We will ensure that NATO is able to effectively address the specific challenges posed by hybrid warfare threats, where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design." — from the NATO Wales Summit Declaration(1)

COVER STORY CONTINUED EVOLUTION OF HYBRID THREATS The Russian Hybrid Threat Construct and the Need for Innovation By Major John R. Davis Jr. United States Army G5 Maneuver Planner 1st Cavalry Division Fort Hood, Texas

Editor's Note: The views expressed in HE NORTH Atlantic Treaty Or- sia, employing an unprecedented degree of hybrid this article are those of the author and do ganization (NATO) currently faces ways and means against the weak or weaker state not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of the a new, but familiar foe. Waging hy- (Ukraine) to coerce and compel it to submit to Army, the U.S. Department of Defense, brid warfare to defeat hybrid threats Russia's will. Traditional hybrid threats focus on NATO, or any of their agencies. is not a new phenomenon. History the blending of various capabilities at the tactical isT abound with examples in which the weak and operational levels of warfare. Russia, however, employed different, hybrid ways and means to is now employing not only the military Instrument achieve their desired end state and defeat the of Power (IOP) of the modern state, but also the strong.(2) However, deterring and defeating fu- economic, informational, and diplomatic IOPs in ture hybrid threats still poses a significant and its hybrid threat construct to exacerbate an already Left, middle: Lviv, Ukraine, 30 December daunting challenge for NATO. In the future, hy- complex problem for NATO.(3) 2014. Armed forces of Ukraine. Military brid threats will continue to evolve as more lethal When faced with quandary of deterring, and armoured vehicles at the International Center for Peacemaking and Safety before and precise weaponry becomes readily available and if required, defeating this Russian version transferring into zone of military conflict. to information age guerillas, funded with capi- of a hybrid threat, NATO will have to adjust its Photograph by Drop of Light/Shutterstock. tal from global criminal activities. Additionally, thinking and its approach to achieve success. com. Bottom: Russian soldiers, 4 March the current hybrid threat construct that the Rus- As future conflict continues to transition into 2014, in Perevalne, Crimea, Ukraine. On 28 February 2014, Russian military forces sians are employing on the plains of Eastern Eu- thinking men's wars, in a race to out-think and invaded Crimea peninsula. Photograph by rope represents a particularly ominous example of out-learn an adaptive adversary, NATO will have photo.ua/Shutterstock.com. things to come. In this case, it is the strong, Rus- to adapt as well. In this evolved conflict, finding ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 28/2015 19 "In this evolved conflict, finding novel ways to link military capabilities amongst all NATO members together with ongoing diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts, holds the key to success." Photograph by NATO.

novel ways to link military capabilities amongst vironments. Before further elaborating on these conventional and non-conventional means all NATO members together with ongoing dip- potential ways to deter, and if required, defeat adaptively in pursuit of their objectives."(5) lomatic, economic, and informational efforts, the Russian hybrid threat, it is important to ex- Both of these definitions align with Frank holds the key to success. However, how can plore contemporary research on the concept of Hoffman's vision of hybrid warfare, which is NATO enable operational level change through- hybrid threats. Knowledge of the evolution of also the most predominantly accepted military out the inter-governmental military Alliance in the hybrid threats will facilitate a better under- and acade mic conceptualization of the subject. order to confront the complexity of an evolving standing of the Russian hybrid threat construct Hoffman, a retired U.S. Marine officer and a- Se Russian hybrid threat? Developing a culture of and their actions in Ukraine. nior Research Fellow with the Institute for Na- innovation throughout the force will help set tional Strategic Studies at the National Defense and maintain the conditions required for suc- University, theorized, "hybrid wars incorporate As future conflict continues to cessful transformation to occur in NATO. a range of different modes of warfare, includ- Throughout history, militaries that suc- transition into thinking men's ing conventional capabilities, irregular tactics cessfully developed new approaches to prob- wars, in a race to out-think and and formations, terrorist acts including indis- lems when preparing for the next war fostered a out-learn an adaptive adversary, criminate violence and coercion, and criminal culture of innovation that permeated through- NATO will have to adapt as well. disorder."(6) Although all three of these defini- out the whole force. The institutionalization of tions are thorough explanations of a hybrid learning organizations full of warrior-scholars threat and hybrid warfare, is there more to the could be one way to cultivate this throughout UNITED STATES (U.S.) Army Doctrine Pub- Russian construct than just the simultaneous NATO. Another way could be the development lication (ADP) 3-0 currently defines a hybrid employment of forces and forms of warfare at of a hybrid mindset, or a hybrid way of think- threat as, "the diverse and dynamic combina- the tactical level? A more expansive review of ing. A hybrid mindset focuses on the interac- tion of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist contemporary literature with a focus towards tion of four mental characteristics — under- forces, criminal elements, or a combination of the Russian model indicates, yes. standing strategic context, a holistic approach to these forces and elements all unified to achieve operations, a focus on potential opportunities, mutually benefitting effects."(4) Furthermore, ONE AREA of study focuses on the impact of and embracing the natural complexity of the the NATO Capstone Concept characterizes the concept of hybrid at the strategic level. The operational environment — to develop innova- hybrid threats as "those posed by adversar- research of Nathan Freier, a defense strategist tive approaches to create desired operational en- ies, with the ability to simultaneously employ and a former Director of National Security Af- ►►►

20 The Three Swords Magazine 28/2015 HYBRID THREATS

THE CONCEPT OF UNRESTRICTED WARFARE IS IN ESSENCE A WAR WITHOUT LIMITS OR BEYOND THE TRADITIONALLY ACCEPTED PHYSICAL Photograph by Flight Sergeant C. Artigues (HQ MARCOM). LIMITS OF A WAR. fairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, outlined Another area of contemporary research thinking. To understand unrestricted warfare, challenges and threats to the United States in focuses on the war or battle that transcends Liang and Xiangsui acknowledged, would re- the post September 11, 2001 security environ- beyond the physical realm and into the cogni- quire a shift in the minds and thoughts of the ment. While working as a strategist on the tive realm, which seems most applicable to the Western way of war.(10) Victory would not be 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS), Freier current Russian hybrid threat construct. Qiao found on the physical battlefield, a notion that developed the concept of a "hybrid norm — Liang, a Major General in the People's Libera- is common to the Western way of war. Instead, the routine state of nature where key aspects tion Army (PLA) of China, and Wang Xiang- "the struggle for victory will take place on a of multiple strategic challenges" combined into sui, a retired PLA officer, devised the concept battlefield beyond the battlefield."(11) With a one.(7) This was a marked change from previ- of "unrestricted warfare" in 1999 as a means by broader and better understanding of hybrid ous thoughts of strategic challenges, which which weaker countries could overcome their threats, a more thorough analysis of the Rus- traditionally focused on separate irregular, military inferiorities in relation to an advanced sian hybrid threat construct can now occur. catastrophic, traditional, and disruptive events nation in a high-tech war. The concept of un- instead of the combined interaction of these restricted warfare is in essence a war without At the tactical level: challenges. Freier continued by arguing that limits or beyond the traditionally accepted Russia is employing irregular forces and tac- hybrid challenges would evolve in complexity physical limits of a war. tics with advanced conventional weapons and from the melding of irregular challenges (un- Liang and Xiangsui postulated, "The first elite regular military special operations forces conventional warfare by state and non-state rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no (Spetsnaz) synergistically for a common goal.(12) actors) and catastrophic challenges (weapons rules, with nothing forbidden."(9) Additionally, Throughout contested areas in Ukraine, there of mass destruction), with existing traditional Liang and Xiangsui argued that future con- are consistent reports of "little green men" along challenges (conventional warfare).(8) Freier's flict would involve connection points between with Russian volunteers moving around the concept of the simultaneous merging of irregu- technology, politics, economics, religion, cul- battlefield without Russian military insignia lar and traditional challenges when combined ture, diplomacy, and the military to create end- or affiliation.(13) These fighters are linking up with an updated catastrophic challenge — for less possibilities and complexity. The crux of with, and then augmenting, local pro-Russian example, the potential threat that cyber-attacks this argument, and its implications for West- irregular units and criminal gangs to boost pose to economic and energy infrastructure — ern militaries, is that it expands warfare be- their numbers and capabilities. With increased has distinct implications for the Russian hybrid yond the cognitive boundaries and dimensions capability, Spetsnaz can organize these soldiers threat construct. of warfare common to most Western military to execute guerilla type operations to wage an ►►►

The Three Swords Magazine 28/2015 21 AS NATO PREPARES TO DEVELOP WAYS TO DETER AND POTENTIALLY DEFEAT THE RUSSIAN HYBRID THREAT, Joint press point with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Philip Breedlove, 11 March 2015. Photograph by NATO. INNOVATION WILL HOLD THE KEY TO SUCCESS. unconventional warfare campaign in order to combined, these actions create a continuous strategic narrative that garners support among erode Ukraine's power, influence, and will. deception operation preventing exact knowl- international organizations suing for peace in As the conflict protracts and extends in edge of Russian intent and the full disposition the ongoing crisis. For internal audiences and time and space, this unconventional warfare of their forces in Ukraine. ethnic Russians in Ukraine, Russia promotes campaign sets the conditions for ethnic Rus- As a supporting effort for its ongoing another strategic narrative of nationalism and sians to overthrow government control of con- physical deception operations with the move- the oppression of its people in Ukraine to rally tested areas within Ukraine.(14) Additionally, ment of heavy conventional forces, Russia is and maintain domestic fervor at home.(20) Russia is employing cyber-attacks against criti- also waging psychological and information Diplomatically, Russia pursues and cal Ukrainian communications infrastructure operations to help achieve its operational level agrees to ceasefires and pauses in hostilities in order to disrupt the flow of their information deception. These operations rally support for by the pro-Russian rebel forces in Ukraine, and allow the Russians to gain intelligence on the rebel cause and incite violence to compel but not completely for humanitarian reasons. Ukrainian intent and actions.(15) When com- the public to act when required. Conversely, The Russians utilize these ceasefires more as bined, these actions directly align with ADP they can intimidate and coerce the public to tactical pauses in ongoing operations and op- 3-0, the NATO Capstone Concept, and Frank inaction, as well.(18) When analyzed collective- portunities to consolidate, reorganize, and re- Hoffman's definition of a hybrid threat. ly, these deception, psychological, and infor- position forces to achieve a relative position of mation operations create a Russian curtain of advantage for future missions. This diplomatic At the operational level: ambiguity that obscures reality and hinders a tactic allows Russia to reinitiate hostilities Russia is linking tactical level actions with in- calculated NATO response due to the "fog and again at a time and place of their choosing. formation operations in order to achieve an friction" of war.(19) Russia wields the economic IOP to operational level deception. Russia is overtly These operational level actions, when threaten and coerce other nations to action positioning and repositioning conventional coupled with tactical level actions, start to or inaction. Economic sanctions, the destabi- military formations and capabilities along align with Liang and Xiangsui's concept of lization of energy prices and physical access Ukraine's border. Once in position, these ar- transitioning the battle beyond the battlefield. to energy resources, and the actions of trans- mored and mechanized forces are executing national criminal organizations can all deter a feints, demonstrations, and training exercises At the strategic level: country from action. However, positive incen- that divert attention from other operations.(16) Russia is synchronizing all of the IOPs towards tives for inaction against Russia or support for Simultaneously, Russia is covertly moving more a common goal. Russia exploits the information the Russian cause can also have a profound ef- weapons and paramilitary proxies of "little IOP to construct competing strategic narra- fect on the decision-making calculus of another green men" into Ukraine under the cover of hu- tives that affect multiple audiences. For external nation.(21) In essence, Russia's actions have manitarian aid to the ongoing crisis.(17) When and international audiences, Russia employs a become the quintessential economic carrot ►►►

22 The Three Swords Magazine 28/2015 JWC Situation Centre (SITCEN) during exercise TRIDENT JAGUAR 15/NRDC-ITA: JWC is NATO's main provider of Command Post/Computer Assisted Exercises (CPX/CAX) at the operational level, providing training across the full spectrum, including the hybrid warfare challenges. Photograph by Marina Dore (NRDC-ITA PAO).

and stick method of international discipline. adjusting hybrid threat whole of government campaigns, then this construct necessitates a Furthermore, the sinister capabilities of cyber approach is the most thought-provoking im- change in NATO's approach to deter, and if warfare possesses the potential to achieve cata- plication of the current Russian hybrid threat required, defeat it. In this case, innovation will strophic effects if employed to disable financial construct because it has truly taken the battle hold the key to success. and/or energy infrastructure in Ukraine or beyond the battlefield. Western Europe. When coupled with their on- THE QUESTION of how militaries innovate going operations by the military IOP, this hy- U.S. AIR FORCE General Philip M. Breedlove, is a critical area of study for military profes- brid and coldly calculated strategy aligns with NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe sionals and academics. Two prominent mili- Freier's concept of hybrid norms and Liang and Commander of U.S. European Command, tary historians and professors, Williamson and Xiangsui's concept of unrestricted warfare. echoed this point of view during a recent Brus- Murray and Allan R. Millett, tackled this ques- While Russia's use of hybrid ways sels Forum in March of this year. General tion in their edited collection of essays on mili- and means to achieve its desired end state in Breedlove highlighted that Russia is using di- tary innovation entitled, Military Innovation Ukraine is not completely new, after synthesis plomacy and information warfare along with in the Interwar Period. At the end of this study, of the Russian hybrid threat construct, some military and economic means to wage this Murray concluded that due to the complexity of interesting overall implications exist. The Rus- campaign.(24) He went on to state, "Informa- multiple variables involved with the task of in- sians have been able to combine various mili- tionally, this is probably the most impressive novating, no exact formula for success exists.(27) tary forms of warfare with economic, informa- new part of this hybrid war, all of the different However, he identified a few key characteris- tion, and diplomatic IOPs into essentially a tools to create a false narrative."(25) tics of military organizations that successfully hybrid threat whole of government approach. Jens Stoltenberg, the former Prime innovated during the interwar period between In addition, Russia is employing this hybrid Minister of Norway and current NATO Sec- World War I (WWI) and WWII. threat whole of government approach during retary General, added to General Breedlove's Murray argued that one central, key Phase 0 (Shape) of Joint and Multinational thoughts when he discussed the deception component for success was a military culture Operations.(22) This plan has allowed Russia operations, and covert and overt actions as- that embraced innovation.(28) He stated, "One to keep the conflict "below the threshold nor- sociated with hybrid warfare.(26) Synthesis of the important components in successful in- mally deemed necessary for invoking NATO's of General Breedlove and Secretary General novation in the interwar period had to do with Article 5 Collective Defence guarantee."(23) Stoltenberg's comments elucidates the prob- the ability of officers to use their imaginations Russia's hybrid presentation and employment lem of uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding in examining potential innovations."(29) of military forces with the other IOPs has also Russia's true intent and actions. If this Rus- An emphasis on learning organizations created uncertainty on how to deter or coun- sian hybrid threat construct continues to be and the warrior-scholar concept within NATO ter it. This ambiguity from Russia's continually their chosen operational approach for future will help cultivate innovation.(30) Additionally, ►►►

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IF AMBIGUITY IS THE REAL CRUX OF THE CURRENT RUSSIAN HYBRID THREAT, THEN A HYBRID MINDSET MAY HELP TO DISPLACE THIS UNCERTAINTY BACK TRIDENT JAGUAR 15 at JWC: The complex training scenario challenges the ONTO THE RUSSIANS staff with restoring security in a failing state set in an unstable region, pressured by CONCERNING NATO's political, military, and civil turmoil. Photograph shows Commander ARRC, Lieutenant General Tim Evans, CBE DSO. Photograph by Sergeant Mike O’Neill, ARRC PAO. NEXT ACTIONS.

leveraging warfighting exercise scenarios and cognitive tool to enable operational level inno- If ambiguity is the real crux of the current Rus- technology available at the NATO Joint Warfare vation in the employment of military force and sian hybrid threat, then a hybrid mindset may Centre (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway, will serve integration of other IOPs within a region from help to displace this uncertainty back onto the as an enabler in the struggle to innovate. These a holistic approach. Russians concerning NATO's next actions. warfighter scenarios will allow officers in NATO This mindset can help to find new ways to col- to test and refine their ideas on how to deter the A HYBRID MINDSET consists of laborate and conduct multinational operations Russian hybrid threat. They will also help of- the conceptual interaction of understand- within NATO. In addition, a hybrid way of ficers eventually develop unique solutions for ing strategic context, developing holistic ap- thinking can help foster updated approaches future use. The idea of using war games as tools proaches to operations focused on potential to intelligence gathering and sharing among to enable operational level transformation was opportunities, and embracing the natural com- NATO nations to draw out the truth from the a point Murray highlighted that the German plexity of an operational environment. This Russian false narrative. It can help to find in- Army and U.S. Navy successfully employed conceptual interaction will help NATO mili- novative ways to link and synchronize military during the interwar period, as well. (31) tary and civilian planners to develop cutting actions with ongoing diplomatic, economic, edge operational approaches to the complexity and informational efforts. Overall, this mind- ANOTHER IDEA that General Breedlove of the Russian hybrid threat by thinking dif- set possesses the potential to help NATO plan- proposed during the March 2015 Brussels ferently about the actual problem set. A hybrid ners think like complex-adaptive systems in Forum was the need to open the aperture mindset understands and embraces the sys- order to out-think and out-learn the continu- when exploring responses to Russia's actions temic nature of the operational environment ally adapting Russian hybrid threat construct. in Ukraine. General Breedlove suggested, "I and operations that occur within it. It pro- think that you have to attack an all of a gov- motes the rearrangement of existing rules and IN 2014, Russia took NATO and the world ernment approach with an all of government the reconfiguration of time and space through by surprise with its employment of a hybrid approach."(32) He continued by stating, "We, I innovation in order to exploit the natural po- threat construct in Ukraine. Although the use think, in the West, should consider all of our tential of an operational environment. Instead of hybrid ways and means is not new to the tools in reply."(33) In essence, to deter and po- of just recognizing the underlying asymmetry landscape of history as a means for the weak tentially defeat a hybrid threat, NATO military between two military forces, this conceptual to combat the strong, the use of it by the strong and civilian planners may need to think like tool helps exploit it in a manner that supports in such an unparalleled manner is something one. A hybrid mindset could be one possible the user's objectives.(34) of concern for the future. Upon further analy- ►►►

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END NOTES:

(1) Heads of State and Government participating partment of Defense, DoD News, March 23, in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 2015 http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle. Wales, "Wales Summit Declaration," North Atlan- aspx?id=128430 (accessed April 15, 2015). tic Treaty Organization (NATO), September 05, (25) Ibid. 2014. http://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_ (26) Kevin McCaney "Russia's Hybrid Warfare Tac- texts_112964.htm (accessed April 15, 2015). tics Gain Upper Hand in Ukraine," Defense Sys- (2) John Davis, The Hybrid Mindset and Operation- tems: Knowledge Technologies and Net-Enabled alizing Innovation: Toward a Theory of Hybrid, Warfare, March 24, 2015 http://defensesystems. Monograph (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army School com/articles/2015/03/24/russia-hybrid-warfare- of Advanced Military Studies, 2014). See this mon- ukraine-nato.aspx (accessed April 15, 2015). ograph for an in depth analysis of the evolution of (27) Williamson Murray, "Innovation: Past and Fu- the concept of hybrid warfare and hybrid threats ture," in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, in theoretical and historical terms. ed. Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, 300-328 (3) Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 1, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States 302-303. (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2013), (28) Ibid., 312-313. 39-42. See this JP for additional details on the In- (29) Ibid., 317. struments of National Power consisting of diplomatic, (30) John Davis, "Defeating Future Hybrid Threats: informational, military, and economic instruments. The Greatest Challenge to the Army Profession of (4) Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army 2020 and Beyond," Military Review, Vol. XCIII, no. Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Op- 5 (September-October 2013): 27-29. The warri- erations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing or-scholar concept emphasizes investment by a Office, 2011), 12. military in the scholarly aspects of the soldier. The (5) Cited in Michael Aaronson et al., "NATO Countering central premise of this concept is to take soldiers the Hybrid Threat," Prism 2, no. 4 (2011): 115. with proven operational knowledge (warriors) and (6) Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The broaden their mental capacities through advanced Rise of Hybrid Wars, Monograph (Arlington: Poto- study on military, social, international relations, mac Institute for Policy Students, 2007), 14. and political science type disciplines (scholars). (7) Nathan Freier, Strategic Competition and Resist- As warrior-scholars, these individuals can serve as ance in the 21st Century: Irregular, Catastrophic, the core of learning organizations helping to solve Traditional, and Hybrid Challenges in Context, tough problems and to cultivate this concept in Monograph (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College Stra- junior leaders. tegic Studies Institute, 2007), iii. (31) Murray, 317. (8) Ibid., 6, 20, 27, 33, 36. (32) Cited in Garamone. (9) Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted War- (33) Ibid. fare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing, (34) John Davis, The Hybrid Mindset and Operationaliz- sis, the Russian hybrid threat construct is truly 1999), 2. ing Innovation: Toward a Theory of Hybrid. See this (10) Ibid., 162. monograph for the origin of the concept of a hybrid taking the concept beyond the normally ac- (11) Ibid., 153. mindset, or hybrid way of thinking, and additional cepted visualizations of the merging of irregu- (12) Richard Weitz, "Countering Russia's Hybrid evidence of its existence throughout history. Threats," Diplomaatia, 2014: 3-4. lar, regular, and criminal elements for a single (13) Ibid., 3-4. purpose and into a more protracted concep- (14) Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Mili- tual battle of wills. In this realm beyond the tary and Associated Terms (Washington D.C.: De- battlefield, no rules exist as the Russians em- partment of Defense, 2015), 261. JP 1-02 defines unconventional warfare as "activities conducted ploy a hybrid whole of government approach to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to achieve their desired end state. to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a de- AS NATO prepares to develop ways to de- nied area." (15) Weitz, 5. ter and potentially defeat this Russian hybrid (16) Ibid., 4. threat, innovation will hold the key to success. (17) Ibid., 4. (18) Ibid., 3. Learning organizations full of warrior-schol- (19) Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Mi- ars could be one way to cultivate innovation chael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Prince- ton University Press, 1989), 89, 119-120. throughout NATO. Another way could be the (20) Weitz, 3. incorporation of a hybrid mindset into the (21) Ibid., 3. MAJOR JOHN R. DAVIS JR., U.S. Army, is cur- (22) Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) NATO military and civilian planner's reper- 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington D.C.: rently a G5 Maneuver Planner in the 1st Cav- toire. This way of thinking possesses the po- Department of Defense, 2011), 117, 119-120. alry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. He holds a B.S. tential to help them find inventive ways to link Phase 0 of a Joint and Multinational Operation from Hampton University, an M.S. from Mis- usually consists of "normal and routine military ac- souri University of Science and Technology, an military capabilities amongst all NATO mem- tivities in which various interagency activities are M.M.A.S. from Air Command and Staff College, performed to dissuade or deter potential adver- bers with ongoing diplomatic, economic, and saries and to assure or solidify relationships with Air University, and an M.M.A.S. from the School informational efforts. Innovation and evolu- friends and allies." This phase does not include of Advanced Military Studies, Army CGSC. His tion always come with some associated risk, more openly hostile actions that usually fall in previous assignments include four combat de- other phases or higher along the Range of Military ployments, three to Iraq as a platoon leader, but in this case, the opportunity may be well Operations, as we are seeing in the Ukraine. company executive officer, and Multi-Role Bridge (23) Weitz, 2. worth the risk to deter the future aspirations of (24) Jim Garamone, "NATO Commander Breedlove Company Commander, and one to Afghanistan the Russian hybrid threat.  Discusses Implications of Hybrid War," U.S. De- as a CJ5 Maneuver Planner.

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