The Cyprus Referendum: an Island Divided by Mutual Mistrust

Home , Annan Plan, Glafcos Clerides, International isolation

The Cyprus Referendum: An Island Divided by Mutual Mistrust

Viola Drath

he people of Cyprus have spoken. And as In his letter to the secretary general dated Toften happens in the annals of history, when- June 7, 2004, Papadopoulos reprimanded Kofi ever bold designs for grand solutions to conten- Annan for allowing those whom he had entrusted tious and complex issues such as the unification with the role of “honest brokers” to become “ac- of Cyprus, devised in secret by powerful political tive participants” throughout the process. elites, are subjected to the free-will decision of a “Through this report they assess effectively the free people, the experts suffered a surprise. The outcome of their own effort while at the same time international community was stunned not so attempting to portray and evaluate the attitude much by the defeat of the referendum on the of the parties involved. In other words, the au- warmed-over final settlement plan proposed by thors of the report play essentially the role of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan; there had judge and jury in the overall outcome of the ne- been signs of impending failure. Contrary to gen- gotiation process they presided over.” eral prognostications, however, it was not the When efforts to reach a settlement on the re- Turkish Cypriots, usually maligned for allegedly unification of Cyprus failed during the last round impeding a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus of negotiations in Buergenstock at the end of question, but the Greek Cypriots who resound- March, in the presence of Greek Prime Minister ingly rejected the referendum on the reunifica- Costas Karamanlis and Turkish Prime Minister tion of the island. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a referendum on the fifth Consistent with his harsh prereferendum version of a still seriously flawed Annan Plan was rhetoric opposing the Annan Plan, Tassos set arbitrarily for April 24, 2004, to exert added Papadopoulos, the president of the Republic of pressures on negotiators on the eve of Cyprus’s Cyprus, remains unapologetic for his role in hand- accession to the European Union (EU) on May 1, ing coordinated U.S., U.K., and UN diplomacy a 2004. serious blow. Criticizing the rejected Annan Plan Concerned about anticipated adverse conse- as “unworkable”1 and “lacking functionality,” he quences for the status of Cyprus that would re- soberly stated, “there are no winners or losers.” sult from the implementation of the Annan Plan, Yet, in keeping his options open, the president the parties to the conflict vigorously argued that observed that the result of the referendum must because of the format of the UN-sponsored act as a catalyst for unification and not as a pre- venue—an ill-guided revival of previously unpro- text for further division. Emphasizing that Greek ductive “proximity” talks2—no real negotiations Cypriots have not turned their backs on their could be conducted in Switzerland. Under con- Turkish Cypriot compatriots, he continues to as- siderable time constraints, compounded by ma- sure the international community that the voter jor outstanding substantive issues, the Annan has not rejected a solution to the Cyprus ques- Plan came across as an all-or-nothing proposition, tion but the particulars of the Annan Plan “for just short of a diktat. Although assembled in the obvious reasons.” same place, the parties were never afforded an

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opportunity to discuss, let alone negotiate, the It was not the first time the Security Council contested “core” issues face to face. Among is- had acted in the contentious Cyprus issue. Dur- sues on which an equitable resolution to the ing a major crisis as far back as 1964, when a UN Cyprus question depends are these: peacekeeping force was introduced to Cyprus to keep the ongoing conflict between the majority • Security: The timely repatriation Greek Cypriots and the 18 percent Turkish Cyp- of Turkish troops hindering the full riot minority from exploding, the Council sprang sovereignty and genuine indepen- into action, passing a resolution affirming its re- dence of Cyprus and the necessity solve to treat the island as one entity. of providing big-power security In this latest effort to spur Council action, the guarantees. United States and the United Kingdom actively supported the EU in order to effect reunification • Refugees: Compensation for dis- and facilitate the accession of a united island. placed persons and the restitution This gambit might have paid off had it not of property. been for a surprise, last-minute reversal in the Russian position. Having for weeks placated all • Settlers: The early return of “ille- sides, Sergey Lavrov, the newly appointed Rus- gal” Turkish settlers in order to pre- sian foreign minister, saw the Cyprus question serve the country’s ethnic identity. as a welcome opportunity to reclaim lost stature in Russia’s international relations. Mindful of • Governance: The confounding Russia’s considerable commercial interests in question of governance within a fed- Cypriot offshore banking and shell companies, eral bizonal, bicommunal structure Lavrov asserted Moscow’s political clout with the providing political equality for a argument that the plan was “unceremoniously minority of 18 percent in order to imposed” on the island’s two ethnic communi- bridge the ethnic divide. ties and bound to influence the “free will” of the people. Arguing that Council action on the U.S./ U.K. draft resolution prior to the referendum was Russia Vetoes the U.S./U.K. inappropriate, Moscow exercised its veto on April Draft Resolution on Security 21, 2004. It was the first Russian veto in 10 years. The Annan Plan was in limbo. Guarantees The Turkish Republic of Desperate to succeed, the vociferous British and American proponents of the unrealistic plan Northern Cyprus (TRNC) attempted to force the issue in a last-ditch effort that came to an end on April 21. Sharply con- Emerges as an “Acknowledged” demning any opposition to the 200-page basic document and its attached 9,000 pages of laws International Actor and technical material relentlessly promoted by the EU as the “last chance” to save the reunifica- Notwithstanding the best diplomatic efforts tion process, the UN Security Council drafted a on the part of the United States, the EU, and the resolution pledging to guarantee the security of UN, Greek Cypriot voters catapulted the Annan Greek and Turkish Cypriots provided that both Plan into the ash heap of history on April 24, 15 parties to the conflict consented to endorse the months after its ill-fated initiation in November Annan reunification plan. 2002. Even though President Bush had succeeded

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in enlisting the support of the key antagonists, President Papadopoulos’s criticism, however Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey and Prime legitimate, that the Annan Plan, continuously Minister Karamanlis of Greece, the referendum revised to address last-minute amendments by as an alternative venue to the faltered reunifi- the Turkish Cypriot leadership, was neither cation talks proved a bridge too short. Against “just” nor “viable” will do little in the short run diplomatic practice, largely at U.S. insistence in to overcome Nicosia’s estrangement from Wash- order to strengthen Turkey’s position in Europe, ington. Criticism, however informal, of open U.S. Secretary General Annan permitted the plan to support for Turkey’s quest for EU accession based be presented to the voters. Responding to the re- on geostrategic reasons will only widen the rift jection of his diplomatic effort, he issued a scath- further. The entente cordiale between Turkey and ing report to the UN Security Council in late May the United States on “stabilizing Iraq” is too im- summarily blaming the Greek Cypriot political portant to a beleaguered White House in an elec- leadership for defying Europe and the interna- tion year to permit the Cyprus question to cloud tional community. 3 relations between Washington and Ankara. On the other hand, lauding the positive atti- An analysis of the failure of the Annan Plan tude of Turkish Cypriots, the framers of the docu- to gain popular support suggests considerations ment swiftly moved to recommend an immediate of varying differentials in underlying long-term end to the international isolation of the versus short-term precipitating causes. Because breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Cyprus question is a dispute involving third- which is “recognized” only by Turkey. After de- party entanglements in a conflict involving power cades when it was shunned by the international politics, it should be addressed within the con- community, the TRNC, with U.S. and EU sup- text of changing national interests as well as the port and the acquiescence of the secretary gen- regional and global realignments of forces. In eral, had at long last voted itself into a position the ongoing search for answers as to why the that would allow it to enter the international com- Annan Plan failed this critical test, a number of munity as an “acknowledged” actor. Although the important questions must be addressed. Did the European Council’s refusal to admit the TRNC secretary general go too far in accommodating pa- presented a profound disappointment, the UN rochial big-power interests in order to regain lost report calling for an immediate improvement in luster for the world organization or perhaps to Northern Cypriot economic and social conditions position himself for a third term at its helm? Have was welcome news. Starting with an end to trade the Greek Cypriots, assured of their admission and shipping restrictions, as well as increased to the EU years ago, lost interest in the reunifi- foreign aid, a marked shift in the political climate cation of their prosperous part of Aphrodite’s Isle in which the TRNC may now conduct its affairs with the economically strapped North? Has the was set in motion. status quo not proved manageable in terms of Accusations hurled by the Greek Cypriot lead- advancing Cyprus’s international standing at the ership questioning the “fairness” of the Annan juxtaposition of a potential Greek–Turkish mili- Plan will do little to affect the TRNC’s new stat- tary confrontation, which at any time could seri- ure in multilateral diplomacy. Turkish Cypriots, ously jeopardize European and NATO relations? 4 backed by Turkey, were willing to play the Ameri- Coached by an eloquent leadership, an over- can card. They won and now stand to reap the whelming 76 percent majority of Greek Cypriots political benefit, as manifested by the fact that came to resent the undue outside pressure and, for the first time officials of the TRNC found doors worried about their security and national iden- opening in Washington while, at least for the time tity, turned the tables on the referendum with being, the president of the Republic of Cyprus was a resounding no vote. On the other hand, con- kept out of town. trary to expectations, 64.91 percent of the voters

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in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus voted the opening of a EU office in North Cyprus. The yes, even though veteran negotiator Rauf diplomatic maneuverings underlining the contin- Denktash had advised circumspection. To be sure, ued partition of the island because of a lack of not all Turkish Cypriot voters were focused on settlement by the Greek Cypriot political elite and the lure of the EU that promised economic ad- thereby automatically eliminating the potential vantages, a deliberation that, without doubt, was veto threat of Greek Cypriots and Greece with foremost on the minds of a frustrated younger regard to Turkey’s controversial accession nego- generation. tiations scheduled to commence in December Accused of being out of touch, Denktash made were not lost on this audience. it abundantly clear that the people who are re- Turkish Cypriots carefully listened to the ally out of touch are those who pin their hopes on promise of initiatives to be advanced to benefit a settlement with the Greek Cypriots, whom he the economic development of the TRNC and im- declares to know best. Stressing that it was the mediate steps to be taken to ease its political iso- Turkish Cypriot side that opened “our borders,” lation by a number of measures enabling TRNC he asked to deal with Greek Cypriots on the ba- and EU citizens to cross over to the Greek Cyp- sis of mutual respect and mutual benefit. The in- riot side without the mandatory visa, EU citizens trepid Denktash, ever cautious of Greek Cypriot to travel directly to the TRNC, and citrus pro- intransigence and power grabs, also voiced the ducers to sell their products freely in the Repub- opinion that many people voted yes not because lic of Cyprus. In addition, the EU Commission they liked the Annan Plan but out of “frustra- started a process of preparing a list of goods the tion with the international isolation imposed TRNC will be allowed to export to the EU, as well upon them by the Greek Cypriots without any as goods that could be exported directly from kind of justification.” TRNC ports and airports. Disappointed with the In contrast, his son Serdar, the TRNC’s Greek Cypriot no vote, the EU awarded the TRNC conciliatory new deputy prime minister and 259 million euros in financial aid—a small minister for foreign affairs, set a positive tone by amount considering that, according to experts, assuring the public that even though the Annan implementation of the Annan Plan would have Plan is off the agenda, Turkish Cypriots should required $3.8 billion (U.S.) and the U.S. Agency be at the forefront of an active policy aimed at for International Development estimated overall reaching a settlement based on mutually enforc- capital expenditures on the economic develop- ing confidence-building measures. His immedi- ment front at approximately $1.7 billion over five ate objective is to restart intercommunal con- years. tacts between the ethnically divided Turkish and After 40 years of economic stagnation caused Greek Cypriots in order to advance an informal by physical restrictions on the free movement of joint decision-making process based on a “new people and goods across the island, early and partnership.” strong financial support by the international community is essential for the TRNC’s sustainable development. In seeking private-sector invest- The EU Rewards the TRNC ment and direct access to world markets through open ports and airports, however, Prime Minis- Even though the TRNC was prevented from ter Mehmet Ali Talat, the first representative of formally acceding to the EU on May 1, 2004, Turk- the TRNC received officially by a U.S. secretary ish Cypriot officials gratefully accepted congratu- of state and the UN secretary general, wants it lations for their “constructive stance” from EU to be known that his government is not looking Enlargement Commissioner Gunther Verheugen for handouts. The funds, he explains, will not be and applauded his announcement pertaining to used solely for infrastructure projects and cul-

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tural, social, and legal initiatives but for the his- an ex post facto recognition of Turkey’s invasion toric opportunity to integrate his systematically and thus would seem to legitimize Turkey’s isolated people into international systems, in- 36,000-strong occupation force in Northern stitutions, and organizations in order to regain Cyprus did not come as a surprise. To date, ever self-confidence and become a political actor, sig- skirting the contentious issue of who precipitated naling to the world the reality of two people and the 1974 invasion of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot the fact that one part of Cyprus does not repre- leadership only tacitly acknowledges its sent the other. Talat’s ambitious outreach pro- coresponsibility. gram began with an aggressive schedule to Still fresh in the annals of the turbulent his- formalize relations with the EU, with the objec- tory of changing fortunes in the Mare Nostrum tive of lifting existing embargoes, among them is the argument, only too eagerly advanced by sports embargoes that have prevented Turkish Turkish Cypriots, that the insertion of Turkish Cypriots from participating in international troops came in response to a failed coup by the sporting events. Greek junta in hot pursuit of enosis, the union Disavowing responsibility for the division of with Greece first advocated by the island’s Greek the country, Talat maintains that the Republic of Orthodox Church in 1825, and the brutal perse- Cyprus has no right to “continue the enslave- cution of the Turkish population of the island that ment” 5 and the international discrimination had been under Ottoman rule for 300 years. The suffered by the North. He insists on political result was an open ethnic divide. Although in re- equality for the Turkish minority occupying 36 cent times latent ethnic prejudice and mistrust percent of the territory. Talat argues that because were masked by British colonial rule (1878–1960), the EU cannot guarantee the security of his they gained considerable momentum when people, the contested presence of Turkish troops, Cyprus achieved independence in 1960 and the having guaranteed the security of the Turkish call for enosis was allowed to get a foothold. minority for more than 30 years, presents no The proposal clearly contradicts the EU’s threat to anyone. In contrast to Greek Cypriots, acquis communataire prohibiting any member the continuing presence of Turkish soldiers in the state from placing invasion troops on the soil of North, he asserts, will not impede future initia- another European country. tives to reunite the island, which has been thrown What happened to the stated goal of demili- into a situation that cannot be maintained for- tarizing the island, ask Greek Cypriots. Under ever. Viewed from this perspective, his declara- the plan Turkish troops would have been reduced tion that the self-styled ministate would not seek only incrementally and in stages until 2018, from formal diplomatic recognition sounds sincere. current troop levels of 36,000 to 650. Even following an eventual accession of Turkey to the EU, would Turkish troops be permitted to remain for The Security Issue the protection of Turkish Cypriots? Another question of fundamental fairness to The confounding security issue has always Greek Cypriots is the issue of the new protocol to emerged as a major impediment to the many the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance grant- rounds of unification talks convened over the ing Turkey special rights as one of the guarantor years. Seventy-five percent of Greek Cypriots are powers, including the right to unilateral military said to have exercised a no vote because of secu- intervention. Too well does the Greek Cypriot rity concerns, primarily the continued long-term community remember the breakdown of this presence of Turkish troops stationed on the is- treaty in 1974, when the guarantor powers and land under the Annan Plan. Their complaint that the United States stood silently by during the the plan was not acceptable because it constitutes violent years of civil strife, marked by serious

American Foreign Policy Interests 346 Viola Drath human rights infractions on both sides, starting would henceforth be handled unisono in Cyprus in 1963, which finally culminated in the invasion by special “court boards.” by Turkish troops for the protection of the Turk- Also unresolved was the highly contentious ish minority. Mindful of Turkey’s strategic posi- issue of Turkish settlers from Anatolia, viewed tion on NATO’s southern flank, the guarantor as much as a security matter as a demographic powers, including the United Kingdom, acqui- issue that would forever transform the country’s esced. Why, it is argued in Nicosia, should such a ethnic–religious composition. Estimated at about Turkish Damocles sword be forever hanging over 110,000, this number constitutes a figure that is a future “United Cyprus Republic”? higher than that of the actual Turkish Cypriot Agreement also proved elusive on the com- population. Greek Cypriots cannot understand plex refugee question. Under the Annan Plan, why, under the plan, 45,000 Turkish settlers, con- land in the North, administered by the TRNC, sidered “illegals” by Greek Cypriots and “citi- would have been handed over to Greek Cypriot zens” by Turkish Cypriots, were to be given authorities within three and half years, when citizenship and another 20,000 were to be granted 80,000 to 85,000 displaced Greek Cypriots could permanent resident status. Equally disregarded return. In the end, the proposal to put the re- remained their demands that only those settlers fugee issue on hold until some 40,000 Turkish shall be exempted from the requirement to re- Cypriots had been relocated and rehabilitated turn home who are able to prove humanitarian was rejected. Furthermore, it was decided that reasons. the land, up to that time, would remain under President Papadopoulos personally led the Turkish Cypriot control, although the govern- fight for the popular rejection of the Annan Plan’s ment of the Republic of Cyprus had insisted stipulations on governance of the united island. on a takeover by a neutral UN caretaker organi- Scrutiny and vigilance notwithstanding, in zation. drawn-out negotiations Greek Cypriots found Divergent positions also proved unbridgeable their principled position on this critical issue con- on a cumbersome bureaucratic quota system, sistently being downgraded to the point at which, carelessly attached to the “right to return” pro- in the final document, the governmental struc- cess, scheduled to be completed by 2023 or even ture envisioned for a unified bizonal and later. Assurances that the contemplated transfer bicommunal federation transcending ethnic dif- of responsibility to unbiased UN authorities ferences and tailored to guarantee independent would ease the legitimate concerns of Greek Cyp- participation in the EU began to resemble more riots about the return of property and outstand- and more the unwanted loose confederation en- ing adjustments were muted by the Security visioned by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Council’s refusal to provide specific guarantees Characterizing this concept as a blueprint and insistence that the lion’s share of costs asso- for a “complicated and dysfunctional state,” ciated with UN involvement, including UN peace- Papadopoulos minced no words in pointing to the keeping forces, would have to be borne by the danger of continuous deadlocks on clearly defined Greek Cypriot community. political issues unsuitable for judicial arbitration. Unfavorably received was yet another divisive Expounding on the “high degree of certainty,” he section of the Annan Plan dealing with the po- warned of the paralysis of such a government, litically charged requirement for Greek and Turk- which could easily disintegrate into irrelevance.6 ish Cypriots to give up their right to legal recourse Although the Greek Cypriots are extremely in the European Court on matters of access and uncomfortable with the prospect of a rotating possession and ownership of private property. presidency, above all they appear to have a prob- Adjudication issues regarding property and com- lem with the interpretation of the concept of po- pensation, it was decreed by UN bureaucrats, litical equality. The “end of Cyprus, as we know

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it” became a clarion call for those opposed to the international standing of the Republic of Cyprus Annan Plan and dominated the public debate and popular opinion in the EU had been impaired before the referendum. At less dramatic moments, in Buergenstock. the president evoked the prospect of an integrated It is, consequently, not surprising that economy, including harmonized monetary, fiscal, Andreas Mavroyiannis, the Greek Cypriot ambas- and economic policies, as he asked the rhetorical sador to the UN,8 expressing his personal view in question whether a small state like Cyprus or any a commentary entitled “Cyprus and Europe: Hos- state could live with a policy that, on the one hand, tage to Turkey,” criticized the Annan Plan for pursues an austerity program in the South in perpetuating the terms of Cyprus’s near indefi- order to decrease the fiscal deficit, while the North nite dependence on and subjugation to Turkey. follows an expansionist deficit spending policy, Cyprus’s support of Ankara’s accession to the EU, freely borrowing money in international markets he asserts, “is not as a matter of policy” but a to be guaranteed by the federal state. duty “under treaty and constitutional obligation,” irrespective of “whether Turkey is under a dicta- torial or an Islamic regime, whether she respects The Fairness Factor human rights or not.” It is common knowledge, Mavroyiannis main- A number of diplomats involved in the nego- tains, that the Annan Plan satisfied practically tiations have complained that the protagonists “all the demands” of Turkey—the reason being of the Annan Plan were too eager to bring Tur- that this was the only way to convince the Turk- key on board in order to ensure a yes vote by the ish military to contemplate consideration of the Turkish Cypriot community. Although the need settlement talks. to assuage Turkey because it holds the key to the “Not even the most pessimistic among us who unification of Cyprus had been quietly accepted, had long pointed out that the target of third par- following the failure of the Annan Plan a sense ties was not the solution to the Cyprus problem, of resignation permeates the diplomatic discourse. but to facilitate Turkey’s course to Europe, could It is said that negotiators were willing to yield imagine what finally happened,” he observed re- too much to Turkish demands for too little in alistically. return. EU control of the use of the island’s territory A spokesman for the Republic of Cyprus has for military operations and the ban on Cyprus’s identified the “fairness” issue as a key to looking participation in military affairs are listed as fur- at and resolving international disputes.7 Viewing ther manifestations of the extent to which the the island as a defenseless, small state caught up Annan Plan favoring Turkey highlights Ankara’s helplessly in big power politics, he has highlighted growing influence behind the scenes in EU de- the island’s strategic importance as a pivot at the cision making even before commencement of crossroads between the Western Christian and the accession negotiations in December. Near Eastern Islamic worlds. Regarding Turkey’s manifest influence on Located between Greece and neighboring Brussels as an undesirable potential impediment Turkey, two NATO members ill at ease with each to a Common European Foreign and Defense other, Cyprus serves as an important conduit to Identity, the author contends that the particu- the vast oil and gas resources in Central Asia and lars of the Annan Plan would have equipped Tur- has thus always been a pawn in the enactment of key with the leverage needed to promote its big power aspirations in the region. Pointing to heavily challenged accession to the EU on its own the Republic of Cyprus’s role as one of the 10 new terms. As a hostage to Turkey, the argument goes, members of the EU, a high-ranking Greek Cyp- the future “United Republic of Cyprus” would riot diplomat quietly admitted that both the have been Ankara’s fifth column in the EU. Un-

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der those circumstances, Cyprus would have stormy past, third parties can never fully appre- turned into the gate through which the Trojan ciate the breaking point that occurred in the hor- horse of those opposed to the creation of a Com- rendous events of 1974. It is the still unforgotten mon European Foreign and Defense Identity in- year when the Turkish minority suffered another dependent of NATO could have passed. The Greek onset of ethnic cleansing by enosis fanatics. Help Cypriot no vote is said to have derailed this hid- came only from the Turkish guarantor in the den agenda. guise of some 40,000 troops who captured 36 per- Dismissing U.S./U.K. support for Turkey’s cent of the territory and have protected its popu- willingness to subjugate EU aspirations to lation ever since. NATO’s quest to reposition itself in the changed So deep are the psychological wounds, so per- European and global realignment of forces as a vasive the rift in a shared national identity that “shortsighted” policy toward Europe, the diplo- intercommunal relations severed three decades mat emphasized that the accession of Cyprus ago have virtually come to a halt. Attempts to without a resolution of the Cyprus question is promote even limited confidence-building mea- deemed highly unwelcome by Turkey. In this con- sures, including a policy of small steps advocated text, one is reminded that the “investment of by the National Committee on American Foreign Greek Cypriots in the accession to the EU as a Policy in 2000,9 with the objective of helping to catalytic factor for the solution of the Cyprus advance the diplomatically feasible rather than problem was never intended to be sacrificed for the politically desirable, have in the past been the sake of Turkey consenting to a solution on hindered by political intransigence and bureau- her own demands.” cratic inertia. The perception that if Turkey became an EU It is regrettable that few seem to want to remember after all, it would torpedo the Common member the threatening incident that took place European Foreign and Defense Identity upheld only a few years ago, when then Greek Cypriot by “old Europe” in order to play the American- President Glafcos Clerides felt obligated to order and British-backed NATO card casts the whole 40 antiaircraft missiles from Russia in response Cyprus reunification issue onto a different politi- to growing tension precipitated by a massive cal trajectory by adding a hitherto conveniently Turkish military buildup. This deeply ingrained overlooked strategic dimension. angst was yet again adamantly displayed by his successor, President Papadopoulos, when he ob- jected to the obligations of the Republic of Cyprus A Deficiency of Mutual Trust under the Annan Plan, which would have required Nicosia to implement agreed on measures Ankara and its Cypriot “colony” are not up front in exchange for Ankara’s promise to hold trusted in Nicosia. One attitude stands out in the up its end of the bargain at some indeterminate negative response to the Annan Plan: a deep- future date. Citing the difficulty of holding the seated, almost palpable distrust of each other on Turkish side accountable for possible both sides, resulting in a profound lack of confi- inaction, he further expressed grave misgivings dence in the other side’s good-faith efforts and about making concessions on propositions rang- intentions. ing from enhanced security to displaced persons Rooted in historic and contemporary hostili- and governance that would take years if not de- ties, however real or perceived, the ethnic divide cades to execute. has, far beyond mere cultural differences, left Papadopoulos never tires of reminding his noticeable psychological scars on the older gen- people that under the Annan Plan Cyprus would eration and an overdose of skepticism displayed have had to fulfill Turkish Cypriot demands im- by a divided political class. Looking at the island’s mediately, within 48 hours after the referendum

American Foreign Policy Interests The Cyprus Referendum 349 was passed, whereas whatever benefits Greek tanglement, historical grievances, and conflict- Cypriots would reap in the future could stretch ing interests that in the past has impeded col- out as far as 18 years. Failing to convince the laboration on such ambitious hydraulic works in United States to help advance a revised, equitable, order to redress the island’s chronic water short- and nondiscriminatory Annan Plan, he asked age. Contrary to the perception given by disen- time and again for measures to hold his Turkish chanted Euro fans, Cyprus is not headed for a Cypriot partners accountable for security and “Mediterranean endgame.” political assurances that the areas to be returned would be returned on time and that the rights of refugees to return in fixed percentages over a Where Do We Go from Here? fixed period within the 18-year “window” would be guaranteed. The right of guarantee became Diplomacy, the late Hans Morgenthau ob- an important issue during talks held to resolve served, is the advancement of the possible, where differences over the withdrawal of Turkish troops, the desirable remains, at least for now, unattain- originally scheduled to take place within 14 years. able. After years marked by the lack of movement Papadopoulos did not appreciate the insertion in failed proximity talks, the Annan Plan was an of the Treaty of Guarantee into the Annan Plan ill-guided attempt by the UN secretary general, for the indisputable reason that the treaty had in collaboration with the president of the United failed to stop the Turkish invasion in 1974. How States, to use the accession of the Republic of much protection could such a legal instrument Cyprus to the EU as an arbitrary deadline to force be expected to guarantee now, he asked. acquiescence in what ostensibly amounted to a Trust remains a rare commodity in Cyprus. big power play. The UN pushed too hard too far Yet, according to the polls, Cypriots born after in too little time. Even though Nicosia was aware 1974 are less prejudiced than their parents to- of the imminent adverse consequences for ward the other side. Although not certain about Cyprus’s international standing should Greek the benefits to be derived from EU membership Cypriots reject the Annan Plan, the no vote proves as a motivating factor, this generational aspect is yet again the realist credo that issues of vital na- especially germane to the voting pattern of the tional interest leave governments little room for younger Turkish Cypriot generation who voted compromise. overwhelmingly for the Annan Plan. Not surpris- The failure of the Annan Plan has demon- ingly, the younger generation of Cypriots is far strated that on the future of Cyprus positions more appreciative of changing political and eco- are not shared and reciprocal interests do not nomic conditions in an increasingly integrated necessarily intersect. Yet by proving that the Europe of open borders and the free movement time had not yet come to advance the core issues of people and goods than their elders. Searching surrounding unification itself, the failed refer- for economic opportunity and opportunities for endum highlighted the fallibility of the ap- growth in open European markets and beyond, proach taken to date. For now it is anybody’s this younger generation, characterized more by guess whether and when a new round of reuni- pragmatism dictated by commerce than by hard- fication talks would be feasible. Signs of line positions based on specific ideologies, may in “Cyprus settlement fatigue,” as John Stilides time move to repair intercommunal relations for reports in a commentary for UPI,10 are highly mutual economic benefit and tolerance. A seri- visible in New York, Washington, and Brussels. ous effort, for example, to expedite the Alarko Although there seems little prospect for the re- underwater pipeline project on a bicommunal sumption of a substantive dialogue prior to the basis could serve as an essential catalyst to cut determination of whether Turkey will in fact through the thicket of Greek and Turkish en- get to join the EU, it remains an open question

American Foreign Policy Interests 350 Viola Drath

when, how, and under whose auspices the es- were ultimately adopted by the EU Council dur- tranged parties to the conflict could be swayed to ing the complex negotiating process of the Annan return to the negotiating table. Plan. A house divided against itself will not long be Notwithstanding promises that Greek Cypri- able to compete with the allure of the common ots shall not walk alone the “avenue the EU has European home of open borders. Forced to coexist opened up to them” and that Nicosia stands ready during a period when the international commu- to share the multitude of advantages offered by nity has allowed them to enter the international EU accession, Turkish Cypriots remain skepti- stage as an acknowledged actor, the Turkish Cyp- cal. They make no secret of their concern that riots realize that their strained relationship with the other side may support political actions that their Greek Cypriot counterparts is bound to are incompatible with their own objectives. There- undergo profound changes. Basking in their new- fore, they are eager to let the world know that found status short of formal recognition as a sov- one side does not represent the other. ereign state, the TRNC has been strengthened Notwithstanding the emergence of separat- in a number of ways. Aside from the fact that ist tendencies, I came away from recent consulta- demands for the return of its settlers have been tions with a sense that both sides seem to be sig- dismissed and issues pertaining to refugees and naling a willingness in principle, once the dust property rights have been kept in abeyance, Turk- has settled on the Annan Plan, 12 to consider a new ish Cypriots retain control of 36 percent of the framework for settlement talks under different island. That would have been slashed to 29 per- terms and conditions. Absent such a new frame- cent under the Annan Plan. Appreciative of the work in the near term, it seems feasible that economic, political, and diplomatic benefits be- momentum on core issues could be gained by a ing derived from the Turkish Cypriot yes vote, discreet dialogue on soft issues. For too long tan- TRNC politicians will remain distrustful of out- gible progress on less ambitious soft issues has side powers until they see the promises made good been held hostage to more ambitious resolutions by the EU, UN, and others. “We are heard now,” during final settlement talks. commented Osman Ertug, the TRNC’s represen- Contrary to recent diplomatic history, core tative in Washington, “but we will have to see and soft issues must be viewed as codependent. whether we are heeded.” 11 Without prejudice to a final settlement, a dual- Rapprochement, conducive to reconciliation track approach between governmental and based on an equitable and nondiscriminatory nongovernmental levels of action based on a con- resolution of issues of national identity, was also structive parallelism between core and soft issues on the mind of President Papadopoulos when he could improve the political climate and minimize declared that “yesterday’s confrontation should the escalatory prospect of hardening positions in be followed by the unity of tomorrow.” light of a lack of dialogue. Immediately one could The need to match the rhetoric of concern envision various interlocking intercommunal ac- with goal-oriented realistic action in order to calm tivities and exchange programs in order to help anxieties has now been recognized by both par- overcome age-old enmities. If successful, prepa- ties. Indeed, the Republic of Cyprus is stable and ratory, back-channel exploration of technical, de- so is its counterpart in the North. In a new spirit velopmental, and economic aspects could further of mutuality, which recognizes that what affects help test whether the political and social climate one side directly affects the other indirectly, warrants a new initiative on core issues. Nicosia let it be known that it was the Greek Overcoming persistent tension caused by a Cypriot government that was responsible for the precarious balancing act performed by Turkey, proposal of a number of measures aimed at ben- Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, and the TRNC efiting the Turkish Cypriot community. They will not be an easy endeavor in the years to

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come. Turkish aspirations may challenge such Past. A long-time correspondent and commenta- a scenario with a continued unwillingness to re- tor for Handelsblatt, she has taught at American linquish control over its Turkish Cypriot “colo- University and writes a column on foreign affairs ny.” In the sense of clearing the air, the Annan for The Washington Times and numerous publi- Plan has been useful. At least it exposed to the cations here and abroad. various political actors the benchmarks of the impossible. Notes Confidence-building measures in the near term, however, will not serve as a substitute for reunification, if, indeed, that is what the people 1. Press conference with foreign media, of Cyprus determine their national goal to be. Nicosia, April 24, 2004. Nevertheless, a new willingness to engage in a 2. Op. cit. dialogue would help advance bicommunal coex- 3. Statement by UN Secretary General Kofi istence in a house divided and in dire need of Annan, April 24, 2004. repair in an era when the world community is 4. TRC News, April 26, 2004. determined to work together for the common good 5. Address to the Heritage Foundation, Wash- and envisions a future based on mutual interests ington, D.C., May 5, 2004. advanced in an alliance of reason. 6. In the National Interest, April 28, 2004. All in all, the lesson to be learned by the popu- 7. Fifteenth Annual PSEKA Conference, lar rejection of the Annan Plan, which has for Washington, D.C., May 14, 2004. now reordered priorities and upset the interna- 8. Address in Kathimerini, Athens, April 18, tional community, is a simple one: It reveals for 2004. all to see that heavy outside pressure in interna- 9. Presentation of NCAFP draft to President tional affairs has its limits. Glafcos Clerides by Viola Drath, New York, Janu- ary 3, 2000. 10. John Stilides, UPI Outside View Commen- About the Author tary, May 12, 2004. 11. One-on-one talk with Osman Ertug, rep- Viola Drath, a member of the National Com- resentative of the TRNC to the United States, mittee on American Foreign Policy’s (NCAFP’s) May 2004. Executive Committee, is the director of the 12. Private discussion with Euripides NCAFP’s project on Cyprus. She has written nine Evriviades, ambassador from Cyprus to the books, among them Willy Brandt: Prisoner of His United States, April 2004.

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American Foreign Policy Interests