brief 22 Burying the Hatchet The Decommissioning of Paramilitary Arms in Northern Ireland brief 22

Contents The authors Kris Brown works in the Northern Preface 4 Ireland Political Collection of the Linen Hall Library, Belfast. He Zusammenfassung studied politics at Queen’s University German summary 6 Belfast, gaining his doctorate in 2000. His main research interests are the Part 1: The History of the Decommissioning Debate 8 Northern Ireland peace process, and Irish foreign policy. Of Arms and the Men: Origin and Initial Development of the Issue 10 Corinna Hauswedell is a historian Institutionalisation of Decommissioning, 1996–1998: and works as a project leader for From the Mitchell Principles to the Agreement 22 post-conflict peace-building at BICC. Guns and Government, 1999–2000: Disarmament and She is currently in charge of a case Difficulties in Implementing the Agreement 34 study of the Northern Ireland peace process and the role of From Crisis to the Rubicon? 2000–2001 42 demilitarisation. She also lectures on Irish history at Mannheim University. Part 2: Small Arms–Bigger Issues 48 The Time Had Come: Burying the Hatchet 50 The “Twin Track” Approach of the Agreement— “Fudging” the Arms 54 Matters of Trust: External and Internal Involvement for Disarmament 58 Proliferation of Violence and the Momentum of Arms 63

Conclusions 68

Glossary 73 Editing: Moira Davidson-Seger and References 74 Mark Sedra

Cover photo: Republican mural in Barcroft Park, Newry, Co. Down (December 2000). Jonathan McCormick

This publication was partially funded by the Volkswagen Foundation.

2 B·I·C·C brief 22 Burying the Hatchet The Decommissioning of Paramilitary Arms in Northern Ireland

Corinna Hauswedell and Kris Brown

B·I·C·C 3 brief 22

Preface

the leadership of Sinn Fein—publicly declared that the organisation had urying the hatchet may become the particular emphasis on the role of the begun to put its arms permanently and Bmost tangible symbol that the war domestic and international actors verifiably beyond use, and by doing so, is over. The concrete circumstances involved. The case study assesses the significantly contributed to the reinvigoration of the deteriorating under which protagonists of civil strife potential of a satisfactory process of peace process. It would go beyond the become prepared to “put their arms demilitarisation* to foster peace scope of our analysis and not do any beyond use” depend on a variety of building and prevent further violent factors: the history and the political conflict in a post-war society. In justice to the issue, if we attempted roots of an armed conflict, the cultural particular, two relevant sections of the either to draw lessons from Northern heritage of those who have taken up Belfast Agreement lie at the core of Ireland for the “war against terrorism” or vice versa—such ill-advised and arms, and the means and provisions of our analysis: careless analogies tend to blur and the peace settlement. Sometimes, a distort the actual subject matter and window of opportunity may be opened the decommissioning of all from the outside, serving as a catalyst paramilitary arms and the the lessons that can be derived from it. generating a solution for a seemingly (re)integration of related personnel, The careful reader, though, may find intractable situation. food for thought upon which to base further research. the normalisation of security When we started our research on the arrangements and practices, such as This comprehensive publication on topic of Demilitarisation in Northern the reduction of the numbers and Ireland—The Role of “Decommissioning” role of the state armed forces, the decommissioning, the first following and “Normalisation of Security” in the Peace removal of security installations and the breakthrough of 23 October 2001, Process (DINI) in early 2000, the Belfast the redevelopment of former analyses the reasons that made the arms issue in Northern Ireland such a Agreement was almost two years old, a military areas for civilian needs. difficult obstacle for the peace process. promising child in the international We assess the attempts to solve the arena of conflict settlement that was In a comparative attempt we hoped to struggling enormously hard to learn offer a key set of lessons applicable as sensitive arms issue, both the failures how to walk. The issue of a door opener into the Northern Irish and the process of confidence building decommissioning paramilitary arms impasse, and vice versa, to draw that provided success. had become the seemingly universal lessons from the Northern The recognition that the issue of insurmountable stumbling block on the Irish situation that can benefit paramilitary arms carried a symbolic road to the Agreement’s full comparable international peacemaking implementation. Between the Ulster and disarmament initiatives. value and weight that went far beyond Unionist position of “no guns, no its military potential, serving as the government” and the Republican stand The scope of this publication was political foundation upon which both conflicting parties anchored their of “no surrender” no bridge of trust determined by the fact that positions, is one of the most pivotal and compromise seemed possible. decommissioning remained the findings of this research paper. Interrupted only by short moments of dominant issue throughout the period hope—after the review of the Agree- of research. We hope to continue our ment in autumn 1999 and the third research on the other related fields of Part 1 of the brief describes, from the party inspections of IRA arms dumps demilitarisation. perspective of the various players, how the issue of decommissioning in summer 2000—one serious crisis historically originated, developed, and was followed by another. In autumn Like many other colleagues working on became institutionalised, from the early 2001, a dangerous mix of a political Northern Ireland, we were often vacuum at the governmental level and a tempted to procrastinate, waiting and days of the peace talks in 1993 to the rise of violence in the streets made a hoping for a breakthrough to present a Agreement, and further on to the deep collapse of the whole peace process more original and optimistic crisis of the summer of 2001. Part 2 appear imminent. perspective.

The joint project of BICC and The shattering atrocities of September INCORE aims to monitor the 11, beyond what any of us could have implementation of the Belfast Agree- imagined, created a change in the * ment and to analyse the governing climate of international relations that Demilitarisation is the term normally used by provisions of the peace accord with induced the Republican movement to BICC in its research covering issues of make their decisive start to bury the disarmament, demobilisation and conversion at a national and international level. In the Northern hatchet. On 23 October 2001, the Irish debate, demilitarisation predominantly IRA—following the encouragement of describes the reduction of state forces and their security installations.

4 B·I·C·C preface

analyses the underlying factors and of the first to encourage the project; to patterns of the peace process that Paul Arthur, who let me discuss the influenced the way decommissioning project with his students at the was handled: the twin track approach University of Ulster; to Dr. Jonathan of the Agreement, the role of external McCormick, who on very short notice involvement, especially of the Inde- provided us access to the superb pendent International Commission on collection of photos in the Northern Decommissioning (IICD), and the Ireland Mural Directory; and last but problem of proliferated violence—in not least, to Paul Nolan, Director of short, the bigger issues behind the the Institute of Life Long Learning at small arms. Queens University, who in 1999, helped me acclimatise myself to the The process of taking the bullets and political geography of the place, and the bomb out of Northern Irish introduced me to the pleasures and politics has only just begun. Our difficulties of distinguishing a Catholic findings are not intended to stir up a from a Protestant. recurring political debate that, in the near future, should be pursued in less I should also like to thank my troubled waters. We intend only to colleagues at BICC: Moira Davidson widen the scope of knowledge by who edited part 1of the brief; Svenja which further disarmament and a new Bends responsible for the layout, cross-sectarian and mutually agreed shortly before giving birth to her first understanding of security and peace in child; and Mark Sedra, whose Northern Ireland can be achieved. knowledgeable input was enjoyable and useful far beyond the language editing Acknowledgements of part 2. All of these individuals made the completion of this publication not Without a series of interviews with only possible but also very presentable stakeholders in the Northern Irish while under severe constraints. peace process, i.e. relevant personnel from the British and Irish governments The Volkswagen Foundation has and from the Independent Internation- generously funded the whole project. al Commission On Decommissioning (IICD), and with representatives from the Assembly parties, spokespersons Corinna Hauswedell for paramilitary organisations, Bonn International Center for Conversion community authorities, and civic groups, this research would not have been successful. We want to thank all those who agreed to engage in UNU/INCORE, a centre for International Conflict Research, was set up in confidential dialogue that helped to 1993 by the University of Ulster and the United Nations University to make Belfast a familiar place and undertake research and policy work that is useful to the resolution of ethnic, allowed us to look behind the infamous political and religious conflicts. Currently, INCORE’s research focuses mainly walls of sectarianism. A number of on post conflict issues, issues of governance and diversity, and research excellent resources, virtual and methodology in violent societies. UNU/INCORE seeks to inform and otherwise, are available to research the influence national and international organisations, including governments and Northern Irish conflict, including the UN agencies working in the field of conflict. While UNU/INCORE’s primary CAIN Web Service, the Linen Hall focus is on international conflict, it also works with policy makers and Library, and the NEWSHOUND. organisations in Northern Ireland, addressing issues of conflict in a comparative context. Special thanks go to the director of INCORE, Mari Fitzduff whose warm INCORE, University of Ulster, Aberfoyle House, Magee Campus, hearted support went far beyond Northland Road setting up an efficient framework of DERRY/LONDONDERRY, BT48 7JA, Northern Ireland co-operation; to Roger Mac Ginty, one Tel +44 (0)2871 375500 Fax: +44 (0)2871 375510 Email: [email protected] URL: http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/

B·I·C·C 5 brief 22

Zusammen-

internen und externen an der Steue- fassung rung dieses Prozesses beteiligten Akteure. German Summary Wir hoffen, dass die in der Studie zusammengefassten Analysen sowohl für die weitere Friedenskonsolidierung Das Problem der Abrüstung der angebot der IRA im August, bestätigt in Nordirland als auch in anderen paramilitärischen Waffen durch die Unabhängige Internationale Konfliktregionen von Nutzen sein (Decommissioning) hat in den vergange- Abrüstungskommission (IICD), ging werden. nen vier Jahren seit der Unterzeichung der UUP nicht weit genug. Der Erste des Belfaster Abkommens zu scheinbar Minister der nordirischen Regional- Nordirland ist ein Beispiel für einen unüberwindlichen Blockaden im regierung, David Trimble (UUP), löste überpolitisierten ethnischen Kon- nordirischen Friedensprozess geführt. durch seinen Rücktritt am 1. Juli eine flikt mit großem historischen Zwischen den Hauptkonfliktparteien, schwere Regierungskrise aus. Heftige Ballast; die Frage der paramilitäri- der protestantischen Ulster Unionist Gewaltausbrüche, seit Monaten vor schen Waffen und ihrer Abrüstung Party (UUP) und der katholisch- allem von protestantisch-loyalistischen erhielt im Zuge des Friedens- republikanischen Sinn Fein, schien kein paramilitärischen Gruppen provoziert, prozesses einen symbolischen Kompromiss möglich. Die Frage, wie eskalierten in den gemischt- Stellenwert, der weit über das das Kriegsbeil zu begraben sei (Burying konfessionellen Arbeitervierteln von militärische Potenzial der Waffen the hatchet), entwickelte ein politisch- Nord-Belfast zu einer Schlacht um die hinaus ging und in den diametralen symbolisches Gewicht jenseits des Schulkinder von Ardoyne. politisch-ideologischen Gegensätzen militärischen Potenzials, an dem beide der Hauptkonfliktparteien wurzelte. Seiten grundsätzlich den Erfolg oder Unter dem Druck der veränderten Misserfolg des im Friedensprozess Weltlage in Folge der Terrorangriffe Diesem Umstand wurde während Erreichbaren maßen. Keine des 11. September entschloss sich die der Friedensverhandlungen und im Regierungsbeteiligung für eine Partei , IRA nach einer Aufforderung durch Belfaster Abkommen zwar durch die mit einer Privatarmee verbunden die Sinn-Fein-Führung, ihr Ab- ein zweigleisiges Vorgehen (Twin ist, so die Position der Unionisten, rüstungsangebot vom August in die Tat track) Rechnung getragen, das die keine Unterwerfung für eine unbesiegte umzusetzen und damit den drohenden politisch-konstitutionellen Aspekte Formation des Bürgerkrieges, so das Kollaps des Friedensprozesses abzu- der Übereinkunft von den militä- Credo der Republikaner. wenden. Am 23. Oktober erklärte die risch-sicherheitspolitischen trennte IRA, dass sie begonnen habe, „ihre und die Lösung der letzteren Abgesehen von einigen hoffnungsvol- Waffen verifizierbar und auf Dauer teilweise einer unabhängigen len Momenten - nach der Überprüfung unbrauchbar zu machen“. Der Schritt internationalen Abrüstungs- des Abkommens durch US-Senator der IRA wurde in der internationalen kommission (IICD) übertrug. Die George Mitchell im Herbst 1999 und Öffentlichkeit als historischer Durch- Waffenfrage sollte so zugänglicher der Kontrolle einiger IRA-Waffenlager bruch gewertet; diesmal schuf die werden („Fudging“ the arms), wurde durch unabhängige Inspekteure im offizielle Bestätigung der geheim aber de facto in die Umsetzungs- Sommer und Herbst 2000 - folgte durchgeführten Aktion durch die phase des Abkommens verlagert. Krise auf Krise. Wichtige andere Abrüstungskommission ausreichend Vorhaben, wie die verstärkte Nord- Vertrauen, um die Unionisten zur Für die Unionisten mag es rückblik- Süd-Kooperation mit der Republik Wiederaufnahme der Regierungs- kend eine fragwürdige politische Irland, eine weitere Entmilitarisierung tätigkeit in Belfast zu bewegen. Taktik gewesen sein, die Waffen- der Provinz sowie die Justizreform und problematik als Veto gegen eine die Reform der protestantisch domi- Der vorliegende BICC brief Burying the Regierungskoalition mit den nierten Polizei verzögerten sich. Hatchet—The Decommissioning of Republikanern zu handeln und Paramilitary Arms in Northern Ireland, der damit alles auf eine Karte zu setzen, Der politische Tiefpunkt war im im Rahmen eines Forschungsprojektes die sie selbst nicht spielen konnten. Sommer 2001 erreicht: Bei den Wahlen zur Bedeutung der Entmilitarisierung Für die Republikaner kam mit dem zum britischen Unterhaus und den im nordirischen Friedensprozess deutlichen Zugewinn an politischer nordirischen Kommunalgremien im entstanden ist, untersucht die Vorge- Akzeptanz und demokratischer Juni hatte Sinn Fein die gemäßigte schichte und die Faktoren, die zu der Legitimation durch die Wahlen die SDLP überrundet und war die stärkste spezifischen Blockade durch die Zeit, den Ballast der Waffen über nationalistische Partei geworden, die Waffenfrage geführt haben, die Bord zu werfen. UUP hatte größere Einbußen an die Ursachen für die Beendigung dieser Abkommensgegner in der DUP Blockade sowie die Handlungs- hinnehmen müssen. Ein Abrüstungs- strategien und Perspektiven der

6 B·I·C·C German summary

In einem ideologisierten Konflikt Decommissioning als einer Forderung, dieser Strukturen, ein Element der kommt dem Instrument der die vorrangig und als Vorbedingung Vergangenheitsbewältigung und Vertrauensbildung, der Abrüstung die IRA-Abrüstung im Visier hatte, Zukunftsgestaltung, das die Kreati- in den Köpfen, eine besondere relativiert und Elemente eines vität und Sensibilität der nordiri- Bedeutung zu. Das nordirische gegenseitig akzeptierbaren schen Politik und Zivilgesellschaft Beispiel unterstreicht die positive Sicherheitsverständnisses eingeführt. gleichermaßen fordern wird. neutralisierende Funktion interna- tionaler Vermittlung in Momenten Auch für Nordirland existiert das Es ist zu hoffen, dass die zu Jahresbe- der politischen Krise, und mehr Problem, dass nach einem vielver- ginn im britischen Unterhaus vorgeleg- noch für das sensitive Waffenthema sprechenden Abkommen historisch te Gesetzesnovelle, die eine Fristverlän- selbst: Die Kontrolle der IRA- gewachsene Gewaltstrukturen - des gerung für das Decommissioning bis zum Waffenarsenale durch zwei interna- für Nordirland typischen Sectarianism Jahr 2007 vorsieht, dazu beitragen tional und in Nordirland anerkannte - als Störfaktor fortwirken bzw. ihre wird, den größten Blockadestein der Inspekteure unter Anwendung eines Ausdrucksformen ändern und neu vergangenen Jahre in weniger ange- „Zwei-Schlüssel“–Systems markierte generieren. Die oft rückwärtsge- spannter Atmosphäre und im weiteren einen innovativen Weg in die wandte und eindimensionale Kontext des nordirischen Weges zum Abrüstung ohne größeren Gesicht- Debatte über Decommissioning ließ Frieden zu beseitigen. Optimistisch verlust. Dass der eigentliche Akt des wenig politischen Spielraum für das stimmte die staatsmännische Erklärung Unbrauchbarmachens (Put beyond parteienübergreifende Argument, von Sinn-Fein-Präsident Gerry Adams use) eines ersten Teils der IRA- dass die Abrüstung der paramilitäri- vor dem World Economic Forum in Waffen im Oktober 2001 glaubwür- schen Waffen auch ein wichtiger New York im Februar diesen Jahres: dig vermittelt werden konnte, Schritt zur Eindämmung der „Ich glaube nicht, dass wir die Unioni- obwohl die Einzelheiten der aktuellen Gewalt ist. Heute gehen sten in ein vereinigtes Irland zwingen Methode und des Umfangs der mehr als zwei Drittel aller paramili- können, das nicht ihre Zustimmung Abrüstung geheim blieben, ist tärischen Aktivitäten vom findet und ihren Vorstellungen von wesentlich der vertrauensbildenden loyalistischen Lager aus, das bisher Sicherheit entspricht.“ Rolle der unabhängigen Ab- keine Bereitschaft zur Abrüstung rüstungskommission unter Leitung signalisiert hat; antikatholische des kanadischen Ex-Generals John Aggressionsakte mischen sich mit de Chastelain zu verdanken. Alltagskriminalität wie Drogen- handel und anderen Märkten der Ein weiterer relevanter Faktor war Gewalt. Infolge des Schulkonflikts die Veränderung der Verhandlungs- in Nord-Belfast entsteht jedoch eine strategie seitens der britischen und neue Sensibilität für das Problem, irischen Regierung, die in Nordir- dass eine Friedensdividende land in einer ambivalenten Doppel- insbesondere in den depravierten rolle als Moderatoren und Konflikt- Teilen der protestantischen Arbei- parteien agieren. Parallel mit dem terviertel noch nicht erkennbar ist. Beginn der IRA-Waffen- inspektionen im Sommer 2000 Die politische Integration und wurde eine Paketlösung für die Partizipation, die das Belfaster weitere Implementierung des Abkommen für die Republikaner Abkommens vorgeschlagen, die die gebracht hat, steht für relevante Lösung des Decommissioning in den Teile der Loyalisten noch aus. Kontext der anderen sicherheits- Soziale und kulturelle Identitäten, politischen Problemkreise, vor allem die sich in Nordirland auch in der der Entmilitarisierung des überdi- Zugehörigkeit zu den traditionsrei- mensionierten staatlichen chen paramilitärischen Organisatio- Sicherheitssektors und der Polizei- nen ausdrücken, sind dabei zu reform stellte. Damit wurde der zerbrechen. Der Beginn des einer Konfliktlösung nicht zuträgli- Decommissioning könnte im weiteren che Umgang mit dem Kontext der Friedenskonsolidierung die Tür öffnen für eine längerfristige Transformation oder Konversion

B·I·C·C 7 brief 22 1 The History of the Decommissioning Debate Republican mural in West Belfast (1999). Photo: Corinna Hauswedell mural in West Republican

8 B·I·C·C part 1

B·I·C·C 9 brief 22

Of Arms and the The Irish Men: Origin government’s initial approach

and Initial Was decommissioning a reckless pre- condition jammed into the peace process by calculating hands or did it Development represent a myopic inability to focus on more important goals? Was it a very necessary basis for future negotiations of the Issue that had been well signposted in advance? Tracking the development of the issue leads to a more nuanced view than any of these positions provide. In fact, the question of disarmament grew Introduction to remain acutely attuned to these into the process at an early stage, albeit feelings. Disarmament was seen as the fitfully and from unexpected directions. he question of the disarmament of logical development of the ideas Disarmament was raised as early as Tparamilitary organisations proved a expressed by both governments—in May 1993 in a document entitled considerable block in the developing the Joint Declaration of December “Steps Envisaged,” which had been peace process in the first year following 1993—that only parties committed to sent to the Sinn Fein leader Gerry the IRA (Irish Republican Army) “exclusively peaceful means” could Adams by the then Taoiseach (Irish ceasefire of August 1994. For the fully engage in the political process. Prime Minister) Albert Reynolds. The British government and Ulster For Republicans, prior document formed part of a series of Unionists, decommissioning of decommissioning represented a belated clandestine soundings of the weaponry represented the most pre-condition introduced by the British Republican movement by the Irish concrete assurance that paramilitary to curry favour with Unionists, so that government and stated that, once organisations had turned away from they might continue to prop up a slim public confidence in any peace process violence and would henceforth pursue government majority in Westminster. It had been established, “every effort political aims democratically. Without was also seen as a psychological tactic, would be made to deal expeditiously” this assurance, all inclusive negotiations the continuation of war by other with issues such as prisoner releases involving the political representatives means, as the British were perceived to and “arms and equipment” in order of paramilitary organisations could not be sowing dissent within Nationalist that “the legacy of the past 20 years take place. For the Irish government, Ireland in an attempt to isolate Sinn and the cost could be put behind the constitutional Nationalists of the Fein. Unionist insistence on [everyone] as quickly as possible” Social Democratic Labour Party decommissioning was seen by Sinn (Mallie and McKittrick, 1996, p. 175). (SDLP) and the Republicans of Sinn Fein as nothing more than a At this stage it is unlikely that it was Fein, this assurance amounted to an ill- reactionary fear of constitutional ever intended that disarmament should judged pre-condition to all-party talks change inherent in a future settlement. serve as a pre-condition to negotiation, and a dangerous impediment in the The SDLP and Irish government were but it demonstrates that weaponry was development of a fragile peace process. more muted in their criticism: it was factored into the political equation, at Decommissioning was an issue best less a case of Albion being perfidious an early stage, by the Irish government tackled within negotiations, not an than being somewhat politically itself. entrance exam to determine suitability. illiterate about what really mattered, the need to help a changing Republican Official Irish underlining of the need It might seem that the issue was merely movement along the road to peaceful for disarmament continued around the a question of timing and choreography politics; inclusive talks would cement period of the issuing of the Joint but, in truth, it reflected deep divisions the ceasefire whilst pre-conditions Declaration in December 1993 (Joint within the two broad views. The would merely prove self defeating and Declaration, 1993). The Declaration demand for decommissioning prior to corrosive. made no specific reference to substantive talks reflected the paramilitary weaponry but it did open scepticism and suspicion Unionism felt the door to Sinn Fein’s involvement in about Republican intentions, and the the political process. Paragraph 10 British Conservative government was stated that:

10 B·I·C·C origin of the issue

“The British and Irish Governments reiterate The issue of disarmament was also demilitarisation through confidence that the achievement of peace must involve a highlighted by Paddy O’Brien, the building on all sides” (Irish Times, 9 permanent end to the use of, or support for, President of the Association of Garda December 1995). Disarmament paramilitary violence. They confirm that, in Sergeants and Inspectors, who stressed remained “essential to the creation of a these circumstances, democratically mandated that paramilitary weaponry could not totally demilitarised situation and to the parties which establish a commitment to remain “out there to be used by future consolidation of peace”, but the Irish exclusively peaceful methods and which have subversive or criminal groups” government felt that giving shown that they abide by the democratic regardless of a ceasefire (Belfast Republicans “an exam they couldn’t process, are free to participate fully in Newsletter, 30 March 1994). pass” would only lead to the isolation democratic politics and to join in dialogue in Decommissioning seemed to be of Sinn Fein from the process and the due course between the Governments and the firming up within the Irish breakdown of the ceasefire— political parties on the way ahead.” establishment as a very necessary something which did not fit the game indicator of peace months before the plan (Albert Reynolds in Dail Debates, Dick Spring, the Irish Tanaiste (Deputy IRA ceasefire was even called. Public Vol. 446, Col. 500, 25 October 1994, Prime Minister), was quick to put flesh appearances, however, may have quoted in Mallie and McKittrick, 1996, on the bones of that statement in the proved deceptive. There was a degree p. 349). Irish parliament on the very same day of nervousness too within the Irish as the Declaration was released. The government about discussion A card up the sleeve? Irish government was talking about a surrounding the handing over of The British attitude to “permanent cessation of violence” armaments and Dermot Nally, the coupled with “the handing up of Secretary to the Government, is disarmament before arms”; there was to be “no reported to have voiced his concern the ceasefire equivocation” in the two governments’ that Republicans would “walk away if opposition to any tactical ceasefire we persist with this kind of talk” As previously stated, in the wake of the (Irish Times, 16 December 1993). The (Duignan, no date, p. 136). ceasefire the British government held direct linkage between disarmament to the view that substantive and fitness to participate in the political The issue was indeed a delicate one negotiations with Sinn Fein could only process was beginning to develop. This given that the Irish government’s first occur with prior decommissioning of view was echoed by John Bruton, priority was to bait the hook weaponry. The British government was leader of the Fine Gael party and sufficiently so that the Republican to constantly reiterate that this had future Taoiseach, who stressed that any movement could be slowly reeled always been their outlook, whilst cessation must be verified by the visible towards a ceasefire. Erratic and Republicans have always insisted that it destruction of weaponry as “people premature movements, such as open was a belated pre-condition, but a who retain access to large caches of discussion of what would happen to careful tracking of public (and private) arms . . . could hardly be considered the guns, would simply scare the fish statements emanating from the British to be normal participants in political away. This was the view which government leads to a more nuanced dialogue” (ibid.). Indeed Spring, under crystallised when the IRA announced view. Sir Patrick Mayhew, the Secretary close questioning and just three its ceasefire; the question of of State for Northern Ireland, first months before the IRA ceasefire, went disarmament was to soften and be seen flagged the issue of disarmament in so far as to say that it was “not as an evolving part of the process October 1993, when he confirmed that possible” for Sinn Fein to participate in rather than a verifiable indication of any IRA cessation would need to be political dialogue without peaceful intent. Writing in late 1995, accompanied by a weapons handover demonstrated disarmament by the IRA Reynolds felt that Spring’s and stated that “nobody would be (Dail Debates, Irish parliamentary interpretation of disarmament was impressed unless there was some debates, Vol. 443, Col. 1023, 1 June “too hardline and sweeping to be practical action taken to demonstrate 1994). sustained” and he declared that by that violence was over” (Irish Times, 11 January 1994 he had come to the October 1993). conclusion that it was “impracticable and unattainable to seek an ‘advance’ There is no doubt that Sinn Fein were gesture” on disarmament. A fully aware of the flagging of this issue disarmament pre-condition would “tip by Mayhew and the wider British the delicate balance of the debate in government, even after the publication the IRA against a ceasefire”; what was of the Joint Declaration which made achievable was the inclusion of the no explicit reference to disarmament. question within an evolving process Gerry Adams voiced his concerns providing for “a mutual process of forthrightly, in January 1994:

B·I·C·C 11 brief 22

Figure 1: Electoral support for Northern Irish political parties, 1996–2001 In percent

Source: Nicholas Whyte, 2001. ”Northern Ireland Elections: 7 June 2001.” 13 June 2001. Available via www.explorers.whyte.com.

Note: In the 1998 Referendum on the Belfast Agreement, 71.1 percent of the population voted in favour in Northern Ireland. In the Republic of Ireland the figure was 94.4 percent.

Northern Westminster Local Northern European Westminster Local Ireland General Government Ireland Parliament General Government Forum Election Elections Assembly Election Election Elections Election Election

1996 1997 1997 1998 1999 2001 2001

UUP 24.2 32.7 27.9 21.3 17.6 26.8 22.9

SDLP 21.4 24.1 20.6 22.0 28.1 21.0 19.4

DUP 18.8 13.6 15.6 18.0 28.4 22.5 21.4

SF 15.5 16.1 16.9 17.7 17.3 21.7 20.7

ALL 6.5 8.0 6.6 6.5 2.1 3.6 5.1

UKUP 3.7 1.6 0.5 4.5 3.0 1.7 0.6

PUP 3.5 1.4 2.2 2.6 3.3 0.6 1.6

UDP 2.2 - 1.0 1.1 - - -

Indepen- dents - - 3.8 - - - 6.6

Others 4.3 2.5 5.4 6.3 0.2 2.1 1.7

ALL Alliance DUP Democratic Unionist Party PUP Progressive Unionist Party SDLP Social Democratic Labour Party SF Sinn Fein UDP Ulster Democratic Party UKUP United Kingdom Unionist Party UUP Ulster Unionist Party

12 B·I·C·C origin of the issue

“Mr. Mayhew goes on to say ‘. . . the Decommissioning had thus ceased to “. . . total demilitarisation. We want to see exploratory dialogue will be so we can discuss be flagged as an indicator of peaceful all the forces in the conflict setting aside their with Sinn Fein how the IRA will hand over intent, but the door had been left open weapons—right now, today. What we’re their weapons’. So I say to myself: ‘This is to its inclusion within exploratory involved in is an initiative which will hopefully what they want. They want the IRA to stop dialogue. This clarification by the lead to a process. As that develops the various so that Sinn Fein can have the privilege 12 British hardened and elongated the armed forces—crown forces, loyalist, weeks later, having been properly sanitised provisions in paragraph 10 of the Joint republican—will see fit, at a time of their and come out of quarantine, to have Declaration to a degree, but the Irish own choosing to demilitarise” (Belfast discussions with senior civil servants of how government, for its part, expressed its Telegraph, 22 October 1993). the IRA can hand over their weapons’. And satisfaction with the British response to then I hear that reiterated again and again; by Sinn Fein (Bew and Gillespie, 1996, p. In the days following the ceasefire, Douglas Hurd, by John Major, by Patrick 53). The British government appears Adams again reiterated the belief that Mayhew” (Irish News, 8 January 1994). then to have been speaking in different “there must be a process of tones on different occasions regarding demilitarisation” and that the task However, even setting aside the fact the matter of decommissioning. In the before the actors was to “create a that there had been no explicit period around the issuing of the Joint climate so that all engaged in armed reference to disarmament within the Declaration, the necessity of action” would be “demilitarised” (Irish Joint Declaration, the picture is disarmament was publicly voiced, but Times, 2 September 1994), but he did complicated by the absence of any in private communications with Sinn not see the issue of the handing over mention of disarmament in the secret Fein, omitted. The picture is of IRA weapons as a “stumbling block communications between the British complicated further by the fact that the on the way to peace” and pointed to and Sinn Fein during 1993. The British British government and Sinn Fein the fact that most of the guns in the view was that disarmament was implicit published differing accounts of these conflict lay in the hands of the British in the secret communication of 5 contacts. Five months after the Army. Martin McGuinness, who was to November 1993 in which it was stated Declaration was unveiled, the British become Sinn Fein’s leading negotiator that both sides would “examine the publicly clarified their understanding in the peace process, expressed practical consequences of the ending of its provisions, again omitting an optimism that “a total demilitarisation” of violence” during exploratory explicit reference to disarmament but could be brought about quickly (Irish dialogue. For the British, this meant skilfully leaving the way open to its Times, 3 September 1994). implementing measures to normalise introduction. It was a card placed up security with the quid pro quo that the sleeve, but one that Republicans Aside from public pronouncements, Republicans would move on knew they possessed. Sinn Fein are reported to have given decommissioning (Irish Times, 15 July tacit assurances to the Irish 1995). The clarification of the Joint The initial government that the issue of weaponry Declaration made by the British at Sinn Republican response would have to be dealt with and that Fein’s request in May 1994, reiterated paramilitary guns would have to be this need to examine the “practical “banjaxed” [destroyed] (Duignan, no Irish Republicans, of course, regarded consequences” of any ceasefire in date, p. 151). As Albert Reynolds was any suggestion that disarmament might exploratory dialogue but again made to recollect in his dealings with be a necessary test of democratic no specific reference to disarmament. Republicans at that time, he was fitness as anathema. This did not mean Although of necessity vague, it did assured that in return for not pressing throw into partial relief the that they were altogether shy in the matter or prior disarmament, discussing the matter in the pre- and choreography which Britain wished to decommissioning “implicitly going immediately post-ceasefire period. see in the developing process. A beyond the approach of the ‘pike in However, in their view it was best seen “public and permanent” renunciation the thatch’ would be dealt with during in a much wider context, one of of violence, followed by a the process of reaching a negotiated “demilitarisation” and a matter that decontamination period of three settlement” (Irish Times, 9 December months was necessary before entry would be resolved as a part of the 1995). process rather than a condition of into exploratory dialogue could take entry to it. As Adams made clear in the place. These preliminary negotiations Disarmament was clearly a matter that months before the Declaration, he would simply be a means to exploring Republicans realised they would have wanted a process to develop that would the “basis upon which Sinn Fein would to face up to at some stage in the “see an end to the IRA”, indeed for come to be admitted to an inclusive process, but not one which they political talks process” (Irish Times, 20 some time Sinn Fein’s policy had been believed should be used as a tollbooth May 1994). supervising entry to political talks.

B·I·C·C 13 brief 22

They had been reassured of this by the propaganda” designed to “blackmail” political commodity. Even the Ulster Irish government, and although they the British government (Belfast Unionist grandee, John Taylor, whose were aware that Britain had raised the Newsletter, 1 September 1994). Ian “gut instinct” was that the ceasefire matter of prior decommissioning Paisley, the leader of the DUP, pictured was “for real” advised only cautious publicly, there seemed to be a tendency the IRA as “dancing on the graves of progression while the IRA continued within the Republican movement to Ulster’s dead” whilst James Molyneaux, to “retain their means of destruction view these public statements as mere the Ulster Unionist leader, could only and killing” (Belfast Newsletter, 10 posturing (Patterson, 1997, p. 264). muster the anodyne hope that September 1994). In essence, Ulster “everyone [would] be pleased” if the Unionist thinking was typified by Unionist scepticism IRA cessation was permanent. David Trimble, who asserted that the “dismantling of the IRA military Unionists, who were to view In fact, the taciturn Molyneaux was machine” was even more important disarmament as a most necessary test masking a deep sense of shock and than an absence of violence: of paramilitary commitment to confusion which echoed throughout peaceful means, proved to be reticent Unionist political thinking. Writing “One has not established a commitment to to discuss arms decommissioning in some years later, Molyneaux expressed exclusively peaceful methods if one maintains the period before the ceasefire. As one the belief that the IRA cessation a secret army. Soon the IRA arsenal must be commentator has asserted, “started destabilising the whole effectively disposed of or surrendered. . . . disarmament was raised on only a population in Northern Ireland. It was The best way of proving that there is a handful of occasions by Unionist not an occasion for celebration, quite permanent cessation is to give these [weapons] politicians in the six months before the the opposite” (quoted in the Independ- up. Until that happens, no one can honestly IRA cessation (Mac Ginty, 1998, p. 29). ent, 10 July 1999). As journalist (and say they are confident that there has been a This probably reflected Unionist former Ulster Unionist insider) Frank permanent cessation” (Belfast Telegraph, 9 scepticism that a genuine, prolonged Millar observed, Molyneaux’s grand September 1994). ceasefire was ever likely; the matter political plan had been to “reverse the existed on a hypothetical plane and had assumptions underlying Anglo-Irish The DUP went further and declaimed not bedded down as a political impera- policy as it had developed over the that they would “not negotiate with the tive. The announcement of the preceding twenty years. It foundered IRA, with its guns or without them. ceasefire was to catapult the issue on the rock of peace” (Irish Times, 29 . . . Sinn Fein’s legitimacy as a political firmly into the Unionist consciousness. August 1995). Rather than seeing any party would not be achieved simply by Indeed in the week before it came into sort of decoupling of Irish the hand over of the IRA’s weaponry. effect—a period of intense media government involvement in the The IRA must disband and be no speculation about the prospects of political process, Unionists now longer in existence” (Irish Times, 27 peace—Reg Empey, a senior figure in perceived the building of a pan- November 1995). In fact, the DUP had the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) Nationalist consensus. For all the talk “nothing to talk to them about. . . . asserted that only a handover of of commitment to exclusively peaceful There is no common ground with weapons would convince Unionists of means, Unionism was less than happy them, so even if we were inclined to sit Republican bona fides. Anything less that Sinn Fein’s Mitchell McLaughlin with them it would be a fruitless would be “useless” (Belfast Newsletter, 23 was now calling for the withdrawal of exercise” (Irish Times, 17 July 1995). August 1994). “psychological, political and military support” from Unionists (Belfast For the Ulster Unionists, arms then A need for substance? Newsletter, 1 September 1994); talks remained the political mantra, but Unionists could also readily recollect a several different stratagems were to be Unionism and the statement by Martin McGuinness at grafted onto this central tenet over the demand for the beginning of the year that coming year. One UUP policy paper decommissioning “anything short of a withdrawal from sent to the British government in Northern Ireland” was “unacceptable” January 1995, proposed the setting up Unionist reaction to the IRA ceasefire and his assertion that a three-month of an international commission to deal was not one of celebration, instead the ceasefire would be “particularly long” with the decommissioning of mood was one of profound mistrust. (Sunday Business Post, 2 January 1994). paramilitary arms. This idea was According to one Ulster Unionist MP eventually taken up and evolved into it would be “extremely foolish” to take It was becoming clear that a rudderless the Mitchell Commission, but, at the the ceasefire at face value; the hardline Unionism needed to at least increase its time it was presented, it was seen less Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) saw ballast in the uncharted waters of the as a means around the it as merely a “cynical piece of peace cessation for fear of being swamped. The dead weight of decommissioned weaponry would prove a valuable

14 B·I·C·C origin of the issue

decommissioning impasse, than as a decommission unilaterally and so Unionists’ benefit; the process could be spotlight which would illuminate “deprive the IRA of any possible moved forward “not through the large Republican intransigence. The paper scintilla of justification for holding on scale media circus of all party talks, but commented that “being seen to be to their weapons” (Irish Times, 4 slowly and quietly one confidence unwilling to co-operate with US and December 1995). building step at a time. Through the other international commissioners will open and transparent forum of an portray the IRA as it really is” (Irish One aspect of the decommissioning assembly, the traditional fear of a back Times, 7 March 1995). question, which perturbed Unionists, door sell out could be allayed” (Irish was the fact that key discussions were Times, 2 October 1995). It was not a Unionism often viewed the matter of taking place above their heads, which proposal which inspired Nationalist or disarmament in terms of confrontation magnified their mistrust. In the Republican confidence. Even the and pressure to be applied to Unionist view, Sinn Fein wished only to Unionist-inspired notion of a Republicans; in David Trimble’s view engage with the British government commission to examine the issue was “concessions would merely be and hoped that whatever deal could be now seen by them to be “lacking pocketed as the IRA proceeded, struck could be foisted on Unionism. credibility” and to be merely a through violence or the threat of The Irish government was perceived as mechanism by which the governments violence, to demand greater wobbly on the question of guns and could push “on to the back burner the concessions” (Irish Times, 2 October “unsure about the solidity of its crucial issue on which they have 1995). Confrontational politics was not bottom line” in dealings with disagreed, in other words when illegal the sole response of the UUP to the Republicans (Irish Times, 2 October weapons will be decommissioned”. question, however. John Taylor stated 1995). (Irish Times, 18 October 1995, 29 that just as the IRA had accepted that October 1995). What mattered was the they could not win, “Ulster Unionists A new Unionist stratagem duly slowing down of the political pace and must accept that the IRA was not emerged in the shape of an elected the transferral of the main stage to beaten” and that consequently assembly, the purpose of which would more familiar local ground. movement would be required from be to discuss future constitutional both sides (Irish Times, 2 October proposals and help take the peace Testing times: The 1995). process forward. Unionists could sit in British insistence on such an assembly with Republicans and The Loyalist ceasefire, initiated in be obliged to respect their new, post decommissioning October of 1994 also provided ceasefire mandate, although formal Unionism with a new means of interparty talks would still be The British government shared the approaching the issue. The leading dependent on disarmament. The gradualist outlook of Unionism. This Unionist Chris McGimpsey suggested benefits to Unionism would be may be explained by several factors. that Republicans emulate the “no first obvious. The process would shift from Firstly, there is some evidence that the strike” clause appended to the Loyalist the unstable high wire of government was initially caught on the ceasefire in August 1995 as a way of intergovernmental diplomacy to the hop by the extent of the IRA ceasefire; moving the process forward (Irish familiar ground of a local forum, a intelligence information expected only Times, 9 November 1995). Trimble, forum in which Unionists would form a conditional truce or time-limited however, took a somewhat different the largest bloc and—they assumed— ceasefire and not the “complete tack and sought to apply greater be able to control the pace of events. It cessation of military activities” that leverage against Republicans by was a means of sidelining the question was proffered. The feeling was one of publicly calling on Loyalists to of decommissioning—but to the suspicion rather than optimism; this was clearly a gift horse that required a thorough dental examination (Mallie and McKittrick, 1996, p. 329). Secondly, although secret channels of communication had been maintained with Republicans over a number of years, Sinn Fein still remained something of an unknown quantity to the British, particularly in terms of dialogue that would be carried out in the full glare of the media spotlight. As Michael Ancram, the Northern Ireland Office minister stated, dialogue between Sinn Fein and the government Republican graffiti on the Pantridge Road, Belfast (February 2002). Photo: Jonathan McCormick

B·I·C·C 15 brief 22

was bound to have a “distinctive the government. Eventually the British ears (Irish Times, 22 September 1995). character” all its own, something which made a “working assumption” that the Even the question of exploratory was “inevitable” given their sharply IRA ceasefire was a permanent one bilateral negotiations between Sinn antagonistic history. Since there was no (Bew and Gillespie, 1996, p. 74), but Fein and the British government was “shared history of debate and the political cost was to be the dogged by the decommissioning issue, negotiation”, dialogue would be a underlining of the decommissioning as the British insisted on the primacy difficult road to traverse and would issue as a priority. of disarmament in any discussions, require a period of tentative whilst Sinn Fein wanted a wide-ranging exploration (Irish Times, 10 May 1995). The ‘Washington 3’ exchange of views. Eventually a Finally, and most importantly, there Test compromise was reached in the form was the need to keep Unionism on of a semantic fudge, which allowed board. This may have encompassed a Britain to raise decommissioning as the The demand for decommissioning had degree of self-preservation on the part first and separate topic of discussion, become most explicit in March 1995 in of the Conservative British after which Sinn Fein could refer to the form of the Washington Test government, as their parliamentary any subject they wished (Irish Times, 25 criteria, announced by Mayhew during majority was slim and slipping away April 1995). a trip to America. This called for a and Ulster Unionist votes would provide a necessary support. However, “willingness in principle to disarm progressively”, a practical The search for a it was essentially a matter of keeping understanding of the modalities of British-Irish Unionists within the process by decommissioning, and the actual mirroring many of their concerns. If consensus decommissioning of some arms as “a the peace process was to be kept alive, tangible confidence building measure it would certainly need Ulster While this sort of semantic wrangling Unionists within it, and as Mayhew and to signal the start of a process” allowed progress to occur in (Irish Times, 8 March 1995). The overt stated, he was not about to call for exploratory dialogue, it seemed that packaging of the decommissioning round table political talks if it meant there could be no getting round the demand in this way made the there would be “a large number of blunt terminology of Washington 3. government’s position easier to defend empty chairs” (Irish Times, 5 September The British view was that Sinn Fein’s (Mac Ginty, 1998, p. 34) and 1995). disqualification from substantive talks impossible to ignore. Whilst was “self imposed” and there was no Nationalists and Republicans viewed There are certainly indications that enthusiasm for finding a means to help the third part of the test, ‘Washington intelligence filtering up to the British Republicans negotiate their way round 3’, as a unilateral pre-condition, for government stressed that the obstacle of prior decommissioning. Unionists it represented a capitulation decommissioning was unlikely to since it necessitated the happen and was relatively unimportant The idea that the question of in terms of gauging Republicans’ decommissioning of only some decommissioning could be separated weaponry prior to talks. The British commitment to peace in any case from substantive talks was seen as a too viewed it as a “concession, a (Mallie and McKittrick, 1996, pp. 350– dangerous chimera: there was “no twin weakening of the government’s 351). This implies that a hard line on track process. There [was] only a single position” (Sunday Tribune, 10 Septem- disarmament was not an intrinsic track. Some parties are further down ber 1995), albeit a necessary one. imperative within the higher elements that track than others because they of government and the security have never been associated with The issue was now impossible to apparatus. British policy was essentially violence. Those that have been evade, given the emphatic trumpeting related to maintaining a Unionist associated with violence can catch of the Washington criteria, but the interest in the process by pressuring them up if they take off the brakes dilemma now facing the government Republicans on the question of that they themselves have applied” was that Republicans were failing to disarmament. For the British (Irish Times, 21 June 1995). In this view, government, the process remained bite at this concessionary hook; instead decommissioning was to be the direct the British themselves became impaled. brittle while the question of weaponry evolutionary leap into political Dislodging Washington 3 from their remained an unsolved part of the respectability; a more circuitous route, political skin would simply result in peace equation. This fragility had been even if it could be started speedily, further Unionist disenchantment and exacerbated in British eyes by the would simply not do. accusations of governmental weakness. inability of the Republican movement to categorise their ceasefire as perma- However, the British government was Similarly, assurances from the British nent, despite repeated public calls from not operating in a political vacuum and Prime Minister that the advancement had to take serious heed of its partner to inclusive political negotiations would “accelerate beyond belief ” following a symbolic decommissioning fell on deaf

16 B·I·C·C origin of the issue

in the process, the Irish government. effective way of baiting the hook, invited on equal basis; and the setting An underlying necessity within the particularly given that the British up of an international body to conduct process dictated that the two government reserved its right to an “independent assessment” of the governments must be seen to be publicly proclaim that prior decommissioning issue. The body’s moving together in the same direction decommissioning was still a necessary purely advisory brief would include as much as possible. Any diplomatic test for Republicans. Peace processes establishing the commitment of impasse in British–Irish relations thrive on semantic fudges, but not paramilitary groups to the principle of filtered down into the Northern Irish when they are accompanied by blunt decommissioning and working out “a parties and made progress especially restatements of what was meant to suitable and acceptable method for full difficult. An Irish resuscitation of the have been fudged. and verifiable decommissioning” (Irish earlier Unionist idea of establishing an Times, 29 November 1995). The international body to examine the The British–Irish summit meeting in International Body comprised former question of decommissioning was September, at which a joint agreement US Senator George Mitchell as consequently accepted by the British at on an international commission to deal chairman, the former Prime Minister the end of June in 1995. with decommissioning would have of Finland, Harri Holkeri, and the been announced, was cancelled at the former Canadian Chief of the Defence Although Britain may have harboured last minute by the Irish government Staff General John de Chastelain. suspicions that an attempt was being after officials ultimately failed to Although a target date for substantive made to side-step the issue by pushing overcome outstanding differences. If talks had been announced in this it down a separate track, this was less the British felt that they could not package—something which was important than being seen to be explicitly retreat from the demand for designed to ameliorate Nationalist and moving jointly with the Irish prior decommissioning for fear of a Republican anxiety—the crucial test of government away from an extended Unionist evacuation from the process, Washington 3 remained unaffected by impasse (Finlay, 1998, p. 289). An the Irish had become aware that the initiative. As John Major said: “We “almost wholly agreed” deal between Republican anxiety about the planned haven’t changed our position on the British and Irish governments on fudge, and Irish compliance in it, could Washington 3. We won’t be asking the the remit of an international body and actually jeopardise the ceasefire itself. international body to question that its connection to the Washington 3 The shepherds could move no faster position” (ibid.). Test, began to emerge in the autumn than their respective flocks. However, of 1995 (Irish Times, 6 September both governments’ need to maintain a The Communiqué was something of a 1995). progressive working relationship and fudge, in that both governments had their desire to court American trumpeted what had never been in Decommissioning influence in the process, pushed dispute between either of them, and goes international discussions on the establishment of an had agreed to disagree on the rest. international decommissioning body Such was the nature of the process that forward. it was important to be seen to be A commission, to be chaired by the moving ahead together, even if activity former US Senate leader George was designed as much to distract Mitchell would be established to deal The idea of a twin attention from obstacles as find a way with paramilitary decommissioning but track approach round them. its remit would be confined to soliciting willingness in principle to A Joint Communiqué issued a scant decommission and examining the two days before President Clinton’s British strategy: necessary practicalities of carrying that visit to Northern Ireland on 30 Picadorism or the out—in other words Washington 1 and November 1995 formally launched the creation of room to 2. A fudge on Washington 3 was to be beginning of a twin track process. The manoeuvre? agreed in that, although bilaterals and main ingredients of the initiative trilaterals between the governments included the “firm aim” of both and Sinn Fein could take place, all- governments to achieve all-party talks Republican opponents of the British strategy on decommissioning felt that party substantive negotiations would by the end of February 1996; the the British had either “no strategy” and only take place when the “appropriate opening of “intensive preparatory were simply operating under “short conditions” had been met. However, talks” in which all parties would be term” considerations (An Phoblacht, 31 replacing the blunt criterion of August 1995) or were using the issue as Washington 3 with a vague reference to “appropriate conditions” was not an a form of psychological warfare to sow confusion within the Republican base (Irish Times, 21 April 1995). Even

B·I·C·C 17 brief 22

Michael Oatley, a former controller political space might be opened up for they put on the process” (Mallie and within the British Secret Intelligence movement between the parties. McKittrick, 1997, pp. 366–367). Service who had served as a back door channel to Sinn Fein, felt that the There is some evidence that the British The view of the Fianna Fail-led Major government was engaging in envisaged that it would take two years government, which collapsed at the “picadorism at its most provocative” in to bring all concerned to inclusive, end of 1994, had certainly been that, using decommissioning as a barb with substantive talks with the interim although decommissioning was which to antagonise Republicanism occupied by the downsizing of security important, it would be “wrong to ask (Sunday Times, 31 October 1999). and “getting Sinn Fein up to scratch” the IRA to surrender its weapons However, these analyses do not (Mallie and McKittrick, 1996, p. 338). before talks” and that Sinn Fein were examine British strategy deeply This timescale was not one widely right to view the question of arms in enough. The British government was shared by other participants in the terms of “total demilitarisation” (Irish fully aware that there was a need not to peace process, particularly the Irish Times, 13 December 1994). However, antagonise the Republican base, as government. the incoming Fine Gael-led Mayhew stated: government, with John Bruton as Softly, softly . . . The Taoiseach, exhibited a more nuanced “To some extent we have got to help Mr Irish government’s view of the decommissioning question. Adams carry with him the people who are This is hardly surprising given that Fine reluctant to see a ceasefire, who believe they approach Gael had always been associated with a might be betrayed by the British government. virulent anti-Republican stance and If the hard men say, ‘What did Gerry A year into the ceasefire, and six were disinclined to automatically Adams do, we have called a ceasefire but got months after the introduction of the project Sinn Fein concerns. Initially, nothing sufficient in return?’ Then Mr Washington 3 test, it was becoming Bruton had stressed the axiomatic line Adams will take a long walk on a short apparent that London and Dublin were that decommissioning was not the only plank and be replaced by someone much separated on the question of item on the agenda and that it harder” (Observer, 8 January 1995). decommissioning by a wide cultural, “shouldn’t be a blocking item for psychological and political gap. A dealing with others” (Irish Times, 14 Of course, reconciling this observation general consensus within Nationalist January 1995). But by March 1995, with the need to keep Unionists within Ireland was that the British were not after Britain had formally announced the process meant squaring the sufficiently attuned to the complexities the Washington Test, he was putting proverbial circle. In essence, of the Irish situation or the particular subtle pressure on the Republican decommissioning was a confidence- psychology of the Republican movement to fully address the matter. building issue and, from early 1995, movement (Irish Times, 7 September Bruton stressed that decommissioning Unionist confidence in the process, 1995). This was clearly understood by could not be left to the end of the and in Britain, was sorely lacking. officials within the Irish government agenda and that it was up to Sinn Fein itself who felt a keen sense of to “go beyond mere general statements In February the British and Irish exasperation at the perceived ham- of their willingness to talk about arms governments had launched the fistedness of the British government. some time and to come up with Framework document, a broad outline As one anonymous official stated: concrete proposals”; such a “gesture” of how they expected a constitutional could not be delayed (Irish Times, 14 settlement might look. The perceived “We were practically on our knees to the March 1995). nationalist agenda within the document British asking them to, for God’s sake, watch sent Unionism into apoplexy, a fact the psychology of it. The psychology was very The Taoiseach also called directly on which initially encouraged Sinn Fein simple on their side: the IRA were in the box Gerry Adams to use his “tremendous (Bew and Gillespie, 1996, pp. 86–89). and the British pronounced confidently they influence” to get the IRA to move on In large measure British determination could never go back to violence again— the question of arms, although he to stick with the Washington 3 test, problem solved. We kept telling them that it underlined the fact that Republicans announced two weeks after the release wasn’t going to be like that, that there was a must take the decision “in their own of the Framework document, can be psychological dimension and they were getting time, in their own way and with their seen as a means of redressing the it wrong, one thing after another. We were own modalities” (Irish Times, 18 March balance. Also, British strategy was not dealing with people who genuinely were a bit 1995). Subtle pressing of the need to working to a speedy timetable; in fact it illiterate in terms of the currency of politics in decommission was applied from seems clear that time itself was Ireland. They were very reckless in the weight different angles by the Irish regarded as an ally in the process. The government; Bruton called on Loyalists more prolonged the negotiation in a to take a “more advanced position” on period of comparative peace, the more

18 B·I·C·C origin of the issue

decommissioning in the hope that operation”. In the Irish view, the body The government’s difficulties were Republicans might follow suit (Irish represented the best hope of easing exacerbated by vocal pressure from Times, 23 March 1995) and felt that the pressure and slowly drawing into Bertie Ahern, the Fianna Fail leader. paramilitaries and their political negotiation all the interested parties; Ahern called on the Irish government representatives should make their own their view of British intent was less to “shame the British government proposals to break the impasse “rather benevolent, as they felt that British before the world” over its “absurd and than saying it is a matter for the strategy was short-sighted and its indefensible” insistence on prior governments to come up with a tactics reflexively Machiavellian. Britain decommissioning (Irish Times, 28 solution” (Irish Times, 21 September could not be allowed to use the body as November 1995) and accused the 1995). It would be erroneous to a lever on Sinn Fein or a means of British of “trying to divide the presume however that the Irish clouding the issue; rather the conflict- nationalist consensus, which brought government were taking a one-sided resolution model epitomised by the about and has sustained the ceasefire” approach in this phase of the process, Irish approach had to be vigorously (Irish Times, 7 September 1995). as they sought to balance criticism of defended (Finlay, 1998, pp. 291–293). Criticism of this calibre, which Republican indolence on the question As Spring underlined, the insistence on resembled much of the thinking of of arms by stressing that Republicans prior decommissioning “ignores the Sinn Fein and came from the largest were “earnest in their commitment to psychology and motivation of those on party in the Irish Republic, was hard to the democratic process” (Irish Times, 29 both sides in Ireland who have ignore. The Taoiseach’s own view was August 1995) and that doubts about resorted to violence, and the lessons of that “going on the warpath” was a Sinn Fein’s intentions were conflict resolution everywhere”; the counterproductive strategy within “unjustified” (Irish Times, 15 July 1995). key to success lay in “a respected and British–Irish relations (Irish Times, 15 objective outside agency” which could July 1995). Furthermore, the Irish were all too “authoritatively and credibly” aware that time was not on the side of underscore confidence-building The Irish government’s ‘trimming’ and peace and that elements within assurances (Irish Times, 28 September positive faith in an international body Republicanism were pushing for a 1995). as a means of softening positions was harder political line, one which might based on Bruton’s analysis that the result in the resumption of violence if The Fine Gael-led government was present period of the peace process, the impasse continued. As Fergus obviously obliged to weave a the movement towards inclusive talks Finlay, political adviser to the Irish meandering course, sometimes overshadowed by Washington 3, was Tanaiste Dick Spring, observed in a pressuring Republicans on “inherently more difficult than the government memorandum, there was disarmament, sometimes responding earlier phase because it [required] an “identity of interest” between the decisively to their anxieties, as was the simultaneous movement by a wider Irish government and Gerry Adams, case when Bruton cancelled the range of parties than were needed to “unpalatable” as that might be. Adams summit of September 1995. Indeed, at make a move at the earlier stage” thus a and the political leadership of Sinn times, this meandering transformed considerable amount of brokerage was Fein were seen as the most progressive into a sharp veering, for amidst the necessary to get the right conditions. elements within Republicanism and wreckage of the planned summit the “If moves are made by one side, and had to be protected from the more Taoiseach insisted that then not reciprocated, the process hawkish backwoods element within the decommissioning was an “urgent could actually go backward. It will not IRA. The government’s “first priority” priority” and sent a coded signal that stand still” (Irish Times, 8 September had to be movement towards all-party the two governments could do a deal 1995). inclusive talks as this was the only way on the matter without ensuring Adams “could win through”. Republicans were on board (Irish Times, No surrender: 8 September 1995). This ‘trimming’ Republican resistance The proposed body on policy by the Irish government was decommissioning was seen by the Irish difficult to maintain, particularly as to decommissioning as a means of softening the doubts were emerging within “irreconcilable” positions of both the Republicanism about the deleterious For Republicans, decommissioning was British and Sinn Fein, by helping them effect it was having on the hidden not simply a strategic difficulty within to deal with the matter “in ways that bedrock of their ceasefire strategy— the peace process but also an historical remove it as a precondition, after a the maintenance of pan-Nationalist impossibility. The Republican view was period of time and voluntary co- consensus (Sunday Tribune, 10 Septem- that there was no precedent in Irish ber 1995). history for disarmament by insurgents either voluntarily or under pressure, a view which existed alongside the

B·I·C·C 19 brief 22

concerns needed to be addressed via prior decommissioning, and viewed the British position as actually encouraging Unionist intransigence. Sinn Fein speculated that the decommissioning pre-condition represented the victory of the more obscurantist and confrontational elements within the British establishment, in which the most reactionary tendency was the “spook constituency” (Mallie and McKittrick, 1996, p. 353), and Republicans were concerned that “military strategists” had now gained control of the agenda (Irish Times, 2 October 1995). Since the Republican analysis of decommissioning was simply that it represented covert, tactical warfare, they were determined that they should put up the most resilient defence possible. Republican graffiti in Andersontown Road, Belfast (1999). Photo: Jonathan McCormick Republican responses of various kinds concern that any handover of arms British could drive a wedge between Republicans formulated various would be seen as an acknowledgement the various components of the responses to the question of of the IRA’s own “inferiority and Nationalist consensus and once again disarmament. One of their most illegitimacy” (Schulze and Smith, 1999, dictate policy on Northern Ireland insistent was that Sinn Fein was itself pp. 21–22). More specifically, Sinn Fein (Irish Times, 7 September 1995). an unarmed organisation “neither a saw even the very introduction of the conduit nor a proxy for the IRA” decommissioning question in a This struck a particularly raw nerve, (Guardian, 16 December 1995) and that particularly hostile light. On one level, given that the IRA ceasefire had been it was unfair “that [its] commitment to it was simply a propagandist ploy by predicated on the creation and real peace [had] to undergo some type the British government to “humiliate” maintenance of a strong consensus of test” (Irish Times, 14 August 1995). the IRA (Irish Times, 21 June 1995), on between the Irish government, the Another Sinn Fein response was to another, the pre-condition of constitutional Nationalists of the stress that disarmament was a decommissioning was simply “the Social Democratic and Labour Party, “necessary and achievable objective”, ambush up the road”, an attempt to and Sinn Fein (Mallie and McKittrick, indeed after a settlement the disposal protract the process of 1996, p. 381–383). of weapons would be a “simple ‘decontamination’ of Sinn Fein by a matter”, but one that it would be government for whom “negotiation is Another component of the Republican “unrealistic” to deal with outside of war by another means” (Mallie and analysis asserted that decommissioning inclusive negotiations (Irish Times, 30 McKittrick, 1996, p. 353). was simply “the latest in a series of September 1995, 7 March 1995, 13 technical barriers which the British March 1995). Yet another tactic In Adams’ view, the British were [had] created to slow or stall the involved expanding the issue to include misusing the peace process “to pursue momentum of peace” (Irish Times, 14 opponents and underlining the fact the an IRA surrender—the real purpose of July 1995). By this reckoning, the IRA were not the only armed the decommissioning demand and British had developed a strategy organisation in the conflict; what was something which the British failed to extending the period of hiatus needed was a process of achieve in 25 years of war” (Irish Times, indefinitely as a means of sapping the demilitarisation taking into account the 14 July 1995). Another part of the political will of Republicanism. security forces, all paramilitary groups, Republican analysis asserted that the Republicans had little understanding of and the thousands of legally held wrangling over decommissioning British insistence that Unionist firearms in Northern Ireland which simply represented “a smokescreen of were mostly in Unionist hands (Irish confusion” under cover of which the

20 B·I·C·C origin of the issue

Times, 13 March 1995, 18 March 1995). front or back door” (Irish Times, 8 [would] be no first strike” (Bew and Other responses included calling on December 1995). Gillespie, 1996, pp. 72–73, 114). the Irish government to “face up to” the British on the issue (Irish Times, 28 This reflected a rapidly growing unease These moves served to deflect criticism August 1995), appealing to the interna- within the Republican rank and file, and inspire a good degree of tional community to pressurise Britain that the peace process was a “sham” confidence in their ceasefire, despite and kick start the process (Irish Times, 2 and going nowhere (Irish Times, 29 the fact that they had killed more October 1995), calling for widespread August 1995, 28 September 1995). All people than Republican groups in the street protests (Irish Times, 17 April through the ceasefire, the IRA had years 1993 and 1994. Loyalists were 1995), writing off the present British maintained its organisational integrity self-consciously portraying themselves government and waiting for a Labour and underlined the fact that it had not as a strategically reactive force that administration (Irish Times, 26 July left the ‘battlefield’ by conducting would only be activated if Republicans 1995), and hinting that calls for ‘punishment’ attacks against alleged returned to war or if there was a sell decommissioning were jeopardising the criminal elements; in fact the number out by the British government. Given ceasefire (Irish Times, 17 April 1995). of ‘punishment’ attacks by Republicans that the upbeat prognosis of Loyalist had doubled in the fourteen months groups was that the union was safe, Republicans also mirrored the British after the ceasefire (Irish Times, 7 this meant that their ceasefire would tactic of stressing the immutability of December 1995). Such displays of last as long as the IRA wanted it to. their position on decommissioning. enduring militancy were no longer Another Loyalist response to the Sinn Fein stated that the sufficient in themselves in a period of demand for decommissioning was to decommissioning question was decaying Republican confidence, and simply point the finger at the IRA and “pointless” and that they had “no between April 1995 and January 1996, state that it was “inconceivable” for room to manoeuvre” on the issue; six alleged drug dealers were killed by Loyalists to decommission whilst there moreover, as Martin McGuinness the IRA. These actions, it is suggested, existed a “fully operational, heavily claimed, even if the IRA surrendered resulted from a changing balance of armed Republican war machine intact only a tiny percentage of its weaponry, forces within Republicanism (Bew and and refusing to relinquish their “Believe me when I tell you the Gillespie, 1996, pp. 145–146), one arsenals” (Belfast Telegraph, 25 August communities where we come from which had never been entirely sold on 1995); thus there could be “no would see the IRA as a laughing stock” the peace, and which was particularly movement until Republicans address (Irish Times, 17 October 1995, 5 incensed by the ever-present question the fears which exist within [the September 1995; Sunday Independent, 10 of decommissioning. Loyalist] community” (Belfast Telegraph, September 1995). The IRA was even 3 November 1995). more succinct: “The new and On the spotlight’s unreasonable demand for a hand over edge: Ulster Loyalism In one analysis, Loyalists felt less of IRA weapons” was “ludicrous” pressured on matters like (Irish Times, 30 September 1995). and decommissioning decommissioning because they were treated differently by the British, who Republican response to the proposed In contrast, Loyalists carried out fewer reserved an “evolutionary” and international commission to examine ‘punishment’ attacks in the period after “clinical” approach towards Loyalism the question of arms was less than the ceasefire than before it. Although that was lacking in their more exultant. Reaction varied from luke- they were as insistent as Republicans “emotional” attitude to Republicans warm commitments to seriously that it was “naïve” to consider the (Mallie and McKittrick, 1997, p. 384). consider the proposal (Irish Times, 28 disposal of weaponry at this stage of Furthermore, Loyalists never August 1995) to suspicion that the the process (Irish Times, 14 March subscribed to the Republican view that commission might be used as a device 1995), the issue was not such a vexing the Washington 3 test represented to achieve the surrender of IRA one for them. Certainly, less pressure diplomatic warfare or Unionist weapons (Irish Times, 1 September seems to have been exerted on them to intransigence, but rather understood 1995). Similarly a statement from the decommission. In part, this was due to Unionist concerns about IRA IRA after the proposal was formally the nature of their own ceasefire, intentions; decommissioning was not launched by the two governments which differed from the IRA’s in a seen as political bludgeon but rather a stated that “British bad faith and number of ways. Loyalists had publicly natural, if naïve, reflex. Ultimately, Unionist intransigence have raised a expressed “abject and true remorse” to Loyalism preferred to watch the huge question mark over the potential the families of its innocent victims and disarmament wrangling from the of the twin track approach”; following had also underlined that they would shadows of the political stage, from this there was to be no “surren- “not initiate a return to war. There confident that it was the Republicans, der of IRA weapons either through the with their superior arsenal, who were caught in the spotlight.

B·I·C·C 21 brief 22

Institutionalisation

political defeat of Irish Republicanism of Decommis- was the actual agenda for the tactical engagement by the British government in the Irish peace initiative” (Irish Times, sioning, 16 February 1996). In retrospect, and although it represented a severe crisis in the peace 1996–1998: process, the ending of the IRA cessation can also be seen to have galvanised activity between the two From the governments. At the end of February, the governments announced a firm date for all-party talks and made clear Mitchell that Sinn Fein could attend once the IRA reinstated its ceasefire. No explicit mention of the need for prior decommissioning was made and Principles to the instead the need for Sinn Fein to sign up to the six Mitchell principles was underlined (See Box A for an excerpt Agreement from the Mitchell report). The Interna- tional Body’s proposals for decommissioning would also need to be addressed at the start of by the terms of any agreement and negotiations (Irish Times, 29 February The erosion of 1996). Similarly, when provisional pre-conditions take effective steps to oppose ‘punishment’ attacks (Irish Times, 25 ground rules for negotiations were January 1996). published in April, the British simply The International Body on emphasised that a ceasefire would be Decommissioning, chaired by George The Unionist idea of an elected necessary for Sinn Fein’s inclusion and Mitchell received submissions from convention also received some support insisted that decommissioning would both governments and all of the as a confidence-building measure, as not inevitably create a log jam (Irish Northern Irish parties excepting the long as it was “broadly acceptable” Times, 17 April 1996). John Major DUP. Its report at the end of January within the community. However, the expanded on this in May, asserting that 1996 concluded that paramilitary British government rejected the he wanted Sinn Fein to be part of organisations would not decommission compromise of parallel negotiations and that its route to this arms prior to all-party negotiations and decommissioning during talks, as the lay in acceptance of the Mitchell suggested the compromise of some Prime Minister saw no reason why principles, an IRA ceasefire, and the decommissioning during the process paramilitary groups could not early discussion of the of substantive negotiations. decommission prior to talks, and stated decommissioning proposals by all the that he would maintain the pressure on parties. Crucially, Major stated that This would undoubtedly be a bitter pill them to do so. Instead he suggested agreement on how to take for Unionists to swallow but the the Unionist-sponsored idea of an decommissioning forward could be Commission also recommended that elective body as a means to enter talks reached “without blocking the parties to negotiation should affirm (Irish Times, 25 January 1996). negotiations” (Irish Times, 16 May their commitment to six principles of 1996). democracy and non-violence. These The Republican response to the British stipulated that the parties should position was the ending of the IRA Talks about talks: commit themselves to democratic and ceasefire in mid-February 1996 with a Starting the Twin peaceful means of resolving issues, bomb explosion at Canary Wharf in support the total disarmament of Track London, in which two people died. An paramilitary organisations, agree that IRA statement said that the ceasefire decommissioning should be In early June, as multi-party talks were had originally been called on the basis independently verifiable, renounce the about to begin, the ground rules for of a “clear and unambiguous use or threat of force as a means of negotiation agreed by the governments understanding” that all-party talks influencing negotiations, agree to abide seemingly pushed the notion of prior would begin rapidly, but that it was decommissioning off the edge of the now clear that “the surrender or

22 B·I·C·C run-up to the agreement

horizon; following open plenary mechanism for allowing progress on Republicanism; instead Republicans discussion of the International Body’s decommissioning, effectively pushing it needed political space and a quickening proposals and once the chairman of into a strand outside other negotiations pace, so that they could sell a ceasefire the talks was satisfied of the (Irish Times, 15 October 1996). to their grassroots as providing participants good intent to work Republicans however did not feel that maximum room for manoeuvrability towards disarmament, they had to restore a ceasefire in order and fast results. decommissioning would be referred to to catch up with snail-like progress. a subcommittee which would conduct Yet, if the British government was now Adams publicly set out the criteria its deliberations in parallel to the rest content, for the moment at least, to let which he believed could secure a of the constitutional talks (Irish Times, 7 decommissioning slip into the renewed ceasefire in February of 1997. June 1996). This was the fruition of background, this did not mean that it At the forefront was the need to the ‘Twin Track’ approach. was hesitant in testing the credibility of remove all pre-conditions to, and in, Republican bona fides in other ways. negotiations. Additionally, a “realistic, These actions indicated a considerable indicative timeframe” was the “only departure from the conditions of Prime Minister Major’s attention now way to generate the necessary urgency Washington 3, but although the focused on the sincerity of any future and momentum towards agreement.” insistence on prior decommissioning IRA ceasefire and he suggested a rather Adams singled out the question of began to fade, like the Cheshire cat, its more gradual phasing of Sinn Fein into decommissioning specifically, since grin remained hanging in the the talks process, albeit one which “given its destructive effect, the Republican field of vision. Their omitted any mention of prior decommissioning pre-condition needs suspicion that the Unionists or the decommissioning. Major described the to be removed and in a way which British might yet resuscitate the last ceasefire as a “fake” and whilst prevents the erection of this obstacle decommissioning obstacle to Sinn asserting that he would welcome a new at some point in the future” (Irish Fein’s entry proved difficult to erode. cessation he was “sceptical about how Times, 22 February 1997). Crucially The movement away from the need for credible it would be” (Irish Times, 29 however, the Sinn Fein leader prior decommissioning on the part of November 1996). Consequently any acknowledged that the removal of the the British government is best ceasefire would have to be gun from the political equation was a explained by four factors. Firstly, the accompanied by other confidence- “clear objective of a lasting peace British wanted to entice Republicans building factors such as no targeting, settlement” and that the “issue of back to a ceasefire mode. Secondly, surveillance or weapons preparation disarmament [needed] to be resolved they wanted to be seen to be pushing and a declaration by the IRA that the but without blocking the negotiations” the process onward, so that pressure ceasefire was unequivocal “with the (Irish Times, 22 February 1997). This would accrue on Republicans on the stated purpose of the conflict being represented an acknowledgement that need for a ceasefire in order to get into permanently ended” (Irish Times, 29 decommissioning was not going to talks before they got left behind. In a November 1996). Even then Sinn Fein leave the political agenda and the period of IRA violence, the British would first have to engage with the concern that it should not be used to also wished to put their relationship British government in exploratory impede negotiation. with the Irish government on the dialogue about assurances and firmest footing, so as to strengthen the confidence-building measures, then Decommissioning no longer blocked moral authority and leverage of both sign up to the Mitchell Principles, and the entrance to negotiation, but Sinn governments in pressing for a finally wait until both governments had Fein did not want it cluttering up the cessation. This entailed a radical toning held consultations with all the parties hallway either; if it could not be down of their differences with the regarding the structure and time frames thrown out of the building, it could at Irish on decommissioning. Lastly, in a of the negotiations before being least be placed in storage. post-ceasefire period, the discussion of formally invited into the talks process. Decommissioning was certainly not decommissioning became something going away, in fact the Northern of an abstract debate with fewer of the Sinn Fein’s response was that the Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act pitfalls that would have existed if Sinn British proposals were nothing more came into force in late February of Fein had been firmly integrated into than a “stalling device” and introduced 1997. The act provided a statutory the process. “a whole new raft of pre-conditions” basis for the disposal of paramilitary (Irish Times, 29 November 1996). The weaponry, and disallowed forensic Compromises can be more easily obvious concern of the British had examination of decommissioned arms. promoted if your opponents are not been to bolster Ulster Unionist faith in Whilst an arms handover seemed as far able to start picking at them because the process and they had sought to do off as ever, legislative action like this they are in post-ceasefire sackcloth. this by surrounding any future IRA nonetheless served to partially reassure However, even with Sinn Fein’s ceasefire with numerous tripwires and Unionists that decommissioning could absence, it took until October for the phasing Sinn Fein entry into talks. not be wished away. Northern Irish parties to agree on a These procedures were unpalatable to

B·I·C·C 23 brief 22

A new British characteristic bluntness. The British government also worked government Decommissioning was now “secondary speedily with the Irish government in to actually getting people into talks. forging a common institutionalised That is what is important” (Irish Times, approach to decommissioning, using When a Labour government was 10 May 1997). Whilst the Conservative the Mitchell Report as the cornerstone. elected with an overwhelming majority position had moved from prior to In June of 1997, a London–Dublin in May 1997, a new sense of dynamism parallel decommissioning, it had never agreement on decommissioning was was quickly injected into the political been expressed so frankly or succinctly. presented to the parties at the process. There was no question of Furthermore, Mowlam’s statement was negotiations. Specifically, the Unionist votes having a an emphatic signal that agreement asked the parties to commit disproportionate effect in Parliament decommissioning would not be allowed in good faith to implement the Mitchell given Labour’s resounding victory, and, to block progress in talks. The pace of report, including the proposal for consequently, Labour had no need to progress quickened notwithstanding decommissioning to occur during talks. look over its shoulder when continued IRA violence. On the 13 formulating Northern Irish policy. June, Tony Blair, the new British Prime The governments further proposed Beyond this, a new administration Minister sent an aide memoire to Sinn that decommissioning be made the meant an infusion of new blood, Fein offering the party admittance to responsibility of an independent untainted by years of grubbing at the the negotiations six weeks after the commission working alongside a coalface of Northern Irish politics and declaration of a new ceasefire and committee of the “plenary” of the all- invigorated by its success at the polls. expressing the desire to see a swift party talks. The independent resolution of the decommissioning commission would operate in both Within days, Marjorie Mowlam, the issue to the satisfaction of all parties jurisdictions, be provided with new Secretary of State for Northern (Irish Times, 23 June 1997). technical and legal advisers and have Ireland, visited the province and access to the expertise of Irish and shifted the tone of the British security forces. The commission decommissioning debate with would consult with the governments and parties, present proposals for decommissioning schemes and facilitate, observe, monitor and certify Box A: An excerpt from the Mitchell Report decommissioning as required. Two subcommittees of the Plenary, one . . . d) To renounce for themselves, and to dealing with decommissioning and the oppose any effort by others, to use other with confidence-building 19) To reach an agreed political force, or threaten to use force, to measures, would report to the Plenary settlement and to take the gun out influence the course or the outcome Committee and assist with all aspects

of Irish politics, there must be of all-party negotiations; of the Mitchell report (see Box A). commitment and adherence to fundamental principles of e) To agree to abide by the terms of These proposals were accepted by the democracy and non-violence. any agreement reached in all-party SDLP but rejected by the DUP, and Participants in all-party negotiations negotiations and to resort to only accepted with reservations by the should affirm their commitment to democratic and exclusively peaceful Ulster Unionists. Gerry Adams stated such principles. methods in trying to alter any aspect that the IRA would not hand over any of that outcome with which they weaponry (Bew and Gillespie, 1999, p. 20) Accordingly, we recommend that may disagree; and, 343). The strategy behind the British the parties to such negotiations and Irish governments approach was affirm their total and absolute f) To urge that ”punishment” killings simple: prior decommissioning was commitment: and beatings stop and to take “simply not a political reality” but the effective steps to prevent such Unionist concern that “the latent threat a) To democratic and exclusively actions. of the weaponry remaining in the peaceful means of resolving possession of the organisations political issues; . . . concerned [would] be used to influence the course of negotiations” was b) To the total disarmament of all “central and valid” (Belfast Telegraph, 17 paramilitary organisations; Source: Report of The International Body July 1997). The governments on Arms Decommissioning, 24 January attempted to assuage Unionist fears by c) To agree that such disarmament 1996, http://www2.nio.gov.uk/ pointing out that the structure of the must be verifiable to the satisfaction mitchrpt.htm. of an independent commission;

24 B·I·C·C run-up to the agreement

negotiations made it “impossible for venture which would portray Unionism Canada, as Chairman, Brigadier Tauno any agreement to be reached without as the spoiler of hopes for peace, and Nieminen from Finland, and Mr. the positive support of parties weaken Unionist input. The Union Andrew Sens from the United States. representing majorities in each main could not be defended “long distance” The IICD had been tasked, in line with part of the community” and (Irish Times, 26 September 1997). the British and Irish Agreement of underlined their belief that progress on June, to facilitate the process of the decommissioning in parallel with Sinn Fein duly signed up to the destruction of arms and to liase with substantive political talks would lead to Mitchell Principles on non-violence in the subcommittee on decommissioning a “benign dynamic” of growing September and gained admittance to at the negotiations. confidence and a mutually acceptable the talks process. Comforting language outcome (Belfast Telegraph, 17 July for Unionism came in the form of a It is significant that no clear agreement 1997). joint declaration by the British and on the question of decommissioning Irish governments that was reached at the otherwise The British government had already decommissioning was an successfully concluded negotiations. As been at work in trying to build “indispensable part of the one commentator has emphasised, the Republican trust by effectively negotiation”, a phrase which resurfaced decommissioning issue was not an removing the decommissioning issue as in an agreed procedural motion at the important focus within the talks a possible block in inter-party all-party talks which opened the way to proper, indeed it was “submerged in negotiations. On the 8 July 1997, Blair substantive constitutional negotiations the sub-committees—literally parked” sent a letter to Martin McGuinness (Irish Times, 16 September 1997, 26 (Mac Ginty, 1998, pp. 40–41). In terms stating his commitment to moving as September 1997). Yet a substantial of decommissioning, what the talks “rapidly as possible to an agreed question mark hung over Republican participants agreed to was a fudge: the political settlement”. “The situation in intent; the IRA made clear that it key paragraph relating to Northern Ireland means that delay is would have “problems with sections of decommissioning in the Belfast not acceptable”, he wrote. It was not the Mitchell Principles” and concluded Agreement of April 1998 simply stated necessary for the IRA to hand in that “decommissioning on our part that the negotiators affirmed their weaponry in order to keep Sinn Fein in would be tantamount to surrender”. To commitment to paramilitary the process as “the only ground for the IRA, questions about disarmament disarmament and would use their exclusion once a party has joined the led up a blind alley and smacked of influence to achieve decommissioning negotiations” was a dishonouring of bad faith as “those with a genuine within two years (see Box B for the the Mitchell Principles on non-violence interest in developing a peace process decommissioning clause in the Agree- (Irish Times, 18 July 1997). which has the potential for producing a ment). The IICD would however act in just and lasting peace will have no support of this and its mandate IRA ceasefire interest in decommissioning beyond enabled it, inter alia, to consult with the reinstated the point where all guns are silent” governments, paramilitary (Irish Times, 12 September 1997). representatives and the political parties, present proposals and reports relevant This commitment from the British to decommissioning, and monitor and successfully secured a reinstatement of The Independent verify the actual decommissioning of the IRA ceasefire on the 19 July. International weaponry (see Agreement on the Unionism reacted with rage, and the Commission on Independent International DUP and the smaller United Kingdom Decommissioning Commission on Decommissioning, 26 Unionist Party withdrew permanently August 1997 at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ from the talks process. Although (IICD) events/peace/docs/dec26897.htm). unhappy with the governments’ Further to this, on 30 June the two position, the Ulster Unionists took a If that was the case, what was to be the decommissioning schemes (as set out more pragmatic approach; as one point of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning in the British and Irish negotiator commented: “The IRA has Decommissioning Acts of 1997) came called a tactical ceasefire, so we should (IICD), instituted a matter of weeks into effect, allowing the disposal of engage in tactical talks” (Irish Times, 26 later? The Commission included weaponry to be undertaken either by September 1997). The Ulster Unionists commissioners from the same three the Commission or by the thus engaged in only indirect contact nations involved in the International paramilitaries themselves. The schemes with Sinn Fein during the talks in order Body, General John de Chastelain from prohibited the forensic examination of to insulate themselves from criticism. armaments, and rendered them Despite the lack of decommissioned inadmissible as evidence in court (Irish weaponry, walking away from Times, 30 June 1998). There were no negotiations was judged to be a risky explicit timetables or definite guarantees that disarmament would

B·I·C·C 25 brief 22

Box B: An excerpt from the Agreement

Decommissioning 3. All participants accordingly reaffirm 5. Both Governments will take all their commitment to the total necessary steps to facilitate the 1. Participants recall their agreement in disarmament of all paramilitary decommissioning process to include the Procedural Motion adopted on organisations. They also confirm bringing the relevant schemes into 24 September 1997 ”that the their intention to continue to work force by the end of June. resolution of the decommissioning constructively and in good faith issue is an indispensable part of the with the Independent Commission, process of negotiation”, and also and to use any influence they may Source: The Agreement, 1998, http:// recall the provisions of paragraph have, to achieve the www.nio.gov.uk/issues/agreement.htm 25 of Strand 1 above. decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years following 2. They note the progress made by the endorsement in referendums North Independent International and South of the agreement and in Commission on Decommissioning the context of the implementation and the Governments in developing of the overall settlement. schemes which can represent a workable basis for achieving the 4. The Independent Commission will decommissioning of illegally-held monitor, review and verify progress arms in the possession of on decommissioning of illegal arms, paramilitary groups. and will report to both Governments at regular intervals.

occur but a tentative deadline of the contained within the Belfast Agree- wing maintained its arsenal was a end of May 2000 was established for ment was the net result; but before the particularly painful and disconcerting the completion of decommissioning. ink was dry on the document, the one for even pro-Agreement Yet the institutionalisation of the question of decommissioning began to Unionism. decommissioning issue, as represented quickly thaw out. in the IICD and the subcommittee on The British government was decommissioning, had played its part in Although 71 percent of the Northern immediately aware of Unionist helping to achieve agreement, if only in Irish electorate endorsed the Agree- difficulties over decommissioning the rather negative sense of allowing ment in a referendum, the absence of within the Agreement. Unionism the matter to be eased out of the line decommissioning proved a wanted the sanction of expulsion from of sight of the talks participants. The considerable sticking point for government to be used against Sinn two governments, and to a lesser extent Unionism, alongside the issue of the Fein if the IRA refused to Ulster Unionists, could argue that the phased release of paramilitary decommission, but the cross- matter was being given attention, whilst prisoners. The constitutional community nature of the Assembly Republicans could take comfort in the provisions of the Agreement, which rendered this an improbable tool. fact that the issue had been squirreled included the setting up of a devolved away during negotiations and could not power-sharing assembly in Northern In a letter to David Trimble during the be used as a blocking mechanism. Ireland, a council for consultation endgame of negotiations, Blair asserted between Northern Irish and Irish that the “process of decommissioning A necessary ‘‘fudge’’? ministers, and a consultative forum should begin straight away” and that, if spanning the British Isles seemed to a party was not honouring its At this stage, institutionalisation shed attract less barbed criticism. commitments in the Agreement, he little effective light on how to solve the would take unilateral action to remove problem, but it served to sap heat from Anti-Agreement Unionists focussed on them from office if cross-community its discussion. Putting it bluntly, the more emotive questions of guns action failed (Bew and Gillespie, 1999, decommissioning was put into cold and prisoners. The thought of sharing p. 358). Although again rather vague, storage during the substantive power with Sinn Fein whilst its armed the assumption which Unionism was negotiations. The rather vague fudge meant to take was that if the IRA did not begin decommissioning, Sinn Fein would pay the price. The trouble was

26 B·I·C·C run-up to the agreement

that this would inflame Nationalist and British strategies, The incoming Labour government Republican sentiment; neither was it a 1996–1998 approached the question of provision of the Agreement. Its main decommissioning with a sense of purpose was to buy time and placate urgency and flexibility not seen in the During the tenure of the Conservative Unionist feeling before the referenda previous administration’s handling of and elections to an Assembly. Blair government, a gradual erosion took the matter. Getting inclusive talks place in their insistence on sought to further soothe Unionist started was seen as the overwhelming decommissioning prior to negotiations. feeling over the lack of priority. This new tone was given a Indeed the dropping of the pre- decommissioning by setting up a list of more concrete form as the Labour condition began to become apparent in criteria with which to judge the administration explicitly removed late February of 1996. Statements from sincerity of paramilitary-linked parties decommissioning as a pre-condition to the Agreement in “an objective, the government had become even within talks. Decommissioning was more explicit by November of that meaningful and verifiable way” (Irish certainly to be discussed within the year and it seemed clear that prior Times, 15 May 2000). These included an talks but there was to be no decommissioning would not be unequivocal statement that the “so requirement for it to occur and this required to gain entry into talks. called war is finished”, an end to realignment of policy secured a However, sceptics felt it more accurate targeting, surveillance and paramilitary reinstatement of the IRA ceasefire. beatings, the “progressive to say that the decommissioning pre- Rather than being placed as a central condition had simply moved from the abandonment and dismantling of focus of the negotiations, the creation entrance way to somewhere behind the paramilitary structures”, full of certain structures enabled front door. Major may have stipulated cooperation with the IICD and a disarmament to be set to one side. that the only qualification for entry to commitment that no other negotiations (aside from subscription organisations would be used as proxies Institutionalisation of the for violence (Irish Times, 15 May 2000). to the Mitchell Principles) was the decommissioning question in the form unequivocal maintenance of a of the IICD and the subcommittee on ceasefire, but it was clear that, within Declarations like this bought time for decommissioning, allowed the issue to talks, decommissioning would feature pro-Agreement Unionism, and partially be effectively compressed into a rather prominently and that substantive balanced the difficulties Unionists had lonely fourth strand of the negotiations could not begin without felt in signing up to an Agreement void negotiations. Whilst the DUP and the of any practical disarmament. What all-party agreement on the issue. UKUP (United Kingdom Unionist they did not do was bring a structured Party) balked at negotiations with Sinn The British plan was to set up an all- approach to the solving of the Fein without decommissioning, the party committee at the negotiations to problem. Perhaps one did not appear institutionalisation of the issue at least review the problem of possible. The IRA did not wish to provided cover for Ulster Unionists, decommissioning, and only when there decommission and felt no pressing who could feel reassured that need to, as it was not a signatory to the was agreement on how to take the decommissioning was not going to be matter forward could the parties move Agreement. On the other hand, pushed away for long, given the beyond the opening plenary session. Unionists demanded its disarmament. creation of specific structures to deal Thus the weapons issue was not to be with it. The benefits of easily separated from all-party The genius of the Agreement, indeed institutionalisation for Republicans negotiations (Irish Times, 18 May 1996). of the peace process itself, had lain in were seen in the compression of the the use of vague language which the As John Wheeler, the security minister issue into discreet fora, which enabled for Northern Ireland stated, the various parties could mould into their substantive negotiations to progress commitment to decommissioning was own image, thus allowing both sides to without fear of blockage. the most important of the many “keys claim victory, or at least honourable on the key ring” that would unlock the compromise. Disarmament is neither At times, the new government would door to peace (Irish Times, 14 June an abstract concept nor a woolly form apply pressure to Sinn Fein; Blair of words, to be endlessly parsed and 1996). Major had claimed that warned Republicans that he would decommissioning need not prove a interpreted. Disarmament exists in the move the process ahead without them “stumbling block” in negotiations, but concrete world of gunmetal and if they dithered on the calling of a it appeared to Republicans that cordite, and as such, has proved ceasefire (Irish Times, 23 June 1997). excessive focus would be given to it difficult for the politics of the peace This threat of being left out in the and that it would soon re-emerge as a process to digest. Yet upon it rests the political cold was applied to Unionists success of the Agreement. blocking mechanism. in more surreptitious fashion a few weeks later; it was asserted that the two governments would pursue “rapid

B·I·C·C 27 brief 22

progress to an overall settlement” felt amounted to Machiavellian “divide face to Republicanism. This was should the talks process fail. The clear and conquer” tactics (Irish Times, 30 echoed even by the Fianna Fail implication was that if Ulster Unionists January 1996). opposition party, a party traditionally immobilised the talks over the absence more sympathetic to Republican of decommissioning, then a deal would Clearly British–Irish relations, in ideology. By early 1997, the Fianna Fail be cut without their input (Irish Times, substance and style, were at a low ebb. leader Bertie Ahern called on the 18 July 1997). Not that Labour was However, as we have seen, the ending Republican movement to stop blaming unsympathetic to the Unionist of the IRA ceasefire galvanised the the British and face its own viewpoint. As Mowlam asserted, process a little and put an onus on responsibilities in building trust; if Sinn decommissioning was “not an arbitrary effective partnership with the British. Fein did not “make the best of what is or unreal issue. It is, and always has The Irish government had begun on offer”, it would face increasing been, an issue of trust and confidence” putting together a “package” to isolation. Furthermore, he signalled (Irish Times, 22 July 1997). Having convince Republicans to resume their that the next ceasefire had to be conceded all decommissioning pre- ceasefire little over a week after the unconditional, “real, not a sham”, and conditions in order to get all-inclusive IRA’s bombing of Canary Wharf in that “on-off violence” could not be talks, the Labour government set about London, and were stressing the need used as an option whenever blockages promoting the necessity of for inclusivity, timetables and the need arose in the process (Irish Times, 24 decommissioning in the immediate to avoid pre-conditions in all February 1997). aftermath of the Agreement. The negotiations (Irish Times, 19 February strategic balance had now shifted to 1996). Bruton went further, choosing to Unionist concerns, and the need to attack the ideological foundations of maintain majority Unionist consent for By May, the British–Irish relationship the Republican movement’s approach the accord. was back on a firm footing, as Major to peace. What could remove the had softened his line on decommissioning obstacle, was The government was exhibiting a decommissioning, allowing the Irish to Republican acceptance of the principle policy of trimming, of shifting the apply stronger pressure on of consent in Northern Ireland, political ballast this way and that in Republicanism. Bruton and Spring something which would “change the order to maintain an even keel, rather urged Sinn Fein to “consider their nature of their assumptions about the than a structured and progressive position” given that there was now in peace process” away from a problem-solving approach. This may place a fixed date for all-party talks and “predominantly military mindset” (Irish have been the only realistic way strong assurances from the British, Times, 24 February 1997). Stinging forward. Decommissioning remained a Irish and American governments that criticism of this nature was designed to highly emotive and symbolic issue decommissioning would not be a block underline to Republicans that they within the process, representing deep in the negotiations. The clear and would be increasingly isolated from the concerns amongst the protagonists subtle implication was that it was now major political forces within the Irish about the nature of the process itself. up to Republicans to make a positive Republic. move, and that attempts to drive a Irish strategies, wedge in the new consensus would be Once the IRA ceasefire had been 1996–1998 fruitless. Spring also introduced a reinstated, the Irish government carrot, in the form of his suggested naturally took a less confrontational “fourth strand” option as a means of stance. When the IRA omitted the Initially, the Irish government was discussing decommissioning in word ‘permanent’ from its new uncomfortable with the British negotiations. Decommissioning would ceasefire declaration in July 1997, government’s stance. Major’s emphasis be isolated from the substantive Ahern, whose Fianna Fail party had on an electoral process, and his negotiations, and placed in a separate been elected to government in June, effective sidelining of the Mitchell strand of the talks (Irish Times, 17 May fully understood the ideological Report was seen as a deflection away 1996). reasons behind this and refused to from the process of negotiations. As make a great deal of it (Irish Times, 21 Bruton saw it, elections would The murder of the Irish policeman July 1997). This reflected a rather “accentuate divisions . . . polarise Jerry McCabe, in a bungled IRA different tone from that exhibited in opinions . . . cause diversion away robbery, soured the Irish governments February. from points of agreement to points of relations with Sinn Fein particularly disagreement” (Irish Times, 25 January given the latter’s reluctance to This sensitivity, designed to nurse a 1996). Furthermore, the Irish Tanaiste, condemn the killing, a recalcitrance participant along at a crucial period, Dick Spring, was chafing at Britain’s which Bruton believed was “deeply was not projected solely in one handling of Irish officialdom, which he worrying” (Irish Independent, 12 June direction. The Fianna Fail government 1996). Henceforth, the Irish exhibited sensitivity towards Unionist government presented a much tougher

28 B·I·C·C run-up to the agreement

concerns about decommissioning in their submission to the Mitchell January 1996); the Republican belief the immediate aftermath of the commission in January 1996. In many was that Britain had deliberately taken Agreement. Ahern stated that he ways it was a rather Janus-faced the process “off at a tangent” in order looked forward to the document pointing at once to the old to forestall progress (Irish Times, 27 decommissioning of arms “later in the rigidities and also to new possibilities. January 1996). summer” (Irish Times, 13 April 1998) The demand for decommissioning was and that decommissioning was “not an castigated as a “stalling device and a Old shibboleths were quick to return issue that was going to go away” (Irish bogus argument created by the British to Republican tongues; the analysis of Times, 2 May 1998). The Taoiseach to avoid the commencement of all British policy on decommissioning was added that “parties associated with party talks”; a disarmament gesture simply that it was being formulated by paramilitary organisations who want to would “symbolise an IRA surrender” “slow learners” and a “particular hold executive office have the something which was “hardly a mindset within a certain clique of the responsibility to ensure that guns reasonable or justifiable demand” and British establishment” besotted with remain silent and out of commission, would “ignore nationalist fears of a memories of empire (Irish Times, 19 and that the ceasefires do in fact repeat of 1969.” Even the distinction February 1996). The decommissioning represent a total and definitive ending between paramilitary and security force obstacle was a Machiavellian ploy to of violence” (Irish Times, 2 May 1998). weapons was held to be mischievous as “micro manage” the conflict, to reduce “this distinction between legal and the pace of change so that it could be The Irish government—as well as the illegal is subjective, dubious, lacks more easily regulated from London. leaders of the other political parties in moral credibility and is particularly Indeed, it was a plot to wear down the Republic—made repeated calls for insulting to the many victims of Republicanism utterly by continually the IRA to state, in the clearest Britain’s ‘legal’ violence”. There were playing for time. As Adams said: possible terms, that the war was over. however substantial chinks of light As Ahern underlined: “People are piercing some of the old certainties. “Mr Major and his advisers calculated that if entitled to an absolute assurance that The document noted repeatedly that the peace process was stretched and stretched the conflict is over, that weapons will the issue of arms “must be settled to and stretched the IRA would find it not be used again either by the parties everyone’s satisfaction” and asserted impossible to go back to war. In other words owning them or allowed to fall in the that, given the right political scenario, the IRA would be defeated. The British wrong hands, and that they will be the actual modalities of would then only have to make the minimal safely and verifiably disposed of ” (Irish decommissioning could be agreed “in a changes necessary to underpin this ‘new’ Times, 15 May 1998). This seesawing matter of hours”. Sinn Fein also situation” (Irish Times, 15 October 1996). approach of applying pressure to asserted the belief that “in any Republicans, then expressing sensitivity democratic society all guns must come Barbed language like this represented a to their ideological contortions, then under democratic authority and defensive strategy, it served to rally the applying pressure on Republicans again control” (Irish Times, 11 January 1996). troops during a period of low in order to reassure the rather touchy momentum in the process and sought pro-Agreement Unionists, resembled Republicans accused the British of to deflect criticism of the IRA’s the approach of Britain’s Labour turning an objective of the peace renewed, if sporadic campaign. The administration, albeit in a slightly more process—disarmament as a natural IRA was even stonier in its utterances. mollified form. Both governments consequence of a peace settlement They refused to “leave nationalist areas actions thus exhibited the same which removed the causes of defenceless this side of a final approach to the question of conflict—into a Machiavellian obstacle settlement” and promised “no surren- decommissioning in this phase of the to progress. In their view, Republicans der of IRA weapons under any process, that of trimming. had already made the one real piece of circumstances and to anyone. progress in taking the gun out of Disarmament of all the armed groups Republicanism and politics by securing the IRA ceasefire; is only viable as part of a negotiated decommissioning, “the big achievement has been to settlement and nobody knows that silence the weapons so that a better than the British. We will accept 1996–1998 negotiated settlement can be achieved no pre-condition whatsoever” (An and as part of this that those who have Phoblacht, 7 March 1996). At least a One of Sinn Fein’s most weapons will be persuaded to dispose comprehensive treatments of the of them” (Irish Times, 11 January 1996). decommissioning question was given in Thus, the ball was not in their court. This attitude was hardened by Major’s treatment of the Mitchell report which Adams accused him of having “effectively dumped” (Irish Times, 25

B·I·C·C 29 brief 22

glimmer of light was visible in that provided a shopping list of possible Fein delegates backed the Belfast disarmament after a settlement had not concessions that might be traded for Agreement, and even though it was been ruled out, but the strategy moves towards disarmament by the stressed by the leadership that it was remained one of holding fast. IRA. Whilst Sinn Fein’s participation in regarded as a transitional arrangement the talks allowed for a more positive (Irish Times, 11 May 1998), this Linking approach to the question of represented a divestment of much of decommissioning, decommissioning, particularly given the Republican principle, particularly with fact that the issue was effectively regard to recognition of a Northern demilitarisation and parked away from the substantive Ireland Assembly. With much of security sector reform constitutional negotiations, problems traditional Republican rhetoric and arose which would prohibit Republican principle unravelling, there remained When the new Labour administration room for manoeuvre on the issue of little leeway for compromise on effectively dropped any disarmament in the future. decommissioning. decommissioning pre-condition relating to negotiations, the scene was A number of sceptics within Sinn Fein In fact, retention of IRA weaponry set for a more measured consideration and the IRA balked at the former’s may have served as a useful political fig of the question of disarmament by endorsement of the Mitchell Principles leaf, a badge showing continued Republicans. During the political on non-violence and the general trend revolutionary legitimacy and continuity negotiations, Sinn Fein submitted the of the process which they saw as with the past, whilst many of document Rendering Weapons Obsolete leading inexorably to Republican Republicanism’s tenets were quietly Whilst blaming ‘securocrats’ and disarmament and a partitionist mothballed. For example, an IRA Unionists for introducing settlement (Irish Times, 7 November statement noted that, whilst the decommissioning as a stalling device 1997, 12 November 1997; Irish Indepen- Agreement was a “significant and means of psychological warfare, dent, 6 November 1997). Although the development”, it fell short of the document nevertheless underlined IRA had stated that it had “problems presenting a basis for a lasting that “a clear and absolute objective of with sections of the Mitchell settlement and made it clear that “there a lasting peace settlement is the Principles” (Irish Times, 12 September will be no decommissioning by the removal forever of the gun from the 1997) and Martin McGuinness had IRA” (Irish Times, 1 May 1998). Yet, at political equation in Ireland. This is an declaimed that Sinn Fein’s agenda in the same time, it was reported that the absolute requirement” (Sinn Fein, 1997, the negotiations was to “smash the IRA had voted at a special convention p. 4). Union” (Irish Times, 7 October 1997), to allow Sinn Fein members to take dissent was clearly beginning to their seats in a Northern Irish Republicans, however, sought to develop within Republicanism. Assembly, a move which overturned an broaden the issue of disarmament out historic and strongly held abstentionist into the question of the Whilst admitting that the negotiations policy (Irish Times, 2 May 1998). It now “demilitarisation of a society which is would not lead directly to Irish seemed that Republicanism was highly militarised”. This meant that unification, Gerry Adams underwrote moving towards a de facto recognition there had to be agreement on the the Republican credentials of Sinn of the principle of consent. withdrawal of troops, the creation of a Fein’s negotiating position by asserting Unsurprisingly, decommissioning new unarmed police service, criminal that the “bottom line” included remained a prickly subject for law reform, a review of legally held powerful cross-border institutions Republicans in the period after the weapons amongst the general operating independently of any local signing of the Agreement, especially population, the release of paramilitary assembly, the total disbandment of the since the British government had prisoners, and an investigation into RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary), begun underlining—by the Blair letter alleged collusion between the security policing and the courts coming under and other means—the necessity of forces and Loyalist paramilitaries (ibid., the control of cross-border disarmament in an attempt to settle pp. 4–8). institutions, and the maintenance of wavering Unionists. Adams asserted the territorial claim to Northern that although Sinn Fein would work This negotiating linkage had several Ireland within the Irish constitution towards removing the gun from benefits. It reassured the Republican (Ireland on Sunday, 8 March 1998). politics, the IRA had made it clear that grassroots that fundamental concerns they would not surrender their guns to would be articulated; it attempted to The problem for Sinn Fein was that anyone. Sinn Fein was not the IRA and shift the harsh spotlight of not one of these minimum demands was armed only with its mandate. decommissioning away from Sinn Fein was met in the Belfast Agreement. At a Consequently, “efforts to resurrect the by widening the focus of debate, and it special conference, 96 percent of Sinn issue of decommissioning as a means

30 B·I·C·C run-up to the agreement

of undermining the rights of voters or asserted Sinn Fein’s commitment to UUP’s belief in elections as the only this party is a nonsense (sic)” (Irish “exclusively peaceful and democratic way forward (Irish Times, 25 January Times, 11 May 1998). Adams also means . . . . Sinn Fein believe the 1996). This dismissive attitude was insinuated that the IRA’s weapons had violence we have seen must be for all spawned by a continuing distrust of already been “taken out of of us now a thing of the past, over, Republicanism’s real intent and was commission” by having been placed in done with and gone” (Belfast Telegraph, 2 reinforced by the weak Conservative dumps (Irish News, 21 May 1998). Alex September 1998). This was widely seen government’s reliance on Unionist Maskey, a leading member of Sinn as the closest Republicans would come votes in Westminster. Even after Fein, poured cold water on any hopes to saying that the war was over. elections, the UUP would only enter of a start to disarmament by into what amounted to exploratory disbelieving that “anyone on the island The timing of these last events was dialogue with Sinn Fein; substantive of Ireland expects decommissioning to important. Just a fortnight before, 29 negotiations would only sprout from a begin by any organisation” (Belfast people had died in Omagh as a result weapons handover by the IRA (Belfast Telegraph, 25 May 1998). However, a of a bomb attack by Republican Newsletter, 2 February 1996). piece of political kite flying was dissidents, the Real IRA. Such was the undertaken by an unexpected universal outcry against these However, the end of the IRA ceasefire Republican source in June. Padraic Republican militants that pro-Agree- curiously softened, rather than Wilson, the IRA’s leader in the Maze ment Republicans naturally sought to hardened, the UUP stance on the Prison, believed that “a voluntary put as much distance between Mitchell compromise. Trimble stated decommissioning would be a natural themselves and the taint of militarism that “Mitchell is the thing”; that development of the peace process” if as was politically practical. adherence in word and deed to the the Agreement was properly Mitchell Report summed up his implemented and being seen to work Actual decommissioning by the IRA conditions for negotiating with Sinn (Financial Times, 17 June 1998). remained a far off prospect. It was Fein and that if Ulster Unionists had reported that an IRA convention had “reasonable commitments” on the idea Perhaps the retention of weapons was decided in December that the of parallel decommissioning then they still a useful, steadying influence within conditions for decommissioning did could move in that direction (Irish Republicanism at a time of difficult not yet exist (Belfast Telegraph, 8 News, 1 March 1996). political shifts, but a signal was being December 1998). The following sent that the prospect of disarmament month, an IRA statement voiced Indeed, Unionism was fighting a war could be used as a spur to the speedy “growing frustration” at Unionist of position; whilst mollifying their implementation of the Agreement and attempts to resurrect the “old pre- position on parallel decommissioning, as a means of extracting possible conditions” of decommissioning. they vigorously protected their flank by future concessions. Weaponry provided Unionism was simply engaged in the attempting to move the British a form of security blanket, an “politics of domination and inequality” government beyond its requirement for assurance of continuity, but it could in blocking the speedy implementation the reinstatement of the 1994 ceasefire also be used as currency, an incentive of the Agreement, in particular the as the initial stepping stone for Sinn to ensure change. devolution of the power-sharing Fein’s entry into talks. The ceasefire Executive, with decommissioning criteria would have to be stepped up. Appointing a Sinn merely serving as a useful excuse. As one source disclosed: “If we haven’t Fein representative to Consequently, Unionist demands had received a redefinition of ceasefire in to be “faced down” (Belfast Telegraph, 7 such a way that keeps Sinn Fein out, the IICD January 1999). Clearly, the IRA was not then our position [on about to compromise on this issue. decommissioning] is as was” (Irish A chink of light had appeared in the The effect on Unionists was deeply Times, 16 October 1996). debate, one which widened in Septem- unsettling; they took the IRA statement ber 1998, when Martin McGuinness to be a threat to return to war. All the while of course, the position was appointed as Sinn Fein’s remained that it would take the physical representative to the IICD. Unionism and handover of munitions before the McGuinness, however, was not Loyalism, 1996–1998 UUP could engage in substantive officially representing the IRA, a move negotiations with Republicans (Irish designed both to insulate Sinn Fein Times, 25 June 1997). When Sinn Fein from connection with the IRA, and the Ulster Unionism’s reaction to the IRA from undue pressure to Mitchell Commission’s report had been decommission. At the same time lacklustre to say the least. Whilst Adams, in an important statement, Trimble viewed it as “worthy of consideration”, his essential judgement of it was that it changed nothing and that it had “simply reaffirmed” the

B·I·C·C 31 brief 22

Box C: Paramilitary groups Irish Republican Army (IRA) Dail Eireann. It has been responsible UDA is the largest of the Loyalist for a series of attacks although none paramilitary groups and in the early Also known as the Provisional IRA have as yet resulted in fatalities. It is 1970s could boast a membership of or Provos. The Provisional IRA was not on ceasefire. 40,000 although its current active established in 1970 following a split in membership is now a small fraction of the IRA into two competing factions, ‘Real’ Irish Republican Army this. The party most closely associated the leftist Official IRA and the more (RIRA) with the UDA is the Ulster Democratic traditionalist Provisionals. Thereafter, Party (UDP) which is not electorally the title IRA became synonymous with This dissident splinter group primarily represented. The UDA/UFF declared the Provisional IRA. It quickly became emerged from the Provisional ceasefire a ceasefire along with the UVF under the largest of the Republican of 1997, and Sinn Fein’s signing of the the auspices of the Combined Loyalist paramilitary groups and prosecuted a Mitchell principles and the Belfast Military Command in October 1994. campaign of violence in Northern Agreement. It is composed of those Although the UDA and UVF have Ireland that lasted over 25 years. There who see the Provisional engagement in cooperated in the past, they have also have been a number of IRA ceasefires the peace process as a sell out of engaged in violent feuding. The UDA/ including the cessation from August Republican principle. The 32 County UFF has been responsible for over 400 1994 to February 1996 and the Sovereignty Committee is widely seen deaths. ceasefire called in July 1997, which still as the political group close to the held at the time of writing. Sinn Fein thinking of the ‘Real’ IRA. In August Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) are acknowledged as the political wing 1998, the ‘Real’ IRA bombed the town of the IRA. The IRA is held of Omagh killing 29 civilians. This This small group originated from responsible for over 1,700 deaths. attack, coming so soon after the dissident members of the mid-Ulster signing of the Agreement, caused UVF who were expelled from the latter Irish National Liberation Army widespread revulsion. Unprecedented organisation in 1996. The LVF (INLA) popular pressure, backed by threats opposed the peace process but called a from the Provisionals, forced the ‘Real’ ceasefire in May 1998 and urged people The INLA was set up in 1975 as the IRA to call a ceasefire in September of to vote ‘no’ in the referendum on the military wing of the tiny Irish that year. Although the ‘Real’ IRA has Belfast Agreement. It then made Republican Socialist Party. Its initial not formally broken its ceasefire, it has statements in June and August 1998 strength came mainly from ex-Official been implicated in a number of attacks declaring its ceasefire to be unequivocal IRA members angry at the latter’s in recent times and has leeched some and that its war was now over. It ceasefire of 1972, but it was also support away from the Provisionals. decommissioned a small amount of believed to have gained recruits from weaponry the following December. It the Provisionals. The INLA has been Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) has killed more than a dozen people. riddled with internal and bloody feuding throughout its history. This The modern Ulster Volunteer Force Orange Volunteers/Red Hand group has been responsible for was formed in 1966, mainly by ex- Defenders approximately 125 deaths. The INLA servicemen, and in opposition to the called a ceasefire in August 1998, growth of a more liberal Unionism. A Two other dissident groups, the which still holds. much smaller paramilitary group, Red Orange Volunteers and the Red Hand Hand Commando, has been closely Defenders, emerged in 1998. They are Continuity Irish Republican associated with the UVF for some believed to be composed of Army (CIRA) years. The UVF has close political links disgruntled members of the main with the Progressive Unionist Party paramilitary groups unhappy with the This splinter group first emerged in (PUP) which currently holds two seats peace process. Both groups are small, 1996 and is also known as the in the Assembly. The UVF declared a and their membership may overlap. Continuity Army Council. The ceasefire in October 1994. It has been These dissidents have engaged in CIRA is opposed to the Provisional responsible for over 500 deaths in the sporadic attacks on Nationalists and IRA’s ceasefire and Republican conflict. their homes. engagement in the peace process. It has been linked to the political party Ulster Defence Association Sources: Dunn and Dawson, 2000; Elliott Republican Sinn Fein, which broke (UDA)/Ulster Freedom Fighters and Flackes, 1999; McKittrick, 2000 away from Provisional Sinn Fein in (UFF) 1986 when the latter voted to end abstention from the Irish parliament, The UDA was founded in September 1971 as an amalgam of various Loyalist vigilante and defence groups. The

32 B·I·C·C run-up to the agreement

were allowed into the talks process, their ministerial posts, there would (UDP) stated that he would without the obligation of have to be a statement that the war was recommend that the UDA should decommissioning of any sort, Unionist over, an end to punishment beatings, make the first move on disarmament rage was palpable. Vociferous attacks the progressive dismantling of and so pressurise Republicans to follow were made upon both the British paramilitary structures, and complete suit (Belfast Telegraph, 21 June 1998). But government and Sinn Fein. Ken disarmament within two years (Belfast there were certain indications of a Maginnis, the UUP’s security Telegraph, 9 June 1998). The Unionists more complex picture. Firstly, the spokesman, lamented the fact that, were compromising in the short term, UDA did not appoint a liaison to the after the UUP had “most reluctantly but issuing a costly post-dated cheque IICD and it seemed unlikely that they accepted” the Mitchell compromise, that would have to be cashed in the would begin the process of the government felt secure enough to near future. By projecting strict terms disarmament. In fact, several months elevate “an evil Mafia” to the into the future, pro-Agreement before the Agreement, the UDA had conference table by “sleight of hand” Unionists were playing for time against broken its ceasefire in retaliation for (Irish Times, 24 September 1997). those who opposed the deal in the here the assassination of the Loyalist Trimble called for the expulsion of and now. It was a tactic which would Volunteer Force leader Billy Wright. Sinn Fein from the talks after the IRA be resurrected through the next phase They had a reputation as the most announced that it had difficulties with of the process. volatile of the two main Loyalist the Mitchell Principles, a move which paramilitary groups, a volatility that he described as a “contemptible little Loyalist dealings with proved difficult to assuage given that trick” (Irish Times, 12 September 1997). the IICD the UDP failed to gain a single seat at the Assembly elections. Even those Similarly, the Unionist leader took linked to the UVF ultimately felt that Whilst both the PUP (Progressive delight at the SDLP’s support for the decommissioning was unlikely to principle of consent in the talks and Unionist Party) and UDP (Ulster happen even in a benign scenario. As Democratic Party) had signed up to the Sinn Fein’s objection. This marked “the Billy Hutchinson said, “if the IRA Mitchell principles, developments start of the process of the decommission that doesn’t mean the within Loyalism pointed to a mixed marginalisation of Sinn Fein and the UVF will. It’s not in the UVF’s attitude to decommissioning. On the break up of the pan-nationalist front” interests to decommission. It’s in the one hand, the Ulster Volunteer Force (Irish Times, 25 September 1997). This UVF’s interests to ensure that Loyalist rhetoric reflected more bark than bite. (UVF) were quick to appoint the PUP’s areas remain protected” (Belfast Billy Hutchinson as their direct liaison Sinn Fein had gained entry into the Telegraph, 10 October 1998). with the IICD (Belfast Telegraph, 25 May talks despite Unionism’s insistence on 1998). Both the Ulster Defence decommissioning; yet Ulster Unionists Loyalist decommissioning seemed a Association (UDA) and UVF fully could not bring themselves to walk out long way off, set somewhere in the supported the Belfast Agreement of the process, a move which would hazy distance. A message from the brand them as spoilers and cost them whilst even the extremist splinter UVF Command Staff stated that “the group, the Loyalist Volunteer Force influence with the two governments. Ulster Volunteer Force will retain their (LVF), declared a ceasefire. In Consequently, there was a need to weaponry, regardless of political December 1998, this latter group insulate themselves from the criticism expediency, until such times as the actually handed in a small number of of Unionists fervently opposed to the people of Ulster are guaranteed a munitions to the IICD; the first and so process. Engaging Sinn Fein only future safe from the despotism of through proximity talks was one far only act of voluntary armed Irish Republicans” (Combat, decommissioning (Belfast Telegraph, 18 means, another was to adopt the most December 1998). There were to be no December 1998). This move was vocally confrontational stance against olive branches. As Gerry Kelly, a prompted more by short term Republicans. Such criticism could only leading Sinn Fein negotiator and long- considerations than any commitment intensify following the signing of the time adversary of Loyalism would say, to a process of disarmament; in Agreement, especially since the Belfast Agreement was a “contract Republicans did not hand in weaponry particular the need to secure the early between opponents” (An Phoblacht, 15 release of their prisoners. even after the negotiations and April 1998); behind its words lay endorsement of the Agreement in mistrust, not a sense of partnership or referenda north and south of the UDA/UDP electorally reconciliation. How would border. unrepresented decommissioning be resolved against this backdrop? The UUP took a firm line on the Movement sometimes appeared likely question of forming an executive with from the largest Loyalist group. John Sinn Fein in their manifesto released White of the Ulster Democratic Party shortly before the elections to the new Assembly. For Sinn Fein to take up

B·I·C·C 33 brief 22

Guns and

working to a purely exclusionist Government, agenda, using decommissioning as a hook to trip Sinn Fein up; the issue of disarmament probed deep into the Republican psyche and the question 1999–2000: remained “fundamental and theological” (Irish Times, 10 April 1999). The disarmament of the IRA whilst Disarmament and Ireland remained partitioned simply cut against the grain of Republican principle. Despite these deep-seated Difficulties in difficulties, the mood of the governments was to spur the process Implementing the on. A joint statement by the British, Irish and American governments served as a prospective pep talk, pointing to the Agreement gains made since the signing of the Agreement and encouraging the full implementation of all its aspects (Irish Times, 19 March 1999). The feeling, The Hillsborough the Agreement and not a prerequisite certainly within the Irish government, Declaration, March of its functioning. This view frustrated was that any “parking or stalling” of those Unionists who sought to use the the Agreement would simply be and April 1999 weight of constitutional nationalism as “reversing” (Irish Times, 18 March a lever against Republicanism. 1999). Seamus Mallon of the SDLP n agreement had been reached, From the beginning of the year, felt that momentum could be regained Abut serious question marks hung decommissioning dominated the by the dropping of the demand for over its implementation. Ulster political agenda. It seemed at first that weapons up front, in return for a Unionists refused to form an executive a very firm line was being taken on the definitive agreement spelling out “that power-sharing government with Sinn issue by the British and Irish it [decommissioning] will be done, how Fein while Republicans held on to their administrations, one of no guns, no it will be processed, and that it will be weapons. Republicans saw this demand government. As Bertie Ahern stated: completed within the time specified by for decommissioning as an ill-disguised the Agreement” (Sunday Independent, 28 attempt to discard their mandate and “Our view is that decommissioning in March 1999). exclude them from government at all one form or another has to happen. I costs. In their eyes, the functioning of am on record in recent weeks and It was against this backdrop that the the Belfast Agreement was too months as saying that it is not two governments formulated the important to be barricaded by the compatible with being part of a Hillsborough Declaration of 1 April demand for weaponry—instead the government – I mean part of an (see Irish Times, 2 April 1999); it was an prospects for decommissioning would executive—that there is not at least a imaginative attempt at providing a only be enhanced by a speedy commencement of decommissioning. precise choreography, synchronising implementation of the accord. In any . . . .That is what we need to achieve” the formation of an executive with a case, as Sinn Fein constantly insisted, (Sunday Times, 14 February 1999). form of decommissioning, all against they could not be held accountable for the backdrop of harmonious and the actions of the IRA. Similarly, there This emphatic line from the Irish reconciliatory mood music. The remained little movement from government both reflected and Declaration asserted that Loyalists on the issue. The SDLP, encouraged the Unionist analysis. decommissioning was not a pre- meanwhile, steered a middle course Unionism believed that if dealing with condition but an “obligation” of the through the negotiating gymnastics. weapons was a problem then that Agreement and proposed that Decommissioning was an obligation of implied a lack of genuine commitment Executive members would be to the Agreement on the part of nominated on a date to be set but Republicans (Irish Times, 22 March would not take up office immediately. 1999, 30 March 1999). Republicans, for their part, believed Unionism to be

34 B·I·C·C guns and government

A “collective act of reconciliation” directly into the IRA Army Council” demand to dispose of weapons as the would take place within a month of the (Irish Times, 3 April 1999). Others were price of Sinn Fein’s advance” (Irish nominations, during which some arms less effusive. The anti-Agreement DUP Times, 2 April 1999). Adams had stated would be put beyond use in a process simply derided the Declaration as “an that the peace process had “stretched verified by the IICD, and ceremonies April Fool’s charter” stuffed with the flexibility of the Irish republican of remembrance to the victims of “fancy semantics and spin-doctoring” constituency” but had also indicated violence would take place. At the same (Irish Times, 2 April 1999). that it could be stretched further (Irish time, powers would be devolved to the News, 27 March 1999). This now Executive (Irish Times, 2 April 1999). Republican response seemed increasingly unlikely.

This was decommissioning and the The Republican response to the After all, whilst the Belfast Agreement implementation of the Agreement as a Declaration was the most crucial. But had been presented to the Republican sombre quadrille. The SDLP fully there was severe scepticism amongst grassroots as a strategic advance, its endorsed the Declaration. For Sean the Republican ranks about the tenets had little resonance within Farren, one of the party’s leading direction the process was taking. One Republican ideology. As Adams negotiators, decommissioning was leaked Sinn Fein document asserted articulated, “Before the Good Friday never meant to be an “optional that the Irish Taoiseach had become document, the six county state was an element”; the Agreement was quite the “biggest danger” to the peace undemocratic, illegitimate and failed clear on this, as it had stipulated that a process because of his increasingly political entity and after it, it remains failure to commit to exclusively strident views on the necessity of so” (Irish Times, 27 March 1999). The democratic and peaceful means would decommissioning (Sunday Independent, 7 Republican leadership may not have lead to exclusion from office. Thus, March 1999). Indeed, Republicans were sincerely held this view, but many in its “acceptance of this principle must irritated at the harder line being taken base did. Would the institutions of the imply rejection of the threat posed by by, of all things, a Fianna Fail Belfast Agreement thus be worth the the mere existence of heavily armed, government. As one anonymous price of a convulsion within non-accountable paramilitary forces” Republican put it, “they galloped faster Republicanism brought on be (Irish Times, 13 April 1999). than the Brits up that alley” (Irish Times, decommissioning? 1 April 1999). There was a fear that the Unionist and Loyalist Republicans were being isolated from a Clearly the leadership thought not. The reactions major source of potential support, the Republican hierarchy described the Dublin administration. Coupled with Hillsborough Document as a “vague proposal”, and the issue of As such, the Declaration was simply a this was a sense of being squeezed by decommissioning as a “provocation”, a reiteration of the commitments within the conflicting demands of the “surrender” and an “unreasonable” the Agreement. Decommissioning Agreement and the Republican rank and file; the latter were concerned that demand (Irish Times, 5 April 1999). represented a line being drawn under Martin McGuinness captured the the conflict; it was “essentially about disarmament would criminalise the mood in saying that “the history of creating trust and enabling people to Republican struggle, encourage Republicanism from time immemorial believe that political violence is being Unionists into thinking they had gained shows they are not going to bow the left in the past”” (Irish Times, 13 April victory, and weaken bargaining power. knee to the demands of elements of 1999). Ulster Unionism reacted It appeared to one senior Republican that the leadership had to choose the British military establishment or positively too; Trimble felt that Unionism, particularly if their although the Declaration embodied a between their political careers and a assessment is that this is seen as an “rather complex form of sequencing”, possible split in the movement (Irish issue which can divide Republicanism it nevertheless had the potential to Times, 13 April 1999). on this island” (Irish Times, 8 April resolve the outstanding problems 1998). satisfactorily (Irish Times, 2 April 1999). As the journalist Deaglán de Bréadún argued, it seemed that the IRA had It even appeared that the PUP, the Sinn Fein formally rejected the Loyalist party linked to the UVF, were been “well and truly snookered. At its Declaration in mid-April because of staunchly in favour of the proposed back it hears the growing clamour from their stated belief that it moved away compromise. David Ervine, the party the Republican grassroots over … the from the Belfast Agreement and made spokesman, stated that the Declaration continuing attacks on Nationalists in the transfer of power conditional on was “extremely significant. . . . What their homes. In front of it is the the delivery of IRA weapons (Irish we are seeing here is the crumbling of Times, 14 April 1999). There was to be the pan-Nationalist front, an Exocet being fired, not at Gerry Adams, but

B·I·C·C 35 brief 22

no room in the Republican belly for David Trimble may have believed that decommissioning were “unacceptable”, the swallowing of pre-conditions. the Declaration offered “realistically what was needed was “recognisable, Republicans felt themselves to be the only way forward” (Irish Times, 16 quantifiable” disarmament. This “victims of [their own] success”; the April 1999), but to those who held the remained the only way of proving that fact that they had sold their base on illegal weapons, it resembled only a cul- the war was over (We must all stand firm matters such as the ceasefire, the de-sac. on decommissioning, 28 June 1999, removal of Ireland’s constitutional www.uup.org.) claim to the North, and participation in The Way Forward? a ‘partitionist’ Assembly had lulled the June/July 1999 Although Unionist and Republican British and Irish governments into remained poles apart, there did appear thinking that progress on to be some movement from Sinn Fein decommissioning would be just as easy Sinn Fein maintained a firm stance on in early July. Whilst they underlined the Unionist demand for guns up (Irish Times, 7 April 1999). In actual fact that prior decommissioning was “not front. In their view, Unionism was it looked as if the retention of within the gift of Sinn Fein to deliver” engaged in the politics of exclusion weapons was the hinge on which all and not part of the Agreement in any with decommissioning merely acting as other compromise turned. case (Irish Times, 1 July 1999), they did a fig leaf; non-implementation of the acknowledge the need to “create The PUP also rejected the Declaration, Agreement suited the Unionist interest, space” for pro-Agreement Unionism; they simply did not want change. As although its given reason was that in consequently Sinn Fein declared their Martin McGuinness argued, “Don’t the collective “act of reconciliation” belief that all the participants “could fool yourself that it is about the issue the illegally held weapons of the IRA succeed in persuading those with arms of decommissioning. It’s about more would be equated with those of the to decommission them in accordance than that. It’s because they don’t want RUC and British army, a situation with the Agreement” (Irish Times, 2 July intolerable to Loyalists (Irish Times, 14 to see a Fenian in government” (Irish 1999). Times, 21 June 1999). McGuinness felt April 1999). This undoubtedly that a serious flaw in the negotiations deflected some of the criticism away This decommissioning was to be in the had been the failure of the IICD to from Sinn Fein, not something the manner set down by the IICD. “effectively stamp” its authority on the PUP would have liked, but there may Although this statement appeared process, which had led to Unionism have been deeper reasons for their rather woolly, the British and Irish rejection. In March 1999, the UVF seizing the issue and using it as a governments were eager to seize upon “weapon to beat Sinn Fein over the leadership had indicated that, in the it as a coded assurance that head”. The solution was simple; the absence of Republican Republicanism would disarm given the removal of the causes of conflict via decommissioning, their bottom line implementation of the Agreement. As the collective implementation of the was that the IRA should declare their Blair put it, the Sinn Fein declaration Agreement by all parties. Once that war to be over. This was the only represented “historic seismic shifts in means of instilling confidence and process was “unstoppable”, the “issue the political landscape in Northern of how you remove the guns becomes trust. If the IRA refused, then Sinn Ireland” (Irish Times, 2 July 1999). A very straightforward” (Irish Times, 24 Fein should not be permitted to hold report from the IICD was similarly June 1999). Ministerial positions in any executive upbeat, and the latter body expected (Combat, March 1999). However, the that “Sinn Fein’s proposal [would] be Unionists of course saw the matter IRA was clearly of no mind to make endorsed by the IRA and reciprocated such a statement or to decommission differently. Trimble accused by Loyalist and other Republican paramilitaries of engaging in a and so, to the UVF, the Declaration groups” (Irish Times, 3 July 1999). The “confidence trick”, of talking peace was dead in the water. The UVF were IICD also stated that the “process of and benefiting from prisoner releases also averse to any decommissioning on decommissioning should begin as soon whilst continuing to surreptitiously use their part at this stage. As its leadership as possible” and defined the beginning violence. Consequently, mere stated: “You can rest assured that the of this “process” as firstly the giving UVF and Red Hand Commando will declarations of intent regarding of an “unambiguous commitment” by not hand over guns to get Sinn Fein a paramilitary group that it would into office” (Irish Times, 9 April 1999). complete decommissioning by May The thought of Martin McGuinness 2000, followed by the commencement ascending to office on a ladder partially of discussions with that group on the built of Loyalist rifles, set their teeth modalities and methods of on edge.

36 B·I·C·C guns and government

decommissioning. The IICD also 1999). The document argued that The fact that these negotiations had anticipated the creation of a timetable Republicans would be unlikely to taken place in the summer, Northern for decommissioning which would be actually decommission in the near Ireland’s marching season and a time worked out with paramilitaries; one future and would consequently incur of especially heightened tension, did which they would be “expected to blame for the lack of progress, putting not help matters either. When the 15 adhere to” to ensure completion by the UUP in a favourable position. This July came and the nominations were May 2000 (Irish Times, 3 July 1999). argument did not however carry the put forward to the Executive, Ulster day, as The Way Forward proposals were Unionists stayed away. As only Natio- These developments spurred the seen to be too vague and risky. As nalist and Republican ministers were British and Irish governments into Trimble stated: nominated, the Executive contravened issuing a joint statement, The Way the Agreement’s rules on cross- Forward document (see Irish Times, 3 “The demand of the IRA is government first community inclusivity and so July 1999), which set out how and then, maybe guns. How can democrats in immediately expired, in scenes decommissioning and devolution could Britain, America and Ireland ask that we do reminiscent of a farce. Emotions ran be achieved. The Way Forward stipulated this? If we agree to put democracy at the high and there were bitter words from that the Executive would be set up and disposal of a secret cabal of committed all sides in the following weeks as the powers devolved to the Northern Irish terrorists, in advance of them giving up arms, blame game was played. With the Assembly in mid-July—an effective we are not acting like democrats but like Agreement stalled, the process now deadline. Shortly afterwards, “within delinquents” (Sunday Times, 11 July 1999). slipped into a period of review. days of devolution”, as Blair was to put it (Irish Times, 5 July 1999), the IICD The failsafe mechanisms were “flawed The review: Autumn/ would confirm a start to the process of and unfair” whilst the Winter 1999 decommissioning as defined in their decommissioning scheme was greatly report and have “urgent discussions” weakened by the lack of an explicit There had been considerable emotional with the paramilitaries’ points of timetable (Irish Times, 14 July 1999). fallout in the weeks after the stillbirth contact (Irish Times, 3 July 1999). The The UUP would only countenance of the Executive, a set of IICD would then specify that actual letting Sinn Fein into government circumstances compounded by decommissioning was to start within a without prior disarmament if two wrangling between Unionist, Nationa- specified period. There was also a conditions were met. Firstly, if there failsafe clause in that the governments was a default on decommissioning, list and Republican over the release of the Patten Commission’s report on promised to suspend the institutions Sinn Fein should be expelled rather proposed policing structures. For of the Agreement, if commitments on than the institutions suspended, as at Republicans, the proposed reforms did either decommissioning or devolution present the arrangements would not go far enough but for Unionists, were not kept. Regarding the former, it “punish the good and guilty alike”. the proposals threatened the future was to be left to the IICD to determine Secondly, the SDLP would have to whether paramilitaries were fulfilling commit themselves to supporting the security of Northern Ireland and represented a slap in the face to the their commitments on Executive without Sinn Fein’s presence Royal Ulster Constabulary’s record of decommissioning (Irish Times, 3 July (Sunday Times, 11 July 1999). There was service. Trimble described the report as 1999). little likelihood of either condition a “shoddy piece of work” (Irish Times, being met, particularly given the 10 September 1999). By the autumn, a What did Unionism SDLP’s view that the UUP was using the impasse to “bleed more recognition of harsh political realities make of The Way had emerged. There was a growing concessions out of the governments. sense that deflections or evasions from Forward? To bleed this process dry” (Irish Times, the goals of decommissioning and 16 July 1999). In June, as a leaked UUP document devolution could not be tolerated. Although the IRA had murdered a showed, there had indeed been some Unionism did not feel that it had the debate about the possible merits of room to manoeuvre on suspected informer and had been caught smuggling a sizeable quantity of dropping the policy of prior decommissioning, so it decided to arms from America, this did not decommissioning and instead adopting stonewall. The knowledge that, in a automatically dishearten the British and what it called Blair’s “preferred strategy recent European Parliament election, Irish governments. Whilst they of putting the main pressure for 12 out of 13 Unionist voters had opted condemned these IRA actions, they decommissioning onto Sinn Fein after for parties with a ‘no guns, no devolution rather than prior to government’ policy, may have weighed appeared to accept that both the smuggling and the assassination had devolution” (Sunday Tribune, 4 July heavily in the UUP mind (Irish Times, been approved by the Republican 19 July 1999).

B·I·C·C 37 brief 22

leadership to assuage the grassroots in process. The negotiations, which had that Republicans could get to admitting the wake of earlier concessions on been conducted under a tighter veil of that the war was over. The Republican decommissioning. Neither of these secrecy, were blossoming out into a commitment to discharging their actions was to be taken as a breach of highly choreographed affair. Both the responsibilities on decommissioning the ceasefire (Sunday Tribune, 22 August UUP and Sinn Fein welcomed the was also crucial and one of the final 1999). The painful need to face up to statements from the IICD and shared pieces of the jigsaw; the appointment certain realities was also underlined by the view that the body should adopt a of an authorised IRA representative to David Trimble, who bemoaned those more proactive and central role (Irish the IICD, was slotted in soon after who talked of “so called alternatives” Times, 7 September 1999). (Irish Times, 18 November 1999). to dealing with Sinn Fein; the UUP Interestingly, the IRA statement would “not achieve progress without This choreography culminated in a announcing the appointment also agreement with Nationalists and this series of confidence-building speeches acknowledged the “leadership given by includes Republicans. . . .the problem by the parties to the negotiations. The Sinn Fein throughout this process”, a we face now is inescapable while Sinn most important came from Sinn Fein phrase which appeared to be an Fein maintains substantial electoral and the Ulster Unionists. The latter implicit signal that Republicanism was support” (Sunday Tribune, 10 October explicitly recognised and accepted that firmly on the political path and that if 1999). it was “legitimate for nationalists to Sinn Fein discharged its pursue their political objective of a responsibilities, the IRA would follow A sense of necessary compromise was united Ireland by consent through their lead. Needless to say, for also stressed by the IICD in a exclusively peaceful and democratic Republicans, any prospect of statement of the 15 November which methods.” The UUP also committed decommissioning would ultimately noted that time was now very short if itself to the principles of “inclusivity, depend upon the full implementation decommissioning was to be achieved in equality and mutual respect” in of the Agreement. the stipulated time frame and that government. They had also partially consequently urgent progress was now retreated from the ‘no guns, no Despite the confidence-building needed. The Commission was government’ pledge. Only a “genuine measures, Adams continually warned convinced that decommissioning could and meaningful response” to the IICD that no one should underestimate just only be achieved in the context of the report was required before the way was how far Sinn Fein had stretched itself Agreement being implemented and clear for the establishment of the in the Review (Irish Times, 19 Novem- reminded the participants that they had political institutions. This effectively ber 1999, 25 November 1999). That a “collective responsibility” in this meant the IRA’s appointment of a Republicanism had stretched itself at regard. The appointment of authorised representative to, and dialogue with, all began to appear in some doubt, representatives by paramilitaries to liase the IICD (Irish Times, 17 November when senior Sinn Fein negotiators were with the IICD was described as an 1999). The quid pro quo from Sinn Fein reported as stating their belief that the “urgent” and “significant” confidence- was a statement stressing their belief IRA would never disarm (Irish Times, 19 building measure. Clearly, the that the issue of arms would be “finally November 1999, 20 November 1999). Commission now felt that it was time it and satisfactorily settled” under the However, Sinn Fein were quick to assumed a “more proactive role” (Irish aegis of the IICD and that the party rebut the accuracy of these reports, Times, 16 November 1999). was committed to “discharging its and described them as misleading (Irish responsibilities in this regard.” Sinn Times, 22 November 1999). If The urgency of the IICD statement Fein also underlined their commitment Republicans had stretched themselves, was not so much a spur to compromise to peaceful means and opposition to pro-Agreement Unionists felt even as a reflection of the degree of “any use of force or threat of force by more exposed. Stepping into an achievement already reached in the others for any political purpose” (Irish executive without a beginning to review conducted under the Times, 17 November 1999). disarmament seemed a bold move. chairmanship of George Mitchell. From the outset, the focus of the Building trust There was however more than one Review had been a narrow one, safety net. Firstly, Peter Mandelson, the concentrating specifically on breaking These statements were designed to Northern Ireland Secretary who had the deadlock over decommissioning have a galvanising effect in building replaced Mowlam in October, initiated and the formation of a government trust. Unionists were saying that they legislation in Westminster to suspend (Irish Times, 7 September 1999). This were not interested in excluding the Executive and other institutions if tight focus had served to prevent Nationalists from government while there was any default on incursions from emotive issues such as Sinn Fein had put light years between decommissioning or devolution (Irish policing, which might bog down the itself and the rhetoric of the armalite Times, 23 November 1999). The Irish and ballot box. This was the nearest

38 B·I·C·C guns and government

government also indicated its support 2 December: Republicanism appeared to remain for the suspension of devolved Devolution—Finally unmoved. Adams felt that the government if there was any failure to decommissioning crisis was merely a implement the Agreement (Irish Times, case of “tactical manoeuvring” by the “ The fissures within the UUP, and 24 November 1999). ‘No’ men of Unionism” who were Republican disquiet at the measures engaged in a “clumsy attempt” to taken to minimise this fracturing, were The second safety net involved the inflict a defeat on Republicans. The disturbing portents of the future. This UUP’s own capacity to set terms. Sinn Fein leader stressed that nobody did not however stop the setting up of Trimble was aware of Unionist should doubt that Republicanism had an executive on the 2 December. concerns about an “open ended already stretched itself considerably in Northern Ireland now had a power- [decommissioning] process, where you reaching out to Unionists, as the get sucked along and get hung out to sharing government comprising Ulster ending of abstentionism had been an Unionist, SDLP, DUP and Sinn Fein dry” (Irish Times, 26 November 1999) “unprecedented decision” by ministers. The North-South cross- and prepared accordingly. Trimble Republicanism. Unionism would border bodies and the rescinding of successfully sold the notion of entering simply have to be “patient” in waiting Ireland’s territorial claim to the North government before arms for decommissioning. quickly followed. The UFF (Ulster decommissioning to his party’s ruling body, the Ulster Unionist Council Freedom Fighters) nominated a Adams emphasised that there had been representative to the IICD on 8 (UUC), in late November. a “clear understanding” in the Review December. that Sinn Fein could not deliver The deciding factor seems to have disarmament in the terms now being There was a general air of euphoria as been post-dated resignation letters demanded by Unionists. Instead, the the Agreement was quickly Trimble had drafted in which he and Republican analysis was that other prospective UUP ministers implemented, but there may also have decommissioning should be handled in been a sense of unreality. Each of the promised to vacate the Executive if no a “mechanism . . . outside the political parties in the Executive had rather IRA decommissioning had occurred by process”, in other words the IICD different views on how the end of January (Irish Times, 29 (Irish News, 28 January 2000). In decommissioning should best be November 1999). Only 58 percent of attempting to separate politics from pursued, and this was a question on UUC delegates had supported this disarmament, they were hoping to change from the ‘no guns, no which the sustainability of the remove a powerful irritant. Executive appeared to rest. Moreover, government policy’ and it was evident the increasing vulnerability of the UUP that a deep fissure was running meant that an answer would need to be The Unionists’ through Ulster Unionism, despite found quickly. resignation deadline Trimble’s expectation that disarmament would follow devolution “as night follows day” (Irish Times, 27 November Suspending the The trouble was that, for the UUP, decommissioning was fundamentally 1999). Agreement: January– political. It touched on questions of February 2000 political principle and affected political Of course, Republicanism bridled at considerations in relation to electoral these “safety nets”; in their view the Although the institutions of the competition with other Unionist Agreement made no mention of Agreement were up and running, they default mechanisms such as the British parties. Most pressingly, existed under a Damoclean sword. decommissioning had struck deep into were now legislating for, whilst Ulster Unionist Party Assembly the internal politics of the party Trimble’s resignation letter merely members warned that they had creating cracks and fissures. introduced a unilateral deadline which “stretched [their] constituency to Consequently, and as Trimble made sought to “dictate and totally breaking point” and that a peace clear, “the formation of the Executive undermine and contradict” the agreed process without decommissioning was role of the IICD (Irish Times, 17 without a start to actual not worth “a penny candle” (Statement decommissioning was an unsustainable November 1999). by the UUP, 1 February 2000, http:// position in all but the short term.” Sinn cain.ulst.ac.uk).

B·I·C·C 39 brief 22

Fein’s complaint that the Unionist unacceptable” and held the view that disclosed* (Statement by Gerry Adams, 11 ministers’ post-dated resignation letters without “clarity over February 2000, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk). amounted to an artificial and unilateral decommissioning”, confidence would However, the proposal came at the deadline was a “patently false notion. quickly “ebb” from the institutions eleventh hour of the negotiations and All that [ had] been asked of them which relied heavily on cross- was too late to prevent the suspension [Republicans] [ was] to fulfil the basic community trust (Statement by the of the institutions on 11 February as democratic condition and to choose Secretary of State, 3 February 2000, Mandelson acted to prevent what he between the party and the army” http://cain.ulst.ac.uk) felt was an inevitable: Unionist (Belfast Telegraph, 2 February 2000). evacuation from the process. To put it more bluntly, Britain realised Suspending the institutions provided a Unionism was not alone in expressing that Republican failure to move on softer landing than watching Unionists impatience with the unhurried decommissioning would force bring the peace architecture down by Republican approach to Unionists out of the executive. Given resigning their posts in the absence of decommissioning. A rather negative that Unionism had already moved from progress on disarmament. Mandelson’s report from the IICD at the end of its position of ‘no guns, no prime directive at this point was to January curtly noted that it had government’, it was Republicanism’s prevent the haemorrhaging of pro- received “no information from the turn to feel the pressure. Republicans Agreement Unionism, which he IRA as to when decommissioning were indeed highly irritated at the considered to be “running on empty” [would] start.” The report also increasing demand for (Statement by the Secretary of State, 23 disclosed that the UFF would not decommissioning which Adams February 2000, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk). begin decommissioning until the IRA referred to as the “hypnotic, all The IRA proposal, as Mandelson started to disarm. Similarly, the UVF pervasive drumbeat now rising to understood it, did not offer the “real would not begin the process of deafening loudness and drowning out definition and clarity” necessary to decommissioning until the IRA had all other logic” (Irish News, 3 February prop up the UUP (Irish Times, 12 emphatically declared its war to be 2000). Mandelson’s responsiveness to February 2000). over. The report pessimistically Unionist concerns and willingness to concluded that, given the quantities of suspend the Executive if However, a report issued by the IICD arms in paramilitary hands, it would decommissioning failed to occur, were in the hours after the suspension of soon be “logistically impossible” for taken as “a slap in the face to the Sinn the Executive, did point to a significant the IICD to complete its task by the Fein leadership” (Statement by Gerry shift in the Republican position, Belfast Agreement’s deadline of 22 Adams, 3 February 2000, http:// May 2000 (Irish Times, 12 February cain.ulst.ac.uk). An IRA statement of 5 2000). February showed just how far off decommissioning appeared, as the IRA * The details of the proposal were not disclosed Obtuse signals from underlined that it had “never entered by the Republican leadership as they did not feel the IRA into any agreement or undertaking or that they could publicly commit to the proposal understanding at any time whatsoever until they had a) time to sell it to their grassroots on any aspect of decommissioning”. and b) a commitment from the British to An IRA statement of 1 February withdraw the legislation allowing the suspension The IRA did however state that the attempted to pour oil on these troubled of the Executive. The British government were issue of arms could be “resolved”, but waters, but it said little; that the “peace made aware of the IRA proposal on the not by “British legislative threats” to morning of 11 February, although the proposal process was under no threat from the suspend the institutions (Irish Times, 7 was not made public for some months. The IRA IRA” was the basic gist of the message February 2000). proposal, codenamed ‘Angel’, ran thus: and no mention of decommissioning “The peace process contains the potential to remove the was made whatsoever (Irish Times, 2 causes of conflict and to deliver a durable peace if the February 2000). This obtuse IRA 11 February—the political will exists. This can be advanced by full statement and the negative report from eleventh hour? implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. In the the IICD set alarm bells ringing in the context of a process that will progressively and irreversibly remove the causes of conflict, the leadership British government. Peter Mandelson Negotiations continued in a pressure of Oglaigh na hEireann [IRA] will initiate an internal found the IRA’s position “totally cooker atmosphere. By 11 February, process subject to our constitution that will finally and Sinn Fein reported a new proposal completely put IRA arms beyond use. This process will from the IRA of “enormous be designed to avoid risk to the public and misappropriation by others. The leadership of Oglaigh significance” which they believed could na hEireann will facilitate verification of this. This will “finally resolve” the matter, although be done in such a way to ensure public confidence and to no details of the plan were actually resolve the issue of arms in a complete and verifiable way” (Belfast Telegraph, 20 September 2000).

40 B·I·C·C guns and government

although details again remained sparse. Fein response appeared to be that the The IICD viewed as “valuable Belfast Agreement was probably lost progress” an assertion by the IRA and that Republicanism’s new goal representative that they would consider should be to back off from the putting arms beyond use in the context process, and build up their political of both the full implementation of the strength so that, when it came to future Belfast Agreement and the rather negotiations, they would have an vague phrase, “the removal of the increased mandate and increased causes of conflict”. The IRA bargaining power (Gerry Adams’ keynote representative also talked of a address, 27 February 2000, http:// “comprehensive process to put arms cain.ulst.ac.uk). beyond use in a manner as to ensure maximum public confidence” and recognised that the resolution of the arms question was “a necessary objective of the peace process.” The IICD interpreted the IRA representatives statements positively and asserted that these held out “the real prospect of an agreement” on decommissioning (Irish Times, 12 February 2000).

The IRA proposal, unspecified as it was, enjoyed only the briefest existence in any case. Following the suspension of the Executive, the IRA withdrew this proposal and cut off contact with the IICD, citing bad faith on the part of Unionists and the British government. The message was clear; the political process was not to be made conditional on the disarmament of the IRA (Irish Times, 16 February 2000).

In fact, Sinn Fein appeared to be reassessing their political options too. Adams felt that the suspension had “subverted” the electoral mandates of the pro-Agreement parties and that the Agreement itself had now become “subject to Unionist terms”. This was taken to be the fault of the British as they had stepped out of the Agreement’s framework “before the ink was even dry” and introduced Blair’s side letter on decommissioning. This represented a “virus that had infected the process.” The overall Sinn

B·I·C·C 41 brief 22

From Crisis to the

ve process on policing which they Rubicon? feared did not take all Patten principles on board and would therefore make joining the new police unacceptable for 2000–2001 members of the Catholic community. The debate during those months indicated that policing was in many respects to become the more far- 11 February 2000: had begun to cooperate with the IICD reaching and important issue: unlike hope and trust in December 1999, while De decommissioning, reform of the police Chastelain’s report of 12 February force would not only deal with the suspended 2000 contained the statement that impending remnants of the past but there was “a real prospect . . . to fulfil would be about a whole new definition he severe crisis that occurred in the substance of its mandate”(Irish of security—concept and structure— TFebruary 2000 revealed what had Times, 12 February 2000). In its report, for the province. Thus another even not been achieved by the peace process the IICD referred to a first time more complex field of counting the since the signing of the Agreement in commitment of the IRA to other side’s gains and losses had now 1998: some kind of mutual decommission “[putting] arms and been opened. This was the time when a understanding among the main explosives beyond use in the context shift in negotiation strategies was conflicting parties in the North, the of the full implementation of the attempted in order to move the UUP and Sinn Fein. Such an Good Friday Agreement”, a move contentious security issues forward. understanding could have created welcomed by both governments “as a Next to decommissioning and policing, confidence and resulted in the development of real significance” (Irish the downsizing of state security— establishment of a language capable of Times, 12 February 2000). While David termed “demilitarisation” by the communicating the political objectives Trimble indicated that progress could Republicans and “normalisation” in the and real concerns of the leaders and not be too quick, if he was to free Agreement—started to move into a their constituencies. The actual events himself from the narrow margin new package deal to accommodate the of 11 February—when Northern caused by a considerable number of interlocked, but divided, concerns Ireland Secretary Peter Mandelson dissenters in his party, Sinn Fein leader about the future of security in triggered the suspension of the Gerry Adams stated that, with the Northern Ireland. Executive in order to preclude David suspension, the British government Trimble’s resignation as First Min- had capitulated to Unionist pressure The IRA initiative: ister—may at some time in the future and deadlines instead of testing the opening arms dumps be interpreted as a set-back of new IRA position to overcome the historical significance. At the crucial decommissioning impasse. to third party moment of implementing the inspections institutional core piece of the Agree- In the following weeks, the famous ment, the act signalled a fundamental blame game was played out. While On 7 May 2000, a Joint Statement of withdrawal of trust. Accusations from intensive, behind-the-scenes talks the British and the Irish governments the Nationalist and Republican side started between Sinn Fein and the two was published containing a new plan ranged from “faulty decision” (Seamus governments to defrost the for the full implementation of the Mallon) to “greatest disaster” (Martin decommissioning ice block, public Agreement in relation to the unsettled McGuinness). attention moved to the other issues and one which was to be controversial issue of how to introduce achieved by June 2001 (see Sunday Apparently the crisis occurred in spite a new police force into Northern Times, 7 May 2000, for full text). In of a rather successful first two months Ireland. Unionist frustrations and fears parallel, the IRA issued a statement performance of the power-sharing were that full implementation of the saying: experience, when people in Northern Patten Commission’s recommendations Ireland learned that—with their new on policing (www.belfast.org.uk/ “For our part the IRA leadership is ministers at work—the media had report.htm) would lead to an committed to resolving the issue of arms. The started to focus on schools, health and unbearable loss of identity for the political responsibility for advancing the equality issues rather than on bullets RUC. Conversely—and with slightly current situation rests with the two and bad guys. Moreover, the crisis different frontlines than over governments, especially the British government, occurred in spite of cautious steps decommissioning—Nationalists and and the leadership of the political parties. The towards decommissioning: the IRA Republicans jointly voiced their criticism against the upcoming legislati-

42 B·I·C·C creative approaches

(apparently situated in remote farmland in the Republic of Ireland) to interna- tional third-party inspection.

The first inspection was carried out in late June 2000 by the ex-ANC Secretary General Cyril Ramaphosa and the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. The two inspectors were understood to have used a “dual- keys” system, similarly pioneered in the UN-assisted El Salvador peace process in the early nineties, which ensured that the arms dumps remained secure and could not be opened unilaterally by the IRA (Guardian, 2 July 2000). A re- inspection in late October 2000 was followed by the inspectors’ report to The two international arms inspectors and two of the three commissioners of the Independent the IICD saying that they had International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD). From left to right: Martti Ahtisaari, consulted with “independent specialists General John de Chastelain, Cyril Ramaphosa, and Andrew D. Sens. Photo: dpa in the field of arms control” and that the “substantial” weaponry they had full implementation, on a progressive and unilateral and creative action of one of seen “remained secure” (Report on the irreversible basis by the two governments, the most exposed partners within the Second Inspection of IRA Weapon especially the British government, of what they conflict. The Rubicon had apparently Dumps, 26 October 2000). have agreed will provide a political context . . been crossed, and this view was . with the potential to remove the causes of reflected in all kinds of official The IRA gesture—unprecedented in conflict, and in which the Irish Republicans, reactions. One significant aspect of the the history of Irish armed conflict— and Unionists can, as equals pursue our statement, as compared to that of 11 provided the creative potential to respective political objectives peacefully. . . . February, was seen in the addition of control tools of violence in a post- the two new adverbs “completely” and conflict situation. Although the The IRA leadership will initiate a process “verifiably”, words that in the opinion confidence-building impact of the that will completely and verifiably put IRA of General de Chastelain echoed inspections only unfolded in part, the arms beyond use. We will do it in such a way recommendations made in the Interna- measure most importantly helped as to avoid risk to the public and tional Body’s 1996 report on restore the Assembly on 22 May 2000 misappropriation by others and ensure requirements (De Chastelain, 2001, p. and the Executive in the following maximum public confidence. . . . 10) The two governments saw the IRA days. In terms of security statement as a “landmark”; US normalisation, the IRA initiative was In this context, the IRA leadership has agreed President Bill Clinton commented on it responded to by a number of minor to put in place, within weeks, a confidence- being a real “breakthrough” in the frail downsizing measures by the British building measure to confirm that our weapons political and psychological situation. Army: the scrapping of 5 of its 71 remain secure” (RTE news online, 6 May David Trimble stated that the IRA military installations, such as bases in 2000). offer “[appeared] to break new Derry and Cookstown and two ground” (Irish Times, 8 May 2000) and observation posts perched atop civilian This IRA statement ended the three- by that, acknowledged the confidence- apartment buildings in nationalist areas month crisis which had followed the building effect of the statement; in his of Belfast (Boston Herald, 10 May 2001). suspension of the power-sharing initial assessment, he argued that a institutions in February. It came as a process to put arms beyond use could A more indirect impact was reflected in surprise to most political actually be tantamount to the report of the IICD in late October commentators, and seemed for a short decommissioning thus going further when “the Governments also called on time to exhibit the potential to move than he had ever gone before the Commission to consider urgently . the stalled peace process ahead by (Hennessey, 2000, p. 213). . . whether there [were] any further proposals for decommissioning The IRA statement included resumption of contact with the IICD and—more prominently—was followed by the initiative of an opening of a number of IRA arms dumps

B·I·C·C 43 brief 22

Box D: Paramilitary weapons estimates

Irish Republican Army Loyalist Paramilitary Groups: The breakaway Real IRA has a small Ulster Volunteer Force and number of rifles, handguns, machine- 2.6 tonnes of Semtex explosive Ulster Defence Association/ guns, unknown quantities of Semtex, 588 AKM assault rifles Ulster Freedom Fighters detonators and home-made mortars. The Continuity IRA has small quantities 400 other assorted rifles 74 VZ58 assault rifles of rifles and pistols and a small 10 general purpose machine-guns 674 handguns amount of Semtex. It has recently 17 DSHK heavy machine-guns acquired an M79 grenade launcher. 20 RPG-7 grenades 3 0.50 calibre heavy machine-guns Both the Continuity IRA and the Real 185 RGD grenades IRA have the ability to manufacture 9 Sam-7 missiles 80 submachine guns (including their own explosives. 46 RPG-7 missiles home made) 11 RPG-7 launchers 33 shotguns The Irish National Liberation Army has 7 flame throwers dozens of automatic weapons and Unknown quantities of Powergel pistols. It has circa 100 kilos of commercial explosive 115 hand grenades commercial explosives. 600 handguns A report in the Irish Times of May 1998 The Loyalist Volunteer Force has only a 40 submachine guns stated that sometime between 1996 and 31 shotguns small number of rifles and handguns, 1998 the UVF and UDA smuggled and a limited amount of commercial hundreds of assault rifles, submachine 1.5 million rounds of ammunition explosives. guns and pistols into Northern Ireland. The report estimated that the UDA This list does not take into account the Sources: Magill, June 1998; Irish Times, IRA’s capacity to manufacture its own and UVF each had 200 assault rifles/ 14 May 1998; Guardian, 8 May 2000 explosives or other ordnance. submachine guns.

schemes which [offered] the nothing to do with decommissioning, border meetings of the North-South Commission a greater scope” (IICD but it took place at a time when it was Ministerial Council. Through this he Report, 26 October 2000). becoming obvious that neither the hoped to push the IRA to move Unionist mainstream nor the Loyalist further on decommissioning. One might expect that such a review paramilitaries seemed satisfied with the The carefully orchestrated steps of the of the Decommissioning Schemes— approach exercised through the summer in this new phase of which had previously reflected a inspections, arguing that the IRA institutionalising the peace process somewhat technical mandate for the initiative was not tantamount to came close to collapse in autumn IICD and had mainly focused on two disarmament. The largest Loyalist because of a return to the policy of weapon destruction methods—might paramilitary groups, UFF and UDA, as deadlines and ultimata which had lead the Commission to reassess the well as the second largest, UVF, already failed before. Banning the Sinn creative potential of inspections. A decided against reciprocating the IRA Fein ministers from those parts of the process of redefining initiative, while none of the institutions of the Agreement which decommissioning might come under paramilitary organisations held were supposed to foster closer links way describing a procedure according meetings with the IICD at that time. between the North and the South of to which stocktaking, arms control and Ireland—and which were hence of verification could precede the actual The return of distrust: particular significance to measures of destruction, the sealing or sanctioning Sinn Fein Republicans—was perceived as a otherwise reliable means of “putting painful variation on the “no guns, no weapons beyond use”. ministers government” stance of the Ulster Unionists. In reaction to Trimble’s However, the initial euphoria resulting On 28 October 2000, after a UUP sanctions, Sinn Fein stepped up their from the unexpected IRA move faded Council meeting that again left David demands that the British government rapidly; a violent intra-Loyalist feud Trimble hanging on with a very slim fulfil its commitments to further scale erupted in the Shankill area of Belfast majority, the First Minister—and party down security installations and to fully in late summer, expelling 70 families leader of the UUP—imposed a implement the recommendations of from their homes and again throwing package of sanctions, including a ban the Patten Commission on policing. darkness over the North. The feud had on Sinn Fein ministers from cross- Sinn Fein also took the banning of

44 B·I·C·C creative approaches

The neutrality of the symbols of the new police force

The restrictions on flags flying over police stations

The powers which the police Ombudsman had to reinvestigate former killings in which there had been alleged collusion of RUC officers and Loyalist paramilitaries

The extent of autonomy enjoyed by the Policing Board and the district David Trimble at a press conference following a UUP Council Meeting at the Waterfront Hall partnerships vis-à-vis the Northern in October 2000. Photo: Corinna Hauswedell Secretary and Chief Constable The contested use of plastic bullets

Whether ex-paramilitary prisoners their ministers to the High Court, Loyalist groups continued their bomb were allowed to join the district where the ban was deemed unlawful. attacks in and around Belfast, though policing partnerships. However this decision did not impress the UFF and the LVF maintained that the Unionist leader nor prevent him their feud had not been reopened. In Although, at times, the SDLP blamed from reinforcing the sanctions. fact, in the first months of 2001, Sinn Fein for using the policing issue Catholic homes were the target of to distract from their responsibility for In the context of Bill Clinton’s last visit more threats and bomb attacks than in IRA disarmament, their combined as US President to Northern Ireland in any of the three years before. On the front on these demands was neither December 2000, all players intensified other side, the dissident Republican seriously shaken by attempts on the their endeavours to save the peace group, the Real IRA, stepped up their part of the Ulster Unionists to win the process and the institutions by campaign by targeting Ebrington moderate nationalists over to a middle- designing a package to link the most Barracks in Derry, Londonderry in ground position nor by the new contentious issues in the fields of February and the BBC building in Secretary of State John Reid, who decommissioning, demilitarisation and London in early March. The RUC, made it clear that he envisaged the policing more closely. once more with major support from Police Act coming into full force by the British Army, was faced with the June (the deadline set in May 2000 for The IICD report of 22 December challenge of keeping law and order in a the full implementation of the Agree- noted that there had not yet been any difficult three-folded balance typical of ment); Reid, as well, had hoped that the progress concerning contact with the the Northern Ireland security situation. SDLP would more readily compromise IRA, but that there was still enough than Sinn Fein. time left to carry out decommissioning Policing moves by the new deadline of June 2001. up front Hillsborough The first two months of the new year, Roundtable: Recruiting for the new Northern during which time Peter Mandelson “parking” the deal resigned as Secretary of State for Ireland Police Service started in February in spite of the fact that both Northern Ireland and was replaced by With the British General elections and Catholic parties, the SDLP and Sinn John Reid, attempts were made to the local elections looming in spring Fein, were still opposed to relevant rebuild the elements of trust which 2001, and the foot and mouth parts of the new Police (Northern had got lost. The British Prime epidemic further absorbing political Ireland) Act 2000 (www.hmso.gov.uk/ Minister and the Irish Taoiseach activity, there was an urgency for all became personally involved in the acts/acts2000/20000032.htm). Core politicians to try to wrap up the demands for legislative amendments negotiations. However, the talks took possible elements of a deal before from the Catholic side related to: place against the background of things got out of hand again. increased paramilitary violence:

B·I·C·C 45 brief 22

On 8 March, the governments met “The peace process is nearer its goal than ever. The June elections with the pro-Agreement parties for But we are not there yet. We still have to and Trimble’s round-table talks at the well-known complete the job on four key issues: venue of Hillsborough Castle to resignation consider a way forward by means of The decommissioning of weapons— possible compromises. That same We need to find ways of putting paramilitary It did not come as a surprise to most morning, the IRA had announced that weapons beyond use and taking the gun out of observers that the election campaign they would re-open contact with the Irish politics forever. was not the time for seeking further IICD and renewed their statement of 6 compromises but that each party May 2000 regarding the circumstances Policing—We must arrive at a point where narrowed down its agenda to the under which they would consider everyone feels able to support the new Police specific concerns of the constituencies. decommissioning. Such contact was Service of Northern Ireland as an indeed re-opened a few days later and accountable policing service representative of For the beleaguered leader of the has been kept open since. This the whole community. Ulster Unionists in particular, serious surprising move on the part of the worries about losing further ground to IRA again worked as an immediate Normalisation—We must return the anti-Agreement DUP caused a defroster of the icy atmosphere of the Northern Ireland to normality, a process movement away from the four- previous weeks, in which belligerent which includes scaling down the security cornered package and a refocusing on rhetoric and actual violence had measures in response to a decreasing terrorist the arms issue. In an interview with the clouded a solution of the impasse. threat. Financial Times, Trimble warned that the However, a statement given by Gerry institutions of the Agreement were Adams made it clear that Sinn Fein Devolved government—We have to “not stable” in their current form and expected the British government to make sure that all the institutions established that “crisis could come before the honour its commitments of May 2000 under the Good Friday Agreement are general elections” unless there was before Republicans would move any working at every level, including the cross- movement from the IRA on further on decommissioning (Irish border agencies. disarmament (Financial Times, 19 April Abroad, 9 March 2001). On the other 2001). hand, David Trimble simply saw the As the political parties agreed when they met IRA statement as a propaganda trick. with the British and Irish prime ministers two Two weeks later, Trimble armed weeks ago in Northern Ireland, it is not a himself psychologically by casting his Commentators in the media tried to question of picking or choosing any one of threat to resign as First Minister on the encourage political leaders to grasp the these four areas. We have to make progress in 1 July into the pre-electoral political opportunity, “take a risk” and jump all four simultaneously if we are to move arena. This move stunned the Deputy unilaterally in order to solve one of the forward together. Only by making real First Minister of the SDLP, who had disputed issues. This was especially progress in each area will we ensure that only been informed at the last addressed to the SDLP, as their everyone’s concerns are met” (Boston Herald, moment, as well as the two Stormont ministers Seamus Mallon and 20 March 2001). governments in London and Dublin, Sean Farren had expressed serious who decided to try to carry on with concerns as to whether the actual Underlining these four issues as the negotiations on the unsolved issues momentum could be sustained until cornerstones of a future deal and not despite the difficulties caused by the after the elections, when time would be suspending the institutions over the elections. The prospect of the running out with the deadline for a unsolved situation was seen as institutions collapsing on the eve of start to decommissioning looming in “parking” the process until after the the peak marching season in early July June (Irish Times, 8 March 2001). elections, which were now set for 7 could hardly have been gloomier. June. The four issues essentially Decommissioning was back as the top Speculations about what kind of ‘mini- described the substance of the interim stumbling block to the peace process— deal’ had actually been achieved at deal achieved at the Hillsborough and the careful choreography of Hillsborough continued to hang in the meeting. Hillsborough was in ruins. press for the next weeks. John Reid’s summary on the occasion of the St. Patrick’s Day celebrations most probably came closest:

46 B·I·C·C creative approaches

The elections on the 7 June, which Back to A new effort of intensive talks chaired brought a victorious Tony Blair back to decommissioning by Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern in Westminster, left Northern Ireland in a Weston Park in the British Midlands highly precarious situation: Ian Paisley’s during the second week of July failed Consequently, the last two weeks in DUP had increased their Westminster to find a solution to the deep crisis of representation from 3 to 5 seats at the June involved intensive talks between the Northern Ireland peace process. A the two prime ministers and the expense of UUP who had only won 6 “take-it-or-leave-it” package to be put political parties in the North, mainly seats against the 10 won in 1997. Sinn to the parties before the 12 August is focused on putting all kinds of Fein gained 4 seats compared to 2 in in preparation. pressure on the IRA to move further 1997 and became the strongest forwards on the arms issue. The Catholic party, overtaking the SDLP for the first time (See Figure 1). The Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, and the SDLP leader, John Hume, for the first time smaller parties, such as the Alliance, played the so-called “green card” by NIWC (Northern Ireland Womens unequivocally stating that sitting in a Coalition) and PUP, lost a considerable government with a private army was number of votes. This trend of actually incompatible with the Irish polarisation towards the more radical ends of the party spectrum and the constitution and democratic terms. Official and semi-official proposals on weakening of the moderate middle practical measures for disarmament, ground was also reflected in the results which had partly been in the air before, of the local elections. Saving the stalled circulated in the media: the broadening peace process had not become easier. of the inspections to include more What would increased pressure on dumps; the sealing of inspected dumps by means of concrete; the introduction David Trimble from the Unionist ‘no’- of the idea of additional inspectors, camp mean for the resumption of talks and so on. But the higher the pressure, on full implementation of the Agree- the less likely it became that ment? In which direction—in terms of Republicans would dance to the decommissioning—would the considerably strengthened Republicans Unionists’ tune. face, with Sinn Fein’s electoral success Against the background of the most ironically proving both the efficacy of serious street fighting and rioting the political peace strategy at the ballot Belfast had experienced in years, with box as well as the psychological hundreds of civilians and police backing for a “no surrender” position. officers injured at the Ardoyne “peace line” and the later murder of a young When arms dumps which had already Catholic allegedly carried out by a been visited were inspected for a third Loyalist paramilitary gang of the time and the IRA reaffirmed both that UDA/UFF who no longer supported the “resolution of the arms issue was a the Good Friday Agreement, the issue necessary step in the peace process” and that they had met with the IICD of arms became even more crucial but even less easy to solve by making four times since March, Trimble’s only unilateral demands on the IRA. comment was that he saw “no substance in it at all” (BBC News, 31 On the 23 June, David Trimble was re- May 2001). For the shattered Unionist elected party leader at the UUP council leader, there seemed to be no room to manoeuvre anymore. meeting but only at the price of maintaining his decision to resign as he later did on 1 July. As the provisions of the Agreement stand, a First Minister must either be re-elected within the following six weeks or the institutions will be suspended and a call for new elections can be made.

B·I·C·C 47 brief 22 2 Small Arms— Bigger Issues Loyalist mural in the Lower Shankill areaLoyalist (2002). Photo: Mark Sedra

48 B·I·C·C part 2

B·I·C·C 49 brief 22

The Time Had

“small” arms. The majority of the Come: Burying findings identified in the subsequent analysis will likely remain unchanged when the long-awaited decommissioning process begins, the Hatchet therefore it is important to mention that the following analysis does not purport itself to be a “now-that- we- know- better” approach. Many of the fter July 2001, the closing date for Colombia in August, and more cul-de-sacs of post-Agreement Athe history section of this paper, significantly, the changes in the Northern Ireland may, in retrospect, almost three months passed without international political climate in the appear to have been historically any major progress on the outstanding wake of the September 11 atrocities in unavoidable, resulting from the more issues in Northern Ireland. The the United States. Responding to the or less productive ambiguities endured emergence of a political vacuum at the augmented international awareness of by many current peace processes. But governmental level and increasing terrorism that followed the launch of assessments will gain more depth of uncertainty and violence in the streets the “war against terrorism”, and the field in the brighter light afforded by created a dangerous combination that enhanced pressure on perceived the actual beginning of the “farewell to placed the peace process in jeopardy terrorist groups that accompanied it, arms”, which has already uncovered and generated the most serious crisis in the Republican movement seized the cracks in the sectarian walls and the province since the signing of the opportunity to make its long expected barriers that have perennially inhibited Belfast Agreement. move to “bury the hatchet”, a gesture conflict resolution in Northern Ireland. that contributed significantly to the A profound breakthrough came on 23 revitalisation of the deteriorating peace Comparison limited October 2001 when the IRA— process. following the encouragement of the There were political circumstances in leadership of Sinn Fein—publicly A closer look at the history of the Northern Ireland that gave the issue of declared that the organisation had decommissioning debate, including the paramilitary weapons, a subject begun to put its weapons permanently months of crisis that preceded the accorded extraordinary political and verifiably beyond use (see Box E). breakthrough, may reveal some of the attention, the heightened significance it When the Independent International factors which made decommissioning gained during the peace process—a Commission on Decommissioning such an intractable obstacle for the significance greater than in most other (IICD), who had witnessed the peace process. It appears that there comparable cases of peace settlements ceremony, confirmed that the IRA’ s were bigger issues at stake behind the move was “significant” (see Box F), trust between Northern Ireland’s political actors was renewed and the suspended institutions reinvigorated. David Trimble’s euphoric reaction to the breakthrough—“the day we thought would never come”— conveyed the readiness of moderate Unionism to embark on a new era in the power-sharing government with the Republicans.

Without a doubt, the sea-change in the IRA’s fundamental approach, exemplified by its credo, “not a bullet, not an ounce”, resulted from a longer journey from violence to politics. The actual timing of the IRA move, however, was influenced by American pressure imposed after the discovery of an IRA-FARC connection in The Day After: Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern with Sinn Fein Education Minister Martin McGuiness and Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams (from left to right) holding a press conference in front of the Dail buildings in Dublin, the day after the IRA’s historic announcement on decommissioning (24 October 2001). Photo: dpa 50 B·I·C·C guns out of politics

Box E: The IRA arms statement in full, 23 October 2001

The IRA is committed to our It was for this reason that Such a collapse would certainly and republican objectives and to the decommissioning was introduced to eventually put the overall peace process establishment of a united Ireland based the process by the British Government. in jeopardy. on justice, equality and freedom. It has been used since to prevent the changes which a lasting peace requires. There is a responsibility upon everyone In August 1994, against a backdrop of seriously committed to a just peace to lengthy and intensive discussions In order to overcome this and to do our best to avoid this. involving the two governments and encourage the changes necessary for a others, the leadership of the IRA called lasting peace the leadership of Oglaigh Therefore, in order to save the peace a complete cessation of military na hEireann has taken a number of process we have implemented the operations in order to create the substantial initiatives. scheme agreed with the IICD in dynamic for a peace process. August. These include our engagement with the ‘Decommissioning’ was no part of IICD [decommissioning body] and the Our motivation is clear. that. There was no ambiguity about inspection of a number of arms This unprecedented move is to save this. dumps by the two International the peace process and to persuade Inspectors, Cyril Ramaphosa and others of our genuine intentions. Unfortunately there are those within Martti Ahtisaari. the British Establishment and the Signed: P O’Neill leadership of unionism who are No one should doubt the difficulties fundamentally opposed to change. these initiatives cause for us, our Source: BBC News, 23 October 2001, volunteers and our support base. The http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/ At every opportunity they have used Political process is now on the point of northern_ireland/newsid_1615000/ the issue of arms as an excuse to collapse. 1615957.stm. undermine and frustrate progress.

during the 1990s. Reviewing patterns academic publication (McGarry, 2001). does limited justice to the historical, and mechanisms by which the process Partisan studies drawing dubious regional and political specifics of a of negotiation and implementation of parallels, with instrumental advantage particular case. We are taking the disarmament initiatives was fostered or for one of the respective sides in a reverse approach here. With the hindered offers a number of lessons conflict, have been a common feature knowledge of comparable cases of for both the ongoing peace process in of the ongoing political debate and international conflict resolution in Northern Ireland and for other dialogue surrounding the peace process mind we want to return for a moment conflict-stricken regions confronting in Northern Ireland (Magginnis, 1999). to look at the specific dilemmas comparable dilemmas. For example, the difficulties plaguing Northern Ireland and begin encountered by the South African our assessment from there. In search of solutions to problems of peace process in putting paramilitary post-war consolidation, such as how to “guns beyond use” has—for all parties Guns out of politics or find ways out of protracted violence, in Northern Ireland in different ways politics out of guns? studies of the varying methodologies and at different times—served as an for managing peace processes have alluring precedent from which to draw After the end of the Cold War, become increasingly popular in lessons (O’Malley, 2000). disarmament of paramilitary and international peace and conflict militia groups as well as state forces has research, with particular emphasis on Placing Northern Ireland in an been crucial to almost all efforts to end the case study of Northern Ireland international context to show that (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2000, and decommissioning was not a problem internal conflict in parts of Africa, Central America and Southeast Asia. 2002). Benefits and limitations of the unique to the province of Ulster and to Decommissioning, which in some comparative perspective have, with demonstrate how others “got it right” cases has been incorporated into respect to Northern Ireland, recently (Belfast Telegraph, 19 May 2000) only programmes to demobilise and been explored in a comprehensive

B·I·C·C 51 brief 22

reintegrate former combatants, has symbolism of the thirty years of Making the well being of the whole customarily been treated as an suffering and tumult that comprised process dependent on the success of important issue, but the heightened the Troubles, thereby making it more decommissioning did not contribute to status it has received in Northern difficult to disarm. Partisan attitudes the central overall requirement of Ireland, where it became the core issue towards both perceptions of security building a stable peace. For the of dispute between rival sectarian and the legitimacy of political change Unionists, staking everything on that groups during an eight-year period, is have been reflected through the arms one card which they could not properly virtually unprecedented. “The success issue. For the Unionists it functioned play, and thereby pushing the of any decommissioning scheme, as as a scapegoat issue that they exploited Republicans in the most painful corner, evident from examples of conflict to apply pressure on the Republicans may in retrospect not have been a very resolution in Angola, Cambodia, El and to compensate for political wise tactic. We agree though with the Salvador, Lebanon, Mozambique, setbacks and failures incurred on other assumption made by Mac Ginty and Nicaragua and Panama, depends on a issues; for Republicans, it served as a Darby (ibid.) that if decommissioning variety of factors, including the bargaining tool to press for political had been resolved other issues of recognition that debates on concessions. Since the inauguration of security concern such as policing disarmament and demobilisation the peace process in 1994, the reform or demilitarisation would have should be prevented from becoming positions on decommissioning likely assumed an air of intractability too highly politicised” (Schulze and espoused by the two main conflicting and created a new impasse. Why, in an Smith, 2000, p.83). parties clearly conveyed their deep attempt to break the deadlock of rooted mutual distrust: Unionists held decommissioning, issues of similar The missing link of decommissioning as the essential factor security concern became more closely decommissioning underpinning their resentment of a linked, will be discussed among the power-sharing government in which themes below. mindsets they were forced to legislate alongside a party linked to private army; Behind the debate about how and How can the specific problems of Republicans argued with great when to disarm the “hardware” of civil Northern Ireland, relating to the issue vehemence that arms had never been strife, much more complex problems of taking guns out of politics, be handed over in the long history of the of how to decommission the mindsets explained? One may indeed argue that Irish armed struggle. “The issue of the main players come to light. the discussions about decommissioning became a metaphor for basic positions Decommissioning efforts in Northern in Northern Ireland have been heavily on the peace process and attitudes Ireland became almost politicised. But what does this imply? towards political opponents…a symbol indistinguishable from efforts to Protagonists on both sides of the for the limits of surrender of both discover ways out of the historically sectarian divide tended to overload the sides” (Mac Ginty and Darby, 2002, p. deep-rooted sectarianism that remains issue of weaponry with the political 105). the main obstacle to non-violent

Box F: Report of the International Independent Commission on Decommissioning, 23 October 2001

Almost three hours after the IRA had risk to the public and avoid the it would not further the process of announced that it had put some arms possibility of misappropriation by putting all arms beyond use were we beyond use, the Independent Interna- others. to provide further details of this tional Commission on 2) We have now witnessed an event event. Decommissioning (IICD) issued a which we regard as significant in 4) We will continue our contact with short statement confirming the IRA’s which the IRA has put a quantity of the IRA representative in pursuit of move: arms completely beyond use. The our mandate. 1) On 6 August 2001 the Commission material in question includes arms, reported that agreement had been ammunition and explosives. reached with the IRA on a method 3) We are satisfied that the arms in Source: BBC News, 23 October 2001, to put IRA arms completely and question have been dealt with in http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/ verifiably beyond use. This would be accordance with the scheme and northern_ireland/newsid_1615000/ done in such a way as to involve no regulations. We are also satisfied that 1615957.stm.

52 B·I·C·C guns out of politics

conflict resolution. That may explain overcome sectarianism: The Agree- underestimated. Consequently, our why the issue became such an ment established a promising assessment of the factors that hindered intractable and prolonged matter. In an constitutional framework, but its twin or helped “good governance” in overly politicised environment like track approach “fudged” the arms relation to the decommissioning Northern Ireland, where the road to issue. A unique instrument of third controversy will focus on the following remove guns from the political arena is party involvement was created in the issues: barred, new routes to separate the issue form of the Independent International of weapons from the sectarian patterns Commission on Decommissioning the ambiguities of the Agreement of the province must be explored. (IICD), but a difficult mix of external Along these routes, mutually and internal players greatly impeded the confidence-building capacities acceptable, cross-partisan approaches the Commission’s performance. In the of external and internal involvement to disarmament must be developed. post-Agreement phase of peace The underlying goal should be a new building, too little attention was paid to the problems associated with the understanding of “common security”. measures that would build trust and proliferation of violence. confidence; the role of civil society The way decommissioning was dealt suffered from the top down approach with in many phases of the peace of the Agreement. The spoiler effects process fostered, rather than helped to and changing patterns of continued violence were “criminally”

Republican mural on R.P.G. Avenue, West Belfast (2002).Loyalist mural on Newtownards Road, East Belfast (2002).

Mindsets, as well as bullets, bombs, and guns, must be decommissioned for the peace process to move forward. These contrasting murals, utilizing similar rhetoric that emphasizes the steadfast resolve of each side to continue the armed struggle, exemplify the ingrained reluctance of both sides to lay down their arms. Photos: Mark Sedra

B·I·C·C 53 brief 22

The Twin Track

suffered by the moderate Unionist and Approach of Nationalist parties to their counterparts occupying the radical poles of Northern Ireland’s political spectrum in the election of 7 June 2001, it the Agreement— became obvious how fragile the compromise of “constructive ambiguities” had become. The First “Fudging” Minister’s resignation in July 2001 coupled with the Secretary of State’s repeated attempts to rescue the power- the Arms sharing institutions by mothballing the cabinet and later by borrowing smaller parties votes to compensate for missing Unionist support—events that transpired amidst intensifying street rying to reach a valid compromise settlement” (Agreement, section 7, violence orchestrated by anti-Agree- Tin a peace agreement that can be para.3, see also Box B). The ment Loyalists—generated a crisis sold as advantageous to all conflicting Agreement itself did not make serious enough to place the whole parties and their constituencies creates disarmament a precondition to the peace process in jeopardy. complex dilemmas, which have, not establishment of governmental without deliberate euphemism, been institutions. The original deadline to In recent months, discussion and described as “constructive ambiguities” achieve decommissioning, “within two debate on the limitations of the (Guelke, 2000; Stevenson, 2000). This years following the endorsement in fundamentally consociational nature of statement appears to be particularly referendums North and South of the the Agreement (including an electoral appropriate when analysing the agreement” (ibid.)—in May 2000— system for the Assembly based on decommissioning debate in Northern became flexible in accordance with this proportional representation of both Ireland since the 1994 peace talks. interpretation of how the overall the Protestant and Catholic implementation would progress. communities, and the power-sharing The Belfast Agreement, a settlement concept of government) has become of an ethno-national conflict achieved The governments in London and more prevalent and lively (McGarry, after inclusive negotiations that Dublin introduced the “fudging” of ed., 2001)). “Since so few severely endeavoured to incorporate the the arms issue as a brokering strategy divided societies have opted for a fully protagonists of an armed struggle, is intended to get the peace process back consociational path, it is difficult to considered to be one of the most on track. The establishment of the foresee how these issues will play out” comprehensive peace accords in the Independent International (Horowitz, in: ibid., p. 104). We are international arena, primarily due to its Commission on Decommissioning inclined to endorse the ideas of Adrian utilisation of a “twin track” approach. (IICD) in 1997, the successor to the Guelke, an acknowledged insider and This approach encapsulates a specially International Body on expert on the Northern Ireland peace designed strategy that facilitates the Decommissioning, that was authorised process, who with particular reference implementation of the political and by special legislation of the Northern to the major changes in Republican security aspects of the settlement in Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act thinking, stated in autumn 2000: “Yet, two parallel corridors. While the (http://www.nio.gov.uk/issues/ despite the weaknesses of the constitutional provisions of the accord, decomm.htm) was a unique example agreement—its ambiguity, its fragility, its consociational and confederal of third party involvement in a non- and its vulnerability to deadlock devices (Brendan O’Leary, in Wilford, UN-brokered peace accord. Equipped because of its mechanisms for ed., 2001, pp. 49–83), seemed to offer a with a practical mandate, the IICD was ensuring that major decisions enjoy firm and unequivocal road to solve the formed to regulate and limit the widespread support across the political dispute over the province’s “fudging” of the technical aspects of province’s sectarian divide—there future, the devices dealing with the disarmament—a task difficult to fulfil remain grounds for expecting the vital security issues of disarmament given the more fundamental problems Northern Irish peace process to and demilitarisation were phrased in an and ambiguities embodied in the survive all its travails” (Guelke, 2000, intentionally vague fashion, accord. p. 21). While such optimistic highlighting the emerging reality that decommissioning would only be solved This “art of the fudge” (Stevenson, “… in the context of the 2000, p.9) kept the peace process alive implementation of the overall throughout the crises of the last few years, but after the electoral losses

54 B·I·C·C ‘‘fudging’’ the arms

assessments are certainly encouraging, around the governmental table; this is a Republicans. There were, of course, critical views, such as those frequently more imposing task than it sounds for reasons behind this imbalance. “The expressed in the non-partisan many of these individuals had never significance of decommissioning lay in Northern Irish left-liberal magazine really talked face-to-face until their first that it was made the touchstone for Fortnight, cannot be omitted. day in office. Security issues were not placating the unionist community According to an editorial of the to be dealt with around this table as throughout the peace process” (Schul- magazine published in the summer of responsibility for such matters rested ze and Smith, 2000, p.81). The 1998,“the institutionalized sectarianism with the British authorities. The twin Unionist position of not joining a of the Assembly will make permanent track approach helped to circumvent government with a party linked to a the catholic/nationalist versus the establishment of mechanisms to private army, and the state’s threat protestant/unionist paradigm” deal with the problem posed by the perception, shaped by the quantity and (Fortnight, Editorial, 372, July-August continued availability of arms among quality of the IRA arsenal (see Box D), 1998, p.5.) the conflicting parties in the province. may have justified the establishment of The matter of ending the war by this one-sided approach towards One may assume that the abandoning the tools of violence decommissioning, but was it a consociational structure of the remained the exclusive domain of politically wise strategy considering agreement, which has shown a British security forces and the IRA, that the removal of all paramilitary tendency to cement sectarianism, was despite an intensification of violence, weapons was the final goal? “Threats adopted regardless of the predominantly carried out by to the peace process have come mainly decommissioning and security issues disillusioned Loyalists. The difficult from dissident groups such as the Real that engendered the establishment of and sensitive process of restructuring IRA, the Continuity IRA, the Loyalist the twin track solution. The power- the state’s monopoly of power in post- Volunteer Force, and the Red Hand sharing model seems to have been the Agreement Northern Ireland included Defenders, which have no political only real governmental option since disarmament of paramilitary representatives, are not parties to the 1973. We want to limit, however, our organisations (with a focus on the Good Friday Agreement, and therefore observations and findings to the illegally held weapons), downsizing of would not be subject to the unionist impact the ambiguities of the Agree- state forces, and the reform of police requirement of decommissioning” ment had on security related issues. In and justice. The fact that the new (Stevenson, 2000, p.15). this context, we will touch on the rarely power-sharing government had discussed problem of the prevailing legitimate stakes but no authorised One may argue that the limitation of partisan approach towards responsibilities in this process, the decommissioning demand to those decommissioning, and thereafter assess prepared the ground for hypocrisy of groups with political representation the attempts to develop a package deal all kinds and permitted the emergence reduced the credibility of the issue as a during the implementation process by of biased approaches and double whole, and in the same vein linking other disputed matters of standards, especially in the represented a subtle admission that security, such as demilitarisation and controversial field of decommissioning neither of the two major Unionist police reform, with the sensitive issue parties felt they possessed the of decommissioning. Most players, during negotiations and necessary clout and support to “use the post-Agreement implementation any influence they may have, to achieve Double standards phase, focused on the the decommissioning of all and hypocrisy: the decommissioning of IRA weapons paramilitary arms”, as stipulated in the when considering disarmament—a decommissioning paragraph of the partisan approach rather narrow interpretation of the Agreement. This unbalanced and towards provisions on decommissioning within “partisan” approach to disarmament decommissioning the Good Friday Agreement. This limited the potential of cross tendency was also reflected in public community conflict resolution initiati- Unlike other post-conflict opinion, which could be discerned in ves, such as addressing the removal of governments, such as those in Lebanon the innumerable newspaper articles the tools of violence on both sides, as or South Africa, the power-sharing written on the issue between April an adequate response to ongoing executive in Belfast was not conceived 1998 and December 2001; over 90 violence. The strategy developed its to be a government of reconciliation percent of these articles referred to own momentum, fostering or of social transformation. Instead, a decommissioning as a requirement for accommodation in the sectarian far more pragmatic approach was trenches and re-invigorating the employed, which simply aimed to fundamental complexities of the assemble all relevant political actors specific Northern Irish conflict

B·I·C·C 55 brief 22

triangle: Unionists – British To summarise an important lesson of also be progress on the other issues Government – Republicans. the Northern Irish peace process: that remain—police reform, so-called Partisan approaches to arms do not demilitarisation and other aspects. We For Republicans it was easy to adhere address the security concerns of all have got to proceed on a broad front.” to their demand for demilitarisation, sides party to the conflict. One can say (Irish Examiner, 8 October 2001) defined as the withdrawal of British that singling out the arms issue in such security forces, while rejecting calls for a manner, by first separating Linking decommissioning, downsizing paramilitary disarmament at the disarmament from other relevant of state forces, and police reform in a sectarian frontlines, for they perceived security concerns and then applying a more coherent framework for this rigid position as the primary means biased or one-sided approach to the negotiation—in response to the IRA’s by which they could underline the arms, deepened division and mistrust unilateral gesture to open its arms legitimacy of their armed struggle. between the parties at a time when dumps to inspection—was undertaken Even in the summer of 2000, the time confidence building and cross sectarian by the two governments in summer of the unprecedented unilateral gesture initiatives were required. The strategy 2000. Although this strategy signified of the IRA on arms dumps virtually guaranteed failure and led to their renunciation of the mindset that inspections, Republican sources did not the process’ degeneration into the decommissioning issue should be make any statement, publicly or deadlock. singled out and approached in relative privately, demanding Loyalist isolation, the package approach was reciprocation. Republican reluctance to The package deal: not immediately and readily accepted make such linkages may have also Linking issues for a as the new norm. The cornerstones for stemmed from their perception of the this new approach, formulated at the UDA as turning more and more into a mutually assured Hillsborough Roundtable on 8 March criminal organisation one would not security 2001 (see p. 45), were placed in cold like to be equated with. storage pending the outcome of the At a pivotal juncture during the subsequent general election. They re- For the Loyalists, the lack of pressure October 2001 crisis, George Mitchell, a emerged in August 2001 in the form of and scrutiny applied to their central facilitator of the peace process a take it-or-leave it letter from the two paramilitary activities appeared to at various critical stages, explained that governments that was addressed to all bolster their determination to avoid while he understood that disarmament the Northern Irish parties: decommissioning until “real steps” remained a difficult issue for the were taken by the IRA, a position that North’s parties, he urged them to “…As we said in Weston Park, while each remained unchanged even after the adopt a more broad-based approach: of the issues—policing, decommissioning, beginning of IRA decommissioning in “It [disarmament] will have to occur, normalisation and the stability of the October 2001. Historically, in the of that I have no doubt. And if there is institutions—is best addressed in its own context of the Irish armed struggle, it going to be any progress there has to terms rather than being seen as a precondition is not surprising that the Loyalists have been as reluctant as Republicans to make arrangements for the disarmament of their weapons. In an allusion to the unknown number of arms caches that were buried, but never handed over, after the Irish Civil War and the northern ‘Troubles’ of the early 1920s, David Ervine, leader of the PUP, the political party related to the UVF, has frequently stated that “rust” would probably be the best solution to the problem of decommissioning.

Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) officers preparing to escort Catholic school children and their parents to Holy Cross Primary School through a fierce Protestant demonstration during the initial days of the Holy Cross dispute (06.09.2001). Photo: dpa

56 B·I·C·C ‘‘fudging’’ the arms

for progress on any other, the Agreement could to follow suit a couple of weeks later, only succeed if all parts of it are implemented whereas Sinn Fein maintained its together. In this context, these proposals set boycott, demanding further out the steps we would take as part of a amendments to the police reform bill. package to secure the full implementation of the Agreement” (Northern Ireland Confronting the most contentious Office/Department of Foreign Affairs, issues with what can be described as a Implementation of the Good Friday “package” approach, permitting Agreement, 1 August 2001). gradual and unilateral steps on all issues as well as the reciprocation of The package delineated a new strategy aims, promotes a better understanding to end the crisis of deadlock that of the security concerns of all sides. gripped the peace process. It One can describe this approach—using demanded mutual respect and joint a distant analogy to conflict resolution action of the parties—something that experienced in the détente phase of the in the following weeks would only be Cold War—as a reaching-out for a delivered in a gradual piecemeal mutually assured concept of “common fashion. security”. In the case of Northern Ireland, this may appear to be overly On 6 August 2001 the IRA offered a optimistic, as the package is still lacking new disarmament plan reaffirming its universal acceptance within the determination to put its arms province. completely and verifiably beyond use, a move that was welcomed by the IICD The surprising start of and positively reflected in the interna- decommissioning in October 2001 tional media (Washington Post, 7 August must also be explained through an 2001). It pledged to cooperate in good analysis of several other factors. A faith with the IICD by providing solution to the disturbing rise of further details on schemes and Loyalist violence has not been methods of decommissioning. In incorporated into the package, as of retrospect, it turned out that the yet. However, a credible pattern of method of decommissioning used on implementation for the Belfast Agree- 23 October 2001 had, in actuality, been ment has been established through the already agreed upon with the IICD in Weston Park package. One day after 23 August. At that time, however, David October 2001, in an immediate Trimble rejected the IRA offer on the response to the IRA move, the Prime grounds that it was not enough to Minister’s official spokesman satisfy his party’s demands, a move that announced that four security prompted the IRA to withdraw its installations would be dismantled proposals. “logistically and physically as quickly as possible” (BBC News, 24 October Since there was no positive response to 2001). The statement, indicating the the package deal before the 12 August Government’s intention to fulfil its deadline for the re-election of a First pledge to intensify demilitarisation in and Deputy Minister, Northern Ireland response to IRA concessions on Secretary John Reid suspended the decommissioning, was referring to an institutions for twenty-four hours, only army/RUC base in Magherafelt near to reinstate them thereafter; this gave Cookstown, three bases in South the parties another six weeks to act on Armagh, the army /RUC base in the proposed package. A positive signal Newtownhamilton, and the came in August when the SDLP signed watchtowers in Sturgon and Camlough. up to the Policing Board, thereby consenting to the new implementation plan for the police. This courageous decision compelled the UUP and DUP

B·I·C·C 57 brief 22

Matters of Trust:

international aura. It is somewhat External and paradoxical that a conflict which has never posed a genuine threat to international security and never been subjected to UN mediation or Internal intervention would become so internationalised. Outside involvement in Northern Ireland would prove its Involvement for relevance predominantly for the unsolved domestic security issues of a protracted low-intensity conflict, and in Disarmament particular for the solution of the impasse surrounding decommissioning. The most evident examples are George Mitchell’s brokering role for the peace accord and the review process of the orthern Ireland serves as a superb Decommissioning, which, with a Agreement in autumn 1999, the Nexample of how a peace process limited mandate, was grappling with Agreement’s provision for independent can be influenced and affected by a the most contentious issue of the international commissions on complex interplay of exogenous and peace process. Civil society, after decommissioning and policing, and the endogenous stimuli. External numerous creative interventions during role of the international inspectors governmental and non-governmental the peace talks that were not always visiting IRA arms dumps since summer actors, and internal players, whether enthusiastically appreciated by local 2000. they be the conflict’s principal political politicians, including its profound protagonists or elements of civil public appeals in the “Yes Campaign” The manner in which a concert of society, have interacted in a manner that ultimately led to the referendum powerful outsiders assumed that has produced a tenuous division of May 1998 (Oliver, 1998), were guardianship of the peace process of labour that has exhibited severe deprived of their influence on policy should not necessarily be equated with imbalances during various phases of when the implementation process was genuine third party intervention. Most the peace process. We would agree that narrowed down to the unproductive external actors chose to adopt an this interplay, which can be described “guns versus government” controversy. approach emphasizing facilitation as first-, and second-track diplomacy rather than intervention; the (Fitzduff, 2001), has been vital in “neutrality” of third parties was developing trust and dialogue across Outsiders: How regularly contested by local politicians sectarian lines between 1994 and 1998, neutral can they get? in Northern Ireland; “they had to be and, most importantly, for achieving a approved by the British and Irish political settlement to the enduring governments and yet retain enough conflict with the signing of the peace The specifics of external involvement in Northern Ireland (Mac Ginty, 1997; distance from the governments to be accord in April 1998. Nonetheless, the Arthur, 2000; Grove, 2001; Mac Ginty regarded as truly independent” (Mac post-Agreement implementation phase, and Darby, 2002, pp. 106-122)—the Ginty and Darby, 2002, p.120). which can be described as the crucial British-Irish guardianship forming a Nationalists and Republicans have, second phase of peace-building, unique “tandem” model of bipartisan above all other groups, demonstrated suffered a great deal from the lack of an ardent determination to new impulses for confidence-building. conflict management inaugurated by the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, internationalise the conflict. The emergent American interventionism premise upon which this position has What happened? An impact of the during the Clinton administration in been based is that the ultimate Agreement, which can be elucidated as response to the impassioned overarching political goal of a united the top-down effect, curtailed the exhortations of the Irish-American Ireland can only be achieved with Irish flexibility of both external third parties and US involvement in the peace and internal bottom up initiatives: The diaspora, and the Special Support Programme of the EU since 1994— process. In contrast, Unionists and prominent outside facilitator of have given the conflict a distinctly Loyalists, endeavouring to reaffirm negotiations, former US-Senator their British identity, have been wary of George Mitchell, left the stage, placing faith or trust in initiatives abandoning the Commission on

58 B·I·C·C third party involvement

facilitated by the United States, and to their own particularistic goals. statements, the Chairman of the especially those that involve Ireland; Accordingly, the positive, neutral and Commission, Canadian ex-General they doubt their capacity for moderating effects of international John de Chastelain, wrote in 1998: impartiality. Several channels of reputation and third party credibility communication were opened between may become overruled by domestic “Our principal usefulness to the process must the Dublin government, the Ulster partisan interests. We intend to focus lie in our impartiality and neutrality. As we Unionists and even the Loyalist on the effect of the third party stated in the report of the International Body paramilitaries in the mid-1990s to initiatives established to facilitate the in 1996: We have no stake in Northern overcome these reservations and build implementation of the Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end confidence; however, these efforts decommissioning provisions of the to the conflict and in the ability of its people dissipated during the post-Agreement Agreement. Specifically, we will analyse to live in peace. Our role is to bring in an period, leading to a renewal of the work of the Independent Interna- independent perspective to the issue” (De sentiments of alienation among tional Commission on Chastelain, 1998, p.15). Protestants (Fitzduff, 2001, p.115). Decommissioning (IICD) and the They clearly expressed their fear of international arms inspectors who The Commission’s mandate to possible joint authority exercised by an began their examinations of IRA arms “monitor, review and verify progress ever-strengthening London-Dublin dumps in the summer of 2000. on decommissioning of illegal arms, axis, which they perceived to be and (will) report to both Governments looming over the province at times of About mandates, at regular intervals” was crisis such as that which transpired in methods and institutionalised in the Agreement spring 2000 (Irish Times, 20 May 2000). (Agreement, section 7, para.3, see also mindsets: Commission Box B), simultaneously highlighting the A reality of most conflicts in which and inspection great extent of British-Irish control of identity is defined in terms of ethnicity, the process and the need for additional nationalism or religion is “that the role As stated earlier, the IICD was formed independent third party involvement. played by international actors is through a unique provision of the affected by how domestic actors peace accord in order to supervise— The Commission enjoyed broad based perceive, cultivate, and bring attention through consultation, acceptance across the political divide at to the linkages between the two recommendation, execution and the time of its implementation, when spheres” (Grove, 2001, p. 357); report—the disarmament process all paramilitary organisations were Northern Ireland is no different. The without disturbing the general political required to appoint representatives to leadership of each party tends to seek settlement. In one of his rare public liase with the commission. However, as external backing that is most amenable the decommissioning process lapsed into paralysis, the Commission’s support base gradually dwindled, especially among sceptical Ulster Unionists. Apart from the handing in of a smaller number of LVF munitions in December 1998, no progress on actual decommissioning was made throughout the whole year of 1999. It was one of the paradoxes of the peace process, that following unprecedented growth of optimism in January 2000 (after the successful review of the Agreement’s implementation by George Mitchell and the setting up of the governmental institutions), the actual low point of trust would be reached between the dominant political players, culminating in the suspension of the Stormont executive on 11 February by Northern Ireland Secretary Peter Mandelson. The three commissioners of the IICD. From left to right, General John de Chastelain, Brigadier Tauno Nieminen, who left the commission in November 2001, and Andrew D. Sens (01.11.2001). Photo: Aaro Suonio/IICD

B·I·C·C 59 brief 22

In spite of an intensification of the welcomed ‘the IRA’s recognition that the issue First, they possessed international Commission’s efforts and activities, of arms needs to be dealt with in an reputations robust enough to receive exemplified by several meetings held acceptable way …’ and their apparent the endorsement of both Unionists with IRA, UVF and UFF willingness ‘to initiate a comprehensive process and Republicans, and secondly, they representatives and its release of three to put arms beyond use, in a manner as to brought with them a strategy of reports between the end of December ensure maximum public confidence’. Given the decommissioning that was soft enough 1999 and 12 February 2000, its actual lack of an unconditional agreement to start to respect Sinn Fein’s concerns about capacity to positively influence the decommissioning … the Secretary of State propagating the image that they had distrustful mindsets remained limited. suspended the Executive and re-imposed direct surrendered, an image that had the The first two reports contained rule. Shortly afterwards, the IRA potential to divide and enflame their conflicting information concerning the representative contacted us and said he would constituency. level of commitment displayed by the soon announce that he was breaking off paramilitaries and uncertainty in regard contact with us and withdraw the proposals The introduction of two supervisors to the timing and methods by which given us to date’’ (De Chastelain, 2001, noted for their skill in confronting the process would be initiated; in their pp. 9–10). thorny cases of conflict resolution— January 2000 report the Commission Martti Ahtisaari lately as a mediator in added, “that if at any time we believed Within John de Chastelain’s sober the Kosovo crisis—underlined the decommissioning would not happen, recollection one can sense his decisive influence of the South African we would recommend that we would profound disappointment and case study on the thinking of Northern be disbanded” (De Chastelain, 2001, frustration with the Commission’s Ireland’s party leaders. Having met p. 9) Embodied in this statement was a inability to restore confidence in the central South African figures, including twofold message: it recognised the peace process at such a critical Cyril Ramaphosa, in Arniston, South inherent obstacles inhibiting the juncture. Indeed, the conditions Africa in May 1997 (O’Malley, 2000) process and asked for confidence in regarding overall implementation that during a crucial phase of the Northern any realistic assessment by the were established in the IRA’s statement Ireland peace process, Unionist and Commission. The latter seemed went beyond the primarily practical Republicans alike appropriated a deep difficult to achieve even after the mandate of the Commission, making it reservoir of lessons derived during the Commission’s third report of 12 exceedingly difficult for the IICD to South African conflict to draw upon February, following the IRA’s last assume a more proactive approach. and apply in Northern Ireland, one minute, though significant, The failure of 11 February 2000 being to accept impartial support from announcement to put arms beyond demonstrated, yet again, the salience of outside. Although enthusiasm faded use. one of Northern Ireland’s central after the first positive reactions to the political tenets, that the inspections and distrust returned on The Commission’s difficulties to guide implementation of technical methods the Unionist side in autumn 2000, it the process through crises were never and schemes of disarmament should was, in retrospect, an unprecedented more apparent than in February 2000 only occur after a sustained period of act of externally-supported following a significant setback. John de confidence building. confidence-building—a way in which Chastelain provides a vivid description the Republicans could declare that “the of this episode and his impressions of In the end, it was the urgent need for a war is over” without actually saying it its impact in the following passage: fresh start, for more creativity and (Irish Times, 13 May 2000)—that got the flexibility in regard to the political and peace process back on track. ‘‘On 11 February, in a meeting with the IRA the technical aspects of confidence- representative, we were given a statement building, which produced, after weeks The creative potential of the which we felt offered some promise on of arduous behind-the-scene-talks with inspectors’ method, a “dual-keys” movement. This was to the effect that the IRA the two governments, a promising system similarly pioneered in the UN- would ‘consider a process to put arms beyond third party initiative that aspired to assisted El Salvador peace process use’ in the context of the overall breathe new life into a seemingly (Laurance and Godnick, 2001), which implementation of the Agreement and the hopeless situation. The involvement of ensured that inspected arms dumps resolution of the causes of conflict. While the two international arms inspectors, the could not be opened unilaterally, statement did not say the IRA would former Finnish President Martti worked as a door opener of a different decommission, and while it seemed to put Ahtisaari, with a long career in kind. It can be safely assumed that the political conditions on their doing so that were diplomacy within the United Nations, inspections served as a catalyst for the outside our mandate to consider, it nonetheless and the ex-ANC Secretary-General emergence of more in-depth contained words the representative had not Cyril Ramaphosa, who was the chief- consideration of practical methods to used before. In our report that day we negotiator in the talks that spawned the new South African constitution, fulfilled two parallel requirements:

60 B·I·C·C third party involvement

put the arms beyond use. The IICD, this event” (see Box F). This referred IRA and the two governments” (Irish which had to confirm the successful to the method, quantity and visual Times, 8 September 2001) appeared to execution of the inspections, made a evidence of the arms that were put be archaic rhetoric that belonged to a point of reminding observers that it beyond use. In an effort to compensate past generation. In contrast, the British was solely a confidence-building for the process’ lack of transparency— Government’s statement following the measure and the actual process of confidentiality was a condition set by 23 October 2001 pointed to the tasks decommissioning would have to follow. the Republicans—De Chastelain that laid ahead: It was in the aftermath of the first invited Ulster Unionist leaders to a arms inspection, though, that the two special meeting in order to assure them “Today’s report reinforces and confirms the governments began to encourage the that the decommissioning event was Government’s view that it is only through the Commission to investigate “further significant. A transcript of the meeting IICD that the putting of paramilitary arms proposals for decommissioning was released to the public thereafter beyond use can be achieved. The IRA’s move schemes which offer the Commission a (UTV Internet, 26 October 2001). In an represents by far the most significant progress greater scope to proceed in more act that served to reassure the in the resolution of the arms issue. All effective and satisfactory ways with the population of Northern Ireland and paramilitary groups need now to play their discharging of its basic mandate” (De the international community, the media part to build on this progress. We are grateful Chastelain, 2001, p. 13). reported extensively on this meeting: to the IICD for their patient work” (http:// www.nio.gov.uk/press/ The process of confidence-building, “Mr. Trimble said Gen. John de Chastelain 011023gov.htm). furthered significantly by the of Canada, head of the disarmament panel, inspections, stimulated a redefinition had told him he had personally witnessed the Lessons learned of the concept of decommissioning; it destruction of the I.R.A. weapons and was assumed a meaning encapsulated in the assured that they could ‘never, ever be used It seems too early to write a history of phrase, “putting arms beyond use”. again.’ Mr. Trimble said the panel had a the Commission, especially since the The actual methods of arms complete list of the incapacitated weaponry process of removing the gun and destruction, accorded little attention and that the secret method of destruction was bomb from Northern Irish politics is and importance when the issue first convincing. ‘It is much more than the concrete far from being over. And many details attained prominence, gradually came to capping over of arms dumps that some have of those hours, which “the Canadian be viewed as critical. The inspectors, described,’ he said” (New York Times, 24 general spent waiting patiently, keeping who revisited the same two arms October 2001). open lines of communication which dumps two more times, in October might have been severed were it not 2000 and in May 2001 (http:// At the time, it seemed not to matter for his quiet perseverance” (The Herald, www.nio.gov.uk/press/010530dca- how exactly the hatchet was buried. 24 October 2001), may never be nio.htm), became closely linked to the Convincing Ulster Unionists that the revealed. One may assume though— actual pursuit of the Commission to manner in which it was carried out was without underestimating other find and communicate a means of “a matter of trust” (Sunday Independent, factors—that the third party capacity decommissioning satisfactory to all 28 October 2001) was as important to of the Commission to develop, over players. the Chairman of the Commission as the years, a deeper and more the actual act of implementation. For empathetic understanding of the Speculation arose that it was the the process to continue, the historical and political nature of the inspected locations, supposedly Commission had to satisfy Northern Northern Irish arms game was a key to containing half of the IRA’s entire Ireland’s “core triangle” of conflicting its successful efforts to kick-start the arsenal (Sunday Independent, 26.8.2001) parties: Ulster Unionists, Republicans process. that was the subject of the IRA’s and the British Government. The fact historic statement of 23 October 2001 that most of these parties bestowed It was not only an unprecedented act in (see Box E). Since the process was their trust on the Commission in spite Irish history, but may, in the context of confidential, the actual scheme that was of the secrecy surrounding the details conflict resolution, provide a few implemented, a method the IICD had of the act reinvigorated its third party lessons for the international debate on agreed upon in August, was not made position in the process, a role that had problems of small arms availability, public. The Commission explained in been questioned at times of crisis. methods of controlling their access its report “that it would not further the DUP leader Ian Paisley’s affirmation and demand, and schemes for process of putting all arms beyond that “he [De Chastelain] and the disarmament: were we to provide further details of decommissioning body are nothing more than a pawn being used by the

B·I·C·C 61 brief 22

Making disarmament a condition February 2002. However, Northern and free floating arms within the for political participation or Ireland Secretary John Reid has asked stocks of both Republicans and inclusion may lead to no-go- the Commons to back the Northern Loyalists. Burying the hatchet may take situations, while political and social Ireland Arms Decommissioning different routes. The history of the empowerment may serve as (Amendment) Bill to extend the conflict shows that this will not be a incentives for disarmament. deadline for another year, with the task that can be tackled solely by either option for further extensions up to of the two “godmothers” in London In a case of protracted distrust 2007 (BBC News, 9 January 2002). This and Dublin. Further external support, among conflicting parties, setting up move has aroused resounding criticism increased involvement of civil society a mutually agreed control from anti-Agreement Unionists such as in anti-sectarian initiatives, as well as mechanism such as the regular North Belfast DUP MP Nigel Dodds patience and creativity in the inspection of “surplus” weapons who has claimed that the purpose of development of new methods of that have been rendered obsolete the initiative is to “bury the issue so disarmament are required for progress. may be a crucial step of confidence- that no deadlines will cause the Tackling the problems of handguns, building prior to substantive government or David Trimble any automatic rifles, and the components disarmament. immediate problems” (ibid.). used to make petrol bombs may demand different strategies than those Disarmament itself can have many A remarkable comment came from used to confront the dilemmas posed features and should be shaped in former Irish Fine Gael leader John by sophisticated weaponry like SAM–7 accordance to the political history Bruton, who set up the ground-to-air missiles and Semtex of the gun holders and the decommissioning body in agreement explosives (see Box D). conditions necessary for the overall with British Prime Minister Tony Blair settlement of the conflict. in 1997: “There is a difficulty if the John Reid, whose leadership on the State, in any long term basis is overall implementation of the Agree- Secret dismantling procedures or the ‘subcontracting’ its obligations, to ment was apparently more successful sealing of arms arsenals under third ensure there is no illegal army in the than his predecessor’s in stimulating party observation may be as State, to another body—namely the change on the arms issue, assessed the symbolically valuable and satisfying international commission which is not standing of the peace process as public acts of destruction. disclosing information to the following the IRA move: “It won’t be Confidence-building may be Government … An international finished for a generation. Ultimately, it advanced by confidentiality. commission [was] a ‘valid enough is culture and the mindset that has to mechanism’ on a short term basis be decommissioned” (Sunday Telegraph, The road ahead only” (Irish Independent, 28 October 28 October 2001). 2001). The prospect of Sinn Féin Rather then saluting the Commission’s becoming a substantial force on the achievement with a farewell address, it Irish political landscape after the was acknowledged that their role would Republic’s next general election, a remain substantial for the foreseeable conceivable outcome according to early time ahead. The IRA move would not polls, has filled Ireland’s traditional be regarded as a one-off event but as a parties with apprehension and put start for further acts of putting them on the offensive (Irish Examiner, paramilitary arms beyond use. January 9, 2002). The IRA may However, the refusal of Loyalist consider their next move to put arms groups to consider reciprocating moves beyond use ahead of the Irish on their arms is a harbinger of the elections. The implementation should profound obstacles that lie ahead. The further rest in the reliable hands of the target date for the completion of Commission. To prepare for possible decommissioning has been moved. domestic challenges, Irish politicians Current legislation stipulates that should not deliberate over releasing Republican and Loyalist groups are “the subcontractor” and throw over obligated to legally put their weapons board the overall positive experience beyond use under the supervision of of the third party involvement of the the Independent International Commission. Decommissioning Commission by 26 The lessons learned in the last few years about how to take the gun out of Irish politics must still be applied to a large number of silent, loud, buried,

62 B·I·C·C cultures and markets of violence

Proliferation of

spectrum, was apparently perceived to Violence and be less relevant than other factors. We will attempt to peer behind this paradoxical wall to analyse why there has been such difficulties in dealing the Momentum with post-Agreement violence, particularly in relation to the issue of of Arms decommissioning. Diversification of inter-, and intra- sectarian violence he start of decommissioning in the peace process changed, diffused, October 2001 has not yet helped and fragmented, the nature of violence T John Darby identifies a diverse array of to halt the proliferation of violence altered accordingly. The form of types and patterns of violence that that has burdened the Northern Irish violence that has evolved in the pose a threat to the transformation peace process over the last eighteen province has proved to be more period of a conflict: months. Deriving a connection difficult to tackle than the mainly between decommissioning and the politically motivated violence that level of paramilitary violence may seem prevailed prior to the Agreement. the changing role of state violence; odd at first glance, however, a closer examination reveals a distinct Top level political debate and crisis paramilitary violence with a possible return to politically motivated correlation between the two. The management regarding the violence, the use of “tactical” object or purpose of decommissioning implementation of the Good Friday violence, the spoiler dilemma of is not limited to the physical removal Agreement seemingly left little room to zealots versus dealers, and intra- of paramilitary arms from Northern address these new problems in an paramilitary forms of “family Ireland; it also aims to obliterate the adequate manner. Somewhere along feuding”; culture of violence that engulfs this the road from the Agreement’s divided, war-torn society. negotiation to the beginning of its implementation phase, the distinction violence in the community with ethnic rivals returning to the streets, In the following passage Darby and between the overarching commitment resulting in a rise in “ordinary Mac Ginty provide a superb analysis of to non-violent means outlined in the decent crime”; the omnipresent threat that violence Mitchell principles (see Box A), and the poses to peace processes: method of handling the decommis- the emergence of new security sioning issue in a broad cross-sectarian related issues in negotiations “The most obvious threat to any peace process context of confronting violence, was (Darby, 2000). is that violence may start up again. Indeed it blurred. seems likely that a combination of factors A combination of the second, third, would make its return inevitable: an One of the significant findings of this and, to a certain degree, the last type entrenched culture of violence; the continuing study is that the arduous of violence appears to be relevant in presence of arms; failure to move towards decommissioning debate rarely touched the case of Northern Ireland, successful negotiations and compromise; and on the problems that have emerged as particularly in the post-Agreement unwillingness to remove the security apparatus a result of the gradual metamorphosis period. erected during the period of violence. The key of violence since the signing of the question then is the resilience of the peace Agreement. The proliferation of The outbreak, late in the summer of process itself, and its ability to continue, violence did not become a major public 2000, of a violent intra-Loyalist feud despite a resumption of violence …”(Darby argument in favour of an between the two major paramilitary and Mac Ginty, 2000, pp.12–13). intensification of decommissioning. groups, the UDA/UFF and the UVF, Demands for decommissioning were over territorial claims in Belfast’s Like most societies emerging from a rarely expressed as a means to halt the Shankill area caused the deaths of at protracted, violent conflict, Northern escalating violence. A wall of para- least seven people and led to the Ireland has faced a continuation, and at doxes seemed to separate the two expulsion of more than 70 families. In times a proliferation, of violence after debates. The availability of arms, an spring 2001, the Loyalist “family feud” the declaration or resumption of cease- evident linkage that has been spilled over the sectarian divide in the fires—in 1994 and 1997—and even acknowledged as a factor that created form of threats and attacks on after the settlement of the peace its own momentum in the vicious circle Catholic homes in Belfast, the most accord of 1998. As the interests and of violence by virtually every interview priorities of the conflicting parties in partner on both sides of the political

B·I·C·C 63 brief 22

severe anti-Catholic violence of the last intimidation, racketeering, and of Northern Ireland (PSNI) was two three years. At the same time, dissident violence, stood at more than 840. After thirds higher than planned (UTVNET, Republican groups such as the Real releasing these figures, Northern 30 January 2002). Speaking about IRA stepped up their spoiler campaign, Ireland Security Minister Jane Kennedy police reform, Sinn Fein leader Gerry targeting British army barracks in the revealed that “loyalist paramilitaries Adams complained about the lack of province and the BBC building in have been responsible for three times prosecutions against Loyalists for their London. as many terror attacks as republicans “campaign of violence against the this year” (BBC News, 7 November nationalist community, in certain However, the most bitter return to 2001). sectarian flashpoints such as north violence in the community occurred in Belfast” (UTV Internet, 20 February September 2001 when Protestant Two dominant trends, an increasing 2002). residents of the small religiously mixed intra-Loyalist confrontation, and an North Belfast community of Ardoyne aggravating anti-Catholic campaign in On 18 January 2002, tens of thousands attempted—by hurling abuses and which the assassination of the Catholic of people turned out for rallies in throwing pipe bombs—to block postal worker Daniel McColgan in Belfast, Derry and other centres to Catholic parents from walking their January 2002 was the latest heinous act, protest against sectarian violence. The children to Holy Cross Primary School. illustrates the growing resolve of the demonstration supported by the trade The Ardoyne school dispute, which at UDA, the largest Loyalist paramilitary unions and the pro-Agreement parties the time of writing was on a slow and group, to turn its back on the peace was one of the largest rallies seen in cautious path towards a settlement, process. The UDA campaign, greeted Northern Ireland. A resolution put primarily due to the provision of with concern and condemnation by forth at the demonstration called for mediation and an improvement of both politicians and the Northern Irish an end to any form of bigotry and security precautions, provoked horror public, has given rise to many political sectarianism and exhorted paramilitary and dismay in Northern Ireland and and security related reactions. organisations to disband; John Reid throughout the international said “that it was now time for people community; it vividly reflected the The British Government decided in to reclaim society from those who were deep-rooted sectarian hatred and fear, October 2001 that the UDA cease-fire filled with hatred” (Irish Times, 18 as well as the overall “culture of was over. The Northern Ireland January 2002). violence” that obdurately remains Secretary appealed to the victims of entrenched in these communities. the expulsions and their families to co- It is clear that the winds of change are operate with the reformed police blowing, not in the form that the Although the Ardoyne situation is far service in Ulster to lift the death violence has taken but in the from typical in terms of the manner in threats issued by the paramilitaries (The willingness of people to accept which the Protestant and Catholic Independent, 6 January 2002). Since a ownership of it. What is behind this communities interact in today’s heightened level of violence endured, development? What is impelling the Northern Ireland, one can find similar recruitment into the new Police Service silent majority, whose voices have, for trends emerging in analyses of general statistics on casualties caused by paramilitary-style attacks (http:// www.psni.police.uk/stats/ securitysit.shtml): The year 2001 witnessed a disturbing statistical rise in sectarian attacks: there was a total of 331 casualties; (1998: 216; 1999: 207; 2000: 268), 186 shootings and 145 assaults, the latter mainly of the variety referred to as “punishment beatings”. The statistics also demonstrate that Loyalists were responsible for a disproportionately large share of the attacks; they carried out twice as many attacks as Republicans. It was reported in November 2001 that the overall number of paramilitary-related violent acts carried out in that year, including A Republican mural depicting the Holy Cross crisis in a Catholic district of the religiously mixed Ardoyne area of North Belfast (2002). Photo: Mark Sedra

64 B·I·C·C cultures and markets of violence

the most part, been dormant The demise of the UDA’s political arm, throughout the years of the the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) on decommissioning deadlock, to enter 26 November 2001 signalled—in a the political fray and raise objections to highly disturbing fashion—the inability the proliferation of sectarian violence? of a dominant strand of the Loyalist movement to achieve legitimate and Not included: Loyalist credible political representation. The feeling of political irrelevance and dilemmas exclusion has haunted working-class Loyalists since the beginning of the The UDA demonstrated its growing Troubles; electoral failure strengthened identity crisis, engendered by the those forces within the UDA who were changing political landscape, in their unhappy with the political direction the immediate defiant response to the peace process had taken, writes IRA’s historic decommissioning commentator Jack Holland. According announcement: “We’ll keep our to Holland: guns…The IRA will never hand over their weapons. Nobody will. They’ll A poster campaign to reverse the focus on hand over some as gesture, but that’s “The UDA, never as well organized as the Republican arms (1999). Photo: Corinna it”(The Times, 23 October 2001); Jackie Ulster Volunteer Force, began to fragment. A Hauswedell McDonald, a former commander of faction under Johnny Adair wanted to resume the UDA who spent ten years in the violence while using the UDA’s resources to Maze prison for terrorist offences, said run a profitable drug-smuggling operation. dilemma, which have traditionally been that the paramilitaries would keep their Several “brigades” threatened to go indepen- overlooked and neglected in Northern weapons to defend Loyalist dent. …The respectable Protestant working- Irish society: communities against the threat of class vote eluded it, and there was never any Republican attacks (ibid.). The ardent chance that middle-class Unionists would be “For a whole swathe of young working-class determination of Loyalists to hang on tempted to a party with such criminal links. Protestants, rioting provides an exciting to their arms is reinforced by their In the end, the UDP manifested all the interlude in otherwise hopeless lives…. conviction to maintain a “narrative of contradictions that were inherent within the Economic prospects are correspondingly poor. defence” (Zurawski, 2001), an outdated UDA from the start … and men who Housing conditions are, arguably, worse in the pattern of identity that serves to justify aspired to real politics stood alongside pure Protestant areas. The relatively flourishing incitement, retribution, and retaliation, criminals. Unfortunately, it was this, the dark Catholic community is growing numerically and thereby encourage the side of the UDA, that finally won the battle while the Protestant community contracts. perpetuation of the self fulfilling cycle for the soul of the organization” (Irish Echo, What many middle-class Protestants can of violence. 14 December 2001). rationalise as symbolic issues marginal to the constitutional position are seen by poor A broad public debate has been One hopeful aspect of this kind of Protestants as erosion of their intrinsic triggered, due to the continued public analysis is that some of the identity” (Irish Times, 17 January 2002). sectarian tension and confrontation in central findings are gaining increasingly the Ardoyne and elsewhere, about the mainstream acceptance, both The Protestant middle class opted out deep-rooted frustration that exists internationally and within Ulster of the gloomy and sloping route within Loyalism. The shift in attention Unionism. In early 2002, President through the Troubles. For the Loyalist towards the grievances, fears and Bush’s envoy to Northern Ireland, working class—who joined disillusionment that are commonplace Richard Haas, called for more paramilitary organisations in larger within impoverished Protestant “sensitivity” towards Loyalist violence, numbers than their Republican working class areas, should be as it stemmed “from painful counterparts—it was this route that interpreted as a positive reflex of the transition”; Haas warned of the served to scatter the community and Northern Irish peace process. Moving dangers posed by a reversal of dilute its identity. This route led the beyond the customary provision of historical trends, creating a “cold community into social and political sympathy for the victims and the house” for Protestants (Irish Independent, exclusion, transforming its fundamental issuance of stern condemnations of 10 January 2002; Guardian, 12 January outlook and purpose from one that the perpetrators, efforts to encourage 2002). Personal advisors to David valued the honourable calling of public understanding of the root Trimble, such as Alex Kane “defending the community” into one, causes of violence is a relatively new (NewsLetter, 4 February 2002 ) and devoid of morality and ethics, which and progressive approach to the Steven King, have recently stressed the engaged in ordinary crime. While a complexities of peacemaking. political relevance of the socio- economic aspects of the Loyalist

B·I·C·C 65 brief 22

growing sense of political and social paramilitarism, has not yet been opened to jump-start the process. inclusion has helped draw released. One may assume, though, Northern Ireland’s peace is entering a Republicanism into the peace process that next to the already mentioned critical phase in which its security and has made them more amenable to social and “cultural” pillars of related roles and identities are the prospect of putting their arms paramilitarism, economic resources undergoing a transformation; this beyond use, the underlying sentiment developed over the years of violent sweeping change will affect virtually within Loyalism, that the process is conflict have become an increasingly every aspect of the peace process, unfair and owes them essential rewards, crucial factor sustaining paramilitary from personal and community based persists. power; it possesses the potential to perceptions of safety to the state’s escalate violence and augment the monopoly of power. Efforts and “Cultures” and availability of arms. Drug dealing— consultations aiming to build a “markets” of violence some observers affirm that since the mutually agreed “common security” mid-90s there has been a 500–1000% approach in Northern Ireland have increase in drug usage within Prot- begun but remain at a rudimentary The remaining challenges and hurdles estant working class areas—as well as stage of development—in a that face the peace process are not trade in tax-free petrol and other community like Ardoyne, it simply limited to Loyalist dilemmas. We are profitable goods has fuelled the does not exist. Literally caught between confident that assessments of relevant development of a self-sustaining sectarian lines, the RUC was criticised sociological aspects of diversified paramilitary economic base. To get an by both sides for its handling of the violence in transitional Northern accurate picture of this problem, it may school dispute. Regardless of the Ireland will prove to be valuable for the become necessary to analyse efficacy of the RUC’s strategy to ongoing peace process. Placing the characteristics of Northern Ireland’s confront the crisis, it was much too arms issue into the broader context of “markets of violence” (Elwert, 1999), a serious and volatile to lend credence to demilitarising and civilising post- concept used to frame research on the North Belfast DUP MP Nigel Dodds’ conflict society will create space for an economic dimensions of protracted assessment: “If we did not have this indispensable debate on the civil wars. The fact that among recent excessive security presence I’m sure the transformation of paramilitary paramilitary-related assassinations, girls could walk safely to organisations (see Box C). suspected drug dealers were high on school”(Washington Post, 4 September the list, and that here, as in many other 2001). Republican reluctance to join When tackling the problem of paramilitary assaults, perpetrators the new Policing Board at a time when violence, the mistake of approaching could not be convicted, illustrates the they feel that accountability to the the arms issue in a partisan manner difficulties for both the community and community provided by the Patten should not be repeated. “Cultural a new police force struggling to recommendations has not been paramilitarism” is a decades old implement fundamental reform posed secured, also stems from the existence paradigm of Northern Irish history on by the existence of opposing of an inherent and entrenched both sides of the ethno-political divide; paramilitary agendas. Northern Irish resistance to change within the police people have accustomed themselves to society is now faced with the imposing force, aptly described as a “‘police its structures, whether out of task of combating new patterns of culture’ …[with] a sectarian sympathy, fear, or revulsion. Its main “ordinary crime” that have precariously overlay”(Mc Ginty and Darby, 2002, p. pillar, a macho-type surrogate police positioned themselves between the 102). Sinn Fein’s security spokesman, structure of vigilantism with a strong traditional political boundaries of the Gerry Kelly, recently re-affirmed his anti-state attitude, was erected during conflict. party’s concern that “the baleful the Troubles and maintains an “alterna- influence of the Special Branch [of the tive” model of order and control in the police] and their relationship with the community (Zurawski, 2001) that has The necessity of UDA remain intact” (Irish Times, 19 been fundamentally questioned by the transforming February 2002). On the other hand, the peace process. paramilitarism full support of Republicans is urgently required for the nascent police “Paramilitary groups [appear] more The time has come to rethink the role structures to function properly in a influential than politicians”, according of paramilitarism as a whole, its new cross-sectarian way. to a headline of a recently carried-out ideological, social and structural roots, research paper conduced for the as well as its basic framework. With the Transformation rather than Belfast City Council. (Irish Times, 9 IRA starting to put their arms beyond disbandment was the term chosen for January 2002). The survey’s results, use, weapons that were silent and not police reform by Chris Patten in 1999. which are based on the responses of readily available on the streets, a One can envisage a similar approach 1,583 residents to questions regarding window of opportunity has been the political influence of

66 B·I·C·C cultures and markets of violence

being used to facilitate the conversion Politicians must endeavour to Accordingly, questions whether it is of paramilitarism. What has been enhance political inclusion, augment “time for an Ulster truth commission” stated about the arms issue, namely social and economic integration, and (Belfast Telegraph, 10 February 2002) that the symbolic value of guns develop a more efficient system to have been raised more loudly. The surpasses their inherent military sanction and prosecute crime. changing atmosphere in the province potential, is also true for Northern Economies which fuel violence have was reflected in a significant statement Ireland’s paramilitary organisations. It to be dried out. of Gerry Adams at the World will require a high degree of sensitivity Economic Forum in New York: “I from inside and outside the Silent spring 2002? don’t think we can force on unionism organisations to adequately deal with an all-Ireland state that doesn’t have their cultural legacies and devastating For 2002, the overall picture for their assent or consent and doesn’t past, and to define routes into civil Northern Ireland’s peace process does reflect their sense of being society. Apart from the experience of not appear all that gloomy after all. comfortable” (The Irish Times, 5 ex-prisoners’ (re)integration during the This is especially apparent when one February 2002). Troubles, and particularly in the compares the relatively tranquil spring context of the 1998 Agreement’s early of 2002 with the crisis-ridden springs Four years after the Good Friday release formula (Gormally, 2001), no of previous years. Although the Agreement, there is no doubt that the comprehensive approach towards beginning of 2002 was rife with process of burying the hatchet has alternative civilian options for problems, they were not monolithic or commenced. Leaving behind violence members of paramilitary groups has intractable in nature; it appears that a during a peace process is not only been developed in Northern Ireland. more relaxed atmosphere has about arms, the bad guys that use Unlike several other post-conflict descended over the province. There them, or the victims who suffer from scenarios in Africa and Central have been many encouraging signs in them; it is about the roots of a conflict America, the decommissioning debate recent months that the peace process is that has hindered the political occurred in the absence of any concept gaining momentum: January rallies representation and inclusion of divided or programme of demobilisation or have shown civic society’s potential to identities; about the achievement of ex-combatant reintegration; neither intervene; the emergence of a Loyalist political goals which were partly was there any relevant demand for the “think tank” indicates a new political pursued by violence, about the integration of ex-militants into voice that may present alternatives to recognition of these goals that spurred Northern Ireland’s security forces, a violence (Sunday Tribune, 20 January 20, the armed struggle; about justice and policy implemented in South African, 2002); and the dissident Republican the healing of wounds inflicted by where former paramilitaries were group INLA has recently offered to violence and violations of human subsumed into the army (MacGinty “talk peace with the UDA” (Belfast rights; and about the adoption of a and Darby, 2002, p.101). Telegraph, 10 February 2002). new approach to the past with the purpose of building a better future. The transformation and conversion of paramilitarism in Northern Ireland—a peace dividend not yet redeemed—may take on various characteristics and features in the future:

From inside, the positive elements within the paramilitary organisations will have to develop more strength and creativity to civilise their culture and confront violence by means of community awareness and community watch operations instead of vigilantism; voluntary forms of community based arms control may lay the groundwork for further decommissioning.

Civil society, both organisations and individuals, may be asked to more proactively take “local ownership” of this process, especially at the interfaces of the two communities. A Divided Society: A ‘‘peace line’’ in Belfast (2001). Photo: Corinna Hauswedell

B·I·C·C 67 brief 22

Conclusions

hang on to their weaponry even as chunks of traditional Republican significance of guns in Northern ideology were hollowed out. Whilst the The difficulties of Belfast Agreement gave Sinn Fein decommissioning Irish society ensured that any concerted effort to remove them access to the levers of power, it also involved an end to abstentionism, and from the province would also n years to come, as the history of with it, an outright, meaningful require the decommissioning of the the Northern Irish peace process is rejection of British rule in Ireland. It I mindsets of the populace on both further researched, commentators will sides of the sectarian divide. was, in traditional Republican terms, a likely marvel at the relative speed with “partitionist” settlement which which agreement was reached on enshrined the principle of consent, constitutional issues such as the Guns, symbolism and ended the Republic of Ireland’s establishment of a power sharing political ballast constitutional claim to the North, and government and the setting up of cross provided for cross-border bodies border bodies. For decades, the The peace process involved undoubted which, while not being flimsy, were far constitutional question had been difficulties for Unionists and from being engines of Irish re- presented as being not merely thorny, Republicans; tactical and strategic unification. These major ideological but practically intractable. The thought concessions were commonplace, concessions required a counter- of Unionists and Republicans sharing ideological tenets were remoulded and balance. Republican reluctance to the government of Northern Ireland, decades worth of political rhetoric decommissioning underwrote and indeed even the notion of Sinn Fein jettisoned. Decommissioned weaponry insulated the new political strategy being involved in a “partitionist” was valuable for Ulster Unionists in within the grass roots. The struggle Assembly, would have seemed the stuff that it provided a foundation upon was not being sold out or de- of fantasy a decade ago. which to anchor both their place in legitimised, as its historical cutting edge negotiations and their subsequent would be sheathed but intact. In this The ease with which some of the position in government. It would way, the symbolic importance of parties slipped into the constitutional provide a very concrete symbol of retaining weaponry served as political clothes of the new political structures Republican intentions to move beyond ballast, its purpose being to steady the contrasts sharply with their handling of armed struggle, and prevent Ulster Republican movement while it the question of disarmament. Unionists from being undermined by jettisoned much of its traditional Decommissioning dogged the process the continuous buffeting of those ideology. from the outset, creating numerous within their constituency opposed to blockages, cul-de-sacs and any rapprochement with One thing Ulster Unionists and Sinn governmental spats. Decommissioning Republicanism. The fact that no Fein share in their political history is an was the quicksand in which the pro- disarmament occurred during the understanding of the debilitating Agreement Unionist leadership peace negotiations served to further nature of political splits and the frequently began to disappear, a inflate the importance of the issue wounding power of allegations that nagging irritant for the Republican when it came to actually sitting in they are “selling out”. In large part, grassroots, and a useful stick with government with Sinn Fein. The goal the decommissioning impasse can which anti-Agreement Unionists beat of decommissioning was held to be be seen as a tussle between pro- their counterparts. critical within pro-Agreement Agreement Unionism and pro- Unionism as it would serve to allay Agreement Republicanism for the Why the Unionist insistence on fears that Sinn Fein’s commitment to political dead-weight of weaponry, decommissioning already silent peace might only be tactical; without which could prevent them from weapons? Why the Republican this assurance, the compromise made being toppled by internal or reluctance to decommission even a in the Belfast Agreement would have external critics. meagre amount of material for so been perceived as a sign of fundamen- many years? Guns have had a tal weakness, leading only to future profound importance for Unionists political instability. and Republicans, far beyond their military potential. The deeply Weaponry also had a great symbolic symbolic and psychological importance for Republicans through the trials and tribulations of the peace process. The symbolic value of munitions ensured that they would

68 B·I·C·C conclusions

Why did Perhaps the greatest boost to These internal circumstances favouring decommissioning decommissioning was given by the an act of decommissioning were electoral results of June 2001. In these already crystallising when unforeseen occur? elections Sinn Fein nosed ahead of the external factors greatly accelerated the SDLP to become the largest Nationa- process. Revelations about IRA Although weapons had a political value list party. Simply put, Republican involvement in the training of the for Republicans, the leadership was bullets have been decisively superseded Marxist FARC paramilitaries in also aware of the costs accrued from by the ballot as a political tool. Colombia soured Republican relations delaying on disarmament. The failure Weaponry has no real use and may with the US government and large to decommission periodically actually be an impediment to further swathes of Irish America. Soon after, engendered unwelcome pressure from electoral growth; it certainly presents a this embarrassment was compounded the British and Irish governments; it clear danger to the Belfast Agreement by the September 11 attacks on New also helped fracture Unionism to such which Sinn Fein supports. York and Washington. To be associated an extent that the institutions of the with an organisation which the US Belfast Agreement would themselves It may be helpful to revisit certain State Department viewed as terrorist, be imperilled. The political value of tenets of Republican military strategy and to have the residual taint of holding on to weapons centred on to assess just how far they, and the terrorist methods, threatened to place easing the Republican movement’s peace process, have come. Republican Republicanism outside the political arduous transition, but this did not violence had several components. The pale. Although these circumstances mean that arms would need to be first component was to act as a costly underlined the need for retained indefinitely. If the question of irritant to the British state. The second, decommissioning within Republican decommissioning could simply be to draw attention and publicity to the thinking and accelerated its progress, stretched out for as long as it is question of partition, a form of the process was already underway. advantageous, then the grassroots propaganda by deed. The third, to foil could be reassured through the period attempts by the British, Unionists, and Loyalism and of ideological adjustment during which constitutional Nationalists to reach an decommissioning their recalcitrant stance on internal settlement. IRA violence could disarmament could be quietly act as a partial veto on any prospective At first glance, the prospects for deconstructed by the leadership. settlement; it tended to act as a Republicans could seek concessions on corrosive and partial solvent on any Loyalist decommissioning do not look bright. The political outlook within issues such as policing or possible rapprochement. The attempt Loyalism differs from that of demilitarisation in return for gradualist to harry and harass the British until Republicans on the merits of the peace movement on decommissioning. These they withdrew from Ireland failed as process, and appears less consistent. advances, alongside the continued the state simply dug itself in for the IRA decommissioning was fuelled by a electoral growth of Sinn Fein, would ‘Long War’. improve morale at the movement’s strong adherence to the survival of the institutions of the new political base, making actual decommissioning Armed propaganda is unnecessary— dispensation; the political space to all the more likely. and of course, prone to backfire decommission was created by their bloodily—when Sinn Fein is being electoral success. Republican movement on disarmament feted by political leaders worldwide for was clearly discernible from May 2000; having moved on to the road of peace. the inspection of several arms dumps The partial veto deriving from IRA In contrast, many Loyalists feel that the new dispensation has done little for amounted to a designation of these activity has now been replaced by the them or the working class areas in weapons for actual decommissioning at very real veto inherent in being the which they live. Loyalism’s political an unspecified future date. In response largest Nationalist party. In terms of concerns, the thinking goes, have been to this, a more propitious framework traditional Republican strategy, guns overshadowed by the more media for decommissioning was developed by are of no use and only serve to expose the two governments— Republicanism to political attack from savvy and electorally successful Sinn Fein. The Loyalist presence in the decommissioning was increasingly seen its opponents. The electoral success electoral arena is weak, and thus does as being linked to other issues of of Sinn Fein has proved the efficacy not act as a powerful incentive to security such as demilitarisation and of Sinn Fein’s peace strategy and relinquish weaponry. The PUP has only policing. has given them the political space two seats in the Assembly while the to disarm without appearing to have surrendered. UDP failed to win any Assembly seats

B·I·C·C 69 brief 22

and has recently dissolved. In any case, would assist Loyalists in moving The general election in the Irish the UDA has been seen as being along a similar path. Achieving this Republic may act as a lever on detached from the political process for will be a difficult and sensitive task Republicans, further easing them some months; following a spate of given the hindrance of Loyalism’s into disarmament. Currently, Sinn pipe bomb attacks and occasional relatively unsuccessful performance at Fein has one representative in the Dail, assassinations, its ceasefire was the polls. and their electoral stock has been declared to be over. The Loyalist rising. Even in early 2000 there was paramilitary response to IRA Loyalist alienation may not simply be a speculation that Sinn Fein could win 3 decommissioning has been far from factor inhibiting the decommissioning or 4 seats at the next election (Magill, effusive. One UDA commander stated of Loyalist weaponry. There has been March 2000); this figure may now seem that his organisation “couldn’t consider no attempt by Republicans to link rather conservative as recent polls decommissioning at least for another further decommissioning to a Loyalist indicate that they are well positioned to 10 years” (The Times, 27 October 2001). response, and indeed Gerry Adams has secure 8 per cent of the vote (Irish warned about making Loyalist Times, 1 February 2002). In this light, it The more impressive political paramilitaries jump through the same is conceivable that Republicans could performance of the PUP has hoops as Republicans (Irish Times, 25 be the power brokers in a future undoubtedly helped keep the UVF October 2001); nevertheless, a failure government coalition. Although Sinn more firmly in the process, but even by Loyalists to decommission could act Fein have been coy about the prospect while acknowledging that the issue of as a brake on the disposal of IRA of earning a place in a governing decommissioning should be “honestly weaponry. This appears particularly coalition, the prospect of holding addressed” (Combat, April 2001) the true given the rise of communal power in both jurisdictions must be UVF seems unlikely to disarm. tension in parts of Belfast. It should extremely tempting for what is Wholesale decommissioning obviously not be forgotten that Republicanism undoubtedly the most anti-partitionist entails either a partial or all- owes much to the memory of both party in all of Ireland. encompassing transformation or sectarian pogroms and the ham fisted conversion of a paramilitary security measures taken by the state. Indeed, in their recent Westminster organisation and the UVF envisions a These psychological chords, easily election manifesto, Sinn Fein continuing role for itself as an armed struck at the political base, are almost committed itself to seeking a form of group while any Republican completely resistant to ideological or representation for Northern Ireland’s paramilitary group exists. strategic argument. Violence at MPs in the Dail. There is, however, a sectarian interfaces does not settle formidable catch. No Irish party is Both the UVF and UDA are extremely nerves, and if Loyalists hang on to willing to accept Sinn Fein in wary of each other following their feud their weaponry, Republicans will government while the link with the in 2000, and this also provides a find it more difficult to disarm. IRA remains. The Irish Taoiseach, compelling reason not to show Although many commentators have Bertie Ahern, has been emphatic on weakness by decommissioning. More focussed on the Republican this point, and has repeatedly stressed, hopefully, the quasi isolation of leadership’s ability to bring the for over a year and a half, that the Loyalism has been challenged from grassroots along, a much more existence of private armies conflicts within. The UDA has found a new imposing task for their Loyalist with Article 15.6 of the Irish voice in the Ulster Political Research counterparts, it would be a mistake to constitution. This is an immovable Group, which aims to articulate the underestimate the power of the demand. The implication is clear: concerns of working class Loyalist movement’s political base. unless Sinn Fein “resolve[s] its communities. Mainstream Unionism relationship with the IRA”, effectively has a responsibility to help groups like Taking the process amputating its armed wing, it would the UDA achieve credible political forward not be welcome within the corridors representation; only through the of power (Irish Times, 9 January 2001; provision of such guidance, succour, Irish Independent, 18 February 2002). and support can the paramilitary Two factors are at work which seem This presents a difficult leap for a likely to push disarmament forward. groups be brought out of the darkness movement which has always sought to The first is external to the of violence and into the light of the minimise internal splits. A possible decommissioning process; namely, the peace process. A growing sense of counter to the finger-wagging threats forthcoming general election in the political inclusion has helped draw and warnings of the established Irish Republic of Ireland. The second Republicanism into the parties may be further IRA decommissioning process. Only a reflects the new internal political decommissioning. In the short term environment in which similar sense of ownership and this might circumvent electoral attacks decommissioning is pursued; an inclusion in the political process environment which has little of the pressure cooker atmosphere in which previous debate took place.

70 B·I·C·C conclusions

on Republican militarism, boosting would see the elongation of the In short, it served as Sinn Fein’s image as a peacemaker. In process a an attempt to elevate it to a incontrovertible proof that pro- the long term, a process of different level, one in which it will be Agreement Unionism had not been decommissioning may serve as a form less of a high stakes game. Under these hoodwinked, and accordingly could of substitute decontamination, circumstances, the discussion of not be presented as such by its obviating the need for a sharp break decommissioning would be stripped of opponents within the Unionist with paramilitarism, instead, taking the some of its emotional rhetoric, political family. The profound route of gentle transformation. face or prestige would not be risked, psychological significance of the and more importantly, the lurch from gun and the bomb to both Sinn Fein probably do not expect to crisis to crisis could be averted. The Unionists and Republicans form a coalition anytime soon, but they IRA gesture, by mitigating the signifies that before the tools of will seek to boost their representation counterproductive tension and violence can be put beyond use in the coming election and may also rancour generated by the the mindsets of the rival hope to widen the path leading to decommissioning debate, has given sectarian communities must be government seats on both sides of the the conflicting parties in the peace decommissioned. A clichéd border. Decommissioning may be a process more flexibility and room to homily of the conflict resolution means to achieving this goal. The manoeuvre on other contentious business is the adage that “one electoral benefits of the peace issues; it has also advanced efforts makes peace with one’s enemies, not process for Sinn Fein are such that to forge a mutually agreed vision of with one’s friends”. The truth is that the breadth of political inclusion security. Both Unionists and the successful peacemaker makes that they offer seems to be Republicans have every reason to peace with an enemy while continually expanding; this acts as a remain in this extended process of remaining circumspect of friends— continuous draw, pulling decommissioning. all the while making sure that as Republicanism towards further many are engaged in the process for decommissioning. Disarmament and as long as possible. In this respect, peacemaking: weaponry could play an important The second factor relates to the pacifying role for both Unionists attenuation of the Lessons from and Republicans. Unfortunately, the decommissioning process. The Northern Ireland symbolic, ideological value of the Arms Decommissioning (Amendment) gun did not lend itself easily to Bill recently introduced by the British A fact which stands out in pragmatic solutions, and the result government, has pushed the researching the Northern Ireland was a paralysing tussle for some disarmament deadline back another peace process, is that paramilitary years. year, and includes the option for weaponry can have a value beyond further extensions of this deadline its limited military potential, beyond In seeking a way to transform this until the year 2007. Although this even its potential worth as a tussle, the International decision has provoked outcry from bargaining chip to extract political Independent Commission on anti-Agreement Unionists, criticism concessions. Weaponry had a Decommissioning (IICD) played a from the pro-Agreement wing has symbolic, ideological value. This valuable role as a third party been relatively muted. The single action made the question of interlocutor; although critics would of decommissioning has had a decommissioning resistant to have preferred that the IICD adopt mollifying effect on the Unionists, who political deal making; both a more proactive stance, the perhaps recognise that a very Unionists and Republicans had meticulous, incremental approach significant rubicon has been crossed by anchored their positions in the of the Commission achieved a the Republican movement and a very peace process on the issue of certain degree of success. Lessons concrete symbol that “the war is over” arms. For Republicans, guns lying for other processes of small arms has been secured. in bunkers were proof positive that disarmament can be highlighted. there had been no sell-out, despite The confidence building nature The lengthening of the process might many political shifts. For Unionists, of the independent inspections be seen negatively as an attempt by the decommissioned weapons were a of arms dumps, a crucial two governments to indefinitely powerful symbol that the war was element of external involvement, suspend action on decommissioning in over, that no future paramilitary was an imaginative step which the hope that it will not re-emerge into campaign would be waged by those the political arena. A more benign view with whom they now shared power.

B·I·C·C 71 brief 22

served to ease an armed group accorded to the IICD’s verification armed groups and their into actual decommissioning. It procedures; the symbolic import of representatives can have no mandate avoided the political pain, and the event was thus relatively to support the use of force, the symbolic sensitivity, of immediate untarnished by its secrecy, allowing weapon of political exclusion is a disarmament by advancing towards Unionists to return to the Northern double-edged sword. It should not it incrementally. The “dual-key” Ireland Executive. be forgotten that constitutional system implied that the armed participation, or other forms of group still retained possession of A final word might be said about political empowerment, provide the weapons, even though the the application of political pressure the space in which disarmament dumps had been compromised, and on armed groups in attempting to can more easily be undertaken. would be further compromised with achieve their disarmament. Few Exclusion, while it can act as a each inspection. The inspections political groups, regardless of their lever that pressures the acted as a surrogate process of hue, move from entrenched representatives of armed groups, decommissioning, allowing political positions without the application of simultaneously cuts away at their movement to take place, which some pressure. But in attempting to political room for manoeuvre. It advancing the chances of a full build an inclusive state in which might imbue Sisyphus with more blown decommissioning event. strength and leverage, but it narrows The efforts to redefine the road up the mountain. decommissioning as a process that, rather than endeavouring to surrender and hand over weapons seeks to “put them beyond use”, exemplifies the type of creativity needed for the peace process to move forward.

When weaponry has substantial symbolic value attached to it, confidentiality is key to the process. A certain degree of secrecy about the method of disposal and the The cure at Troy quantity of arms decommissioned allows armed groups some Human beings suffer, So hope for a great sea-change protection against internal criticism They torture one another, On the far side of revenge. and the cries of triumphalism from They get hurt and get hard. Believe that a further shore their political opponents. To put it No poem or play or song Is reachable from here. more bluntly, it allows them to save Can fully right a wrong Believe in miracles face. Secrecy about the disposal of Inflicted and endured. And cures and healing wells. illegal weaponry may seem distasteful in an open democracy, The innocent in gaols Call miracle self-healing: but if disarmament is achieved than Beat on their bars together. The utter, self-revealing the end justifies the means. There A hunger-striker’s father Double-take of feeling. is, however, an important proviso Stands in the graveyard dumb. If there’s fire on the mountain to this: confidentiality will only The police widow in veils Or lightning and storm be accepted if disarmament is Faints at the funeral home And a god speaks from the sky verified by a credible indepen- dent body which has the trust of History says, Don’t hope That means someone is hearing the participants in the political On this side of the grave. The outcry and the birth-cry process. In this regard the IICD But then, once in a lifetime Of new life at its term. has certainly performed well. The longed-for tidal wave It means, once in a lifetime Although highly secretive, the IRA Of justice can rise up, That justice can rise up, act of decommissioning had And hope and history rhyme. And hope and history rhyme. sufficient credibility, due to the trust Seamus Heaney

72 B·I·C·C glossary

Glossary

ANC African National Congress

CIRA Continuity Irish Republican Army

DUP Democratic Unionist Party

IICD The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning

INLA Irish National Liberation Army

IRA Irish Republican Army

LVF Loyalist Volunteer Force

NIWC Northern Ireland Womens Coalition

PUP Progressive Unionist Party

PSNI Police Service of Northern Ireland

RIRA Real Irish Republican Army

RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary

SDLP Social Democratic Labour Party

SF Sinn Fein

UDA Ulster Defence Association

UDP Ulster Democratic Party

UFF Ulster Freedom Fighters

UKUP United Kingdom Unionist Party

UUC Ulster Unionist Council

UUP Ulster Unionist Party

UVF Ulster Volunteer Force

Unionists Primarily consisting of Protestants, Unionists support the continuation of Northern Ireland’s union with Great Britain.

Loyalists Loyal to the British crown and committed to the continuation of Northern Ireland’s union with Great Britain, the Loyalist movement vehemently resists any political settlement that would result in an all-Ireland state.

Nationalists Identifying themselves as Irish, not British, the Nationalists aspire to achieve an all- Ireland state. They are predominantly Catholic.

Republicans Emphatically endorsing the political goal of a united Ireland, the Republican movement, which primarily consists of Catholic Nationalists, has traditionally adopted radical tactics to achieve this political goal.

B·I·C·C 73 brief 22

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76 B·I·C·C The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)

an independent non-profit organization dedicated to promoting the transfer of former military resources and assets to alternative civilian purposes

he transfer of resources from the military learinghouse. In its capacity as an T to the civilian sector represents both a C independent organization, BICC supports social and an economic challenge, as well as and assists international organizations, offering an opportunity for the states government agencies, nongovernmental concerned. The sustained process of organizations, companies and the media, as disarmament during the decade following the well as private individuals. It hereby mediates end of the Cold War has made defense conver- and facilitates the conversion process at all sion an important issue in many countries levels—local, national and global. BICC today. This process has now slowed down collects and disseminates data and information considerably, but the problems faced by those on conversion to practitioners in a wide range affected are far from solved. BICC’s main of fields and institutions. BICC strives to reach objective is to make use of the chances offered researchers and practitioners as well as by disarmament, whilst at the same time parliamentarians, the media, and the general helping to avoid—or lessen—the negative public by means of a variety of tools including effects. its library, its extensive on-line documentation services and its internet service (www.bicc.de). This issue concerns a number of areas: What Furthermore, the Center documents the course can scientists and engineers who were formerly of disarmament and conversion in its annual employed in weapons labs do today? What is conversion surveys and produces a variety of the fate of the roughly eight million employees publications. who lost their jobs in the defense factories? Why are so many defense companies faring The Bonn International Center for Conversion better today than they did ten years ago? Will was established in 1994 with generous support all demobilized soldiers or former combatants from the State of North Rhine-Westphalia find a future in civilian society? What action (NRW). The Center’s Trustees include the two must communities take when suddenly faced German states of North Rhine-Westphalia and with the closure of a huge military base? How Brandenburg as well as the Westdeutsche Lan- does one solve the problem of the ready desbank–Girozentrale (WestLB), Düsseldorf/ availability of small arms and light weapons? Münster and the Landesentwicklungsgesell- schaft NRW (LEG). It is BICC’s task to tackle these questions, to analyze them on the basis of scientific research, to convey the necessary information, Published by and to give advice to those involved—in short, © BICC, Bonn 2002 Bonn International Center for Conversion to manage disarmament. Director: Peter J. Croll Publishing Management, Layout: Svenja Bends An der Elisabethkirche 25 nternational think tank. BICC conducts D-53113 Bonn I research and makes policy Germany recommendations. In-house and external Phone +49-228-911960 Fax +49-228-241215 experts contribute comparative analyses and E-mail: [email protected] background studies. Internet: www.bicc.de ISSN 0947-7322 roject management and consulting services. BICC provides practical Printed in Germany P All rights reserved support to public and private organizations. For instance, BICC staff advise local governments confronted with the difficult task of redeveloping former military installations. BICC also combines development assistance with practical conversion work by helping in the fields of demobilization, reintegration and peace-building.