Countering Hybrid Warfare So What for the Future Joint Force?
Euromaidan demonstrations in Kiev in 2013. To prevent or discourage such "color revolutions" and maintain control over its arc of influence, Russia has developed a suite of sophisticated coercive and influence techniques often referred to as "hybrid." (Wikimedia/ Mstyslav Chernov).
82 | FEATURES PRISM 8, NO. 2 Countering Hybrid Warfare So What for the Future Joint Force?
By Sean Monaghan
We need to do three things. First, accept what is happening rather than pretend it is not happening. Second, understand the tactics being used. Third, act intelligently and consistently to defend Western states, values, and interests from this insidious form of conflict —Bob Seeley and Alya Shandra, 20181
f strategy, in whatever era, is “the art of creating power,” then so-called hybrid warfare is merely the latest attempt by revisionist actors to create and exploit a form of power to meet their ends.2 Successfully coun- tering these challenges will require careful thought and calibrated strategy. This article aims to generate theI conceptual clarity required for nations to, in the words of one member of Parliament, “act intelligently and consistently” to counter the rising challenge of hybrid warfare emanating from a variety of revisionist actors.3 More specifically, its purpose is to establish conceptual foundations for the contribution of defense forces to countering all hybrid challenges to national security. In doing so, it takes the perspective of the role of defense within a wider, whole-of-government approach, where defense will play a distinct but varying role, subordi- nate to national strategy. The article is divided into five parts. The first part addresses the language problem of hybrid challenges by briefly tracing the roots of the concept in Western military and strategic discourse to demonstrate that hybrid warfare and hybrid threats are different things. Next, a conceptual distinction is made between hybrid warfare and hybrid threats to provide further clarity. The third and fourth parts address the implications of each challenge for national defense policy, strategy, and capability. Finally, the prospect of both challenges occurring in parallel is considered.
Hybrid Warfare and Hybrid Threats Are Different Things One of the main obstacles to thinking clearly about hybrid challenges is the problem of language. Terms pairing “hybrid” with the words “threats,” “warfare,” “activity,” “operations,” and “tactics” are often used interchangeably without definition, while concepts such as “gray zone warfare,” “competition short of war,” and “modern political warfare” are—while helpful in their own right—too often conflated in the academic literature, policy publications and mainstream media.4 This section addresses the language problem by clari- fying and distinguishing between two key terms: hybrid warfare and hybrid threats.
Mr. Sean Monaghan is a strategic analyst in the UK Ministry of Defense (MOD)’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC). During 2017–19 he was a project lead on the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) Countering Hybrid Warfare project. All views are the author’s own and do not represent those of UK MOD or HMG.
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What Is Hybrid Warfare? is all somewhat beyond Mattis and Hoffman’s ideas In 2005, Lt Gen James Mattis—then Commanding about the evolving character of armed conflict. As one General, Marine Corps Combat Development Swedish analyst generously suggests, the term hybrid 12 Command—and Frank Hoffman of the Center for warfare has “travelled a lot in definition.” Emerging Threats and Opportunities at Quantico A key moment in the journey of the term argued that future adversaries were likely to “mix hybrid warfare was the annexation of Crimea by and match” forms and modes of warfare to offset the Russian Federation in 2014. The combination conventional U.S. military battlefield power.5 The of “deniable” special forces, local proxy mili- roots of their concept stem from a period of reflection tia, economic pressure, disinformation, and the following the so-called revolution in military affairs exploitation of social divisions used to present a fait moment following Operation Desert Storm in 1991. accompli to Ukraine and the West was unexpected. Western military theorists were focused on two big Such a strategy—apparently taken from an outdated ideas that threatened to undermine their technolog- Soviet playbook, but employing modern means— ical dominance of the battlefield. The first was the was also difficult to describe. In reaction, the hybrid 13 threat posed by future adversaries combining types of warfare label was applied, and it stuck. Another warfare (including nonmilitary tools) to overwhelm reason the hybrid label became widely used was the through complexity.6 The second was the problem of popular assertion that a 2013 article by Russian chief “non-trinitarian” adversaries who could seemingly of the general staff Valery Gerasimov described the not be defeated in “Clausewitzian” terms through a strategy later used to annex Crimea—which looked conventional military campaign culminating in a a lot like a hybrid approach of military and nonmil- 14 decisive battle.7 Meanwhile, military practitioners itary means. Although many analysts have since elsewhere sought to make good on such fears by debunked this myth, the claim gathered enough 15 designing new ways of war that harnessed complexity credibility to gain mainstream traction. and targeted Western vulnerabilities, and nonstate It is therefore clear that the term hybrid war- actors such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah prosecuted fare is not simply a reaction to the annexation of 16 campaigns that put these principles into practice.8 Crimea. It is a more sophisticated and endur- In this form—as a description of the ways in ing attempt to understand and articulate the which armed conflict was becoming more complex ever-changing character of warfare. It is import- and challenging—the concept was incorporated into ant because if understood correctly, it will allow various approaches to international security strategy at the development of a future force able to deter and the time, for example in U.S., UK, and North Atlantic defeat potential adversaries who seek new ways to Treaty Organization (NATO) strategy documents.9 win. As Hoffman and Mattis put it in 2005: However, in mainstream discourse, hybrid warfare Our conventional superiority creates a has taken on a much wider conception. One exam- compelling logic for states and non-state ple uses it to describe revisionist grand strategy that actors to move out of the traditional mode of employs “a comprehensive toolset that ranges from war and seek some niche capability or some cyber-attacks to propaganda and subversion, eco- unexpected combination of technologies and nomic blackmail and sabotage, sponsorship of proxy tactics to gain an advantage.17 forces and creeping military expansionism.”10 It has also been commandeered by those seeking a snappy Hybrid warfare is a challenge that is likely to idiom to describe the Kremlin’s art of strategy.11 This persist. The contemporary strategic environment
84 | FEATURES PRISM 8, NO. 2 COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE presents potential adversaries with an array of new, They all essentially describe nonviolent revision- more cost-effective means to employ in combi- ist grand strategy in contemporary international nation, ranging from information operations in politics. They describe the use of multiple, ambig- cyberspace to the proliferation of cheap air defense uous means to target vulnerabilities across society and missile technology. This is why the United to achieve goals gradually without triggering States expects a continued rise in future hybrid wars decisive responses. As Michael Mazarr has stated, and why the United Kingdom suggests that “recog- “Unwilling to risk major escalation with outright nizing and responding effectively to hybrid warfare military adventurism, these [revisionist] actors are will become increasingly important.”18 employing sequences of gradual steps to secure stra- It can therefore be seen that the principal utility tegic leverage. The efforts remain below thresholds of the term hybrid warfare is to describe the chang- that would generate a powerful U.S. or international ing character of warfare against violent adversaries response, but nonetheless are forceful and deliberate, during armed conflict, in which “adversaries employ calculated to gain measurable traction over time.”25 combinations of capabilities to gain an asymmetric These strategies seek to blur and exploit several advantage.”19 Although in mainstream discourse the distinctions that underpin the Western use of force, term has been used with some elasticity to describe such as those between peace and war; combatants revisionist grand strategy (Russian actions in par- and third parties; international and non-international ticular), the original concept remains a valid and conflict; and aggression, the use of force, and armed helpful one when considering the development of conflict. Hybrid aggressors can take advantage of any defense forces to deter and defeat future adversaries. of these grey areas to remove or impede the ability of the victim to respond decisively—hence the term What Are Hybrid Threats? “gray zone.”26 This challenge is set within a context Hoffman was also one of the first to use the term of “inter-state strategic competition” and “increased hybrid threats in reference to his own concept efforts short of armed conflict.”27 As well as being a of hybrid warfare.20 However, the term has since description of current Russian statecraft, this type of evolved through use, proliferating in recent years strategy is also used in varying degrees for regional throughout Euro-Atlantic security strategy doc- influence by China (which exploits public opinion, uments in particular. For example, NATO has a psychological warfare, and legal warfare in the South “Counter Hybrid Threat Strategy,”21 the European China Sea) and Iran (which uses a variety of nonmil- Union has developed a “playbook” for counter- itary and proxy military means for influence in the ing hybrid threats, and the European Countering Syrian conflict and across the Middle East), among Hybrid Threats Centre of Excellence was launched others. As Lieutenant General James Dubik, Senior in Helsinki in 2017.22 In the UK 2015 Strategic Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War, has noted, Defense and Security Review, “hybrid threats” were “In the cases of China’s actions in the South China classified as a “tier one” risk to national security and Sea, Russia’s in the Crimean Peninsula and eastern “hybrid attacks” on allies as a “tier two” risk.23 Ukraine, and Iran’s in Iraq and beyond, revisionist While these interpretations differ somewhat actions in the gray zone seem to be paying off.”28 in content, what they have common is less to do All strategy is contingent. Successful strategy with Hoffman’s hybrid warfare and more to do emerges as a product of the aims of the actor, the with Sun Tzu’s ancient wisdom that “to subdue strengths and weaknesses of their adversary, and the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”24 the character of the strategic environment. Hybrid
PRISM 8, NO. 2 FEATURES | 85 MONAGHAN threats are no different. They have evolved out of a “remarkable trinity”—which he related to the peo- need for revisionist actors to offset the strengths and ple, the government, and the military—and the target the vulnerabilities of the “status quo” powers, complex dependencies between all three that under- including the self-restraint in taking decisive action pin the ability of any state to wield power. While this and using force built into the regime of international idea is clearly not new, such a full-frontal assault on law established after World War II. The relative suc- society across the people, government, and mili- cess of efforts to normalize the use of dialogue over tary has usually been reserved for the most intense violence in international politics, underpinned by confrontations in history. Yet the trends described hard power to enforce the rules, has forced revision- above suggest the intensity of this type of con- ist actors to use hybrid strategies to achieve goals frontation—as an increasing number of motivated without triggering decisive or armed responses.29 As revisionist actors gain more access to means that can evolutionary biologists say, “Everything is every- target more vulnerabilities, more cost effectively—is where, but the environment selects.” unlikely to dim in the near future. With this in mind, there are three key con- To summarize the first part of this article, textual factors that help explain the rise of hybrid the terms hybrid warfare and hybrid threats mean threats, understood as nonviolent revisionist grand different things. Hybrid warfare describes a change strategy using multiple means to target vulnerabili- in the character of warfare (that is, against violent ties across society: adversaries during armed conflict), while hybrid threats emanate from nonviolent revisionist grand ■ the shifting balance of global and regional strategy that seeks gains while avoiding reprisal power, meaning more actors are more moti- through exploiting the gray zone between peace and vated to challenge the status quo; war. Yet these two terms and concepts are com- ■ complex interdependence within the global monly conflated. This kind of conceptual confusion political economy, meaning more states are and elasticity makes it difficult to understand the increasingly vulnerable to others in more distinct nature of the challenge, and even more ways; and difficult to develop any counter-strategy. As Antulio ■ technological convergence, meaning more actors Echeverria has said, this problem “has clouded the have more means available to do more harm. thinking of policymakers and impaired the develop- ment of sound counter-strategies.”32 Trends across all three factors point to a likely increase in future hybrid threats as more revision- How to Achieve Conceptual Clarity ist actors have more access to means that can target more vulnerabilities and do so more cost effectively.30 To clear up any conceptual confusion and avoid clouded thinking, this section builds on the distinc- Furthermore, as Western military powers double down on securing a technological edge through mod- tion in the discourse traced above between hybrid warfare and hybrid threats to establish some firmer ernization (such as the U.S. Third Offset Strategy), conceptual foundations. By building on these, the revisionist actors will have further cause to refine need to counter each challenge can be considered hybrid threats to neutralize these gains, including and the contribution of defense forces determined— through unconventional threats to the generation and including the implications for defense policy, strategy, deployment of military forces in the first place.31 and capability. The subsequent section then goes on To achieve such an offset of their own, hybrid to address this question by examining the distinct aggressors target all three elements of Clausewitz’s
86 | FEATURES PRISM 8, NO. 2 COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE implications of each challenge in turn. The previous the whole of society to undermine the func- section briefly traced the lineage of the term hybrid tioning, unity, or will of their targets, while warfare to demonstrate its principal utility in describ- degrading and subverting the status quo. This ing the changing character of warfare against violent kind of strategy is used by revisionist actors to adversaries during armed conflict. It also showed gradually achieve their aims without triggering how the term hybrid threats describes a distinct decisive responses, including armed responses.
(but related) challenge: the use of multiple, ambigu- ■ Hybrid warfare is the challenge presented ous means to target vulnerabilities across society to by the increasing complexity of armed con- achieve goals gradually without triggering decisive flict, where adversaries may combine types of responses. While the former concept can help charac- warfare plus nonmilitary means to neutralize terize contemporary approaches to warfare as seen in conventional military power.33 the Middle East and eastern Ukraine predominantly emanating from nonstate actors, the latter concept It should be noted that both challenges have can also help analyze the approaches of revisionist the same basic cause: revisionist actors and adver- states such as Russia, China, and Iran. Importantly, saries finding a way to neutralize conventional state both phenomena are likely to become part of the power in achieving their goals. But each strategy is future strategic environment as more motivated designed to target distinct components of the state’s revisionist actors gain access to means that can target ability to protect national security. Returning to more vulnerabilities more cost effectively without the language of Clausewitz, hybrid threats mainly resorting to armed attack. target the will of the people and the decisionmaking Bearing in mind that both hybrid threats ability of the government, whereas hybrid war- and hybrid warfare describe distinct challenges to fare mainly targets the effectiveness of the military national security that are likely to endure and per- to conduct successful operations. Each therefore sist, the following conceptual distinction is therefore demands different countermeasures, and each has proposed, building on the findings above: distinct implications for defense policy, strategy, and capability at all levels of warfare.34 Each challenge is ■ Hybrid threats combine a wide range of non- shown in Figure 1 on a continuum of conflict. violent means to target vulnerabilities across
FIGURE 1. Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare Shown on a Continuum of Conflict 35
Lower Major Theater War
Limited Conventional War
HYBRID Irregular WARFARE Warfare Probability Terrorism HYBRID THREATS Low intensity conflict
Higher
Confrontation ‘Gray zone’ Armed conflict Intensity
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Critically, each challenge represents a gap in the insights, it also sheds some light on its character. On ability of many nations’ defense forces to respond to the one hand, nonviolent revisionist strategy, while contemporary challenges that are likely to endure not precluding the use of the military instrument and intensify. Existing defense policies often address in small doses (or indirectly, for example, through the challenges of low-intensity conflict, irregular coercive posture and presence), does preclude the warfare, conventional conflict, and even nuclear conduct of armed attack; otherwise, it would be war, but have less convincing answers to hybrid simply “warfare.” On the other hand, the language threats and hybrid warfare. This is because these of “war” and “warfare” possesses power beyond challenges have not been specifically and system- strict Clausewitzian limits, as demonstrated through atically addressed in the same way. The separation commonly used terms such as “economic warfare,” proposed here is therefore intended to be analyt- “the war on drugs,” “cyber warfare,” “lawfare,” and ically progressive and helpful to policymakers, so on. Some argue that such devices—including the offering firm foundations on which to consider how term “hybrid warfare” itself—are exploited for polit- to counter both hybrid threats and hybrid warfare. ical purposes and in doing so ultimately degrade The article will do this in the next section, before and undermine efforts to isolate, regulate, and rule going on to determine the implications of this out large-scale violent confrontation in the interna- understanding for defense forces. tional system.37 At the same time, there may also be value in using the innate seriousness of the lan- Countering Hybrid Threats: guage of war to denote the invidious threat posed by Implications for Defense Forces nonviolent revisionist strategy that might otherwise This section considers how to counter hybrid threats escape due attention over time.38 and what the implications of this might be for It is also important to note the critical dif- defense policy, strategy, and capabilities. This sub- ference between hybrid threats and conventional ject is addressed first, before hybrid warfare, because statecraft. Hybrid threats involve ways and means the role of defense in countering what is ostensibly a that breach international norms and law to achieve nonmilitary problem is arguably more contentious political goals (for example, through public disinfor- and underconceptualized in comparison. To address mation, airspace violations, illegal territorial claims) this challenge, it is helpful to recall the American while aiming to degrade and subvert the existing diplomat George Kennan’s description of “political international order and status quo in the interna- warfare” as a strategy prescription for confronting tional system. Ultimately, as Clausewitz observes, the Soviet Union during the Cold War: “Political “the political cause of a war has a great influence on warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz’s the method in which it is conducted.”39 Or, as NATO doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has said, political warfare is the employment of all the means Hybrid is the dark reflection of our compre- at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its hensive approach. We use a combination of national objectives. Such operations are both overt military and nonmilitary means to stabilize and covert.” 36 countries. Others use it to destabilize them.40 While this understanding of hybrid threats as “Clausewitz inverted”—the continuation of war Notwithstanding whether hybrid threats are by other means—is viewed by many as a heretical a form of “warfare,” the need to counter this type misuse of one of the dead Prussian’s most enduring of strategy must be considered. To help determine
88 | FEATURES PRISM 8, NO. 2 COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE the scope of any strategy to counter hybrid threats, TABLE 1. Proposed Range of Potential Table 1 contains a list of potential levers available to Nonviolent Hybrid Threat Instruments. any future adversary looking to prosecute a hybrid Type of instrument Source campaign. The basic challenge in responding to such a range of nonviolent but potentially damag- Cultural ing actions is whether to respond to them as acts of Diplomatic war or as confrontational behavior, or whether to Network respond to them at all. Kennan, this time channeling Intelligence a more conventional interpretation of Clausewitz, Psychological also suggested the United States had been “hand- Technological icapped however by a popular attachment to the Smuggling concept of a basic difference between peace and Drug ‘warfare’ war, by a tendency to view war as a sort of sporting Fictitious/fabrication Liang and Xiagsui's context outside of all political context.”41 This is the ‘warfare’ trans-military and non-military inherent dilemma forced onto decisionmakers by Financial forms of warfare in adversaries who use hybrid threats. Policymakers Trade Unrestricted Warfare must therefore conceptualize a challenge that does Resources (1999) not conform to the rules, while responding in a way Economic/economic aid that will reinforce those rules. incentives Legal/moral/regulatory Implications for Policy Sanctions The basic policy dilemma presented by hybrid Media/propaganda threats is, therefore, whether to do anything about Ideology/religion them. If such hostile activity can be tolerated and Forced population shifts/ absorbed, then the policy implications are minimal. migration If it does require countering, strategy and capabil- Covert means RAND study, ities must be developed accordingly. This choice Unconventional warfare Modern Political depends on the extent to which hybrid threats can Warfare (2018) damage the national interest. On the one hand, Proxy warfare while hybrid threats might be harmful to some Domestic networks Dubik and Vincent, extent, they are rarely an immediate matter of life Military coercion America's Global Competitions: or death. On the other hand, over time they could (short of war) The Gray Zone in cause cumulative risk and damage to the founda- Context, ISW (2018) tions and functions of society and government. Sources: Liang and Xiangsui, “Unrestricted Warfare,” 123; This might include undermining public trust in Robinson et al., Modern Political Warfare; Dubik, America’s government, damage to critical infrastructure, or Global Competitions. the erosion of rules and norms, economic growth, or the readiness of national defense assets. Hybrid threats can also be seen as short-term “preparation of the battlefield” to establish vulnerabilities that could be exploited in any longer term conflict.42 This
PRISM 8, NO. 2 FEATURES | 89 MONAGHAN approach certainly meets the British academic and the absorption of activity (below a certain thresh- author Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman’s definition old, bolstered by the resilience measures above) in of strategy as “the art of creating power.”43 parallel with specific countermeasures to both deter This choice should also take into account the hybrid aggressors and respond to hybrid attacks. potential resource bill for countering hybrid threats, The hybrid “dilemma” must be considered through- which may require tradeoffs to be made in other out: hybrid threats are designed to prevent decisive areas (in the case of defense forces, for example, in responses in the first place. This makes detection high-end warfighting at the other end of the spec- more important and countering more difficult. The trum to nonviolent hybrid threats). It is therefore defense contribution to each of these three compo- vital to be clear about whether, when, and how to nents is briefly expanded on below.48 respond to hybrid threats by asking the following questions: Detecting Hybrid Threats The role of defense in detecting hybrid threats will ■ To what extent can such threats simply be not be substantively different from existing prac- absorbed across society? tice. Two principles should apply: closer cooperation ■ What are the consequences of success: if hybrid across government, and closer cooperation with threats can be successfully countered but revision- allies and partners. Beyond this, defense’s contribu- ist actors remain motivated, what comes next? tion to detecting hybrid threats will remain focused on exploiting strategic intelligence and data from Implications for Strategy technical and physical assets deployed around the In the case of defense forces, if policy is to sim- world. Analysis must consider the wider “political, ply absorb hybrid threats, defense strategy should military, economic, social, information, infrastruc- focus on increasing resilience in two areas. The ture” context when processing this data: spotting first is defense’s contribution to national resilience, hybrid threats requires analysts to “connect the 49 which must evolve to meet intensifying threats.44 dots” across unfamiliar domains. This may require The second is the resilience of defense itself against enhanced training and will certainly require more future hybrid threats that may prevent or impede familiarity, contact, and closer working with col- deployment, sustainment, and power projection leagues from across government, other nations, and (prior to or during an armed conflict).45 Lessons multinational institutions. across both these areas can be learned from nations such as Finland and Sweden, which have recently Deterring Hybrid Aggressors refreshed their approach to national resilience in Hybrid threats are designed to both complicate and the face of increased threats.46 Regional cooperation undermine conventional deterrence strategy by is also important to build resilience through allies specifically avoiding actions that obviously breach and partners.47 If policy is to counter hybrid threats, the thresholds or red lines signaled by the deterring defense strategy must be capable of contributing actor.50 However, the basic principles of deterrence do to a national strategy to do so, coordinated across not change against hybrid adversaries. There are two the whole of government. Any strategy to counter main ways to deter: by denial and by punishment.51 hybrid threats must have three components. First, Either of these will require a defense contribution. this will require detecting hybrid threats to begin Deterrence by denial has both a defensive and with. Second, countering hybrid threats will require offensive component.52 The former is based on
90 | FEATURES PRISM 8, NO. 2 COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE resilience (as above). The latter overlaps somewhat Deterring hybrid threats will also be a collective with punishment (described below) as the ability to endeavor. The need for strategy that is “international impose costs by making it more difficult to maneu- by design” (particularly through interoperability) ver or attack. Defense must therefore retain the is therefore greater than ever. Allies must be able ability to prosecute potent denial operations, such to summon a punishment capability that is greater as air defense, maritime coastal defense, missile than the sum of its parts. Solidarity is also vital in defense, and force projection, including in the new the face of hybrid threats, which often aim to under- domains of space and cyberspace.53 mine allied cohesion in the first place. Any deterrence-by-punishment strategy must first and foremost be a whole-of-government effort, Responding to Hybrid Threats relying primarily on nonmilitary means to threaten In most cases, defense will not be the lead responder vulnerabilities in the aggressor’s own system.54 The to hybrid threats, although it is often implicitly contribution of defense will rely primarily on tradi- relied on as the first responder.56 Defense must tional capabilities, sufficiently modernized to be able therefore continue to provide the government with to hold any adversary’s critical capabilities at risk. conventional defensive and offensive options as But the gradualist nature of hybrid threats requires part of a whole-of-government response to counter early, decisive responses to punish selected revision- hybrid threats. Defense may also be required to ist acts and “stop the rot.” Defense must therefore provide specific options short of war to influence a offer government a range of options short of war to hostile state actor (to coerce, disrupt, deny, deter). punish an adversary. These require tailoring to the However, defense forces are not primarily designed situation and to the aggressor’s vulnerabilities but to operate in this gray zone to provide coercive could include smaller force packages conducive to options short of war. Developing the ability to do deployment at short notice; nonkinetic threats to so may therefore ultimately require tradeoffs with posture or hold critical capabilities at risk without existing missions and capability. Furthermore, using the use of physical force (for example, electronic defense forces to conduct operations short of war warfare, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, target carries the risk of counterescalation that requires acquisition, and reconnaissance); or the use of spe- careful consideration. cial operations forces to provide irregular responses. In summary, competing in the gray zone to However, credible deterrence by punishment relies counter hybrid threats will have three broad impli- to some extent on the attribution of aggression cations for defense to sustain advantage in an era (to generate the legitimacy to underpin decisive of persistent strategic competition, based on their action), which hybrid threats seek to deny. Detection contribution to detecting hybrid threats, deterring methods will therefore need to find ways to achieve hybrid aggressors, and responding to hybrid attacks: attribution in the face of ambiguity (for example, ■ more sophisticated attribution of cyber attacks).55 potentially substantive revisions to both Even with such improvements, defense forces may defense’s contribution to homeland resilience have to operate in a more fluid strategic environ- and the resilience of defense itself to hybrid threats; ment in the absence of clear, bounded mandates for decisive action. This will have implications for oper- ■ improved coordination between the use of force ating permissions, rules of engagement, training, and the other levers of power across govern- and so on. ment; and
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■ potentially substantive revisions to the way whether these should be traded for other capa- defense is organized, resourced, and equipped bility (such as high-end warfighting). to offer the government more options that fall It should be noted that whether countering hybrid below the threshold of armed conflict.57 threats actually requires tradeoffs with existing or Importantly, these implications for defense forces of new capability remains unclear and requires further countering hybrid threats must be balanced against investigation. The answer may well be to use exist- the need to protect their “core business”: being ing capability differently, or to invest more in certain prepared to fight and win conventional conflicts. training and skills. For example, in the United Any significant rebalance that reduces the ability of Kingdom, an analogous approach has been taken defense to prosecute high-end warfighting requires in recent years to “defense engagement” to revise a careful and clear-eyed assessment of what consti- strategy, increase training, and allocate regionally tutes the most likely and the most dangerous threats aligned units.60 However, it bears repeating that to the nation.58 The overall challenge for defense any significant rebalance that reduces the ability of strategy in countering hybrid threats is neatly cap- defense to prosecute high-end warfighting requires tured by the following assessment: a careful and clear-eyed assessment of what consti- tutes the most likely and the most dangerous threats Compete successfully with the revisionist to the nation. powers below the threshold of war. Success in this arena requires maintaining a robust Implications for Policy and Strategy alliance system, retaining a credible nuclear deterrent capacity, resurrecting conven- There is no comparable policy dilemma for dealing tional deterrent capabilities, and winning with hybrid warfare. Defense forces must simply in the area in which revisionist powers now maintain the ability to defeat a variety of complex seek to expand their influence—what is potential adversaries in armed conflict, particularly those who may combine many types of warfare. called the ‘gray zone’.59 Likewise, the implications for strategy of hybrid warfare remain constant. Ultimately, policy aims Implications for Capability will still be accomplished through combining joint Given the implications for strategy outlined above, military action (across government and with allies) the consequences for capability development can be with the ability to wield a high-end, full-spectrum described by identifying three principle force design capability that can overmatch a variety of adversar- problems that require further investigation: ies. Defense forces should also retain the ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations and the agil- ■ the role of defense in homeland resilience ity required to counter irregular adversaries. against hybrid threats; ■ making defense itself resilient to hybrid threats Implications for Capability that may prevent or impede deployment, sus- Assuming these broad tenets of strategy remain tainment, and power projection (prior to or constant, the true implications of countering hybrid during an armed conflict); and warfare concern capability development. In other ■ determining what capabilities are required words, defense forces need to develop the ways and to counter hybrid threats short of war, and means required to counter hybrid warfare. Frank
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Hoffman has argued that force planners should TABLE 2. Proposed Range of Potential abandon the “dichotomous choice between counter- “Warfares” Available to an Adversary in a insurgency and conventional war” adopted in recent Future Hybrid Warfare Scenario. times. He suggests the choice is no longer “[either] Type of instrument Source one of preparing for long-term stability operations or high-intensity conflict,” but that “hybrid threats Conventional warfare Hoffman‘s original Irregular warfare are a better focal point for considering alternative definition of hybrid 61 Terrorism joint force postures.” warfare To define the capability development require- Criminality (large-scale) ments (including doctrine, training, equipment, and Information warfare Mattis and other components of defense capability) of countering Hoffman‘s 2005 definition of the hybrid warfare, two key questions must be answered: ‘four block war’ ■ What is the full range of future “warfares” Nuclear warfare likely to be employed in combination by a Bio/chemical warfare Liang and Xiangsui‘s military forms future hybrid adversary during an armed Ecological warfare of warfare in conflict? Space warfare Unrestricted Warfare ■ What are the implications of countering these Electronic warfare (1999) for future defense forces? Concussion warfare Network warfare Liang and Xiangsui‘s Table 2 offers an answer to the first question. It trans-military identifies a range of potential future modes of forms of warfare in Intelligence warfare warfare likely to be employed in combination by a Unrestricted Warfare future hybrid adversary during an armed con- (1999) flict.62 This scope can be used as an initial baseline Cyber warfare The UK's Future for capability and force development investigations Urban warfare Force Concept (2017) into countering hybrid warfare. Unmanned warfare The second question can be answered by Sources: Hoffman, “Hybrid Threats,” 1; Mattis and examining the specific implications of each mode Hoffman, “Future Warfare”; Liang and Xiangsui, of warfare, then trading off the ability to counter “Unrestricted Warfare,” 123“; UK MOD, “Future Force each with the ability to adapt across the whole set. Concept,” JCN1/17. This process involves establishing the robustness suffice. As with countering hybrid threats, there is of future capability across a wide range of pos- also likely to be a tradeoff between counter-hybrid sible future outcomes.63 It must account for the warfare and high-end capability. added complexity and cost of dealing with multiple Given the implications for strategy and capa- modes of warfare simultaneously, for this is the bility outlined above, the following force design true challenge of hybrid warfare. Ultimately, the problems can be identified for further investigation: key tradeoff for force design may well be between specialization and adaptability. The most serious ■ the future force balance between specializa- threats will require specialized forces to counter tion and adaptation to counter the full range of them, while against others the ability to adapt—a “warfares” likely to be employed in combina- less optimal but more robust solution—may tion by future hybrid adversaries; and
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■ assuming finite resources, how much high-end near future. This article has sought to help national (or other) capability to trade for counter-hybrid governments and multinational institutions counter warfare capability. the rising hybrid challenge emanating from a variety of revisionist actors in the international system. Combining Hybrid Threats and It does so in five parts by establishing conceptual Hybrid Warfare foundations for the contribution of Defense forces Finally, it should be acknowledged that hybrid to countering hybrid challenges, before identifying threats and hybrid warfare may occur at the same implications for Defense policy, strategy and capa- time, prosecuted by the same adversary, as part of bility development. an intense revisionist campaign or during war. For The first part addressed the problem of opaque example, the current conflict in eastern Ukraine and confusing language—where the same terms might be viewed as an example of hybrid warfare were being used to mean different things—by briefly that is taking place within a wider Russian cam- tracing the roots of the concept in Western military paign of regional revisionism and global influence. and strategic discourse. It demonstrated that while Likewise, Iranian proxy militia fighting hybrid wars “hybrid warfare” and “hybrid threats” are differ- in Syria and Iraq, and against Israel (Hezbollah ent things, these terms (and others) are often used was Frank Hoffman’s original example of a “hybrid interchangeably, hindering the ability of national warfare” actor), are part of a wider regional revision- governments and multinational institutions to ist challenge. Alternatively, any future large-scale understand the nature of the challenge and develop war is likely to involve hybrid warfare operations, effective counterstrategies. in parallel with hybrid threats to the homeland. The The second part established a conceptual dis- challenge will be to fight both in parallel. tinction between hybrid warfare—which describes changes in the character of warfare against violent Conclusions adversaries during armed conflict— and hybrid In their 1999 book Unrestricted Warfare, Chinese threats—which emanate from nonviolent revision- People’s Liberation Army Air Force officers Qiao ist grand strategy that seeks gains while avoiding Liang and Wang Xiangsui noted: reprisal through exploiting the gray zone between peace and war. Critically, each challenge represents Everything is changing. We believe that the a gap in the ability of many nations’ defense forces age of a revolution in operating methods, to respond to contemporary challenges that are wherein all of the changes involved in the likely to endure and intensify. By building on these explosion of technology, the replacement conceptual foundations, counterstrategies can be of weapons, the development of security developed and the implications for defense policy, concepts, the adjustment of strategic targets, strategy, and capability determined. the obscurity of the boundaries of the bat- The third part assessed the implications for tlefield, and the expansion of the scope and defense forces of countering hybrid threats. It scale of non-military means and non-mil- concludes that for defense forces to contribute to itary personnel involved in warfare are national, whole-of-government strategy to counter 64 focused on one point, has already arrived. hybrid threats, they must make distinct contribu- In their words, so-called hybrid challenges have tions to detecting hybrid threats, deterring hybrid already arrived and are unlikely to disappear in the aggressors, and responding to hybrid attacks. More
94 | FEATURES PRISM 8, NO. 2 COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE specifically, doing so will have three broad implica- Notes tions for defense: improved coordination between 1 Bob Seely and Alya Shandra, “The the use of force and the other levers of power across Toolkit for Kremlin’s New Warfare, The Times, April 2, 2018, PRISM 8, NO. 2 FEATURES | 95 MONAGHAN chinas-three-warfares-perspective/>. an Instrument for Military Operational Analysis (New 5 James Mattis and Frank G. Hoffman, York: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 111. “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” 13 For a detailed account of how this happened, see Proceedings 131/11/1233 (November 2005), 96 | FEATURES PRISM 8, NO. 2 COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE lence-countering-hybrid-threats_en>. See also: www. provides the bridge between the strategic and tactical hybridcoe.fi. levels,” while “the tactical level of warfare is the level at 23 United Kingdom, “National Security Strategy which formations, units and individuals ultimately con- and Strategic Defense and Security Review 2015,” front an opponent or situation within the joint operations PRISM 8, NO. 2 FEATURES | 97 MONAGHAN political, economic, civilian, and informational (MPECI) the distinct demands of hybrid threats and hybrid warfare instruments of power that extend far beyond the mili- require different counter-measures, and therefore have tary realm. National efforts should enhance traditional distinct implications for future defense forces. threat assessment activity to include non-conventional 63 See the literature on ‘robust’ approaches to strat- political, economic, civil, international (PECI) tools and egy, for example: RJ Lempert et al, Defense Resource capabilities.” Planning Under Uncertainty, RAND Corporation, 50 MCDC, “Countering Hybrid Warfare,” 35–38. 2016; or Yakov Ben Haim, Dealing with Uncertainty in 51 Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense Strategic Decision-making, Parameters, Parameters 45(3), (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961). 2015, 63–73. 52 See UK MOD, “Deterrence: The Defence 64 Liang and Xiangsui, “Unrestricted Warfare.” Contribution (JDN 1/19),” 2019, 40–41, 98 | FEATURES PRISM 8, NO. 2