PAKISTAN TIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) KEY FINDINGS In 2017, religious minorities in Pakistan, including Hindus, 2018 national elections further threatens religious minori- Christians, Sikhs, Ahmadis, and Shi’a Muslims, continued to ties’ already precarious status in the country. In May 2017, a face attacks and discrimination from extremist groups and USCIRF delegation visited Islamabad and met with Pakistani society at large. The government of Pakistan failed to protect government officials, U.S. Embassy officials, representatives these groups adequately, and it perpetrated systematic, of civil society, and religious minority community leaders. ongoing, egregious religious freedom violations. Various Based on these violations, in 2018 USCIRF again finds that media outlets promoted intolerance against religious minori- Pakistan should be designated as a “country of particular ties. Abusive enforcement of the country’s strict blasphemy concern,” or CPC, under the International Religious Free- laws resulted in the suppression of rights for non-Muslims, dom Act (IRFA), as it has found since 2002. Despite USCIRF’s Shi’a Muslims, and Ahmadis. Forced conversions of non-Mus- longstanding recommendation, the State Department has lims continued despite the passage of the Hindu Marriage never so designated Pakistan. In December 2017, the State Act, which grants greater rights in family law for Hindu cit- Department named Pakistan as the first, and only, country on izens. The entry of fundamentalist, and often extremist, its “Special Watch List,” a new category created by December religious parties into the political arena in advance of July 2016 amendments to IRFA. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT • Designate Pakistan as a CPC under IRFA; religious minorities in the country, link between religious freedom and • Negotiate a binding agreement with their contributions to society, and their overall security in the country; the government of Pakistan, under sec- equal rights and protections, and use • Pressing the government of Paki- tion 405(c) of IRFA, to achieve specific the tools of U.S. public diplomacy, such stan to implement the two dozen and meaningful reforms, with bench- as educational and cultural exchanges religious freedom recommendations marks including major legal reforms and U.S.-funded media, to highlight it accepted from its 2017 Univer- and releasing blasphemy prisoners, similar themes; sal Periodic Review by the United and accompany such an agreement • Use targeted tools against specific offi- Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, with U.S.-provided resources for cials identified as having participated in of which Pakistan is a member; related capacity building through the or being responsible for human rights • Urging the government of Paki- State Department and U.S. Agency for abuses, including particularly severe stan to repeal its blasphemy and International Development (USAID); violations of religious freedom; these anti-Ahmadi laws, until repeal can be • Ensure a portion of existing State tools include the “specially designated accomplished, enact reforms to make Department Bureau of Democracy, nationals” list maintained by the U.S. blasphemy a bailable offense, require Human Rights and Labor programs Department of the Treasury’s Office evidence by accusers, and allow are geared to helping the government of Foreign Assets Control, visa denials investigatory authorities to dismiss implement plans to ensure the physical under section 604(a) of IRFA and unfounded accusations, and also urg- security of religious minority commu- the Global Magnitsky Human Rights ing the enforcement of existing penal nities, and to countering the extremist Accountability Act, and asset freezes code articles that criminalize perjury rhetoric that underlies their discrimina- under the Global Magnitsky Act; and and false accusations; and tory treatment; • Prioritize religious freedom issues in the • Encouraging the government of • Enhance support from the State U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship, and Pakistan to enhance the Ministry of Department and other relevant federal work with international organizations Religious Affairs and Inter-faith Har- or federally funded organizations for and representatives like the European mony’s role in fostering interfaith non governmental groups engaging in Union (EU) Special Envoy for freedom dialogue and empowering religious conflict resolution and peace training of religion or belief outside the EU to minority groups and to provide for religious leaders and administrators jointly raise religious freedom concerns security and facilitate meetings of madrassa administration boards; with Pakistani officials in Islamabad and between leaders and scholars from in multilateral settings, including by: • Encourage the government of Paki- various religions and from the vari- stan to launch a public information • Emphasizing to Pakistan’s prime ous Islamic sects. campaign about the historic role of minister and military leadership the USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2018 TIER 1 TIER PAKISTAN COUNTRY FACTS FULL NAME RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY* Islamic Republic of Pakistan 96.28% Muslim 85–90% Sunni GOVERNMENT 10–15% Shi’a Federal Parliamentary Republic 0.22% Ahmadi POPULATION 1.59% Christian 207,774,520 1.60% Hindu GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHS *Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook and Paki- Islam stan Bureau of Statistics BACKGROUND has fostered the spread of an increasingly divisive and Pakistan is an ethnically diverse country with a population anti-minority narrative among the public. of 207 million people, according to the government’s 2017 The government of Pakistan has not addressed the census. While the constitution establishes Islam as the spread of sectarian or religiously motivated intolerant state religion, articles 20 through 22 protect the rights of speech and has not prosecuted perpetrators of vio- freedom of religion and religious education and articles 26 lent crimes against religious minorities. Despite the and 27 prohibit discrimination based on religion in relation existence of specialized antiterrorism courts to deal to access to public places with extremist suspects, a and provision of public vast number of extremists services. There are 10 seats The government of Pakistan has not have either been released reserved for members of addressed the spread of sectarian or from custody or avoided religious minority commu- religiously motivated intolerant speech arrest and prosecution all nities in the parliament. Yet, and has not prosecuted perpetrators of together. Often, acquit- despite these provisions, violent crimes against religious minorities. tals of terrorist suspects the second amendment to can be attributed to the constitution prohibits flawed police investi- Ahmadis from calling themselves Muslims or referring to gation procedures, which continue to persist across their places of worship as mosques. Pakistan’s police forces. Rather than addressing these The continued operation of terrorist groups like institutional shortcomings, the civilian government Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), the gave control over terrorist prosecutions to military Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), and Tehr- tribunals, which have had a higher rate of successful ik-e-Taliban (Pakistani Taliban) challenges the overall prosecutions but have also been accused of major security of the country. These groups threaten not only violations of due process rights and for using torture members of religious minority communities but also against suspects. anyone who attempts to advocate on their behalf. This The government of Pakistan has taken other steps has resulted in politicians and judges avoiding the pub- to curb the capability of terrorist groups to target the lic promotion of rights for religious minorities, which public at large and religious minorities specifically. The USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2018 TIER 1 TIER PAKISTAN Zarb-e-Azb Operation launched by the military in 2014 While other ethnic groups in Pakistan are also Shi’a in the western border region targeted sectarian terrorist Muslims, the Hazaras have a distinct appearance and groups like the Pakistani Taliban and LeJ, who have have established their own neighborhoods and enclaves taken responsibility for several attacks against Chris- around the country. These two factors make Hazaras tians, Shi’a Muslims, and Ahmadis. The impact of this prime targets for sectarian extremist groups targeting operation continues to be felt today by terrorist groups Shi’a Muslims. Violent sectarian groups have perpetrated who have a diminished capability to carry out attacks on massive attacks on Hazara neighborhoods in places like vulnerable groups. The government has also provided Quetta despite the additional security provided by the additional security to religious minority groups, espe- government for those neighborhoods since 2013. In 2017, cially during religious festivals. Further, the National there were several kidnappings and murders of Hazaras, Action Plan of 2014 (NAP) set forth several strategies to such as the attack on a coal miners’ bus that left two deal with terrorism and address the spread of sectarian- Hazaras dead, and the January 2017 shooting that left five ism and extremist ideology. Unfortunately, despite the Hazaras dead and many others injured. elapse of three years, many of NAP’s recommendations have not been implemented. Accordingly, religious Conditions for Other Religious Minorities