Next Steps: It Goes Without Saying That There Is No Way to Know If Putin Is
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On the ZIK Television Channel (Novi Komunikatsii LLC) on November 13, 2020
Opinion No.44 On the coverage of the topic of grant receivers (the Renaissance Foundation and others) on the ZIK television channel (Novi Komunikatsii LLC) on November 13, 2020 Kyiv December 21, 2020 І. Circumstances of the case 1. On November 12, 2020, the Independent Media Council received an appeal from Oksana Romaniuk, executive director of the Institute of Mass Information, regarding the telethon “Sorosist Revenge” as announced on the ZIK television channel, to review the respective content and provide an opinion on whether or not there were violations of professional standards on the part of the ZIK channel, including hate speech and manipulations. 2. On December 1, 2020, the Independent Media Council, pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Regulations on the Independent Media Council, recognized the appeal regarding this case admissible, given the matter is of great social importance (similar content was already aired on this TV channel, whereby the IMC identified violations). 3. In the morning (at 08:37) on November 13, 2020, the ZIK channel aired a story devoted to George Soros, his influence on the Ukrainian government and the "army of his supporters", allegedly formed by him in nearly every country of the world; it was said that the billionaire was born into a Jewish family in Budapest in 1930; that "Soros combines getting rich quick with charity", and that most of his assets are allegedly owned by the Open Society Foundations. It is asserted that G.Soros is financing various projects in developing countries through a network of his foundations. Yet later, with a reference to the "billionaire’s critics", he is accused of having selfish motives and commercial interests - with only Ihor Mosiychuk, an ex-MP, shown to be criticizing G.Soros directly. -
Ukraine at the Crossroad in Post-Communist Europe: Policymaking and the Role of Foreign Actors Ryan Barrett [email protected]
University of Missouri, St. Louis IRL @ UMSL Dissertations UMSL Graduate Works 1-20-2018 Ukraine at the Crossroad in Post-Communist Europe: Policymaking and the Role of Foreign Actors Ryan Barrett [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://irl.umsl.edu/dissertation Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, and the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Barrett, Ryan, "Ukraine at the Crossroad in Post-Communist Europe: Policymaking and the Role of Foreign Actors" (2018). Dissertations. 725. https://irl.umsl.edu/dissertation/725 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the UMSL Graduate Works at IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Ukraine at the Crossroad in Post-Communist Europe: Policymaking and the Role of Foreign Actors Ryan Barrett M.A. Political Science, The University of Missouri - Saint Louis, 2015 M.A. International Relations, Webster University, 2010 B.A. International Studies, 2006 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School at the The University of Missouri - Saint Louis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor Philosophy in Political Science May 2018 Advisory Committee: Joyce Mushaben, Ph.D. Jeanne Wilson, PhD. Kenny Thomas, Ph.D. David Kimball, Ph.D. Contents Introduction 1 Chapter I. Policy Formulation 30 Chapter II. Reform Initiatives 84 Chapter III. Economic Policy 122 Chapter IV. Energy Policy 169 Chapter V. Security and Defense Policy 199 Conclusion 237 Appendix 246 Bibliography 248 To the Pat Tillman Foundation for graciously sponsoring this important research Introduction: Ukraine at a Crossroads Ukraine, like many European countries, has experienced a complex history and occupies a unique geographic position that places it in a peculiar situation be- tween its liberal future and communist past; it also finds itself tugged in two opposing directions by the gravitational forces of Russia and the West. -
Whereabouts of Yanukovych and Azarov in Russia
Whereabouts of Yanukovych and Azarov in Russia Table of contents Part 1 Yanukovych and his family Part 2 Azarov and his family Part 1 So far, the media have made a few versions of the whereabouts of Ukrainian ex-president Viktor Yanukovych. The main ones point toward two Russian southern cities: Rostov-on-Don and Sochi, along with the capital of Russia and the Moscow region. Hereinafter, you’ll find an analysis of media references to the location of the Ukrainian former president from 2014 till early 2016, as well as information about what has happened to his close allies and assets obtained through corruption schemes during the specified period. 1. After the flight After the flight of Viktor Yanukovych from Ukraine in the twentieth of February 2014, conflicting reports on the whereabouts of the disgraced president began appearing in the press. Thus, on February 22, 2014 some sources reported that Viktor Yanukovych wasn’t in Kharkiv1, others – that he indeed was in Kharkiv at the moment, where he was going to sign the recently adopted 1 http://kharkov.comments.ua/news/2014/02/22/152813.html laws by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (the Ukrainian Parliament)2. On the same day the border guards denied a charter flight, with Viktor Yanukovych on board, the permission to take off from Donetsk, as quoted by Sergey Astakhov – head assistant of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine3. By all appearances, at that time Viktor Yanukovych was in Kharkiv, where the Congress of Deputies from the South-Eastern regions took place on February 224. -
The Struggle for Ukraine
Chatham House Report Timothy Ash, Janet Gunn, John Lough, Orysia Lutsevych, James Nixey, James Sherr and Kataryna Wolczuk The Struggle for Ukraine Chatham House Report Timothy Ash, Janet Gunn, John Lough, Orysia Lutsevych, James Nixey, James Sherr and Kataryna Wolczuk Russia and Eurasia Programme | October 2017 The Struggle for Ukraine The Royal Institute of International Affairs Chatham House 10 St James’s Square London SW1Y 4LE T: +44 (0) 20 7957 5700 F: + 44 (0) 20 7957 5710 www.chathamhouse.org Charity Registration No. 208223 Copyright © The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2017 Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author(s). All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Please direct all enquiries to the publishers. ISBN 978 1 78413 243 9 A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library. Printed and bound in Great Britain by Latimer Trend. The material selected for the printing of this report is manufactured from 100% genuine de-inked post-consumer waste by an ISO 14001 certified mill and is Process Chlorine Free. Typeset by Soapbox, www.soapbox.co.uk Cover image: A banner marking the first anniversary of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea is hung during a plenary session of Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, in Kyiv on 6 March 2015. -
Euromaidan Values from a Comparative Perspective
Social, Health, and Communication Studies Journal Contemporary Ukraine: A case of Euromaidan, Vol. 1(1), November 2014 MacEwan University, Canada National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine Ternopil State Medical University, Ukraine Article Euromaidan Values from a Comparative Perspective Sviatoslav Sviatnenko, graduate student, Maastricht University, Netherlands Dr. Alexander Vinogradov, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine Abstract Ukrainian revolution frequently called the “Euromaidan” changed Ukrainian society in 120 days and, later, became a regional conflict and a challenge to a global order. This primary social revolution was followed by value and paradigmatic shifts, middle class revolution, and a struggle for human rights, equality, justice, and prosperity. This study examines values and social structure of the Euromaidan. In addition to ethnographic study consisting of participant observations and informal interviewing, data from European Social Survey (2010-2013) and face-to-face survey conducted by an initiative group of sociologists on Maidan were used in order to approach this goal. Results of the study show that values of the Euromaidan (Universalism, Benevolence, Self-Direction, Stimulation, and Security) coincide more with European values, especially those of developed Western and Scandinavian countries, than Ukrainian ones. Furthermore, values of protesters find its reflection in deeply rooted Ukrainian identity. Moreover, Maidan was consisted of three major groups of protesters: “moralists,” “individualists,” -
The Government of the Russian Federation Resolution
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION RESOLUTION of 1 November 2018, No 1300 MOSCOW On Measures to Implement Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 22 October 2018, No 592 Pursuant to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 22 October 2018, No 592, On Application of Special Economic Measures in Connection with Unfriendly Acts of Ukraine Against Citizens and Legal Entities of the Russian Federation and in response to unfriendly acts of Ukraine performed contrary to international law to introduce restrictive measures against citizens and legal entities of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation resolves: 1. To establish the blocking/freezing of non-cash means of payment, uncertificated securities and property in the Russian Federation and a ban on transferring funds (capital withdrawal) outside the Russian Federation as special economic measures applicable to individuals listed in Appendix 1 and legal entities listed in Appendix 2, as well as in regard to organisations controlled by these individuals and legal entities. 2. The federal executive authorities shall ensure the implementation of paragraph 1 of this Resolution within their autority. 3. The Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation shall ensure the balance of commodity markets and prevent the adverse impact of the special economic measures specified in paragraph 1 of this Resolution on the activities of Russian organisations. 4. To appoint the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation as the authority responsible for proposals made to the Government of the Russian Federation on: making changes to the lists given in Appendixes 1 and 2 to this Resolution; granting temporary permits to conduct certain operations in respect of certain legal entities to which special economic measures are applied; cancelling this Resolution in the event that the restrictive measures imposed by Ukraine on citizens and legal entities of the Russian Federation are lifted. -
Constitutional Crisis in Ukraine: Looking for Solutions
No. 65 l March 2021 KENNAN CABLE The Constitutional Court of Ukraine, Kyiv, July 2020. Source: Pavelskyi Vladyslav/Shutterstock Constitutional Crisis in Ukraine: Looking for Solutions By Mikhail Minakov and William Pomeranz As the gatekeeper of the Ukrainian Constitution, were unconstitutional.1 In response, President Zelensky the Ukrainian Constitutional Court is no stranger to introduced legislation calling for the early termination of controversy. It often has to balance competing legal all Constitutional Court judges.2 Later, in December, he and political interests in determining whether legislation suspended the chairman of the Court for two months.3 complies with the country’s highest law. The principle The result was widespread chaos in Ukraine’s political of judicial review, however, comes with an implicit system. Zelensky’s actions were of questionable warning, namely not to abuse these sweeping powers legality and provoked harsh criticism from all political and do more harm than good. sides. The ramifications of the Court’s decision include Despite this longstanding admonition, the the cancellation of over 100 pending corruption Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) recently plunged investigations, a development that potentially could the country into one of its deepest crises in its 30-year endanger future EU-Ukraine trade and economic history. Specifically, on October 27, 2020, the Court cooperation under the 2014 Association Agreement.4 declared that the main elements of Ukraine’s anti- Whether the various players in this drama (particularly corruption legislation, adopted between 2014 and 2020, President Zelensky; the chief of the presidential office, No. 65 l March 2021 KENNAN CABLE Andriy Yermak; the head of the CCU, Oleksandr these officials regarding any important acquisitions Tupitskyi; and Rada Speaker Dmitro Razumkov) and expenditures. -
Anti-Corruption Reform
PROJECT MANAGEMENT OFFICE NATIONAL REFORMS COUNCIL REFORMS MONITORING PROGRESS 9 Months, 2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS THE RESULTS OF THE NATIONAL REFORMS COUNCIL'S ACTIVITY FOR 9 MONTHS OF 2015......................................................6 ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORM.....................................................................................................................................................................12 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REFORM............................................................................................................................................................16 DECENTRALIZATION REFORM.................................................................................................................................................................19 LAW ENFORCEMENT REFORM.................................................................................................................................................................24 DEREGULATION...........................................................................................................................................................................................26 HEALTHCARE REFORM................................................................................................................................................................................30 TAX REFORM.................................................................................................................................................................................................33 -
Police Reform in Ukraine Since the Euromaidan: Police Reform in Transition and Institutional Crisis
City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 2-2019 Police Reform in Ukraine Since the Euromaidan: Police Reform in Transition and Institutional Crisis Nicholas Pehlman The Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3073 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] Police Reform in Ukraine Since the Euromaidan: Police Reform in Transition and Institutional Crisis by Nicholas Pehlman A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2019 © Copyright by Nick Pehlman, 2018 All rights reserved ii Police Reform in Ukraine Since the Euromaidan: Police Reform in Transition and Institutional Crisis by Nicholas Pehlman This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Date Mark Ungar Chair of Examining Committee Date Alyson Cole Executive Officer Supervisory Committee: Julie George Jillian Schwedler THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii ABSTRACT Police Reform in Ukraine Since the Euromaidan: Police Reform in Transition and Institutional -
I. Objectives 1. to Assess the Obstacles in Existing Ukrainian
Implementing IHL and the Rome Statute of the ICC into Ukrainian Legislation International Parliamentary Roundtable Hosted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 13 July 2016, from 15:00pm to 17:30pm Hrushevskogo Str. 18/2, room 11 Supported by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine I. Objectives 1. To assess the obstacles in existing Ukrainian legislation that hinder accountability for perpetrators of international crimes 2. To discuss the implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) into Ukraine’s revised Criminal Code 3. Introduction of the draft law on harmonization of Criminal Code of Ukraine and the Rome Statute of ICC prepared by CCL and the Expert Roundtable II. Expected Outcomes 1. Improved understanding of the role parliamentarians can play in aligning Ukrainian legislation with international laws and standards 2. Increased knowledge of feasible adaptions to Ukrainian legislature that bring perpetrators of international crimes to justice 3. Revision of the draft law on harmonization of Criminal Code of Ukraine and the Rome Statute of ICC, in preparation for effective membership of Ukraine in the first permanent system of international criminal justice created by the Rome Statute III. AGENDA Working language – Ukrainian, English ( simultaneous translation is provided) 15:00 Registration time 15:20 Introduction to the Seminar Chair: Ms. Olexandra Matviychuk, Chair of the Board, Center for Civil Liberties (3 Minutes) Opening remarks: Ms. Oksana Syroyid, MP, Deputy Speaker, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (3 Minutes) Ms. Valeriya Lutkovska, the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights (3 Minutes) Hon. -
The Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity in Comparison Why Some Resistance Movements Turn Violent, Whereas Others Do Not
Graduate School of Social Sciences MSc Political Science – International Relations Track Master Thesis The Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity in comparison Why some resistance movements turn violent, whereas others do not Name: Brian Pieneman Student ID: 10535365 Mail: [email protected] Research Project: Violence, resistance and restraint in war and genocide Supervisor: Dr. Jana Krause Second Reader: Dr. Dimitris Bouris Submission Date: June 22, 2018 Words: 23,810 Abstract According to Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), nonviolent resistance movements are more successful in accomplishing political and social change than their violent counterparts. And yet, some nonviolent resistance movements turn to violent strategies in their endeavour to establish political and social change. This decision seems counterproductive and is worth studying. This thesis argues that mass mobilization is a double-edged sword – i.e. on the one hand, mass mobilization is required to accomplish the objectives of a nonviolent resistance movement, but mass mobilization appeals to people with different motives to participate in a nonviolent resistance movement, on the other hand. To elaborate this argument, the (nonviolent) Orange Revolution and the (violent) Revolution of Dignity are extensively studied and compared. These case studies indicate that different motivations for participation in a nonviolent resistance movement can be problematic in case of a lack of leadership and unity within the resistance movement. ~ Nonviolence, Social Movements, Orange Revolution, Revolution of Dignity ~ Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Dr. Jana Krause for her moral guidance and encouraging words during the thesis process. I admit that my process was far from flawless, it has been a true struggle and without the help of my supervisor I would, in all probability, not have been able to write this thesis and to submit this thesis today. -
Revolution and Reform in Ukraine EVALUATING FOUR YEARS of REFORM
ITRevolution DOES and Reform NOT in Ukraine MATTEREvaluating Four Years of Reform HOW SLOWBy Silviya Nitsova, Grigore Pop-Eleches, YOU and Graeme RobertsonGO LNG AS YOU DON'T STOP PONARS Eurasia July 2018 Revolution and Reform in Ukraine EVALUATING FOUR YEARS OF REFORM JULY 2018 Silviya Nitsova University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Grigore Pop-Eleches Princeton University Graeme Robertson University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill PONARS Eurasia is an international network of scholars advancing new approaches to research on security, politics, economics, and society in Russia and Eurasia. PONARS Eurasia is based at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. This publication was made possible in part by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors. Program Directors: Henry E. Hale and Marlene Laruelle Managing Editor: Alexander Schmemann Senior Research Associate: Sufian Zhemukhov Program Associate: William McHenry PONARS Eurasia Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) Elliott School of International Affairs The George Washington University 1957 E Street NW, Suite 412 Washington, DC 20052 Tel: (202) 994-6340 www.ponarseurasia.org Cover image: Shutterstock/Vadven 393132940 © PONARS Eurasia 2018. All rights reserved Executive Summary In February 2014, Ukraine grabbed the world’s attention with its second revolution in a decade. The corrupt and increasingly authoritarian administration of President Viktor Yanukovych was overthrown. After the revolution, Ukraine embarked upon a wide- ranging series of economic and governance reforms. In this volume, we assess the progress of these reforms and analyze the main factors that explain the successes and failures we see.