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CONTINUED EVOLUTION of HYBRID THREATS the Russian Hybrid Threat Construct and the Need for Innovation by Major John R

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CONTINUED EVOLUTION of HYBRID THREATS the Russian Hybrid Threat Construct and the Need for Innovation by Major John R We will ensure that NATO is able to effectively address the specific challenges posed by hybrid warfare threats, where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design." — from the NATO Wales Summit Declaration(1) COVER STORY CONTINUED EVOLUTION OF HYBRID THREATS The Russian Hybrid Threat Construct and the Need for Innovation By Major John R. Davis Jr. United States Army G5 Maneuver Planner 1st Cavalry Division Fort Hood, Texas Editor's Note: The views expressed in HE NORTH Atlantic Treaty Or- sia, employing an unprecedented degree of hybrid this article are those of the author and do ganization (NATO) currently faces ways and means against the weak or weaker state not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of the a new, but familiar foe. Waging hy- (Ukraine) to coerce and compel it to submit to Army, the U.S. Department of Defense, brid warfare to defeat hybrid threats Russia's will. Traditional hybrid threats focus on NATO, or any of their agencies. is not a new phenomenon. History the blending of various capabilities at the tactical isT abound with examples in which the weak and operational levels of warfare. Russia, however, employed different, hybrid ways and means to is now employing not only the military Instrument achieve their desired end state and defeat the of Power (IOP) of the modern state, but also the strong.(2) However, deterring and defeating fu- economic, informational, and diplomatic IOPs in ture hybrid threats still poses a significant and its hybrid threat construct to exacerbate an already Left, middle: Lviv, Ukraine, 30 December daunting challenge for NATO. In the future, hy- complex problem for NATO.(3) 2014. Armed forces of Ukraine. Military brid threats will continue to evolve as more lethal When faced with quandary of deterring, and armoured vehicles at the International Center for Peacemaking and Safety before and precise weaponry becomes readily available and if required, defeating this Russian version transferring into zone of military conflict. to information age guerillas, funded with capi- of a hybrid threat, NATO will have to adjust its Photograph by Drop of Light/Shutterstock. tal from global criminal activities. Additionally, thinking and its approach to achieve success. com. Bottom: Russian soldiers, 4 March the current hybrid threat construct that the Rus- As future conflict continues to transition into 2014, in Perevalne, Crimea, Ukraine. On 28 February 2014, Russian military forces sians are employing on the plains of Eastern Eu- thinking men's wars, in a race to out-think and invaded Crimea peninsula. Photograph by rope represents a particularly ominous example of out-learn an adaptive adversary, NATO will have photo.ua/Shutterstock.com. things to come. In this case, it is the strong, Rus- to adapt as well. In this evolved conflict, finding ►►► The Three Swords Magazine 28/2015 19 "In this evolved conflict, finding novel ways to link military capabilities amongst all NATO members together with ongoing diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts, holds the key to success." Photograph by NATO. novel ways to link military capabilities amongst vironments. Before further elaborating on these conventional and non-conventional means all NATO members together with ongoing dip- potential ways to deter, and if required, defeat adaptively in pursuit of their objectives."(5) lomatic, economic, and informational efforts, the Russian hybrid threat, it is important to ex- Both of these definitions align with Frank holds the key to success. However, how can plore contemporary research on the concept of Hoffman's vision of hybrid warfare, which is NATO enable operational level change through- hybrid threats. Knowledge of the evolution of also the most predominantly accepted military out the inter-governmental military Alliance in the hybrid threats will facilitate a better under- and acade mic conceptualization of the subject. order to confront the complexity of an evolving standing of the Russian hybrid threat construct Hoffman, a retired U.S. Marine officer and a- Se Russian hybrid threat? Developing a culture of and their actions in Ukraine. nior Research Fellow with the Institute for Na- innovation throughout the force will help set tional Strategic Studies at the National Defense and maintain the conditions required for suc- University, theorized, "hybrid wars incorporate As future conflict continues to cessful transformation to occur in NATO. a range of different modes of warfare, includ- Throughout history, militaries that suc- transition into thinking men's ing conventional capabilities, irregular tactics cessfully developed new approaches to prob- wars, in a race to out-think and and formations, terrorist acts including indis- lems when preparing for the next war fostered a out-learn an adaptive adversary, criminate violence and coercion, and criminal culture of innovation that permeated through- NATO will have to adapt as well. disorder."(6) Although all three of these defini- out the whole force. The institutionalization of tions are thorough explanations of a hybrid learning organizations full of warrior-scholars threat and hybrid warfare, is there more to the could be one way to cultivate this throughout UNITED STATES (U.S.) Army Doctrine Pub- Russian construct than just the simultaneous NATO. Another way could be the development lication (ADP) 3-0 currently defines a hybrid employment of forces and forms of warfare at of a hybrid mindset, or a hybrid way of think- threat as, "the diverse and dynamic combina- the tactical level? A more expansive review of ing. A hybrid mindset focuses on the interac- tion of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist contemporary literature with a focus towards tion of four mental characteristics — under- forces, criminal elements, or a combination of the Russian model indicates, yes. standing strategic context, a holistic approach to these forces and elements all unified to achieve operations, a focus on potential opportunities, mutually benefitting effects."(4) Furthermore, ONE AREA of study focuses on the impact of and embracing the natural complexity of the the NATO Capstone Concept characterizes the concept of hybrid at the strategic level. The operational environment — to develop innova- hybrid threats as "those posed by adversar- research of Nathan Freier, a defense strategist tive approaches to create desired operational en- ies, with the ability to simultaneously employ and a former Director of National Security Af- ►►► 20 The Three Swords Magazine 28/2015 HYBRID THREATS THE CONCEPT OF UNRESTRICTED WARFARE IS IN ESSENCE A WAR WITHOUT LIMITS OR BEYOND THE TRADITIONALLY ACCEPTED PHYSICAL Photograph by Flight Sergeant C. Artigues (HQ MARCOM). LIMITS OF A WAR. fairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, outlined Another area of contemporary research thinking. To understand unrestricted warfare, challenges and threats to the United States in focuses on the war or battle that transcends Liang and Xiangsui acknowledged, would re- the post September 11, 2001 security environ- beyond the physical realm and into the cogni- quire a shift in the minds and thoughts of the ment. While working as a strategist on the tive realm, which seems most applicable to the Western way of war.(10) Victory would not be 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS), Freier current Russian hybrid threat construct. Qiao found on the physical battlefield, a notion that developed the concept of a "hybrid norm — Liang, a Major General in the People's Libera- is common to the Western way of war. Instead, the routine state of nature where key aspects tion Army (PLA) of China, and Wang Xiang- "the struggle for victory will take place on a of multiple strategic challenges" combined into sui, a retired PLA officer, devised the concept battlefield beyond the battlefield."(11) With a one.(7) This was a marked change from previ- of "unrestricted warfare" in 1999 as a means by broader and better understanding of hybrid ous thoughts of strategic challenges, which which weaker countries could overcome their threats, a more thorough analysis of the Rus- traditionally focused on separate irregular, military inferiorities in relation to an advanced sian hybrid threat construct can now occur. catastrophic, traditional, and disruptive events nation in a high-tech war. The concept of un- instead of the combined interaction of these restricted warfare is in essence a war without At the tactical level: challenges. Freier continued by arguing that limits or beyond the traditionally accepted Russia is employing irregular forces and tac- hybrid challenges would evolve in complexity physical limits of a war. tics with advanced conventional weapons and from the melding of irregular challenges (un- Liang and Xiangsui postulated, "The first elite regular military special operations forces conventional warfare by state and non-state rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no (Spetsnaz) synergistically for a common goal.(12) actors) and catastrophic challenges (weapons rules, with nothing forbidden."(9) Additionally, Throughout contested areas in Ukraine, there of mass destruction), with existing traditional Liang and Xiangsui argued that future con- are consistent reports of "little green men" along challenges (conventional warfare).(8) Freier's flict would involve connection points between with Russian volunteers moving around the concept of the simultaneous merging of irregu- technology, politics,
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