Appendix 1 Arend Lijphart’S Schematic Presentation of Principal Propositions of Consociational Theory
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Appendix 1 Arend Lijphart’s Schematic Presentation of Principal Propositions of Consociational Theory Source: Arend Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, policy papers in International Affairs, no. 24, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1985 p. 85. 177 Appendix 2 Cypriot Population Distribution: 1960 Source: Richard A. Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963–1971, Ontario, University of Waterloo, 1976 p. 10. 178 Appendix 3 Greek Cypriot Political Parties Major Greek Cypriot political parties Recent parliamentary Party Ideology Alliances vote % Foundation of party AKEL Communist DIKO, EDEK 2006: 31.1% 1926 as KKK, banned 2001: 34.7% in 1931 by the British government; Re-formed 1941 as AKEL. DISY Centre-right EDI, Liberal 2006: 31.4% 1976 as a result of split 2001: 34.0% with President Makarios. Traditionally houses EOKA and EOKA B supporters. DIKO Centre-right AKEL, EDEK 2006: 19.9% 1976 Founded by second 2001: 14.8% president, Spyros Kyprianou. EDEK Social-Democrat DIKO, AKEL 2006: 8.9% 1970 by Vassos Lyssarides, (Centre-left) 2001: 6.5% personal physician of Archbishop Makarios. Traditionally houses supporters of Makarios and Lyssarides’ 1964 group of fighters against Turkish Cypriots. EDI Liberal DISY 2006: 1.6% 1993 as Movement 2001: 2.6% of Free Democrats by third president Georgos Vassiliou; Later merged with ex-AKEL members ADISOK to form EDI. Sources: Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office; personal interviews of author. 179 180 Appendices Previous presidents of the Republic of Cyprus President Term of office Party Archbishop Makarios 1960–77 None Spiros Kyprianou 1977–88 DIKO George Vassiliou 1988–93 EDI Glafkos Clerides 1993–2003 DISY Tassos Papadopoulos 2003–8 DIKO Demetris Christofias 2008 AKEL Source: Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office. Previous presidents and prime ministers of the TRNC Position Name Term of office Party Of Cabinet President Rauf Denktass¸ 1985–2005 UBP President Mehmet Ali Talat 2005–Present CTP Prime Minister Hakki Atun 1994–6 DP DP-CTP Prime Minister Dervis¸ Erogg˘lu 1996–2004 UBP UBP-DP/UBP-TKP Prime MinisterMehmet Ali Talat 2004–5 CTP CTP-DP Prime Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyer 2005–9 CTP CTP-DP Prime Minister Dervis¸ Erogg˘lu 2009–Present UBP UBP Source: http://www.cm.gov.nc.tr/cm/kabine/kabban.htm (accessed 27 December 2006). Appendix 4 President Makarios’ 13 Amendments to the 1960 Constitution 1. The right of veto of the president and the vice-president of the Republic to be abandoned. 2. The vice-President of the Republic to deputise for the president of the Republic in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties. 3. The Greek president of the House of Representatives and the Turkish vice- president to be elected by the House as a whole and not as at present the presi- dent by the Greek Members of the House and the vice-president by the Turkish Members of the House. 4. The vice-president of the House of Representatives to deputise for the president of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties. 5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished. 6. Unified municipalities to be established. 7. The administration of Justice to be unified. 8. The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie to be abolished. 9. The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defence Forces to be determined by a law. 10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the com- position of the Public Service and the Forces of the Republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 11. The number of the members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten to five. 12. All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority. 13. The Greek Cypriot Communal Chamber to be abolished. Source: Dimitris Bitsios, Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic, Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975 p. 217. 181 Appendix 5 Alvaro de Soto’s Preliminary Thoughts, 12 July 2000 1. As we are about to break until 24 July, I would like to share with you some prelimi- nary thoughts on the way ahead. It is difficult to draw a balance sheet of a process which has not yet entered the negotiating phase as such, and that is not my pur- pose today. Nor has the time come for submitting proposals, let alone comprehen- sive proposals. I am intentionally refraining from covering the entire spectrum at this time. One step at a time. I first wish to obtain reactions to these preliminary thoughts, which contain a mixture of procedure, assumptions, emerging trends, and pending issues. 2. I am not asking for approval or concurrence with what I am about to say. My pur- pose is to elicit your comments, not now, but when you return from the break. 3. General points: • The aim is a comprehensive settlement covering all issues on the table, encompassing all legal instruments and other agreements involving non- Cypriot actors. • The settlement should be self-executing and provide for appropriate mecha- nisms for verification of compliance. • The settlement should leave nothing to be negotiated subsequently. • The settlement should include binding timetables of implementation. • Labels are to be avoided, at least for the present, so as to concentrate on the underlying concepts. • Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. 4. General aims: • Political equality for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. • Maximum security and institutional protection for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to ensure that neither can dominate the other. • Equitable solutions for the exercise of property rights, for the right of return, and on territory. 5. Among the broad features of a potential settlement that are emerging, I see the following: • A common state consisting of an indissoluble partnership of politically equal, largely self-governing component states, sharing in a single international legal personality. Each component state shall have its own constitution, govern- ment, powers and distinct citizenship. The comprehensive settlement would enshrine the basic legal framework of the common state. • A common Cypriot nationality and government with specified powers. 182 Appendices 183 • Effective participation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the common government. • Free movement throughout the island. • An international force to be deployed under a Security Council mandate; dis- solution of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces; prohibition of arms supplies; substantial reduction of non-Cypriot forces to equal levels. Security arrangements will have to recognise the crucial role of the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance. • The need to honour property rights. My sense is that this will require an appropriate combination of restitution, exchange and compensation. The exact make-up will be closely linked to the extent of territorial adjustment. • The extent of territorial adjustment will require considerable further reflection. There also seems to be a correlation between territorial adjustment and the degree of integration of, or separateness between, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in general. • An additional factor in this equation is the powers and structures of the com- ponent states and the common state respectively. These linkages confirm the view, which I am sure we all share, that we must advance on all issues simultaneously. Finally, let me state my assumption that a comprehensive settlement shall com- mit Cyprus to EU membership while taking into account legitimate concerns in this regards. I have attempted to share with you my impression of the state of play. The resulting snapshot is unavoidably blurry. More cannot be expected in the short time available to me because of the early break. It is obvious that considerable work remains to be done on all issues, but we must take the long view. I look forward to your comments on 24 July so as to build on what we have so far. Source: David Hannay, Cyprus, the Search for a Solution, London, I. B. Taurus and Co. 2005. Appendix 6 The 8 November 2000 Document 1. I am very glad to join you and wish to thank you for accepting my invitation to continue and intensify efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement. I was gratified that, in New York, we saw the first signs of the real engagement and I understand that this has continued here in Geneva. I realize, of course, that there is a long way to go. 2. Since we are now seriously engaged in the substance, I wish to make a number of observations. Further to my statement of 12 September, I want to give you my thoughts, first about procedure, and then about some substantive aspects of a possible comprehensive settlement, in the hope of facilitating negotiations. However, I wish to make clear that, as with Mr de Soto’s ‘Preliminary Thoughts’ of 12 July, and the subsequent ideas we have offered, I am not at this stage putting forward a proposal, nor am I covering all the ground. I do not intend to make these remarks public, but I will leave you with the notes of what I say just for your record. 3. On procedure, the first thing I wish to do is to confirm that, as concerns the United Nations, these negotiations are being conducted pursuant to Security Council Regulation 1250, which sets out four guidelines: • No preconditions; • All issues on the table; • Commitment in good faith to continue to negotiate until a settlement is reached; and • Full consideration of relevant United Nations resolutions and t reaties. 4. In these negotiations, each party represents its side – and no one else – as the political equal of the other, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.