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VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DIPLOMACY PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT Maryna Kupriienko INFLUENCING PUBLIC OPINION IN SOCIAL MEDIA. TROLLING AND DISINFORMATION STRATEGIES Final Master Thesis Journalism and Media Industries Study Program, state code 621P50002 Degree in Journalism Supervisor prof. Robert van Voren (acad. title, name, surname) Defended prof. Šarūnas Liekis (Dean of the Faculty) Kaunas, 2019 VYTAUTO DIDŽIOJO UNIVERSITETAS POLITIKOS MOKSLŲ IR DIPLOMATIJOS FAKULTETAS VIEŠOSIOS KOMUNIKACIJOS KATEDRA Maryna Kupriienko VIEŠOS NUOMONĖS ĮTAKA SOCIALINĖSE MEDIJOSE. TROLINIMO IR DEZINFORMACIJOS STRATEGIJOS Magistro baigiamasis darbas Žurnalistikos ir medijų industrijų studijų programa, valstybinis kodas 621P50002 Žurnalistikos studijų kryptis Vadovas (-ė) prof. Robert van Voren (Moksl. laipsnis, vardas, pavardė) Apginta prof. Šarūnas Liekis (Fakulteto/studijų instituto dekanas/direktorius) Kaunas, 2019 CONTENTS SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................ 4 SANTRAUKA ............................................................................................................................................ 5 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 6 1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................ 9 1.1. Theoretical aspects of the interaction of state authorities and the media. The phenomenon of social media in modern political science ................................................................................................ 9 1.2. Social media as a tool to influence public opinion ........................................................................ 13 1.3. The artificial activity of Internet users as a way to simulate the involvement of citizens in socio- political campaigns ............................................................................................................................... 15 2. THE ROLE OF THE IRA IN RUSSIA ............................................................................................... 20 2.1. IRA experience in creating artificial activity: structure of the organisation and implementation practice ................................................................................................................................................. 20 2.2. Strategies and technologies of the IRA on social media ............................................................... 22 2.3. The geopolitical impact of the IRA: global trends ........................................................................ 23 3. REFLECTION ON ACCOMPLISHED CREATIVE APPLIED PROJECT .................................... 27 3.1 Methodological framework ............................................................................................................ 27 3.2 Propaganda and political persuasion ............................................................................................. 27 3.3 Russian interference in foreign policies ......................................................................................... 30 3.4 Evaluation of the effectiveness of mechanisms for creating artificial activity during the socio- political campaigns in Ukraine ............................................................................................................ 32 CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 35 REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................ 37 APPENDICES ...................................................................................................................................... 41 SUMMARY Mass media has become the primary tool for the dissemination of messages that affect the public consciousness. What has not fallen into the channels of mass communication, in our time, almost does not affect the development of society. Thus, a modern person cannot escape the influence of the media. In these conditions, it becomes necessary to determine what kind of influence of mass media on public opinion formation. The thesis conceptualised around the activity of paid trolls and influencing public opinion in social media, particularly the case of IRA and focus on the problem of mapping pro-Kremlin trolls through media channels. The relevance of this research is due to the critical situation in Ukraine for the last five years as well as the case with the interference of Russia in US elections in 2016. Many are inclined to believe that all the events that occurred in early 2014 are the result of brazen manipulation of information. This research examines the trend of IRA activities, explores the opinion held by journalists and experts on trolling and disinformation strategies in social media. The purpose of the investigation is to comprehensively study the activities of the IRA and their impact on the formation of public opinion in social networks. As well it tends to determine factors of the effectiveness of the influence of Russian trolls, the synthesis of disinformation strategies and methods of forming their public opinion regarding political forces, identifying the best ways to accelerate the development of democratic, independent journalism in the state and increasing the effectiveness of its operation. Is there any difference in how Russians and Americans look at the same events, and if they do, what explains it? It revealed to analyse an example of the known state-sponsored internet propaganda used by the Russian government, the most stable ideas about the IRA distributed by the American, Russian and European media. Keywords: Russian trolls, disinformation, troll factory, Kremlin bots, information warfare. 4 SANTRAUKA Žiniasklaida tapo pagrindiniu įrankiu žinių plėtimuisi, kurios įtakoja viešą sąmonę. Tai kas nepateko į kanalus masinės komunikacijos, mūsų laikais, beveik neįtakoja visuomenės vystymosi. Nors, modernus žmogus negali išvengti medijų įtakos. Tokiomis sąlygomis, tampa būtina užtikrinti kokio tipo įtaka žiniasklaidoje formuoja viešą nuomonę. Disertacija konceptualizuoja apmokamų trolių veiklą ir įtaką viešos nuomonės socialinėse medijose, ypač IRA atveju, bei sutelkia dėmesį į kartografavimo Kremliaus trolių problemą medijų kanaluose. Aktualija šio mokslinio tyrimo yra dėl kritinės situacijos Ukrainoje per paskutinius penkis metus, taipogi dėl Rusijos trukdžių Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų rinkimuose 2016 metais atvejo. Dauguma yra linkusi tikėti, kad visi įvykiai nutikę ankstyvuosiuose 2014 metais yra akivaizdžios informacijos manipuliacijos rezultatas. Šis mokslinis tyrimas nagrinėja IRA veiklos tendenciją, tyrinėja žurnalistų, bei ekspertų nuomonę apie „trolinimą“ bei dezinformacijos strategijas socialinėse medijose. Tyrimo tikslas išsamiai ištirti IRA veiklą ir jų poveikį formuojant viešą nuomonę socialiniuose tinkluose. Taipogi tyrimas linksta užtikrinti Rusijos „trolių“ įtakos efektyvumo faktorius, dezinformacijos strategijų sintezes ir metodus formuojant viešą nuomonę ryšium su politinėmis jėgomis, nustatyti geriausius būdus paspartinti demokratiškos nepriklausomos žurnalistikos vystymąsi šalyje ir didėjimą įtakos jos operacijose. Ar yra skirtumas tarp Rusų ir Amerikiečių žiūrinčių į vieną įvykį ir jei yra, kas tai apibūdina? Tyrimas atskleidžia tiri žinomus šalies remiamus interneto propagandos pavyzdžius naudotus Rusų vyriausybės, stabiliausias idėjas apie IRA paskirstytas Amerikiečių, Rusų, bei Europos medijų. Keywords: Rusijos troliai, dezinformacija, trolių fabrikas, kremliaus parankiniai, informacinis karas. 5 INTRODUCTION In the modern world, the struggle for markets, energy sources and the expansion of political influence continue. In this arena, the interests of states, corporations, and, ultimately, individuals, clash. In this confrontation, propaganda is an essential tool and often an effective weapon for achieving goals. Therefore, the study of the experience of conducting propaganda during political warfare, that is, at the time when it was most in demand and became, in fact, a matter of vital necessity. The importance of wars without blood, which do not cause enormous destruction, is increasing, but at the same time capable of solving the most critical political and economic problems facing several world powers. Thanks to the achievements of technological progress in the field of mass communications, radio, television, the development of social networks, the primary weapons of modern war are no longer information, but meanings and values. If information warfare as a type of warfare is widely known to people, then cognitive warfare is a new phenomenon for man, which he cannot yet resist. In the meantime, imposed meanings seep deep into society, destroying and subjugating it. Knowingly, depending on uncontrolled circumstances, the human factor significantly impairs the overall impression of the processes of informatisation. Inaccuracy, inappropriate use of data, censorship, and conscious manipulation of facts are all questions of the whole mass, all existing data. After all, for example, how much poison should be poured into a glass to be considered poisonous? Of course, two drops can and do not die, and who knows if there
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