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On the ZIK Television Channel (Novi Komunikatsii LLC) on November 13, 2020
Opinion No.44 On the coverage of the topic of grant receivers (the Renaissance Foundation and others) on the ZIK television channel (Novi Komunikatsii LLC) on November 13, 2020 Kyiv December 21, 2020 І. Circumstances of the case 1. On November 12, 2020, the Independent Media Council received an appeal from Oksana Romaniuk, executive director of the Institute of Mass Information, regarding the telethon “Sorosist Revenge” as announced on the ZIK television channel, to review the respective content and provide an opinion on whether or not there were violations of professional standards on the part of the ZIK channel, including hate speech and manipulations. 2. On December 1, 2020, the Independent Media Council, pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Regulations on the Independent Media Council, recognized the appeal regarding this case admissible, given the matter is of great social importance (similar content was already aired on this TV channel, whereby the IMC identified violations). 3. In the morning (at 08:37) on November 13, 2020, the ZIK channel aired a story devoted to George Soros, his influence on the Ukrainian government and the "army of his supporters", allegedly formed by him in nearly every country of the world; it was said that the billionaire was born into a Jewish family in Budapest in 1930; that "Soros combines getting rich quick with charity", and that most of his assets are allegedly owned by the Open Society Foundations. It is asserted that G.Soros is financing various projects in developing countries through a network of his foundations. Yet later, with a reference to the "billionaire’s critics", he is accused of having selfish motives and commercial interests - with only Ihor Mosiychuk, an ex-MP, shown to be criticizing G.Soros directly. -
Ukraine at the Crossroad in Post-Communist Europe: Policymaking and the Role of Foreign Actors Ryan Barrett [email protected]
University of Missouri, St. Louis IRL @ UMSL Dissertations UMSL Graduate Works 1-20-2018 Ukraine at the Crossroad in Post-Communist Europe: Policymaking and the Role of Foreign Actors Ryan Barrett [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://irl.umsl.edu/dissertation Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, and the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Barrett, Ryan, "Ukraine at the Crossroad in Post-Communist Europe: Policymaking and the Role of Foreign Actors" (2018). Dissertations. 725. https://irl.umsl.edu/dissertation/725 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the UMSL Graduate Works at IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Ukraine at the Crossroad in Post-Communist Europe: Policymaking and the Role of Foreign Actors Ryan Barrett M.A. Political Science, The University of Missouri - Saint Louis, 2015 M.A. International Relations, Webster University, 2010 B.A. International Studies, 2006 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School at the The University of Missouri - Saint Louis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor Philosophy in Political Science May 2018 Advisory Committee: Joyce Mushaben, Ph.D. Jeanne Wilson, PhD. Kenny Thomas, Ph.D. David Kimball, Ph.D. Contents Introduction 1 Chapter I. Policy Formulation 30 Chapter II. Reform Initiatives 84 Chapter III. Economic Policy 122 Chapter IV. Energy Policy 169 Chapter V. Security and Defense Policy 199 Conclusion 237 Appendix 246 Bibliography 248 To the Pat Tillman Foundation for graciously sponsoring this important research Introduction: Ukraine at a Crossroads Ukraine, like many European countries, has experienced a complex history and occupies a unique geographic position that places it in a peculiar situation be- tween its liberal future and communist past; it also finds itself tugged in two opposing directions by the gravitational forces of Russia and the West. -
The Ukrainian Weekly 2012, No.39
www.ukrweekly.com INSIDE: l Russia’s “soft power with an iron fist” – page 3 l The Ukrainian minority in Poland, 1944-1947 – page 9 l Tennis championships at Soyuzivka – page 11 THEPublished U by theKRAINIAN Ukrainian National Association Inc., a fraternal W non-profit associationEEKLY Vol. LXXX No. 39 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2012 $1/$2 in Ukraine Foreign Relations Ukraine’s 2012 parliamentary elections: Committee approves Two parties that might make the cut Tymoshenko resolution by Zenon Zawada Special to The Ukrainian Weekly WASHINGTON – A resolution intro- duced by U.S. Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.), a KYIV – Polls indicate that at least four member of the Senate Foreign Relations political parties will qualify for the 2012 Committee, and co-sponsored by U.S. Verkhovna Rada. Another two parties have Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), Senate majori- a chance of surpassing the 5 percent ty whip, on September 19 unanimously threshold on election day, October 28: the passed the Senate Foreign Relations Ukraine – Forward! party launched by Luhansk oligarch Natalia Korolevska and Committee. The resolution, S. Res. 466, the Svoboda nationalist party launched by calls for the unconditional release of Oleh Tiahnybok. political prisoner and former Ukrainian At the moment, however, both parties Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. would fail to qualify. Ukraine – Forward! “Tymoshenko was a key revolution- would earn 4 percent of the votes for ary in Ukraine’s 2004 Orange closed party lists, while Svoboda would get Revolution and is a pro-Western reform- about 3.8 percent, according to a poll er,” said Sen. -
Whereabouts of Yanukovych and Azarov in Russia
Whereabouts of Yanukovych and Azarov in Russia Table of contents Part 1 Yanukovych and his family Part 2 Azarov and his family Part 1 So far, the media have made a few versions of the whereabouts of Ukrainian ex-president Viktor Yanukovych. The main ones point toward two Russian southern cities: Rostov-on-Don and Sochi, along with the capital of Russia and the Moscow region. Hereinafter, you’ll find an analysis of media references to the location of the Ukrainian former president from 2014 till early 2016, as well as information about what has happened to his close allies and assets obtained through corruption schemes during the specified period. 1. After the flight After the flight of Viktor Yanukovych from Ukraine in the twentieth of February 2014, conflicting reports on the whereabouts of the disgraced president began appearing in the press. Thus, on February 22, 2014 some sources reported that Viktor Yanukovych wasn’t in Kharkiv1, others – that he indeed was in Kharkiv at the moment, where he was going to sign the recently adopted 1 http://kharkov.comments.ua/news/2014/02/22/152813.html laws by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (the Ukrainian Parliament)2. On the same day the border guards denied a charter flight, with Viktor Yanukovych on board, the permission to take off from Donetsk, as quoted by Sergey Astakhov – head assistant of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine3. By all appearances, at that time Viktor Yanukovych was in Kharkiv, where the Congress of Deputies from the South-Eastern regions took place on February 224. -
The Struggle for Ukraine
Chatham House Report Timothy Ash, Janet Gunn, John Lough, Orysia Lutsevych, James Nixey, James Sherr and Kataryna Wolczuk The Struggle for Ukraine Chatham House Report Timothy Ash, Janet Gunn, John Lough, Orysia Lutsevych, James Nixey, James Sherr and Kataryna Wolczuk Russia and Eurasia Programme | October 2017 The Struggle for Ukraine The Royal Institute of International Affairs Chatham House 10 St James’s Square London SW1Y 4LE T: +44 (0) 20 7957 5700 F: + 44 (0) 20 7957 5710 www.chathamhouse.org Charity Registration No. 208223 Copyright © The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2017 Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author(s). All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Please direct all enquiries to the publishers. ISBN 978 1 78413 243 9 A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library. Printed and bound in Great Britain by Latimer Trend. The material selected for the printing of this report is manufactured from 100% genuine de-inked post-consumer waste by an ISO 14001 certified mill and is Process Chlorine Free. Typeset by Soapbox, www.soapbox.co.uk Cover image: A banner marking the first anniversary of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea is hung during a plenary session of Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, in Kyiv on 6 March 2015. -
Euromaidan Values from a Comparative Perspective
Social, Health, and Communication Studies Journal Contemporary Ukraine: A case of Euromaidan, Vol. 1(1), November 2014 MacEwan University, Canada National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine Ternopil State Medical University, Ukraine Article Euromaidan Values from a Comparative Perspective Sviatoslav Sviatnenko, graduate student, Maastricht University, Netherlands Dr. Alexander Vinogradov, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine Abstract Ukrainian revolution frequently called the “Euromaidan” changed Ukrainian society in 120 days and, later, became a regional conflict and a challenge to a global order. This primary social revolution was followed by value and paradigmatic shifts, middle class revolution, and a struggle for human rights, equality, justice, and prosperity. This study examines values and social structure of the Euromaidan. In addition to ethnographic study consisting of participant observations and informal interviewing, data from European Social Survey (2010-2013) and face-to-face survey conducted by an initiative group of sociologists on Maidan were used in order to approach this goal. Results of the study show that values of the Euromaidan (Universalism, Benevolence, Self-Direction, Stimulation, and Security) coincide more with European values, especially those of developed Western and Scandinavian countries, than Ukrainian ones. Furthermore, values of protesters find its reflection in deeply rooted Ukrainian identity. Moreover, Maidan was consisted of three major groups of protesters: “moralists,” “individualists,” -
The EU and Ukraine: Hapeless but Not Hopeless
>> POLICY BRIEF ISSN: 1989-2667 Nº 141 - NOVEMBER 2012 The EU and Ukraine: hapless but not hopeless Natalia Shapovalova and Balazs Jarabik Since his democratic victory in 2010, Ukrainian President Viktor >> Yanukovych has asserted his control over Ukraine’s political system by arresting leaders of the opposition, restricting freedom of assembly and HIGHLIGHTS speech and allegedly enriching himself and his close circle in the process. This has jeopardised Ukraine’s declared goal of European integration and • The October polls exposed has pushed the country into greater isolation from the West. Ukraine's corrupted political Last October’s parliamentary elections were meant to be a litmus test for system, but also the democracy in Ukraine. Amidst allegations of fraud in some districts, the resilience of Ukrainian polls exposed the abuse of power and corruption present in Ukraine's society to an illiberal political political system. However, the results also demonstrated some level of regime. resilience against an illiberal political regime. The opposition did better • The incumbent Party of than expected and must now use its gains wisely to resist further regime consolidation by building on popular discontent with the ruling party. Regions will have to ally with The future is uncertain: the country's further democratisation is in the independent candidates to hands of Ukrainians. As for the EU, it is also facing its own litmus test in form a narrow majority in its relations with Ukraine. Its room for manoeuvre is squeezed between Parliament. the Ukrainian opposition’s calls for sanctions and the need for dialogue with the Yanukovych government. -
Next Steps: It Goes Without Saying That There Is No Way to Know If Putin Is
FL-2020-00028 10-6-20 7 of 7 Obtained via FOIA by Judicial Watch, Inc. Next Steps: It goes without saying that there is no way to know if Putin is sincere about this joint initiative with Merkel or ifhe intends to follow through on withdrawing Russian forces from Eastern Ukraine. It is also unclear whether Merkel and Macron will be able to command the Normandy Group as they might like. Also anything can happen during the impeachment in Washington, and in the politics of Kyiv this winter. For these reasons, I suggest we watch what happens during November in gas transit discussions and the Normandy Group Summit, if it actually takes place. December would be the earliest time we could have a serious discussion about how to respond to a changed and more positive environment. If the implications of the German-French-Russian initiative remain ambiguous, we will have to wait until the end of the impeachment process. This suggests a meeting around the time of the Munich Security Conference in the first week of February. With warmest regards, Bruce Sender: Bruce Jackson ~b )( S ) Recipient: 'Taylor, William B (Kyiv)'Kb)(6) FL-2020-00028 10-6-20 1 of 86 Obtained via FOIA by Judicial Watch, Inc. From: (b )(6) Kent, George P l(b)(6) I Castillo, Raymond A lK.y1v) (b )(6) Tremont, Pamela M (Kyiv) • Yovanovitch, Marie L (Kyiv) Kb )(6) Holmes, David A (Kyiv) lfh\fR\ Reinert. David Mike (Kviv) lrh\fR\ To: (b )(6) Schutte, John P (Kyiv) i(b)(6) fh \{~\ Kviv EXEC <Kviv EXEC(a)state.aov> · (b )(6) CC: EUR-Press <[email protected]> Subject: Re: Reactions to Hill Article (Giuliani Tweet etc) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 15:35:37 +0000 Thanksl(b)(6) Ir have passed this to the EUR FO. -
The Government of the Russian Federation Resolution
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION RESOLUTION of 1 November 2018, No 1300 MOSCOW On Measures to Implement Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 22 October 2018, No 592 Pursuant to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 22 October 2018, No 592, On Application of Special Economic Measures in Connection with Unfriendly Acts of Ukraine Against Citizens and Legal Entities of the Russian Federation and in response to unfriendly acts of Ukraine performed contrary to international law to introduce restrictive measures against citizens and legal entities of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation resolves: 1. To establish the blocking/freezing of non-cash means of payment, uncertificated securities and property in the Russian Federation and a ban on transferring funds (capital withdrawal) outside the Russian Federation as special economic measures applicable to individuals listed in Appendix 1 and legal entities listed in Appendix 2, as well as in regard to organisations controlled by these individuals and legal entities. 2. The federal executive authorities shall ensure the implementation of paragraph 1 of this Resolution within their autority. 3. The Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation shall ensure the balance of commodity markets and prevent the adverse impact of the special economic measures specified in paragraph 1 of this Resolution on the activities of Russian organisations. 4. To appoint the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation as the authority responsible for proposals made to the Government of the Russian Federation on: making changes to the lists given in Appendixes 1 and 2 to this Resolution; granting temporary permits to conduct certain operations in respect of certain legal entities to which special economic measures are applied; cancelling this Resolution in the event that the restrictive measures imposed by Ukraine on citizens and legal entities of the Russian Federation are lifted. -
Two Years of Operation of the Verkhovna Rada of 8Th Convocation: Legislative Capacity and Law-Making Process
TWO YEARS OF OPERATION OF THE VERKHOVNA RADA OF 8TH CONVOCATION: LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY AND LAW-MAKING PROCESS SUMMARY Judging by two-year law-making efficiency and legislative capacity indices, the Verkhovna Rada of 8th convocation looks somewhat better than the 7th convocation Rada, but is inferior to the parliaments of earlier convocations. The efficiency coefficient of the current parliament (the share of adopted draft laws in the total number of registered drafts) is just 11%. In terms of specific holders of the right to legislative initiative, the President’s efficiency (81%) is much higher than that of the MPs (7%) or the Government (29%). The law-making efficiency coefficient of every single faction is similarly low, ranging from the lowest figure of 3.6% (the Opposition Bloc) to the highest of 13.8% (the Radical Party). During the two-year period, the individual law- making efficiency of 99 MPs was at zero level: they initiated dozens of drafts none of which became a law. On the whole, female MPs displayed a somewhat higher law-making efficiency compared to male MPs: 11% and 7%, respectively. Deputies elected on the basis of political party lists were twice as efficient as those elected in majority districts: 10% vs. 5%. The main reason for the low level of the parliament’s law-making efficiency of the parliament consists in the excessively high number of draft laws registered by the People’s Deputies. During the first two years of operation of the 8th convocation Verkhovna Rada, the MPs registered twice as many draft laws compared to their colleagues who had been working in the faraway parliament of 3rd convocation. -
The Future of Ukrainian Oligarchsdownload
Ukrainian Institute for the Future is an independent analytical center that: • forecasts changes and models possible scenarios for events in Ukraine; • makes a competent assessment of the Ukrainian events; • makes specific recommendations for actions; • offers effective solutions; • offers a platform for discussions on current topics. It is a project of representatives of Ukrainian business, politics and the public sector. Founded in summer 2016. AUTHORS Victor Andrusiv Executive Director of the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, PhD in Political Science, analyst and opinion journalist, author of the book “Change the future” Oleg Ustenko Executive Director of the Bleyzer Foundation, President of Harvard Club of Ukraine alumni association Yurii Romanenko Co-founder of the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, head of the International and Domestic Policy programme, editor-in-chief of the portal Hvylya Ihar Tyshkevich Expert of International and Domestic Politics programme of the Ukrainian Institute for the Future (UIF) © Art-direction D!VANDESIGN © Idea and design INCOGNITA INTRODUCTION. THE BRITISH DISEASE IN UKRAINE Content 05 THEORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE UKRAINIAN OLIGARCHY 06 INFLUENCE OVER ENERGY INDUSTRY 14 INFLUENCE OVER METALLURGY 26 INFLUENCE OVER TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 38 INFLUENCE OVER MEDIA 50 INFLUENCE OVER POLITICS 62 THREE SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE OLIGARCHS 72 Victor Andrusiv Executive Director of the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, PhD in Political Science, analyst and opinion journalist, author of the book “Change the future” Introduction: the British disease in Ukraine After the fall of the Soviet Union, the starting conditions for economic development in Ukraine were advanta- geous. However, after 27 years of independence, we continue to be the most backward country of the post-Sovi- et bloc. -
The Extreme Right in Ukraine
INTERNATIONAL POLICY ANALYSIS The Extreme Right in Ukraine MRIDULA GHOSH October 2012 n The major political forces in Ukraine do not have a well-articulated ideology. An analysis of the gradual emergence of the Svoboda (Freedom) party into the political mainstream since 2001 and as a contender in the October 2012 parliamentary elec- tions reveals that this party is the flagship of core extreme right ideology. n The economic crises, unemployment and corruption have enabled Svoboda to add a socioeconomic dimension to its ultra-nationalist agenda as well as to expand its out- reach by communicating with the grassroots rather than via elite lobby politics. This has helped Svoboda to gain power in regional legislative bodies in Western Ukraine. n Instead of distancing themselves from the rhetoric of Svoboda, the mainstream po- litical parties have entered into situation-dependent and other tacit alliances with it, either in order to win the nationalist vote or to showcase Svoboda as an »enemy« of democracy while presenting them as the only democratic alternative. The lack of consensus among the major political actors on how to combat right-wing extremist ideas has legitimised Svoboda in the public perception. n Civil society has provided some counter-strategies to the Svoboda party. However, in the absence of political consensus, these efforts have proved feeble and futile. To raise awareness of the inadmissibility of right-wing extremism in mainstream poli- tics, it is necessary to turn to the substantive socioeconomic elements of participa- tory governance. MRIDULA GHOSH | THE EXTREME RIGHT IN UKRAINE Contents 1. Introduction: Overview of the Extreme Right and Its Electoral Performance ......3 2.