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BOOK REVIEWS to its missions, and ground forces have been sive” China as an emerging threat with a mod- overtaxed. We have borrowed from long-term ernizing force and an expanding navy. Major equipment modernization to the short-term wars matter, so defeating conventional threats costs of contingency operations. He does single must be our core mission. out the special operations community for praise, It is difficult to agree with Davidson’s complimenting their joint approach across the premise that all America’s major wars came as full spectrum of military operations. surprises. Germany and Japan were vying for The second and third parts of the book illus- greater global roles before shots were fired in trate his key points about needed defense reforms. World War II. We may not have unambiguous Based on his experience in key National Guard warning of an impending conflict, but as in World and Army Reserve positions, Davidson makes War II, we will probably have strong indications the case for a fundamentally different defense of intense military competition. Victory at Risk: Restoring America’s structure and a return to a citizen-soldier army. Some of his harshest comments are aimed Military Power: A New War Plan for the He assesses that the Pentagon has a “rush-to-war” at Pentagon civilians stifling the sounder advice Pentagon mindset that favors the expensive Active-duty of generals and admirals. Secretary Rumsfeld By Michael W. Davidson force when every major American war has been decreased the likelihood of policy dissent and Zenith Press, 2009 fought and won by citizen-soldier armies. Like rethinking when policy changes were needed. 256 pp. $25.00 Morris Janowitz and other Republican theorists, The examples of Generals Marshall and Creigh- ISBN: 978-0-7603-3557-4 he views military service as a positive obligation ton Abrams provide keen insights into how that will increase the connection between the courageous decisions could provide the basis Reviewed by military and American people. We will have for improved military capabilities. Military JAMES CRICKS more time to build an army with broad-based officers should have more forcefully presented national service now that the Cold War has ended. their assessments directly to the President. n his first book, Michael Davidson, a retired Although he acknowledges that the conventional Advocating more authority for the Chairman Army National Guard major general, has warfight is extremely complex, his prescrip- of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he envisions senior Iissued a clarion call for the U.S. military to tions are not as detailed as his strong historical generals and admirals defining the next defense fundamentally change course or face the sober- examples. He does not discuss how an Army with strategy. Although he does not state it specifi- ing prospect of losing our next war. As a deco- more conventional combat National Guard forces cally, it appears he would question the necessity rated citizen-Soldier whose long service began would overcome the challenges of peacetime and of the Chairman and Secretary of Defense both with Vietnam, Davidson advocates a renewed postmobilization training that were apparent publishing strategies. As was the case with emphasis on preparing for major conflicts while in roundout brigades during Operation Desert Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense doubting the wisdom of the “war on terrorism.” Storm. During that war, the Army’s Reorganization Act of 1986, Davidson believes He reserves special criticism for the tenures of premobilization information on the proficiency much of what needs to be fixed in the Pentagon Defense Secretaries Robert McNamara and of its roundout brigades overstated their capabili- will be fixed from outside. Donald Rumsfeld as periods of wrongheaded ties and created significant capability shortfalls. It is hard to ignore the passion and thought- arrogance by civilian officials. His analysis of With limited peacetime training, it is still likely ful experience Davidson brings to the subject of American military history since World War II the lack of opportunities for realistic training and defense reform. There is no doubt the role of the provides an important backdrop for his argu- constraints on the extent of collective training will citizen-soldier should be redefined to better meet ment that poor civil-military relations have limit Reserve units to lower levels of organization. our post–Cold War requirements. General Craig led the United States to an extremely danger- Like military analysts such as Colin Gray McKinley, USAF, chief of the National Guard ous strategic position. Our force is exhausted and Gian Gentile, Davidson prefers a shift in focus Bureau, has already discussed focusing on helping and out of balance. Returning to the model of toward preparing for a major war. Standing forces the Nation build partnership capacity worldwide. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and General would be used to contain crises and small wars. Somehow the linkage among the Department of George C. Marshall, where military advice was They would also serve as the base from which the Defense, Department of State, and U.S. Agency given greater weight, would be an important citizen-soldier army would expand. Although he for International Development efforts must be step toward crafting a sensible defense strategy acknowledges the debilitating impact of engage- fundamentally addressed in a whole-of-govern- devoid of political posturing. The solutions he ment missions and our escalating workload, ment approach. The Reserve components could offers are wide ranging and would require radical he would have deployed forces to Rwanda and be an important part of a solution, especially if movement away from Afghanistan and current Darfur. He still contends that we must apply more they share Michael Davidson’s desire to contrib- defense strategies. strict criteria to the application of military power ute fully to the defense of freedom. This important The book is divided into three parts and in the defense of America. His willingness to work enriches the reform debate and deserves begins with a survey of the current poor state consider new missions in Africa appears to be in to be studied by strategic planners as Americans of military readiness for conventional conflicts. contradiction with his opinion that we must more consider the future of the military after current Soldiers need more time, training, and resources. carefully expend our military resources. contingency operations. JFQ Our war plans are unrealistically optimistic He recommends that we begin by identify- and framed by Pentagon battles between the ing our threats and then devising a strategy to James Cricks is a Joint, Interagency, and Services. The Army’s funding bears little relation meet those threats. Davidson identifies “expan- Multinational Operations Instructor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. 108 JFQ / issue 67, 4 th quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu.
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