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The Cyprus Referendum: an Island Divided by Mutual Mistrust

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The Cyprus Referendum: an Island Divided by Mutual Mistrust TheAmerican Cyprus Foreign Referendum Policy Interests, 26: 341–351, 2004 341 Copyright © 2004 NCAFP 1080-3920/04 $12.00 + .08 DOI:10.1080/10803920490502755 The Cyprus Referendum: An Island Divided by Mutual Mistrust Viola Drath he people of Cyprus have spoken. And as In his letter to the secretary general dated Toften happens in the annals of history, when- June 7, 2004, Papadopoulos reprimanded Kofi ever bold designs for grand solutions to conten- Annan for allowing those whom he had entrusted tious and complex issues such as the unification with the role of “honest brokers” to become “ac- of Cyprus, devised in secret by powerful political tive participants” throughout the process. elites, are subjected to the free-will decision of a “Through this report they assess effectively the free people, the experts suffered a surprise. The outcome of their own effort while at the same time international community was stunned not so attempting to portray and evaluate the attitude much by the defeat of the referendum on the of the parties involved. In other words, the au- warmed-over final settlement plan proposed by thors of the report play essentially the role of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan; there had judge and jury in the overall outcome of the ne- been signs of impending failure. Contrary to gen- gotiation process they presided over.” eral prognostications, however, it was not the When efforts to reach a settlement on the re- Turkish Cypriots, usually maligned for allegedly unification of Cyprus failed during the last round impeding a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus of negotiations in Buergenstock at the end of question, but the Greek Cypriots who resound- March, in the presence of Greek Prime Minister ingly rejected the referendum on the reunifica- Costas Karamanlis and Turkish Prime Minister tion of the island. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a referendum on the fifth Consistent with his harsh prereferendum version of a still seriously flawed Annan Plan was rhetoric opposing the Annan Plan, Tassos set arbitrarily for April 24, 2004, to exert added Papadopoulos, the president of the Republic of pressures on negotiators on the eve of Cyprus’s Cyprus, remains unapologetic for his role in hand- accession to the European Union (EU) on May 1, ing coordinated U.S., U.K., and UN diplomacy a 2004. serious blow. Criticizing the rejected Annan Plan Concerned about anticipated adverse conse- as “unworkable”1 and “lacking functionality,” he quences for the status of Cyprus that would re- soberly stated, “there are no winners or losers.” sult from the implementation of the Annan Plan, Yet, in keeping his options open, the president the parties to the conflict vigorously argued that observed that the result of the referendum must because of the format of the UN-sponsored act as a catalyst for unification and not as a pre- venue—an ill-guided revival of previously unpro- text for further division. Emphasizing that Greek ductive “proximity” talks2—no real negotiations Cypriots have not turned their backs on their could be conducted in Switzerland. Under con- Turkish Cypriot compatriots, he continues to as- siderable time constraints, compounded by ma- sure the international community that the voter jor outstanding substantive issues, the Annan has not rejected a solution to the Cyprus ques- Plan came across as an all-or-nothing proposition, tion but the particulars of the Annan Plan “for just short of a diktat. Although assembled in the obvious reasons.” same place, the parties were never afforded an American Foreign Policy Interests 342 Viola Drath opportunity to discuss, let alone negotiate, the It was not the first time the Security Council contested “core” issues face to face. Among is- had acted in the contentious Cyprus issue. Dur- sues on which an equitable resolution to the ing a major crisis as far back as 1964, when a UN Cyprus question depends are these: peacekeeping force was introduced to Cyprus to keep the ongoing conflict between the majority • Security: The timely repatriation Greek Cypriots and the 18 percent Turkish Cyp- of Turkish troops hindering the full riot minority from exploding, the Council sprang sovereignty and genuine indepen- into action, passing a resolution affirming its re- dence of Cyprus and the necessity solve to treat the island as one entity. of providing big-power security In this latest effort to spur Council action, the guarantees. United States and the United Kingdom actively supported the EU in order to effect reunification • Refugees: Compensation for dis- and facilitate the accession of a united island. placed persons and the restitution This gambit might have paid off had it not of property. been for a surprise, last-minute reversal in the Russian position. Having for weeks placated all • Settlers: The early return of “ille- sides, Sergey Lavrov, the newly appointed Rus- gal” Turkish settlers in order to pre- sian foreign minister, saw the Cyprus question serve the country’s ethnic identity. as a welcome opportunity to reclaim lost stature in Russia’s international relations. Mindful of • Governance: The confounding Russia’s considerable commercial interests in question of governance within a fed- Cypriot offshore banking and shell companies, eral bizonal, bicommunal structure Lavrov asserted Moscow’s political clout with the providing political equality for a argument that the plan was “unceremoniously minority of 18 percent in order to imposed” on the island’s two ethnic communi- bridge the ethnic divide. ties and bound to influence the “free will” of the people. Arguing that Council action on the U.S./ U.K. draft resolution prior to the referendum was Russia Vetoes the U.S./U.K. inappropriate, Moscow exercised its veto on April Draft Resolution on Security 21, 2004. It was the first Russian veto in 10 years. The Annan Plan was in limbo. Guarantees The Turkish Republic of Desperate to succeed, the vociferous British and American proponents of the unrealistic plan Northern Cyprus (TRNC) attempted to force the issue in a last-ditch effort that came to an end on April 21. Sharply con- Emerges as an “Acknowledged” demning any opposition to the 200-page basic document and its attached 9,000 pages of laws International Actor and technical material relentlessly promoted by the EU as the “last chance” to save the reunifica- Notwithstanding the best diplomatic efforts tion process, the UN Security Council drafted a on the part of the United States, the EU, and the resolution pledging to guarantee the security of UN, Greek Cypriot voters catapulted the Annan Greek and Turkish Cypriots provided that both Plan into the ash heap of history on April 24, 15 parties to the conflict consented to endorse the months after its ill-fated initiation in November Annan reunification plan. 2002. Even though President Bush had succeeded American Foreign Policy Interests The Cyprus Referendum 343 in enlisting the support of the key antagonists, President Papadopoulos’s criticism, however Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey and Prime legitimate, that the Annan Plan, continuously Minister Karamanlis of Greece, the referendum revised to address last-minute amendments by as an alternative venue to the faltered reunifi- the Turkish Cypriot leadership, was neither cation talks proved a bridge too short. Against “just” nor “viable” will do little in the short run diplomatic practice, largely at U.S. insistence in to overcome Nicosia’s estrangement from Wash- order to strengthen Turkey’s position in Europe, ington. Criticism, however informal, of open U.S. Secretary General Annan permitted the plan to support for Turkey’s quest for EU accession based be presented to the voters. Responding to the re- on geostrategic reasons will only widen the rift jection of his diplomatic effort, he issued a scath- further. The entente cordiale between Turkey and ing report to the UN Security Council in late May the United States on “stabilizing Iraq” is too im- summarily blaming the Greek Cypriot political portant to a beleaguered White House in an elec- leadership for defying Europe and the interna- tion year to permit the Cyprus question to cloud tional community. 3 relations between Washington and Ankara. On the other hand, lauding the positive atti- An analysis of the failure of the Annan Plan tude of Turkish Cypriots, the framers of the docu- to gain popular support suggests considerations ment swiftly moved to recommend an immediate of varying differentials in underlying long-term end to the international isolation of the versus short-term precipitating causes. Because breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Cyprus question is a dispute involving third- which is “recognized” only by Turkey. After de- party entanglements in a conflict involving power cades when it was shunned by the international politics, it should be addressed within the con- community, the TRNC, with U.S. and EU sup- text of changing national interests as well as the port and the acquiescence of the secretary gen- regional and global realignments of forces. In eral, had at long last voted itself into a position the ongoing search for answers as to why the that would allow it to enter the international com- Annan Plan failed this critical test, a number of munity as an “acknowledged” actor. Although the important questions must be addressed. Did the European Council’s refusal to admit the TRNC secretary general go too far in accommodating pa- presented a profound disappointment, the UN rochial big-power interests in order to regain lost report calling for an immediate improvement in luster for the world organization or perhaps to Northern Cypriot economic and social conditions position himself for a third term at its helm? Have was welcome news. Starting with an end to trade the Greek Cypriots, assured of their admission and shipping restrictions, as well as increased to the EU years ago, lost interest in the reunifi- foreign aid, a marked shift in the political climate cation of their prosperous part of Aphrodite’s Isle in which the TRNC may now conduct its affairs with the economically strapped North? Has the was set in motion.
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