by LIEUTENANT COLONEL JUAN JOSE TERRADOS Spanish Air Force Former Joint Targeting Subject Matter Expert NATO Joint Warfare Centre HYBRID WARFARE

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42 The Three Swords Magazine 35/2019 COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS

“We can thus only say that the aims a belligerent adopts, and the resources he employs, must be governed by the particular characteristics of his own position; but they will also conform to the spirit of the age and to its general character. Finally, they must always be governed by the general conclusions to be drawn from the nature of war itself.’’

Carl von Clausewitz On War

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policy of member governments, or of NATO.

HROUGHOUT HISTORY, there The Unclear Concept "War of the next century will comprise a of Hybrid War and How kind of hybrid war, projecting all elements of have been numerous attempts to national power along a continuum of activities define and classify the phenomenon International Actors Define from stability, security, and reconstruction of war; a social event to be solved It Differently operations, to armed combat." via a violent confrontation to which (Bond, A New Paradigm for Stability Operations Tthe human factor confers extreme complexity. The first sign that the concept of hybrid war in Failing States, 2007, pp. 3-4) Although practical and precise definitions are roams intellectual circles with imprecision is most useful, some Western defence profes- that the various definitions lack clarity, accura- The below are some words by Frank G. Hoff- sionals tend to use lavish terms that enjoy ac- cy and precision. Instead, current attempts to man (see p. 44) on the subject of hybrid war: ceptance and popularity and to which different define hybrid warfare make simple reference to qualifiers are associated with the term "war". attributes present in this supposedly new type "[…] in the future, the most capable opponents may seek to combine truly disruptive capacity Their supporters continue to come up with the of conflict. Among the existing definitions, the with traditional, irregular, or catastrophic forms new definition of existing types of armed con- two definitions below are the clearest and most of warfare […] future conflict will be multi- flicts. One type of conflict can therefore be de- relevant to the topic of this article. The first modal or multi-variant rather than simple scribed in different ways, such as asymmetric definition is by John J. McCuen: black or with the characterization of one form of warfare […] This construct is more frequently war, non-linear war, war of a given generation, described as 'hybrid warfare', in which the "Hybrid conflicts [therefore] are full spectrum composite war, total war, or, in the case of the adversary will most likely present unique wars with both physical and conceptual topic of this article, hybrid war. combinational or hybrid threats […] instead dimensions: the former, a struggle against an of separate challenges with fundamentally In this text, I will argue that hybrid war armed enemy and the latter, a wider struggle different approaches (conventional, irregular, does not constitute something new in history. for control and support of the combat zone's or terrorist), we can expect to face competitors indigenous population, the support of the What is new in the concept of hybrid war is who will employ all forms of war and tactics, home fronts of the intervening nations, and the the growing capacity of international actors to perhaps simultaneously." support of the international community […] To use all tools at their disposal to project power. secure and stabilize the indigenous population, (Hoffman, Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, This is due to the fact that it has become easier the intervening forces must immediately 2009, p. 35) to implement global strategies in a coordinated rebuild or restore security, essential services, local government, self-defense forces and manner, given the technological advances and Given the above definitions, are we really fac- essential elements of the economy." shorter "distances" between our societies. Hy- ing a new phenomenon? Or the concept of hy- brid war is not different from the war on which (McCuen, Hybrid Wars, Military Review, March- brid war, rather than being something novel, Sun Tzu wrote his treatise 500 years B.C., or April 2008, p. 108) should simply aim to corroborate or warn that from the wars that philosophers, sociologists, war is something infinitely complicated, with political scientists, historians, strategists, sol- In her research project for the U.S. Army War numerous appearances and variables, chang- diers, etc., have attempted to theorize through- College, Margaret S. Bond expressed the above ing; adaptable to the context and, in short, as out history. definition in similar terms: unpredictable as human nature.

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“War is infinitely which the article was written, when the evolu- action and, specifically, in the QDRs of 2010 tion of the Iraq campaign required a greater and 2014, as shown in the following paragraph: number of troops on the ground, whose fire- complicated "The term 'hybrid' has recently been used to power should be used more against an insur- capture the seemingly increased complexity and as gent force and less against a conventional force, of war, the multiplicity of actors involved, and compelled the authors the need for a turn in the blurring between traditional categories American strategic thinking. The latter should of conflict. While the existence of innovative unpredictable as adversaries is not new, today’s hybrid not base the achievement of superiority on con- approaches demand that U.S. forces prepare human nature.” frontation exclusively through constant tech- for a range of conflicts. These may involve state nological advances but had to contemplate to a adversaries that employ protracted forms of greater extent the influence of the human factor. warfare, possibly using proxy forces to coerce and intimidate, or non-state actors using This led Mattis and Hoffman to emphasize on operational concepts and high-end capabilities the complexity of the "new" war, since the op- traditionally associated with states."3 erations in Iraq presented them with many dif- The previous assessment would entail ferent threats (paramilitary forces, presence of The influence of Mattis and Hoffman, how- the obligation to follow a conflict management weapons of mass destruction, terrorist groups, ever, was limited within the scope of the U.S. process with a holistic view, analysing the ac- organized crime, failed state) that United States Department of Defense, the former, taking tors as complex systems and admitting that the had not previously been faced with. Therefore, advantage of his position as Commander of phenomenon transcends military activity. War everything seems to indicate that Mattis and NATO's Allied Command Transformation, will always be a confrontation in which the in- Hoffman, far from pursuing a term to define ensured that the concept was taken into ac- tention of the adversaries will be the use of all a completely novel phenomenon, would have count in the Atlantic Organization. the means at their disposal, in the most coordi- as main purpose to provoke debate about the For NATO, the concept of hybrid war nated way possible, to impose their will. challenges that the U.S. Armed Forces would be has been evolving towards a very broad term forced to face in the near future, and influence that, leaving aside the obsessive ambition to RETURNING TO THE BEGINNING, the the making of the Quadrennial Defense Review define a new type of war, has a very practical first appearance of the concept of hybrid war, (QDR)2 of 2006. approach, more focused on the threats, trying as such, was in November 2005, at the hands of Although the term hybrid war has since to cover the contextual complexity associated two officers of the United States Marine Corps; enjoyed great acceptance, this had yet to be re- with current conflicts. In this regard, I think General James N. Mattis and Colonel Frank G. flected in the American strategic or doctrinal it is appropriate to reflect Paragraph 72 of the Hoffman, who wrote an article on that term in documents. Nevertheless, Mattis and Hoffman's Communiqué issued by the Alliance after the the journal Proceedings,1 edited by the United "pulling of the ears" did have the desired effect Summit of Heads of State and Government States Naval Institute. The circumstances in in the U.S. Department of Defense courses of held in Warsaw in July 2016:4

Hybrid warfare blends conventional/ unconventional, regular/irregular, and information and cyber warfare. Photo by Frederik Ringnes, Forsvaret

44 The Three Swords Magazine 35/2019 CHARACTERISTICS OF HYBRID THREATS1

⁄⁄ Coordinated and synchronized, ⁄⁄ Deliberately target democratic states' and institutions' economic vulnerabilities, ⁄⁄ Use a wide range of means, ⁄⁄ Exploit the thresholds of detection and attribution as well as the border between war and peace, ⁄⁄ Aim to influence different forms of decision-making at the local (regional), state or institutional level. 1 Extracted from NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, "Hybrid Threats: A Strategic Communications Perspective" bit.ly/HybridThreats

ABOVE: Hybrid threats are generated from a mix of adversarial measures to influence political decision-making of the targeted nation, therefore an integrated approach across government is needed to effectively identify and address such threats. (NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Hybrid Threats: A StratCom Perspective)

"We have taken steps to ensure our ability to political, diplomatic, economic and legal in- the mantle of a 'humanitarian intervention'. effectively address the challenges posed by Massive disinformation campaigns designed to hybrid warfare, where a broad, complex, and struments, which are essential to counteract control the narrative are an important element adaptive combination of conventional and any such threat. As a final result, we can see of a hybrid campaign. All this is done with the non-conventional means, and overt and covert that within the Alliance, hybrid war runs from objective of achieving political influence, even military, paramilitary and civilian measures, are the Russian influence in the countries near its dominance over a country in support of an employed in a highly integrated design by state overall strategy." and non-state actors to achieve their objectives. border, such as Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Responding to this challenge, we have adopted Lithuania, to the expansive strategy of the Is- a strategy and actionable implementation plans lamic State of Iraq and the Levant (also known The EU's difficulty to achieve a clear definition on NATO's role in countering hybrid warfare. by its Arabic-language acronym Daesh), and of the term hybrid war has led to the organi- "The primary responsibility to respond to hybrid other jihadist movements in the Sahel and its zation practically renaming it "hybrid threat". threats or attacks rests with the targeted nation. projection towards Europe particularly Spain, This decision reflects the adoption of a practi- NATO is prepared to assist an Ally at any stage France, and Italy. As for the European Union cal vision on the matter, avoiding difficult and of a hybrid campaign. The Alliance and Allies will (EU) and its attempt to define hybrid war, it is debated definitions and focusing on address- be prepared to counter hybrid warfare as part of Collective Defence. The Council could decide to understandable that it is very difficult to build ing present risks and threats. Proof of this is invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The a clear and uncontested definition. In this con- the quasi-total absence of the term hybrid war Alliance is committed to effective cooperation nection, the following definition is taken from in each and every one of the key documents re- and coordination with partners and relevant a working document of the European External lated to this matter, such as the Joint Commu- international organisations, in particular the EU, 5 as agreed, in efforts to counter hybrid warfare." Action Service: nication of the European Commission to the European Parliament and the European Coun- "Hybrid warfare can be more easily cil, regarding the Joint Framework on counter- characterised than defined as a centrally 6 Given the multifaceted nature of the threat designed and controlled use of various covert ing hybrid threats, the press release of the Eu- which transcends the strictly military and, and overt tactics, enacted by military and/or ropean Council on countering hybrid threats,7 therefore, the normal scope of employment non-military means, ranging from intelligence the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and and cyber operations through economic of the Alliance, there is a clear requirement Security Policy,8 the European Defence Ac- pressure to the use of conventional forces. By 9 to take that ultra-military (in the classic sense employing hybrid tactics, the attacker seeks tion Plan, and most recently, the study devel- of the prefix) nature into account. Therefore, to undermine and destabilise an opponent oped by the Directorate General for External within this Comprehensive Approach, the by applying both coercive and subversive Policies of the Union titled "EU Defence: The methods. The latter can include various forms primary responsibility to neutralize the threat White Book implementation process".10 of sabotage, disruption of communications to an attacked nation lies with the latter, and and other services including energy In addition to the Western view of the apart from the possibility of invoking Article supplies. The aggressor may work through matter, it is interesting to see the Russian ap- 5, NATO relies on cooperation and coordina- or by empowering proxy insurgent groups, or proach. To do this, we briefly analyse the opin- disguising state-to-state aggression behind tion with related organizations endowed of ion of one of Russia's most important military

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leaders; General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of with the aim of establishing a new strategy, but • Submission to the public maelstrom of such the General Staff of the Russian Federation. to challenge the positions and ways of think- an abstract and open concept as hybrid war Gerasimov, in a speech delivered in 2013, to the ing of the Russian military leadership, giving has resulted in multiple interpretations. Academy of Military Sciences of the Russian a heads-up and trying to trigger the develop- Federation, presented forms and methods that ment of new ideas to counter emerging risks. • In official forums, the lack of the attributes the armed forces put into practice during the Additionally, Gerasimov infers, both in the required in its definition, namely; clarity, pre- planning and conduct of military operations. In speech and in the aforementioned article, the cision and accuracy, invokes very different addition, he stressed the fundamental role that same idea that Vladimir Putin began to extend interpretations and is adapted to the security science or military should play in the achieve- just before the elections that in 2012 would circumstances of each international actor. ment of efficient military capabilities, through take him to the presidency of the Federation; the accurate foresight of the challenges that the the existence of a strategy in execution by the • There is a boom in popularity of the concept armed forces will face in the future. Many West- West consisting in implanting "controlled cha- of hybrid war in some sectors, which is not ern experts have used a paragraph from this os" in zones of Russian interest. shared by, for example, official instances of speech. The translation into English is repro- We can see that the line of argument the main powers and alliances. The main duced below and is used as a basis to argue that followed by Gerasimov is tremendously co- reason is the lack of a clear definition and hybrid war is a new way of conducting military incident with the one followed by Mattis and rigor; something which makes it impracti- operations adopted by the Russian Federation: Hoffman in 2005 and, similarly, it was pri- cal to use, and consequently leads to it being marily oriented to redirect the policies for replaced by concepts of more clarity, lower "In the 21st Century we have seen a tendency the transformation of the Russian Federation level of ambition and, therefore, more man- towards blurring the lines between the states armed forces, not having in any case its main ageable, understandable and practical. of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared, and having begun, proceed according to an effort directed to define a new type of conflict unfamiliar template. The experience of military or new way of making war to be implemented • Finally, another aspect that definitively conflicts […] confirm that a perfectly thriving by the Russian Federation in the near future. weakens the usefulness of the term is the state can, in a matter of months and even Having analysed in the previous paragraphs, the cross-attribution of the term between the days, be transformed into an area of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign ambiguous definition of the concept of hybrid West and Russian strategists. intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, war, its evolution, and its appreciation and in- humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war. […] terpretation in different and disparate ambits, Examples of Hybrid Warfare The very 'rules of war' have changed. The role we could conclude the following: of non-military means of achieving political strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, The Hybrid War of Daesh they have exceeded the power of force of • The objective pursued by the authors when weapons in their effectiveness." coining the concept of hybrid war was not Since its inception, Daesh has distinguished to define a new type of conflict, but to call itself from other terrorist organizations by its If we analyse in a rigorous way both the context attention to new risks, resulting from the level of ambition,12 strategies, and tactics em- in which the 2013 speech was made and the current context, and thereby make the struc- ployed. It is able to adapt its forms of combat to article published in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy tures responsible for the defence policies of context and capacity. This multi-dimensional Kurier (VPK news)11, in February 2014, we will their respective countries react by incorpo- way of acting corresponds perfectly with most see that Gerasimov follows an argument not rating lines of action to counteract them. of the definitions of hybrid war, with its main

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characteristics being the combined use of con- cial management, social servicing, etc. This hi- and transcendence of becoming a Daesh com- ventional, unconventional, terrorist and crimi- erarchical organization of centralized control batant in the face of apathy, nonsense and lack nal actions, mostly synchronized, and under and execution coexists with another, where the of expectations offered by Western life. the umbrella of a careful coverage media, or- execution is completely decentralized, and the In conclusion, the hybrid nature of the chestrated by a clear and targeted communica- structure diffused. This latter organization is Daesh rests on its capacity to combine different tion strategy. In this way, it is possible to act on the one required to carry out non-convention- forms of action (conventional, unconventional a global scale while at the same time following al, terrorist, and criminal activities globally. and terrorist), supported by criminal activities, a conventional type of action similar to that of A fundamental classification of Daesh as mainly as a source of financing, coordinated, other terrorist organizations, while directing it a hybrid threat is its extensive use of informa- directed, and controlled, efficiently, and sup- against interests classified as "Western". tion, which is supported by a clear communi- ported by a perfectly orchestrated media cam- There are mainly two areas of action. The cation strategy. Within this strategy lie three paign. From all these characteristics the only first area of action, a regional or limited type, different lines of action, with their respective thing that is novel is the degree of synchrony is the one where Daesh executes its operations target audiences. The first line of action is the and efficiency, which are only due to aspects by taking advantage of power gaps, normally one aimed at influencing the morale and will such as accessible technological advances, the in areas of conflict or post-conflict. The second to fight against it. The target audience, in this current international structure, and interde- area of action is global, but could be combined case, is constituted by the international com- pendence relations between different global with the regional one or, if the previous one is munity of Western character and thought. The social groups. affected or denied, it will become a priority. actions towards this audience are aimed at The type of operations carried out is primarily seeking a feeling of vulnerability through the The Conflict in Ukraine: Characteristics of unconventional or terrorist operations that are dissemination of information related to the re- the Hybrid Phenomenon aimed primarily at affecting the morale of the sults of indiscriminate terrorist acts. adversary, and, therefore, negatively influenc- The second line of action is aimed at I. Chronology of the Conflict ing their daily lives. However, the execution of achieving acceptance and even harmony with actions requires command and control struc- its ideology. The international community of In 2013, in the months before Euromaidan,13 tures with an enormous capacity for adapta- Arab character and thought is the target audi- the political situation in Ukraine was extreme- tion. Thus, acting as a "pseudo-state" would ence, to whom a message is addressed high- ly complicated. On the one hand, there was the require an organization capable of carrying out lighting the social and governance actions incumbent "Party of the Regions", representa- functions of government, economic and finan- put into practice in the areas of conflict, or in tive of the Russian ethnic groups and those in those areas where the sovereign state is unable favour of ties with the Russian Federation, and, to meet the population's basic needs. Finally, on the other, the "Ukrainian Democratic Alli- ABOVE, FROM LEFT: Chaos-induction is key to hybrid there is the line of action whose objective is ance for Reform" (UDAR),14 "Fatherland Par- aggression; masked Russian soldiers, also known as "green men", photo.ua/Shutterstock; the new the recruitment of followers in terrorist acts, ty"15 and "Liberty"16 (Svoboda). During 2013, operational environment of cyber warfare; a woman support, or combat. The target audience is the opposition by the parties to the policies of lights a candle in front of the theatre Le Bataclan in 17 tribute to victims of the November 13, 2015 terrorist world population susceptible to radicalization. Viktor Yanukovych became increasingly no- attack in Paris. Photo by Frederic Legrand/Shutterstock. In this case, the message is aimed at offering ticeable, despite the fact that the latter justified A destroyed tank is seen along a road on the territory controlled by the self-proclaimed Luhansk People's attractive and hopeful perspectives within the the austerity measures imposed as necessary to Republic near airport of Luhansk, in Luhansk region, "true" religion of Islam, presenting the benefits channel their future integration in the EU. eastern Ukraine, November 19, 2014. © REUTERS ►►►

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2014. The United States and the EU responded to this annexation by means of economic sanc- tions and limited military deployments to Po- land and the Baltic States. These actions had no practical outcome, as the conflict spread to the eastern region of Ukraine, instigated by the pro-Russians. Next, the pro-Russian separatists, sup- ported by the Russian Federation, tried to es- tablish the same successful Crimean process in the east of the country, but which instead resulted in clashes during the summer of 2014. Among their consequences with heavy inter- national impact was the downing by pro-Rus- sian militias of a commercial aircraft belong- ing to the Malaysian Airlines. 298 passengers and crew died during this tragic event. As a re- sult of the aforementioned incident, the sanc- tions against Russia were hardened and there was a perception of weakening in the Federa- tion's support to the militias. This reduction of Russian support coupled with the military offensive of the Kiev government ended with the recovery of a large part of the territory that had been ceded to the pro-Russian paramili- taries. In September 2014, the parties reached a ceasefire agreement,20 supported by the EU and the Russian Federation. ABOVE: December 1, 2013 Euromaidan riots. Thousands of people in Ukraine demonstrated against President This agreement not only failed to stop the Yanukovich's decision to abandon an EU integration pact. Photo by Kiev.Victor/Shutterstock violence, but it also had an agglutinating effect of the pro-Russian separatist groups, under the The situation was exacerbated by a Kiev, being dismissed by the parliament, which denomination of the "Unified Armed Forces of 180-degree turnaround in President Yanu- then formed an interim government headed by Novorossiya". The ceasefire situation did not kovych's strategies, which stopped the sign- Oleksandr Turchynov.18 However, the situation last long since the conflict was again intensi- ing of the Association Agreement with the EU was far from stable. Pro-Russian opposition fied, and Russian forces crossed the border. In under the pretext of the existence of economic denounced the illegality of the constituted gov- response to this open aggression and in an at- obstacles, which would have to be negotiated ernment and the focus of the conflict shifted to tempt to preserve territorial integrity, the gov- with the Russian Federation. In order to con- the Crimea Peninsula, due to the ethnic Russian ernment of Poroshenko21 appealed for the 1994 trol the situation, and offer the international demographic superiority in that region. The Memorandum of Budapest22 to be respected. community an apparent normality, President change in the government of the country served Thus, in a new attempt to achieve peace, Yanukovych and Vladimir Putin signed a bi- as an excuse for pro-Russian paramilitaries19 to the Minsk II23 Agreement was signed on 12 lateral agreement, by which the price of gas for appeal Putin's protection, implying that Ukrai- February 2015, despite the conflict continuing Ukraine and Russia was lowered by one third nian population of Russian ethnicity was threat- until the pro-Russian separatists consolidated in order to buy Ukrainian public debt to allevi- ened by Kiev. territory in the Debaltseve area, establishing ate the crisis. The effect was the opposite. The In this climate of instability, from the continuity in the pro-Russian territories. These protests were further aggravated in an attempt Ukrainian Government and Western intelli- changes led to less violence and a fall in death to avoid ratification of the agreement with Rus- gence agencies' perspective, the appearance on toll. Subsequent agreements and dialogue sia and as a reaction to the measures imposed by scene of unidentified armed personnel, which between the belligerents have led to less vio- the government to quell the revolts. By Febru- supposedly belonged to the Russian special op- lence.24 Nevertheless, a definitive solution to ary 2014, violent actions had spread throughout erations forces, was denounced. The support of the conflict has not yet been reached. the country, with opponents of the government these special operations forces was the reason occupying official buildings. Despite making behind the pro-Russian paramilitary forces an attempt to negotiate in extremis with the seizing power in Crimea and the annexation opposition, Yanukovych was forced to leave to the Russian Federation signed on 18 March

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II. The Intervention in Ukraine Principal Characteristics of the behaviour of the adversary, sowing: be- The reasons for the Russian Federation's inter- the Hybrid War Phenomenon wilderment, instability, dissatisfaction, de- vention in Ukraine are primarily: the Russian moralization, as well as undermining the co- security strategy aspiring to expand beyond a Under the following heading, I will revisit, in hesion of the target audiences. This causes an regional power, and the instability of the gov- specific, the main characteristics that are sup- internal fracture and inability to perceive re- ernment itself. Under the umbrella of the secu- posedly seen exclusively or substantively in a ality correctly, with serious consequences for rity, Russia would primarily emphasize preoc- hybrid war. the decision processes, the unity of action, cupation and reservations concerning NATO and the support required in any conflict. Ad- and EU pressure on its expansion towards the • Actions oriented towards enemy vulner- ditionally, as an example of the adaptation of east (Mearsheimer, 2014). Also related to this abilities: This orientation towards vulner- these types of strategies to the current con- first aspect, but more in the facet of the ambi- ability is determined as a fundamental text, where the majority of the information tion to become a world power, is the Russian characteristic of hybrid attacks in several is managed by computer means, we find one Federation's need to control the Black Sea re- publications. It turns out to be an absolute of the ultimate ways of executing this type of gion, which inevitably also implies the control and indisputable principle in the planning actions that has lately grown in prominence: of the Peninsula of Crimea. The Black Sea con- of all military operations, past, present and the use of cyber-attacks. stitutes a vital access for Russia, both for eco- future. For numerous reasons, military ac- nomic and military aspects, since it facilitates tions are always be directed against critical • Employment of political, diplomatic and the maritime communication lines necessary vulnerabilities, that is, those that directly in- international legal pressure: Under this for the access of commercial routes or the pro- fluence the integrity of the adversary's centre heading we could include all those measures jection of naval power to the Mediterranean of gravity. Would a force waste its resources that, through the use of political power and Sea and from there to the rest of the world.25 trying to affect an impregnable characteristic diplomatic activity in different forums and Given the Russian aspirations, it is clear that a of an adversary unless this is done with the international organizations, place one of the Crimean Peninsula as part of the territory of a intention of deceiving? contestants, in a given conflict, in a position country belonging to the EU or NATO would of superiority or, at least, with the ability to constitute a situation of impermissible risk to • The harmonized deployment of regular curtail the decisions of his opponent. These its economy and freedom of projection. and irregular forces: There are two main forms of pressure could be complemented by forms of combat. The first type is the so- a twisted use of current international legisla- III. The Hybrid Aspects of the Conflict called compound warfare, where a regular tion, drafted in the light of Western thought, force is deployed in the main effort, while and whose interested interpretation or even "Hybrid" activity in Ukraine can be perceived an irregular force, consisting of local fight- transgression is justified for most non-state since the moment in which this nation formal- ers, equipped, trained and controlled by the actors and for some states, in case of threat izes its intent to become an independent state, nation to which the regular forces belong, is of their national interests. in the summer of 1991. A series of diplomatic, engaged in smaller-scale attacks. The sec- economic and political initiatives (pro-West- ond way of executing military actions by • Exercising economic and financial strate- ern and pro-Russian) were executed by both using regular and irregular forces, is known gies: These measures would be based on sides of the conflict, accompanied by protest as protracted warfare, a type of warfare first the ability of certain states to exert pres- actions, civil disobedience, and subversion, described by Mao Zedong in an essay pub- sure on others by influencing their internal to which, as the conflict escalated, others of a lished in 1938. In this type of warfare, one of or external financial activity, causing effects paramilitary and military nature were added; the belligerents experiences an evolutionary that transcend the economic ones and even all of them conveniently complemented with process, where it initiates its actions from the affect social welfare and, thereby, increase the corresponding propaganda, information basic state of insurgency, with very limited the possibilities of internal destabilization. and misinformation. But among all these ac- capabilities, and performs mainly subversive Examples would be investments in strategic tions, is there anything revolutionary new? actions (mobile warfare). What differenti- sectors, purchase of large-scale debt, restric- From my point of view the answer is no. As in ates this form of executing the military op- tions on access to raw materials or energy the case of Daesh, a greater efficiency and syn- erations from the compound warfare is the resources, or the implementation of policies chrony in the actions is only the consequence absence of explicit support from a state actor. aimed at making extensive the use of a cer- of a superior command and control capacity, tain currency. which would simply obey the circumstantial • Extensive use of information: Influence aspects already mentioned. strategies which would go far beyond the • Execution of subversive, terrorist, and military sphere would mainly consist of the criminal activities: The objective here is to use of any mean to deprive information or achieve a degree of internal instability that PLUS disseminate it, altered or not, according to again would negatively influence the man- need. The objective of these actions is to agement of the conflict. Propaganda, desta- For more articles about Hybrid War visit www.jwc.nato.int/selected articles influence the perception, and therefore also bilizing impact of terrorism, and creating

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“The term hybrid bal in the Italian Peninsula, the attempts to the case of information about the murder of a synchronize the actions of the Irish irregular woman attributed to the atrocities committed war simply forces and the Spanish troops during the rebel- by the Indians, allies of the British, in order to lion of Hugh O'Neill against the English, the instigate feelings of rejection and hatred (Mur- refers to the actions of the Spanish guerrilla against Napo- ray, 2012). leonic troops, in the Peninsular War, or the re- With a more strategic character, years phenomenon of surgence of French irregular forces during the later, during the Peninsular War, King Joseph Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Bonaparte tried to gain the initiative in the war in general.” The degree of integration and synchro- information environment. The method used nization in the cited examples is logically dif- was the dissemination, through gazettes and ferent. Obviously, the greater the availability with scope throughout the Iberian Peninsula, of technology, the better the strategic-political of messages that included the atrocities and level may manage and control operations, al- brutalities committed by the guerrillas, pre- lowing it to exercise the command of tactical senting the members of these groups as beasts entities if, due to the strategic effects of such at the service of the English (Hart, 2012). Years action, the situation demands it. Moreover, it later, during the American Civil War, in a more is expected that this feature will improve as hu- operational sense, both the army of the Union manity advances technologically. Shall we say and the Confederation were determined to then, that a greater integration and synchro- alter the telegraph lines, causing the transmis- nization than the current one will constitute a sion of wrong or false orders or impeding its characteristic of another new type of war? broadcast.26 These same practices continued to The use of information is another char- be very common also during the First and Sec- acteristic that has been present in each and ond World War, and in each and every one of every conflict in the history of mankind. The the conflicts that have occurred up today. collection, distribution, propagation and ma- insecurity through organized crime are ways nipulation of information has been essential Conclusion to achieve this. These measures cause desta- in all the wars of history to found decisions, bilization, heightening of ethnic, religious, or achieve the support of influential groups and, To conclude, I would say that the lack of con- social tensions. if necessary, create a context that induces the creteness of the concept of hybrid war is evi- adversary to erroneous decision making and dent, demonstrated by the absence of a clear, Critical Judgement of the loss of the support it enjoys. I would like exact and precise definition, since those that the Characteristics of to quote Sun Tzu, who in his work The Art of exist are based on a mere description of the Hybrid Warfare War explained the importance of information phenomenon by enumerating some supposed in military thought at that time: exclusive characteristics, which are actually The following paragraph aims to sum up the circumstantial and not at all innovative. The "If you know yourself but not the enemy, for unique aspects of hybrid war as a long existing above offers the possibility of adapting the every victory gained you will also suffer a type of war, not as a new concept, showing that defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor concept so that it is applicable to conflicts of these specific characteristics have been imple- yourself, you will succumb in every battle. […] very different types according to other clas- mented at different degrees through the his- All warfare is based on deception. Hence, sifications of proven validity, undermining when able to attack, we must seem unable; tory, according to historical context. The fact its practical use. This is revealed in its limited when using our forces, we must seem inactive; that attacks have to be directed against critical when we are near, we must make the enemy use in strategic or security and defence policy vulnerabilities of the adversary, reinforces that believe we are far away; when far away, we documents. Yet, regardless of the above, it is this characteristic is one of the fundamental must make him believe we are near." noteworthy that its creators achieved the ini- principles of military planning. It is neither ex- tial objective that led them to coining the term. clusive to the hybrid war type or novel. Moving on to practical examples not very dis- The aim was no other than to provoke a change In relation to the use of regular and tant in time, in which these type of principles in the defence policies of their countries, re- irregular forces, the supporters of the new related to the "management" of information directing them to face complex challenges, concept claim this as exclusive to hybrid war were followed, we find the American War of consequence of the evolution of the context of because of the high level of synchronization Independence, where false messenger infor- military operations. In short, the lack of con- achieved by these two kinds of forces. Fleeing mation was leaked to British sources, in order cretion of the hybrid war concept, its malleable from the most recent ones to show the pres- to provoke erroneous judgments regarding the applicability and absence of exclusivity of its ence of this aspect throughout most conflicts entity of the rebel forces (Norman B. Hutcher- defining characteristics show that the term hy- in the history of humanity, we could highlight; son, Command and Control Warfare, 1994). In brid war simply refers to the phenomenon of the tactics of Fabius Maximus against Hanni- addition, propaganda was routinely used, as in war in general.

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ENDNOTES:

1 Mattis, J and Hoffman, F. Future Warfare: The Rise 11 The Role of Non-Military Methods in the Resolution 20 The Protocol of the Trilateral Contact Group signed in of Hybrid Wars, Proceedings, num. 11th November of Interstate Conflicts. Source: Valery Gerasimov, Minsk on September 5, 2014, by the representatives 2005, pp. 18-19. "The value of science in anticipation", VPK news, 27 of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the Organiza- 2 The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is a periodic February 2014. Accessed 2 July 2014, http://www. tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), review by the United States Defense Department vpk-news.ru/articles/14632. established a series of measures aimed at achieving concerning its strategy and priorities. The result are 12 DAESH's level of ambition has been focused on the cessation of hostilities, guarantee the security of the general lines of action for implementation by the creation of necessary conditions for the establish- border between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, department. These actions are meant confront future ment of the ideal Islamic State, destined to last and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in the threats and manage risk while safeguarding national expand. Following military successes in which numer- zones in conflict, the deactivation of illegal military interests. https://www.defense.gov/News/Special- ous cities and vast territories in Syria and Iraq were formations, the elimination of military equipment, Reports/QDR/ conquered, the organization announced on 29 July and the implementation of measures democratic 3 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense 2014 the restoration of the caliphate in the person institutions for the solution of the problems related Review Report, Washington DC, February 2010, of Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, who made his appearance to the demands of independence. www.osce.org/ p.8. https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/ on 4 July of that year in the Great Mosque of Mosul. home/123257 defenseReviews/QDR/QDR_as_of_29JAN10_1600.pdf He proclaimed that under his guidance, the Islamic 21 Petro Poroshenko was elected during the May 2014 4 NATO. Warsaw Summit Communiqué. Issued by world would recover its dignity, power, and rights. elections held by the interim government in Kiev. the Heads of State and Government participating in 13 Through Euromaidan, it is known that by the end 22 The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assur- the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw of 2013, thousands of students were initiated and ances, signed on December 5, 1994 by Ukraine, 8-9 July 2016. Press Communiqué (2016) 100. 9 centered in Maidan Nazeezhnosti, Independence the Russian Federation, the United States and the July 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/of- Plaza situated in Kiev's center. These protests were United Kingdom, to which China and France would ficial_texts_133169.htm directed to reclaim the continuation of pro-European later join, confirms in its first point the respect of the 5 EU. European External Action Service. Working policies and the signing by the Ukrainian government independence, sovereignty and the existing borders Document EEAS (2015) 731. Food-for-thought paper of a Treaty of Association with the European Union, of Ukraine, as a consequence of the adhesion of "Countering Hybrid Threats". 13th May 2015. http:// a definitive step towards becoming a member of the the latter to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of www.statewatch.org/news/2015/may/eeas-csdp- union in the near future. Nuclear Weapons. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Pub- hybrid-threats-8887-15.pdf 14 The centre right "UDAR" party with nationalist views lication/UNTS/No%20Volume/52241/Part/I-52241- 6 EU. European Commission. Joint Communication and ties to the European Popular Party approved 0800000280401fbb.pdf. to the European Parliament and the Council. Joint integration into the EU. 23 Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Framework on countering hybrid threats. JOIN 15 The centre-right "Fatherland" party with nationalist Research, Uppsala Data Conflict Program https:// (2016) 18 final. 6th April 2016. http://eur-lex.europa. views and ties to the European Popular Party ap- ucdp.uu.se/?id=1&id=1. eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018 proved integration into the EU. 24 Sánchez Herráez, P. (2015) Crimea: A new Russian 7 EU. Council. Press Communiqué. Council conclu- 16 "Liberty" was initially founded as the Nationalist- "advanced position" Analysis Paper 13/2015 (only sions on countering hybrid threats. 19th April 2016. Socialist Party of Ukraine. In recent years, however, available in Spanish language), Spanish Institute for http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press- it has moderated its ideology and public manifesta- Strategic Studies (IEEE), MINISDEF. releases/2016/04/19-fac-conclusions-hybrid-threats/ tions, continued to attract far-right, ultra-nationalist 25 Furlan, L. (2014) Crimea and the inheritance of the 8 EU. Global Strategy for the European's Union Foreign parties, and maintaining connections with paramili- Admiral Gorshkov, Framework Document 10/2014, and Security Policy. Shared Vision, Common Action: tary organizations. 2015 (only available in Spanish language), Spanish A Stronger Europe. June 2016 https://europa.eu/ 17 Member of the "Regional Party", Viktor Yanukovych, Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE), MINISDEF. globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/regions/files/ who came from the post of Governor of the Donetsk 26 In particular, the role played then by the telegraph eugs_review_web.pdf Region and twice Prime Minister, served as President is perfectly compatible to the one currently played 9 EU. European Defence Action Plan. COM (2016) 950 of Ukraine between 25 February 2010and 22 Febru- by the means of command, control and communi- final. Brussels 31st November 2016. https://eeas. ary 2014. cations, military or not, supported by information europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/com_2016_950_f1_com- 18 Oleksandr Turchynov, member of the "Patria" Party, technology. In both cases, they represent critical munication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v5_ was nominated interim President of Ukraine on 22 vulnerabilities. The cyber-attacks of today are the p1_869631.pdf February 2014. He filled the role until his succession projection in our days of the attacks on the telegraph 10 EU. Directorate-General for External Policies of by Poroshenko on 7 June of that same year. line. Old ideas adapted to new circumstances. the Union (European Parliament). EU Defence: 19 The initial request for aid is mainly attributed to The White Book implementation process. 1st Sergei Aksyonov, leader of the pro-Russian party March 2019. https://publications.europa.eu/en/ "Russian Unity", who formed a paramilitary group publication-detail/-/publication/171abc9e-22af- initially consisting of youth militancy of his party, but 11e9-8d04-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/ later recruiting hundreds of pro-Russian Ukrainians, source-95159511 and renamed "Crimean Self-Defense Brigades".

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