Cyprus ICG Report
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
THE CYPRUS STALEMATE: WHAT NEXT? Europe Report N°171 – 8 March 2006 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. A HISTORY OF DISCORD .......................................................................................... 1 II. THE ANNAN PLAN AND THE 2004 REFERENDUMS........................................... 3 A. THE ANNAN PLAN ................................................................................................................3 B. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS: A SHIFT TOWARDS COMPROMISE..................................................5 C. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS: FROM TACIT ACCEPTANCE TO OUTRIGHT REJECTION ......................5 D. ANALYSING THE REFERENDUMS: CAN THE ANNAN PLAN BE SALVAGED?............................8 III. LOCAL, REGIONAL AND EU DEVELOPMENTS................................................ 11 A. THE OPENING OF THE GREEN LINE AND THE GREEN LINE REGULATION .............................11 B. THE EU’S UNFULFILLED PROMISES TO THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS .........................................11 C. THE OVERHAUL OF TURKISH CYPRIOT POLITICS.................................................................14 D. THE LACK OF MOVEMENT IN GREEK CYPRIOT POLITICS.....................................................14 E. TURKEY’S DOMESTIC REFORMS AND THE EU ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS..........................16 F. GREEK-TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT ....................................................................................17 IV. ALTERNATIVE FUTURE SCENARIOS ................................................................. 18 A. A SHORT OR MEDIUM-TERM SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE ANNAN PLAN......................18 B. A CENTRALISED STATE: THE GREEK CYPRIOTS’S PREFERRED OPTION? .............................19 C. CREEPING RECOGNITION OF A SEPARATE TURKISH CYPRIOT STATE .......................................20 V. MOVING FORWARD................................................................................................. 21 A. WITHIN CYPRUS: THE INTERNAL DIMENSION .....................................................................21 B. THE GREEK-TURKISH-EU DIMENSION................................................................................22 C. A PACKAGE DEAL, CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, OR UNILATERAL STEPS? ............23 VI. THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN FOR NOW: UNILATERAL STEPS.................... 24 A. TURKISH CYPRIOT AND TURKISH UNILATERAL STEPS.........................................................24 B. GREEK CYPRIOT AND GREEK UNILATERAL STEPS .............................................................27 C. UNILATERAL STEPS BY KEY MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY....................28 APPENDICES A. MAP OF CYPRUS .................................................................................................................31 Europe Report N°171 8 March 2006 THE CYPRUS STALEMATE: WHAT NEXT? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The last round of Cyprus’s drawn-out peace process Papadopoulos. They should realise that if they persist in ended in April 2004 when the Greek Cypriot community, their refusal to engage with the United Nations and with which had long advocated reunification of the divided Cyprus’s other international partners, the island will island on a bicommunal and bizonal basis, overwhelmingly slip by default toward permanent partition and the rejected the UN-sponsored “Annan Plan”, which provided independence of the north, whether formally recognised for just that. At the same time on the northern side of the or not. The idea that Turkish Cypriots will instead accept Green Line, the Turkish Cypriot community, in a major minority status in a centralised Greek Cypriot state is a reversal of its traditional preference for secession, backed pipe dream. reunification. The failure of the referendum did not stop a still-divided Cyprus being admitted to membership of Confidence building measures cannot, in the present the EU a week later. Notwithstanding clear continuing environment, realistically be negotiated. But they can still support for the Annan Plan, or some variation of it, be undertaken unilaterally. Political leaders are always among all other members of the EU and the wider reluctant to make concessions not immediately international community, the present situation remains reciprocated, but these can sometimes be very much in stalemated. the longer term national interest. The argument of this report is that the best hope of changing the dynamics of Given that no negotiated settlement is presently in sight, the Cyprus conflict, and creating an environment in which the only way forward appears to be a series of unilateral a UN-brokered solution can once again be contemplated efforts by the relevant domestic and international actors, and the best interests of all parties advanced, is for the aimed at sustaining the pro-solution momentum in following measures, and approaches, to be taken by the the north, inducing political change in the south, and key players: advancing inter-communal reconciliation. External players The EU, UN and U.S. have important roles in should, to the extent of their capacity, seek to exert creating an atmosphere where progress may be pressure upon the political elites of both communities possible. In 2004, the UN Secretary-General, the for immediate recommencement of negotiations and do EU Council of Ministers and the U.S. Secretary everything possible meanwhile to reduce the isolation of of State all called for ending the north’s isolation; the north. their words should now be followed by deeds. The best-case outcome, manifestly in the interests of both The EU, for all the difficulty of acting in the face sides and their regional neighbours, would be for Greek of Cypriot vetoes, has a particular obligation to and Turkish Cypriots to make further efforts to reunify sustain by every available means the economic Cyprus within the broad framework laid down in the development and European integration of northern Annan Plan. With its detailed and comprehensive Cyprus as it pledged to do in April 2004. The provisions, its tightly forged compromise arrangements Commission, Council, Parliament and other and its distillation of three decades of negotiations, some member states should implement the new funding new variation of that Plan, built around the concept of a instrument for northern Cyprus, and press for the bizonal and bicommunal federation as originally agreed establishment of a branch of the Commission’s by Archbishop Makarios and Rauf Denktash in the 1970s, delegation in the north to oversee its delivery and is the only proposal that seems ultimately capable of the inclusion of northern Cyprus in the EU’s common acceptance. customs union with Turkey. The U.S. similarly should upgrade its existing office in the north. The most substantial blockage of such an agreement Lifting the isolation of the north is key to promoting is now the policy and attitude of the Greek Cypriot a long-term and sustainable solution based on leadership and in particular of President Tassos equality. The Cyprus Stalemate: What Next? Crisis Group Europe Report N°171, 8 March 2006 Page ii Greek Cypriots need to refocus on the core issues, RECOMMENDATIONS recognise that a centralised state is a recipe for endless further domestic and regional instability, To EU Institutions and Member States: accept that the roots of the Cyprus conflict lie as much in 1963 as 1974, acknowledge that it is not 1. Accept that ending the isolation of northern Cyprus only they who have been uprooted from their is a strategic imperative for the European Union, homes and mourn their missing, and look again pending the unification of the island. at the advantages of giving practical effect to 2. Continue to work on, and press Cyprus to accept: the bizonality and bicommunality principles they agreed to three decades ago. Given the (a) committing the Union to proceed on the uncompromising position taken by the present trade regulation under a specified timeframe government, the critical role here in generating and implementing the aid regulation for debate must be played by the Greek Cypriot northern Cyprus, with provision for acquis opposition, moderates on all political sides and civil harmonisation, reform of the civil service, society leaders. refurbishment of Famagusta port and financing of a census; Greece, similarly, must review its historic approach. The attitude of successive governments that (b) establishing a subordinate branch of the “Cyprus decides, Greece follows” is anachronistic Commission’s delegation in the north to and unhelpful: Greece needs to move on from coordinate the delivery of funds and acquis its politics of silence, once more clarify to the harmonisation; international community its stance towards the (c) ensuring that Turkish Cypriots are fairly Annan Plan as the basis for recommencing represented within EU institutions; and negotiations and finding a solution, and be prepared to take a lead within the EU to refocus efforts on (d) revising the current proposals for direct trade discharging the Union’s obligations to its Turkish to include the incorporation of northern Cyprus Cypriot citizens. into the EU customs union with Turkey, the amendment of the Green Line regulation and Turkish Cypriots should through their government the joint management of Famagusta port by address the outstanding property cases, harmonise the Turkish Cypriots and the Commission. laws and practices in line with the EU’s acquis 3. For individual