Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict by Frank G

No. 240 Strategic Forum April 2009 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict by Frank G. Hoffman

Key Points Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directly what degree should investment resources challenged the Pentagon’s strategists and mil- be allocated to conducting current opera- itary chiefs in an important speech at the tions, and what needs to be invested in the America’s ongoing battles in Afghanistan National Defense University in September 2008. future? How much should be devoted to so- and Iraq have highlighted limitations in our understanding of the complexity of modern The speech was a critical assessment of the pre- called nontraditional or irregular missions warfare. Furthermore, our cultural prism has vailing U.S. military culture and the prism such as counterinsurgency versus traditional retarded the institutionalization of capabilities through which our Armed Forces see themselves. military capabilities? How should we invest needed to prevail in stabilization and counter- This prism clarifies what is important about scarce funding to reflect this balance? How do insurgency missions. the future and how we posture our forces for the we balance not only missions, but also force An ongoing debate about future threats is future. Secretary Gates questioned that mindset capabilities, risks, and resources? often framed as a dichotomous choice between and its hold on the Services and the Department In the defense community, this “fight over counterinsurgency and conventional war. This of Defense’s capitalization practices. the next war” has been going on for some time.3 oversimplifies defense planning and resource Secretary Gates also declared that “the The debate has been poorly framed as a choice allocation decisions. Instead of fundamen- defining principle of the Pentagon’s new between idealized dichotomous options (see figure tally different approaches, we should expect National Defense Strategy is balance,”1 a 1). This distorted conception grossly oversimplifies competitors who will employ all forms of war, principle that will also be key in the upcom- critical defense planning and resource allocation perhaps simultaneously. Such multimodal ing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). decisions. Secretary Gates implied that this was threats are often called hybrid threats. Hybrid This principle will force the critical exam- not how he perceived balance in any event. This adversaries employ combinations of capabili- ination of assumptions about the future, essay aims to widen the debate over post–Opera- ties to gain an asymmetric advantage. our understanding of threats, and their rel- tion Iraqi Freedom defense budgets and the pos- Thus, the choice is not simply one of ative priorities. Gates emphasizes achiev- ture of the joint warfighting community. preparing for long-term stability operations or ing a balance between our current conflicts This reconceptualization will have signifi- high-intensity conflict. We must be able to do and the Pentagon’s penchant to plan toward cant implications for military force design and both simultaneously against enemies far more more canonical, conventional scenarios. posture. In a perfect world, our military would be ruthless than today’s. The Secretary believes that the Pentagon is robustly sized, and we would build distinct forces This essay widens the aperture of the devoted to postulated longer term challenges for discrete missions along the conflict spectrum. current debate to account for this threat. It com- that have little to do with current conflicts We would have separate forces to deal with coun- pares and contrasts four competing perspec- and more likely threats. He used the term terterrorism, protracted counterinsurgencies, tives and evaluates them for readiness and risk implications. This risk assessment argues that Next-War-itis to describe a prism that distorts expeditionary missions, and the rare but existen- the hybrid threat presents the most operational the Services’ ability to see military affairs tial interstate conflagration. The training and 2 risk in the near- to midterm. Accordingly, it con- clearly and objectively. equipping of these forces would be well matched cludes that hybrid threats are a better focal point The concept of balance is central to to their expected operating environments and for considering alternative joint force postures. today’s security debate, but it is a complex threats. But we do not live in such a world, and problem rather than a simple equation. To we need to prepare and shape our forces in an

No. 240, April 2009 Strategic Forum 1 Figure 1. Balancing the Joint Force surgency and irregular threats as the proper between conventional powers are not realis- focus for our Armed Forces. Proponents tic planning scenarios and should not be the Irregular Traditional of the competing school of thought at the focal point for shaping tomorrow’s military. Capability Capability other end of the spectrum are labeled the They maintain that the most likely challenges Traditionalists, who argue for a force struc- and greatest risks are posed by failing states, ture to fight conventional wars. Bacevich per- ungoverned territories, transnational threats, sonalized the ongoing debate by using two and followers of radical versions of Islam. Desired General Purpose prominent contemporary authors, John Nagl The Counterinsurgents contend that the Forces Capability Portfolio and Gian Gentile, as the polar protagonists.6 purpose of a military is not to perpetuate its H.L. Mencken would have characterized preferred paradigms but rather to prepare environment of greater uncertainty and fewer Bacevich’s essay as offering something neat, for likely contingencies and secure America’s resources. As Secretary Gates has noted, the 9/11 clean, and completely wrong. His “black-and- interests. They worry that U.S. military culture funding spigot is about to be turned off, requiring white” option set creates a false binary choice will reject the primacy of, or even the need the Pentagon to rethink its priorities and make that is great for media consumption, but that for, competency in irregular warfare as opera- hard calls. We no longer have the resources to represents a gross oversimplification and dis- tions in Iraq wind down. That would be a stra- simply buy everything and eliminate every risk. torted conception of America’s strategic options. tegic mistake, even more reprehensible than The time for thinking anew has arrived. Four of the various schools of thought on the institutional memory dump that occurred This essay sets out to expand the array of how to address this force posture problem will after Vietnam.7 In their opinion, preparing for potential posture options for the U.S. military set be assessed here. In each school, the prin- an age of asymmetric wars is neither folly nor against an appreciation for the evolving charac- cipal military threat and its probability and a matter of strategic choice or an “imperial ter of modern conflict. There are far more con- consequences are identified. An alternative delusion”; it is simply a strategic necessity in tenders in this debate, and a far broader range approach based upon the growing “hybrid an era of persistent conflict.8 of options with significantly different risks and threat” literature is also incorporated as a Advocates of this school stress that this distinct investment shifts. Given the economic better construct for sizing and shaping the should be the focus of effort for the American crisis and the need to carefully husband our joint force. Additionally, the force structure military. Some of them deride the notion of defense resources in the next decade, it is impor- requirements and posture shifts that would irregular warfare in our military’s culture as tant that the Obama administration grasp the be required to support each school are exam- fallacious and criticize the U.S. military’s con- numerous modes of warfare that we face and ined. The four schools are: ceptual blindness about the frequency and have a broader spectrum of options. The admin- complexity of nontraditional forms of conflict. istration needs to avoid strategic overstretch and ■ Counterinsurgents, who emphasize As military expert Barak Salmoni has argued: make difficult decisions about what to empha- the high likelihood and rising salience of size and how to prudently balance risk.4 irregular adversaries It will only be when American military and Moreover, the debate so far has focused ■ Traditionalists, who focus on conven- civilian leaders recast the irregular as reg- on shaping land forces for future scenar- tional threats ular that they will begin to fundamentally ios instead of understanding implications ■ Utility infielders, who attempt to bal- restructure forces, properly re-educate person- for the entire joint warfighting community. ance the risks posed by multiple threats by nel, effectively plan operationally and use- Inasmuch as the Navy and Air Force are rel- striving to create forces agile enough to cover fully deploy as well as employ military forces.9 evant to both current conflicts and will the full spectrum undoubtedly be critical contributors to future ■ Division of labor proponents, who The Counterinsurgents believe that fights, a wider lens is needed. balance risk differently by specializing forces America’s enemies are learning and adaptive to cover different missions. beings who recognize the futility of confront- Competing Schools ing the United States in open warfare. Rather The Counterinsurgents. than present predictable aim points for easy Andrew Bacevich captures today’s post– Proponents of this camp challenge the narrow targeting and destruction, these opponents Iraqi Freedom strategy and forces debate orientation of traditionally focused forces and will continue to confound the American mili- in his widely cited article, “The Petraeus argue for a transformation based on today’s tary until it demonstrates that it has mastered Doctrine.” He portrayed a stark choice fights. They believe that Iraq and Afghanistan irregular warfare. between two competing camps in the U.S. represent far more than a passing trend in the Some highly regarded military officers military.5 At one end of the spectrum of con- evolution of conflict. The Counterinsurgents who are part of this school are concerned that flict is a group that Bacevich derisively calls contend that massed formations comprised the U.S. military is misreading the shifts, espe- the Crusaders, who emphasize counterin- of traditional arms and large-scale conflict cially in ground force training and capabilities, that will be required to create forces capable of Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman, USMCR (Ret.), is a Research Fellow in the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

2 Strategic Forum No. 240, April 2009 producing the same dominance in irregular strategic and operational context for the Joint defended its assumptions about the salience of warfare that we currently have in air and naval Force over the next 25 years.”13 interstate conflict. Most of the geopolitical argu- warfare. As one author put it: Traditionalists are particularly wary ments for focusing on near-peer or large states about the newfound embrace of messy, pro- presume automatically that conflicts will be Today’s wars represent the latest data tracted counterinsurgencies such as Iraq and essentially conventional and high intensity.20 The points of a continuum of experience in Afghanistan. They are rightfully concerned results of these assumptions will be tested later. the next phase of conflict. This new epoch about the degradation of combat skill sets Utility Infielders. The third of wars in the “American era” has funda- within the Army and Marine Corps due to the and most prevalent school, at least among mentally changed how America has fought severe operational tempo of today’s conflicts. American ground force commanders, is the its wars since the end of the industrial age The debate is inherently mixed Utility Infielder school. Its advocates rec- and will shape how we fight our wars for a with the strategic lessons of Iraq. To the ognize the need to adequately deal with generation or more to come.10 Traditionalists, our experiences in Iraq both strictly conventional tasks and irregu- should have “raised questions about the wis- lar threats. They propose covering the entire The Counterinsurgent school argues that dom of employing American military power spectrum of conflict and avoiding the risk of irregular warfare is not only different and to build nations where none exist or where an being optimized at either extreme. Instead, of greater priority, but it also cannot be suc- American military presence is not wanted.”14 they seek to spread this risk across the range cessfully conducted by general purpose forces The Traditionalist proponents make clear that that prepare for it only marginally. Its propo- irregular warfare/counterinsurgency/nation- the Counterinsurgents nents challenge “current orthodoxy [which] building does not match well with U.S. cul- believe that America’s says that what is needed is a one-size-fits- ture or priorities. As Gentile has argued: all medium force that is both strategically enemies are learning mobile and tactically robust.”11 Instead, they The real question . . . is whether the Army and adaptive beings who argue for a greater emphasis on wars among should be prepared to conduct stability oper- recognize the futility of the people, and a force particularly shaped for ations, nationbuilding, counterinsurgency, sustained irregular warfare. and related operations for more than very confronting the United The Traditionalists. At the brief periods. Experience to date both indi- States in open warfare opposite end of the spectrum of conflict are cates the limitations of American military the Traditionalists, who seek to reestablish capability to reshape other people’s societies the focus of the Armed Forces on “fighting and governments and points to the limits of of military operations by investing in quality and winning the Nation’s wars.” They focus American military and economic resources forces, educating officers for agility in com- on major, high-intensity interstate wars. They in the conduct of these operations.15 plex problems, and conducting tough but advocate against reorienting forces, especially flexible training programs. ground forces, away from their traditional Traditionalists also ask the valid question The Utility Infielders school is officially emphasis on large-scale, Industrial Age war- of whether our culturally based inadequacies represented in the Army’s new doctrinal pub- fare against states or alliances. against ambiguous threats are largely immu- lication Field Manual 3–0, Operations, which Proponents of this school do not ignore table.16 Can America’s military culture be suf- declares “stability operations are a core U.S. the frequency of irregular warfare or dis- ficiently adapted to deal effectively with the military mission that must be given prior- miss its persistent nature; they just believe insidious character of irregular combat and ter- ity comparable to that of combat (offen- that such scenarios are not amenable to mil- rorism? How real and permanent are the insti- sive and defensive) operations.” This con- itary intervention and that these contingen- tutional adaptations that have been made since struct rejects the narrow mission profile of cies should not be the focus of the American 2003? Is being prepared for irregular warfare the Traditionalists and claims that the Army military. Traditionalists want to retain the really “folly”?17 Should we dismiss the irregular must train its units in the application of full- Pentagon’s current procurement profile and foe as merely “mischievous,” or will this result spectrum operations to ensure it provides a its emphasis on the “big guns” for a future in reruns of the “David over Goliath” show?18 As balanced, versatile force to joint and com- they predict will be conventional in nature one critic of this school observes, “The institu- bined force commanders. These full-spec- and for which a large and expensive military tional military still seems to think that the cur- trum operations emphasize the importance of is strategically necessary.12 rent conflicts are mere temporary distractions adaptive, flexible forces able to fight and win This school would concur with a key from some future main showdown with an as- in combat, whether facing a terrorist entity assessment in U.S. Joint Forces Command’s yet-undefined peer force.”19 or the modern forces of a hostile nation. Joint Operating Environment that concludes All in all, the Traditionalist school pres- However, the real priorities of this school “competition and conflict among conven- ents strong arguments for not conducting sta- might be found in this crucial statement: tional powers will continue to be the primary bility operations, but it has not tested much less full-spectrum operations “will take us into

No. 240, April 2009 Strategic Forum 3 the 21st-century urban battlefields among the does not give comfort. Both Services empha- Systems Administration, would be assigned people without losing our capabilities to dom- size the same hardware priorities they held to the naval Services. The second task, ful- inate the higher conventional end of the spec- before the current operations. filling the role of the warfighting Leviathan, trum of conflict.”21 The assumption inher- The Army has not seriously altered its would belong to the Army and Air Force. The ent in these statements is that conventional move toward modular force structures or its Systems Administration force would maintain conflict is at the higher end, but that urban $200 billion Future Combat System, despite the global commons and provide constabu- battlefields and today’s emerging threats are the fact that those plans were predicated lary and crisis response forces.25 Other observ- somehow less demanding and less costly. upon a different threat and an untested con- ers reinforced this concept and recommended Likewise, the Marine Corps’ long-range cept and an even less mature suite of tech- that the Marine Corps return to its small wars vision and capstone operating concept that nologies. Critics suggest that the Marine roots and drop its pursuit of major programs extols the versatility of “multi-capable” Marine Corps should stop perceiving its mission designed to preserve its forcible entry mission.26 Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) across the based on the iconic Iwo Jima model built A team from RAND proposes a differ- full range of military operations reflect this around its World War II experiences and urge ent approach that also rationalizes roles school of thought. In its latest long-range it to conceptualize its development efforts on and missions, and offers a means of guiding Service vision, the Marines Corps claims to more relevant and modern enemies.23 future defense investments: cover an “extraordinary range of operations,” Understandably, both Services have their but seeks to add new competencies only “with- particular mask of war, but it is hard to square The imperative to promote stability and out losing our conventional capabilities.”22 their fixed programmatic priorities with a democracy abroad will place the great- The proponents of the Utility Infielder newly expressed understanding of irregular est demands on the Army, the Marine school do not address a number of crucial warfare. Will either Service move past con- Corps, and special operations forces. The questions. How reasonable is it for general cepts and doctrine and adapt longstanding most plausible regional wars that U.S. purpose forces to be able to train, equip, and organizational models? Is the current mantra forces might be called on to fight—involv- be proficient at such a wide range of opera- of full-spectrum operations and “multi-capa- ing Iran, China (over Taiwan), and North tional missions and contexts? How can our ble” MAGTFs simply more of the same? Are we Korea—call for heavy commitments of ground forces be good at many things, and really going to be ready against more implaca- air and naval forces and, in the first two shift emphasis in training, doctrine, and ble and irreconcilable enemies who seek adap- cases, fewer U.S. ground forces.27 equipment without losing time and resources tive and asymmetric means? How do we mea- for so-called conventional capabilities? Are sure that commitment and readiness, and how Accordingly, RAND recommended that increased resources or a much larger ground do we test the assumptions and risk exposure the Department of Defense consider focusing a force implied? An even more critical question that this force posture presents? much larger proportion of U.S. ground forces is whether the new version of full-spectrum Division of Labor. A number of on direct and indirect stability operations and operations is any different than the 1990s analysts reject the fundamental premise of the “accept the risk of shifting some of the bur- version, when nontraditional programs got Utility Infielders school. They instead take a den for deterring and defeating large-scale so little attention. Since full-spectrum oper- page from C.E. Callwell and argue that irregular aggression to air and naval forces.”28 This rec- ations and the Marine “3-block-war” were and conventional warfare are markedly different ommendation appears based upon a set of prevalent before 2003 but apparently given modes of conflict that require distinctive forces assumptions: that the three scenarios listed only lip service, how can defense policymak- with different training, equipment, and force represent the most serious force-driving con- ers now be assured that our general purpose designs.24 This camp places a great emphasis on tingencies for U.S. planners; that all three are forces will truly be ready across a broadening preventing conflict, preparing for stability oper- vulnerable to standoff precision warfare; and spectrum of tasks in an increasingly com- ations, and investing in indirect forms of secu- that U.S. political interests can be guaranteed plex operating environment? Is it operation- rity forces with a greater degree of specialization or obtained reliably without ground forces. ally feasible for troops to cover such a wide for security cooperation tasks and warfighting. Instead of inter-Service divisions of labor, mission profile, and is the military hiding Because this school specifically divides roles and Andrew Krepinevich proposes that the Army behind the rhetoric of full-spectrum domi- missions between the Services, it can be labeled divide its ground forces between stability opera- nance while remaining devoted to yesterday’s the “division of labor” option. tions and warfighting.29 He challenges the criti- battles? Aside from the experience gained One of the earliest proponents of this cal assumption of the Utility Infielder school: painfully in Operations Enduring Freedom particular option is Thomas P.M. Barnett. In and Iraqi Freedom, are the Services really The Pentagon’s New Map, he argued that Because the range of missions is so broad, making the necessary doctrinal, organiza- the U.S. military needed to perform two dis- and the skill sets required sufficiently dif- tional, and equipment changes needed to suc- tinctly different missions: maintaining stability ferent, attempting to field forces that can ceed across the range of military operations? around the globe on a daily basis to dampen move quickly and seemlessly [sic] from On these questions, the jury is still out, and a the dysfunctional “nonintegrating gap,” and stability operations to high-intensity con- look at the Army and Marine equipment lists traditional warfighting. The first mission, flict appears destined to produce an Army

4 Strategic Forum No. 240, April 2009 that is barely a “jack-of-all-trades” and This conception of blurring modes of and the United States must preserve its com- clearly a master of none.30 war was a subtext to the Bush administra- petitive advantages in this domain. It is tion’s National Defense Strategy of 2006. It increasingly probable, however, that we will His proposal would bifurcate the Army is also central to Secretary Gates’ prodding face adversaries who blur and blend the dif- into two components: a warfighting force of the Pentagon and the false depiction of ferent methods or modes of warfare. We do of 27 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), and a binary choice. In addition, it is reflected not face a widening number of distinct chal- a stability operations force comprised of 15 in newly issued joint concepts as well as the lenges but rather their convergence. Security Cooperation BCTs. The National maritime strategy and Marine Corps capstone Hybrid challenges are not limited to Guard would also be similarly reconfigured. concept. These documents reflect the under- nonstate actors. States can shift their conven- This arrangement would ensure higher readi- standing that outdated assumptions about tional units to irregular formations and adopt ness for these distinct tasks by ensuring that states (conventional) and nonstate actors new tactics as Iraq’s fedayeen did in 2003. forces were organized, trained, and equipped (unconventional and weak) are no longer the Evidence from open sources suggests that sev- to fulfill the missions. Should a sustained basis for realistic defense planning. Future eral powers in the Middle East are modify- conventional fight arise, the stability forma- threats can be increasingly characterized by a ing their forces to exploit this more complex tions could be cycled into more traditional hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tac- and more diffused mode of conflict. We may combat forces over a 12- to 18-month cycle.31 tics, decentralized planning and execution, find it increasingly irrelevant to characterize and nonstate actors, using both simple and states as essentially traditional forces, or non- Hybrid Threats sophisticated technologies in innovative ways. state actors as inherently irregular. Future Hybrid threats incorporate a range of dif- challenges will present a more complex array There is a fifth potential perspective on ferent modes of warfare including conventional of alternative structures and strategies, as this critical debate. Some analysts have sug- capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, ter- was seen in the battle between Israel and gested that future conflict will be multi- rorist acts (including indiscriminate violence and Hizballah in the summer of 2006. Hizballah modal or multivariant rather than a simple coercion), and criminal disorder. Hybrid wars black-or-white characterization of one form can be also be multinodal—conducted by both of warfare. These analysts call for greater states and a variety of nonstate actors.34 These in hybrid warfare, attention to the blending of war forms in multimodal/multinodal activities can be con- the adversary most combinations of increasing frequency and, ducted by separate units or even by the same unit likely presents unique perhaps, lethality. This construct is most fre- but are generally operationally and tactically combinational threats quently described as hybrid warfare. This directed and coordinated within the main bat- concept builds upon other noteworthy con- tlespace to achieve synergistic effects in the phys- specifically designed to ceptions about conflict.32 ical and psychological dimensions of conflict. target U.S. vulnerabilities In hybrid warfare, the adversary most likely The effects can be gained at all levels of war. presents unique combinational threats specif- Hybrid threats blend the lethality of state ically designed to target U.S. vulnerabilities. conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor clearly demonstrated the ability of nonstate Instead of separate challengers with fundamen- of irregular warfare. In such conflicts, future actors to study and deconstruct the vulnera- tally different approaches (conventional, irregu- adversaries (states, state-sponsored groups, or bilities of Western-style militaries and devise lar, or terrorist), we can expect to face competi- self-funded actors) exploit access to modern appropriate countermeasures. Ralph Peters tors who will employ all forms of war, including military capabilities including encrypted com- described the combination of Hizballah’s criminal behavior, perhaps simultaneously. mand systems, man-portable surface-to-air combat cells and militia as “a hybrid of guer- This expectation suggests that our great- missiles, and other modern lethal systems, as rillas and regular troops—a form of oppo- est challenge in the future will come not from well as promote protracted insurgencies that nent that U.S. forces are apt to encounter with a state that selects one approach, but from employ ambushes, improvised explosive devices, increasing frequency.”35 This prism also offers states or groups that select from the whole and assassinations. This could include states an interesting angle through which to reex- menu of tactics and technologies and blend blending high-tech capabilities such as anti­ amine the conflict against Serbia in Kosovo them in innovative ways to meet their own satellite weapons with terrorism and cyber war- and Russia’s latest intervention in Ossetia, strategic culture, geography, and aims. As fare directed against financial targets, as sug- which was also markedly hybrid in character. Mike Evans wrote well before the last QDR, gested by the pair of Chinese officers who wrote The lessons from these confrontations are “The possibility of continuous sporadic armed Unrestricted Warfare. filtering to other states and nonstate actors. conflict, its engagements blurred together in So instead of seeing the future as a suite With or without state sponsorship, the lethality time and space, waged on several levels by of distinct challengers in separate boxes on and capability of organized groups are increas- a large array of national and sub-national a matrix, a more complex future may be ing, while the incentives for states to exploit forces means that war is likely to transcend ahead. Traditional or conventional capabil- nontraditional modes of war are on the rise. neat divisions into distinct categories.”33 ities will remain an important part of war, This requires that we modify our mindsets with

No. 240, April 2009 Strategic Forum 5 Figure 2. Implied Change in Spectrum of Conflict The Counterinsurgent school focuses on today’s fights and what could be tomorrow’s Humanitarian Assistance most likely scenarios. This school would mark- edly improve our preparation for stability opera- Relief Operations tions and counterinsurgency tasks by improving

Peace Enforcement Most Likely, individual cultural and language skills, small More Complex, unit tactics, and training/advisory missions. At Increasingly More Lethal Show of Force the same time, this focus would leave the United States less prepared for rare but demanding con- Noncombat Evacuation ventional conflicts and for hybrid threats that Counterinsurgency would severely maul light forces not ready for Selective Strike equency the ferocity of some scenarios. But this school Fr Terrorism Train/Advise would reduce defense spending overall by pre-

Nationbuilding cluding the need for heavy and expensive Civil War ground forces and attendant aviation support for Terrorism multiple interstate wars. Major Global Combat War The Traditionalist camp preserves today’s competitive advantages in large-scale

Peacetime and Crisis Low-intensity Conflict Mid-intensity Conflict High-intensity Conflict conflicts and avoids entanglements in messy protracted stability operations. It focuses on conventional combined arms in the most respect to the relative frequency and types of bilities on the range of military operations, dangerous of scenarios and emphasizes tradi- threats of future conflict. Irregular tactics and and it should weight our effort in the upcom- tional kinetic maneuver. This posture would protracted forms of conflict are often castigated ing QDR and inform our investment portfolio perpetuate the sine wave of American military as tactics of the weak that are employed by non- and risk assessment. The increasingly proba- disinterest in small wars, the “small change state actors who do not have the means to do ble scenario of preparing to win a hybrid con- of soldiering” in Kipling’s phrase. What this anything else. Future hybrid opponents may flict and operate in contested urban zones is school overlooks is America’s global leader- exploit combinations and profoundly asymmet- a stressing one that generates the most opera- ship role and the destabilizing effects of the ric means not because of the opponents’ weak- tional risk in the near- to mid-range. Stability withdrawal of U.S. forces and the concomi- ness but because of the proven effectiveness of operations may occur more frequently, and tant decline in American access and influ- those means; they are the evolving tactics of the the rare conventional war may generate the ence it would produce. As Secretary Gates smart and nimble. most consequence or perception of dan- has noted, “The United States does not have ger. However, the hybrid threat, especially by the luxury of opting out because these sce- Hybrid as Focal Point states such as China, Russia, Iran, and North narios do not conform to preferred notions Korea, actually presents the greatest opera- of the American way of war.”36 This option The hybrid threat construct appears tional risk, which is represented in figure 2 only ensures that the military “remains [an] valuable at this point in time for a number of by the greater intensity of conflict and greater expensive tribute to the past” that will “both reasons. It serves as a concept that: frequency of occurrence. This focal point bankrupt the taxpayer and perpetuate anach- should be the “sweet spot” around which to ronistic military organizations.”37 ■ describes the evolving character of prepare our joint forces of the future. This The Utility Infielders have no spe- conflict better than counterinsurgency spot is depicted as the knee in the curve of a cific posture or focal point. They accept risk ■ challenges current “conventional” modified spectrum of conflict in which mis- that forces will be suboptimal for any spe- thinking and the binary intellectual bins that sions and tasks converge in time and are not cific threat but strive to increase their effec- frame debate executed in linear fashion. tiveness across the range of military opera- ■ highlights the true granularity or tions. This posture may make the unlikely breadth of spectrum of human conflict Risk Analysis assumption that force size and resources will ■ raises awareness of potential risks remain high. Under all but the most favor- and opportunity costs presented by the vari- The benefit of this new focal point is able resource projections, the force would ous options in the ongoing threat/force pos- best depicted by the risk analysis displayed in be spread thin, and most units and individ- ture debate. the table, which reflects the potential ben- uals would not obtain proficiency in many efits and disadvantages by the four prevail- tasks. Because of the manpower, training, The hybrid threat could be viewed as a ing schools today, and their relevance to the and equipment costs, the Utility Infielders better focal point for the development of capa- hybrid threat. force is slightly more expensive than those

6 Strategic Forum No. 240, April 2009 of the other options because it underwrites Table. Assessment of Potential Postures the retention of many legacy systems and the Utility development of high-end systems, receiving Counterinsurgents Traditionalists Division of Labor criticism from Secretary Gates for preserving Infielders Conventional a notional American Way of War. Irregular adversaries: Ready for failed and Threat focus threats: most No focus most likely conventional states Finally, the Division of Labor school dangerous proposes dedicated and separate forces or Individuals and Full range Readiness Traditional kinetic Higher readiness for Services for discrete missions. It offers high small units for of military emphasis maneuver two polar missions levels of unit readiness for stability opera- counterinsurgency operations tions and conventional state-based scenarios. Ignores destabilizing However, it exposes the United States to some Spreads force Unprepared for effects of failed thin, seeks Less joint capacity risk that its forces would lack the depth and conventional war by states, loss of journeyman in conventional capacity for long-duration scenarios. Because Operational risk regional threats, force global leadership; level of scenarios for suboptimized for perpetuates the specific options described represent the individual and decisive results hybrid threats learning curve two extremes of the conflict spectrum, this unit readiness for irregular and posture option produces forces suboptimized hybrid threats for hybrid threats, but optimized for the two Hybrid threats Less prepared Unprepared Partly prepared Suboptimized extremes. There are risks attendant here, too. readiness As a former British officer noted, the blur- Resource impact Reduced spending Current levels Highest Current levels ring of neat delineations in modern opera- tions risks troops of one specialization find- ing themselves in situations for which they are unprepared and unsuited.38 nities are better suited. Shifting forces toward matically assume that these are synony- This option would have little impact on the middle of the conflict spectrum to address mous with Cold War models. Undoubtedly, the total resources projected; however, investment in its complexity may come at the expense of con- Nation should preserve the capacity to engage ground forces would be reduced since they would ventional capacity such as tank divisions or in more than one major conflict, but the force not be required to provide combat formations for some number of artillery battalions. This might sizing and shaping concept should include more than one scenario. The resources could be increase the risk that the joint force may not more than just conventional conflicts and shifted to the Air Force and Navy to ensure that have as much capability for large-scale, multi- should posture itself for success against ene- their modernization needs are met. divisional maneuver against a great power. That mies using more advanced approaches such as Overall, the Division of Labor school possibility might have to be mitigated by other the Chinese “Assassin’s Mace” concept.41 approaches balance differently and with greater military means or coalition assistance. Resource A joint force prepared to conduct two attention to the resource balance dilemma. This implications depend on ground force moderniza- major regional conflicts of a hybrid nature is approach acknowledges that the Services do not tion needs and the anticipated extensive train- suggested as the best force posture construct have to receive fixed shares of the budget and ing requirements but should be easily accommo- to adopt. The aggregate “conventional” com- that each Service does not play equally in all dated within today’s anticipated funding levels. bat capabilities of these two asymmetric scenar- modes of war. However, the RAND team’s ver- ios could constitute the required total combat sion noted earlier is largely incongruent with Potential Construct power for a purely conventional contingency, Secretary Gates’ conclusion that “we should look should one ever arise. More likely, the com- askance at idealistic, triumphalist, or ethnocen- A key element that this debate will even- posite stability operations capacity in the two tric notions of future conflict that aspire to tran- tually inform is the force sizing and shaping hybrid scenarios would provide the requisite scend the immutable principles and ugly real- model that will come out of this year’s QDR. assets for some sustained failed state scenario ities of war, that imagine it is possible to cow, A revised force planning construct is certainly that did not require the ability to defeat modern shock, or awe an enemy into submission.”39 needed; it should place far more emphasis on armed groups. How the Air Force is best shaped The hybrid force has greater focus of effort, unconventional or hybrid combinations of for these models, and what the role of special orienting the joint force on the hybrid threat in irregular war, terrorism, and socially disrup- operations forces and their degree of integra- complex operating terrain. Its lower readiness tive challengers. It must differentiate between tion within the joint force will be, are excellent for initial and protracted stability operations of forward deployed and steady-state and surge issues for the QDR to resolve. The inherently the type envisioned by Krepinevich is an admit- levels of effort, home and abroad. As Michael complex nature of hybrid threats suggests that ted risk. But this risk is offset by the potential Vickers has stressed, the construct must be a truly joint combined arms approach will be that the joint force will end up being employed in able to explain the application of forces, in necessary to prevail. scenarios for which the law enforcement, intel- form, scale, and duration, in major combat The current bifurcation of the spectrum ligence, and nongovernmental agency commu- operations.40 However, we should not auto- of conflict between irregular and conventional

No. 240, April 2009 Strategic Forum 7 wars is a false choice that intellectually blinds 4 Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, “The 24 C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Defense Inheritance: Challenges and Choices for the Next Practice (1896; Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2003). us to a number of crucial issues. We need Pentagon Team,” Washington Quarterly (Summer 2008). Callwell claimed that “the conditions of small wars are so to assess our beliefs about frequency, conse- 5 Andrew J. Bacevich, “The Petraeus Doctrine,” The diversified, the enemy’s mode of fighting so peculiar . . . that quences, and risk far more carefully and ana- Atlantic Monthly (October 2008). irregular warfare must generally be carried out on a method totally different” from conventional wars. lytically. The choice is not simply one of prepar- 6 John A. Nagl, “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009), 20–26; Gian P. 25 Thomas P.M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: ing for either long-term stability operations or Gentile, “Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars,” Joint Force War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century (New York: high-intensity conflict. We must be able to do Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009), 27–33. Putnam, 2004). both and do them simultaneously against ene- 7 Shawn Brimley and Vikram Singh, “Averting the 26 Max Boot, “The Corps Should Look to its Small Wars System Reboot,” Armed Forces Journal (December 2007). Past,” Armed Forces Journal (March 2006). mies far more ruthless than today’s. 27 8 Andrew J. Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of Andrew R. Hoehn et al., A New Division of Labor: While we continue to compartmentalize American Exceptionalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, Meeting America’s Security Challenges Beyond Iraq (Santa the various modes of war into convenient cate- 2008), 13. Monica, CA: RAND, 2007). 28 gories, future adversaries will not gaze through 9 Barak Salmoni, “The Fallacy of ‘Irregular’ Warfare,” Ibid., 75. RUSI Journal (August 2007), 18. 29 Andrew F. Krepinevich, An Army at the Crossroads our analytical prism. There is a greater 10 Robert H. Scales, The Past and Present as (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary amount of granularity across the spectrum Prologue: A View of Future Warfare Through the Lens of Assessments, 2008). of conflict, and a greater potential for hybrid Contemporary Conflicts (Washington, DC: Center for a New 30 Ibid., 65. types of war. Future opponents will exploit American Security, forthcoming). 31 Ibid. However, the need for armor, artillery, and 11 David Betz, “Redesigning Land Forces for Wars other combat capabilities to promote this midconflict trans- whatever methods, tactics, or technologies they Amongst the People,” Contemporary Security Policy 28, no. formation would have to be acquired and stored. think will thwart us. We need to better pos- 2 (August 2007), 223. 32 Thomas Huber, ed., Compound Wars: The Fatal ture our forces, reduce the risks we face, and 12 Charles A. Dunlap, “We Still Need the Big Guns,” The Knot (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and New York Times, January 9, 2008. General Staff College, 1996); T.X. Hammes, Insurgency: allocate scarce resources against threats that 13 James N. Mattis, Joint Operating Environment Modern Warfare Evolves Into a Fourth Generation, pose the most operational risk. Hybrid threats (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, December 2008), Strategic Forum No. 214 (Washington, DC: National Defense are profoundly asymmetric and do present the 23. University Press, January 2005). 14 33 Michael Evans, “From Kadesh to Kandahar: Military greatest operational risk to U.S. forces and to Gentile, 27. 15 Ibid., 28. Theory and the Future of War,” Naval War College Review (Summer 2003), 136. the attainment of America’s strategic interests. 16 Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence 34 We must maintain the ability to wage suc- of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? (Carlisle, The author thanks Michael Noonan, managing PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006). director of national security programs at the Foreign Policy cessful campaigns against both large, conven- Research Institute, for this phrase. 17 Mike Mazarr, “The Folly of Asymmetric Warfare,” tionally armed states and their militaries and 35 Washington Quarterly (Summer 2008), 33–53. Ralph Peters, “Lessons from Lebanon: The New Model Terrorist Army,” Armed Forces Journal International against widely dispersed terrorists—and against 18 Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future (October 2006), 39. everything in between. We must be smart Warfare (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005), 383. 36 Gates, 30. 19 about our force posture and lean toward agile, John D. Waghlestein, “What’s Wrong in Iraq? Or 37 Ruminations of a Pachyderm,” Military Review (January- Douglas A. MacGregor and G.I. Wilson, “Maneuver rigorously multipurpose forces capable of being February 2006), 116. Forces: The Army and Marine Corps after Iraq,” in America’s Defense Meltdown, ed. Winslow Wheeler (Washington, DC: adaptive in approach to the unique conditions 20 Colin S. Gray, After Iraq: The Search for a Center for Defense Information, 2008), 81. each conflict poses. Some degree of specializa- Sustainable National Security Strategy (Carlisle, PA: U.S. 38 Army War College, January 2009). John Kiszely, “Learning about Counter-Insurgency,” tion might be necessary, but for a joint perspec- RUSI Journal (December 2006), 19. 21 U.S. Army Field Manual 3–0, Operations 39 tive, forces should be postured not for just one (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, Gates, 39–40. end of the spectrum or the other but rather for February 2008), 3–1. 40 Michael G. Vickers, “What the QDR Should Say,” the greater lethality and complexity of hybrid 22 James T. Conway, Marine Corps Vision and Armed Forces Journal (February 2006). Strategy 2025 (Quantico, VA: June 2008), 6. 41 See the fictional scenario pertaining to this concept threats in urban terrain and complex operat- 23 in Andrew F. Krepinevich, 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Dakota L. Wood, The U.S. Marine Corps: Fleet st ing environments. This focal point will mini- Marine Forces for the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Center Futurist Explores War in the 21 Century (New York: mize risks and maximize readiness demands for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008), 58–76. Bantam, 2009). within constrained resources. This posture offers a different kind of balance between competing The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members demands and constrained resources. research and strategic gaming organization within the National of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of Notes senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 1 Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: international security affairs and defense studies. Through an Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at active outreach program, including conferences and publications, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal Affairs (January-February 2009), 28. challenges and policy options. can be accessed at www.ndupress.edu. 2 Michael P. Noonan, “Next-War-itis, This-War- itis, and the American Military,” Foreign Policy Research INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES Institute E-note, January 2009, available at . James A. Schear Director David H. Gurney 3 Julian E. Barnes and Peter Spiegel, “A Battle over Director of Research Director, NDU Press ‘The Next War,’” The Los Angeles Times, July 21, 2008.

8 Strategic Forum No. 240, April 2009