THE EVOLUTION of RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE the Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare

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THE EVOLUTION of RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE the Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare Contents Acknowledgements Introduction ........................ 2 The authors are grateful for research assistance provided by U.S.-based Ukraine ................................. 7 journalist Iryna Solomko, as well as the Estonia .................................. 18 communications and editorial team at the Center for European Policy Analysis United Kingdom ................ 27 (CEPA). The authors would also like to EU/NATO ............................. 36 thank the external peer reviewers for their invaluable comments and suggestions, Conclusion ........................... 44 as well as Donald Jensen for his original Endnotes .............................. 48 framing of the research question. This report was made possible with generous support from the Smith Richardson Foundation. About CEPA The Center for European Analysis (CEPA) is a non-partisan think-tank dedicated to strengthening the transatlantic relationship. Headquartered in Washington, D.C. and led by seasoned transatlanticists and young leaders from both sides of the Atlantic, CEPA brings an innovative approach to the policy arena. Our cutting- edge analysis and timely debates galvanize communities of influence while investing in the next generation of leaders to understand and address present and future challenges to transatlantic values and principles. All opinions are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. Cover: Members of the Emergencies Ministry of the separatist Donetsk People’s Republic demine the area at the militants’ former positions on the contact line with the Ukrainian armed forces following troop withdrawals near the settlement of Petrivske (Petrovskoye) in Donetsk region, Ukraine November 19, 2019. REUTERS/ Alexander Ermochenko. ii The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare About the Authors Alina Polyakova is the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). She serves on the board of the Free Russia Foundation and the Institute of Modern Russia and is professor of European studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Dr. Polyakova was the founding director for global democracy and emerging technology at the Brookings Institution. Mathieu Boulègue is a research fellow at the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in London. Before joining Chatham House, Mathieu was a partner at the risk management and strategic research consultancy AESMA, where he worked as director of Eurasian affairs. In his research, Mathieu focuses particularly on Eurasian security and defence issues as well as on Russia’s domestic and foreign policy. Kateryna Zarembo, Associated Fellow, the New Europe Center. She teaches at the International Relations Department at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. From 2010 to 2017 worked at the Institute of World Politics; she was a Deputy Director at the New Europe Center in 2017-2019. She got her Ph.D. from the National Institute for Strategic Studies (Kyiv, Ukraine), holds an MA in European Studies from the University College Dublin (Dublin, Ireland) and an MA in English and Italian Languages at the National Taras Shevchenko University (Kyiv, Ukraine). Sergiy Solodkyy, First Deputy Director of the New Europe Center, is an expert in foreign policy, international relations, and security. Previously, he worked at the Institute of World Policy (2010-2017). Solodkyy graduated from the Westminster University majoring in International Relations and also from the Institute of Journalism of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. Kalev Stoicescu is a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) in Estonia. Prior to joining ICDS in August 2014, Kalev was an Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence official. Among other fields, he specializes in issues related to Russian foreign and domestic policy, as well as developments in the field of NATO’s defence and security. He served at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1991-2000, including as Ambassador to the OSCE and Ambassador to US and Canada. He was a member of the Estonian delegation in border negotiations with Russia and Latvia. Precious N Chatterje-Doody is a Lecturer in Politics and International Studies at The Open University, UK. Her research focuses on Russian approaches to communication, memory and security, and she is the author (with Dr Ilya Yablokov, Leeds University) of Russia Today and Conspiracy Theories: People, Power and Politics on RT, forthcoming with Routledge in 2021. Oscar Jonsson is academic director at the Center for the Governance of Change at IE University. He was earlier director of Stockholm Free World Forum, a subject-matter at Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, and a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley. He holds a PhD from Department of War Studies, King’s College London and is the author of The Russian Understanding of War (Georgetown University Press). 1 The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare INTRODUCTION Alina Polyakova and Mathieu Boulègue In 2018, CEPA examined Russia’s approach But hybrid war is not static. Over time, to nonlinear competition in its well- Russia’s views on the conduct and efficacy received report “Chaos as a Strategy: Putin’s of its chaos strategy with the West has ‘Promethean’ Gamble.”1 The report’s initial evolved based on experience, development assessment was that Kremlin leaders were of new tools, and assessment of the applying military and nonmilitary means Western response. From the West’s point of as one in the same, that they were strategic view, it is paramount to assess the evolution in intention and opportunistic in their use of Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics to better of chaos, and that they were succeeding understand likely developments in multi- by effectively managing two of the most vector warfare against Western interests, essential variables in their strategy: time international institutions, and frontline and risk. states. The result is a form of strategic The West, however, is not united on how competition whereby Russia sows chaos to confront the issue and define common to achieve its agenda beyond its borders solutions to the problem, especially by deploying an array of hybrid warfare because lessons learned from one case tools. This “chaos strategy” calculates rarely apply to another. Given that Russia’s that a relatively weakened Kremlin can strategic assumptions about the conduct avoid direct competition with the West to of hybrid warfare appear to be changing, still successfully compete by splintering Western policymakers would benefit its opponents’ alliances, dividing them from a fresh examination of how Russia’s internally, and undermining their political strategists and military leaders are adapting systems, and by doing so ensure long-term hybrid warfare tools to increase chaos, and regime survival.2 Western responses to it. From the Kremlin’s perspective, hybrid This report seeks to assess, understand, warfare is a tactical application of the and respond to the evolution of Russia’s chaos strategy. It is full spectrum warfare vision of the chaos strategy through critical that deploys a blend of conventional examples of Russia’s use of hybrid warfare. and nonconventional means aimed at It looks at the evolution and adaptations of affecting on the ground changes in target Russian hybrid warfare against four target while seeking to avoid direct military countries and institutions — Ukraine, a confrontation with Western states. Hybrid frontline state suffering the consequences warfare is employed in a tailored way to of aggressive Russian military and sub- sow chaos in target countries. Such efforts threshold action; Estonia, whose resilience generally include irregular warfare, active against Russian cyberattacks has inspired measures, and special operations.3 Unable major policy changes in Europe regarding to compete in direct confrontation, the information security; the United Kingdom, Kremlin’s use of hybrid warfare is a means a unique and remarkable example of to compensate for its weaknesses vis-à-vis how Western countries are affected by the United States and NATO. subthreshold activities, especially in the informational realm; and, finally, 2 The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare institutions like the European Union (EU) For Russia, the problem and NATO, which are seeing their internal cohesion put to the test by Russian non- remains that it cannot linear operations. compete in a direct contest Each case study examines the evolution of Russia’s tailored toolkit of nonlinear of national power means of action, the impact on respective countries and institutions, as well as policy architecture. This would have forced Russia responses to the challenge. However, to choose confrontation over cooperation the Russian toolkit of hybrid means is with the West. different in each case study because these represent diverse theaters of operation for The Russian leadership has the perception the Russian regime. Different tools are, that there is a window of opportunity to therefore, deployed to different degrees to take action and make foreign policy and 5 obtain different results. security intentions a reality — the war with Georgia in 2008 was a harbinger What ties these case studies together is of Russia’s reassertion.
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