THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION FEBRUARY 26, 2018 VOLUME XVI, ISSUE 4 p.1 p.3 p.5 p.7 Alexander Sehmer Farhan Zahid Aleksandre Kvakhadze Alessandra Bocchi BRIEFS The Potential for a Ending Islamic State: Libya’s Rogue Militias New Strand of Islamist Dealing With Women Keep the Country From Extremism in Pakistan and Children Tackling Human Returnees in the Trafficking North Caucasus INDONESIA: INFLUENTIAL ISLAMIC STATE CLERIC the southern Philippines (ABS-CBN, June 9, 2017). In- GOES ON TRIAL deed, his influence is such that in late 2016 he was moved to solitary confinement on the Nusakambangan Alexander Sehmer prison island south of Java (Straits Times, February 15). Indonesia has put on trial an Islamist cleric alleged to A former university lecturer, Abdurrahman is considered have been behind the 2016 shooting and suicide bomb- to be the ideological leader of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah ing attack in Jakarta. Although the trial is welcome, an- (JAD), an IS-aligned group that emerged in Indonesia in other conviction against him is unlikely to weaken the 2015 (Tempo, March 21, 2015). The group appears to Islamic State (IS)-aligned group he is accused of head- bring together militants with IS sympathies from a vari- ing. ety of different factions, and it was designated a terrorist organization by the United States last year (Jakarta Post, Aman Abdurrahman (a.k.a. Oman Rochman) was indict- January 11, 2017). ed in a Jakarta court on February 15, accused of inciting others to carry out attacks between 2016 and 2017 According to a recent United Nations report on IS activi- (Jakarta Post, February 15; Benar, February 15). Among ties, JAD is one of two key IS-aligned groups currently the violence he is accused of inspiring is the attack by menacing Indonesia (See UNSC S/2018/80). The other gunmen and suicide bombers on a shopping mall in is Jamaah Ansarul Khilafah (JAK), led by Abu Husna central Jakarta on January 14, 2016, in which four peo- (a.k.a. Adurrahim bin Thotib), a longtime friend and for- ple were killed (Jakarta Post, February 18). mer cellmate of Jemaah Islamiyah ideologue Abu Bakar Bashir. Husna, who was convicted in 2009, was himself a Abdurrahman has not taken part in any of the attacks Jemaah Islamiyah leader, heading the group’s “educa- himself, because he has been in jail since 2010. None- tion” division. theless, he has remained influential, including suppos- edly putting out a call from his prison cell exhorting his Jailing Abdurrahman and Bashir back in 2010—the two followers to join Islamist militants fighting in Marawi, in were convicted after they established an Islamist training 1 camp under a single banner in Aceh Province—was a YEMEN: KEEPING ISLAMIC STATE IN PERSPECTIVE success for Indonesia in the fight against terrorism, but putting the pair behind bars has failed to stop their in- Alexander Sehmer fluence on the region’s Islamists. A division of Islamic State (IS) in Yemen has claimed an If convicted in his new trial, Abdurrahman could face the attack on Houthi forces in Ibb governorate—its first in death penalty. However, while he is doubtless a key in- months. It comes as there is a renewed focus on IS in fluencer, he is unlikely to be central to JAD’s operations, Yemen, though the real jihadist threat in the country re- leaving both it and Husna’s group as serious threats to mains al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Indonesian security. In a message on the Telegram app on February 18, Liwa al-Akhdar, a contingent of IS fighters operating in Ibb, claimed to have killed five Houthi fighters and wounded a number of others, using an improvised explosive de- vice (IED) in the al-Shaar neighborhood of the main city of Ibb. The attack ends nearly 13 months of silence from the IS affiliate in Ibb. The last attack it claimed was a suicide blast at a Houthi checkpoint in January last year (SITE, January 24, 2017). Instead, IS has concentrated on building its forces in neighboring al-Bayda, where it set up training camps in sparsely populated areas of the province (AMN [Lebanon], June 12, 2017). In October, when the United States expanded its Yemen counter-terrorism opera- tions, these bases were targeted in airstrikes (U.S. De- partment of Defense, October 16, 2017). IS in Yemen effectively came into being in November 2014 with the release of an audio recording of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in which the IS leader recognized pledges of allegiance by groups around the region, including in Yemen (Daily Star [Lebanon], November 14, 2014). IS in Yemen carried out its first major attack in March 2015, with twin suicide blasts at Houthi mosques in the capital Sana’a, killing at least 137 people (al-Jazeera, March 21, 2015). In another audio recording in May that year, al- Baghdadi congratulated the Yemen wilayat (province) for advances it had made against the Houthis (MEMRI, May 14, 2015). However, while IS in Yemen has expanded—U.S. intelli- gence estimates are that the group doubled in size last year—it still consists of disparate groups that are yet to see any territorial victories. AQAP, by contrast, has been well established in Yemen since the 1990s and is a key part of the global al-Qaeda network. It has cultivated local relationships, maintained its safe havens and governed territory, including suc- 2 cessfully running the port of al-Mukalla, Yemen’s fifth largest city, for a year, before being pushed out by Unit- The Potential for a New ed Arab Emirates-backed troops (TRT World, April 24, Strand of Islamist Extremism 2016). in Pakistan Both AQAP and IS have benefited from the years of devastation wrought by Yemen’s civil war as a Saudi- Farhan Zahid backed coalition attempts to defeat the Houthis and reinstall Yemen’s President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. The emergence of violent Barelvi extremism in Pakistan Sectarianism, insecurity and a ruined economy have was brought sharply to the country’s attention last year made Yemen fertile ground for jihadists. AQAP particu- when Tehreek-i-Labaik Ya Rasool Allah, an Islamist politi- larly has been able to use the Saudi-backed coalition’s cal party, staged an almost month-long sit-in that later blinkered focus on defeating the Houthis to paint itself turned violent. as a potential ally for anti-Houthi Sunnis. It is this prag- matic approach that means AQAP, despite IS’ recent The party objected to an alleged change to the wording gains, remains the real jihadist threat in Yemen. of the oath of office contained in the 2017 Election Bill, which it considered to be blasphemous, and demanded the resignation of then-Federal Minister of Law and Jus- tice Zahid Hamid. Police operations to uproot the pro- testers served only to spread the protests wider, paralyz- ing the whole state apparatus. Barelvi extremism is a new phenomenon, a potential threat still in the making, but one that the Pakistani gov- ernment must address. A New Strain of Extremism Most militant Islamist organizations in South Asia—and particularly in Pakistan—adhere to either the Deobandi- Sunni or Ahl-e-Hadith (Salafist) schools of Islam. Prom- inent among these are Deobandi organizations like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Harkat ul Jihad-e-Islami, Harkat ul Mujahedeen, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Omar and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda, Islam- ic State, Waliyat-e-Khurasan, Hizb-ut Tahrir and Lashkar- e-Taiba (LeT) adhere to the Salafist tradition. By contrast, before the emergence of Tehreek-i-Labaik, no Islamist organization belonging to the Barelvi sect of Sunni Islam had been involved in violent activities. Sunni Tehreek, a Barelvi group that is now part of Tehreek-i- Labaik, was considered by some to have violent tenden- cies, but it was not a designated terrorist organization. Barelvism is a South Asian variant of Sufi Islam and is widely practiced in the region. While there are no official figures, it is possible that about 70 percent of Pakistanis adhere to the Hanafi-Sunni sect of Islam, and of those more than half are Barelvi Sunni. [1] As a consequence, 3 Tehreek-i-Labaik considers itself to be the representative operation against the crowd of more than one thousand of Pakistan’s religious majority. Tehreek-i-Labaik protestors was unsuccessful and in- stead sparked violence. Protesters burned vehicles and In this respect, it enjoys some level of support at the attacked passersby in the capital. Six protesters were community level for two main reasons. First, because it killed in clashes with police in Rawalpindi, while 40 per- purports to safeguard the rights of Pakistan’s sizeable sonnel of the Rawalpindi police, 76 members of the Is- Barelvi population; and second, because it has framed lamabad Capital Territory police, 64 Frontier Constabu- its purpose in terms of fighting against blasphemers and lary personnel and 50 civilians were injured (Express Tri- protesting any move by the government to amend Pa- bune, November 25, 2017). kistan’s anti-blasphemy law. The district administration of Islamabad Capital Territory Prior to the 2017 protests, Barelvi leaders Syed Khadim called for the deployment of the military to restore order Hussain Rizvi and Dr. Ashraf Jalali, considered the (Dawn, November 25, 2017). Tehreek-i-Labaik leader founders of Tehreek-i-Labaik, had not enjoyed much Rizvi ordered his followers to stage sit-ins across the prominence. However, in recent by-elections in three country, and in response, Tehreek-i-Labaik workers different constituencies, candidates backed by their par- across Pakistan turned violent, cutting off the national ty managed to win 5-10 percent of the popular vote, a communications and railway networks.