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Musikpädagogik in Nordkorea

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Musikpädagogik in Nordkorea Musikpädagogik in Nordkorea Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Humanwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität zu Köln nach der Promotionsordnung vom 10.05.2010 vorgelegt von Mi-Kyung, Chang aus Seoul (Südkorea) Dezember/2014 Diese Dissertation wurde von der Humanwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität zu Köln im April 2015 angenommen. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Einleitung-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4 1.1 Forschungsinteresse und Zielsetzung--------------------------------------------4 1.2 Ausblick: Eine positive Rolle der Musikpädagogik für den Wiederverei- nigungsprozess-------------------------------------------------------------------------9 1.3 Zur Forschungs- und Quellenlage------------------------------------------------10 2. Zum historischen Hintergrund: Der Koreakrieg und die endgültige Landesteilung-----------------------------------------------------------------------------14 2.1. Unabhängigkeit und erste Teilung ----------------------------------------------14 2.2. Die Entstehung des Teilungssystems-------------------------------------------18 2.2.1 Regierungsbildung in der Republik Korea------------------------------18 2.2.2 Regierungsgründung im Norden Koreas--------------------------------20 2.2.3 Der Weg zum Koreakrieg---------------------------------------------------22 2.3. Die Situation vor dem Koreakrieg -----------------------------------------------23 2.3.1 Die Lage im Süden-----------------------------------------------------------23 2.3.2 Die Lage im Norden----------------------------------------------------------25 2.4. Der Koreakrieg------------------------------------------------------------------------27 2.4.1 Die Kriegsfolgen---------------------------------------------------------------32 3. Erziehung in Nordkorea----------------------------------------------------------------35 3.1. Veränderungen im Erziehungswesen und das sozialistische Bildungs- ziel----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------35 3.2. Das nordkoreanische Bildungssystem-----------------------------------------41 1 3.3 Berufsbild und Ausbildung des Lehrpersonals--------------------------------52 3.3.1 Die Pflichten der Lehrer------------------------------------------------------52 3.3.2 Der Erziehungsprozess an den pädagogischen Hochschulen-----53 3.3.3 Die soziale und wirtschaftliche Position der Lehrkräfte--------------57 3.4. Das Schulleben----------------------------------------------------------------------60 4. Die Nordkoreanische Musik-Politik-------------------------------------------------65 4.1. Die Ideologie der Musik-Politik---------------------------------------------------65 4.1.1 Der Hintergrund der Musik-Politik----------------------------------------67 4.1.2 Die Lieder der Musik-Politik------------------------------------------------76 4.2. Die Besonderheiten der Musik---------------------------------------------------83 4.2.1 Die Juche-Musik--------------------------------------------------------------83 4.2.2 Die „Sozialistische Musik“--------------------------------------------------91 4.2.3 Die Volksmusik---------------------------------------------------------------91 4.2.4 Die Neugestaltung der nationalen Musikinstrumente---------------97 4.2.5 Die Instrumentation--------------------------------------------------------109 4.3. Nordkoreanische Künstlerorganisationen-----------------------------------112 4.3.1 Die Künstlervereine in Nordkorea--------------------------------------113 4.3.2 Die Rolle der Künstlervereine--------------------------------------------117 5. Die nordkoreanische Musikerziehung--------------------------------------------122 5.1. Das Wesen und Ziel der Musikerziehung-----------------------------------122 5.2. Der Musikunterricht in der Grundschule------------------------------------124 2 5.2.1 Der Inhalt der Schulmusikbücher---------------------------------------126 5.2.1.1 Der Gesang-------------------------------------------------------127 5.2.1.2 Das Blattsingen--------------------------------------------------143 5.2.1.3 Die Instrumentalmusik-----------------------------------------149 5.2.1.4 Das Musikhören-------------------------------------------------152 5.2.1.5 Die Abbildungen in den Musikbüchern--------------------156 5.3. Die Elite- und musikalische Früherziehung--------------------------------160 5.3.1 Die musikalische Früherziehung---------------------------------------167 5.3.2 Die Musikbegabtenerziehungsorganisation in der Grund- und Mit- telschulphase------------------------------------------------------------176 6. Musikerziehung in Südkorea--------------------------------------------------------184 6.1. Musikerziehung in der Grundschule------------------------------------------184 6.2. Die Musikkultur in Südkorea----------------------------------------------------191 7. Schlussfolgerungen--------------------------------------------------------------------194 8. Anlagen-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------200 8.1. Ein Musikbeispiel: Die propagandistische Veränderung eines traditionellen Volksliedes am Beispiel von Chang Bu Ta Ryong------------------------------------200 8.2. Verschiedene nordkoreanische Musikstücke------------------------------------209 9.Literaturverzeichnis---------------------------------------------------------------------216 3 1. Einleitung 1.1. Forschungsinteresse und Zielsetzung Das koreanische Volk bewahrt seit 4000 Jahren die gleiche Kultur und Sprache und bildete über 1300 Jahre lang einen einheitlichen Staat. Aber das Land ist nunmehr seit 60 Jahren in zwei einander feindliche politische Systeme getrennt: Kommunismus in Nordkorea und Demokratie und temporäre Militärdiktaturen in Südkorea. Beide Staaten lehnen ihre gegenseitige politische Anerkennung ab, und es kam und kommt häufig zu Konfrontationen. Seit der Teilung von 1948 entfremdeten sich Nord- und Südkorea immer stärker in Politik und Wirtschaft, damit aber zugleich auch in Sprache und Kultur, die Gleichartigkeit und das Bewusstsein ihrer Zusammengehörigkeit verloren sich somit allmählich zunehmend. Die Rivalität beider Länder wurde durch die ungleichen ideologischen Systeme hervorgerufen und durch ihre unterschiedlichen Erziehungskonzepte verstärkt. Beide Erziehungsprinzipien veränderten Denkweisen und Handlungen ihrer Be- völkerung grundlegend, sodass die Hoffnung auf die Vereinigung in weite Ferne rückte. Nach dem Koreakrieg wurde in Südkorea die Erziehung gezielt anti- kommunistisch ausgerichtet, wobei verstärkt die negativen Seiten Nordkoreas hervorgehoben wurden, um so die eigene große demokratische Überlegenheit herauszustellen. Das kommunistische Nordkorea besitzt als kommunistisches Land ein einzigar- 4 tiges politisches System, dessen Grundlage die von Kim Il-sung entwickelte Juche-Ideologie, die auch einen enormen Einfluss auf die Erziehung besitzt, bildet. Die Bevölkerung lernte aber vor allem, seinen Führer Kim Il-sung sowie auch seinen Nachfolger Kim Jong-il abgöttisch zu verehren. Durch die grundverschiedene Erziehungspolitik beider Staaten kam es zu ge- genseitigen Provokationen und Misstrauen, was eine Annäherung oder gar die Vereinigung zusätzlich erschwerte und bis heute verhinderte. Nach dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion und des kommunistischen Osteu- ropas veränderte sich jedoch weltweit die politische Situation. Denn die von niemandem erwartete deutsche Wiedervereinigung hat dem koreanischen Volk enorme Hoffnung auf seine Wiedervereinigung gegeben. Und auch in Nordko- reas Gesellschaft bahnte sich eine gewisse Wende an, die sich beispielsweise nach dem Jahr 2000 im allmählich einsetzenden Kulturaustausch zwischen Nord- und Südkorea zeigte. Doch die geweckten Erwartungen sind rasch wie- der enttäuscht worden, denn Nordkorea kehrte wieder zum Konfrontationskurs zurück, indem es seine atomare Aufrüstung forcierte. Und auch nach der Machtübernahme der dritten Generation durch Kim Jong-un ist kein Wechsel erfolgt, denn vielmehr scheinen für Nordkorea militärische Drohungen unver- zichtbar zu sein, um die Herrschaft der Partei zu stabilisieren, indem der äußere Feind die Homogenität der eigenen Gruppe garantiert. Obwohl die Wiedervereinigung noch in weiter Ferne liegt, sollten Nord- und Südkorea für alle Fälle, vor allem im Erziehungsbereich, darauf vorbereitet sein, damit das Volk wieder ein gemeinsames Wertesystem erlangen kann. Beide Länder müssen dafür gegenseitiges Verständnis aufbringen und Vertrauen auf- 5 bauen, denn sie waren 60 Jahre lang getrennt und die dadurch entstandenen unterschiedlichen Denkweisen sollten so schnell wie möglich überwunden wer- den. Die südkoreanische Bevölkerung sollte darum die Erziehungsideologie Nordko- reas und ihre Ziele studieren und begreifen. Besonders die Lernprozesse, die Erziehungsmethoden und das Schulleben müssen untersucht werden, denn nur so kann die Grundlage ihrer Erziehungsideologie kritisch hinterfragt werden. Man schreibt dem Musikunterricht in Korea im Gegensatz zu Europa, wo er in der Regel eher eine marginale Bedeutung hat, unter den Schulfächern eine wichtige Rolle zu, denn weil er die Emotionen sehr stark beeinflusst, spielt er eine sehr wichtige Rolle für die kindliche Entwicklung. Musik als grenzenlose Weltsprache dient dazu, Geist, Körper und Seele des Menschen zu erreichen. Und durch ihre Klänge werden momentane Gefühle und Stimmungen ausge- drückt. Die Schüler in Südkorea haben die Freiheit verschiedene musikalische Aktivitä- ten auszuwählen
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