Cyprus After the Failure of the Annan-Plan

Cyprus after the failure of the Annan-Plan Jan Asmussen ECMI Brief # 11 July 2004 The European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) is a non-partisan institution founded in 1996 by the Governments of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the German State of Schleswig-Holstein. ECMI was established in Flensburg, at the heart of the Danish-German border region, in order to draw from the encouraging example of peaceful coexistence between minorities and majorities achieved here. ECMI’s aim is to promote interdisciplinary research on issues related to minorities and majorities in a European perspective and to contribute to the improvement of interethnic relations in those parts of Western and Eastern Europe where ethnopolitical tension and conflict prevail. ECMI Briefs are written either by the staff of ECMI or by outside authors commissioned by the Centre. As ECMI does not propagate opinions of its own, the views expressed in any of its publications are the sole responsibility of the author concerned. ECMI Brief # 11 European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) Director: Marc Weller © ECMI 2004 EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MINORITY ISSUES (ECMI) Schiffbruecke 12 (Kompagnietor Building) D-24939 Flensburg Germany phone: +49-(0)461-14 14 9-0 fax: +49-(0)461-14 14 9-19 e-mail: [email protected] internet: http://www.ecmi.de CYPRUS AFTER THE FAILURE OF THE ANNAN PLAN Jan Asmussen On 24 April 2004 Greek and Turkish Cypriots decided in separate simultaneous referenda on whether or not Cyprus would join the European Union on 1 May 2004. While 64.91% of Turkish Cypriots accepted the Annan Plan, an overwhelming majority of 75.83% of Greek Cypriots rejected the UN blueprint. The extent of the Greek Cypriot “Oxi”(No) brought an end to a large scale effort by the United Nations Secretary-General to broker a final deal for a solution of the “oldest item continuously on the peacemaking agenda”.1 Apart from the UN, the United States (Special envoy: Thomas Weston), the United Kingdom (Special envoy: (Sir David Hannay) and the European Union have constantly observed and tried to facilitate the process. Consequently, there has been a great deal of disappointment among those engaged in finding a solution. The most outspoken comment came from EU Enlargement Commissioner, Günter Verheugen who on 21 April declared that he felt “cheated” by the Greek Cypriot Government.2 Kofi Annan’s latest report clearly puts most of the blame for the failure on the Greek Cypriot leader, Tassos Papadopoulos, and his government and stresses that “if the Greek Cypriots are ready to share power and prosperity with the Turkish Cypriots in a federal structure based on political equality, this needs to be demonstrated, not just in word, but in action.”3 Apparently, the international community never took the possibility of such an outcome into consideration. As a result, both the EU and the UN concentrated on pressuring the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey to accept the UN Plan. At the same time no efforts were made to secure a more positive attitude by the Greek Cypriot leadership. Today the international community is in a stage of shock and has clearly not developed an alternative plan to cope with the new situation. 1 S/2003/398 Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, April 2003, § 4. 2 “I am going to be very undiplomatic now. I feel cheated by the Greek Cypriot government. We had a clear agreement on this point. Mr Papadopoulos must respect his part of the deal. Under no circumstances was a resolution to the conflict to fall as a result of opposition from the Greek Cypriot authorities.”; Cyprus Mail, 22.4.2004. 3 S/2004/437 Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, 28 May 2004, § 86. Background The present stage of the Cyprus Conflict dates back to 1963, when a violent “civil war” brought an end to the constitutional set-up arranged in the London and Zurich Agreements of 1959.4 At the core of the conflict was the demographic dilemma of a Greek Cypriot community comprising 78.17% of the population which had the political aim of uniting Cyprus with Greece (Enosis) and a Turkish Cypriot community of 18.18% which categorically rejected such a notion.5 The 1960 Cyprus Republic collapsed mainly because it failed to satisfy the political will of the Greek Cypriots who felt pressed into an unwanted constitutional partnership granting disproportionate rights to their Turkish Cypriot “compatriots”. 6 United Nations engagement in Cyprus started in 1964 with the establishment of the United Nations Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).7 The main aim of the force during its first decade was to monitor the cease-fire and facilitate movement of persons between territories under control of the Greek Cypriot authorities. The UN in 1964 recognised the administration as Government of the Republic of Cyprus despite the constitutional breakdown8 and the Turkish Cypriot enclaves which comprised approximately 2% of the Islands territory. The following phase of the conflict developed out of a coup d’état on 15 July 1974 which was triggered by mainland Greek officers of the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Greek Cypriot supporters of the EOKA-B movement. Emphasising its right to intervene under the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey sent troops to the island and proceeded to partition Cyprus. As a result, 180 000 Greek Cypriots fled to the south of the island, while 45 000 Turkish Cypriots moved to the north.9 On 15 November 1983 Turkish Cypriots declared their independence and established the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”. The move was immediately condemned by the UN Security Council. The principal reason for non-recognition was that the international community would not condone the expulsion of thousands of Greek Cypriots. Subsequently, only Turkey recognised the new isolated, breakaway state. Northern Cyprus has been subject to international embargoes ever since.10 4 For the historical foundations of interethnic conflict in Cyprus see: Asmussen, Jan: “Wir waren wie Brüder”. Zusammenleben und Konfliktentstehung in ethnisch-gemischten Dörfern auf Zypern. (Hamburg, 2001). 5 While the small groups of Armenians and Maronites were counted as “Greeks” the remaining population of 3.65% contained British, “Gypsies” and others; The 1960 census is the last one conducted in the whole of Cyprus. For subsequent periods only unreliable estimates exist; Republic of Cyprus (Ed.): Census of Population and Agriculture. (Nicosia, 1962), Table I. 6 See Zervakis, Peter: "Historische Grundlagen", in Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev, Winfried Steffani, and Peter Zervakis (eds.): Südosteuropa-Handbuch. Vol. 8: Zypern. (Göttingen, 1998), 38-90. 7 Theordorides, The United Nations Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), in: 31 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1982), 765-783. 8 UN Security Council Resolution 186/1964. 9 Drury, Michael P.: “The Political Geography of Cyprus”, in Clarke, John I. and Howard Bowen-Jones (eds), Change and Development in the Middle East (London, New York, 1981), 289-304, 293. 10 As a result there have been no direct flights to and from Northern Cyprus; no direct imports and exports; Turkish Cypriot educational organisations are not recognised, and so forth. International efforts to find a solution – ‘A grave of diplomacy’ Originally planned for three months, UNFICYP’s deployment continues and has developed into the UN’s longest peacekeeping mission and its largest failure in international diplomacy. Almost immediately after the peacekeepers arrived, the UN began to broker a peace deal on the island (see Galo Plaza report 1965) and after 1968 it sponsored direct talks. At the start, the chief negotiators were Rauf Denktaş, who officially continues to hold the position, and Glafcos Clerides, who held the post intermittently until February 2003. Direct dialogue failed to produce any results. As UN Secretary General Kofi Annan described “[it] was not (…) because solutions were not achievable. Rather, it was because negotiation, in the sense of give and take, almost never occurred. Instead, the process was one of procedural wrangling, verbal gymnastics, shadow boxing, and mini-crises, with only occasional promising glimmers on the substance which did not last.”11 The diplomatic deadlock cannot be solely attributed to one side or the other, however. Until 1974 the Greek Cypriot side clearly carried most of the blame for the impasse led by the President and Archbishop Makarios most notably. After 1974, it was the Turkish Cypriot side with the support of Turkey and Rauf Denktaş as chief delegate that stood their ground.12 The EU factor As the Republic of Cyprus filed its application for European Union membership in 1990, there was little hope that this move would facilitate a solution to its territorial and political division. Turkish and Turkish Cypriot reactions to this initiative were hostile and as accession negotiations began in March 1998, Denktaş refused to attend further talks. On the other hand, Greek-Turkish rapprochement led by George Papandreou and İsmail Cem further encouraged the two sides to come together. Moreover, the implications of membership negotiations were not overlooked by the Turkish government, as it too was seeking accession to the Union.13 Consequently, in December 1999 the European Council decided to bring Turkey closer to accession talks while granting Cyprus candidacy status. The political climate had changed little in Cyprus, however. Five sessions of “proximity talks” dragged on from December 1999 to late 2000 and into the early months of the following year. The two leaders, Denktaş and Clerides, meanwhile, were not able to bridge any major differences.14 In the end, Turkey seemed ready to push Northern Cyprus towards a reconciliation. In early November 2001 Denktaş sent Clerides a letter calling for direct talks to break the deadlock and to arrive at a final solution.

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