://www.washtimes.com/world/20020731-8859213.htm

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