The Cyprus Conflict and the Annan Plan: Why One More Failure?

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The Cyprus Conflict and the Annan Plan: Why One More Failure? THE CYPRUS CONFLICT AND THE ANNAN PLAN: WHY ONE MORE FAILURE? Yrd. Doç. Dr. Muzaffer Ercan YILMAZ Balıkesir Üniversitesi, Bandırma İİBF, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü [email protected] ÖZET INTRODUCTION Bu makale, Kıbrıs’ta Türk ve Rum etnik grupları Cyprus, the third largest island in the arasında devam eden uyuşmazlığı, Birleşmiş Mediterranean Sea, has witnessed an intermittently- Milletler Genel Sekreteri Kofi Annan’ın barış planı bloody conflict since the latter part of the twentieth ile bağlantılı olarak inceleyen ve planın başarısızlık century. The birthplace of Aphrodite, the goddess nedenlerini tartışan bir çalışma ortaya of love, turned into a battle ground between Greek koymaktadır. Çalışma, öncelikle Kıbrıs sorununun (about 76 percent) and Turkish (about 20 percent) hem iç, hem de dış dinamiklerini gözden geçiren ethnic groups. Hundreds died and thousands kapsamlı bir analiz sunmaktadır. Bunun ardından, became refugees. Despite various efforts by third- genel olarak Annan’ın barış çabaları, spesifik parties, no solution has been achieved to date. olarak ise planı değerlendirilmekte ve kritik edilmektedir. Bu bağlamda Annan Planı’nın From an international perspective, the Cyprus başarısızlığı, Annan’ın arabulucu olarak stratejik conflict somehow needs to be resolved. In its over hatalarına ve daha önemlisi, planının Kıbrıs forty-year stalemate, the conflict not only weakens sorununun ilişkisel boyutlarını kavrayamama the credibility of the international community to gerçeğine ilişkilendirilmektedir. Sözü geçen deal with intra-state conflicts, which have gradually kritikler temelinde gelecek barış çabalarının replaced the Cold War’s ideological clashes as the izlemesi gereken yön de vurgulanmaktadır. principal sources of post-Cold War conflicts but also intensifies the pessimistic belief that two ethnic ABSTRACT communities cannot co-exist under a single state, which does not fit the optimistic agenda of the st This article examines the ongoing conflict on “new world order” of the 21 century. Cyprus between Greek and Turkish ethnic groups in conjunction with UN Secretary General Kofi In this respect, Cyprus is particularly seen by the Annan’s peace plan and discusses why the plan United Nations (UN) as the “laboratory” for the failed to produce a mutually-accepted solution. The new world order. If resolution succeeds, the study first portrays a comprehensive analysis of the Cypriot state would be the model to which many issue, reviewing both internal and external other nations and peoples will look to guide the dynamics of the conflict. Following that Annan’s resolution of their own conflicts and ethnic peace efforts, in general, and his plan, in tensions. For this reason, the UN has always given particular, were evaluated and criticized. In this a special importance and priority to the Cyprus regard, the plan’s failure is attributed to Annan’s problem, and UN Secretary Generals put great strategic mistakes and more important, his plan’s efforts to resolve the issue. failure to capture the relational dimensions of the conflict. Based on the critiques, the direction that Albeit well-intended, most UN efforts, however, future peace efforts ought to follow is also have failed to capture the realities of Cyprus and addressed. hence, the utility of peace efforts remained limited. The purpose of this article is to analyze the conflict in a comprehensive way and discuss recent peace efforts by the UN, specifically the so-called Annan 29 Plan, in order to illustrate the gap between the in the political life of the island. Initially, the intricacy of the Cyprus issue and simplicity of the Turkish Cypriots reacted to the enosis campaign UN initiatives. The ultimate aim is to balance the with anti-union pronouncements and sources of and appropriate responses to the conflict demonstrations. As the British signaled their to help determine the direction of future peace departure in the 1950s, however, they began efforts on the island by the international pursuing taksim, the division of the island between community. the two communities. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND In the mid-1950s, terrorism prevailed on Cyprus after a Greek underground organization, the EOKA OF THE CONFLICT (National Organization of Cypriot Combatants), was formed to work for enosis. The Turkish Due to its strategic position on the main routes Cypriots, in turn, formed their own underground between Europe and Asia, Cyprus has long been organization, namely Volkan, which was later the focus of political conflict. It was invaded, replaced by the better-led TMT (Turkish Defense bought and sold, and transferred from one ruler to Organization). another without the inhabitants ever being consulted. The occupying forces can be listed as the In February 1959, in the midst of inter-communal Assyrians (707-650), Egyptians (570-546), Persians violence, Britain, Greece and Turkey, all NATO (546-333), Ptolemies (320s-58), Romans (58 BC- members, came together in Zurich to find a solution 330 AD), and Venetians (1489-1571). to the issue. This was mainly done, among other concerns, to preserve the unity of NATO against a Cyprus was conquered by the Ottoman Turks in possible Soviet attack under the threatening climate 1571. Under the Venetians, from whom the of the Cold War. (As Robert H. Stephens astutely Ottoman Turks took over the island, the island’s observed, “the outlook was black not only on the population had dwindled to little more than island but internationally. Khrushchev, flushed with 200,000, consisting almost entirely of Greek- the success of Russia’s first Sputnik, was putting speaking people. After the conquest, about 30,000 pressure on the Western powers over Berlin. There Turks were sent in from the mainland in order to was a call from Washington for a closing of the form a Turkish element in the population. ranks in NATO to meet the new Soviet threat. Cyprus was drifting into a civil war which Ottoman rule continued until 1878 and during that threatened to involve Britain, Greece, and Turkey- period, there was no overt conflict between the all NATO members- in deepening conflict. All of Turks and Greeks of the island. Rather, the the parties concerned found they had reasons for Ottoman authority abolished feudalism and considering a compromise” (Stephens, 1996: 175)). serfdom, terminating the Latin persecution of the The negotiators rejected enosis or taksim, and Greek-speaking Christians as well. The Ottomans instead found another formula. That was to create also officially recognized the Greek Orthodox an independent Cyprus Church as an autocephalous, self governing Archbishopric. The Greek Cypriots enjoyed self- Accordingly, on August 16, 1960, the Republic of government, mainly through the church, which Cyprus came into existence as a compromise regulated their social, educational and religious between the Greek demand for enosis and Turkish affairs. To many analysts, this system, indeed, counter-demand for taksim. It is an irony that when fortified the cohesion of the ethnic Greek the Cypriot state was set up, the consent of the population (Necatigil, 1982: 1-2). Cypriots was not actually considered. In fact, the sate was formed rather against the will of the Greek In 1878, the Ottomans “leased” Cyprus to the and Turkish communities, who were in fight and British with the understanding that the British who showed no urge to live under a common state. would help the Ottomans’ defense against the Under this climate, it was already too optimistic to Russians. When the Ottomans joined the Central evaluate the Cypriot state as a solid, durable Powers in World War I, however, Britain Republic. unilaterally annexed the island (1914) and British rule was formally recognized by the Turkish As expected, shortly after independence, serious government in 1923, with the Treaty of Lousanne. problems began to arise between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots over the interpretation of the Under British rule, particularly in the period after constitution, which was also shaped by the three 1931, the Greek Cypriot movement for enosis outside powers, Britain, Greece and Turkey (It was (union with Greece) became the dominant influence decided that the president would be a Greek 30 Cypriot and the vice-president a Turkish Cypriot, Turkey and in April 1984, full diplomatic ties were and that there would be a Council of Ministers (7 established between the two countries. Greeks, 3 Turks) and a House of Representatives Since then, further efforts have been made, some of (70 percent Greek, 30 percent Turkish) elected by a which with the help of third-parties. Especially universal suffrage for a term of five years.). important was former UN Secretary General Dr. Successive constitutional crises paralyzed the Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s “set of ideas”, which, at government and eventually spilled over into inter- least, motivated the parties to initiate more serious communal fighting. In 1963, three years after the efforts to work on a solution, whereby several establishment of the Republic, large-scale violence summit meetings were actually arranged between broke out and the “reluctant state of Cyprus” (See, the Cypriot leaderships. Xydis, 1973) de facto collapsed. A buffer zone marked by “the green line” was drawn between the As known, the latest, and perhaps the most popular opposing groups, and in 1964, UN peacekeeping effort, is present UN Secretary General Kofi forces (UNFICYP) were sent in, most of which still Annan’s peace plan. This plan generated great remain there. hopes for the international community as it received a certain degree of support from the Cypriot In July 1974, the National Guard of Greek communities, as well as Athens and Ankara. It also Cypriots, with the support of Greek military regime succeeded in arranging a referendum on April 24, governing Greece since 1967, staged a successful 2004 between the parties for the first time. But the coup. The common plan was to realize enosis. result of the referendum was not positive as the President Makarios fled to London and Nikos majority of the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan.
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