Hybrid Warfare and Challenges

Hybrid Warfare and Challenges By FRANK G. HOFFMAN and army for what they hoped would be a decisive battle and a short war.1 The scarlet-clad Spartans learned the first lesson of military history—the enemy gets a vote. The Athenians elected to remain behind their walls and fight a protracted campaign that played to their strengths and worked against their enemies. Thucydides’ ponderous tome on the carnage of the Pelo- Matthias Kabel ponnesian War is an extended history of the operational adaptation of each side as they strove to gain a sustainable advantage over their enemy. These key lessons are, as he Above: Corinthian helmet, circa intended, a valuable “possession for all time.” 500 BCE In the midst of an ongoing inter-Service Left: Colonel John S. Mosby, C.S.A., roles and missions review, and an upcom- “The Gray Ghost” ing defense review, these lessons need to be underlined. As we begin to debate the scale and shape of the Armed Forces, an acute appreciation of history’s hard-earned lessons will remain useful. Tomorrow’s enemies will still get a vote, and they will remain as cunning and elusive as today’s foes. They may be more Library of Congress (Brady-Handy Photograph Collection) Photograph (Brady-Handy Congress of Library lethal and more implacable. We should plan accordingly. One should normally eschew simplistic metanarratives, especially in dynamic and he U.S. military faces an era In his classic history, Thucydides nonlinear times. However, the evolving char- of enormous complexity. This detailed the savage 27-year conflict between acter of conflict that we currently face is best complexity has been extended by Sparta and Athens. Sparta was the overwhelm- characterized by convergence. This includes the T globalization, the proliferation ing land power of its day, and its hoplites convergence of the physical and psychological, of advanced technology, violent transnational were drilled to perfection. The Athenians, the kinetic and nonkinetic, and combatants extremists, and resurgent powers. America’s led by Pericles, were the supreme maritime and noncombatants. So, too, we see the con- vaunted military might stand atop all others power, supported by a walled capital, a fleet vergence of military force and the interagency but is tested in many ways. Trying to under- of powerful triremes, and tributary allies. community, of states and nonstate actors, and stand the possible perturbations the future The Spartan leader, Archidamius, warned his of the capabilities they are armed with. Of poses to our interests is a daunting challenge. kinsmen about Athens’ relative power, but the greatest relevance are the converging modes But, as usual, a familiarity with history is our Spartans and their supporters would not heed of war. What once might have been distinct best aid to interpretation. In particular, that their king. In 431 BCE, the Spartans marched operational types or categorizations among great and timeless illuminator of conflict, through Attica and ravaged the Athenian terrorism and conventional, criminal, and chance, and human nature—Thucydides—is as country estates and surrounding farms. They irregular warfare have less utility today. relevant and revealing as ever. encamped and awaited the Athenian heralds Current Strategic Thinking Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman, USMCR (Ret.), is a Research Fellow in the Center for Emerging Threats The 2005 National Defense Strategy and Opportunities at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. (NDS) was noteworthy for its expanded understanding of modern threats. Instead of the his- 34 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu HOFFMAN torical emphasis on conventional state-based Subsequent to the strategy’s articulation, of increasing frequency and lethality. This threats, the strategy defined a broadening range a number of U.S. and foreign analysts compli- construct is most frequently described as of challenges including traditional, irregular, mented DOD strategists for moving beyond “hybrid warfare,” in which the adversary will terrorist, and disruptive threats. The strategy a myopic preoccupation with conventional most likely present unique combinational or outlined the relative probability of these threats war. But these analysts have also identified an hybrid threats specifically targeting U.S. vulner- and acknowledged America’s increased vulner- increased blurring of war forms, rather than abilities. Instead of separate challengers with ability to less conventional methods of conflict. the conveniently distinct categorizations found fundamentally different approaches (conven- The strategy even noted that the Department in the NDS. Yet the strategy itself did suggest tional, irregular, or terrorist), we can expect of Defense (DOD) was “over invested” in the that the most complex challengers of the future to face competitors who will employ all forms traditional mode of warfare and needed to shift could seek synergies from the simultaneous of war and tactics, perhaps simultaneously. resources and attention to other challengers. application of multiple modes of war. The NDS Criminal activity may also be considered part While civil and intrastate conflicts have explicitly admitted that the challenger catego- of this problem, as it either further destabilizes always had a higher frequency, their strategic ries could and would overlap and that “recent local government or abets the insurgent or impact and operational effects had little impact experience indicates . the most dangerous irregular warrior by providing resources. This on Western military forces, and especially circumstances arise when we face a complex could involve smuggling, narcoterrorism, illicit U.S. forces, which focused on the significantly of challenges. Finally, in the future, the most transfers of advanced munitions or weapons, or more challenging nature of state-based threats capable opponents may seek to combine truly the exploitation of urban gang networks. and high-intensity conventional warfighting. disruptive capacity with traditional, irregular, A number of analysts have highlighted This focus is partly responsible for America’s or catastrophic forms of warfare.”2 this blurring of lines between modes of war. overwhelming military superiority today, This matches the views of many military They suggest that our greatest challenge in the measured in terms of conventional capability analysts, who have suggested that future con- future will not come from a state that selects and its ability to project power globally. This flict will be multi-modal or multi-variant rather one approach but from states or groups that investment priority and American force capa- than a simple black or white characterization of select from the whole menu of tactics and tech- bilities will have to change, however, as new one form of warfare. Thus, many analysts are nologies and blend them in innovative ways environmental conditions influence both the calling for greater attention to more blurring to meet their own strategic culture, geography, frequency and character of conflict. and blending of war forms in combinations and aims. As Michael Evans of the Australian Defence Academy wrote well before the last the 2005 National Defense Strategy was noteworthy for its Quadrennial Defense Review, “The possibil- expanded understanding of modern threats ity of continuous sporadic armed conflict, its engagements blurred together in time and U.S. Army (Curtis G. Hargrave) 101st Airborne Division Soldiers fire missile at building in Mosul, Iraq, in which Uday and Qusay Hussein barricaded themselves, July 2003 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 35 FORUM | Hybrid Warfare and Challenges space, waged on several levels by a large array by the hybrid threat is a further complexity. As force generally induces the adversary to con- of national and sub-national forces, means that one insightful student of war noted: centrate for defense or to achieve critical mass war is likely to transcend neat divisions into for decisive offensive operations. distinct categories.”3 Hybrid forces can effectively incorporate tech- One can see this in the American Revolu- Numerous scholars are now acknowledg- nologically advanced systems into their force tion, when George Washington’s more conven- ing the mixing likely in future conflicts. Colin structure and strategy, and use these systems in tional troops stood as a force in being for much Gray has admitted the one feature that “we can ways that are beyond the intended employment of the war, while the South Carolina campaign predict with confidence is that there is going parameters. Operationally, hybrid military was characterized by militia and some irregular to be a blurring, a further blurring, of warfare forces are superior to Western forces within their combat.11 The Napoleonic era is frequently c at e g or i e s .” 4 British and Australian officers limited operational spectrum.8 viewed in terms of its massive armies marching have moved ahead and begun the hard work of back and forth across Europe. But the French drawing out implications and the desired coun- Hybrid wars are not new, but they are invasion of Spain turned into a quagmire, with tercapabilities required to effectively operate different. In this kind of warfare, forces become British regulars contesting Napoleon’s control against hybrid threats. The British have gone blurred into the same force or are applied in the of the major cities, while the Spanish guerrillas past American doctrine writers and already

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