The Carter Administration and South African Apartheid

Between Morality and Power

Noor ter Meer – 2388073 [email protected] Master thesis MA North American Studies Universiteit Leiden 21-10-2020 Supervisor: Dr. W.M. Schmidli Second reader: Dr. D. Fazzi Word count (excluding footnotes): 19.774 Declaration of originality

By submitting this test, I certify that:

✓ this work has been drafted by me without any assistance from others (not applicable to group work); ✓ I have not discussed, shared, or copied submitted work from/with other students ✓ I have not used sources that are not explicitly allowed by the course instructors and I have clearly referenced all sources (either from a printed source, internet or any other source) used in the work in accordance with the course requirements and the indications of the course instructors; ✓ this work has not been previously used for other courses in the programme or for course of another programme or university unless explicitly allowed by the course instructors.

I understand that any false claim in respect to this work will result in disciplinary action in accordance with university regulations and the programme regulations, and that any false claim will be reported to the Board of Examiners. Disciplinary measures can result in exclusion from the course and/or the programme.

I understand that my work may be checked for plagiarism, by the use of plagiarism detection software as well as through other measures taken by the university to prevent and check on fraud and plagiarism.

I understand and endorse the significance of the prevention of fraud and I acknowledge that in case of (gross) fraud the Board of Examiners could declare the examination invalid, which may have consequences for all students.

20 October 2020

Abstract

When Jimmy Carter was inaugurated in 1977, he promised to make his commitment to human rights absolute. The deeply torn and racially divided region of Southern Africa would become his administration’s stage to illustrate their moralistic foreign policy which was based on the promotion of human rights. Whereas Carter’s commitment to human rights was motivated by his personal experiences during the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, his National

Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was led by strategic considerations which could advance the American position in the Cold War. These conflicting approaches to a human rights policy resulted in a vague, often hypocritical, and quickly shifting policy, which started with a strong moral undertone and focus on human rights, yet ended with economic and strategic considerations as the top priorities of the administration. Through its in-depth analysis of primary sources, this study has sought to research the change in the Carter administration’s human rights policy towards South Africa, thereby also discussing the general changes within the foundations of the administration’s foreign policy.

Table of contents

Introduction 4

1 Carter, Brzezinski and human rights in South Africa 11

2 1977: The year of hope and morality 28

3 1978-1980: The years of failed attempts and hypocrisy 46

Conclusion 62

Bibliography 67

Introduction

On January 20, 1977, Jimmy Carter was inaugurated as the 39th president of the United States.

As Carter set out the plans for the foreign policy of his administration, it became clear that human rights would be the underlying theme.1 When he inherited the global issues faced by his predecessor, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter had probably not foreseen the challenges he would face during his presidency in southern Africa. The issues in the deeply torn and racially divided region would present president Carter with difficult dilemmas, which had, in the light of the administration’s human rights policy, the potential to be of major influence on the administration’s credibility and success.

Since the victory of the Nasionale Party van Suid-Afrika (National Party of South

Africa) in 1948, apartheid was deeply embedded in South African politics. South Africa, however, had been racially divided for a long time before the apartheid laws. Having been dominated under white, foreign rule since the seventeenth century, alternately by British and

Dutch colonizers, South African blacks had been subject to discriminatory systems of control for a long time.2 The National Party ruled over South Africa with a system and laws based on the ideology of apartheid, which was a “microcosm of human degradation.”3 Deprived of basic political, civil and socio-economic rights, black South Africans were severely repressed by the political regime. As South Africa was one of Carter’s prioritized countries in his human rights policy, South Africa will serve as the case study in this thesis. Through a detailed analysis of the change within the administration’s policy towards South Africa, this thesis will illustrate the general shift of the administration’s human rights policy.

1 Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 6. 2 Edward Kamara, “Continuity or change: American foreign policy of human rights under the Carter and the Reagan administration with particular emphasis on Southern Africa 1977-1984,” PhD dissertation, Wayne State University, thesis (2005): 12. 3 Kamara, “Continuity or change,” 111.

Jimmy Carter was President of the United States from 1977 until 1980. Carter was raised in a religious family in the Old South and had personally experienced the African-

American struggle for civil rights. Because of his faith and his experience with the civil rights movement, Carter was deeply committed to racial equality and a moral foreign policy. The scholarly assessment of Carter as the president has changed notably over time. Scholars who have researched Carter in the late nineties and early 2000’s emphasize the moral underpinnings of Carter’s foreign policy and human rights policy, and argue that the administration remained true to its moral beliefs and its dedication to human rights until the end of its term. Scholars who researched Carter in the past decade, however, argue that Carter did not live up to his initial foreign policy plans, and contend that the administration traded its moral beliefs for power and Soviet containment.

Another important policymaker in the Carter administration, was Zbigniew

Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Advisor (NSA). Zbigniew Brzezinski, born in Poland in 1928, fled to Canada with his family in 1938. He studied at Harvard – notably, at the same time as Henry Kissinger – and became a well known international relations scholar during the

Cold War.4 In 1972, Brzezinski founded the Trilateral Commission, which was aimed at improving the trilateral economic and political relations between Japan, Europe and the US.5

After Carter was introduced to the Commission in 1973, Brzezinski and Carter quickly became close. Having worked together for three years, Brzezinski was eager to support

Carter’s candidacy in 1976.6 His early support and his incredibly wide range of knowledge ultimately resulted in Carter’s decision to appoint him to the position of National Security

Advisor.7 Being a Polish immigrant, Brzezinski’s particular focus had always been on the

4 Kamara, “Continuity or change,” 111. 5 Ibid., 37-38. 6 Ibid., 38. 7 Ibid.

Soviet Union.8 He viewed the Soviet Union as one of the primary obstacles to a stable world order, and, therefore, tended to have a power-ridden and strategic view of the world.9 Even though Carter was aware of the influence that Brzezinski’s personal and academic background might have on their policy, he was very thankful for the enormous amount of information and experience that Brzezinski brought to his administration, since Carter himself lacked any real experience in foreign affairs.10

The academic debate on Brzezinski has also changed over time. Scholars who researched Brzezinski in the nineties and early 2000’s are fairly critical about him. They generally contend that Brzezinski’s background as a Polish immigrant heavily influenced his beliefs, and argue that Brzezinski’s hawkish approach to the Cold War had a negative influence on the administration’s human rights policy. More recent academic literature, however, emphasizes the positive influence that the NSA had on the Carter administration, and argues that he was in favour of an active promotion of human rights.

As seen in the political history of the United States, the combination of morality and national interest is essential to the character of United States foreign policy. As described by legal scholars Peter Baehr and Monique Castermans-Holleman, “American foreign policy has always been a mixture of idealism and realism. It gives evidence of a certain measure of moralism, of ethical principles, based on the idea that the United States will bring good to the world. At the same time, a careful eye is kept on preserving its own national interests.”11 The combination of idealism and realism, of morality and national interest, has thus been characteristic for US foreign policy and can also clearly be recognized in the Carter administration.

8 Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, 36. 9 Ibid., 135. 10 Ibid., 27; 38. 11 Peter R. Baehr and Monique Castermans-Holleman, The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 91.

Carter began his term as an idealistic and moralistic president, when he promised to make his commitment to human rights absolute. Carter saw human rights through the lens of civil rights because of his personal experiences with the civil rights movement, and was therefore deeply committed to battling apartheid in South Africa. Even though Brzezinski was also committed to human rights, it was through a Cold War perspective. By advancing human rights in southern Africa and showing the moral character of the US, Brzezinski wanted to prevent more Soviet influence on the continent. Brzezinski thus saw human rights as a tool to enlarge US power, whereas Carter saw it as the underlying theme of his foreign policy. Since these approaches to human rights were very different, it is interesting to discover how both

Carter and Brzezinski affected the human rights policy towards South Africa and, specifically, to analyse how this policy changed during their term. The research question, therefore, is: how did the human rights policy of the Carter administration towards South Africa change between 1977 and 1980? Ultimately, I argue that mainly under the influence of Brzezinski and other neoliberals in the Carter administration, the priorities in the policy towards South

Africa shifted from morality to power, as the administration prioritized economic and strategic considerations over the promotion of human rights. The analysis will illustrate how this shift took place, why it took place, and who pushed the administration away from its moralistic and idealistic foreign policy towards a realist view of the world.

This thesis aims to make a significant contribution to the existing debate on the Carter administration and its human rights policy within the field of political history. This study performs a qualitative analysis, as it presents an in-depth discussion of a large number of primary sources and aims to connect and compare the content of these sources to build its argument. It uses the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series on the Carter administration, specifically volume II on Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and volume XVI on Southern Africa. These files contain transcripts of National Security Council

7 meetings, letters between US and South African government officials, presidential directives and policy papers on specific issues. These volumes were published in 2013 and 2016, respectively, and will, therefore, enable this research to review documents which many scholars have not been able to use in their research on this topic. Furthermore, primary sources will be drawn from the Digital National Security Archive and the Association for

Diplomatic Studies and Training Oral History. Brzezinski’s memoir, Power and Principle:

Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1981, will also be utilized in this study’s analysis. Together these sources will offer a fresh analysis of the human rights policy of the

Carter administration in South Africa.

In the first chapter, this study analyses the existing secondary source material on the most important themes and topics for this research. Due to the extensive amount of literature on president Carter and apartheid, the literature review limits its analysis to the following topics: Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski and American foreign policy in South Africa.

Through a thorough analysis of the literature on these topics, this chapter illustrates the change over time in the scholarly debate on Carter and Brzezinski and discusses potential reasons for these changes in the academic debate. In doing so, it builds the framework for the analytical chapters, in which this thesis aims to make its own original contribution to the debate.

The second and third chapter present a close reading of the aforementioned primary sources. These chapters thoroughly discuss the statements of US and South African officials in both direct and indirect contact. It evaluates the manner in which these statements were made, and discuss the possible hidden meanings behind them. Moreover, the analysis discusses the potential discrepancies between, on the one hand, statements made within the

US government by government officials, and on the other hand the communication with the

South African government. As there were often differences between the rhetoric and proposed

8 actions within the US government, and the actual rhetoric and actions taken towards the South

African government, these discrepancies are discussed in detail to clarify the potential contrast between rhetoric and action of the US government. Through this discussion, this thesis elaborates on the transparency and credibility of the foreign policy towards South

Africa and the general human rights policy of the Carter administration.

This study splits up the four years of Carter’s presidential term in three periods. The first period focuses on the first year of the administration, which is discussed in the second chapter. As the policy towards South Africa was distinctively different during the administration’s first year, than during the remainder of their term, the other three years are analysed in the third chapter. This chapter, however, distinguishes 1978 from 1979-1980. As the analysis illustrates, 1978 can be seen as the year in which the administration shifted its policies and is, therefore, discussed as the second period. The last two years are analysed together as the third period, for two reasons. First of all, the number of documents in the

FRUS series of these years is small and do not, on their own, give enough information to write an entire chapter about. Secondly, the policies of the administration in 1979 and 1980 were similar and are, therefore, considered as one period. The chapters discuss the policy through an analysis of the primary documents, after which they consider the underlying motives and ideas behind the policy in more depth. Moreover, the chapters discuss the influence of Brzezinski and other policymakers, thereby tying the case study to the academic debate on the Carter administration and its general human rights policy.

When conducting this research there were, as in any research, some difficulties in the analysis of primary source material. First of all, the formal and inexplicit character of some of the primary sources posed some issues, as the transcripts of the meetings between government officials did not always explicitly show their intentions and potential hidden meanings due to their formal character. Another limitation of this study is its US-centric view. By only

9 reviewing American sources, due to the scope of this study, this thesis has solely approached the relations between the US and South African governments from an American perspective.

Even though this thesis has critically reviewed the sources, it remains a one sided research of the human rights policy towards South Africa. These limitations might have slightly affected the depth and inclusiveness of the analysis. Unfortunately, however, this will always be the case when conducting an historical analysis, which has, in its nature, an unexclusive character. This study has, nonetheless, aimed to contribute to the existing academic debate through its own original analysis. In doing so, this thesis has hopefully shed a light on how the Carter administration manoeuvred between action and inaction – between morality and power.

1 Carter, Brzezinski and human rights in South Africa

This chapter will make an assessment of the existing literature on Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew

Brzezinski and human rights in Apartheid South Africa. It will illustrate the Christian and moral values on which Carter’s human rights policy was based, the personal and professional background of Zbigniew Brzezinski and his influence on Carter, and the human rights policy of the Carter administration in South Africa. In doing so, it will reflect on the scholars who have written on these subjects and discuss the change over time within the academic debate.

James (Jimmy) Earl Carter, born on the first of October, 1924 in Plains, Georgia, was raised in a Christian family, which meant, according to professor Michael Kramer, that faith played an important role in Jimmy’s life .12 During his visits to the Northern cities as a missionary, before his political career took flight, Carter realized that “politics must be a moral activity.”13

Kramer, professor in communication science, argues that this feeling of moral obligation helped Carter to get elected in 1976. After a difficult period, the American people were drawn to Carter’s way of thinking and his idealist ideas of honesty and integrity would turn out to be the reason for his election.14 Carter’s Christian faith was, according to Kramer, one of the most important pillars of Carter’s character and thus his policy.15

Historian William Steding also emphasizes Carter’s Christian background. He contends that Carter’s ideals were based on principles as justice, “the process of sin, redemption and salvation” and his missionary beliefs.16 Soon, Carter began to see human

12 Michael Kramer, “Jimmy Carter’s presidential rhetoric: Panama Canal, human rights and Zimbabwe,” University of Minnesota (2005): 4. 13 Kramer, “Jimmy Carter’s presidential rhetoric,” 5. 14 Ibid., 6-7. 15 Ibid., 5. 16 William Steding, Presidential Faith and Foreign Policy: Jimmy Carter the Disciple and Ronald Raegan the Alchemist (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 42.

11 rights as America’s salvation.17 By promoting human rights throughout the world, Jimmy

Carter wanted to establish certain moral values in the foreign policy of the US. Steding argues that this idea became one of Carter’s principal beliefs and that the president even saw this as a national interest.18 According to historian Nancy Mitchell, Carter’s Christian faith was “at the core of his being,” which combined well with his appeal to human rights.19

In their book, which was published almost a decade after Brinkley’s article, Baehr and

Castermans argue that American foreign policy is often identified with thinking “in terms of good and evil,” and that the principles of moralism, freedom and democracy are personified in presidents as, among others, Jimmy Carter.20 They contend that the thirty-ninth president displayed a “strong moralistic character” through his human rights policy. 21 Baehr and

Castermans-Holleman argue that Carter developed some important “activities in the field,” which were not seen during the presidencies of his successors. 22 Ultimately, they emphasize that even though Carter admitted that his human rights policy was to a large extent verbal, he displayed the importance and power of words.23 The scholarly debate on Jimmy Carter and his personal background illustrates that many scholars see the thirty-ninth president as a moral and honest man, whose commitment to human rights was grounded in his personal beliefs and experiences.

The literature on Carter as the president and specifically on his foreign policy, however, displays a significant change over time. This chapter will illustrate this change and discuss the scholars who have written about Carter in the past few decades. The debate in the late nineties and early 2000’s displayed a fairly positive assessment of Carter and his

17 Steding, Presidential Faith and Foreign Policy, 43. 18 Ibid., 46. 19 Nancy Mitchell, Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War (Stanford: Standford University Press, 2018): 8-9. 20 Baehr and Castermans-Holleman, The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy, 91. 21 Ibid., 92. 22 Ibid., 93. 23 Ibid.

12 dedication to human rights in foreign policy. Historian Douglas Brinkley, for instance, wrote an article in 1996, in which he stated that human rights was the most important legacy of the

Carter administration.24 Brinkley counters the arguments made by scholars who depict

Carter’s presidency as failed, by stating that the challenges faced by the administration made it vulnerable to failure and criticism.25 Therefore, in Brinkley’s opinion, Carter must be remembered for his many successes like the Camp David Accords and the Panama Canal

Treaties.26 However, according to Brinkley, Carter’s biggest success was that by the end of

Carter’s term, human rights had “permanently entered the diplomatic parlance of American foreign policy.”27

Whereas Brinkley clearly still recognizes the flaws in Carter’s human rights policy, historians David Schmitz and Vanessa Walker argue that “the administration’s commitment to human rights was not merely rhetorical or naïve.”28 Focusing on the early years of the administration, this article states that the administration quickly turned their promises into a workable policy.29 According to this article, the administration actively pursued their human rights policy despite some substantial risks. Even though the article focuses on the first two years of the administration, at the end of which the administration had made human rights a central factor of American foreign policy according to the authors, they also argue that Carter did not give up on his ideals during the rest of his presidency.30 In making human rights “a key element of all discussions…Carter succeeded in shifting the discourse on American foreign policy away from the dominant concerns of the Cold War and containment.”31 Even

24 Douglas Brinkley, “The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter: The “Hands On” Legacy of Our Thirty-ninth President,” Diplomatic History 20, no 4 (1996): 520. 25 Brinkley, “The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter,” 513. 26 Ibid., 527. 27 Ibid., 522. 28 David F. Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, “Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 28, no. 1 (2004): 113-114. 29 Schmitz and Walker, “Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights,” 121. 30 Ibid., 114, 136; 137. 31 Ibid., 114.

13 though Schmitz and Walker convincingly praise the administration’s human rights efforts, their assessment stands in stark contrast with other scholarly opinions. By ignoring the shortcomings of the human rights policy of the administration, Schmitz and Walker have not painted a realistic picture of either the presidency or the human rights policy of the administration.

Even though scholars were thus fairly positive on Carter and the sincerity of his human rights policy in the late nineties and early 2000’s, the scholarly debate has become more critical during the past decade. Historian William Michael Schmidli, for instance, displays a critical stance towards the degree in which Carter lived up to his human rights goals in his book on the Carter administration’s human rights policy towards Argentine’s military junta. Schmidli explores the extent to which Carter actually lived up to his proposed human rights policy and that the translation of human rights rhetoric into policy initiatives was “an ongoing challenge” for the administration, due to lack of clarity in terms of certain guidelines and opposition in Congress.32 In 1977, it was unclear how the administration would carry out the human rights rhetoric, as there were difficulties during the implementation of the policy. A major issue was the “relationship between human rights policy and broader foreign policy goals.”33 Moreover, the desire to make the human rights policy “absolute,” as expressed in Carter’s inaugural speech, turned out to be difficult to live up to. Instead, a case by case approach would become dominant. Moreover, Jimmy Carter’s personal development towards a “hawkish stance in foreign affairs” made it increasingly difficult to implement the human rights policy as set out at the beginning.34 Even though

Schmidli argues that the human rights policy of the administration became less powerful throughout the presidency, he also contends that Carter did shift the “locus of human rights

32 Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Somewhere Else, 4. 33 Ibid., 92; 105. 34 Ibid., 4-5; 105.

14 advocacy from the nongovernmental sector and Capitol Hill to the White House and Foggy

Bottom.”35

In his biography of Brzezinski, Justin Vaïsse argues that there were two major issues that shaped the human rights policy. The first was “conflicting objectives” and the second was the “unequal relations between America and the various authoritarian regimes.”36 These issues would make it very difficult for the Carter administration to carry out its policy plans.

Moreover, Vaïsse contends that the administration created very high expectations through its human rights rhetoric. These expectations made the “disillusionment” even bigger when it turned out that the administration had to sacrifice some of their initial values in order to safeguard national security.37

In her book on Jimmy Carter in Africa, Mitchell argues that Carter was much less focused on morality and human rights than believed by many. Even though she argues that

Carter saw human rights as an essential tenet of US foreign policy, the historian contends that

Carter should be described as a Cold Warrior, or even a “hard-line realist”, from the start of his presidency.38 Mitchell thus challenges the authors that have argued that Carter upheld his morality throughout his presidency, as she argues that he never saw this as the primary goal or motivation of his administration. With this assessment, Mitchell does not necessarily contend that Carter did not see the value of a moral foreign policy. Instead, she argues that his intentions were both moral and practical, and that US policy should be adjusted to “the circumstances of power in the real world.”39

As Jimmy Carter was born in the South, he was raised amidst the African-American struggle for civil rights. During his childhood, the Jim Crow system was still in place.

35 Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Somewhere Else, 191. 36 Justin Vaïsse, Zbigniew Brzezinski. America’s Grand Strategist (Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 331. 37 Vaïsse, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 341. 38 Mitchell, Jimmy Carter in Africa, 8; 662. 39 Ibid., 8-9.

Jimmy’s closest friends were African-Americans and Carter was therefore, according to

Mitchell, very aware of this horrible and unjust system.40 For this reason, Mitchell argues,

Carter became a strong advocate of the civil rights movement.41 This personal background greatly affected Carter’s beliefs and goals as a politician which, in turn, made him very popular among African Americans as he ran for the presidency.42 According to Andrew

Young, Carter’s ambassador to the United Nations, “the hands that used to pick the cotton had now picked a President.”43 Carter saw the Civil Rights Act as “the best thing that ever happened to the South” during his lifetime, and even stated that he would not have become president if it had not been for the courage of the leaders of the Civil Rights movement.44

Historian Simon Stevens contends that Carter’s commitment to the civil rights movement was “also animated by a sense of guilt.”45 This guilt, according to Stevens, motivated Carter to oppose racial inequality in southern Africa.46 The connection between

Carter’s commitment to the civil rights movement and his foreign policy in southern Africa will be discussed in more depth at the end of this chapter.

Whereas Mitchell and Stevens both argue that Carter’s commitment to changing the

South and supporting the civil rights movement originated from his personal experiences and background, historian Zachary Lechner contends that Carter only used this rhetoric to gain votes and sympathy. Carter’s claims to “heal the wounds of the US”, according to Lechner, were “nothing more than a hoke.”47 His campaign took place just after the Civil Rights

40 Mitchell, Jimmy Carter in Africa, 11-12. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., 219; 233. 43 Ibid., 233. 44 Ibid., 667. 45 Simon Stevens, “From the Viewpoint of a Southern Governor: the Carter Administration and Apartheid, 1977- 81,” Diplomatic History 36, no. 5 (2012): 848. 46 Stevens, “From the Viewpoint of Southern Governor,” 848. 47 Zachary J. Lechner, “’Fuzzy as a Georgia Peach’: The Ford Campaign and the Challenge of Jimmy Carter’s Southernness,” Southern Cultures 23, no. 4 (2017): 63.

Movement, which enabled Carter, as a “racially progressive white southerner,” to frame himself as “a figure well-suited to deal with the country’s racial divide.”48

As illustrated, the academic debate on Jimmy Carter has shifted notably during the past few decades. Scholars who wrote about Carter in the late 1990’s and the early 2000’s, such as Baehr, Castermans-Holleman, Brinkley, Schmitz and Walker, emphasize Carter’s strong moral compass, his successes in foreign policy issues such as the Camp David

Accords, and the positive change in human rights that Carter brought to Capitol Hill. Scholars such as Vaïsse, Schmidli and Mitchell, however, who studied Carter during the past decade, have presented a more critical stance towards the 39th president. Among other things, they argue that, even though Carter was a moralistic president, he did not maintain this during his entire presidency. Possible reasons for this shift in the literature will be discussed at the end of this chapter.

Similarly to the debate on Carter, the scholarly debate on Brzezinski also changed over time.

However, whereas the scholarly opinion on Carter became more critical during the past decade, the literature on Brzezinski became more positive. The literature during the nineties and early 2000’s was fairly critical of Brzezinski, highlighting the stark contrast between

Brzezinski and Carter and his negative influence on the administration. Historian Gaddis

Smith, for instance, argues that Brzezinski and Carter had completely different characters:

Carter was an “internalist moralist,” whereas Brzezinski was an “externalist acolyte of power.”49 These two characters resulted in fundamental disagreements between the importance of power and the importance of principle, according to Smith.50 Not only Carter and Brzezinski had different views of the world, Brzezinski also clashed with Secretary of

48 Lechner, “Fuzzy as a Georgia Peach,” 63. 49 Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, 38. 50 Ibid.

State Cyrus Vance. In a three year rivalry for power and influence in the White House,

Brzezinski and Vance’s issues became bigger than anticipated in the beginning, making it very difficult for the president to find a balance between morality and power.51 Even though

Brzezinski thus had different views than both Carter and Vance, the differences between

Carter and Brzezinski were practically ignored, while the clash between Vance and Brzezinski carried grave consequences.52 Smith even argues that the conflict between these two advisors was a manifestation of a deeper issue within the administration, and on another level, even of modern American foreign policy as a whole.53 Smith even argues that Carter became the prey of Brzezinski’s power-ridden view of the world.54 Even though Carter started his term with a foreign policy based on morality and human rights, Brzezinski’s influence shifted Carter’s focus from improving “global issues of human welfare” to a focus on the Soviet Union and military advancement.55 As power was the ultimate goal for Brzezinski, morality was just “an instrument to be used when appropriate, abandoned when not.”56 This change in policy, which

Smith argues was created by Brzezinski, thus made Carter abandon his beliefs and initial foreign policy plans, and shift towards a hawkish, Cold War-focused policy, in which the rhetoric on human rights was almost completely lost.57

Historian John Gaddis argues that Carter’s advisers were not helpful in sorting out the priorities of the administration.58 Carter was faced with a great difficulty in determining what kind of tradition it would follow, and his advisors did not help him to solve this issue.59

51Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, 35. 52 Ibid., 38; 43. 53 Ibid., 43. 54 Ibid., 35; 48. 55 Ibid., 48-49. 56 Ibid., 37. 57 Ibid., 48. 58 John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (New York, Oxford University Press, 2005), 346. 59 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 344.

In her biography on Jimmy Carter, Glad contends that by setting up a new system within the National Security Council, Brzezinski was able to exert his influence on multiple levels. 60 Glad points to the daily one-on-one meetings between the NSA and the president, in which Brzezinski had the possibility to present his views on important matters without the interference of other foreign policy advisors.61 Vance, on the other hand, only had meetings with the president when other people were present.62 Glad contends that Brzezinski and his staff were able to exert so much influence on Carter’s policy because their communication was often quick and clear.63 Even though Glad is not necessarily critical of Brzezinski’s influence on the administration, she does contend that he had a lot of impact on Carter and argues that he quickly manifested his power within the process of policy making.

Smith, Gaddis and Glad illustrate the negative stance towards Brzezinski’s commitment to human rights and his relationship with Carter which dominated the academic debate on

Brzezinski in the late nineties and early 2000’s. The scholarly assessment of Brzezinski, however, has become less critical during the past decade. Political scientist David Rothkopf, for example, argued in 2013 that Brzezinski possessed a “unique capacity for foresight” and that he translated this capacity into successful policies.64 Rothkopf declares Brzezinski to be

“one of America’s most respected, incisive policy commentators.”65 Robert Pastor, a member of the National Security Council Staff during Carter’s administration, echoes Rothkopf’s opinion, claiming that while other people view Brzezinski’s ideas as conservative, Brzezinski actually was a liberal and “in some ways revolutionary.”66 Pastor argues that Brzezinski did

60 Betty Glad, An Outsider in the White House. Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 30-31. 61 Glad, An Outsider in the White House, 31. 62 Ibid., 32. 63 Ibid., 38. 64 David J. Rothkopf, “Setting the Stage for the Current Era,” in Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed. Charles Gati (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2013), 84. 65 Rothkopf, Setting the Stage for the Current Era,” 84. 66 Robert A. Pastor, “The Caricature and the Man,”Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed. Charles Gati (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2013), 104.

19 not use his personal and professional ties to the president to force his own policy ideas into reality.67 Carter was still the policy maker and ensured that Brzezinski would not be able to obtain too much influence.68 Even though Pastor recognizes the administration’s policy shift from morality to a more realist approach, he sees the developments on the world stage as the reason for these changes, not Brzezinski.69 Moreover, Pastor argues that Brzezinski did not see human rights as something that would solely serve as a weapon against communism and emphasizes that one of Brzezinski’s policy aims was to “promote human rights and racial justice in the third world.”70

Nancy Mitchell also highlights Brzezinski’s positive influence on the administration’s foreign policy and his good relationship with Carter. She argues that, even though “it is a caricature to limn Brzezinski as the realpolitik hawk,” the National Security Advisor was not always solely focused on the power battle between the US and the Soviet Union.71 Mitchell does not ignore Brzezinski’s emphasis on the Cold War, but states that he was mostly motivated by the American duty of “bringing order to the chaotic world.”72 The relationship between Carter and Brzezinski was, according to Mitchell, almost that of professor and student, in which Carter had to be “trained in the cruel ways of the world.”73 Carter was not secretive about this ‘order’ in their relationship, as he often asked Brzezinski to give him ideas, choices, and most of all, solutions.74 Mitchell argues that even though Brzezinski was never unfaithful to Carter or his policy, he did often warn the president of the dangers of a soft approach.75 Making him aware of critics labelling the administration as soft, Brzezinski often

67 Pastor, “The Caricature and the Man,” 106. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid., 108; 110-111. 70 Ibid., 104. 71 Mitchell, Jimmy Carter in Africa, 126; 250. 72 Ibid., 126-127. 73 Ibid., 683. 74 Ibid., 129. 75 Ibid., 665.

20 redirected the president towards a slightly more hawkish and forceful policy in order for the administration to be taken seriously.

Justin Vaïsse emphasizes the strong relationship between Carter and Brzezinski. He states that their relationship was “characterized by loyalty, respect, and trust” and contends that they shared the same priorities concerning foreign policy.76 Vaïsse argues that even though Brzezinski sometimes went too far in his policy, Carter would not really tell him to stop.77 This would mean that hierarchy was a less important part of their relationship. Even though Vaïsse emphasizes the close ties between Brzezinski and Carter, he also admits that the president was easily accessible to Brzezinski for meetings and other moments of contact, in which he was able to present his views on important matters.78 Vaïsse also points to the shared ambition of Carter and Brzezinski to stress the importance of human rights.79 He argues that “Brzezinski paid a great deal of attention to sociological, political, and ideological developments that were agitating the planet,” which was in line with Carter’s own desire to focus on the moral side of their policy.80 Even though Brzezinski was in favour of a strong focus on human rights, Vaïsse also argues that he soon recognized the “limitations of the administrations human rights policy.” 81

As visible in the analysis of the historiography, the scholarly opinion on Brzezinski as the National Security Advisor has thus become more positive over time. Whereas the debate in the late nineties and early 2000’s was generally critical, especially towards Brzezinski’s relationship with Carter and his influence on the human rights policy of the administration, the debate has become more positive during the past two decades. Emphasizing Brzezinski’s sincere commitment to human rights and his strong relationship to the president, scholars

76 Vaïsse, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 276; 294. 77 Ibid., 274. 78 Ibid., 284. 79 Ibid., 296. 80 Ibid., 325. 81 Ibid., 331.

21 have argued during the past decade that Brzezinski should not be ‘blamed’ for the administration’s shift from a focus on morality and human rights, to a more realist approach to foreign policy.

The debates on Carter and Brzezinski have thus changed notably over time and have become either more or less critical, which begs us to ask ourselves what could be the reasons behind these changes. Most probably due to the increasing global focus on and sincere commitment to human rights over the past few decades, scholars have become more critical of the degree to which Carter actually lived up to the promises he made at the beginning of his presidency. Even though Carter’s commitment to human rights was progressive for that day and age, it still was, for the largest part, rhetorical. The contemporary global commitment to human rights, however, demands actual action. As scholars are now able to compare Carter’s human rights policy to the contemporary commitment to human rights, it is logical that they have become more critical and that they raise questions about the degree to which Carter actually lived up to his promises. Even though this is surely not the only explanation for the shift in the scholarly debate on Carter, it is plausible that this can, at least partially, explain the rising criticism towards Carter in the academic literature.

Whereas the academic debate on Carter has thus become more critical during the past few decades, scholars have become less critical towards Brzezinski and his role in the administration. Even though the reason for this shift can never be explained with full certainty, a possible explanation is that the general stance towards American neoliberalism and neoliberal politicians has become more positive during the past two decades. Scholars argue that even though Brzezinski understood the importance of human rights, he also saw the limitations of this policy and became realistic of the actual potential success of this policy much faster than Carter. Whereas scholars were critical of Brzezinski’s realistic approach in the nineties and early 2000’s, the rising neoliberalism in the western hemisphere of the past

22 two decades could explain the shift to a less critical academic opinion of Brzezinski’s realist approach to human rights during his time as the National Security Advisor.

Carter and Brzezinski clearly had different characters and backgrounds, making it even more interesting to analyse their influence on the human rights policy of the administration. In order to discuss what kind of influence they had and how this influence potentially shifted during the administration’s term, this thesis will analyse the human rights policy of the administration towards South Africa, as this was one of the prioritized countries in Carter’s human rights policy. To know where the academic debate on Carter’s foreign policy towards South Africa stands, it is essential to review the literature on this subject. The literature on the policy of the Carter administration towards South Africa can be split up in two schools of thought. The first one views Carter’s policy towards South Africa as a success and emphasizes the ways in which the administration remained critical of the South African government. The second school is critical of Carter’s policy towards the Apartheid regime and focuses on the ways in which Carter abandoned the moral underpinnings of his foreign policy.

Smith is convinced of the success of Carter’s South Africa policy. He argues that

American rhetoric changed after the massacre at Sharpeville, and emphasizes Carter’s direct condemnation of minority rule once he became president.82 Moreover, Smith highlights the support of the US in the UN resolutions and sanctions, and argues that the US even went beyond these consequences in their policy towards South Africa.83 By cutting off the equipment of South African police and military personnel, and urging American businesses in

South Africa to abide a code of labour practices against that of Apartheid law, the US tied above average consequences to the human rights violations of the racist regime.84

82 Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, 143-144. 83 Ibid., 145. 84 Ibid.

Both Douglas Brinkley and William Steding also mention Carter’s policy in South

Africa. Steding argues that South Africa was on Carter’s priority list.85 Douglas Brinkley states that Carter advocated majority rule in Africa and was the first American president to publicly criticize and condemn the apartheid regime of South Africa.86

Nancy Mitchell views Carter’s policy towards southern Africa as positive and well- executed. She argues that Washington was very concerned with the possibly of a Cuban or

Soviet intervention in Rhodesia, and that Carter had to figure out “how to claim the moral high ground but not end up on the same side as the Soviet Union.”87 Mitchell argues that the administration decision to treat “communist-backed rebels as equal partners,” made them break with the American tradition of favouring white minority regimes over any ties with the

Soviet Union.88 Through this policy, Carter remained loyal to his administration’s goals and moral underpinnings, even though he pursued a very controversial policy.89 In this policy,

Carter was motivated by his own experiences in the Jim Crow South of America. According to Mitchell, race and the Cold War were always intertwined for the president, making it harder for him to solely focus on American geopolitical goals within his policy towards South

Africa.90

In contrast to the relatively small number of scholars who contend that Carter’s policies in

South Africa had a positive result, more scholars are critical of the South Africa policy of the administration. In their book Decoding Corporate Camouflage: U.S. business support for apartheid, historians Elizabeth Schmidt and Ron Dellums argue that the trickle down effect, expected as a result of economic cooperation, did not work.91 Moreover they contend that by

85 Steding, Presidential Faith and Foreign Policy, 54. 86 Brinkley, “The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter,” 519. 87 Mitchell, Jimmy Carter in Africa, 670. 88 Ibid., 673. 89 Ibid., 685. 90 Ibid., 11;14. 91 Schmidt and Dellums, Decoding Corporate Camouflage, 6.

24 favouring a moderate, anti-Soviet, pro US government, the policy of the Carter administration placed itself “on the wrong side of the liberation struggle.”92 Furthermore, they state that by doing so, the US tied itself to a racist regime and that any further cooperation would only expand their support and approval for the regime’s policies.93

In his book on US policy during the Apartheid years, historian Robert Massie argues that even though the election of Jimmy Carter initially created high hopes among anti-Apartheid groups, it soon became clear that the administration struggled to find a balance between a gradual increase in pressure on the South African government, or a hard line policy which would contain some risks.94 This in-between policy, together with pressure from other international crises, made Carter shift his attention to other parts of the world.95

Historian Alex Thomson emphasizes the initial attempts made by Carter to reform

Apartheid trough economic cooperation.96 The article, however, also concludes that this economic approach did not work as the United States had envisioned.97 Thomson also focuses on the role of Brzezinski and argues that the NSA’s views had become dominant in the second year of the term.98 The focus on the Cold War made the administration’s priorities clear, when it turned out that the US was willing to defend human rights in South Africa, but not when jeopardizing its own economic interests.99

Historian Simon Stevens contends that the administration’s human rights policy in South

Africa was influenced by the personal experiences of Carter.100 Growing up in one of the few white families in his village, he had experienced first hand what segregation could do to a

92 Schmidt and Dellums, Decoding Corporate Camouflage, 84. 93 Ibid., 84-85. 94 Robert Kinloch Massie, Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in The Apartheid Years (New York: Nan. A. Talese/Doubleday, 1997), 403; 407. 95 Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 457. 96 Alex Thomson, “The Diplomacy of Impasse: the Carter Administration and Apartheid South Africa,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 21, no. 1 (2010): 117. 97 Thomson, “The Diplomacy of Impasse,” 117. 98 Ibid., 120. 99 Ibid., 121. 100 Stevens, “From the Viewpoint of a Southern Governor,” 845.

25 country and was shaped by “the recollection of the transformation of race relations in the

American South.”101 Even though Carter was thus committed to ending racial inequality in

South Africa, he still adopted a “very cautious policy for promoting change.”102 Carter was not the only one in the administration who was committed to human rights, according to

Stevens.103 Brzezinski recognized the possibility of two problems. First, Apartheid would soon appear on the agenda of the UN, and the US needed to quickly demonstrate its condemnation towards it.104 Secondly, the NSA was well aware of the potential spread of communism in Southern Africa.105 Stevens, therefore, argues that even though his motives were different than those of Vance and Young – Brzezinski’s motive was containing communism, Vance and Young saw it as a moral issue – he still “shared their belief in the necessity of promoting change.”106 Not knowing how to approach the South African government without angering them, Carter came up with the policy of economic cooperation.

The Sullivan Principles were a step towards the right direction, containing guidelines for

American businesses in South Africa promoting anti-Apartheid regulations.107 However, the administration was still hesitant to promote real change through not only verbal condemnation, but actual policy action, which was reflected in the constant fear that the administration would push South Africa too far and lose the possibility of any cooperation.108

This fear resulted in a decline in interest and action towards South Africa from the Carter administration in the second half of its term.109

Not only the commitment to human rights in South Africa declined. Generally,

Washington’s commitment to human rights faded away during Carter’s four years in office.

101 Stevens, “From the Viewpoint of a Southern Governor,” 845. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid., 848. 104 Ibid., 849-850. 105 Ibid., 851. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid., 872; 874. 108 Ibid., 868; 876. 109 Ibid., 878-879.

To exemplify this general shift in the administration, this thesis will analyse the administration’s policy towards South Africa in depth in the other chapters and discuss the influence of the most important policymakers, such as Carter and Brzezinski. In doing so, it will illustrate how the administration shifted its priorities and under which, or whose, influence this process occurred.

2. 1977: The year of hope and morality

Shortly after Jimmy Carter was inaugurated as the 39th President of the United States, he promised to make his commitment to human rights “absolute.”110 As illustrated earlier, the administration’s desire to focus on morality and human rights was very strong, at least in the beginning. Scholars, however, disagree on the degree to which Carter actually lived up to this promise during his presidency. This chapter will shed a light on the human rights policy towards South Africa in the first year of Carter’s administration and discuss the most important motives for that specific policy. Moreover, it will discuss the influence of

Brzezinski on the policy. This year was, as the title suggests, the year of hope and morality, as it was characterized by sincere attention to human rights, a major focus on the issues concerning Southern Africa and a policy very similar to the initial policy plans of the Carter administration. However, this chapter will also illustrate that the administration’s intentions already started to fade away at the end of its first year, due to a general shift in the administration’s foreign policy priorities.

Carter made a commitment to globally promote human rights in his early days as a president, which resounded in the better part of his first year. Carter’s commitment was clearly visible throughout 1977, however, it was far from ‘absolute’. Human rights were an important of Carter’s foreign policy, but were sometimes also used as a leverage to solve international difficulties. Even though the administration thus made it clear that human rights would play an important role in its foreign policy, it never became entirely clear in what kind of policy this would result and how this policy would be implemented. In an action memorandum, written on February 4, from the director of the policy planning staff, Anthony

Lake, to Vance, it was stated that “implementation depends on our designing an overall

110 Baehr and Castermans-Holleman, The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy, 93.

28 strategy – with a coherent set of goals, sense of priorities, and assessment of US leverage.”111

According to Lake, the State Department was lacking this strategy, resulting in uncoordinated attempts to deal with current problems.112 Seven months after this action memorandum, another action memorandum was sent to Vance, this time written by Lake and the Assistant

Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Patricia Derian. In this memo,

Lake and Derian conveyed that there was still public misunderstanding about the administration’s human rights policy.113 This illustrates the incapacity of the administration throughout its first year to publicly clarify the meaning and goals of its human rights policy.

The administration’s internal struggle to find a strategy to implement its policy and the difficulties to publicly explain and motivate its human rights policy would turn out to be a large incompetence in its foreign policy. As Carter and his administration struggled to define its general human rights policy, accordingly, they had issues defining their human rights policy towards specific countries. One of the administration’s prioritized countries was South

Africa, in which human rights violations were an everyday occurrence.

Carter’s policy towards southern Africa in 1977 was characterized by the interplay between the issues in Namibia, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa. Even though this thesis specifically researches the policy towards South Africa, the issues in Namibia and

Rhodesia were so intertwined with those of South Africa, that it is nearly impossible to assess the situation in South Africa in isolation. Both Rhodesia and Namibia proved to be political challenges for the administration. Namibia had been under a mandate of South Africa since the end of the First World War. As South Africa imposed its apartheid laws on Namibia in

111 Department of State (DOS), Action Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance, February 4, 1977, FRUS, 1977-1980, vol. 2, 26. 112 DOS, Action Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance, February 4, 1977. 113 DOS, Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance, September 15, 1977, FRUS, 1977-1980, vol. 2, 254.

1948, tensions rose. The SWAPO (South West Africa People’s Organization) stood up for its country and contested the South African government. Despite waging a long relentless battle against the colonizers, Namibia only gained independence in 1990. Rhodesia was subject to a white minority government which had remained in power after the division of the Federation of Rhodesia in 1963. Even though the British had distanced themselves from Rhodesia and preferred a black majority government, the Rhodesian government still claimed its independence in 1965. This government was immediately condemned by the international community and was not recognized as the official government.114 The ZAPU (Zimbabwe

African People’s Union) – supported by China – and the ZANU (Zimbabwe African National

Union) – supported by the Soviet Union – also contested the white minority government, and eventually gained political power in 1980.115

Even though the issues in Namibia and Rhodesia were of great importance to the administration, Carter’s focus was on South Africa and the elimination of apartheid.116

The Apartheid regime came to power in South Africa in 1948, establishing laws that separated the South African whites from South African blacks. Even though there were eighteen million black citizens in South Africa at this time, making them the majority of the population, John

Vorster’s government did not even consider these people citizens of South Africa.117 Through the policy of ‘homelands’, Vorster made sure that the white South Africans would not have to live alongside black South Africans. This system had a lot of resemblances with the Jim Crow system in the American South, which made it crucially important for the Carter administration to demonstrate their unwillingness to support the South African government.

114 Sarah B. Snyder, From Selma to Moscow: How Human Rights Activists Transformed U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 45. 115 Snyder, From Selma to Moscow, 59. 116 National Security Council (NSC), Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 757-777. 117 Mitchell, Jimmy Carter in Africa, 74.

In a report, written in the beginning of 1977, the National Security Council Policy

Review Committee set out the meaning of apartheid and its consequences. According to the committee, racial discrimination had been present in South Africa for almost three centuries, through a system in which white supremacy was “maintained by a complex system of interwoven coercive economic and social controls.”118 The committee pointed to the fact that the South African law was the only law which maintained its dominance over the majority on the basis of ‘colour’.119 Furthermore, the report pointed to the increasing violence in South

Africa, but also recognized that the government was probably, at that moment, strong enough to suppress the violent uprisings.120 In addition, the report concluded that, despite internal and external pressure, the South African government did not envision much change and remained to be influenced by their “traditional attitudes of innate conservatism, racial prejudice and fear of black domination.”121

To encourage peaceful settlements and majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia and to end Apartheid in South Africa were thus the main goals of the administration in their policy towards southern Africa.122 Even though the administration aimed to approach these countries separately, it realised that these three issues were undeniably interrelated, and thus concluded that it had to create an intricate way of approaching these three issues all together.123

After the inauguration in January 1977, the administration immediately began developing its policies towards South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia. The first few weeks display the administration’s initial struggles with this region, as they tried to balance criticizing the South African government on one hand, and their dependence on South African cooperation and contact on the other hand. They concluded that “within the basic policy of

118 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 757-777. 119 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 757-777. 120 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 757-777. 121 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 757-777. 122 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 757-777. 123 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 757-777.

31 restraint on our relations with South Africa”, they would “avoid taking any further restrictive actions which could have an adverse effect on our relationship with the South African government.”124 They thus chose to loosen the ties on South Africa to some extent, in order to create a solid cooperation with the South African government, which would be essential in their policy towards Namibia and Rhodesia. 125 In March, the president issued a presidential directive in which he stated that the US government would “adopt a new focus in its policies toward the Government of South Africa.”126 Its aim would be “to promote a progressive transformation of South African society.”127 This policy meant that the American government would refrain from imposing any new measures on the South African government, in order to create stability in the region. Almost two weeks after this presidential directive, Carter met with the South African ambassador to the United States, Pik Botha. In this meeting, Carter reiterated his condemnation of Apartheid, but also emphasized that the American government did not aim to publicly criticize the South African government, and only asked for a clearer understanding of the South African policies.128

The months after this meeting, however, illustrate a shift in the American policy.

When the administration realised that the initial approach was not successful, because the

South Africans had not shown any real commitment to changing their policies, they altered their course.129 In March, the administration successfully lobbied in Congress for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment, which made it possible for Carter to halt the import of Rhodesian chrome.130 Even though this action was not specifically aimed at South Africa, it did display

124 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 757-777. 125 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 757-777. 126 Executive Office of the President (EOP), Presidential Directive/NSC-5, March 9, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 804. 127 EOP, Presidential Directive/NSC-5, March 9, 1977, 804. 128 DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, March 23, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 805-811. 129 DOS, Paper Prepared in the Department of State, undated, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 867-890. 130 The Byrd Amendment (1971) prohibited the US from banning the import of strategic materials from non- communist countries, which made it possible for the US to import chrome from Rhodesia even though this country was not recognized by the UN due to its racist policies; NSC, Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of

US condemnation of southern African white minority regimes, which ultimately also affected its relations with South Africa.

In May, the administration made the decision to halt the export of military equipment to South Africa, since “military cooperation (…) would undercut the progress we have made in generating better understanding and acceptance of American goals among black African states and other Third World Countries.”131 This political decision clearly shows the shift in the policy due to a lack of actual change in South Africa, as well as the fear for international condemnation if the US did not take appropriate measures towards the South African government.

Only three months after the first draft of the US policy towards South Africa, a new policy review was issued in July 1977. In this review, additional measures towards South

Africa were discussed. Some of the smaller measures would, for example, be the closure of the American missile tracking station in South Africa and the elimination of commercial services, whilst graver measures would entail discouraging future US investment and discouraging American banks from issuing loans to South Africa.132 The gravest measure would be supporting the call for mandatory sanctions in the UN.133 Even though these steps were seriously considered by the American government, the administration concluded that only a few small measures would be taken at this point, and that the rest of the measures needed further studies, in order to take into account potential economic or political consequences for the US and South Africa.134

the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), April 20, 1977, FRUS, 1977-1980, vol. 2, 111. 131 DOS, Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), May 28, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 854. 132 DOS, Paper Prepared in the Department of State, undated, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 867-890. 133 DOS, Paper Prepared in the Department of State, undated. 134 DOS, Paper Prepared in the Department of State, undated.

Shortly after this policy review, the US-South African relationship was tested when the Soviet Union supposedly found proof of the development of a South African nuclear weapon. Even though the rhetoric from the American government towards the South African government had been relatively ‘soft’ up till now, the possibility of a nuclear weapon clearly aggravated Washington. In a telegram from the Department of State to the American embassy in South Africa, the US made clear that they considered “the proliferation of nuclear weapons to be a major risk to international peace and stability” and that the administration was

“determined to do everything in its power to prevent a further spread of nuclear weapons capabilities.”135 The administration, furthermore, emphasized that, if these allegations would turn out to be true, the relationship between the US and South Africa would be heavily damaged.136 It is notable, especially for this study, that during these conversations on the possible nuclear bomb, the worries about the other issues in South(ern) Africa became of much less importance to the administration. Moreover, at the same time that the US showed deep concern about a possible nuclear bomb, the South African and American governments began their conversations on their possible cooperation on the uranium plants in South

Africa.137 Even though this cooperation was more deeply developed in the years after 1977, it is essential to point to the double sided policy of the US at this point in time. By trying to condemn the apartheid regime as well as cooperating with them on uranium production, the administration displayed little perseverance in adhering to their initial policy towards South

Africa. Therefore, the few actions of the Carter administration which did actually condemn the apartheid regime, became much less powerful and, at times, almost ineffective and hypocrite.

135 DOS, Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa, August 10, 1977, FRUS 1977- 1980, vol. 18, 895. 136 DOS, Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa, August 17, 1977, FRUS 1977- 1980, vol. 18, 899-900. 137 NSC, Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance, September 6, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 928-929.

As the year went on, US policy seemed to become even more complex. At the same time that the American government set up the first talks on potential cooperation on uranium supply, the administration also decided to end the cooperation on naval surveillance and to add additional restrictions on military exports.138 Moreover, the administration decided to recall their naval attaché and review US economic relations with South Africa. The last few months of 1977 were thus characterized by contradicting interests and signals of the US, which made their relationship with the South African government even more complicated then it already was at the beginning of 1977.

During the first year of the Carter administration, it quickly became clear what the underlying motives and ideas were for US policy towards South Africa. First of all, what was clearly essential to the administration’s approach to South Africa, was an emphasis on

America’s own progress on racial issues. In multiple conversations with the South African government, US officials recalled America’s history, its racial issues and the many wrongdoings against African-Americans. For example, in a conversation between American

Vice President Walter Mondale and African officials Pik Botha and Balthazar Vorster,

Mondale stated that “we have undergone a profound transformation over the past ten years” and that the US “record on race was disgraceful” as it “separated people in politics, schools, buses, business and systems of justice.”139 The American record on racism was thus an incentive for the administration to pursue a human rights policy, as this would help “fulfil a moral obligation” that the US had “incurred by virtue of its heritage and values.”140 President

Carter also emphasized US racial history in his personal conversations with the South

138 Department of Defense (DOD), Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Duncan) to the Chief of the South African Defense Force (Malan), November 21, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 980; NSC, Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Commerce Kreps, November 28, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 985. 139 NSC, Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, March 3, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 838. 140 DOS, Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, August 15, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 2, 224-227.

Africans, and concluded that the US still had improvements to make.141 Partially because of their own history, the US felt a moral obligation to bring about change in apartheid South

Africa. It is, therefore, no surprise that both the “depth of America’s dedication to human rights,” and the wish to abolish apartheid were often repeated in the US conversations with the South Africans and within their own government.142 Mondale, for example, stated in a meeting with South African officials, that “human rights are at the core of our meaning” and that everyone should understand this.143

An essential motivation for pursuing their South African policy was thus the commitment to human rights, which can, at least partially, be explained through America’s own racial history and struggle with civil rights. As discussed in the first chapter, Carter was not only professionally, but also personally motivated to actively battle racism, as he was raised in the old South. Therefore, partly because of his own experiences with racism and racial inequality in his youth, Carter saw human rights, at least in South Africa, through the lens of civil rights and was personally motivated to bring about change in this country. The

American civil rights movement, which had peeked during the 1950’s and 1960’s, was a struggle for social justice and equality for African Americans. As both movements were thus focused on equality between black and white citizens, the civil rights movement in the US and the anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa had a lot of similarities. As the US had already experienced this movement, Carter and other top officials saw it as America’s responsibility to establish equality in South Africa as well. Their human rights policy was, therefore, heavily influenced by, and maybe even based upon, their experiences with the African-American struggle for civil rights.

141 DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, October 4, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 936-942. 142 Office of the Vice President (OVP), Memorandum From Vice President Mondale to President Carter, May 10, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 820. 143 OVP, Memorandum From Vice President Mondale to President Carter, May 10, 1977, 839.

Even though the moral obligation of the administration seemed sincere and well- expressed, another theme that clearly reinforced the human rights policy was the fear for domestic and international condemnation. Due to its own racial history, the administration was specifically worried that a racial war would have an emotional impact on American society.144 The domestic implications of their human rights policy were, therefore, often taken into consideration during meetings on their human rights policy.145

Not only domestic implications of their policy were a driver for change, as Washington was also concerned with its image abroad. Recognizing US isolation in the United Nations – due to former American opposition to imposing drastic measures towards South Africa –, the administration clearly wanted to prevent this isolation from growing.146 Cooperation with

Great Britain and France were of great importance to the administration.147 In a memorandum from NSC staff member Jessica Tuchman to Brzezinski, written in January 1977, Tuchman argued that the U.S. should carefully construct its policy towards Southern Africa. As “our past support of South Africa in the UN is viewed by many as our single most repugnant policy in the area of human rights,” Tuchman concluded that the U.S. should prevent a situation in which it could not exert pressure on South Africa in relation to apartheid.148 Tuchman emphasized that, in order to align with the UN policy towards southern Africa, the administration should repeal the Byrd amendment and to “consider a change in U.S. policy towards South Africa, particularly concerning U.S. investment there.”149 These statements point to the administration’s concern to prevent isolation in the UN and condemnation from

144 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 758; Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013): 12. 145 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 757-777. 146 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 758. 147 DOS, Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting, February 8, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 783-792. 148 NSC, Memorandum from Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), January 24, 1977, FRUS, 1977-1980, vol. 2, 8. 149 NSC, Memorandum from Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), January 24, 1977, 12.

37 its member states, which was thus clearly on of their most important motivations to adjust their human rights policy towards southern Africa.

Not only the Western opinion of the US was kept in mind, as the opinion of the African states was also of great importance for this administration. In light of the American position in the UN and its tendency to oppose measures towards South Africa, other African states often portrayed the US as a supporter of South Africa and racism.150 The administration was thus aware of the general opinion of African states on the United States, and was motivated to alter their condemnation. In discussions on their South African policy, it was often stated by officials that their method should not undercut US relations with other African states.151

Moreover, the US was worried that a decline in their relations with African states would also result in a cut-off from important minerals.152

The administration’s human rights policy in 1977 was thus driven by morality and the preservation of domestic and international prestige. Even though the administration’s sense of morality shone through in many conversations, it was sadly often something that was more a subject of conversation, than of actual action. Other motives, however, often resulted in actual change and tougher policy decisions. In the case of South Africa, economic and strategic motives often seemed to weigh heavier than the motivation of human rights and had proven to be of great importance to the administration. Mainly in conversations within the US government, it was often repeated that economic interests in Southern Africa were very important to the US.153 Southern Africa represented both a “growing market for American products,” as well as it was an important source of minerals for the US.154 Due to the

150 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 759. 151 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 757-777; DOS, Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), May 28, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 853. 152 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 757-777. 153 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, undated, FRUS 1977- 1980, vol. 18, 757. 154 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, undated, 757.

38 stagnating economy and high inflation in the US during these years, the administration considered their economic interests in almost every policy decision they took and often delayed making decisions because they were afraid of the economic and financial consequences.155 The administration took a step in the right direction when introducing the

Sullivan Principles. This was a set of requirements for employers which demanded equality and prohibited segregation in the workplace. As the US had many corporations in South

Africa which had to abide by these principles, they were created to condemn the Apartheid regime in South Africa and promote equality from within the country. Nonetheless, the economic part of the American policy towards South Africa was still mainly focused on

American benefit.156

Even more important than economic interests were strategic interests. South Africa was of great importance to the Carter administration due to its key role in the negotiations with Namibia and Rhodesia. Remaining in a good and communicative relationship with South

Africa was therefore essential for the administration to reach its goals in southern Africa. Far more important, however, was the role that southern Africa played in the worldwide battle between the Soviet Union and the United States. By supporting and equipping black opposition parties in their struggle against white minority regimes, the USSR had gained influence on the continent. It was, therefore, essential for the US government to prevent a further spread of communism in southern Africa. There was, however, a difference in the rhetoric on communism within the US government, and in their conversations with the South

African government. Instead of letting them know about their fear of communism, the Carter administration told the South Africans that their policy did not depend on US-Soviet relations and that their policy on South Africa was not founded “on our attitude toward communism but

155 DOS, Paper Prepared in the Department of State, undated, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 876-890. 156 DOS, Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, February 9, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 792; DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, November 9, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 956-963.

39 based upon fundamental principles affecting human rights.”157 In the safety of their own government, however, the Carter administration expressed their fear of communism quite regularly, stating, for example, that in southern Africa “communists use pockets of violence to exploit a situation and to accelerate hostility and more violence.”158

The policy towards South Africa during the first year of the administration was thus founded on a moral obligation towards the black South Africans and a sincere desire to halt apartheid on one side, and economic and strategic motives on the other side. As these motives were quite different, they often resulted in a vague and inefficient policy during 1977. As shortly discussed in the introduction, some of the policy makers within the Carter administration had different backgrounds. Even though they all had the same goal during the first year of the administration, which was to promote human rights abroad, some of the most important policy makers had different incentives to reach this goal. Whereas Carter was motivated by a belief in human rights through his experiences with the civil rights struggle in the old South as discussed earlier in the chapter, Brzezinski’s commitment to human rights was driven by the power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Even though his commitment to human rights was certainly sincere during the first year of the administration, Brzezinski’s background often made him advocate a moderate approach, in which he ultimately favoured economic and strategic considerations over moral motives.

Even though Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was officially responsible for US policy towards Southern Africa, Brzezinski never shied away from offering his opinion on the policy towards this region. In many conversations with both US officials and members of the South

African government, Brzezinski offered honest and sharp comments. For example, in a meeting with the South African prime minister on January 28, 1977, Brzezinski clarified to

157 OVP, Memorandum From Vice President Mondale to President Carter, May 10, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 817-821; DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, May 20, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 847. 158 DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, May 19, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 831.

Botha that the US would “never intervene in the conflict on the side of a minority white government, even if the communists were involved.”159 Moreover, when referring to his personal support to the liberation movement of the Boers, Brzezinski stated that he was

“always in favour of national liberation movements, consistently,” after which Botha commented that he was not happy to hear that.160 Even though, in some conversations,

Brzezinski concentrated on the moral aspect of US policy and chose the morally responsible policy options, this was not always his guiding principle. For example, in a National Security

Council meeting on March 3, 1977, Brzezinski was in favour of “the promotion of a moderate

South African policy” and argued that a progressive transformation would be the most fitting policy.161 Moreover, when deciding on the South African policy of the administration,

Brzezinski was in favour of a continuation of the current policy, which was aimed at strategic and economic benefits for the US, instead of a condemnation of apartheid. Brzezinski thus showed different degrees of commitment to human rights in his conversations with the South

African government.

In his memoirs, Brzezinski emphasized the initial goals of the administration, one of which was “to set in motion a progressive and peaceful transformation of South Africa towards a biracial democracy while in the meantime forging elsewhere a coalition of moderate black African leaders in order to stem continental radicalization and eliminate the

Soviet-Cuban presence from the continent.”162 Brzezinski was convinced that “a major emphasis on human rights as a component of U.S. foreign policy would advance America’s global interests by demonstrating to the emerging nations of the Third World the reality of our democratic system, in sharp contrast to the political system and practices of our

159 DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, January 28, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 755. 160 DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, January 25, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 746-752; DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, January 28, 1977, 752. 161 DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, May 19, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 802. 162 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1893), 55.

41 adversaries.”163 Thus, by illustrating the American commitment to human rights and democracy to African nations, Brzezinski aimed to minimize the Soviet influence on the continent. Moreover, he stated that “some of the clearest examples of flagrant disregard for human rights were provided by the white regimes of southern Africa,” and that “the president’s deep religious commitment to freedom and racial justice as well as his sense of responsibility to the American black community” made sure that the administration was highly motivated to bring about change in South Africa.164 However, the NSA was convinced that this policy would only be successful if the administration did not do “anything radical,” and “maintain a policy of benevolent neutrality.”165 In doing so, the administration would be able to accelerate the process of change but still “maintain a positive relationship with the

Front Line African states.”166

Even though Brzezinski adhered to the administration’s policy towards South Africa most of the time, which can be seen in both the FRUS documents as in his memoirs, he also sometimes portrayed his personal opinions. When discussing the recent uprisings of black opposition parties, he stated that “the aspirations of the Southern African blacks are

‘fundamentally legitimate’ even if certain individuals may seem too radical or ill prepared to govern.”167 Even though this statement does not necessarily mean that Brzezinski was not in favour of a black government, it does portray his doubts about the leaders of the black South

African movement. Moreover, during his private meetings with South African government officials, Brzezinski sometimes illustrated his personal admiration for the South African white minority. In his meeting with Botha, Brzezinski states that he had a “personal admiration for

163 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 124. 164 Ibid., 139. 165 Ibid., 141. 166 Ibid., 141. 167 DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, January 25, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 754.

42 the historical role of the South African whites.”168 A few months later, Brzezinski emphasized that the US had “great historical concern and empathy” for the South African government.169

Brzezinski was expected to deliver the US policy as discussed among the members of the administration, yet the documents illustrate that he sometimes went in a different direction. Instead of pushing the South Africans for changes on their apartheid policies, he often warned Botha and Vorster for the unavoidable changes in their country. For example, in a conversation with the South African ambassador to the United States, Brand

Fourie, Brzezinski stated that he had always had an interest in South Africa, especially the

Boer War, and that he was “conscious of the historical dilemmas now facing South Africa.”170

However, he said, “some of these legacies are in conflict with world trends… and create a web of concerns that affects the international community.”171 Furthermore, Brzezinski conveyed to Fourie that even though he could see their “reasons for maintaining a more leisurely pace of change, this may be impossible under the circumstances.”172

As discussed in the first chapter of this study, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s aversion to the

Soviet Union had always dominated his way of thinking about global affairs. Brzezinski was, therefore, well aware of the possible influence that the Soviet Union could create in the continent of Africa. Instead of focusing on other motivations to maintain good relations with the South African government – e.g. human rights and the end of apartheid – Brzezinski’s main concern was preventing a proxy conflict in Southern Africa between the US and the

Soviet Union. In his memoirs, Brzezinski stated that his role in the US policy towards South

Africa was to make certain that the administration did not “ignore the Soviet-Cuban military presence in Africa.”173

168 DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, January 25, 1977, 754. 169 DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, March 23, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 810. 170 DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, November 11, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 975. 171 DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, November 11, 1977, 975. 172 DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, November 11, 1977, 978. 173 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 139-140.

Brzezinski’s personal background and political beliefs often surfaced, as he clarified his Cold War-focus through statements First of all, in a meeting with Botha in the beginning of 1977, the NSA stated that “if the black-white struggle in Southern Africa also becomes a red-white conflict, it will be a disaster.”174 During a NSC policy review meeting in February,

Brzezinski first stated that “the possibilities are there to transform this from a black-white conflict into a red-white conflict,” and warned the other policy makers that they should pick up the pace because, if they would wait to long to act, the conflict would “involve the spectre of communism.”175 Even though he did not always explicitly mention his fear of communism and the implications of a conflict between the US and the Soviet Union in Southern Africa could have on the US and the world, it is very clear that Brzezinski’s way of thinking was heavily influenced by his hawkish view of the world.

His favour for promoting moderate change was fuelled by his fear for an increasing influence of the Soviet Union in southern Africa. Brzezinski always reminded the administration of the dangers of such a conflict, as he tried to illustrate the potential larger consequences of the administration’s policy in South Africa. Even though Brzezinski was not officially responsible for the South Africa policy, it is safe to say that he had a lot of influence during the first year of Carter’s term. Even though Brzezinski shared the same goals as Carter, regarding human rights, he approached the policy very differently.

As this chapter has illustrated, the human rights policy of the Carter administration in

1977 had two different sides. Morality was, as set out at the beginning of the year, the underlying theme for this policy. However, as the year was passing, it became clear that this theme would sometimes also be set aside when economic or strategic relations between the

US and South Africa were at stake. As discussed in this chapter, Brzezinski’s influence on the

174 DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, January 25, 1977, 754. 175 DOS, Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting, February 8, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 785.

44 policy can, at least partially, explain this double sided policy, as he often prioritized economic and strategic goals over the moral goals of his president. It is clear that Brzezinski did not do this because he did not want to promote human rights in South Africa, but because of his personal background and his hawkish, cold-warrior view on foreign relations. Even though

Carter and Brzezinski thus had the same goal, their approach was very different, which was immediately visible in the hesitant and fluctuating policy towards South Africa in 1977.

Although the policy was thus not as moral and ‘absolute’ as promised by Carter in the beginning of 1977, it clearly contrasted with the human rights policy of former US administrations. As Carter drafted his policy plans for other prioritized foreign policy regions, he clearly tried to embed his focus on human rights and morality. In doing so, Carter was a fairly progressive president and risked, among other things, a lot of backlash from conservatives. 1977 was therefore, although maybe less absolute than expected, still ‘the year of human rights’. Whether or not Carter and his administrations were able to uphold this in the remaining years of their term, will be discussed in the next chapter.

3. 1978-1980: The years of failed attempts and hypocrisy

The first year of the Carter administration was characterized by a sincere attempt to live up to the moral underpinnings of Carter’s policy. Although the administration was not completely successful, as illustrated in the previous chapter, it definitely attempted to approach the issues in Southern Africa with a sense of morality and a consciousness of human rights. From 1978 onwards, however, it became more difficult to uphold this policy, and the commitment to ending apartheid and protecting human rights slowly faded away.

1978, which this study sees as the second period of this administration, can be characterized as the year in which the administration made its transition from ‘morality’ to

‘power’. In this year, the administration shifted from a focus on ending apartheid, to a focus on maintaining beneficial economic and strategic relations with the South African government. The third period – 1979-1980 – was the opposite of the administration’s initial policy plans and, more importantly, its policy in 1977. This period was characterized by very little contact between the South African and American governments, as well as secrecy and delayed decision-making. This chapter will analyse both these periods – 1978 and 1979-1980

– and illustrate the changing character of the administration’s South Africa policy during these years.

In January 1978, the CIA issued an ‘intelligence assessment’ for the administration, in which it discussed the violations of human rights by the South African government, the prospects for change and the implications of the human rights situation on the US. The paper defined human rights through three different categories: individual rights – e.g. freedom from torture

46 and from arbitrary arrest –, social and economic rights and political and civil rights.176 It moved on to list the several human rights violations in South Africa of the past few months: the death of Steve Biko – a black South African civil rights activist – and his inhumane detention conditions, the security crackdown of October 19, 1977, the detention of more than fifty black leaders and activists and the ban of anti-apartheid organisations.177 The paper stated that actions such as these were not unusual in this country and that they reflected “basic white South African attitudes about race and security.”178 The administration concluded that the only people that the South African government protects were whites who did not

“question the fundamental policies of white supremacy and apartheid.”179 Moreover, the paper argued that abusing human rights of black civilians was one of the key factors of apartheid.180

For the administration, however, it appeared to be more important how these human rights abuses would affect US policy towards South Africa. This paper illustrates the everlasting struggle of the administration whether they should engage in a no compromise policy towards the South African government, or to prioritize their own national interests. It is a clear example of the administration’s increasing hypocrisy at this point, as it was well aware of the awful actions of the white minority government under the name of apartheid, but did not act upon this knowledge. The fact that, other than this paper, there was no noteworthy mentioning of human rights violations in the FRUS volume on southern Africa in 1978, only strengthens this argument.

In the FRUS volume on human rights and humanitarian affairs, South Africa was mentioned a few times. In a telegram from the American mission in Geneva to the

Department of State from March 11, 1978, in which the HRC (Human Rights Council)

176 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Intelligence Assessment, January 1978, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 989. 177 CIA, Intelligence Assessment, January 1978, 990. 178 CIA, Intelligence Assessment, January 1978, 990. 179 CIA, Intelligence Assessment, January 1978, 993. 180 CIA, Intelligence Assessment, January 1978, 993.

47 session in Geneva was discussed, it was stated that southern African issues were debated during the session. During this HRC session, it was argued that the “the west was ‘guilty’ of a double standard on human rights by refusing to take practical action on South Africa.”181

Even though the telegram stated that the US was not specifically called out for their policy towards South Africa, it did say that “it was clear that South Africa will continue to be one of the most important measures of U.S. moral credibility in this forum,” meaning that the US still had to prove the sincerity of their condemnation through actual action.182 Nine months later, in a paper prepared in the National Security Council on the administrations ‘human rights performance’, it was stated that there had been “some improvements in Rhodesia but no real change in South Africa.”183 Even though the administration was thus aware of the human rights issues still present in South Africa, pointed out to them by both the UN and their own government officials, it did not propose to take action. This reflects the administration’s stance towards human rights in South Africa during the second year of the administration, as the issue was a subject of discussion, but clearly not important or urgent enough to actually act upon it. Again, this illustrates the hypocritical character of the administration’s policy towards South Africa. By discussing the issue, but not undertaking any action, the administration tried to prevent domestic and international condemnation, at the same time as it aimed to preserve its economic and strategic relations with the South African government.

As the second chapter illustrated, the end of 1977 saw a conflicted U.S. policy. The administration was torn between battling apartheid, through economic sanctions and other measures, and maintaining enough relations with South Africa to prevent losing access to important minerals and keeping up with nuclear arrangements. The issues in Namibia and Rhodesia had gradually lost

181 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State, March 11, 1978, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 2, 416; 421-422. 182 U.S. Mission, Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State, March 11, 1978, 416; 421- 422. 183 NSC, Paper Prepared in the National Security Council: Human Rights Performance: January 1977-December 1978, December, 1978, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 2, 547-548.

48 their importance to the administration as they were now picked up by other countries and the UN as well. The focus could now thus be on South Africa. Instead of prioritizing on improving the life of black South Africans, the US government chose to shift its focus to maintaining beneficial economic and strategic relations with the South African government, illustrating the rather quick shift from a moral belief in improving human rights in South Africa to a policy in which US national interest was prioritized.

In the beginning of 1978, the administration was eager to find “a workable mix between principle and practicality, action and inaction.”184 This dilemma remained present throughout the entire year and paralysed the administration in undertaking any real action, in either of the two directions. The idea of principle was sometimes enforced through the administration’s sporadic condemnation of apartheid. In conversations with both the US government and the South African government, it was stated that the policy decisions needed to consider the racial policies of the South Africans, and to think about the US prestige in both western and African countries.185 The administration wanted to prevent other countries from

“identifying the US with racism and the southern African status quo.”186 In a memorandum from Peter Tarnoff – executive secretary of the Department of State and former employee of the American embassy in Nigeria– to Brzezinski from May 1978, a possible response to a letter from Douglas Fraser is discussed. Fraser, president of United Auto Workers and lobbyist for, among other things, American divestment in South Africa, had sent a critical letter to Carter about the administration’s policy in South Africa. In the proposed response to

Fraser’s letter, it was reiterated that the US would not “accept South Africa’s system of racial discrimination nor the brutal measures that are used to enforce it,” and that “the South

Africans fully understood the deep commitment of this administration to seeing progress

184 CIA, Intelligence Assessment, January 1978, 998. 185 DOS, Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), March 20, 1978, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 1011-1019. 186 CIA, Intelligence Assessment, January 1978, 998.

49 towards full political participation for all South Africans.”187 Even though the moral side of the administration had thus not completely disappeared, its strength had clearly diminished in contrast to 1977, as no real action was taken to fortify their condemnation.

Contrary to this principled side of the administration, stood the practical side.

Motivated by their fear for communism, the advantages of nuclear cooperation and their important economic relations with South Africa, the administration much more often acted from this side than from their principles. Even though the fear of communism seemed to be less present during this year than in 1977, it was still there. In the policy paper on human rights, which was issued in January, the administration stated that the communists had “a tactical advantage in this situation in that they advertise themselves as the champions of revolution.”188 Therefore, the administration aimed to establish a “viable position between the racist and the communist extremes.”189 A few months later, the administration expressed their worry about how economic sanctions from the US towards South Africa, would benefit the

Soviet Union in their trade with South Africa.190 Even though the fear for communism was clearly still present, the reasons behind it stood in stark contrast to the reasons in 1977.

Instead of a fear for a complete communist take-over of southern Africa, the administration was now worried about practicalities and Soviet influence on a much smaller scale.

The second motivation for the ‘practical’ policy, was the advantage of nuclear cooperation, which would not succeed if the administration focused too much on human rights. The first talks on nuclear cooperation had already taken place at the end of 1977. These discussions were mainly about the possible nuclear weapon testing site in Kalahari. In 1978, however, the US and South Africa

187 Douglas Fraser (President of the United Auto Workers) had written to Carter about his policy towards South Africa. The response to Fraser is proposed by Tarnoff in this Memorandum; DOS, Memorandum for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The White House, May 9, 1978, Digital National Security Archive, South Africa: the Making of U.S. Policy, 1962-1989, 2. 188 CIA, Intelligence Assessment, January 1978, 998. 189 CIA, Intelligence Assessment, January 1978, 998. 190 NSC, Memorandum From Tom Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant foe National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), April 4, 1978, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 1031.

50 focused on the possible nuclear fuel export from the US to fuel South Africa’s nuclear power reactors. In February 1978, an American technical team was send to South Africa to find out whether or not South Africa had kept its promises, which the US had demanded in order to continue their cooperation.191 Delivering proof that the Kalahari site was not being used as a testing site for a nuclear bomb, and signing the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty) were the most important demands of the US government.192 If these conditions were met by the South African government, the US would agree to fuel the nuclear power reactors in South Africa. Even though it seems that South Africa would benefit the most from this cooperation, they only responded at the end of this year and, even then, nothing was actually decided. As the administration realised at the end of the year, the South

Africans had deliberately kept the US government waiting for so long.193 During all of these conversations on potential nuclear cooperation, the US had almost completely discarded its initial condemnation of apartheid and the white minority government. The South African government had successfully ‘distracted’ the American administration with a deal which would benefit both South

Africa and the United States. This deal thus withheld the US from imposing extra sanctions on South

Africa, since those sanctions would cross their own benefits.

The last and most important motivation for the administration to maintain good relations with the South Africans, were economic considerations. In a review of economic relations at the end of

March, the administration discussed several policy options in their economic ties with the South

Africans: the termination of export promotion activities, discouragement of investment and bank loans to and in South Africa and a variety of restrictions on US exports.194 Whether or not to actually pursue these policy options, was the more difficult question. Imposing these measures would be

191 DOS, Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), February 11, 1978, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 1002. 192 U.S. Embassy in South Africa, Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State, August 9, 1978, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 1058. 193 DOS, Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa, December 30, 1978, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 1069-1071. 194 DOS, Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), March 20, 1978, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 1012.

“costly”, especially if they would only be imposed by the US.195 However, “maintenance of the status quo (…) would be costly in terms of our foreign relations with the rest of Africa and the credibility of our general human rights policy.”196 The US was also afraid to lose important minerals when undertaking steps towards losing economic ties.197 Moreover, it is often stated and weighed into almost every policy decision, that restrictions in the economic relations with South Africa would have an adverse effect on the US economy.198 In the memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski from May

1978, the role of American corporations was discussed. It was stated that, even though this subject was a major concern to the administration, its policy would remain to be “one of neither encouraging nor discouraging investment.”199 Even though “actively discouraging American investment or loans to South Africa” was an option which could have been discussed in the future, the letter emphasized that the US had little leverage over South Africa and could thus not risk taking such a step.

As illustrated, the underlying motives for the policy of the administration towards

South Africa in 1978 were thus a mixture of ‘principle and practicality’. Still, practical considerations such as the economic relations between the US and South Africa, as well as their nuclear relations, turned out to be of much bigger value to the administration, which was clearly visible in their policy. This, again, points to the hypocritical character of the administration, as they had already abandoned their ‘absolute’ commitment to human rights during the second year in the White House.

Whereas the administration clearly attempted to adhere to its commitment to human rights and morality in 1977, the second year of the administration painfully proved that this

195 DOS, Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), March 20, 1978, 1015. 196 DOS, Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), March 20, 1978, 1015. 197 DOS, Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), March 20, 1978, 1015; DOS, Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts, March 24, 1978, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 1019-1028. 198 DOS, Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), March 20, 1978, 1015. 199 DOS, Memorandum for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The White House, May 9, 1978, Digital National Security Archive, South Africa: the Making of U.S. Policy, 1962-1989, 3.

52 commitment was, for a large part, merely rhetorical. 1977 had illustrated that prioritizing human rights in foreign policy did not get the administration where it wanted to be. Although the discussion on human rights had become more present, at least in the US and the UN, real improvements had yet to be seen. However, as an effect of this commitment to human rights, the US had also not reached its practical goals in many foreign policy issues. In the case of

South Africa, this meant that the administration had neither practically improved human rights, nor had it established profitable relations with the South African government. 1978, therefore, saw a shift in the general foreign policy of the administration. What had been a good start by committing to human rights, was now pushed to the backburner.

Even though it was still hesitant and vague, the foreign policy of the Carter administration had definitely become more realist in 1978. Human rights were too costly in terms of economic and strategic considerations, and slowly faded away in Washington’s priorities. Even though Carter was still committed to human rights and a moral foreign policy because of his background and personal beliefs, he was, from 1978 onwards, overshadowed by the neo-liberals in the government. Brzezinski was one of them. As explained in the previous chapter, Brzezinski recognized the importance of human rights, but only when it could improve the position of the US in its battle with the Soviet Union.

Even though the visible influence of Brzezinski was difficult to discover in the sources, this does not necessarily mean that he did not play a role behind the scenes. A lot of communication, for instance some policy discussions and other conversations, went to

President Carter of Secretary Vance via Brzezinski. These memo’s and summaries will, therefore, probably have been influenced by Brzezinski and his views on the policy. An example is the letter, discussed in the previous subchapter, to Douglas Fraser, which was also sent to Brzezinski before Carter received it. In the letter to Carter, in which he sent the proposed response to Fraser, Brzezinski stated that he believed this was the best solution and

53 that he found “the State Department statement an adequate response to Fraser’s concerns.”200

Thus, even though the influence of Brzezinski, for instance during conversations or in other meetings, became less visible, this does not necessarily mean that his influence on Carter and therefore, the policy towards South Africa actually declined.

Through his hawkish views and his focus on strategic goals, Brzezinski, among other neoliberals in the administration, was able to convert the administration’s foreign policy to a policy focused on economic and strategic considerations, instead of on morality and human rights. Even though the administration cannot be blamed for attempting to preserve its economic and strategic relations with South Africa, they simply went too far. The South

African government had already been given quite some time to alter its policies, but had still not implemented any changes to their racial policies. Carter’s initial policy plans for South

Africa would have suggested that, after having given South Africa some time to adjust, it would take action and cut ties with South Africa. However, instead of its initial policy, based on human rights and morality, Washington chose to go in another direction. This shift in the policy towards South Africa is a clear example of how the Carter administration had quickly abandoned its focus on human rights, and had now chosen a path of less resistance, and more power.

In 1979 and 1980, the communication between the South African government and the US government declined drastically. Both conversations within the US government on their South

Africa policy, and the conversations with the South African government itself, were scarce during the last two years of the administration. It is partly for this reason that this study has

200 NSC, Memorandum for The President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, June 19, 1978, Digital National Security Archive, South Africa: the Making of U.S. Policy, 1962-1989, 1.

54 combined these two years and will discuss these years as one period. Moreover, these years show a lot of resemblance in the implementation of the policy and the motivations behind this policy.

Whereas the first half of Carter’s term displayed – to a greater or lesser extent – a sincere devotion to human rights, this sense of morality almost completely evaporated during

1979 and 1980. In all of the FRUS documents on South Africa in 1979 and 1980, there is only one mention of human rights. In a meeting with Pik Botha, the American ambassador discussed the influence of the Soviets and the possibility of their world domination. The ambassador stated that he did not believe that the Soviet Union was as strong as it used to be, and argued that the US had many advantages over the Soviet Union. Two of these were “the respect for human rights and the recognition of the force of nationalism, specifically African nationalism.”201 Considering the general policy of the US towards South Africa, which will be discussed in more depth further on in this chapter, this statement is extremely hypocritical.

Even though the US had, at this point, not made real attempts to battle apartheid and to protect the human rights of black South Africans, the ambassador still believed that the American strength lied in its human rights policy and its support for nationalism in Africa.

In the FRUS volume on human rights, South Africa is only mentioned once. In a briefing memorandum from Derian to Secretary of State Warren Christopher on the NGO

Community’s recommendations on the American human rights policy from June 1979, it is stated that the NGO’s perceived the visibility of the human rights policy of the Carter administration to have drastically declined.202 It was specifically stated that the U.S. had diminished pressure on “major violators” such as South Africa, and it was then recommended by the NGO community to maintain “a tough human rights stance toward major violators,”

201 U.S. Embassy in South Africa, Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State, October 26, 1979, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 1096. 202 DOS, Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to Acting Secretary of State Christopher, June 13, 1979, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 2, 585-586.

55 such as South Africa.203 It is striking, and almost unimaginable, that even though the administration was thus notified of their diminishing attention to major human rights violators, they did not act upon these allegations in any way.

Not many things had thus changed in South Africa since 1978, as well as in Carter’s policy towards this country. The economic measures that had been imposed by the administration were still enforced, but had not yet shown their effect. The South Africans had not changed their policies and, despite mounting international pressure, it did not seem as if the situation was not very likely to change in the coming years. Even though the US had started a fairly strong policy towards South Africa in 1977, the morality in Carter’s administration was now no longer visible, which is illustrated by the almost non-existing human rights policy towards South Africa during the last two years of the administration.

Even though the administration had already noticed that the South Africans were deliberately postponing the nuclear settlement to avoid sanctions, the US government was still eager to advance in its nuclear cooperation with the South Africans. In January, the

Department of State sent a telegram to the US embassy in South Africa, urging the ambassador to talk to either Brand Fourie or Pik Botha. In this telegram, the Department of

State stated that they questioned “whether substantial further delay would in be in the interests of the U.S. or South Africa,” and demanded a decision on the potential nuclear cooperation between the US and South Africa within weeks.204 Three months later, in April, the

Department of State sent yet another telegram, this time stating that “in the continuing absence of a response,” there would be “a tendency to conclude that the South African government has no serious interest in the kind of settlement discussed last June.”205

203 DOS, Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to Acting Secretary of State Christopher, June 13, 1979, 585-586. 204 DOS, Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa, January 23, 1979, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 1072. 205 DOS, Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town, April 6, 1979, FRUS 1977- 1980, vol. 18, 1080.

A week after this telegram, the Department of State and the CIA received a telegram from the Consulate in Cape Town, in which an allegation was expressed by the South

Africans that a US aircraft had been used for espionage.206 This aircraft had supposedly been used to take photographs of large areas of Africa, “including some very sensitive installations.”207 Pik Botha called this action a “shocking violation of national sovereignty.”208

Having given an understanding response to Botha first, the US official later concluded in this telegram to the US, that it seemed “highly probable that this incident was staged as part of the

South African campaign to discredit the integrity of the US in dealing with the South African government.” 209 A few months later, in September 1979, the American administration reported a possible nuclear explosion in the area around Southern Africa.210 Although the documents do not clarify why, the US did not want to make a public statement about this report, and only discussed it in high level meetings with the South Africans.211 A few months later, another report concluded that the explosion was probably not a nuclear explosion.212

Without any further discussion on these accusations, Carter’s administration immediately urged the South Africans to “resume promptly negotiation of the proposals we made earlier.”213

206 U.S. Consulate in South Africa, Telegram From the Consulate in Cape Town to the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Embassy in South Africa, April 12, 1979, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 1081- 1083. 207 U.S. Consulate in South Africa Telegram From the Consulate in Cape Town to the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Embassy in South Africa, April 12, 1979, 1081. 208 U.S. Consulate in South Africa Telegram From the Consulate in Cape Town to the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Embassy in South Africa, April 12, 1979, 1081. 209 U.S. Consulate in South Africa Telegram From the Consulate in Cape Town to the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Embassy in South Africa, April 12, 1979, 1083. 210 NSC, Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting, September 23, 1979, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 1088. 211 U.S. Consulate in South Africa, Telegram From the Consulate in Cape Town to the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Embassy in South Africa, April 12, 1979, 1081-1083. 212 NSC, Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter, January 9, 1980, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 1100-1102. 213 NSC, Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter, January 9, 1980, 1100-1102.

The last few months of the administration were characterized by a lot of secrecy and very little communication from both the American as the South African government. Whereas the Carter administration was still pressuring the South Africans to continue the discussions on the nuclear cooperation, it also often threatened the South African government that they could “not put off the question of sanctions indefinitely” and that “the absence of significant progress toward a nuclear settlement is eroding the basis on which the US has been able to oppose any form of sanctions against South Africa in the area of nuclear supply.” 214 South

Africa, however, also did not play a fair game. Even though the US was well aware of this tactic, the South Africans continued their postponement of discussing nuclear cooperation with the American administration. Giving the US the bare minimum, yet enough to keep them interested, the South African government was able to postpone adhering to the demands of the

US and, at the same time, kept their important support in the UN.215 Even though both governments were aware of the games that were played, they both continued with their policies.216 The only thing than one can conclude from this observation, is that both countries had interests in the other country that were simply too important to let go of.

Almost every document of these two years echoes either the demand for nuclear cooperation or the fear for international condemnation. These two motives were thus essential to the Carter administration during 1979 and 1980. The possible nuclear cooperation was very important to the Carter administration during the last two years. Without receiving any reaction from the South African government, the US government remained to pressure the

South Africans to pursue the potential nuclear arrangements between the US and South

214 DOS, Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town, January 12, 1980, FRUS 1977- 1980, vol. 18, 1106. 215 U.S. Consulate in South Africa, Telegram From the Consulate in Cape Town to the Department of State, January 25, 1980, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 1108-1111; U.S. Consulate in South Africa, Telegram From the Consulate in Cape Town to the Department of State, March 27, 1980, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 1111-1114; Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom, 155. 216 Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom, 155.

Africa. Even though the Carter administration often stated that they would not put off sanctions indefinitely, they were actually quite vulnerable and dependent of the South

Africans, which made them postpone undertaking any real action for a long time. South

Africa had thus successfully played their part of the game, as they kept the US interested in a nuclear deal, even though they did nothing to adhere to their side of the obligations. The US, however, had been manipulated by South Africa, but did not respond to this or take any action. As a result, the administration did not achieve its goal of nuclear cooperation with

South Africa. However, by not punishing South Africa for their postponement and taking action, the US was also risking to be domestically and internationally criticized for their policy towards South Africa.

International and domestic condemnation was feared by the administration. Even though it was not often said explicitly, the Carter administration was definitely aware of the issues that might arise if other countries knew the details of the US-South African relations at this stage. A lot of information was, therefore, kept secret. For example, when the report came out on the possible nuclear explosion near South Africa, the administration stated that every effort would be made “to restrict circulation of this information and these decisions within the

US government.”217 This illustrates that the US government was not even allowed to know about this event, let alone the international community. The demand for nuclear cooperation and the fear for international condemnation of US-South African relations were thus the main motivations behind the US policy in 1979 and 1980. These motivations obviously stand in stark contrast to the motivations behind the policy of the first two years of the administration.

The analysis of the sources from the last two years of Carter’s term have illustrated that the administration no longer saw human rights as the basis for its policy towards South

Africa. Instead, international prestige and nuclear cooperation were the most important pillars

217 NSC, Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting, September 23, 1979, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 1089.

59 during these years. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the advancement of human rights abroad had simply turned out to be too costly for the administration. The trend of neoliberalism and prioritizing economic and strategic considerations that had begun in 1978, had thus continued during the last two years. Even though the presence and influence of both

Carter and Brzezinski is difficult to pin down due to the small number of documents in 1979 and 1980, it is highly plausible that they continued in the roles they played within the administration in 1978. In Power and Principle, Brzezinski stated that, throughout 1979, he repeatedly pointed the administration towards the importance of convincing black South

Africa that the administration was serious about pursuing majority rule, at the same time as illustrating white South Africa that they would “have a future” in South Africa if majority rule became reality.218 This suggests that Brzezinski was actually still present in discussions about

South Africa and even played an important role. Whether or not the policy had influenced the presence of apartheid, was even doubted by Brzezinski himself, as he stated that as the administration ended, “we had only just begun to recognize the fundamental outlined of the problem.”219 Abolishing apartheid, Brzezinski concluded, had proven to be very difficult.

However, by the end of the administration, Brzezinski still found that the Carter administration had successfully influenced the situation, by establishing “greater willingness to listen to the African view in Washington and a better understanding in Africa of American dilemmas.”220

Another reason for the almost non-existing interest in South Africa during the last two years, is the prioritization of other foreign policy matters. Whereas South Africa had been one of the administration’s priorities in 1977, as South Africa was the perfect stage for

Washington to illustrate its moralistic human rights policy, other countries had now taken

218 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 143. 219 Ibid., 143. 220 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 143-144.

60 centre stage. Even though a shift in foreign policy priorities is not necessarily bad or illogical, as it occurs in almost every administration, it does confirm that human rights were no longer prioritized by Carter and his top officials.

As this chapter has illustrated, the Carter administration had abandoned its initial beliefs and foreign policy goals in their policy towards South Africa during 1979 and 1980.

Even though the administration’s rhetoric was fairly strong and promised to take action if

South Africa would not alter its racial policies, it ultimately only took ‘action’ through verbal condemnation during the first two years of the administration. The general trend within the administration explains this shift, as Carter was gradually overshadowed by neoliberals such as Brzezinski. Ultimately favouring the way of least resistance by often remaining neutral in its contact with the South Africans, and sometimes even actively making the ‘wrong’ decisions – e.g. favouring economic and strategic considerations over the condemnation of apartheid – the Carter administration did not fulfil the promises it had made in January 1977.

Even though his good intentions were present, Jimmy Carter had not been successful in putting morality and human rights first in his foreign policy towards South Africa.

Conclusion

When Jimmy Carter pronounced his intention to make his administration’s commitment to human rights absolute, it was met with great enthusiasm both domestically and internationally. Human rights and morality would be the backbone of Carter’s foreign policy, which was a logical result of Carter’s personal experiences and background. However, turning this intention into a policy, and even more important, into actual action, turned out to be an impossible task for the Carter administration.

To research the shift in the administration’s human rights policy, this thesis has specifically analysed the policy towards South Africa, which was, in 1977, one of Carter’s foreign policy priorities. Carter’s first year in the White House was characterized by a sincere attempt to promote human rights abroad, even though this was already often set aside when economic and strategic considerations came into play. Even though the administration was motivated to push the South African government into a different direction, one in which majority rule was at least considered, it was often distracted by other policy goals, which seemed to have more priority. For instance, remaining in good relations with not only South

Africa, but also Namibia and Rhodesia, was of great importance to Washington, due to the fast approaching proxy conflict between the US and the Soviet Union in the African continent. Moreover, economic considerations also took centre stage in the decision making process of the Carter administration. Forcing the South African government too much would thus result in economic and strategic risks that the administration was not willing to take.

Even though the verbal condemnation of apartheid lasted throughout the entire first year, the administration clearly wanted to avoid, at all costs, to take real action, which would inevitably hurt the American position. The combination of verbal condemnation and economic and strategic cooperation resulted in a hesitant and vague policy during the first year.

The policy did not improve during the second year of Carter’s term. Whereas the administration still made sincere attempts to, at least verbally, condemn the South African government for their racial policies in 1977, the administration’s commitment to human rights was slowly pushed to the backburner in 1978. This year’s policy towards South Africa was characterized by a combination of principle and practicality. Even though reality suggested otherwise, the administration still did not completely abandon its principles. However, their sporadic condemnation of apartheid was mainly motivated by the fear of domestic and international condemnation, instead of moralistic incentives. Practical considerations, however, were of much greater importance to the administration. Whereas the fear of communism mainly led the focus on strategic relations in 1977, the administration’s most important aim during 1978 was economic and nuclear cooperation with South Africa. In a complicated game between Washington and Pretoria, the Carter administration often got the short end of the stick. The administration was neither successful in their condemnation of apartheid, nor did it achieve its strategic and economic goals, which meant that its policy towards South Africa was not successful during 1978.

After two frustrating and rough years in office, the Carter administration clearly shifted its foreign policy priorities during 1979 and 1980. Condemnation of apartheid was almost non-existent and only the fear for international criticism and the desire to establish nuclear and economic cooperation were driving the administration in their policy towards

South Africa. South Africa was still giving Washington the bare minimum that was necessary to avoid sanctions, yet the Carter administration either did not seem to understand this or was still not willing to take their condemnation to the next level. Instead of realizing that their relationship with South Africa would probably result in nothing but international criticism towards the US, the administration continued this policy during its final years in office.

At the end of their four years in office, the Carter administration had thus almost completely abandoned their commitment to human rights in their policy towards South

Africa. When it turned out that the promotion of human rights in South Africa was simply too costly in regard to other policy goals, the administration slowly shifted its priority from human rights to economic and strategic cooperation with the South African government.

Meanwhile, the South African government had not changed their racist policies and human rights violations were still a daily reality for many black South Africans.

As illustrated in the chapters, one of the reasons for this shift was the increasing influence of neoliberal figures in the administration, such as Brzezinski. Even though

Brzezinski shared Carter’s commitment to human rights, at least in the first year of the administration, it came from a realist and strategic point of view. Due to his personal background and experiences, Brzezinski saw almost every foreign policy matter through the lens of the Cold War. In order to gain more power and grip in southern Africa, which was necessary to avoid a communist takeover of the front line states, Brzezinski used the promotion of human rights to gain ideological support of black South African leaders.

However, once it turned out that the promotion of human rights was too difficult and thus too costly, and that other policy goals, such as strategic and economic cooperation, would make the American position more powerful, Brzezinski easily shifted his priorities.

Brzezinski’s motivation for the promotion of human rights was thus completely different than Carter’s. As thoroughly discussed in the chapters, Carter’s commitment was based on his strong sense of morality and his personal experiences with the Civil Rights

Movement in the US. Even though Carter had a more deeply rooted motivation to promote human rights in South Africa, he was quickly overshadowed by people such as Brzezinski. As mentioned in the literature review, Carter did not have a lot of experience in foreign affairs.

He was, therefore, heavily dependent on his advisors. Because of his good personal

64 relationship with and close proximity to the president, Brzezinski was able to influence Carter to a great extent. Even though this cannot be stated with full certainty, the analysis does point to an increase in Brzezinski’s influence on Carter during his term and, therefore, also on the policy towards South Africa and the general human rights policy of the administration.

However, not only Brzezinski can be blamed for the shift that occurred within Carter’s human rights policy. Even though he did not have a lot of experience in foreign affairs, Carter could have used his leadership more forcefully if he had truly wanted to promote human rights in

South Africa. Instead, he chose the path of less resistance and let his advisors pull him away from his idealism, towards their more realist and neoliberal approach. This points to both a weak and hypocritical stance from Carter. Of course, he could not have been expected to carry out his human rights policy as absolute as he promoted to do. However, the fact that human rights would be the backbone of Carter’s foreign policy, yet in reality had almost completely disappeared in the South African policy at the end of his term, points to a lack of perseverance and courage to take risks.

It is, however, almost never in the power of a few to determine the course of history.

Although Carter and Brzezinski both had a great amount of influence on the administration’s policy towards South Africa, other factors should also be considered. The most important

‘external’ influence on the shift within the administration’s human rights policy, was the Cold

War. Even though the promotion of human rights should never be inferior to other policy goals, the Cold War was simply too big and all-encompassing to ignore. An American-Soviet proxy conflict in southern Africa would have had enormous consequences, which would only have worsened the situation. Brzezinski’s focus on the bigger picture of the Cold War is, therefore, not hypocritical in itself. Still, I argue that Brzezinski and Carter could have done more to condemn the South African regime, without directly risking a proxy conflict with the

Soviet Union. The focus on nuclear and economic relations was, for a large part, based on the

65 administration’s aim of improving the American economy and establishing even more power in the world. Risking the wellbeing and even the lives of black South Africans by choosing to ignore the human rights violations of the South African government, only to improve the

American economy and global power, is hypocritical to say the least. This shift from morality to power is, unfortunately, not only seen in the Carter administration. In the foreign policy of almost every American administration, moral beliefs and a sincere devotion to human rights are often traded for more important interests, such as strategic advantages and economic development. Eventually even Jimmy Carter, a deeply religious and moral man, was forced to undermine his personal beliefs and succumb under the often hypocrite and power-ridden world of foreign policy.

Bibliography Secondary sources

Anderson, Carol. ‘’Apartheid South Africa: Destroyer of the New World Order?’’ Diplomatic History 38, no. 2 (2014): 468-470.

Baehr, Peter.R. and Monique Castermans-Holleman. The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Borstelmann, Thomas. The Cold War and the Color Line. American Race Relations in the Global Arena. Cambrigde, USA: Harvard University Press, 2001.

Borstelmann, Thomas. The 1970s a new global history from civil rights to economic inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.

Brinkley, Douglas. ‘’The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter: The ‘’Hands On’’ Legacy of Our Thirty-ninth President.’’ Diplomatic History 20, no. 4 (1996): 505-529.

Brzezisnki, Zbigniew and Alexander Dallin. Africa and the Communist World. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1963.

Carter, Gwendolyn M. American Policy and the Search for Justice and Reconciliation in South Africa. Racine, Wisconsin: The Johnson Foundation, 1975.

Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1995.

Coker, Christopher. ‘’Retreat into the future: the United States, South Africa, and human rights, 1976-8.’’ The journal of modern African studies: a quarterly survey of politics, economics and related topics in contemporary Africa 18, no. 3 (1980): 509-524.

Danaher, Kevin. In Whose Interest?: A guide to U.S.-South Africa relations. Washington D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1984.

Davis, R. Hunt Jr. Apartheid Unravels. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1991.

Firsing, Scott. ‘’Asymmetry as context: The rollercoaster of South Africa-US relations post 1994.’’ South African Journal of International Affairs 19, no. 1 (2012): 105-133.

Gaddis, John L. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Gati, Charles (ed.). Zbig. The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2013.

Glad, Betty. An Outsider in the White House. Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009.

Gleijeses, Piero. Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013.

Irwin, Ryan M. Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Jones, Alan M. Jr. (ed). U.S. Foreign Policy In A Changing World. The Nixon Administration, 1969-1973. New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1973.

Kamara, Edward and James D. Chalmers (advisor). ‘’Continuity or change: American foreign policy of human rights under the Carter and the Reagan administration with particular emphasis on Southern Africa 1977-1984’’. PhD dissertation, Wayne State University, Detroit, 1988.

Kramer, Michael and Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (advisor). ‘’Jimmy Carter’s presidential rhetoric: Panama Canal, human rights, and Zimbabwe’’. University of Minnesota, 2005.

Lake, Anthony. ‘’Caution and Concern: The Making of American Policy Toward South Africa, 1946-1971.’’ Princeton University, 1974. https://search-proques com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2443/docview/302746232?accountid=12045.

Lake, Anthony. The ‘’tar baby’’ option: American policy toward Southern Rhodesia. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973.

Lechner, Zachary J. “’Fuzzy as a Georgia Peach’: The Ford Campaign and the Challenge of Jimmy Carter’s Southernness.” Southern Cultures 23, no. 4 (2017): 62-81.

Leffler, Melvyn P. and Odd Arne Westad. The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Lodge, Tom. Sharpeville: An Apartheid Massacre and Its Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Lulat, Y. G-M. U.S. Relations with South Africa: An Annotated Bibliography. Volume One: Books, Documents, Reports, and Monographs. Boulder, United States: Westview Press, 1991.

Lulat, Y.G-M., U.S. Relations with South Africa: An Annotated Bibliography. Volume Two: Periodical Literature and Guide to Sources of Current Information. Boulder, United States: Westview Press, 1991.

Massie, Robert Kinloch. Loosing The Bonds: The United States and South Africa in The Apartheid Years. New York: Nan. A Talese/Doubleday, 1997.

McMahon, Robert J. editor. The Cold War in the Third World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Mitchell, Nancy. Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018.

Mitchell, Nancy. ‘’Tropes of the Cold War: Jimmy Carter and Rhodesia’’. Cold War History 7, no. 2 (2007): 263-283.

Mitchell, Nancy. ‘’Zbigniew Brzezinski: Intellectual Gadfly or Grand Strategist?’’ Diplomatic History 0, no. 0 (2019): 1-4.

Newsom, David D. The Imperial Mantle: the United States, Decolonization and the Third World. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.

Nicol, Davidson. ‘’United States Foreign Policy in Southern Africa: Third-World Perspectives.’’ The Journal of Modern African Studies 21, no. 4 (1983): 587-603.

Pastor, Robert A. “The Caricature and the Man.’’ In Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski, edited by Charles Gati. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2013.

Robb, Thomas K. Jimmy Carter and the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’. Edinburgh: Edinburg University Press, 2017.

Rothkopf, David J. ‘’Setting the Stage for the Current Era.’’ In Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski, edited by Charles Gati. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2013.

Saunders, Chris. ‘’South Africa, human rights, and the United Nations: A review essay.’’ South African Journal of International Affairs 19, no. 1 (2012): 135-142.

Schabot, Daniel E. ‘’Jimmy Carter’s Post-Presidential Rhetoric: Faith-based Rhetoric and Human Rights Foreign Policy’’. University of Southern Mississippi, 2012.

Schmidli, William Michael. The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere. Human Rights and U.S. Cold War Policy Toward Argentina. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2013.

Schmidt, Elizabeth. Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Schmidt, Elizabeth and Ron Dellums. Decoding corporate camouflage: U.S. business support for apartheid. Washington, D.C.,: Institute for Policy Studies, 1980.

Schmitz, David. F. and Vanessa Walker. ‘’Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy.’’ Diplomatic History 28, no.1 (2004): 113-143.

Smith, Gaddis. Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years. New York: Hill and Wang, 1986.

Sneh, Itai and Alan Brinkley (advisor). ‘’The eclectic badge of honor: how the Carter administration integrated human rights into American foreign policy and to what extent’’. Colombia University, 2003.

Snyder, Sarah B. From Selma To Moscow. How Human Rights Activists Transformed U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Columbia University Press, 2018.

Steding, William. Presidential Faith and Foreign Policy: Jimmy Carter the Disciple and Ronald Reagan the Alchemist. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

Stevens, Simon. ‘’From the Viewpoint of a Southern Governor: the Carter Administration and Apartheid, 1977-81.’’ Diplomatic History 36, no. 5 (2012): 843-880.

Taapopi, Leanord and T.A. Keenleyside. ‘’The West and Southern Africa: economic involvement and support for liberation 1960-1974.’’ Canadian journal of African studies 13, no. 3 (1980): 347-370.

Thomson, Alex. ‘’The Diplomacy of Impasse: the Carter Administration and Apartheid South Africa.’’ Diplomacy & Statecraft 21, no. 1 (2010): 107-124.

Vaïsse, Justin. Zbigniew Brzezinski. America’s Grand Strategist. Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press, 2018.

Vance, Cyrus. ‘’Human Rights and Foreign Policy.’’ Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 223, no. 7 (1977): 223-229.

Vance, Cyrus. ‘’The human rights imperative.’’ Foreign Policy 63, summer edition (1986): 3-19. Accessed January 24, 2019.

Van Wyk, Anna-Mart, and Jackie Grobler. ‘’The Carter administration and the institution of the 1977 mandatory arms embargo against South Africa: rhetoric or active action?’’ Historia: Amptelike Orgaan 51, no. 1 (2006): 163-199.

Primary sources

Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, vol. 2, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, vol. 18, Southern Africa.

Digital National Security Archive, South Africa: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1962-1989.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977- 1981. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983.