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Russia's Hostile Measures Russia’s Hostile Measures Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against NATO in the Contact, Blunt, and Surge Layers of Competition Appendix B: Detailed Case Studies of Russia’s Use of Hostile Measures STEPHANIE PEZARD, KATYA MIGACHEVA, BRENNA ALLEN Prepared for the United States Army Approved for public release; distribution unlimited ARROYO CENTER For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2539 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2020 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org About This Appendix This appendix accompanies the RAND report Russia’s Hostile Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against NATO in the Contact, Blunt, and Surge Layers of Competition and an additional appendix that presents a historical review of Soviet-era hostile measures. Both are available online at www.rand.org/t/RR2539. Here, we present findings from our analyses of the five gray zone case studies of Russian hostile measures that were briefly summarized in the report. Each case study includes a chronology of Russia’s use of hostile measures, a review of their implementation and reactions at the local and international levels, and an analysis of their success. However, we begin with an overview of our case-study approach, including how we selected the cases and our use of process tracing and the limits of that approach. Case-Study Approach These case studies offer comprehensive narratives that provide insights into how and why Russia used specific hostile measures, as well as how it combines or sequences these measures in situations of crisis to further its strategic and political objectives. To achieve a sufficient level of depth, we relied on a small-n case-study method, whose benefits were summarized by Ste- phen Biddle as follows: Small-n case method permits the depth of analysis needed to characterize variables . that have not heretofore been included in large-n datasets. It also allows detailed process tracing to help distinguish real causation from mere coincidence. This depth of detail, however, makes it impossible to consider more than a handful of cases.1 While the small-n approach does not offer significant opportunity for quantitative analyses, we combined this approach with process tracing to increase the value of our results and to lay the foundation for further empirical research. Case-Study Selection The small-n case-study comparison makes case selection particularly difficult. The limited number of cases gives each considerable weight, and deciding to exclude one case or another could have important consequences for the observations made—as well as the conclusions 1 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 10. iii iv Russia’s Hostile Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against NATO derived from them.2 Cases must also be similar enough to allow for comparison but sufficiently different to provide varied observations and findings that are not self-evident. Ragin, Berg- Schlosser, and de Meur advised that “a maximum heterogeneity for a minimum number of cases should be achieved.”3 This insight guided our selection process. We defined a case study as any instance of Russia using a combination of measures in or against a specific country to achieve geopolitical objectives without crossing the line into major conventional or nuclear confrontation.4 Such measures may have been employed gradually over an extended period, representing a form of “hostile-measures steady state” for the target country, while others may have happened in response to a specific crisis. Recognizing, however, that our definition would encompass an inordinate number of potential cases, we scoped the universe of cases in the following ways: • confined to post-Soviet Russia to help characterize contemporary behavior • eliminated cases of Russian influence when risks of war were exceptionally limited. We also gave preference to cases that could provide some variety with regard to the country on the receiving end of Russian hostile measures: • Geographic proximity to Russia: Building from our historical analysis, we assumed a Russian focus on near states. Therefore, these states would offer the most intense application of hostile measures. • Presence of Russian minorities: We assumed that this factor would affect Russia’s ability to employ some hostile measures (e.g., political influence, cultural or religious influence). • North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership: We assumed that this factor would influence Russia’s cost-benefit calculations when it considered employing hostile measures. NATO membership makes Russia’s use of hostile measures potentially more costly. • Frozen conflict: A frozen conflict is one that has gone on for many years without resolution and without offering prospects for near-term resolution. We assumed that this factor would provide Russia with an automatic means of leverage in the afflicted country. • U.S. strategic interest: We assumed that U.S. strategic interest in a particular country would influence Russia’s cost and risk calculations when employing hostile measures: Perceptions of costs and risks would rise along with perceived U.S. strategic interest in the targeted state. Table B.1 presents an overview of our case selection criteria. These various profiles reflect different opportunities for and constraints on Russian hostile measures and the approaches that the target country and its allies could use to counter them. 2 Charles C. Ragin, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Gisèle de Meur, “Political Methodology: Qualitative Methods,” in Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds., A New Handbook of Political Science, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 752. 3 Ragin, Berg-Schlosser, and de Meur, 1996, p. 752. 4 As defined by Ben Connable, Jason H. Campbell, and Dan Madden, Stretching and Exploiting Thresholds for High-Order War: How Russia, China, and Iran Are Eroding American Influence Using Time-Tested Measures Short of War, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1003-A, 2016, p. 1. Detailed Case Studies of Russia’s Use of Hostile Measures v Table B.1 Selection of Cases Differences Contiguous to Presence of Russia/Former Russian Minority NATO Frozen High U.S. Cases Soviet Republic? Population? Member? Conflict? Strategic Interest? Moldova (1992–2016) Yes Yes No Yes No Georgia (2004–2012) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Estonia (2006–2007) Yes Yes Yes No Yes Ukraine (2014–2016) Yes Yes No No Yes Turkey (2015–2016) No No Yes No Yes Case-Study Structure Researchers Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown state that small-n case studies should follow a “structured-focused comparison” method, which requires “collecting data on the same variables across units.”5 Accordingly, our five case studies share a similar structure to facilitate comparison and to highlight variations in Russia’s relative success—or lack thereof— in using similar hostile measures in different situations. The case studies begin with a background section that outlines the situation that Russia was trying to change and its objectives in doing so. Each section follows a similar pattern: (1) a description of hostile measures and how they were implemented, (2) local and interna- tional responses to the hostile measures, and (3) Russia’s success in using hostile measures identified (based on our understanding of what Russian intentions might have been). Each case study concludes with a timeline summarizing the hostile measures employed and the key events that triggered their use, as well as an assessment of Russia’s overall success and the suc- cess of local and international countermeasures. Process Tracing: Its Use and Limitations Ideally, the cases would have enough similarities to allow replicable findings on Russian hos- tile-measures tactics. To that end, we traced the emergence of Russian hostile measures in the context of the cases, tracked the duration of their use (from one instance to a period of months or years), and mapped these events in the individual case timelines. This mapping is one component of the method known as process tracing, which political scientist David Collier described as a “systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator.”6 The limitations of a small-n study prevented us from deriving empirical findings from
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