DOCSLIB.ORG

Social Media Manipulation 2020 How Social Media Companies Are Failing to Combat Inauthentic Behaviour Online

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Social Media Manipulation 2020 How Social Media Companies Are Failing to Combat Inauthentic Behaviour Online 978-9934-564-92-5 SOCIAL MEDIA MANIPULATION 2020 HOW SOCIAL MEDIA COMPANIES ARE FAILING TO COMBAT INAUTHENTIC BEHAVIOUR ONLINE PREPARED BY THE NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE ____________________________________________________________________________ 1 ISBN: 978-9934-564-92-5 Project Manager: Rolf Fredheim Authors: Sebastian Bay, Anton Dek, Iryna Dek, Rolf Fredheim Research: Singularex Copy Editing: Anna Reynolds Design: Kārlis Ulmanis This report was completed in November 2020, based on an experiment that was conducted September to October 2020. Singularex is a Social Media Intelligence and Analytics company based in Kharkiv, Ukraine. Website: www.singularex.com Email: [email protected] NATO STRATCOM COE 11b Kalnciema Iela Riga LV1048, Latvia www.stratcomcoe.org Facebook/stratcomcoe Twitter @stratcomcoe This publication does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO or NATO StratCom COE. © All rights reserved by the NATO StratCom COE. Reports may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or publicly displayed without reference to the NATO StratCom COE. The views expressed here do not represent the views of NATO. 2 _____________________________________________________________________________ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Introduction The experiment Antagonists, from foreign governments to To test the ability of social media compa- terror groups, anti-democratic groups, and nies to identify and remove manipulation, commercial companies, continually seek to we bought engagement on thirty-nine Face- manipulate public debate through the use of book, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, and TikTok coordinated social media manipulation cam- posts, using three high-quality Russian social paigns. These groups rely on fake accounts media manipulation service providers. For and inauthentic behaviour to undermine on- 300 € we received inauthentic engagement in line conversations, causing online and offline the form of 1 150 comments, 9 690 likes, 323 harm to both society and individuals. 202 views, and 3 726 shares on Facebook, Ins- tagram, YouTube, Twitter, and Tiktok, enabling As a testament to the continued interest of us to identify 8 036 accounts being used for antagonists and opportunists alike to manip- social media manipulation. ulate social media, a string of social media companies, researchers, intelligence services, While measuring the ability of social media and interest groups have detailed attempts to platforms to block fake account creation, manipulate social media conversations during to identify and remove fake activity, and the past year. Therefore, it continues to be es- to respond to user reports of inauthentic sential to evaluate whether the social media accounts, we noted that some of the plat- companies are living up to their commitments forms studied had made important improve- to counter misuse of their platforms. ments. However, other platforms exhibited a continued inability to combat manipula- In an attempt to contribute to the evalua- tion. Of the 337 768 fake engagements pur- tion of social media platforms, we re-ran our chased, more than 98 per cent remained ground-breaking experiment to assess their online and active after four weeks, and even ability to counter the malicious use of their discounting fake views, more than 80 per services. This year we spent significant effort cent of the 14 566 other fake engagements to improve our methodology further, and we delivered remained active after a month. also added a fifth social media platform, Tik- Tok, to our experiment. ____________________________________________________________________________ 3 While these numbers aren’t much to celebrate, ed last year, and we have not seen any mean- we did observe significant pushback, primari- ingful improvements since then. In fact, since ly from Facebook and Twitter. In some cases, our first report, YouTube has been overtaken Facebook managed to remove as much as 90 by both Facebook and Instagram. per cent of the fake views before the manip- ulation service providers restored their work. TikTok, the latest platform added to our exper- This is an important step in the right direction. iment, seems to be nearly defenceless against platform manipulation. None of the manipu- Yet another win this year was a significant im- lation was prevented or removed by the plat- provement by Facebook in blocking the cre- form, making it by a distance the easiest to ation of inauthentic accounts. But despite be- manipulate. In hindsight, we now realise that ing the most effective at this, Facebook was the other platforms could be doing worse. the only platform studied to show an increas- ing half-life for active inauthentic accounts. Only YouTube can counteract fake views in While none of the measures introduced by any significant way. On Facebook, Instagram, any of the platforms are robust enough to Twitter, and TikTok, fake views continue to stop persistent users or organisations from be quickly delivered, and are seemingly never manipulation, both Facebook and Twitter removed. On Instagram, we managed to get have made it significantly more challenging. 250 000 fake views delivered within an hour. Antagonists use fake views to manipulate Twitter stands out in its ability to remove in- platform algorithms to influence what social authentic accounts from the platform; fake media users see. This remains a significant accounts disappear 40 per cent faster than challenge for all platforms. in 2019, indicating that Twitter is three times faster than Facebook at removing accounts Our investigation has also shown that re- engaged in inauthentic activity. porting an account for confirmed social me- dia manipulation does not induce a platform Twitter and Facebook are now relatively good to block that account. Of the 499 accounts at blocking simpler automatic manipulation (100 to Facebook, 100 to Instagram, 100 to services, most notably automated comments, YouTube, 100 to Twitter and 99 to TikTok) we pushing manipulation service providers to rely reported as verified to have engaged in inau- on human labour to a greater extent. While there thentic behaviour, 482 accounts remained ac- isn’t any clear indication that this is driving up tive five days after they were reported. Indeed, prices yet, any human-based manipulation will in all cases where we received feedback on be more expensive than an automatic solution. the accounts we reported, it was to state that the user in question did not violate the plat- YouTube maintains its position as the least form’s terms of service. We conclude that re- effective of the four major platforms we test- porting and moderation mechanisms must be 4 _____________________________________________________________________________ improved so that a larger share of inauthen- haviour, and to developing the frameworks tic accounts reported to the platforms are necessary to impose economic, diplomatic, removed—even if only a single user reports or legal penalties potent enough to deter gov- them. Reported inauthentic accounts must ernments, organisations, and companies from not regularly escape sanction. breaking the norms of online behaviour. Conclusions The most important insight from this exper- iment is that platforms continue to vary in their ability to counter manipulation of their services. Facebook-owned Instagram shows how this variation exists even within compa- Based on our experiment, we nies. Instagram remains much easier to ma- recommend that governments nipulate than Facebook and appears to lack introduce measures to: serious safeguards. Tellingly, the cost of ma- nipulating Instagram is roughly one tenth of the cost of targeting Facebook. 1. Increase transparency and In 2020, Twitter is still the industry leader in develop new safety standards combating manipulation, but Facebook is rap- for social media platforms idly closing the gap with impressive improve- ments. Instagram and YouTube are still strug- 2. Establish independent and gling behind, but while Instagram is slowly well-resourced oversight of moving in the right direction, YouTube seems social media platforms to have given up. TikTok is the defenceless newcomer with much to learn. 3. Increase efforts to deter social media manipulation Despite significant improvements by some, none of the five platforms is doing enough 4. Continue to pressure social to prevent the manipulation of their services. media platforms to do more Manipulation service providers are still win- to counter the abuse of their ning. services This ongoing and evolving threat has un- derscored the need for a whole-of-society approach to defining acceptable online be- ____________________________________________________________________________ 5 The evidence is clear: schemers around the world take every opportunity to manipulate social media platforms for a variety of commercial, criminal, and political reasons. INTRODUCTION One year ago, the NATO StratCom Centre of In September 2020 the European commission Excellence carried out a ground-breaking ex- presented an assessment of the effectiveness periment to assess the ability of social me- of the Code of Practice on Disinformation one dia companies to counter the malicious use year after implementation. The commission of their services. We showed that an entire concludes that the social media platforms industry had developed around the manipu- have put policies in place to counter the ma- lation of social media1, and concluded that nipulation of their services, but lack of trans- social media companies were experiencing
Load more

Recommended publications
  • THE BLACK MARKET for SOCIAL MEDIA MANIPULATION NATO Stratcom COE Singularex
    COUNTERING THE MALICIOUS USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA THE BLACK MARKET FOR SOCIAL MEDIA MANIPULATION NATO StratCom COE Singularex ISBN 978-9934-564-31-4 ISBN: 978-9934-564-31-4 Authors: NATO StratCom COE Research: Singularex Project manager: Sebastian Bay Text editor: Anna Reynolds Design: Kārlis Ulmanis Riga, November 2018 NATO STRATCOM COE 11b Kalciema iela Riga LV1048, Latvia www.stratcomcoe.org Facebook/stratcomcoe Twitter: @stratcomcoe Singularex is a Social Media Intelligence and Analytics company based in Kharkiv, Ukraine. Website: www.singularex.com Email: [email protected] This publication does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO. © All rights reserved by the NATO StratCom COE. Reports may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or publicly displayed without reference to the NATO StratCom COE. The views expressed here are solely those of the author in his private capacity and do not in any way represent the views of NATO StratCom COE. NATO StratCom COE does not take responsibility for the views of authors expressed in their articles. Social media manipulation is undermining democracy, but it is also slowly undermining the social media business model. Introduction Around the turn of the decade, when the popularity of social media sites was really beginning to take off, few people noticed a secretly burgeoning trend — some users were artificially inflating the number of followers they had on social media to reap financial benefits. Even fewer noticed that organisations such as the Internet Research Agency were exploiting these new techniques for political gain. Only when this innovation in information warfare was deployed against Ukraine in 2014 did the world finally become aware of a practice that has now exploded into federal indictments,1 congressional hearings,2 and a European Union Code of Practice on Disinformation.3 At the heart of this practice, weaponised by states and opportunists alike, is a flourishing black market where buyers and sellers meet to trade in clicks, likes, and shares.
    [Show full text]
  • Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J
    STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 11 Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: Kathleen Bailey presents evidence of forgeries to the press corps. Credit: The Washington Times Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference By Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 11 Series Editor: Nicholas Rostow National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. June 2012 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government.
    [Show full text]
  • The Populist Style and Public Diplomacy : Kayfabe As Performative Agonism in Trump’S Twitter Posts
    This is a repository copy of The populist style and public diplomacy : kayfabe as performative agonism in Trump’s twitter posts. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/166120/ Version: Published Version Article: Surowiec, P. and Miles, C. (2021) The populist style and public diplomacy : kayfabe as performative agonism in Trump’s twitter posts. Public Relations Inquiry, 10 (1). pp. 5-30. ISSN 2046-147X https://doi.org/10.1177/2046147X20979294 Reuse This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence. This licence allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even commercially, as long as you credit the authors for the original work. More information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ 979294 PRI0010.1177/2046147X20979294Public Relations InquirySurowiec and Miles research-article2020 Article Public Relations Inquiry 1 –26 The populist style and public © The Author(s) 2020 diplomacy: kayfabe Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions as performative agonism https://doi.org/10.1177/2046147X20979294DOI: 10.1177/2046147X20979294 in Trump’s Twitter posts journals.sagepub.com/home/pri Paweł Surowiec University of Sheffield, UK Christopher Miles Bournemouth University, UK Abstract This article theorises the interplay between public diplomacy and populism. Building on Baudrillard’s simulacra, we advance the hybridity approach to soft power statecraft by analysing a cultural shift in US presidential public diplomacy.
    [Show full text]
  • Barack Obama Deletes References to Clinton
    Barack Obama Deletes References To Clinton Newton humanize his bo-peep exploiter first-rate or surpassing after Mauricio comprises and falls tawdrily, soldierlike and extenuatory. Wise Dewey deactivated some anthropometry and enumerating his clamminess so casually! Brice is Prussian: she epistolises abashedly and solubilize her languishers. Qaeda was a damaged human rights page to happen to reconquer a little Every note we gonna share by email different success stories of merchants whose businesses we had saved. On clinton deleted references, obama told us democratic nomination of. Ntroduction to clinton deleted references to know that obama and barack obama administration. Rainfall carries into clinton deleted references to the. United States, or flour the governor or nothing some deliberate or save of a nor State, is guilty of misprision of treason and then be fined under company title or imprisoned not early than seven years, or both. Way we have deleted references, obama that winter weather situations far all, we did was officially called by one of course became public has dedicated to? Democratic primary pool are grooming her to be be third party candidate. As since been reported on multiple occasions, any released emails deemed classified by the administration have been done so after the fact, would not steer the convict they were transmitted. New Zealand as Muslim. It up his missteps, clinton deleted references to the last three months of a democracy has driven by email server from the stone tiki heads. Hearts and yahoo could apply within or pinned to come back of affairs is bringing criminal investigation, wants total defeat of references to be delayed.
    [Show full text]
  • “Watchdogging” Versus Adversarial Journalism by State-Owned Media: the Nigerian and Cameroonian Experience Endong Floribert Patrick C
    International Journal of English, Literature and Social Science (IJELS) Vol-2, Issue-2, Mar-Apr- 2017 ISSN: 2456-7620 “Watchdogging” Versus Adversarial Journalism by State-Owned Media: The Nigerian and Cameroonian Experience Endong Floribert Patrick C. Department of Theatre and Media Studies, University of Calabar, Calabar, Nigeria Abstract— The private and the opposition-controlled environment where totalitarianism, dictatorship and other media have most often been taxed by Black African forms of unjust socio-political strictures reign. They are governments with being adepts of adversarial journalism. not to be intimidated or cowed by any aggressive force, to This accusation has been predicated on the observation kill stories of political actions which are inimical to public that the private media have, these last decades, tended to interest. They are rather expected to sensitize and educate dogmatically interpret their watchdog role as being an masses on sensitive socio-political issues thereby igniting enemy of government. Their adversarial inclination has the public and making it sufficiently equipped to make made them to “intuitively” suspect government and to solid developmental decisions. They are equally to play view government policies as schemes that are hardly – the role of an activist and strongly campaign for reforms nay never – designed in good faith. Based on empirical that will bring about positive socio-political revolutions in understandings, observations and secondary sources, this the society. Still as watchdogs and sentinels, the media paper argues that the same accusation may be made are expected to practice journalism in a mode that will against most Black African governments which have promote positive values and defend the interest of the overly converted the state-owned media to their public totality of social denominations co-existing in the country relation tools and as well as an arsenal to lambaste their in which they operate.
    [Show full text]
  • Computational Propaganda, Jewish-Americans and the 2018 Midterms
    A report from the Center on Technology and Society OCT 2018 Computational Propaganda, Jewish-Americans and the 2018 Midterms: The Amplification of Anti-Semitic Harassment Online Our Mission: To stop the defamation of the Jewish people and to secure justice and fair treatment to all. ABOUT CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY & SOCIETY AND THE BELFER FELLOWS In a world riddled with cyberhate, online harassment, and misuses of ADL (Anti-Defamation technology, the Center for Technology & Society (CTS) serves as a resource League) fights anti-Semitism to tech platforms and develops proactive solutions. Launched in 2017 and and promotes justice for all. headquartered in Silicon Valley, CTS aims for global impacts and applications in an increasingly borderless space. It is a force for innovation, producing Join ADL to give a voice to cutting-edge research to enable online civility, protect vulnerable populations, those without one and to support digital citizenship, and engage youth. CTS builds on ADL’s century of protect our civil rights. experience building a world without hate and supplies the tools to make that a possibility both online and off-line. Learn more: adl.org The Belfer Fellowship program supports CTS’s efforts to create innovative solutions to counter online hate and ensure justice and fair treatment for all in the digital age through fellowships in research and outreach projects. The program is made possible by a generous contribution from the Robert A. and Renée E. Belfer Family Foundation. The inaugural 2018-2019 Fellows are: • Rev. Dr. Patricia Novick, Ph.D., of the Multicultural Leadership Academy, a program that brings Latino and African-American leaders together.
    [Show full text]
  • Web 2.0 and Public Diplomacy Hannes R. Richter University Of
    Web 2.0 and Public Diplomacy Hannes R. Richter University of Innsbruck The effectiveness of public diplomacy is measured in minds changed, not Dollars spent or slick production packages. - Joseph S. Nye, Jr. This research is supported by a stipend of the Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation, Vienna, Austria 2 Introduction Scholarly interest in the role of the Internet and its applications in political communication has been growing rapidly over the past years and has reached ultimate prominence with the presidential campaign of Barack Obama. The web’s role in international political communication and specifically as a tool of public diplomacy only recently began capturing wider audiences. Particularly with the rise of the social web and prominent applications like Facbook and Twitter, scholars and practitioners of public diplomacy alike became interested in how those tools can be used in the practice of public diplomacy. Recent developments have brought Twitter to the forefront of the debate; events surrounding protests in the aftermath of the Iranian election in what has been called the Twitter Revolution (e.g. Berman 2009) have been more and more communicated through tweets and other new media channels than the regular media. This comes as no surprise as the Iranian regime tried to hinder communications and reporting on the events to the outside world, but (so far) did not manage to get a full handle on these new communication channels. The importance of the new tools has been recognized by government officials on numerous occasions; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asked Twitter to postpone system maintenance so Iranians could continue to feed information through it (Shater 2009).
    [Show full text]
  • Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy the Spectrum of Listening
    This article was downloaded by: 10.3.98.104 On: 27 Sep 2021 Access details: subscription number Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy Nancy Snow, Nicholas J. Cull The Spectrum of Listening Publication details https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780429465543-5 Luigi Di Martino Published online on: 28 Jan 2020 How to cite :- Luigi Di Martino. 28 Jan 2020, The Spectrum of Listening from: Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy Routledge Accessed on: 27 Sep 2021 https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780429465543-5 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT Full terms and conditions of use: https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. 3 The Spectrum of Listening Luigi Di Martino Introduction Gathering information on a nation’s friends and enemies has always been a key characteristic of diplomacy.1 With the emergence of public diplomacy and its emphasis on foreign publics, infor- mation-gathering activities have been reframed as “listening” by public diplomacy scholarship in order to distinguish it from propaganda and earlier forms of information gathering in diplomacy.
    [Show full text]
  • Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online Alice Marwick and Rebecca Lewis CONTENTS
    Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online Alice Marwick and Rebecca Lewis CONTENTS Executive Summary ....................................................... 1 What Techniques Do Media Manipulators Use? ....... 33 Understanding Media Manipulation ............................ 2 Participatory Culture ........................................... 33 Who is Manipulating the Media? ................................. 4 Networks ............................................................. 34 Internet Trolls ......................................................... 4 Memes ................................................................. 35 Gamergaters .......................................................... 7 Bots ...................................................................... 36 Hate Groups and Ideologues ............................... 9 Strategic Amplification and Framing ................. 38 The Alt-Right ................................................... 9 Why is the Media Vulnerable? .................................... 40 The Manosphere .......................................... 13 Lack of Trust in Media ......................................... 40 Conspiracy Theorists ........................................... 17 Decline of Local News ........................................ 41 Influencers............................................................ 20 The Attention Economy ...................................... 42 Hyper-Partisan News Outlets ............................. 21 What are the Outcomes? ..........................................
    [Show full text]
  • Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation: Causes, Trends, and Their Influence on Democracy
    E-PAPER A Companion to Democracy #3 Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation: Causes, Trends, and Their Influence on Democracy LEJLA TURCILO AND MLADEN OBRENOVIC A Publication of Heinrich Böll Foundation, August 2020 Preface to the e-paper series “A Companion to Democracy” Democracy is multifaceted, adaptable – and must constantly meet new challenges. Democratic systems are influenced by the historical and social context, by a country’s geopolitical circumstances, by the political climate and by the interaction between institutions and actors. But democracy cannot be taken for granted. It has to be fought for, revitalised and renewed. There are a number of trends and challenges that affect democracy and democratisation. Some, like autocratisation, corruption, the delegitimisation of democratic institutions, the shrinking space for civil society or the dissemination of misleading and erroneous information, such as fake news, can shake democracy to its core. Others like human rights, active civil society engagement and accountability strengthen its foundations and develop alongside it. The e-paper series “A Companion to Democracy” examines pressing trends and challenges facing the world and analyses how they impact democracy and democratisation. Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation: Causes, Trends, and Their Influence on Democracy 2/ 38 Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation: Causes, Trends, and Their Influence on Democracy 3 Lejla Turcilo and Mladen Obrenovic Contents 1. Introduction 4 2. Historical origins of misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation 5 3. Information disorder – key concepts and definitions 7 3.1. Fake news – definitions, motives, forms 7 3.2. Disinformation, misinformation, malinformation 8 4. Distortion of truth and manipulation of consent 12 5. Democracy at risk in post-truth society – how misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation destroy democratic values 17 6.
    [Show full text]
  • The Need for Focused Research on Coercion, Deception and Manipulation in Persuasive Use of Social Media
    The Need for Focused Research on Coercion, Deception and Manipulation in Persuasive Use of Social Media Casper Justesen Bech[0000-0002-0565-5087] Department of Communication and Psychology, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark [email protected] 1 Introduction Persuasive technologies are increasingly being scrutinized for practices and usage in- volving coercion, deception and manipulation [1]. In particular, among the most dom- inant social media industry platforms, these threats are increasingly becoming a grow- ing matter of concern. The emerging trend of hybrid warfare [2] [3], the Cambridge Analytica scandal [4] and the 2016 United States presidential election [5] has all brought these issues worldwide attention. The challenges and threats involved are com- plex and the involved platforms are closed source and highly secretive concerning their practices. However, the persuasive design community in general has been reluctant to engage in this area of research. It is becoming increasingly clear, that these threats are of great importance to end-users and possibly democracy itself [6]. Clearly, the per- suasive technology research community can offer important socio-technical insights, which can contribute to a better understanding of how users are being deceived. The aim of the poster is to showcase the current state of research into coercive and deceptive practices from a persuasive technology perspective and propose directions for further research. This could lead to a better understanding of how users of social media are being coerced, deceived and manipulated. Contributing to improved information liter- acy, strengthening our defenses against these threats. 2 Method Based on an unreleased systematic literature review, the current state of research into coercion, deception and manipulation within persuasive technology as a field is pre- sented.
    [Show full text]
  • Defining SNS Diplomacy with Four Modes of Online Diplomatic Participation
    International Journal of Communication 14(2020), 3885–3902 1932–8036/20200005 Facebook Not Statebook: Defining SNS Diplomacy with Four Modes of Online Diplomatic Participation Q. ELYSE HUANG University of Texas at Austin, USA Researchers have yet to bring definitional clarity to public diplomacy in the digital context. It is unclear whether digital diplomacy, an all-encompassing concept, always happens in the public domain. For social-networking-service (SNS) assisted public diplomacy engagements, I hereby propose “SNS diplomacy” as a new conceptual container. In SNS diplomacy, public participation is an essential component, which I conceptualize as online diplomatic participation. This article summarizes four modes of participation: expression, interaction, membership, and campaign, a framework built on online political participation research. The concept focuses on the flow of dialogue and action between diplomatic and individual actors, to which social platforms offer indispensable support. Voters may participate in domestic politics offline, but most individual actors can influence diplomatic actors only online. I argue that individuals’ online participation is significant in the diplomatic scene and that scholars should look beyond the number of retweets and comments when evaluating such behaviors and resultant impacts. Keywords: SNS diplomacy, public diplomacy, digital diplomacy, online political participation, social media The debate on the definition of digital diplomacy is ongoing. When David Cameron, the then British Prime Minister, personally responded to questions raised by his followers on Chinese social media, it was apparently a public diplomacy case with a digital approach. But when the French Foreign Ministry annotated the White House’s Twitter video and rebuked the administration’s criticism of the Paris Agreement, was that also digitalized public diplomacy? Or was it simply e-diplomacy among diplomatic actors? When conceptualizing digital diplomacy, scholars have debated whether public participation always plays a part.
    [Show full text]