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The Real North Korea This page intentionally left blank The Real North Korea Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia ANDREI LANKOV 1 1 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offi ces in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Th ailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 © 2013 Andrei Lankov All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lankov, A. N. (Andrei Nikolaevich) Th e real North Korea : life and politics in the failed Stalinist utopia / Andrei Lankov. pages; cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-19-996429-1 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Korea (North)—Politics and government—1994– 2. Korea (North)—Foreign relations. I. Title. DS935.774.L36 2013 951.9304—dc23 2012046992 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper CONTENTS A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s i x I n t r o d u c t i o n x i Transcription xvii CHAPTER 1 Th e Society Kim Il Sung Built and How He Did It 1 Captain Kim Returns Home 1 Way to War 9 Between Moscow and Beijing: Th e Foreign Policy of Kim Il Sung’s North Korea 15 Dealing with the South 27 Th e Command Society 34 A Country of Camps 45 Th e World According to Kim Il Sung 50 Th e Silver Lining in a Social Disaster 61 Th e Birth of Juche, the Rise of the Son, and the Slow-Motion Demise of a Hyper-Stalinist Economy 67 CHAPTER 2 Two Decades of Crisis 75 A n d Th en the World Changed 75 C a p i t a l i s m R e b o r n 8 2 Th e State Withers Away 88 Taking the Exit Option: Not an Exodus Yet, But . 94 Arrival in Paradise, aka Capitalist Hell 97 Changing Worldviews 102 vi Contents CHAPTER 3 Th e Logic of Survival (Domestically) 109 Reform as Collective Political Suicide 109 Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: (Not-So-Successful) Crackdowns on Market Activity 119 A Disaster That Almost Happened: The Currency Reform of 2009 126 Th e Belated Rise of a “New Star General” 132 Th e Sudden Beginning of a New Era 135 CHAPTER 4 Survival Diplomacy 145 Playing the Nuclear Card 146 Aid-Maximizing Diplomacy 150 Meanwhile, in South Korea . (the Rise of 386ers and Its Consequences) 157 A Decade of Sunshine 162 Th e Sun Sets 172 Th e Entry of China 179 INTERLUDE Th e Contours of a Future: What Might Happen to North Korea in the Next Two Decades 187 Why North Korea Is Likely to Continue for a While (But Not Forever) 188 Contours of a Coming Crisis 191 Stability Will Return, but How? 196 CHAPTER 5 What to Do about the North? 203 Why the Sticks Are Not Big Enough 203 Why the Carrots Are Not Sweet Enough (and Why “Strategic Patience” Is Not a Great Idea, Either) 208 Th inking Long Term 212 Th e Hidden Benefi ts of Engagement 217 Reaching the People 225 W h y Th ey Matter: Working with the Refugees in South Korea 228 Contents vii CHAPTER 6 Being Ready for What We Wish For 233 A Perfect Storm 234 A Provisional Confederation as the Least Unacceptable Solution 243 Something about Painkillers . 252 Conclusion 257 Notes 261 Index 271 This page intentionally left blank ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Th e present book would have been impossible without the support and encouragement of many individuals with whom I have discussed the nu- merous issues dealt with in the book. Among many others, I would like to mention Rüdiger Frank, Scott Snyder, John Park, Stephen Haggard, Nico- las Eberstadt, Marcus Noland, Fyodor Tertitsky, Tatiana Gabroussenko, Kim Yŏng-Il, Kim Sŏk-hyang, Yu Ho-yŏl, Nam Song-uk, Yu Kil-chae, Kim Byŏng-yŏn, and Zhu Feng. I am especially grateful to Peter Ward, who typed most of the manu- script while correcting my less than perfect English and also providing me with advice on both style and subject matter, as well as with valuable cri- tiques of my ideas and arguments. When it deals with the issues of the recent social and economic devel- opments, the book draws on the result of the research that was supported by a grant from the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2010- 330-B00187). I also would like to express my deep gratitude to “Moravius” who allowed me to use some photos from his extensive collection. This page intentionally left blank INTRODUCTION What does the average Westerner think when North Korea is mentioned? In all probability a number of oft -repeated phrases straight from the media will spring to mind. “A mad country,” “the world’s last Stalinist regime,” “nuclear brinkmanship,” and other similar clichés dominate popular un- derstanding of North Korea. Above all, North Korea is said to be “irra- tional.” Th is is, allegedly, a country whose actions are unpredictable, defying common sense and perhaps even the laws of physics. But there is one problem with these clichés: they are largely wrong. North Korea is not irrational, and nothing shows this better than its con- tinuing survival against all odds. North Korea is essentially a political living fossil, a relic of an era long gone. Similar regimes either changed out of recognition or disappeared long ago and are now remembered with disdain, if at all. Meanwhile, the regime in Pyongyang still remains in full control of its country. Th is is a remarkable feat, especially if we take into consideration that it has to operate in a highly—and increasingly— unfavorable environment. North Korea is a small country with few resources and a moribund economy. In spite of all this, however, it has managed to survive and successfully manipulate larger players, including an impressive number of the great powers. You simply cannot achieve this by being irrational. North Korea’s alleged penchant for irrational and erratic behavior is illu- sionary: the North Korean leaders actually know perfectly well what they are doing. Th ey are neither madmen nor ideological zealots, but xii Introduction rather remarkably effi cient and cold-minded calculators, perhaps the best practitioners of Machiavellian politics that can be found in the modern world. And what of other descriptions: Is North Korea really “driven by an insane ideological zeal”? Is it “unpredictably aggressive”? Indeed, the gro- tesquely bellicose and oft en nonsensical rhetoric of the North Korean of- fi cial media and the country’s occasional armed provocations and nuclear weapons program might seem like a confi rmation of its alleged aggres- siveness. However, a deeper look into Pyongyang’s decision making should make us skeptical of such claims. Pyongyang’s brinkmanship indeed appears risky at times, but so far North Korea’s leaders have known where to stop, how not to cross the red line, and how not to provoke an escalation of tensions into a full-scale war. Th ey have employed saber rat- tling for decades as part of a shrewd (and highly rational) manipulative strategy that has succeeded—in most cases, at least. Th is book is, fi rst of all, about the inner logic of North Korean behavior. Th is logic is defi ned by the peculiarities of North Korean society, which in turn are the results of long-term developments. I have written this book in order to explain how North Korea has come to be an international prob- lem, and I also attempt to explain why North Korea’s leadership has had no option but to try to remain a pariah. Th e book starts with a sketch of North Korean history, which is impor- tant since familiarity with the history of the North is vital for anybody who wants to understand the current predicament facing the North Korean leadership. Th e Kim family regime began as a bold experiment in social engineering. Th is experiment was led by the elite, whose eff orts were much encouraged—and oft en directly controlled—by Stalin’s Russia, but they also enjoyed considerable support from below. However, the initial rosy expectations and popular enthusiasm were sadly misplaced and soon North Korean society found itself saddled with an increasingly ineffi cient and unsustainable economic model that had become dependent on the constant infusion of foreign aid. Matters were made worse by the nature of the North Korean elite, which had become hereditary and almost impossible to challenge or change.