Hybrid Warfare and Challenges

By Frank G. Hoffman and army for what they hoped would be a decisive and a short .1 The scarlet-clad Spartans learned the first lesson of —the enemy gets a vote. The Athenians elected to remain behind their walls and fight a protracted campaign that played to their strengths and worked against their enemies. Thucydides’ ponderous tome on the carnage of the Pelo- Matthias Kabel ponnesian War is an extended history of the operational adaptation of each side as they strove to gain a sustainable advantage over their enemy. These key lessons are, as he Above: Corinthian helmet, circa intended, a valuable “possession for all time.” 500 BCE In the midst of an ongoing inter-Service Left: Colonel John S. Mosby, C.S.A., roles and missions review, and an upcom- “The Gray Ghost” ing defense review, these lessons need to be underlined. As we begin to debate the scale and shape of the Armed Forces, an acute appreciation of history’s hard-earned lessons will remain useful. Tomorrow’s enemies will still get a vote, and they will remain as cunning and elusive as today’s foes. They may be more

Library of Congress (Brady-Handy Photograph Collection) Photograph (Brady-Handy Congress of Library lethal and more implacable. We should plan accordingly. One should normally eschew simplistic metanarratives, especially in dynamic and he U.S. military faces an era In his classic history, Thucydides nonlinear times. However, the evolving char- of enormous complexity. This detailed the savage 27-year conflict between acter of conflict that we currently face is best complexity has been extended by Sparta and Athens. Sparta was the overwhelm- characterized by convergence. This includes the T globalization, the proliferation ing land power of its day, and its hoplites convergence of the physical and psychological, of advanced technology, violent transnational were drilled to perfection. The Athenians, the kinetic and nonkinetic, and combatants extremists, and resurgent powers. America’s led by Pericles, were the supreme maritime and noncombatants. So, too, we see the con- vaunted military might stand atop all others power, supported by a walled capital, a fleet vergence of military force and the interagency but is tested in many ways. Trying to under- of powerful triremes, and tributary allies. community, of states and nonstate actors, and stand the possible perturbations the future The Spartan leader, Archidamius, warned his of the capabilities they are armed with. Of poses to our interests is a daunting challenge. kinsmen about Athens’ relative power, but the greatest relevance are the converging modes But, as usual, a familiarity with history is our Spartans and their supporters would not heed of war. What once might have been distinct best aid to interpretation. In particular, that their king. In 431 BCE, the Spartans marched operational types or categorizations among great and timeless illuminator of conflict, through Attica and ravaged the Athenian terrorism and conventional, criminal, and chance, and human nature—Thucydides—is as country estates and surrounding farms. They have less utility today. relevant and revealing as ever. encamped and awaited the Athenian heralds Current Strategic Thinking Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman, USMCR (Ret.), is a Research Fellow in the Center for Emerging Threats The 2005 National Defense Strategy and Opportunities at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. (NDS) was noteworthy for its expanded under- standing of modern threats. Instead of the his-

34 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu HOFFMAN torical emphasis on conventional state-based Subsequent to the strategy’s articulation, of increasing frequency and lethality. This threats, the strategy defined a broadening range a number of U.S. and foreign analysts compli- construct is most frequently described as of challenges including traditional, irregular, mented DOD strategists for moving beyond “hybrid warfare,” in which the adversary will terrorist, and disruptive threats. The strategy a myopic preoccupation with conventional most likely present unique combinational or outlined the relative probability of these threats war. But these analysts have also identified an hybrid threats specifically targeting U.S. vulner- and acknowledged America’s increased vulner- increased blurring of war forms, rather than abilities. Instead of separate challengers with ability to less conventional methods of conflict. the conveniently distinct categorizations found fundamentally different approaches (conven- The strategy even noted that the Department in the NDS. Yet the strategy itself did suggest tional, irregular, or terrorist), we can expect of Defense (DOD) was “over invested” in the that the most complex challengers of the future to face competitors who will employ all forms traditional mode of warfare and needed to shift could seek synergies from the simultaneous of war and tactics, perhaps simultaneously. resources and attention to other challengers. application of multiple modes of war. The NDS Criminal activity may also be considered part While civil and intrastate conflicts have explicitly admitted that the challenger catego- of this problem, as it either further destabilizes always had a higher frequency, their strategic ries could and would overlap and that “recent local government or abets the insurgent or impact and operational effects had little impact experience indicates . . . the most dangerous irregular warrior by providing resources. This on Western military forces, and especially circumstances arise when we face a complex could involve smuggling, narcoterrorism, illicit U.S. forces, which focused on the significantly of challenges. Finally, in the future, the most transfers of advanced munitions or , or more challenging nature of state-based threats capable opponents may seek to combine truly the exploitation of urban gang networks. and high-intensity conventional warfighting. disruptive capacity with traditional, irregular, A number of analysts have highlighted This focus is partly responsible for America’s or catastrophic forms of warfare.”2 this blurring of lines between modes of war. overwhelming military superiority today, This matches the views of many military They suggest that our greatest challenge in the measured in terms of conventional capability analysts, who have suggested that future con- future will not come from a state that selects and its ability to project power globally. This flict will be multi-modal or multi-variant rather one approach but from states or groups that investment priority and American force capa- than a simple black or white characterization of select from the whole menu of tactics and tech- bilities will have to change, however, as new one form of warfare. Thus, many analysts are nologies and blend them in innovative ways environmental conditions influence both the calling for greater attention to more blurring to meet their own strategic culture, geography, frequency and character of conflict. and blending of war forms in combinations and aims. As Michael Evans of the Australian Defence Academy wrote well before the last the 2005 National Defense Strategy was noteworthy for its Quadrennial Defense Review, “The possibil- expanded understanding of modern threats ity of continuous sporadic armed conflict, its engagements blurred together in time and U.S. Army (Curtis G. Hargrave)

101st Airborne Division Soldiers fire missile at building in Mosul, , in which Uday and Qusay Hussein barricaded themselves, July 2003

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 35 FORUM | Hybrid Warfare and Challenges space, waged on several levels by a large array by the hybrid threat is a further complexity. As force generally induces the adversary to con- of national and sub-national forces, means that one insightful student of war noted: centrate for defense or to achieve critical mass war is likely to transcend neat divisions into for decisive operations. distinct categories.”3 Hybrid forces can effectively incorporate tech- One can see this in the American Revolu- Numerous scholars are now acknowledg- nologically advanced systems into their force tion, when ’s more conven- ing the mixing likely in future conflicts. Colin structure and strategy, and use these systems in tional troops stood as a force in being for much Gray has admitted the one feature that “we can ways that are beyond the intended employment of the war, while the South Carolina campaign predict with confidence is that there is going parameters. Operationally, hybrid military was characterized by militia and some irregular to be a blurring, a further blurring, of warfare forces are superior to Western forces within their combat.11 The Napoleonic era is frequently c at e g or i e s .” 4 British and Australian officers limited operational spectrum.8 viewed in terms of its massive armies marching have moved ahead and begun the hard work of back and forth across Europe. But the French drawing out implications and the desired coun- Hybrid are not new, but they are invasion of Spain turned into a quagmire, with tercapabilities required to effectively operate different. In this kind of warfare, forces become British regulars contesting Napoleon’s control against hybrid threats. The British have gone blurred into the same force or are applied in the of the major cities, while the Spanish guerrillas past American doctrine writers and already same . The combination of irregular successfully harassed his lines of communica- incorporated hybrid threats within their con- and conventional force capabilities, either tion. Here again, strategic coordination was struct for irregular war.5 Australian military operationally or tactically integrated, is quite achieved, but overall in different .12 analysts remain on the front lines of inquiry in challenging, but historically it is not necessar- Likewise, the American Civil War is framed by this area.6 ily a unique phenomenon.9 The British faced famous at Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Theorists responsible for some of the a hybrid threat at the turn of the last century Vicksburg, and Antietam. Yet partisan warfare most cutting edge thinking in alternative when the Boers employed Mauser rifles and and famous units like John Mosby’s 43d Vir- modes of war and associated organizational ginia provided less conventional capa- implications continue to explore the blurring bilities as an economy of force operation.13 T.E. of conflict types. John Arquilla, an expert in the compression of the levels Lawrence’s role as an advisor to the Arab revolt irregular warfare, has concluded that “[n]et- of war is complicated by a against the Ottomans is another classic case works have even shown a capacity to wage war simultaneous convergence of of compound war, which materially assisted toe-to-toe against nation-states—with some modes General Edmund Allenby’s thrusts with the success. . . . The range of choices available to British Expeditionary Force against Jerusalem networks thus covers an entire spectrum of and Damascus. But here again, Lawrence’s conflict, posing the prospect of a significant Krupp field guns and outranged their red-clad raiders did not fight alongside the British; they blurring of the lines between insurgency, terror, adversary. Ultimately, the British adapted and were strategically directed by the British and and war.”7 ran down the Boer commandos. The fierce supplied with advisors, arms, and gold only.14 Some research has been done on civil defense of Grozny by the Chechens is another Vietnam is another classic case of the wars as hybrid conflicts. Other research focuses potential hybrid case study. But both were strategic synergy created by compound wars, on the nature of the societies involved. But bloody and protracted conflicts that arguably posing the irregular tactics of the Viet Cong hybrid wars are much more than just conflicts required more military resources and greater with the more conventional capabilities of between states and other armed groups. It is the combat capabilities than classical counterinsur- the North Vietnamese army.15 The ambiguity application of the various forms of conflict that gencies and Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsur- between conventional and unconventional best distinguishes hybrid threats or conflicts. gency, would suggest. approaches vexed military planners for several This is especially true since hybrid wars can years. Even long afterward, Americans debated be conducted by both states and a variety of Compound Wars what kind of war they actually fought and lost.16 nonstate actors. Hybrid threats incorporate Historians have noted that many if not a full range of modes of warfare, including most wars are characterized by both regular Hybrid Wars conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and and irregular operations. When a significant As difficult as compound wars have formations, terrorist acts that include indis- degree of strategic coordination between sepa- been, the operational fusion of conventional criminate violence and coercion, and criminal rate regular and irregular forces in conflicts and irregular capabilities in hybrid conflicts disorder. These multi-modal activities can be occurs, they can be considered “compound may be even more complicated. Compound conducted by separate units, or even by the wars.” Compound wars are those major wars wars offered synergy and combinations at the same unit, but are generally operationally and that had significant regular and irregular com- strategic level, but not the complexity, fusion, tactically directed and coordinated within the ponents fighting simultaneously under unified and simultaneity we anticipate at the opera- main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects direction.10 The complementary effects of com- tional and even tactical levels in wars where in the physical and psychological dimensions of pound warfare are generated by its ability to one or both sides is blending and fusing the conflict. The effects can be gained at all levels of exploit the advantages of each kind of force and full range of methods and modes of conflict war. Thus, the compression of the levels of war increase the nature of the threat posed by each into the battlespace. Irregular forces in cases of is complicated by a simultaneous convergence kind of force. The irregular force attacks weak compound wars operated largely as a distrac- of modes. The novelty of this combination and areas, compelling a conventional opponent to tion or economy of force measure in a separate the innovative adaptations of existing systems disperse his security forces. The conventional or adjacent operating area includ-

36 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu HOFFMAN ing the rear echelon. Because it is based on operationally separate forces, the compound The Second Lebanon War, 2006 concept did not capture the merger or blurring modes of war identified in past case studies In many details, the amorphous Hizballah is represen- such as Hizballah in the second Lebanon war tative of the rising hybrid threat. The 34-day battle in of 2006 or future projections. southern Lebanon revealed some weaknesses in the Thus, the future does not portend a suite posture of the Defense Forces (IDF)—but it has of distinct challengers into separate boxes of implications for American defense planners, too. Mixing a matrix chart. Traditional conflict will still an organized political movement with decentralized pose the most dangerous form of human cells employing adaptive tactics in ungoverned zones, Hizballah showed that it could inflict as well conflict, especially in scale. With increasing as take punishment. Its highly disciplined, well-trained distributed cells contested ground against a modern conventional force using an admixture of guerrilla tactics and technology in densely probability, however, we will face adversaries packed urban centers. Hizballah, like Islamic extremist defenders in the battles in Fallujah in Iraq who blur and blend the different methods or during April and November of 2004, skillfully exploited the urban terrain to create ambushes and modes of warfare. The most distinctive change evade detection and to hold strong defensive fortifications in close proximity to noncombatants.1 in the character of modern war is the blurred In the field, Israeli troops grudgingly admitted that the Hizballah defenders were tenacious or blended nature of combat. We do not face and skilled.2 The organized resistance was several orders of magnitude more difficult than coun- a widening number of distinct challenges but terterrorism operations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. More importantly, the degree of training, their convergence into hybrid wars. fire discipline, and lethal technology demonstrated by Hizballah were much higher. These hybrid wars blend the lethality of Tactical combinations and novel applications of technology by the defenders were notewor- state conflict with the fanatical and protracted thy. In particular, the antitank guided missile systems employed by Hizballah against IDF armor and defensive positions, coupled with decentralized tactics, were a surprise. At the battle of Wadi fervor of irregular warfare. In such conflicts, Salouqi, a column of Israeli tanks was stopped in its tracks with telling precision.3 Hizballah’s anti- future adversaries (states, state-sponsored tank weapons include the Russian-made RPG–29, Russian AT–13 Metis, and AT–14 Kornet, which groups, or self-funded actors) will exploit has a range of 3 miles. The IDF found the AT–13 and AT–14 formidable against their first line access to modern military capabilities, includ- Mark IV tank. A total of 18 Merkavas were damaged, and it is estimated that antitank ing encrypted command systems, man-porta- guided missiles accounted for 40 percent of IDF fatalities. Here we see the blurring of conventional ble air-to-surface missiles, and other modern systems with irregular forces and nontraditional tactics. lethal systems, as well as promote protracted Hizballah even managed to launch a few armed insurgencies that employ ambushes, impro- unmanned aerial vehicles, which required the IDF to vised explosive devices (IEDs), and coercive adapt in order to detect them. These included either the Iranian Mirsad-1 or Ababil-3 Swallow. These concerned assassinations. This could include states blend- Israeli strategists given their global positioning system– ing high-tech capabilities such as antisatellite based navigational system, 450-kilometer range, and weapons with terrorism and cyber warfare 50-kilogram explosive carrying capacity.4 There is evi- directed against financial targets. dence that Hizballah invested in signals intelligence and Hybrid challenges are not limited to non- monitored IDF cell phone calls for some time, as well state actors. States can shift their conventional as unconfirmed reports that they managed to decrypt IDF radio traffic. The defenders also seemed units to irregular formations and adopt new to have advanced surveillance systems and very advanced night vision equipment. Hizballah’s use tactics as Iraq’s fedayeen did in 2003. Evidence of C802 antiship cruise missiles against an Israeli missile ship represents another sample of what from open sources suggests that several powers “hybrid warfare” might look like, which is certainly relevant to naval analysts as well. Perhaps Hizballah’s unique capability is its inventory of 14,000 rockets. Many of these are in the Middle East are modifying their forces relatively inaccurate older models, but thanks to Iranian or Syrian support, they possess a number of to exploit this more complex and diffused missile systems that can reach deep into Israel. They were used both to terrorize the civilian popula- mode of conflict. We may find it increasingly tion and to attack Israel’s military infrastructure. Hizballah managed to fire over 4,100 rockets into perplexing to characterize states as essentially Israel between July 12 and August 13, culminating with 250 rockets on the final day, the highest traditional forces, or nonstate actors as inher- total of the war. Most of these were short range and inaccurate, but they achieved strategic effects ently irregular. Future challenges will present both in the physical domain, by forcing Israel to evacuate tens of thousands of citizens, and in the a more complex array of alternative structures media, by demonstrating their ability to lash back at the region’s most potent military. and strategies as seen in the battle between Ralph Peters, who visited Lebanon during the fighting, observed that Hizballah displayed im- Israel and Hizballah in 2006. The latter effec- pressive flexibility, relying on the ability of cellular units to combine rapidly for specific operations or, when cut off, to operate independently after falling in on prepositioned stockpiles of weapons tively fused militia forces with highly trained and ammunition. Hizballah’s combat cells were a hybrid of guerrillas and regular troops—a form fighters and antitank guided missile teams into of opponent that U.S. forces are apt to encounter with increasing frequency.5 the battle. Hizballah clearly demonstrated the ability of nonstate actors to study and decon- 1 Andrew Exum, Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment, Policy Focus #63 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East struct the vulnerabilities of Western-style mili- Policy, December 2006), 9–11. 2 Matthew Stannard, “ wages new generation of warfare,” San Francisco Chronicle, August 6, 2006; Jonathan Finer, taries and devise appropriate countermeasures. “Israeli Soldiers Find a Tenacious Foe in Hezbollah,” The Washington Post, August 8, 2006, 1. The lessons learned from this confronta- 3 Judith Palmer Harik, Transnational Actors in Contemporary Conflicts: Hizbullah and its 2006 War with Israel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, March 2007), 14; Exum, 9–14. tion are already cross-pollinating with other 4 Exum, 5; see also Harik, 19–20. 5 states and nonstate actors. With or without Ralph Peters, “Lessons from Lebanon: The New Model Terrorist Army,” Armed Forces Journal International (October 2006), 39. state sponsorship, the lethality and capability ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 37 FORUM | Hybrid Warfare and Challenges of organized groups are increasing, while the Fleeting, “Twenty-first century conflict has thus tions of the two. What is the center of gravity incentives for states to exploit nontraditional far been typified by what might be termed as in such conflicts, and does it invalidate our modes of war are on the rise. This will require hybrid wars.” 18 emphasis on whole-of-government approaches that we modify our mindsets with respect to and lines of operations? the relative frequency and threats of future Implications Success in hybrid wars also requires small conflict. Irregular tactics and protracted forms The rise of hybrid warfare does not unit leaders with decisionmaking skills and tac- of conflict are often castigated as tactics of the represent the end of traditional or conventional tical cunning to respond to the unknown—and weak, employed by nonstate actors who do not warfare. But it does present a complicating the equipment sets to react or adapt faster than have the means to do anything else. Instead of factor for defense planning in the 21st century. tomorrow’s foe. Organizational learning and weakness, future opponents may exploit such The implications could be significant. John adaptation would be at a premium, as would means because of their effectiveness, and they Arquilla of the Naval Postgraduate School has extensive investment in diverse educational may come to be seen as tactics of the smart and noted, “While history provides some useful experiences.21 What institutional mechanisms nimble. The future may find further evidence examples to stimulate strategic thought about do we need to be more adaptive, and what that hybrid threats are truly effective against such problems, coping with networks that impediments does our centralized—if not large, ponderous, and hierarchical organiza- can fight in so many different ways—sparking sclerotic—Defense Department generate that tions that are mentally or doctrinally rigid. myriad, hybrid forms of conflict—is going to must be jettisoned? Some analysts in Israel have all too require some innovative thinking.”19 The greatest implications will involve quickly dismissed the unique character of We are just beginning this thinking. Any force protection, as the proliferation of IEDs Hizballah. These analysts blithely focus inward force prepared to address hybrid threats would suggests. Our enemies will focus on winning on the failings of the political and military have to be built upon a solid professional the mobility-countermobility challenge to limit leadership.17 This is a fatal disease for military our freedom of action and separate us from planners, one that can only benefit future close proximity to the civilian population. Hizballahs. As Winston Churchill so aptly put hybrid wars blend the lethality The ability of hybrid challenges to exploit the it, “However absorbed a commander may be of state conflict with the range and precision of various types of missiles, in the elaboration of his own thoughts, it is fanatical and protracted fervor mortar rounds, and mines will increase over sometimes necessary to take the enemy into of irregular warfare time and impede our plans. Our freedom of account.” So, too, must military historians and action and ability to isolate future opponents serious efforts to extract lessons from current from civilian populations are suspect. history. Russell Glenn, a retired U.S. Army military foundation, but it would also place a The exploitation of modern information officer now with RAND, conducted an objec- premium on the cognitive skills needed to rec- technology will also enhance the learning cycle tive evaluation and concluded that the second ognize or quickly adapt to the unknown.20 We of potential irregular enemies, improving their Lebanon conflict was inherently heterogeneous may have to redouble our efforts to revise our ability to transfer lessons learned and techniques and that attempts to focus on purely con- operational art. We have mastered operational from one theater to another. This accelerated ventional solutions were futile. Moreover, as design for , and recently learning cycle has already been seen in Iraq and both Ralph Peters and I concluded earlier, this reinvigorated our understanding of counter- Afghanistan, as insurgents appeared to acquire conflict is not an anomaly, but a harbinger of insurgency campaigns. It is not clear how we and effectively employ tactical techniques or the future. As Glenn summed up in All Glory Is adapt our campaign planning to combina- adapt novel detonation devices found on the Internet or observed from a different source. Marines aid displaced Iraqi civilians These opponents will remain elusive, operate in near An Nasiriyah during Operation an extremely distributed manner, and reflect a Iraqi Freedom, March 2003 high degree of opportunistic learning. The U.S. military and indeed the armed forces of the West must adapt as well. As one Australian officer put it, unless we adapt to today’s protean adversary and the merging modes of human conflict, “we are destined to maintain and upgrade our high-end, industrial age square pegs and be condemned for trying to force them into contemporary and increas- ingly complex round holes.”22 DOD recognizes the need for fresh think- ing and has begun exploring the nature of this mixed challenge. An ongoing research project, including a series of joint wargaming exercises, has been initiated by the Office of the Secre- tary of Defense. U.S. Joint Forces Command

U.S. Marine Corps (Mace M. Gratz) is exploring the implications as well, and the

38 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu HOFFMAN

Marines are doing the same. But the challenge bifurcation of war forms, and this orientation General: Nathanael Green and the Triumph of the affects all the Services, not just ground forces. overlooks the most likely and potentially the American Revolution (New York: Henry Holt, 2005). 12 Hizballah’s use of long-range missiles, armed most dangerous of combinations. One pair Charles J. Esdaile, Fighting Napoleon, Guer- rillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain 1808–1814 unmanned aerial vehicles, and antiship cruise of respected strategists has concluded that (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 154–155. missiles should be a warning to the whole joint “hybrid warfare will be a defining feature of 13 Jeffrey D. Wert, Mosby’s Rangers (New York: 27 community. The maritime Services under- the future security environment.” If true, Simon & Schuster, 1991). stand this and reflected the new challenge in we face a wider and more difficult range of 14 B.H. Liddell Hart, Lawrence of Arabia (New the national maritime strategy: “Conflicts are threats than many in the Pentagon are think- York: De Capo, 1989). increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of ing about. As today’s Spartans, we will have to 15 Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, We traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized take the enemy’s plans into consideration and Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young: Ia Drang—The planning and execution, and non-state actors, adapt into a more multidimensional or joint Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam (New York: using both simple and sophisticated technolo- force as Sparta ultimately did. Random House, 1992). 16 gies in innovative ways.”23 Today’s strategists need to remember The best source on the war is Andrew F. the frustrated Spartans outside Athens’ long Krepinevich, The Army in Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Tomorrow’s conflicts will not be easily wall and remember the bloody success of the 17 Avi Kober, “The Israel Defense Forces in the categorized into conventional or irregular. British, Russians, and Israelis in their long wars Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance,” The emerging character of conflict is more against hybrid threats—and prepare Journal of (February 2008), 3–40. complicated than that. A binary choice of big accordingly. JFQ 18 Russell W. Glenn, All Glory Is Fleeting: Insights and conventional versus small or irregular from the Second Lebanon War (Santa Monica, CA: is too simplistic. The cannot RAND, 2008), 73. imagine all future threats as state-based and Notes 19 Arquilla, 369. completely conventional, nor should it assume 20 David C. Gompert, Heads We Win: The Cogni- 1 that state-based conflict has passed into his- Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucy- tive Side of (COIN), Santa Monica, tory’s dustbin. Many have made that mistake dides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian CA: RAND, Counterinsurgency Study Occasional War (New York: Free Press, 1996). before. State-based conflict is less likely, but it Paper 1, 2007. 2 National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: 21 Michael Evans, From the Long Peace to the Long is not extinct. But neither should we assume U.S. Department of Defense, 2005), 4. War (Canberra: Australian Defence College, 2007). that all state-based warfare will be entirely 3 Michael Evans, “From Kadesh to Kandahar: See also David Betz, “A Real Revolution in Military conventional. As this article suggests, the future and the Future of War,” Naval War Affairs,” paper delivered at the Marine Corps Training poses combinations and mergers of the various College Review (Summer 2003), 136. and Education Command Conference, “Pedogology methods available to our antagonists. 4 Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future for the Long War,” October 29–31, 2007, Quantico, Numerous security analysts have Warfare (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006). VA. acknowledged the blurring of lines between 5 Countering Irregular Activity Within a Compre- 22 Krause, v; David Betz, “Redesigning Land modes of war.24 Hybrid challengers have passed hensive Approach, Joint Doctrine Note 2/07, United Forces for Wars Amongst the People,” Contemporary from a concept to a reality, thanks to Hizballah. Kingdom, March 2007, 1–15. Security Policy 28, no. 2 (August 2007), 221–243. 6 23 A growing number of analysts in Washington Michael G. Krause, “Square Pegs for Round General James T. Conway, USMC, Admiral Holes?” Australian Army, Australian Land Warfare realize that the debate about preparing for Gary Roughead, USN, and Admiral Thad W. Allen, Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 132, June 2007. USCG, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st-Century Sea- counterinsurgency or stability operations 7 John Arquilla, “The End of War As We Knew power (Washington, DC: October 2007). versus big wars is a false argument. Such a It ,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (March 2007), 24 Thomas G. Mahnken, “Modern War,” in The debate leads to erroneous conclusions about 369. Impenetrable Fog of War: Reflections on Modern future demands for the joint warfighting com- 8 William. J. Nemeth, USMC, Future War and Warfare and Strategic Surprise, ed. Patrick M. Cronin munity. Scholars at the Naval War College in Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare (Monterey, CA: (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), Newport, Rhode Island, and at King’s College, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2002). 15–24. London, endorsed the concept.25 Max Boot 9 James N. Mattis and Frank Hoffman, “Future 25 Mackubin T. Owens, “Reflections on Future concluded his lengthy study of war and tech- Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Warfare,” U.S. Naval War,” Naval War College Review (Winter 2007); nology with the observation that Institute Proceedings (November 2005), 30–32; F.G. Colonel John J. McCuen, “Hybrid Wars,” Military Hoffman, “How the Marines Are Preparing for Review (April-May 2008), 107–113. Hybrid Wars,” Armed Forces Journal International 26 The boundaries between “regular” and “irregu- Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, (April 2006); and F.G. Hoffman, “Preparing for Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today lar” warfare are blurring. Even non-state groups Hybrid Wars,” Marine Corps Gazette, March 2007; (New York: Random House, 2006), 472. are increasingly gaining access to the kinds of st Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21 Century: The Rise 27 Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, weapons that were once the exclusive preserve of of Hybrid Warfare (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute “The Defense Inheritance: Challenges and Choices states. And even states will increasingly turn to for Policy Studies, December 2007). for the Next Pentagon Team,” Washington Quarterly unconventional strategies to blunt the impact of 10 Thomas Huber, Compound Wars: The Fatal (Autumn 2008), 63. For additional background, see American power.26 Knot (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Greg Grant, “Hybrid Wars,” Government Executive College, 1996). (May 2008); and Matthew Rusling, “For the Military, This should widen our lens about the 11 John Grenier, First Way of War: American A Future of Hybrid Wars,” National Defense (Septem- future joint operating environment. Yet our War Making on the Frontier (New York: Cambridge ber 2008). focus remains on an outmoded and dated University Press, 2005); Terry Golway, Washington’s ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 39