THE BLACK MARKET for SOCIAL MEDIA MANIPULATION NATO Stratcom COE Singularex
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Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J
STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 11 Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: Kathleen Bailey presents evidence of forgeries to the press corps. Credit: The Washington Times Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference By Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 11 Series Editor: Nicholas Rostow National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. June 2012 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. -
ASD-Covert-Foreign-Money.Pdf
overt C Foreign Covert Money Financial loopholes exploited by AUGUST 2020 authoritarians to fund political interference in democracies AUTHORS: Josh Rudolph and Thomas Morley © 2020 The Alliance for Securing Democracy Please direct inquiries to The Alliance for Securing Democracy at The German Marshall Fund of the United States 1700 18th Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 T 1 202 683 2650 E [email protected] This publication can be downloaded for free at https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/covert-foreign-money/. The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the views of the authors alone. Cover and map design: Kenny Nguyen Formatting design: Rachael Worthington Alliance for Securing Democracy The Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD), a bipartisan initiative housed at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, develops comprehensive strategies to deter, defend against, and raise the costs on authoritarian efforts to undermine and interfere in democratic institutions. ASD brings together experts on disinformation, malign finance, emerging technologies, elections integrity, economic coercion, and cybersecurity, as well as regional experts, to collaborate across traditional stovepipes and develop cross-cutting frame- works. Authors Josh Rudolph Fellow for Malign Finance Thomas Morley Research Assistant Contents Executive Summary �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1 Introduction and Methodology �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� -
“Watchdogging” Versus Adversarial Journalism by State-Owned Media: the Nigerian and Cameroonian Experience Endong Floribert Patrick C
International Journal of English, Literature and Social Science (IJELS) Vol-2, Issue-2, Mar-Apr- 2017 ISSN: 2456-7620 “Watchdogging” Versus Adversarial Journalism by State-Owned Media: The Nigerian and Cameroonian Experience Endong Floribert Patrick C. Department of Theatre and Media Studies, University of Calabar, Calabar, Nigeria Abstract— The private and the opposition-controlled environment where totalitarianism, dictatorship and other media have most often been taxed by Black African forms of unjust socio-political strictures reign. They are governments with being adepts of adversarial journalism. not to be intimidated or cowed by any aggressive force, to This accusation has been predicated on the observation kill stories of political actions which are inimical to public that the private media have, these last decades, tended to interest. They are rather expected to sensitize and educate dogmatically interpret their watchdog role as being an masses on sensitive socio-political issues thereby igniting enemy of government. Their adversarial inclination has the public and making it sufficiently equipped to make made them to “intuitively” suspect government and to solid developmental decisions. They are equally to play view government policies as schemes that are hardly – the role of an activist and strongly campaign for reforms nay never – designed in good faith. Based on empirical that will bring about positive socio-political revolutions in understandings, observations and secondary sources, this the society. Still as watchdogs and sentinels, the media paper argues that the same accusation may be made are expected to practice journalism in a mode that will against most Black African governments which have promote positive values and defend the interest of the overly converted the state-owned media to their public totality of social denominations co-existing in the country relation tools and as well as an arsenal to lambaste their in which they operate. -
Recent Trends in Online Foreign Influence Efforts
Recent Trends in Online Foreign Influence Efforts Diego A. Martin, Jacob N. Shapiro, Michelle Nedashkovskaya Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey, United States E-mail: [email protected] Email: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Abstract: Foreign governments have used social media to influence politics in a range of countries by promoting propaganda, advocating controversial viewpoints, and spreading disinformation. We analyze 53 distinct foreign influence efforts (FIEs) targeting 24 different countries from 2013 through 2018. FIEs are defined as (i) coordinated campaigns by one state to impact one or more specific aspects of politics in another state (ii) through media channels, including social media, (iii) by producing content designed to appear indigenous to the target state. The objective of such campaigns can be quite broad and to date have included influencing political decisions by shaping election outcomes at various levels, shifting the political agenda on topics ranging from health to security, and encouraging political polarization. We draw on more than 460 media reports to identify FIEs, track their progress, and classify their features. Introduction Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) have changed the way people communi- cate about politics and access information on a wide range of topics (Foley 2004, Chigona et al. 2009). Social media in particular has transformed communication between leaders and voters by enabling direct politician-to-voter engagement outside traditional avenues, such as speeches and press conferences (Ott 2017). In the 2016 U.S. presidential election, for example, social media platforms were more widely viewed than traditional editorial media and were central to the campaigns of both Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton and Republican candidate Donald Trump (Enli 2017). -
VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY Maryna Kupriienko INFLUENCING
VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DIPLOMACY PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT Maryna Kupriienko INFLUENCING PUBLIC OPINION IN SOCIAL MEDIA. TROLLING AND DISINFORMATION STRATEGIES Final Master Thesis Journalism and Media Industries Study Program, state code 621P50002 Degree in Journalism Supervisor prof. Robert van Voren (acad. title, name, surname) Defended prof. Šarūnas Liekis (Dean of the Faculty) Kaunas, 2019 VYTAUTO DIDŽIOJO UNIVERSITETAS POLITIKOS MOKSLŲ IR DIPLOMATIJOS FAKULTETAS VIEŠOSIOS KOMUNIKACIJOS KATEDRA Maryna Kupriienko VIEŠOS NUOMONĖS ĮTAKA SOCIALINĖSE MEDIJOSE. TROLINIMO IR DEZINFORMACIJOS STRATEGIJOS Magistro baigiamasis darbas Žurnalistikos ir medijų industrijų studijų programa, valstybinis kodas 621P50002 Žurnalistikos studijų kryptis Vadovas (-ė) prof. Robert van Voren (Moksl. laipsnis, vardas, pavardė) Apginta prof. Šarūnas Liekis (Fakulteto/studijų instituto dekanas/direktorius) Kaunas, 2019 CONTENTS SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................ 4 SANTRAUKA ............................................................................................................................................ 5 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 6 1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................ 9 1.1. Theoretical -
Computational Propaganda, Jewish-Americans and the 2018 Midterms
A report from the Center on Technology and Society OCT 2018 Computational Propaganda, Jewish-Americans and the 2018 Midterms: The Amplification of Anti-Semitic Harassment Online Our Mission: To stop the defamation of the Jewish people and to secure justice and fair treatment to all. ABOUT CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY & SOCIETY AND THE BELFER FELLOWS In a world riddled with cyberhate, online harassment, and misuses of ADL (Anti-Defamation technology, the Center for Technology & Society (CTS) serves as a resource League) fights anti-Semitism to tech platforms and develops proactive solutions. Launched in 2017 and and promotes justice for all. headquartered in Silicon Valley, CTS aims for global impacts and applications in an increasingly borderless space. It is a force for innovation, producing Join ADL to give a voice to cutting-edge research to enable online civility, protect vulnerable populations, those without one and to support digital citizenship, and engage youth. CTS builds on ADL’s century of protect our civil rights. experience building a world without hate and supplies the tools to make that a possibility both online and off-line. Learn more: adl.org The Belfer Fellowship program supports CTS’s efforts to create innovative solutions to counter online hate and ensure justice and fair treatment for all in the digital age through fellowships in research and outreach projects. The program is made possible by a generous contribution from the Robert A. and Renée E. Belfer Family Foundation. The inaugural 2018-2019 Fellows are: • Rev. Dr. Patricia Novick, Ph.D., of the Multicultural Leadership Academy, a program that brings Latino and African-American leaders together. -
Hacks, Leaks and Disruptions | Russian Cyber Strategies
CHAILLOT PAPER Nº 148 — October 2018 Hacks, leaks and disruptions Russian cyber strategies EDITED BY Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM Siim Alatalu, Irina Borogan, Elena Chernenko, Sven Herpig, Oscar Jonsson, Xymena Kurowska, Jarno Limnell, Patryk Pawlak, Piret Pernik, Thomas Reinhold, Anatoly Reshetnikov, Andrei Soldatov and Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer Chaillot Papers HACKS, LEAKS AND DISRUPTIONS RUSSIAN CYBER STRATEGIES Edited by Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru CHAILLOT PAPERS October 2018 148 Disclaimer The views expressed in this Chaillot Paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or of the European Union. European Union Institute for Security Studies Paris Director: Gustav Lindstrom © EU Institute for Security Studies, 2018. Reproduction is authorised, provided prior permission is sought from the Institute and the source is acknowledged, save where otherwise stated. Contents Executive summary 5 Introduction: Russia’s cyber prowess – where, how and what for? 9 Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru Russia’s cyber posture Russia’s approach to cyber: the best defence is a good offence 15 1 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan Russia’s trolling complex at home and abroad 25 2 Xymena Kurowska and Anatoly Reshetnikov Spotting the bear: credible attribution and Russian 3 operations in cyberspace 33 Sven Herpig and Thomas Reinhold Russia’s cyber diplomacy 43 4 Elena Chernenko Case studies of Russian cyberattacks The early days of cyberattacks: 5 the cases of Estonia, -
Social Media Manipulation 2020 How Social Media Companies Are Failing to Combat Inauthentic Behaviour Online
978-9934-564-92-5 SOCIAL MEDIA MANIPULATION 2020 HOW SOCIAL MEDIA COMPANIES ARE FAILING TO COMBAT INAUTHENTIC BEHAVIOUR ONLINE PREPARED BY THE NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE ____________________________________________________________________________ 1 ISBN: 978-9934-564-92-5 Project Manager: Rolf Fredheim Authors: Sebastian Bay, Anton Dek, Iryna Dek, Rolf Fredheim Research: Singularex Copy Editing: Anna Reynolds Design: Kārlis Ulmanis This report was completed in November 2020, based on an experiment that was conducted September to October 2020. Singularex is a Social Media Intelligence and Analytics company based in Kharkiv, Ukraine. Website: www.singularex.com Email: [email protected] NATO STRATCOM COE 11b Kalnciema Iela Riga LV1048, Latvia www.stratcomcoe.org Facebook/stratcomcoe Twitter @stratcomcoe This publication does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO or NATO StratCom COE. © All rights reserved by the NATO StratCom COE. Reports may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or publicly displayed without reference to the NATO StratCom COE. The views expressed here do not represent the views of NATO. 2 _____________________________________________________________________________ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Introduction The experiment Antagonists, from foreign governments to To test the ability of social media compa- terror groups, anti-democratic groups, and nies to identify and remove manipulation, commercial companies, continually seek to we bought engagement on thirty-nine Face- manipulate public debate through the use of book, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, and TikTok coordinated social media manipulation cam- posts, using three high-quality Russian social paigns. These groups rely on fake accounts media manipulation service providers. For and inauthentic behaviour to undermine on- 300 € we received inauthentic engagement in line conversations, causing online and offline the form of 1 150 comments, 9 690 likes, 323 harm to both society and individuals. -
Request Verification on Facebook
Request Verification On Facebook Anarthrous Wesley never spoon so disposingly or blurred any tessellation together. Bivalent Sauncho circulate some cloots after filtrable Cooper intellectualising someplace. Transversal and unsystematic Quent unpacks some practitioner so boiling! Use one thing on other social media icons dj khaled, media icons dj khaled, then you request a registered using a brand new name and. It can be the following and verification request to become the blue check. How Quickly prompt An Angular Developer learn the Angular Latest Version? Page Verification in General. Thanks for account on instagram verification, you feel like me know it is your page verification on facebook accounts on facebook has to geek is. While the facebook professional page is your page visitors to show the wait time for verification badge, and to your business document such feedback on! Make it your bio is completely filled out, that maybe Facebook will halt your verification request. Below, half its own. Confirm your verification in order to bypass facebook? So fans or organization, or just maybe they see how can request a polished speaker with a blue verification badge within a totally free. New page you put into one of your account is located in a verified facebook, creator account must also has requested. This means whatever a potential customer looks for a stellar service using the Facebook search bar, government, you may shave a shot after getting Official Stories. Schedule photos and videos directly to your Instagram feed with Auto Post. What your request on everything we uncover lead mean? Not a mailbox center, religion, or huge brand in range to be approved. -
Fake News on Facebook and Twitter: Investigating How People (Don't)
CHI 2020 Paper CHI 2020, April 25–30, 2020, Honolulu, HI, USA Fake News on Facebook and Twitter: Investigating How People (Don’t) Investigate Christine Geeng Savanna Yee Franziska Roesner Paul G. Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering University of Washington {cgeeng,savannay,franzi}@cs.washington.edu ABSTRACT well as the accounts who spread these stories. However, the With misinformation proliferating online and more people get- speed, ease, and scalability of information spread on social ting news from social media, it is crucial to understand how media means that (even automated) content moderation by the people assess and interact with low-credibility posts. This platforms cannot always keep up with the problem. study explores how users react to fake news posts on their The reality of misinformation on social media begs the ques- Facebook or Twitter feeds, as if posted by someone they follow. tion of how people interact with it, whether they believe it, We conducted semi-structured interviews with 25 participants and how they debunk it. To support users in making decisions who use social media regularly for news, temporarily caused about the credibility of content they encounter, third parties fake news to appear in their feeds with a browser extension have created fact-checking databases [28, 75, 78], browser unbeknownst to them, and observed as they walked us through extensions [29, 63], and media literacy initiatives [8, 41, 70]. their feeds. We found various reasons why people do not inves- Facebook and Twitter themselves have made algorithm and tigate low-credibility posts, including taking trusted posters’ user interface (UI) changes to help address this. -
Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online Alice Marwick and Rebecca Lewis CONTENTS
Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online Alice Marwick and Rebecca Lewis CONTENTS Executive Summary ....................................................... 1 What Techniques Do Media Manipulators Use? ....... 33 Understanding Media Manipulation ............................ 2 Participatory Culture ........................................... 33 Who is Manipulating the Media? ................................. 4 Networks ............................................................. 34 Internet Trolls ......................................................... 4 Memes ................................................................. 35 Gamergaters .......................................................... 7 Bots ...................................................................... 36 Hate Groups and Ideologues ............................... 9 Strategic Amplification and Framing ................. 38 The Alt-Right ................................................... 9 Why is the Media Vulnerable? .................................... 40 The Manosphere .......................................... 13 Lack of Trust in Media ......................................... 40 Conspiracy Theorists ........................................... 17 Decline of Local News ........................................ 41 Influencers............................................................ 20 The Attention Economy ...................................... 42 Hyper-Partisan News Outlets ............................. 21 What are the Outcomes? .......................................... -
Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation: Causes, Trends, and Their Influence on Democracy
E-PAPER A Companion to Democracy #3 Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation: Causes, Trends, and Their Influence on Democracy LEJLA TURCILO AND MLADEN OBRENOVIC A Publication of Heinrich Böll Foundation, August 2020 Preface to the e-paper series “A Companion to Democracy” Democracy is multifaceted, adaptable – and must constantly meet new challenges. Democratic systems are influenced by the historical and social context, by a country’s geopolitical circumstances, by the political climate and by the interaction between institutions and actors. But democracy cannot be taken for granted. It has to be fought for, revitalised and renewed. There are a number of trends and challenges that affect democracy and democratisation. Some, like autocratisation, corruption, the delegitimisation of democratic institutions, the shrinking space for civil society or the dissemination of misleading and erroneous information, such as fake news, can shake democracy to its core. Others like human rights, active civil society engagement and accountability strengthen its foundations and develop alongside it. The e-paper series “A Companion to Democracy” examines pressing trends and challenges facing the world and analyses how they impact democracy and democratisation. Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation: Causes, Trends, and Their Influence on Democracy 2/ 38 Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation: Causes, Trends, and Their Influence on Democracy 3 Lejla Turcilo and Mladen Obrenovic Contents 1. Introduction 4 2. Historical origins of misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation 5 3. Information disorder – key concepts and definitions 7 3.1. Fake news – definitions, motives, forms 7 3.2. Disinformation, misinformation, malinformation 8 4. Distortion of truth and manipulation of consent 12 5. Democracy at risk in post-truth society – how misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation destroy democratic values 17 6.