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Convergence and divergence in the “Islamic” republics of the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire: 1913-1988. (Volumes I and n)
Gross, Robert Douglas, Ph.D.
Thi Ohio State University, 1991
UMI 300 N.ZeebRd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106
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CONUERGENCE AND DIUERGENCE IN THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLICS OF THE SOUIET UNION
AND THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE: 1913 - 1900
Uolume I
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy In the Graduate
School of the Ohio State Uniuerslty
3y
Robert D. Gross, O R., C.S.T.R.S.S., M R.
The Ohio State Uniuerslty
1991
Dissertation Committee: Rpproued by
Emilio Casetti
S. Earl Oroiun ______Emilio Casetti Yuri U. Meduedkou Department of Geography HCKNOIULEDGEMENTS
There are several people who have provided assistance directly or indirectly in the completion of this dissertation and the PhD. program. The people cited below are by no means all the persons involved, but those who have played the most important roles. First and foremost i would like lo thank the members of the dissertation committee. Professor Emilio Casetti, Professor S. Earl Brown, and Professor Yuri Medvedkov have all played key roles in the creation, the analysis, and the polishing of this dissertation into its final form. From Professor Casetti I received the original inspiration for this topic and the push to carry it through. Professor Brown has played a leading role in the organization and coherency of this work. Professor Medvedkov provided a great deal of information for the data, the Soviet materials, and how to use them. I would like to thank Professor Philip Stewart of the Political Science Department for his participation in the PhD. general enaminations and Professor Gene Mumy of the Economics Department for his participation in the dissertation oral enamination. Doctor Predrag Matejic has given considerable assistance by providing the word processor used for producing this dissertation, offering assistance on how to use It most efficiently, as well as valuable advice based on his own dissertation work here at the Ohio State University. I also would like to thank Professor Uera Herman of the Ohio State University, Sister Camilla Mullay of the Ohio Dominican College, and Doctor Philip Heath of Ohio State - Lima Campus for their encouragement and assistance in my teaching ewperience during my Ph.D. program. I should once again thank Professor Casetti and Professor Brown, for their recommendations after the defense of the Master's Research Paper made It possible for me to receive my teaching position at Ohio State and to enter the Ph.D. program. uiTn
December 50,1955 ...... Bom - Roanoke, Uirginia
June 1976 ...... B.R., German, Ohio State Uniuerslty
March 1977 - Rugust 1978 . . Indener-Translator, Current Digest of the Souiet Press, Columbus, Ohio
June 1980 ...... Certificate for Specialist in Trans lating from the Russian Social Sciences, Ohio State Uniuerslty
June 1980 - February 1981 . . Es^glish Language instructor, Huazhong Institute of Technology, Wuhan, PRC
July 1981 - July 1987 .... Translator, Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio
June 1985 ...... M R., Geography, Ohio State Uniuersity
Sept. 1986 - March 1990 . . . Geography instructor, Ohio State Uniuersity (Columbus and Marlon), Ohio Dominican College
September 1990 - ...... Geography Instructor, Ohio State Uniuersity - Lima Campus
FIELD OF STUDY
Major Field: Geography
III TABLE OF CONTENTS flCKNOUJLEOGEMENTS ...... ii
Ü IT fl...... iii
L!ST OF TABLES...... uii
L8ST OF FIGURES ...... HiU
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION...... 1 A. Background ...... 1 B. Goal üf the Dissertation ...... 4
CHAPTER II. ECONOMIC QUALITY AND EQUALITY...... 0 A. Standard of Liuing ...... 0 B. Regional Inequality ...... 11
CHAPTER III. ISLAMIC SOUIET UNION...... 16 A. Definition of a M u s lin ; ...... 16 B. Reasons for Moscoui's Concern ...... 19 C. Policies for Islamic Regions and Peoples . . . 25 0. Recent Trends and E u e n ts ...... 27
CHAPTER lU. METHODS OF STUDY...... 54 A. Republic-Leuel Data ...... 54 B. Time Periods C hosen ...... 56 C. Conuergence/Diuergence ...... 59
lU CHAPTER U. üflRIRBLES STUDIED...... 42 fi. Enuironmental ...... 42 B. Enuironmental-Behauioral ...... 55 C. Behauiorai ...... 63 5. rëîridië~Naî6 Ratios ...... 71 E. Data Origin ...... 81
CHfiPTER Ul. DflILV ENÜIRONMENT...... 82 fi. Introduction ...... 82 B. Ethnie Balance and Urbanization ...... 83 C. Employment ...... 98 D. Domestic ...... 150 E. Medical Gare and H e a l t h ...... 162 F. Summary of Results ...... 191
CHAPTER un. ENUIRONMENT-BEHfiUIOR...... 194 fi. Introduction ...... 194 B. Education ...... 195 C. Prestige and Politics ...... 216 D. Goods and S eru ices ...... 229 E. Summary of Results ...... 251
CHfiPTER UIII.BEHfiUIOR ...... 255 fl. Introduction ...... 255 B. Migration ...... 255 C. Marriage and Diuorce ...... 260 D. Children ...... 277 E. Summary of Results ...... 29C
CHAPTER IH. FEMfiLE-MflLE RfiTIOS ...... 302 fi. Introduction ...... 302 6. Residency and Employment ...... 303 C. Education ...... 317 D. Prestige and Politics ...... 328 E. Summary of Results ...... 335
u CHAPTER H. CONCLUSION ...... 341 A. Purpose and G oals ...... 341 B. Findings of D isse rta tio n ...... 344 C. Further Study ...... , . 359
RPPENOiH...... 371
Ul LIST OF THOLES
THOLE PHGE
1. Population of the Union Republics (1 0 0 0 s) ...... 22
2. Percent of the Population Native /Russian ...... 04
3. Distribution of the Russian Population ...... 00
4. Share of the Population in Urban Pieces ...... 93
5. Nonemployment in Public Sector per 1000 Persons of iOorking R g e ...... 100
6. Share of Employed Persons in Industry and Construction ...... 105
7. Share of Employees in Machine Ouilding and Metal Processing ...... I l l
8. Share of Employed Persons Who Rre Collective F a r m e r s ...... 116
9. Hcerage Base Monthly Pay for the Proletariate and Employees in the Service Sector ...... 122
10. Average Base Monthly Pay for Construction Workers . . 126
11. Average Pay per Collective Farmer for One Person- Work Day ...... 131
VII TABLE PAGE
12. Power Supply per Agricultural W o r k e r ...... 131
15. Irrigated Land per 1000 Rural R esid en ts ...... 140
14. Irrigated and Improued Land per 1000 Rural Residents . 140
15. Growth in Agricultural Labor Productluity ...... 145
16. Share of Employed Persons increasing Qualification L eu e l...... 145
17. Money Spent on Safety and Health per Employee .... 148
18. Share of Unemployed General High School Graduates out of Total PupH s ...... 148
19. Electric Power Production per C a p ita ...... 152
20. Number of New Apartments per 1000 Newlywed Couples ...... 157
21. Hospital Beds per 10,000 Persons ...... 164
22. Physicians per 10,000 P e r s o n s ...... 170
25. Physician:Nurse R atio ...... 170
24. Life [Hpectancy a t Birth ...... 180
25. infant Mortality R a t e s ...... 180
2Ô. incidence of Infant Deaths Caused by Infections, Parasites or Diseases in the Oigestiue or Respiratory System s ...... 186
uiii TABLE PAGE
27. Incidence of Stillborn Children among Total Births . . . 186
28. Aatio of Students in Higher Education to Pupils in Elementary and General Secondary Schools ...... 197
29. Share of Employed Specialists with Degrees in Higher Education per 1000 Employed P e rs o n s ...... 204
30. Aatio of Students in Secondary Specialized Education to Pupils in Elementary and General Secondary Schools ...... 208
31. Share of Employed Specialists with Degrees in Secondary Specialized Education per 1000 Employed P e r s o n s ...... 213
32. Share of Aesearch Workers with Doctoral and Candidate Degrees per Million Employees ...... 218
33. Party Members and Candidates per 1000 Persons of Eligible Age ...... 223
34. Share of Persons Employed in Public Sector per 1000 Population ...... 231
35. State Betafi Trade per Capita ...... 237
36. Percent of Eligible Children in Preschool ...... 243
57. Percent of School Children in Summer Pioneer Camps . 243
38. Annual Auerage Net Migration per 1000 Population . . 256
39. Aelatiue Marriage-Oiuorce Aatio ...... 262
IK TABLE PAGE
40. Uiomen Age 20 or Younger among All Women Getting Married in European Bussia ...... 266
41. Share of Aural Women Married Before Age 20 per 1000 S urueyed ...... 266
42. Incidence of Giuorce per 1000 Married Couples .... 271
43. Share of Diuorced Women Who Marry Again within 10 Years per 1000 Diuorced Women ...... 271
44. Incidence of Births per 1000 Women Ages 15-49 . . . 282
45. Cumulatiue Fertility B a t e ...... 2B2
46. Incidence of Liue Births per 1000 Women Ages 15-19 288
47. Incidence of Liue Births per 1000 Women Ages 45-49 288
48. Share of Births among Aural Unmarried Women .... 294
49. Incidence of Abortions among Women Ages 15-49 . . 294
50. Female-Male Adult Aatio for Rural Residency ...... 304
51. Female-Male Ratio for Nonemployment among Those of Working A g e ...... 308
52. Female-Male Ratio of Collectiue Farm Employment as a Share of Total Employment in Public Sector .... 315
53. Femaie-Maie Aatio of Students in Higher Education and Secondary Specialized Education per 1000 Persons Ages 1 7 - 2 4 ...... 319 TABLE PAGE
54. Female-Male Aatio for Employed Persons with Higher or Secondary Specialized Degrees per 1000 E m ployees ...... 525
55. Female-Male Ratio of Researchers with Doctoral and Candidate Degrees per Million Employed Females and Males ...... 325
56. Female Share of Communist Party Members and C andidates...... 353
57. Physicians per 10,000 Persons in Kazakhstan: Whole Republic, Alma-Ata, Rest of Republic ...... 363
58. Physicians per 10,000 Persons In Uzbekistan: Whole Republic, Tashkent, Rest of Republic ...... 363
59. Number of New Apartments per 1000 Newlywed Couples In Kazakhstan: Entire Republic, Alma-Ata, Rest of R e p u b lic ...... 365
60. Number of New Apartments per 1000 Newlywed Couples In Uzbekistan: Entire Republic, Tashkent, Rest of R e p u b lic ...... 365
61. Marrlage-Oluorce Ratio for Kazakhstan: Whole Republic, Alma-Ata, Rest of R e p u b lic ...... 367
62. Marriage-Oiuorce Ratio for Uzbekistan: Whole Republic, Tashkent, Rest of R e p u b lic ...... 367
Hi TABLE PAGE
63. Islamic and Republic Nationalities as a Percent of Querall Population of Russian Empire and Souiet Union: 1897 - 1989 ...... 372
64. Share of Islamic and Republic Nationalities Uihc Liue in Their Own Republic or Prouince ...... 374
65. Mean Ualues for Uariables for the Russian Empire and the Souiet U nion ...... 376
Hii LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE PAGE
1. The SiH "Islamic" Republics of the Souiet Union .... 6
2. Percent of Population of the Russian Empire/ Souiet Union In the SIk "Islamic" Republics, of Islamic Nationality, and of Non-flsslmllated Islamic Nationality ...... 21
3. leuel of Urbanization in flzerboldzhan, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage of Russian Empire/Souiet U nion ...... 92
4. Nonemployment in the Public Sector in Rzerbaid- zhan, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the USSR R uerage ...... 99
5. Employed Persons in Industry and Construction in flzerbaidzhan, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet Union ...... 105
6. Share of Employees in Machine Building and Metal Processing in Azerbaidzhan, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for USSR ...... 110
7. Share of Employed Persons UJho Are Collectiue Farmers in Azerbaidzhan, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet U nion ...... 115
Kill FIGURE PHGE
8. Ruerage Base Monthly Pay for the Proletariate and Employees In the Serulce Sector in flzerbaidzhan, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet U nion ...... 122
9. Ruerage Base Monthly Pay for Construction Workers In Azerbaidzhan, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet Union ...... 126
10. Ruerage Pay per Collectiue Farmer for One Person- Work Day in Rzerbaldzhan, Central Rsia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to Ruerage for Souiet Union .... 130
11. Power Supply per Rgrlcultural Worker in Rzerbaid- zhan. Central Rsia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to Ruerage for USSR ...... 134
12. Irrigated Lend per 1000 Rural Residents In Rzer- baidzhan, Central Rsla, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet Union ...... 130
13. Irrigated and Improued Land per 1000 Rural Residents In Rzerbaldzhan, Central Rsia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet U nion ...... 139
14. Electric Power Production per Capita In Rzerbald zhan, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet Union ...... 151
15. Number of New Apartments per 1000 Newlywed Couples In flzerbaidzhan. Centra! Rsia, Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet Union ...... 156
KiU FIGURE PAGE
16. Hospital Beds per 10,000 Persons in Rzerbald zhan, Central Rsla, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet Union ...... 163
17. Physicians per 10,000 Persons In Rzerbaldzhan, Central Rsla, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet Union ...... 169
IB. Physlclan-Nurse Ratio In Rzerbaldzhan, Central Rsia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet Union ...... 174
19. Infant Mortality Rates In Rzerbaldzhan, Central Rsia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet Union ...... 179
20. Ratio of Students In Higher Education to Pupils In Elementary and General Secondary Education In flzerbaidzhan. Central Rsla, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet Union ...... 196
21. Share of Employed Specialists with Degrees In Higher Education per 1000 Employed Persons In Rzerbaldzhan, Central Rsla, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet Union ...... 203
22. Ratio of Students In Secondary Specialized Education to Pupils In Elementary and General Secondary Education In Rzerbaldzhan, Central Rsia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet U nion ...... 207
HU FIGURE PAGE
23. Share of Employed Specialists with Degrees in Secondary Specialized Education per 1000 Empioyed Persons in Azerbaidzhan, Centrai Asia, and Kazakhstan Aelatiue to the Auerage for the Souiet U nion ...... 212
24. Sliare of Aesearch Workers with Doctoral and Candidate Degrees per Million Employees in Azerbaidzhan, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan Aelatiue to the Auerage for the Souiet Union ...... 217
25. Party Members and Candidates per 1000 Persons of Eligible Age in Azerbaidzhan, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan Aelatiue to the Auerage for the Souiet U nion ...... 222
26. Share of Persons Empioyed in Public Sector per 1000 Population in Azerbaidzhan, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan Aelatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet U nion ...... 230
27. State Retail Trade per Capita in Azerbaidzhan, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan Aelatiue to the Auerage for the Souiet Union ...... 236
28. Percent of Eligible Children in Preschool in Azer baidzhan, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Auerage for the Souiet U nion ...... 242
29. Percent of School Children in Summer Pioneer Camps in Azerbaidzhan, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan Aelatiue to the Auerage for the Souiet U nion ...... 249
KUI FIGURE PAGE
30. Marriage-Oiuorce Ratio in Rzerbaldzhan, Central Rsla, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet Union ...... 261
31. Share of Rural UJomen Married before Age 20 per 1000 Surueyed In Rzerbaldzhan, Central Rsla, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet U nion ...... 265
32. Incidence of Diuorce per 1000 Married Couples In Rzerbaldzhan, Central Rsla, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet Union ...... 270
33. Share of Diuorced Uiomen Who Marry Rgain within 10 Years per 1000 Diuorced Women In Rzerbald zhan, Central Rsla, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet Union ...... 272
34. Incidence of Births per 1000 Women Rges 15-49 in Rzerbaldzhan, Central Rsia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet Union ...... 280
35. Cumulatiue Fertility Rate in Rzerbaldzhan, Central Rsia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet U nion ...... 281
36. Incidence of Liue Births per 1000 Women Rges 15-19 in Rzerbaldzhan, Central Rsia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Rurage for the Souiet U nion ...... 287
37. incidence of Liue Births per 1000 Women Rges 45-49 in Rzerbaldzhan, Central Rsia, and Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Rurage for the Souiet U nion ...... 291
HUH FiGURE PAGE
45. Physicians per 10,000 Persons in Kazakhstan, Alma-Ata, and Rest of Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Auerage for the Souiet U nion ...... 361
46. Physicians per 10,000 Persons in Uzbekistan, Tashkent, and Rest of Uzbekistan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet U nion ...... 362
47. Number of New Apartments per 1000 Newlywed Couples in Kazakhstan, Alma-Ata, and Rest of Kazakhstan Relatiue to the Auerage for the Souiet U nion ...... 364
48. Number of New Apartments per 1000 Newlywed Couples in Uzbekistan, Tashkent, and Rest of Uzbekistan Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet U nion ...... 364
49. Marriage-Oiuorce Ratio for Kazakhstan, Alma-Ata, and Rest of Republic Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet Union ...... 366
50. Marriage-Oiuorce Ratio for Uzbekistan, Tashkent, and Rest of Republic Relatiue to the Ruerage for the Souiet Union ...... 366
Kin CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
fl. BACKGROUND.
Between 1917 and 1922 the ancestors of the current inhabitants of the Souiet Union staged a reuolutlon and fought a Ciuii Uiar in order to bring socialism to what is now the Souiet Union. Although there were diuerse objectiues at that time, the publicly stated intention of
Souiet socialism, as described by Tatyana Zaslauskaya, member of the
USSR Academy of Sciences, was to be "the absence of any significant measure of euploitation of some social groups by others, the reduction of unearned income to a minimum, the regular and just distribution of income and consumer goods according to work done; a steady rise In liuing standards and the elimination of pouerty; ... political and cultural equality among nations, the ouercoming of chauuinism in large nations and nationalism in small ones ..."^ Euer since 1922 Soviet sources have cited these goals and their accomplishments since Tsarist times. For enample, a 1937 statistical reference quoted Stalin as saying Our révolution is the only one, which ... succeeded as we:; in giving the people the material conditions for a comfortable life" and that "one of the fundamental achievements of the four years of the Five-Vear-Plan was that we have eliminated unemployment and freed the workers of the USSR from its horrors."^ Another source notes "... concern for raising the material standard of living and for the growth in the Soviet people's cultural level of life has been and continues to be In the center of attention of the Communist Party and the Soviet government The basis for raising the Soviet people's standard of living is the steady growth in the national income, which in the USSR is completely distributed in the interests of the working people ..."^
The promise was not only to improve standards of living, but to provide equality in conditions and opportunties throughout the country. R recent source has stated "... the great social-economic, political and cultural transformations that have occured during the years of Soviet rule are particularly visible in Central Asia's enample. Here Lenin's briHlant uision that preulousiy lagging peoples could make
the transition from feudalism to socialism was completely prouen."^
flt present the Souiet Union is undergoing dramatic changes in
nearly euery aspect of life due to the failure of the system and its
leadership to keep these promises and fulfill these triumphs. Rn estimated 130,000 members of the Communist Party quit in the first
fiue and a half months of 1990 "because they blame the party for the
miserable state of the country's economy and its ethnic conflicts."^
Or. Olga Meduedkou and Dr. Yuri Meduedkou haue concluded in a paper
presented in summer 1990 that most of the impact on the standard of
liuing in the Souiet Union has come from permanent structures of the
Souiet economy.^
This opinion is shared by other prominent authorities. Tatyana
Zaslauskaya's 1990 book describes Gorbacheu's "perestoika", or
restructuring, as a way of accomplishing the tasks from which Souiet
society has diuerged.^ The system under-utilizes the potential of
workers by encouraging them not only to not work more inlensiuely,
but also to obstruct others from doing so. This occurs owing to
disincentiues such as free time, the difficulties of increasing income, 4 and the shortage of high-quality goods. She also cites the incredible waste of materials that the system produces.^
Rn Associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences, A S. Aeualkln, also concludes the failure to prouide a good standard of liuing and to eliminate pouerty-ridden, backward regions is due to the system.^
And this inequality has prompted many of the explosions of discontent that are becoming increasingly common in the Souiet Union.^^
Outing times of strong economic performance, the multi-national composition of the Souiet Union posed a challenge to its leaders. UJith a deteriorating economy, inter ethnic clashes haue become increasingly common. For Gorbacheu, the nationality issue has become intimately linked to perestoika s goal of an improued economy. As shown in the Meduedkou paper, the regions with the worst economic standards are also the ones with the most ethnic uiolence. ^ ^ Economic improuement and better conditions for the different nationalities must go hand in hand.
B. GOAL OF THE DISSERTATION
In researching the problems of the economy and of nationalities in the Souiet Union, the most reueaiing information can be found in the eHtreme situations: in the regions with the lowest economic well-being and the nationalities that haue least adopted the habits
(e g, organizational membership, family size) desired by Moscow.
As indicated in the Meduedkou report, the poorest regions and the areas of most intense ethnic conflicts coincide uery closely - predominantly in the republics inhabited primarily by tradtionally
Islamic groups. The republics of Rzerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia,
Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan haue, for the most part, the lowest standards of liuing and haue the nationalities (among those with at least one million members) least assimilated into the Souiet economy and society. This lower standard of liuing is due to many factors: geographical remoteness from Moscow, a radically different physical enuironment, language barriers, and, most important,
Moscow's own attitude to the republics and nationalities there. The nationalities there haue statistically described behauior (diuorce rates, family size, language usage, migratorij mobility, etc.) that has shown them to be least assimilated owing to religious heritage, language diuersity, remoteness, the attitude of whites toward them, and, not insignificantly, wars between locals and Moscow l8(AZ KAZAKHSTAN IZB TUR "ISLAMIC" REPUBLICS: AZE “ Azerbaldzhan; KIR = Kirgizia; KIR TAD = Tadzhikistan; TUR » Turkmenistan UZB = Uzbekistan Others Ukra ine Belorussia 4 « Estonia; 5 “ Latvia; 6 = Lithuania; 7. - Moldavia; B » Armenia; 9 = Georgia
Figure 1. The Six "Islamic" and Other Nine,Republics of the Soviet Union
O) within the past century.
The dissertation will initially eHamine the enuironment established
by Moscow in these sin republics during tTie Souiet era. It will then
euamine uariables describing interactiue processes - an enuironemnt
established by Moscow that is altered by local behauior. Finally, the
dissertation will euamine behauioral uariables and uariables inuoluing
the statistical relationship between females and males.
Unlike many studies, the dissertation will not determine how well
off the republics are compared to earlier periods. Rather, the
comparison will be made throughout the Souiet era of how these siu
republics stand statistically in relation to the rest of the country. In
what ways and times haue the republics conuerged toward (become
more similar to) the Souiet norm at different pol ’s in Souiet history?
in what ways haue these republics diuerged from (become less similar to) the rest of the USSR? LUhat are some of the plausible reasons for these patterns - the trends of each era or a Souiet system
that has remained unchanged (in terms of affects of polcies) ouer time? CHHPTER II
ECONOMIC QÜRLITY RNO EQURLITV
R. STRNORRD OF LIUING
The standard of liuing has occupied a major portion of studies on the USSR. Tujo important official Souiet statistical publications - the monthly Uestnik statistiki. the annual Narodnoe khozyaystuo for the entire Souiet Union, the Union republics, and the uarious prouinces - deuote major sections to describing population welfare. Each
Fiue-Vear-Plan has had as a goal the improuement in the quality of daily life for the population. It is often used by gouernment and scholarly publications to compare the Souiet Union and United States.
In describing regional inequities in the Souiet Union, Matthew
Sagers focused entirely on the level of liuing in the different prouinces. ^ Rndrew Bond's analysis of Gorbacheu's economic strategy focused on the spatial distribution of employment, not for the sake of production, as much for meeting job needs.^ The Meduedkou paper differentiated between disaduantaged and other groups in the Souiet
Union based on quality of life.^
The quality of life is, of course, not limited In being Important to
Just researchers and gouernment agencies. Many of the recent disturbances were caused by and/or aimed at liuing conditions. The uiolence in Osh Prouince and Frunze in June of 1990 were sparked by housing, food and employment problems.'* Some obseruers blamed the anger shown in the riots in RIma-Rta in December 1986 on the horrible failures in prouiding housing and food, citing nationalism as merely a momentary spark.^ Following those riots, Radio Moscow called for calm, during which it cited the successes in improuing daily
life conditions for Kazakhs.^ Coal miners across the country ended
their strike in 1989 when they receiued promises of better housing
and food conditions. Despite the benefits of "glasnost, or "open
discussion", Gorbacheu's name is now being uilified owing to the
increasingly deteriorating situation in food and consumer goods.^ The
defections from the Communist Party haue resulted, in large part, due
to deteriorating economic conditions and in order to saue on
membership dues.® 10
There haue been different measures used to indicate the standard of liuing in the Souiet Union. Sagers used 15 different indicators for standard of liuing (in addition to two indications of social participation and two for social habits). They included uariables to reflect spending of income, housing, urban percentage, medical care, education and leisure time facilties.^ These uariables will receiue in-depth treatment in the section describing the uariables used in this study.
G.fl. Gornostoyeua chose 10 uariables to measure the quality of life in the largest cities of the USSR.^^ As in the Sagers work, they couered housing, retailing, health facilities and education. These uariables will be discussed in more depth in Chapter Fiue.
Other works haue included employment as a measure of quality of life. An article written by Sagers following his dissertation focuses on industrial employment, both from Uie perspectiue of national economic interests and in quality of employment for the different regions. A work by Gillula in 1979 focused on the leuel of employment in machine building^ one of the most aduanced types of employment in the country. 11
The most comprehensiue system for measuring quality of life encountered luas the Meduedkou paperIt included 32 indicators for measuring standard of liuing. By including so many indicators, it not only measured standard of liuing, but mas able to determine horn much mas affected by permanent factors (long-term establishments of the system).
In selecting uariables to measure the quality (enuironment) of daily life, I mas strongly guided by the materials included in the annual Narodnoe khozyaystuo SSSR and by Professor Yuri Meduedkou, one of the authors of the Meduedkou paper and a member of my dissertation committee. It is primarily mith Professor Meduedkous guidance that some nem uariables mere created and that changes from some traditional measures haue been justified.
6. REGIONRL INEQUBLITV
The standard of liuing has been used uery often as a may of determining the successes and failures of the Souiet system. Equally, and perhaps more, important is horn mell improuements haue been distributed throughout the system. 12
Sager's dissertation was deuoted to the inequalities of the Souiet system. He deuised his own system for showing these inequalities, describing them through convergence and divergence of different provinces (oblasts) between 1940 and 1975.^^ The divergence he noted for the iotter years indicated failures in the system.
Another dissertation from the Political Science Department at the
Ohio State University focused on inequalities of the system. Ann
Rappoport's work focused on Moscow's attitude toward the republics as a measure of its nationalities policies.^ ^ Rappoport focuses more on representation in the Party, but considers this process linked to the deveiopment of local economies and daily living conditions.
Demko and Fuchs haue written a number of studies on regional inequalities, including one that has proven very helpful to this study. Oemko is also responsible for having guided a previous work
I did on regional environmental perceptions in the Soviet press.
As Gillula notes, regional equality is a stated goal of the Soviet system, and its success or failure is crucial to smooth operation of the system. Since tlie state budget dominates investments in economic and domestic construction, Gillula concludes that Moscow does have 1 3 the power to determine the regional deuelopmentai balance.^ ^ This is in contrast to studies that haue placed the blame of unequal regional deuelopment on mere population dynamics.
Spechler noted in his 1979 work that regional inequalities haue a two-edged effect He describes the traditional backwardness of the republics of the South and the harm done there by Inequality. He also describes the effect of reduced productiuity there, and how the rest of the countnj has had to subsidize these lagging areas. Rs deuelopment has lagged in the South, reduced motiuation and ability to produce has drained the rest of the country. Spechler describes this as welfare colonialism."^^
These regional inequalities haue been part of the motiuation behind the "separatist" mouements of the sin "Islamic" republics. For instance, in June of 1990 Uzbekistan declared economic autonomy from Moscow. The purpose of this declaration was to control the supply of cotton, silk, leather and fur. Moscow's handling of these products was uiewed by the Uzbekistan Supreme Souiet as being detrimental to the economic interests of the republic. HIso, the Uzbek
Supreme Souiet started controlling the flow of other products in order 1 4 to protect the republic's mothers and childrenCertainly, this is a major condemnation of the enisting system.
These moues are all the more understandable when considering
Moscow's plans. Rs noted in Souiet Geography. Moscow's inuestments in Asiatic Souiet Union haue been minimal during the latest
Fiue-Vear-Plan. Inuestments are Important to a region's deuelopment and Gorbacheu has shown little interest In the areas outside the deueloped core areas.
Pokshisheuskiy has noted another cause for pessimism regarding deuelopment in the lagging areas. Industrial deuelopment came to
Central Asia when Russians arriued. They established the widustry there, and Central Asians gained Jobs (he did not indicate to what entent) after the Russians' employment needs had been m et But with continued deueloment still requiring the presence of Russians, and
Russians leaning Central Asia (for Russia and the Baltics) in increasing numbers, the future does not bode well for Industrial deuelopment in
Central Rsia.^^
Rs such, regional inequalities in the standard of liuing are not only important for measuring the success or failure of the socialist system 1 5 in the USSR, but also are Important in terms of peaceful cooperation, local/natlonallstic Interests, and for the stability of the entire system.
Giuen the declining leuel of inuestment in the lagging regions and the outflow of Russians from these areas, the future Is not promising. CHHPTER III
ISLAMIC' SOUIET UNION
R. DEFINITION OF R MUSLIM
During the twentieth century ualues and traditions haue changed in the Souiet Union as they haue in other industrialized societies.
UJhile in the nineteenth century Russian Empire it would haue been easier to deCine people by their religion, it is not the case in the Souiet
Union today. Urban life and the efforts by the Souiet state to suppress religion haue reduced the surface habits and institutions of religion.
Howeuer, euen those who are conuinced non-belieuers still haue many of their habits and attitudes formed by the culture of their area, the culture being formed by tribal traditions and religious ones. So, whether or not the majori^ or minority of people in Rzerbaidzhan,
Central Asia, and Kazakhstan take the tenants of the Islamic faith seriously, they are still of nationalities strongly influenced by its traditions and local interpretations. It is also a potential unifying
1 6 1 7 factor of people of different languages.
I haue applied two criteria in selecting which nationalities are to be included in the category "Islamic". The first criteria is the nationalities" predominant faith in pre-reuolutionary Russia. Did most of the religious males of that nationality go to mosques? There is no eualuation of current beliefs or religious habits for including the different nationalities. The second factor is language. The eutent to which a nationality has broken away from its own distinctiue habits can be measured statistically - what share of the members of the nationality speak a foreign language as their primary language. For this purpose, any nationality in which more than fiue percent of its members speak Russian as their primary language is considered
assimilated (or "russified""). The other nationalities are treated in this dissertation as "non-assimltated" Muslims.
Fiue sources were used to decide which nationalities are traditonaliy "Islamic"'. They were Ulinman's The Peonies of the USSrV his 1984 article "Demographic Trends among Souiet Moslems" that appeared in Souiet Geography^. Tokareu's Etnografia narodou SSSR^.
Katz's Handbook of Major Souiet Nationalities^, and Kozious The 1 8
Peoples of the Souiet Union.^ Based on these sources, and the preuelance of those speaking Russian as a primary language (see Table
57 in RppendiH R), the selection of non assimHated and "assimilated
Muslims" is as follows:
Union-Republic Nationalities: Rzerbaidzhanis, Kazakhs, Kirgiz,
Tadzhiks, Turkmen, and Uzbeks;
Rutonomous Republic/Prouince Nationalities: Rbkhaz, Rdyges, Balkars,
Chechens, Bogestanis, Ingush, Kabards, Karachay, and Karakalpaks;
Other Nationalities: Rbazas, Rfghans, Hrabs, Baluchis, Oungans, Kurds,
Turks, and Uighurs.
Hssimilated Nationalities: Bashkirs, Cherkess, Ossetis, Persians, and
Tatars.
There are a number of problems when defining nationalities in the
Souiet Union. From census to census there haue been changes in how groups haue been defined. In 1897 Rzerbaidzhanis were listed as
Bashkirs or Turks. A large segment of people who were Tadzhiks or
Turkmen in 1926 had other classifications in 1897. The Rdyges and
Cherkess were listed as one group in 1926 and 1959. Uarious nationalities haue been either "assimilated" into other groups, or 1 9 became too small in number to be Included, such as Hrabs and Turks In
1970, and Afghans and Arabs In 1979 (see Table 57 In Appendln).
A 1989 article in Moskouskle noüüstl^ Indicates that these alterations In nationality definitions continued Into the 1969 census.
One Kurdish scholar In the Kazakh Republic Academy of Sciences stated that about 152,000 Kurds were reported In the 1989 census. He belleues there should be ouer 300,000. He claimed that residents of half the Kurdish settlements In the republic were listed as
Rzerbaidzhanis or Turks. Doubtless, there are other nationalities that haue been undercounted or ouercounted, based on previous criteria.
For the sake of practicality, this dissertation will accept the data giuen In Souiet censuses and other statistical sources on the different nationalities. Estimates of other kinds can lead to euen more arbltary
Inflated or deflated representations of nationalities.
8. REASONS FOR MOSCOID'S CONCERN
A book published last year written by Benningsen/Hezne/Tanham/ lUlmbush ^ - Souiet Strategy and Islam - outlines the history of
Moscow's attitudes and actions toward Muslims Inside and outside the
USSR. Lenin and the Bolsheviks immediate concern was control. 20
During the uiar in 1916 there had been seueral reuolts in Centrai Asia against Russian authority.^ The Basmachi Reuolt that began in 1921 not only succeeded in suruiuing for 10 years, but actuaiiy seized
Dushanbe for a short period of time.^ The Sufis had waged war in the
Caucasus during the Ciuil lOarJ^
After the Communists consolidated their hold ouer the Islamic regions and nationalities, there were other reasons for concern. Since
IDorid War II the population in the Islamic republics and of Islamic nationalities has grown much more rapidly than the rest of the population (see Figure 2 and Table 1). The increase in the
"non-assimilated" Islamic nationalities' share in the ouerall population
rose from 8.8% in 1959 to 13.5% in 1979. If you include assimilated nationalities (predominantly Tatars), the increase is from 11.8% in
1959 to 16.7% in 1979. Assuming that population growth among these nationalities mirrored that of the siu Islamic republics, by 1989 nearly 16% of the USSR population would be non-assimilated Islamic nationalities (see Figure 2 and Table in Appendin).
WiHman pointed out in his 1984 orticie^^ that Islamic naDonalities haue uery young populations. By 1979 the number of Muslims ages c 25-1
20 -
-C P E R C E N T
5-
1897 1913 1926 1939 1950 1959 1970 1979 1989 Figure 2. Percent of Population of Russian Empire/Soviet Union in the Six "Islamic" Republics (A), of Islamic Nationality (B), and of Non-Assimilated Islamic Nationality (C).
|\J TABLE 1
POPULATION OP THE UNION REPUBLICS (1000b )
1950 1959 1970 1979 1987 1989 Republic 1897 1913 26 1939 190,678 178,547 208,827 241,720 262,436 281,689 286,731 USSR 124,649 159,153 028 3,698 5,117 6,028 6,811 7,038 1,807 2.33 9 314 3,205 2,859 Azerbaldzhan 13,009 14,684 16,244 16,535 4,333 5,597 025 6,082 6,592 9,295 Kazakhstan 2,934 3,529 4,143 4,290 663 8 64 002 1,458 1,716 2,066 K irgizia 2,900 3,801 4,807 5,109 810 1.034 032 1,485 1,509 1,981 Tadzhikistan 1,516 2,159 2,759 3,361 3,534 Turkmenistan 750 1,042 998 1,252 1,197 6,194 8,119 11,799 15,391 19,026 19,905 Uzbekistan 3,948 4,334 621 6,347 108,377 101,438 117,534 130,079 137,551 145,311 147,400 Russia 67,473 89,902 735 51,707 515 40,469 36,588 41,869 47,126 49,755 51,201 Ukra ine 28,445 35.210 10,078 10,200 968 8,912 7,7 0i 8,056 9,002 9,560 Belorussia 6,673 6,899 1,466 1,556 1,573 954 a 1,052 1,097 1,197 1,356 Estonia 975 2,521 2,647 2,680 2,493 a 1,885 1,944 2,093 2,364 Latvia 1,929 3,128 3,398 3,641 3,690 2,536 2,828 à 2,880 2,573 2,711 Lithuania 2,885 3,569 3,947 4,185 4,338 1,615 2,056 b 2,452 2,290 Moldavia 1,347 1,763 2,492 3,031 3,412 3,288 Armenia 798 1,000 881 1,282 3,540 3,494 4,044 4,68 6 5,015 5,266 5,443 Georgia 1,894 2,601 677
rles In 1926. a- Eatonla, Latvia ana Lxcnuamo Moldavia within the Soviet b- The m ajority of Moldavia was w ithin Romania. tction of Union was not a separate republic. I t s pi
, NO.3, pp. 74-79 ; ^^aaelenle SSSR 1 9 ^ . PP. 0-15. Source : VffHtnlk s ta tis tik i, 1990
NJ ro 2 3
0-10 eKceeded that of Ukrainians of Uie same ageJ ^ This had implications not only for the future labor force, but also for the military. Should universal conscription continue in its present form, by the year 2000 about a third of the draftees would be from Islamic nationalities. fls will be shown at the conclusion of this chapter, this has major implications for the unity and performance of the
Souiet armed forces.
In addition, due to lower mobility and Russian language skills, there are economic concerns.^ ^ Rs pointed by flzrael in 1978, Moscow has been greatly concerned ouer the rapid increase in the Central
Hsian populations, since they are in the poorest region, a region which has limited potential and utility to the national economy.^ ^ The
Meduedkou paper gaue conuincing evidence of the link between ethnic uiolence and poverty in the USSR.^^ Other articles, as described at the end of this chapter, offer much to support this claim.
There haue been entemal causes for Moscow's concern regarding
Islam. The Basmachi Reuolt In Central Rsia in the 1920s was led by a
Turk named Enver Pasha. After agreeing with Lenin to assist the
Bolsheviks in gaining support from Muslims there, Pasha led the 2 4
reuolt He had hopes of a new Turkish Empire, presumably euentuaily
llnklny with the Republic of Turkey
The fear of Pan-Turkism, a unity of Turkey with the Turkic
populations of Rzerbaidzhania and Central Rsia, has some foundation.
In Turkey in December 1986 the news media took a uery strong
interest in the riots in RIma-Rta. One newspaper was symapthetic and
concerned ouer the fate of brother Turks Turkish state teleuision
used brother Turks" seueral times in describing the Kazakhs and
Uzbeks mentioned in Ine stories. Seueral Turkish citizens mentioned
that about 100 million people speak Turkish, which includes the majority of nationalities in the sin "Islamic republics of the USSR.
This was not a new deuelopment. R standard tentbook for elementary schools about major Turks included the musician Farabi
and the warriors Gengiz Han (Genghis Khan) and Timurienk
(Tamerlane). There is a plaque in the Turkish Rrmy Museum in
Istanbul dedicated to the 16 Turkish Empires, which Includes the
Mongolian Empire and uarious ones centered in Central Rsia, a t the
same time the Ottoman Turks were established in Rsia Minor. 2 5
In December 1989 the Souiet pulblcatlon Kommunist carried an interuleiu uiith Gamid KherishchI, a spokesman for the flzerhaidzhan
People's Front, tuho called for unity among all the Turkic peoples not to glue up their lands to the Christians, fls a roaming he claimed that the entire Muslim world, especially Turkey and Iran, were behind his programs for Justice for Muslims.^®
Whether or not Muslims in the Souiet Union consider themselues
Turks, whether Turkey, iran and other Islamic countries support this flzerbaidzhani's claims, Moscow does haue concern about the potential unifying factor of Islam.
C. POLICIES FOR "ISLflMIC REGIONS RNO PEOPLES
There are nuoierous sources describing the policies of Moscow toward the peoples of Rzerbaidzhania, Central Rsia, and Kazakhstan.
Rmong them are works written or edited by Krautsou^^, Hagit^^,
Rllworth Gerutis and Rychener^"^, LewytzkyJ^^, Gindin, e t al.^^,
Karkliiis Oenningsen^®, and Conquest^^.
Following the October Reuolution Lenin's policy toward the
Muslims was threefold: ensure loyalty at home, permit no bonds to outside Muslims, and control bordering Islamic countries.^® Loyalty 2 6 and control loithin the Souiet Union were the most crucial of these.
The Bolsheuiks successfully played off different local nationalities against each other during the Ciuil UJar.^^ Following the war potential unity among Muslims was further disrupted by splitting Turkestan into seueral separate republics.^^ The educational system that was established taught children that Islam was incompatible with economic deuelopment and modem life.^^ Stalin continued Lenin's policy of attacking Islam. During the rule of Stalin Islam was described negatiuely. "... Islam, as with other religions as well, always played a reactionary role, being a weapon in the hands of the euploiting classes for spiritually suppressing the working people and was used by foreign colonizers to enslaue the peoples of the East"^^
Stalin systematically attacked Islamic institutions. Between 1929 and 1935 the 700-year-old Nakshband Order was dissolued, with most of its one and a half million members impiisoned.^^ The number of mosques declined from 30,000 in 1920 to 1000 by 1941 Between
1929 and 1936 police gathered all the Korans they could find and burned them. Only the Nazi inuasion caused a temporary halt to these actiuities in 1942.^^ 2 7
Khrushcheu and Brezhneu continued strong anti-Islamic activities.
The number of mosques ivas reduced from 1500 (after some recovery during World War II) to 500. It tuas In the latter Brezhnev years that an accommodation mas reached. This mas oming to the discovery of a large underground Islamic system (called parallel Islam)^^ and the increasing share of the Islamic population in the USSB. TTte mar in
Afghanistan, doubtless, had some influence.
0. RECENT TRENOS AND EUENTS
The foremost concern of Moscom regarding the gromth and attitude of the Islamic peoples of the Soviet Union is in the military.
During the Gorbachev years the reports have been both more candid and less reassuring in relation to Moscom's interests.
A 1987 interviem by Krasnaya zvezda openly described the language problems of Central Asians in the military. A battalion commander said "... the draftees are literate or highly educated people. But of late me are increasingly coiming up against cases ...
[mhere] the Russian is very poor." A private from Uzbekistan had had
10 years of schooling, but his Russian mas limited to a dozen mords.^ 2 8
A Kazakhstanskat|a nrauda article pointed out that not only Is language training poor, but so is physical fitness and paramilitary training. The performances of Kazakh males in shooting and sports mere uery uieak. The artcle blamed the lack of effort by OOSAAF and other organizations, which merely took attendence to meet quotas.^^
Another article in Krasnaya zuezda Illustrates euen deeper problems. A Souiet colonel described how misunderstandings between men of different nationalities was common. He often ouerheard racist remarks. Economic problems, such as a lack of m eat in ethnic regions, also has led to many disputes in the army. He felt that the lack of work in promoting mutual understanding was the main problem.'*^
Ethnic tensions haue led to armed clashes outside the military.
The most well known in the West inuolues the Azerbaldzhani-Rrmenian conflict. In June 1990 the border clashes became so severe that the
Azerbaidzhan Supreme Souiet declared a state of emergency with
Armenia, asking for Moscow's military intervention.^^ This request for
Moscow's assistance came soon after armed clashes between
Azerbaidzhanis and Souiet forces. Many aspects of the clash there indicate full-scale war may be coming. 2 9
Riots üGcured in February 1990 In Dushanbe (Tadzhikistan) that claimed dozens of Hues. The original reports mentioned anger of locals regarding rumors that Armenians uiho had left Baku mere being giuen housing without waiting their tum .^ The riots were strong evidence of how deep the problems of housing and ethnic animosity haue become.
The problems were not limited to street riots. There were reports of an attempted palace coup", in which unnamed groups tried to take ouer political control of the republic.^^ How well organized was this?
That remains unknown or unpublished, but if there was a coup attempt, this indicates that euen relatively minor transgressions by
Moscow can be a prêtent for major civil revolt
Moscow must take the blame for most of this violence and failure of assimilation. Krasnaya zvezda pointed out that teachers have not motivated Central Asians and Azerbaidzhanis to learn Russian. Years of schooling Is giving not oniy little language learning, but a dislike for the language. Military officers have been disinterested in spending the time each day required to give minimal functional ability in the language. 5 0
Violence in üsh Prouince in Kirgizia betioeen local Kirgiz and
Uzbeks in June this year was blamed on pouerty, unemployment, and housing probiems. But euen deeper problems were the "arbitary border" established in 1924 between Kirgizia and Uzbekistan as well as total loss of faith in authorities soloing the problems/*^ The iocals had decided to résolue these issues using traditionaS methods.
One area in which Moscow has made progress (from the local point of uiew) has been in religion. Gorbacheu started his rule with a strong anti-religious campaign. On his way to India in Nouember 1986 he stopped in Tashkent to call for a determined and pitiless suppression of reiigious actiuities in the Moslem-populated ... republic of Uzbekistan. He noted that anyone lau in these efforts would be held accountable.*^®
Howeuer, this policy has been discarded. For instance, Uzbekistan was permitted to declare March 21 a republic-wide holiday to celebrate Naurus - a local celebration of spring and friendship that goes back 2000 years."^® R Souiet military commander used traditonal
Islamic rites of honoring the dead to help restore calm in Tadzhikistan following the riots in June 1990.^® 3 1
More substantial progress has been made. The first officially sanctioned newspaper for Muslims has already had Its first issue. The newspaper - Islam nuri [Ray of Islam! - Is printed In Uzbek using both the Souiet-style Cyrillic alphabet and traditionally [and formerly banned) Arabic script The purpose of the newspaper will be to inform on religious issues, giue aduice on religious upbringing, and giue news on Islamic brothers in other countries.^^ All of these subjects, and the use of Arabic script, were illegal until uery recently.
Euen more noteworthy is that the Koran will be published in
Russian by a Russian-language magazine.^^ This will make this work auailable not only for Russians (primarily for scholarly research, but perhaps to promote understanding), but also for uarious Islamic nationalities who do not know Arabic or other ethnic languagues.
Islamic structures are being repaired and constructed. In
Uzbekistan the number of functioning mosques increased by 150% in one year alone.^^ And Souiet officials haue gluen permission for Saudi
Arabia, perhaps the Islamic world's most conseruatiue society, to send clergy to Tashkent on a regular basis for mosque repair and construction and discussions on religious issues.^^ This is in direct 3 2 contrast to the policy of separating Muslims of the Souiet Union
(encept state-appointed propagandists) from outsiders. Hoiueuer,
Saudis are not as likely to encourage political and social revolt as mould Islamic clergy from some other countries.
All of this Indicates the groming concern Moscom has In placating
Islamic nationalities. Assimilation, apparently, has not morked. As the numbers of "Muslims" grom In the USSR, perhaps Islam can be an ally to Moscom. In the ofAcial Souiet uiem Islam promoted, and still promotes, lomer values of Earthly (mortal, physical) eulstence and reduced demands for social and economic Justice and Improvement^^
A lomer level of Interest and value In life before death may aid
Moscom, since It has so many problems In creating satisfactory conditions for everyday life.
And Moscom must be concerned about even tbose groups mho are considered assimilated. The Tatars, the "Islamic" nationality that has lived and behaved most like the Russians, have become more vocal and troublesome. Numbers of drifters from Kazan are nom at rallmay stations and the streets of Moscom threatening local residents and painting slogans "Uie'll bring Moscom to its knees" and "Our 3 3 forefathers conquered Moscow and so will we It may be merely
Indicatlue of the problems mentioned by the Meduedkou paper regardiny poiierty and tenslons.^^ Or It may Indicate greater Interest
In their past heritage than expected. CHAPTER lU
METHODS OF STUDY
A. REPUBLIC-LEUEL DATA
The ideal administratlue unit for study of this kind would be the prouincidi ( "oblast") leuel. Most of the provinces predate the Souiet era, and they represent natural cultural and economic regions formed ouer the centuries.
Howeuer, Souiet statistical sources treat Union republics as the basic unit For that reason, most of the statistical information that is used in this dissertation, and many other studies, can be found only at the Union-republic leuel. There are some data auailable on the capitals of the Union republics (and other cities with populations of a million or more). This makes it possible to compare the capitals of the republics (with predominantly Russian populations) to the rest of the republics (which haue predominantly indigenous populations).
3 4 3 5
fls noted by Spechler, republics represent the "home" areas of different nationalities. Members of the nationalities mho Hue outside their "home republics" lose their identity and language enuironment.
Those in the republic are in their oum enuironment. Therefore, progress for the republic generally is equiualent to progress for that nationality. ^
This is certainly true for Azerbaidzhan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan. In 1979 ouer tiuo-thirds of their populations were of the indigenous nationality. In Tadzhikistan nearly three-fifths were
Tadzhiks. And their share of their republics’ population had grown steadily since 1959. By 1989 the share of Kirgiz likely euceeded 50% of the republic's population, while the number of Kazakhs probably exceed that of Bussions (see Table 2 for details).
At the same time, the portion of Islamic nationalities liuing in their
own republics exceeds 80% for all six Union-republic nationalities (see
Table 64 in Appendix). And the percentage has been growing since
1959. Indeed, the potential for linking the enuironment and habits of nationalities to their republics has grown stronger. 3 6
Howeuer, the republic data does not likely reflect the ouerall
picture for the indigenous population. For that purpose in future wor1(
it will be necessary to look at the difference between the Russian-
dominated capitals and the local-dominated non-capital provinces to
see to what entent the changes in the republics reflect changes
among the indigenous nationalities. UJhen possible, data would be
used that deal with the indigenous nationalities directly.
B. TIME PERIODS CHOSEN
This dissertation will discuss changes in daily liuing enuironemnt
and habits of the local natioanlitles during the uarious eras of Souiet
hisiory. It is my Intention to demonstrate that the policies (or lack of
them) of the uarious eras haue been reflected by different patterns of
convergence and diuergence at different points in time.
The "eras" are as follows: Tsarist, Lenin, Pre-war Statin, Post-war
Stalin, Khrushcheu, Early Brezhneu, Late Brezhneu, and Gorbacheu.
These include all the major leaders who suruiued long enough to haue
significant impact on the country's deuelopment The years chosen
were: Tsarist - 1897 and 1913/14; Lenin - 1926/28; Pre-War Stalin -
1939/40; Post-w ar Stalin - 1950; Khrushcheu - 1959; Early Brezhneu - 3 7
1970; Late Brezhneu - 1979; and Gorbacheu - 1987/1988.
These years represent a sufficient amount of time from the creation of plans by the different leaders for changes to occur. Some of the uariables will reflect the conditions created by the polcieis of the preuious era, but in many cases the uariables will reflect the lack of change by the leadership of that year.
The years giuen aboue couer all the years when a census was taken (1897, 1926, 1939, 1959, 1970, 1979) or the years which official
Souiet annual statistical sources include regularly for most data (1913,
1950, most recent year). A census was conducted in 1989, but only a minimum of information has been published so far (total population, total population of major nationalities in the USSR, urban/rural population, city populations, male-female population). When data is not auailable for a specifically targeted year, then data used is from the year closest to it For the Gorbacheu era 1987 data is used when more recent data (1988 or 1989) is not auailable.
Both census data and other official Souiet data are reported by the same Souiet agency - the USSR Central Statistical Administration.
Both census data and official data reflect the entire population. This 3 8
dissertation does not include data that is handled on the basis of a
sub-sample suruery, unless specifically stated.
It must be noted that data accuracy can be questioned. Not only
are there problems in honesty (particularly in the Stalin era), but also
problems with the accuracy of information receiued from smaller
regions and the ability to gather the Information (In the Tsarist era
and early Souiet years). There haue been changes In data definition
and regional boundaries. U/hen there are discrepancies In data from
one source to another, this dissertation uses the most recently published figures. This assumes, of course, that the current leadership is interested in greater accuracy, has been able to find sources perhaps preuiously inaccessible, and has adjusted data to fit cunent standards and boundaries. Souiet statistical sources generally state
that republic leuel data of preuious years are based on current
republic borders.
Estimates by the U.S. gouernment or non-Souiet researchers are
used only when Souiet data are not auailable. The results obtained
from using primarily Souiet data will be more consistent and, possibly, more reliable than those using both official Souiet data and foreign 3 9 estimates.
C. CONUERGENCE/DiUERGENCE
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to enamine houi the enuironment and behauior of the peoples of the Islamic republics has changed ouer time when compared to the auerage for the Souiet
Union. Festinger uses the argument of cognitiue dissonance to help euplain why many people are more concerned with relatiue well-being, i.e., how well off they are compared ta contemporary members of their group or society, than with their standard of liuing when compared to past or in absolute terms.^ For many people, they are more more satisified with being equals or superior in conditions of pouerty, than in being in an inferior position in conditions of relatiue well-being.
For that reason, this dissertation will rarely concern itself with the absolute progress or failure in the standard of liuing or in statistical behauior. The focus is on how well the peoples of the sin
Islamic republics are faring compared to the rest of the country, and how distinctiue their behauior is. This will allow some conclusions to the questions: Is Moscow gluing these regions their "equal" share? 4 0
Are these nationaOties truly distinctive, or haue they become assimilated Into the Souiet may of life?
The measure of conuergence and diuergence mill be a form of locational quotient. The auerage ualues of the Souiet Union mill be represented by "100" (100% of auerage ualue). R "200" mill represent a ualue in a republic or region that is tmice the ualue of the Souiet
Union for that year, fl "50" mill represent a ualue that is half the USSR auerage.
The information mill be illustrated and analyzed from graphs of the trends ouer the periods in mhich data are auailable. The graphs mill present the locational quotients of Rzerbaldzhan, Kazakhstan, and Central Rsia (Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan). The three graphic entries represent mell recognized entities in the Souiet Union. Azerbaidzhan is distinctiue since it is located in the Caucasus, physically separated from the Asiatic republics (see Figure 1). Shi ite Islam is predominant In Azerbaidzhan
(as it is in neighboring Iran and nearby Iraq), mhile Sunni Islam is predominant In the other fiue republics (as it is in most of the other
Islamic countries of the morld). Kazakhstan mas a nomadic region 41
■jüiîh 3 different cümstic, economic and sociaî system than Centrai
Rsia. It also has been heauily influenced by the presence of Russians, mho for most of the Souiet era haue outnumbered the Kazakhs. The four Central Asian republics haue more of a common climate (mainly desert or mountainous), an older tradition of fined settlements (some of the worlds oldest cities, such as Samarkand and Bukhara, are in
Central Asia), a more common Islamic history, and are generally grouped together in Souiet studies and economic planning.
in essence, the graphic presentations and statistical tables mill be the predominant tools for determining the foiioming: lUhat has been the impact of the different eras on the daily enuironment of the
Islamic regions? Horn distinctiue has the behauior been of the people of the Islamic republics in the Souiet Union? Haue they gromn more
"souiet" (i.e., is their behauior closer to the statistical norm for the
USSR), stayed constant, or become euen more distinctiue (perhaps foiioming trends in the Islamic countries outside the Souiet Union)?
Are the different eras different from each other, or haue the policies of different leaders led to the same results? CHRPTER U
URRIRBLES STUDIED
This chapter defines the uariables used in this dissertation, describes hoiu they are deriued, enplains their significance, justifies their usage, and compares them to data used in other studies.
R. ENDIRONMENTRL
"Natiue "/Russian Paouitoition: This uariable Is the percentage of the republic's ouerall population that belongs to the titular nationality
(the nationality for mhich the republic is named) and the percentage of ouerall population that is defined as being ethnically Russian (this sometimes includes nationalities that haue been "assimilated" since the preuious census). Since there are seueral nationalities in each republic, the "natiue" and Russian population will not add up to 10D%.
Rs noted by Rowland, Russian migration into a region is usually accompanied by urban deuelopment and capital inuestment.^ The stronger the Russian presence in a republic, the more likely that the
4 2 4 3
physical benefits of Souiet society will be there. Since Russians haue
made the policy for the country as a whole, they would most likely be
the ones to superuise and benefit from changes in a region.
Urban Population: This uariable is the percentage of the republic's
population that Hues in urban places. The Souiet figures for urban
residency will be used. This uariable is standard among studies of
regional differences in deuelopment. Studies by Sagers^,
Meduedkou Lola‘S, Ginzburg^, flbdykadyrou^, Cole^, Khodzhaeu^,
Oemko and Fuchs^, Zholkou^^, Khoreu^ ^, and Harris^ ^ are some of the
more notable or recent enamples. The main reason for using this
uariable is that job opportunties, consumer goods auailability, cultural
deuelopment, and mobility are much greater in cities than in rural
areas. Along with the presence of Russians, this uariable is probably
the most Important in predicting how well off a region is and how the
population behaues. The leuel of Russian presence and the leuel of
urbanization are, of course, strongly related in most of the USSR.
Nonemnloument in Public Sector. This uariable measures the share
of persons of working age who do not haue work in the public sector.
This nonemployment can be for different reasons, such as 4 4 post-secondary education, taring for the famiiy, or simpie unemployment. Though for many years the Souiet Union maintained that unemployment mas eliminated In 1930^^, recent Information shoms that this has not been the case. Oming to the fiction that there mas no unemployment in the USSR, there haue been relatiueiy fem studies of it (the lack of data before Gorbacheu s era being a probable cause). Since official sources haue maintained until recently that there is no unemployment, Souiet statistics do not prouide information on horn nonemployment is diuided among those mho are uoluntarily not morking in the public sector and those mho cannot mark in the public sector.
Tmo studies that include employment problems are Ulinman s 1984 article on the Islamic nationalities, mhere unemployment is most seuere ^ and Bond's 1987 article that quotes Selskaya zhizn’s claim that 1,000,000 are unemployed in rural Uzbekistan.^^ It is eupected that Central Asia's unemployment rates mill be the highest.
Employment in Industry and Construction: This uariable indicates the share of the people employed in the public sector mho are in industry or construction. Sagers manted to use industrial employment 4 5
[il his 1980 U /o r k , but did n o t because such data was not consistently auailable at proulnclal (oblast) leuel. Sogers' 1984 article dealt with industrial employment on a republic leuel. In both cases Sagers used industrial employment to indicate inuestment leuels in an area.^^ This dissertation will use industrial and construction employment to indicate a certain amount of quality and opportunity in employment
These two areas are generally the highest paying in the Souiet economy and offer opportunities to moue elsewhere.
A second difference is in how the employment is measured. Sagers' two works utilized industrial employment per 1000 population.^ ^ This dissertation, as indicated aboue, measures it as a share of the labor force. This is logical both because the focus of this dissertation is on employment opportunity (pay and transferability), as well as a way to reduce the effects of a population with a rapidly growing share of young dependents (as is the case in Islamic regions).
Employment in Machine Building und Metal Processing: This uariable is the share of employed persons who are in machine building or metal processing. This uariable was one of the most difficult to obtain. Since it is closely linked to the defense industry, data for it 4 6 haue been missing beiow the Bil-ünian leuel since 1975.^- Therefore, it was necessary to diuide product output by labor productiuity and compare this with the most recent year that employment figures were auailable.
Since this sector of Industry requires high skill leuels and is strongly tied to military production, persons in this sector haue many opportunities for moonlighting and are In demand throughout the country. Both Gillula^^ and Listengurt^^ regarded employment in this sector as important to help lagging Central Asia to catch up and a key to improuing the standard of liuing.
Collectiue Farm Emoloument: This uariable measures the share of the work force engaged in collectiue farming in the public sector. This uariable reflects the leuel of economic non-opportunity. Collectiue farming, for the most part, has the least socioeconomic mobility and opportunity in souiet society and many of the worst conditions. Liuing standards are rarely good on collectiue farms. Reductions in the standard of liuing occur in these places more frequently than in other sectors of employment. 4 7
Bueraoe Pay* for Prolétariats and Serüice üioricers: This uariable Is
the base pay (not including bonuses and benefits) per employed person in the secondary and tertiary sectors. Since there is no mage comparison between years, inflation and currency changes haue no effects.
Uoznesenskiy^^ and McHuley^^ treated this uariable to measure not only a worker's welfare, but also the leuel of state inuoluement in
the daily life a region. Low pay generally meant poorer conditions, and also possibly included more actiuity outside the public sector.
Sagers considered it an indication of standard of lluing.^^ Howeuer, it was indicated as being per 1000 residents. This measured ouerall wealth as influenced by population age structure, not state interest in employment opportunities, as my work and other works eualuate it
Bergson treated it as measuring both state inuestment in an area
(annual rates per worker) and workers' conditions (hourly rates).
This dissertatior^ will use monthly rates, since the standard worker receiues their pay on that basis.
iiioge leuels in the Souiet Union, as in the United States, are affected by a number of factors. Moscow sets the pay rates for 4 8 different types of jobs, different sklU leuels in that Job, and their are differentials in pay based on which geographic region a worker is located In. The pay leuels of the proletariate (which includes construction workers below, whose pay rates are well aboue auerage) and seruice workers can be influenced by age. UJages increase with skill leuels or time of seruice, so older workers tend to earn more than younger. The Islamic regions, thus, would haue some lower of auerage pay leuels owing to a younger labor force. The pay leuel of collectiue farm workers, howeuer, would show uery little influence of age, since skill-based pay leuels are based more education, rather than aduancing up the ladder" ouer a period of time. Souiet republic data does not permit measuring each sector's workers by age.
(Auerage Pay for Construction Workers: This uariable measures base monthly pay per construction worker. Potentially, the leuel of pay for the secondary and tertiary sectors combined could differ by republics because of differences in the share of the different Jobs. By focusing on one type of Job (the highest paid), this dissertation will determine whether Job types alone create income differences, or whether the state pays differently by republics. 4 9
Auerage per CoKetliue Farnien This uariable measures the ruble ualue of payment in money and/or product gluen to each worker per credited working day. Monthly and annual pay may differ owing to differences In growing seasons or crop success. This measures how much opportunity each employed person is giuen to earn money.
Bergson measured this uariable enclusiuely for payment in kind, which he considered the best measure for indicating the tangible rewards of collectiue farm working. Money might be relatiueiy useless because of few accessible products, and costs in areas with collectiue farms differed from other areas. Kotlyakou^^ noted that income in collectiue farm areas was constrained by product auailability, so dealt with payment In kind. My own data includes both payment by product and rubles, since this Is the information included
In standard statistical sources and payment in kind still predominates.
Power Supply per Agricultural Uiorker. This uariable measures fuel
(electricity and gasoline) consumption per worker per year. This uariable measures two factors: how much opportunity Is gluen to workers of a republic to produce more and earn more, and how much the state has done to reduce the physical burden of work. 5 0
irrigated Land per 1000 Rural Residents: This usiiahle measures
the number of hectares of land under irrigation per 1000 rural residents. This farmland is the best in quality and offers opportunity
for higher agricultural output. In much of arid Central Asia irrigation is cnicial to, in Yuri Meduekou s mords, the rural uitality" of a region.
The data reflect oniy the area reported by local authorities.
Underreporting of actual land improuement would constitute land being used outside the official "public sector". Therefore, this uariable reflects the leuel of Income and food opportunity created by the state.
Irrigated and Imoroued Land per 1000 Rural Residents: This uariable is the number of irrigated and drained ("ameliorated") land per 1000 rural residents. Drained swamps and other forms of
Improued land offer similar economic opportunities to rural areas, in
the siK Islamic republics ameliorated land is rare, while It is uery common within the European USSR. By combining both types of land improuements, a more balanced picture is giuen of sWte inuestment in
"rural uitality." Statistical studies of land improuement effects on the standard of liuing are somewhat less common. R study by Kinchuk^^ 51 dealt more uXth labor utilization and Sand, In u>iilcii irrigated and improued iands were included along with more conuentional land use.
This measures ouerall land usage, rather than usage of eupensiue, higher qualitg land.
Growth in Agricultural Productiuitu: This uariable reflects how productiuity per agricultural worker has improued or declined in recent years. tUith agriculture employing such a large share of the local nationalities, it is a measure of state inuestment and income opportunity. Khinchuk^^ dealt with productiuity as a measure of quality of life, while Rafikou^^ dealt with productiuity as a national economic concern and a result of enuironmentai changes.
Electric Power Production per Capita: This is the amount of electricity produced within the republic per person. UJhile most products can be shipped to other areas of the country (making production and consumption patterns dramatically different), electric power transmission in the Souiet Union is limited by technology to shorter distances, thus most electricity is used close to where it is produced. On a proulnclal basis electricity would cross boundaries In large amounts, but on a republic leuel only 3.5%^^ of electricity 5 2
generated goes across borders. This percent Is higher in the Baltic
republics, Moldaula and Belorussia. Howeuer, it is likely to be lower in
the siK Islamic republics. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan haue many open areas where electric power transmission Is limited or nonoKlstent. Rzerbaldzhan, Kirgizia, and Tadzhikistan are
mountainous along their borders, and the flatter regions of
Rzerbaldzhan face the Caspian Sea, limiting the Inter-republlc electric power exchange. Electricity is a uery fleulble power source, and reflects domestic convenience and/or investment In opportunities
In dally Jobs (reduced physical workload, better lighting, better equipment power, more use of automated systems, etc.).
New Roartments oer 1GBQ Newlywed Couoles: New apartments are those units put into operation in the given year. Earlier studies of housing, such as those of Sosnovy^^, Bergson^^, and Sagers^^ used
floor space to Indicate housing availability. However, as later studies such as Gornostayeva^*^, Morton^^, and Gachechiladze^^ have pointed out, the biggest need is not in roomier accommodations, but having your own unit. The group having the greatest need for this privacy are newlyweds, who may be planning to start their families. This 5 3 commodity is promised as a right to Soiiiet citizens, but has been in chronic short supply throughout the Souiet era.
Hospital Beds per 10.000 Residents: This does not include maternity wards or dental offîces. Sogers^^ and Gomostayeua^^ used this uariable to measure the quality of life in a region. It does reflect the auailability of medical facilities.
Physicians oer 10.000 Residents: This does not include dentists or nurses. Sagers^^ and Gomostayeua^^ included this uariable as well to measure the quality of life. While it is a measure of the auailability of medical help, it cannot be used to determine the quality of help (much less training is required to become a physician In the USSR than in the
USR) or auailability of supplies and equipment The latter might be indirectly infered, since supplies are linked to the same measure
(general medical need of a region).
Physician-Nurse Ratio: The quality and skill leuels of physicians are likely to uary by different regions. The better trained and more qualified physicians, for instance, are more likely to be in larger cities and administratiue centers. Since Souiet data does not measure the skill leuels of physicians by different republics or prouinces, the ratio 5 4
Of physicians to nurses Is a substitute for determining the approKimate relatiue leuel of skills comparing two republics. Ulith a higher ratio of physicians to nurses, it is likely that conditions are more fauorable for higher-skilled physicians. In a nurse-heauy republic, you are more likely to haue a lower skill leuei of physicians
(this assumes a fairly continuous pyramid among medical personnel).
infant Mortality Rate: This is the number of infants dying before the first birthday per 1000 bom aliue. The purpose of this uariable is to indicate ouerall population health, quality and auailability of medical seruices, prenatal care, food supply, and enuironmental nuaifty. Since infants are more susceptible to diseases and enuironmental problems, differences from one region to another will show more readily in this uariable.
R uariety of data has been used to indicate population health.
Kingkade used life eupectancy to measure health. Unfortunately, with people mouing around and conditions uarying from one generation to another, this does not measure recent health conditions uery well. S a g e r s ^2 used crude death rate, probably since it was the only uariable gluen for prouinces. This uariable, howeuer, often 5 5 reflects population age structure more than health (Malaysia has a lower crude death rate than the USR owing to its lower median age).
Two recent articles in Komsomolskaya orauda^^ described Infant mortality as measuring quality of diet, social habits, and the problems of pollution, fl nouel method of measuring population health is described by Barbash^^, in which the average size of the Infant at birth helps identify better or poorer conditions. Unfortunately, this enample was confined to Moscow. Infant mortality rate is used because of infant sensitivity, availability at the republic level, and consistency of definitions.
B. ENUI nONMENTHL-BEHAU I ORAL
These variables define phenomena that are primarily the result of state control, but reflect population habits too.
Higher Education Student-Primary and Secondary School Puoil
Ratio : This variable is the result of the number of students in higher education divided by the number of pupils in primary and general secondary education. Soviet figures are accepted, even though they include a range of students from full-time in universities to those in correspondence courses in local institutions. Since many students do 5 6 not compiete their courses, this uariabie iuiii not reflect quality of labor force or job opportunity, but the resources deuoted by the state to prouide opportunities for desirable jobs (good work conditions and long uacatlons) and time inuested to seek these state-prouided opportunities. Does the opportunity enist (Moscow sets the limits on students) and is it worth it (people must apply and enroll)?
Sagers^^ used students per 1000 population. This is partially due to data limitations at that time for prouinces. Howeuer, this uariable reflects the population age structure more than student enrollment
Bergson measured enpenditures in higher education to indicate quality of training and facilities. Pomorina^^ calculated the number of students in higher (and secondary specialized) education compared to persons ages 15-39. This was closer to describing the opportunity prouided and taken than the other two methods. Because of limitations on published data, Pomorina was limited to republic-leuel units, as is this study. Khualinskaya s articles ^ noted the problems and criteria for locating higher education. She was Interested in both economic needs and educational needs. 5 7
This dissertation uses pupsSs in school as a denominator for two reasons. 1) Data Is not auallable for smaller units (republic capitals, prouinces, nationalities) for age cohorts, but it is auailable for pupils in school for all years and leuels. 2) Only those who go through the school system are eligible for higher eduction, and the number of pupils act as a surrogate educational age cohort.
Employed Specialists with Higher Education Degrees: This is the share of employed persons who completed higher education. This is a measure of brain quality " of a republic's labor force, fl higher ualue indicates resources inuested by the state and time by the employed in preparing for their occupation. Sagers^^ used the number of persons with higher or secondary education per 1000 persons ouer 10 years of age (this odd age being restricted by Souiet data). Sagers was more interested in educational opportunity (this uariable coming closer than that of students per 1000 residents), while this dissertation is using completion of degree to measure quality and flenibility of labor.
Secondaru Specialized Education Student-Primaru and Secondary
School Pupil Ratio: This uariable is the result of the number of students in secondary specialized education diuided by the number of pupils in 5 8 primary and genera! secondary education. These insUtutsGRS are more job-specific, with much of the time in them being spent in on-the-job training (not that work superuisors always feel fortunate to haue these trainees). Much of this education may not be used, but training does prouide better oppourtunity in industrial and construction production jobs, where pay and transferability is good. This uariable indicates state inuestment in deuelopment and personal interest in state-prouided job opportunities. Gomostayeua^^ used the number of students In secondary specialized education to help measure the quality of life (opportunity) In different cities. Unfortunately, she measured this per 1000 residents, which would skew results against populations too old to take aduantege of these opportunities.
Employed Specialists with Secondary Specialized Education
Degrees : This is the share of employed persons who completed econdary specialized education. This is a measure of the technical skill of the labor force. Higher education has more prestige, whereas secondary specialized education may offer more tangible benefits
(compare to the U.S. where machine and computer hardware technicians are in high demand). The state has shown some 5 9 preference for these production skills ouer academic ones. These skills also permit opportunity to change residence more easily, owing to the high demand In many priority Industries.
Share of Research UJorkers with Doctoral and Candidate Degrees per Million Employees: fis pointed out by Nolting and Feshback^^, the definition of a research worker Is somewhat uague and paries from year to year and region to region. Data on research workers, therefore, often do not glue precise comparisons of regions. Also, there can be major differences In quality and type of work they perform. Howeuer, as Yuri Meduedkou has pointed out, Souiet standards for receluing candidate and doctoral degrees are stringent and fairly unlfrom. Awarding a degree can create either a colleague or competitor. This uariable measures not only the brain resources of a republic, but also the prestige and strength of a republic's A&D system. Since these degrees require both a high leuei of competence and a huge Inuestment in time and effort. It reflects attitudes by both
Moscow and the Indlulduals inuolued. Does Moscow want to confer more status on a republic? Do the indlulduals feel there are benefits to be had in the republic when achleuing this status? 6 0
Partu Members and Candirintes oer 1000 of Eligible floe: Members and candidates are grouped together since many sources do not separate the two, candidates rarely fail to become members, candidates are inuolued in Party actiuities already, and candidates make up a small portion of total numbers. Rigby's work^^ on the party membership was a ualuabie source of data, as well as other statistical sources. UJesson's work^^ proued inuaiuable in interpreting the results of the data on party membership. Sagers^^ and
Rappoport considered membership as measures of both Moscow's interest in controling a region and in getting local residents inuolued in the political and social system. Both measured membership as a function of number of residents (members per 1000 residents). Sagers was constrained by the lack of data on the prouincial leuei for population age distribution. Rappoport's work was on the republic leuei; therefore her results seem unduly affected by population age structure. Rfter all. Communist Party membership has minimum age requirements, and a younger population (such as in Islamic areas) would be fairly represented with lower membership per 1000 residents. The uariable of membership per 1000 persons of eligible 61 age measures the eutent opportunity to join is giuen and being accepted (some regions see more social loss than socioeconomic gain by joining, partlculalry In recent years).
Employed Persons oer 1000 Population: fls noted by Uiluman^^ and Zuldrinsh^^, the rapidly gromlng populations of Central Asia,
Rzerbaldzhan, and Kazakhstan haue Increasing dependency ratios.
This uariable measures the number of people earning income from the state diuided by those uiho consume Income (eueryone). This uariable is used uery frequently by the Souiet gouemment and others to euplain the causes of pouerty In these republics. This uariable measures much of the domestic economic effects of the baby boom".
Retail Trade oer Capita: This measures the ruble ualue of commodities and seruices purchased from the state. Since the ualues are compared within a year. Inflation and currency changes haue no impact Bergson^^ considered retail sales one of the best measures of prosperity. Sagers^^ and Gomostayeua^^ consider It a measure of quality of life. Khinchuk^^ compared urban-rural retail ratios to describe regional imbalances in state supply. Bystroua and
Buklbayeua noted that per-capita measures and population age 6 2 distribution were needed to compare not only the uolume of goods and seruices, but also whether specific local needs were being met
Tadzhibayeua used rural retail sales to compute dependency on priuate plots in rural Turkmenistan for day-to-day needs. All of these interpretations haue merit State sales of goods and services indicate the amount of disposable income, the amount of state commodities auailable, and to what entent locals may use non-state sources for their needs. In other words, how important is the state distribution in everyday iife?
Percent of Eligible Children in Preschool Institutions: Since both spouses work in the typical Souiet family, daycare, kindergarten and other instutitions are a uery important seruice. Daycare shortages haue been common from the 1930s^'^ to the présentas. Sagers^^ computed the number of children per 1000 residents, primarily due to the lack of data at prouincial leuels. Population age structure, obuiously, has had major Impacts on this since IDorld IDar II. Bystroua and Bukiuayeua^^ computed this based on the number of children of eligible age in order to demonstrate that state calculations, done in a manner similar to Sagers', often left euen greater shortages. This 6 3 uariable reflects both Moscoui's inuestment in reducing family burdens, educating and sociaiizing chiidren, and parents' willingness to haue the state be responsibie for their children. A more traditional, family-oriented culture, such as the Islamic culture, would not make use of these institutions euen if they were in abundance.
Summer Pioneer Camp Use: This measures the percent of eligible children enrolled in summer pioneer camps. These camps serue not only as "baby sitters", but also as social indoctrination centers. This uariable reflects state interest in easing parental load and inuoluing children in Souiet society (including some para military actiuity).
Auailability may also reflect interest in this kind of work. Use reflects accesibility of facilities, quality of facilities, and/or parental interest in hauing their children "souletized."
C. BEHAUIOAAL
These uariables reflect habits that, for the most part, are under control of the indiuidual. They can be controlled by indiuidual choice
(such as marriage and abortion) or a reaction to culture, state policies, and enuironment 6 4
Net Migration Rate: This Is computed by the population change minus the natural Increase per 1000 residents at the beginning of the time period. Thanks to Increased data auailability, works on migration
Increased rapidly In the 1960s and 1970s. lOorks by Leu/ls^^,
Toukun Uolkou^®, Zayonchkouskaya and Pereuedentseu^^, Chlnn^^, and Knabe^^ are just a few euamples. Sagers^^ considered migration balance as a measure of quality of life In a region. Pereuedentseu^^ stated that lluing conditions In a region u^ere the number one cause of migration patterns and noted that migration patterns often run counter to state Interests (people leaue the regions that the state wants deueloped). Rowland noted that migration consists mainly of people mouing to urban areas or to build them^^, that it tends to follow Inuestment and Industrial employment^^, and that the majority of migrants are Russians.^® Recording to Feshbach^^ and Ulinman®® migration from Central Rsla and Kazakhstan to other regions (such as
Siberia) Is unlikely to grow owing to poor conditions in Siberia, the family orientation of the indigenous people in those regions, and that education and modern life do not always change people's cultural ualues and attitudes. This dissertation uses migration as a measure of 6 5 a republic's apparent desirability or, as Yuri Meduedkou describes it,
people uoting [for which republic they prefer to Hue ini with their feet.
Marriaqe-Diuorce Ratio: This is the number of marriages In a year diuided by the number of diuorces for the same year. This is an approHimate indicator of both interest in starting marriage and maintaining it - the desirability of being a couple. Works by
Uishneuskiy , Koroleu®^, Uolkou®^, Kharcheu^^, and Fisher®^ describe the uarious changes in law and social conditons that may haue influenced marriage desirability. Sagers^^ considers marriage rates as an indicator of social order. Howeuer, marriage alone per
1000 residents can be altered by age structure, as well a slump following a good year. Zuidrinsh^^ studies marriage rates as a factor of age groups, describing possible reasons for changes for younger groups. This dissertation combines marriage with diuorce as a measure of the desirability (entering and staying) of being a spouse.
Share of Rural Women Married before Age 20: This Is the percent of women who are married by the time they reach age 20. As
Zuidrinsh notes, young women haue more pressure to choose as 6 6 older teenagers whether to matry and possibly haue children, get further education (putting job ahead of emotional security), or work and possibly haue a family too. In Islamic regions, marriage Indicates a likely orientation toward child-bearing, while not being married indicates either work at home or further educaUon.
Diuorces oer 1000 Marriages: This uariable is more refined than diuorce rates per 1000 population. This data was generally not auailable until recently, and is still giuen at the republic leuei or in sampling surueys. It is an indicator of social attitudes toward a stable family life. Changing diuorce rates are the subject of many works. Florkowski^^ and Petmecky^^ linked diuorce rates directly to changes in the law, particularly just before and after lUorld tUar II.
Reuesz^^ links diuorce rates to housing problems, the inability of couples to Hue alone or euen together. Zuldrlnsh^^ uses surueys to
point out alcoholism in men as the leading cause. This probably
applies more to the Europeans (Latuians) In the suruey than to
Muslims. Golod^^ and Kharcheu^'^ cite numerous reasons, stating that the economic, social and cultural climates all contribute. The Islamic culture strongly discourages diuorce, particularly one requested by 6 7 the wife. Increased diuorce In the Islamic regions would indicate a clear break from tradition.
Share of Dluorced Ulomen lUho Marrg Again within 10 Years: This is the number of women who remarry within ten years per 1000 who haue diuorced. In lOestem societies diuorce does not carry a major stigma. In traditonat Islamic society, a woman who is diuorced is disgraced. This would indicate the degree to which women are
liberated from stigma or haue broken away from tradition themselues.
Birth Rales: Numerous studies haue been done on factors influencing the number of children that women are bearing.
Fedorenko Uishineuskiy^^, and Uolkou®^ haue giuen lengthy desciptions of changes in birth rates and Souiet laws and benefits.
They haue used numerous types of measurements. Sagers^^ used crude birth rates, since these are the only figures auailable at prouincial leuels. Uishineuskiy and Uolkou^^ used crude birth rates for earlier years In the Souiet era, then switched to cumulatiue fertility rates. This was mainly owing to changes in data auailable to them.
Most recent works haue used cumulatiue fertility rates when 6 8 measuring family habits, ujhile others haue used crude birth rates for illustrating population size change (result, not behauior).
There are many enplanations as to why birth rates change ouer time and uary by region. Borisou^^^ cited abortions, income, and housing probiems. Rybakouskiy^^^ and Ryabushkln^^^ detailed the woman s work load on the job and at home as a disincentiue.
Zuidrinsh concluded there were ouer a dozen reasons for the number of children a woman has, but that the leuei of urbanization and nationality background were the best factors at predicting birthrates. Kingkade^ as with most Souiet authors, felt that the system of benefits and conditions set by the state were primary, and he felt more daycare, housing, medical care, etc. were the answer to increasing birth rates as desired by the state.
Below are the four measures of birth rates used In this dissertation and why they are significant
Births oer 1000 liJomen Roes 15-49: Crude birth rates are misleading since the population age structure can enpiain differences.
Rge-sBH birth rates prouide a more refined measure of the desire for children. They can be affected by population age structure (how large 6 9 is the share of loomen In the younger child-bearing years). This uariabie is conuenient since you need only the number of births and women of this age group, which is auailable at prouincial and capital leuels during census years.
Cumulatiue Fertility Rate: This is the number of children born per
1000 women of 5 year age cohorts, multiplied by fiue (flue years per cohort), add the ualues of all seuen cohorts, and then diuide by 1000.
This predicts how many chiidren a woman will haue by age 49, if the odds of hauing children at each age do not change. This is probably the most refined way of indicating interest in hauing children
(child-bearing behauior). It is not Influenced by population age structure. Unfortunately, this uariable is auailable only at the republic leuei, and only since World War II. This dissertation will use a net reproductiue rate estim&te from 1926 as a substitute.
Liue Births per 1000 Women Rges 15-19: This is an indication of to what entent women are foregoing educational and job opportunities in order to start their family life. In traditional Islamic societies women married in the early teens (or perhaps earlier) and began child-bearing as soon as possible. H lower ualue for this uariable 7 0 would indicate delayed child-bearing or nontraditional behauior.
Liue Births per 1000 UJomen Ages 45-49: flbortion and, to a lesser entent, contraception are both uieiued negatiuely in traditional
Islamic societies in the Souiet republics. High ualues for this uariable would indicate a continuation of these uiews. They also indicate a ualue on family or clan size, which played a role in prestige. R recent article in Komsomolskaya orauda^^^ indicates that women in
Turkmenistan are continuing to haue children euen when they are not in physicial condition to support them.
Abortions per 1000 Women Rges 15-49: Most studies on abortions compare the number of abortions per 1000 liue births. Borisou^^^ and
Mishina are recent euamples of concerns ouer more abortions than liue births. Due to the shortage of contraceptiues and since abortion early in pregnancy is freely auailable, the abortion-birUi ratio indicates an interest in children - do they want them or not? The abortion-"eligible women" ratio used here is indicatiue of habits of health and reaction to the enuironment of daily life, fls noted by
Petmecky abortion was considered the number one right for women when introduced in Nouember 1920. Its high usage led to 71 complaints In the press of general poor health among moment this led to a restrlctiue code In June 1936, but problems continued due to large numbers of illegal abortions, as pointed out by Petmecky^ and
Serebrennlkou. "Muslims" who today haue traditional habits would haue lower usage of abortions. Studies of abortion rates for regions are not numerous, owing to the recent appearance of data on the republic leuei.
D, FEMflLE-MflLE RATIOS
One of the major themes of Souiet society, particularly in the earlier years, was to change the traditional female-male roles in society and to liberate women. Oleckmann^^^ and Mamonoua^^^ haue written general works on the uarious aspects of these changes - legal, social, economic, political, etc. Dodge^l^ Lapidus^^^, and
Reuesz^^^ haue described these changes, as well hauing presented large amounts of data to Illustrate their conclusions on the changes that haue occured in the Souiet Union between women and men.
The role of women in the Islamic regions was more strongly traditional at the time of the Reuolution than in Christian or Jewish areas, flminoua^^^ describes many of the Islamic traditions regarding 7 2 women and the methods used by the state to change them. Halle^^^,
Massed Zeyons^ZO, and Gray^^l describe the customs particular to Central Rsla and Kazakhstan and the local aspects of change there.
Paluanoua glues uiuld descriptions of the frightening conditions of
Turkmen women before the Souiet era. Men with 10 to 12 wiues were not uncommon (despite standard Islamic limitations to four), marrying of child brides was standard, and women were shielded from public life In any form. Busygina Tatar scholar, describes the situation of Tatar women before the reuolution and changes since. She does note that some changes had occured among Tatars earlier and with less reslstence than among most other Muslims.
In addition to the works cited aboue, there are other descriptions of the situation of women In the Souiet era. Petmecky^ quotes
Rrticle 122 of the 1936 Constitution, which glues women equal social, economic and political rights as men. Rt the same time, women who were housewlues were considered prostitutes. Reuesz^^S notes that buying wiues became Illegal In June 1921, yet this practice was continuing In Kazakhstan in the 1960s. Two articles in 1990 In
Komsomoiskaua orauda^^^ describe the tradition of leaning women 7 3
and chiidren iast in the family food chain. Because of food and
economic problems in Turkmenistan, women are commonly anemic and
staruing, while dystrophy among adult men is uirtually unknown. One
of these articles^ also describes how the custom of bride money
(dowries to obtain brides) often leaues the newlywed couple in abject
pouerty as they start married life. This has led to numerous cases of
marriage inside the family in order to saue money. The results of this
inbreeding, of course, haue been most unfortunate for the children.
In June of 1990 the Uzbek gouemment declared control from
Moscow ouer uital products and supplies. The reason for this limited
economic autonomy was to protect motherhood and children.^
Shortages and enuironmental problems are not limited to
Turkmenistan alone.
It would seem that many traditional habits continue in Central
Asia and Kazakhstan. It is likely that they (perhaps Rzerbaldzhan too)
will show distinctiue non-Souiet trends in female-male ratios.
Female-Male Adult Rural Residency: This uariable is the percent of
females 20 years and older who liue in rural places diuided by the
percent of males 20 years and older who liue in rural places. In 7 4 traditional Islamic society, the males were able to explore opportunities outside the uliiage, while the females stayed In place, fl break from this tradition would result In balanced female-male rural residency. Of course, there are Souiet limitations to mouement to cities, but they are the same to both genders. This uariabie indicates to what extent females are taking aduantage of the opportunities that exist of mouing to cities.
Female-Male Nonemoloyment: This is the percent of females of working age who do not haue jobs In the public sector diuided by the percent of males of working age who do not haue jobs In the public sector. Traditionally Muslim women generally put in more hours of work than men, but at home or on priuate fields. Petmecky^ described the stated Souiet aim of freeing women from the household and gaining full employment Paluonouo^^^ described the methods used in Central flsia to gain public employment for women, including hiring couples or entire families together.
Success was certainly not immediate. Serebrennlkou^ notes that unemployment in 1934 was higher among women, particularly women of indigenous nationalities. Oodge^^Z ^^ed age-sex 7 5 employment pyramids to illustrate that in 1959 women of Uzbekistan haue higher nonemployment than males there and higher than females of the USSR as a whole. Reuesz noted that in the mid-1960s women's pay was about two-thirds that of men (owing to being in poorly paid jobs). This led to women in Central Asia and Russia hauing higher nonemployment rates (their Jobs being more enpendible).^^^
The reasons for nonemployment uary. fl June 1990 article in
Izuestia noted that 80% of women surueyed work only because the family cannot suruiue on the husband's income alone. Uery few belieued that women should be required to work, or that mothers should be required to stay at home. Bond^ noted that a major solution to masslue rural unemployment in Uzbekistan was in creating jobs for women during the agricultural off-season.
In all likelihood, nonemployment continues to be much higher among women than men, particularly in the more remote and traditonal republics (such as Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan, and Turkmenistan).
Female-Male Ratio for Collectiue Farm Employment: This is the percent of employed females who work on collectiue farms diuided by the percent of employed males who work on collectiue farms. Giuen 7 6 that collectiue farming Is one of the worst types of employment and associated lifestyles, and that, as Serebrennlkou noted^^^, women were gluen the worst jobs before the Reuolution, the ratio should be higher for women In tradition-bound regions. Reuesz noted that In early years women gained an Increasing share In agricultural employment ^ Rosenberg claims that In the Gorbacheu era 98% of
the manual agricultural work Is done by women.^^^ It would seem
that little has changed. Rnd this Is certainly detrimental In many ways. Rn Interulew In Kommunist deplored the 40-degree
(Centigrade) heat that women worked under. Komsomolskaya nrauda this year described how women In the cotton fields were breathing poisoned air and drinking poisoned w ater^^ and that pesticide use In
the cotton-growing areas Is 20 times the auerage for the Souiet
Union. In these condtlons, it Is women who aremosl likely to be
forced to work In Central Rsia's "cotton bask et "
EenialBrMale, Ratio for Students in Higher and Secondary
Specialized Education oer 1000 persons Ryes 17-24: This uariable
depicts the share of persons of normal unluerslty, college or
specialized secondary age who is attending. Gender breakdown Is not 7 7 giuen for elementary and general secondary school pupils. Rt the same time, population age structure Is gluen at the republic leuel, thus using age Is not as useful as Is "students-pupils ratio for prouinces or republic capitals.
Paluanoua describes the quota system used to get females Into the education system. Minorities were gluen euen more special attention. ^ Dodge notes that women haue had more success In entering higher education than secondary specialized.^ This Is most likely owing to the more Immediate rewards (as men might perceive them) and the state's public ulew of technical skills. O odge^^ and
Lapidus^^^ haue both claimed that minority women haue not seen nearly as much progress as Slavic women. Reuesz^^G points out that education is often denied to girls as early as general secondary school
In Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan, making higher education and secondary specialized education only an empty dream.
One major drawback to this variable Is the combination of unluerlsty and technical students. University degrees are highly standardized and a graduate can be accepted anywhere either in the republic or the entire Soviet Union. Technical school degrees from 7 8
different institutions haue widely uarying leueis of occeptibility.
These students are geared toward local needs - prouincial or
republic-wide at best Howeuer, due to the fact that these two types
of students are combined in most years when information on female
participation in education are giuen, it was necessary to present the
infonnation in this combined form.
Ouerall, women haue made progress in post-secondary
attendance in the Souiet era, but it is unclear whether the indigenous
Islamic women haue enjoyed much progress in recent years.
Female-Male Ratio of Employed Persons with Degrees in Higher
Education or Secondary Specialized Education: This uariable may not
mirror the uariable for student enrollment Graduates may transfer,
meaning some areas haue aboue-norm education leueis in the
employed work force, while others lag. Hiso, not all students
complete their degrees. There may be more pressures on women to
leaue school, or there may be more incentiue for them to complete
school. Lapidus^^^ has claimed that Souiet affirmatlue action has
been responsible for progress in the educational quality of the female
work force. Serebrennikou^'^® and Dodge^^G claim that women haue 7 9 been more successful in getting degrees than in getting enrolled.
Among the possible reasons are greater motiuation (they haue more to lose in not being skilled), no potential disruption from military service, and better disicipline. It is likely that the success of women in completing degrees will be more pronounced in Central Asia and
Kazakhstan, where failure would reduce the precious freedom gained by the women.
Female-Male Ratio for Aesearchers with Candidate and Doctoral
Degrees : This indicates how much progress has been made at getting women into positions of academic and economic prestige and influence. Dodge claims there is no satisfactory way to measure the prestige leuel of women outside politics (he is concerned mostly with publications) but yet claims that the record of women gaining prestige is poor^^l Lapidus^^^ claims that women haue made slow, but steady progress in obtaining positions of prestige (mainly research positions with important titles). Rather than measure publications or titles, whose standards uary greatly, candidate and doctoral degrees are best to measure nonpoiitcal prestige. If traditions are still strong, women will face euen more resistence in 8 0 gaining these degrees (which may threaten males) , than they do gaining employment in the public sector (which has economic benefits euen in traditional societies).
Female Representation in the Communist Party: This is the percentage of members and candidates who are women. The better method would haue been a female-male ratio based on members per
100 of eligible age, but population age structure is generally not auaiiable below republic ieuei or for nationalities. UJesson^^^ and
Rigby point out that the Party has had quotas for women for much of its history. Mandel^^^ and Lapidus^^^ demonstrate the steady progress made in female share of Party membership up through the
1960s. Howeuer, most minorities haue lagged behind^ with Tadzhik and Turkmen women enperiencing a decline in their share in some recent years.^^® Giuen the sometimes hostile nature of the Party toward the "Islamic" republics, it is unlikely that women in these areas are joining to the same eutent as in other areas.
The first sin uariables that measure changes between females and males are different from most studies. They haue used percentages of females in the giuen actiuity. But since the population age 8 1 structure is different for females and males, particularly among adults, and the share of women employed is eupected to differ significantly, it seemed more appropriate to measure ratios than percent of those inuolued. In this way the results should indicate behauior and conditions for women more than results of baby booms, wars, migration, and differences in mortality rates.
E. OflTR ORIGIN
The values of the uariables below could be used directly from
Souiet sources. Others had to be computed or constructed.
Urban population; average pay for proletariate and service workers; average pay for construction workers; average pay per collective farmer; growth In agricultural productivity; hospital beds per 10,000 residents; physicians per 10,000 residents; infant mortality rate; share of divorced women who marry again in 10 years; age sen specific birth rate; cumulative fertility rate; live births per 1000 women ages 15-19; live births per 1000 women ages 45-49; and female share (percent) in Communist Party membership. CHAPTER Ul
DAILY ENUIAGNMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will analyze the uariables describing the daily enuironment that is predominantly Moscotu's responsiblity. Ulith tbe promise of equality in liuing and work conditions being a major theme of the Communist Party ouer the decades, the amount that the sin
Islamic republics ouercome (or fail to) their initial shortcomings is a measure of the success of the Souiet system and of its uarious eras.
Recent literature indicates major failures. A recent intemieiu with an Azerbaidzhani actiuist calls the Baltic republics a uirtual paradise compared to the horrors faced by the Turkic peoples. The actiuist cites seueral reasons: the land stolen by the Souiet military in
Kazakhstan, the fact that Moscow directly runs 93% of the industry of
Rzerbaidzhan, and the horrid conditions of growing cotton in
Uzbekistan, while workers in luanouo work comfortably in their
8 2 83 teKtile factories. He calls for a major reuolt owing to these and other horrors created by the system.^
Why should Moscow care what the condtions are for the Turkic peoples? As noted by Lydolph^ and others, the population of the
Islamic nationalities and regions is the most rapidly growing in the country. Table I and Figure 2 (see pp. 21-22) glue graphic illustration of this increase since 1950. IbiHman notes that in 1979 Russians outnumbered Islamic nationalities by 3:1. By the year 2000 this ratio will be down to 2:1.- According to some forecasts, by the middle of the nent century the Central Asian and other Islamic nationalities are likely to outnumber Russians, with Uzbeks being the single largest nationality in the entire USSR by the beginning of the 22nd century.^
With this kind of population growth, the Islamic nationalities are no longer one of many major concerns to the continued enistence of the Souiet Union in its current form, but perhaps the most important in the long run.
B. ETHNIC BALANCE AND URBANIZATION
1. "Natiue "/Russian Balance: The presence of Russians in a region has been indicatiue of the control required and enerted by central TABLE 2
PERCENT OF POPULATION "NATIVE"/RUSSIAN
1897 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 Azerbaldzhan na 63.3/9.7 58.4/na 67.5/13.6 73.8/10.0 78.1/7.9 Kazakhstan 79.9/14.4 57.1/19.7 37.9/40.2 30.0/42.7 32.6/42.4 36.0/40.8 Kirgizia 64.4/3.0 66. 6/ 11.8 51.7/20.8 40.5/30.2 43.8/29.2 47.9/25.9 Tadzhikistan 57.0/1.6 74.6/0.7 59.5/9.1 53.1/13.3 56.2/11.9 58.8/10.4 Turkmenistan 65.2/8.6 73.8/7.7 59.2/18.0 60.9/17.3 65.5/14.5 68.4/12.6 Uzbekistan 57 .7/1.4 66.0/4.7 64.6/11.8 62.1/13.5 65.5/12.5 68.7/10.8 Russia 75.2/75.2 78.1/78.1 82.9/82.9 83.3/83.3 82.8/82.8 82.6/82.6 UkraIne 61.3/10.8 80 .0 /9 .2 7 3 .5/na 76.8/16.9 74.9/19.4 73.6/21.1 Belorussla 7 1.6/5.0 80 .6 /7 .2 77.1/na 8 1 .1 /8 .2 81.0/10.4 79.4/11.9 Estonia na a 91.8/na 74.6/20.1 68.2/24.7 64.7/27.9 Latvia na a 77.4/11.5 62.0/26.6 56.8/29.8 53.7/32.9 Lithuania 63.9/na a 73.7/na 79.3/8.5 8 0 .1 /8 .6 8 0.0/8.9 Moldavia 4 8.6/6.9 b 66 .6/na 65.4/10.2 64.6/11.6 63.9/12.8 Armenia na 8 4 .4 /2 .1 82.8/na 8 8 .0 /3 .2 8 8.6/2.7 89.7/2.3 Georgia na 6 7 .0 /4 .0 61.4/8.7 64.3/10.1 66.8/8.5 68.8/7.4 USSR (Russians) 44.7 52.9 58.4 54.6 53.4 52.4
a- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were Independent countries in 1926. b- Most of Moldavia was w ithin Romania In 1926. The sectio n w ithin the USSR (not a separate rep u b lic) had 30.0% Moldavians and 11.8% R ussians.
Sources ! Vestnlk statlstlkl, 1980, No.7, pp. 41,43, No.8, pp. 64,69, No.9, P.. 61,65, No.10, pp. 67-72, No.11, pp. 61-64; Itogl Vsesoyuznoy pereplsl naselenla 1970 gods. Vol. 4, pp. 12-25; Itogl Vsesoyuznoy pereplsl naselenla 1959 goda; SSSR, pp. 184, 202-208; Trud v SSSR; stat1stIcheskly sbornlk. p. 19; Vsesoyuznaya perepls naselenla 17 dekabrya 1926 gods, kratkle svodkl 4, tables 14-17; Denko, 1969, pp. 210-212; Krader, 1963, pp. 199, 212; Lewis, 1976, p. 402; Lorlmer, 1946, pp. 63-64; Sulkevlch, 1940, p. 55-58. eo 8 5 authority. But it also is indicatiue of the standard of liuing in that migration (which is dominated by Russians) has reflected urban deuelopment, capital inuestments, and the euistlng standard of liuing. ^ Therefore, the balance between Russians and local nationalities wiii be used to predict trends in other enuironmentai uariables.
in 1897 Russians were not as uisible in any region as they were in
1979. They constituted 14.4% of the population in w hat is now
Kazakhstan, and 8.6% in Turkmenistan. Their numbers were negligible in other areas. Howeuer, with each census during the years of Lenin’s,
Stalin's and Khrushcheu s policies, the Russians' share of local population increased in nearly euery republic. By 1959 Russians outnumbered Kazakhs in Kazakhstan by 33% and were numerous enough to preuent Kirgiz from being a majority in their own repubiic.
Their weakest presence was in Tadzhikistan, but still nearly one of euery seuen residents was a Russian.
Between the 1959 and 1979 censuses the percentage of Russians declined in all sin of the "Islamic" republics. This was caused by two factors. The urban Russians haue lower fertility rates than the more 8 6 rural local populations, flt the same time, Russians haue been leaning
Central Asia, with the rate of departure increasing in the 1970s and probably continuing in the early 1980s.^ Their is ample euidence that the departure of Russians from Islamic regions mas as strong or stronger in the late 1980s, particularly in Rzerbaidzhan.^
It is anticipated that 1989 census information mill sham that
Kazakhs outnumber Russians in their omn republic for the first time since the early 1930s. Kirgiz most likely constitute an absolute majority of ouer 50% of the population in their republic for the first time since lOorld lOar II. Tadzhiks may mell constitute nearly tmo-thlrds of their republics population, mith Turkmen and Uzbeks accounting for ouer seuen-tenths of the people of their republics.
Rzerbaidzhanis shoud constitute mell ouer four-fifths of their republic's population.
These shifts to greater predominance by the "natiue" nationalities should reflect or affect many other changes. The urban gromth of these regions mas probably most rapid in the Lenin and Stalin years.
Since the Khrushcheu era, relatiue urban gromth has most likely declined. RIong mith lagging urban gromth since 1959, employment in 8 7 construction and Industry (Including machine building and metal processing), apartment construction, medical care, education and research haue likely suffered, flt the same time, reduced flusslan populations may allow greater opportunities for local natloanalltles to assume positions of economic and political importance, as well as occupy uacant apartments and Jobs. The reduced number of flussians
(along with larger numbers of locals) has been part of the reason for increasing public demands. It will be interesting to see if family habits, and general relations between females and males will assume more trational patterns.
The Increase of Russians outside Russia during the Lenin-Stalin eras occured throughout the USSR. Howeuer, the decline in the share of Russians since then has not been uniuersal. The only other republics showing declines in the Russian percentage since 1959 haue been Rrmenia and Georgia. Rli other republics outside Russia haue had growing Russian presence. The enodus of Russians has been from the
South, not necessarily to Russia.
This shift in Russian presence has had its impact on Russians themselues. The share of Russians inside Russia has not returned to 88
TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF RUSSIAN POPULATION (Percent of Russian Population in Each Republic)
1897 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 Azerbaldzhan a 0.3 na 0.4 0.4 0.3 K azakhstan 1.4 1.7 2.5 3.5 4.3 4.4 Kirgizia 0.03 0.15 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.7 Tadzhikistan 0.02 0.01 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 Turkmenistan 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 U zbekistan 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 R ussia 91.1 92.9 80.3 85.8 83.5 82.6 U kraine 5.5 3.9 na 6.3 7.0 7.6 B e lo ru ssla 0.6 0.5 na 0.6 0.7 0.8 E sto n ia b c na 0.2 0.3 0.3 L atv ia b c 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.6 L ith u a n ia b c na 0.2 0.2 0.2 Moldavia 0.2 na na 0.3 0.3 0.4 Armenia a 0.02 na 0.05 0.05 0.05 G eorgia a 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.3
a- The Russians in Azerbaldzhan - Armenia and Georgia accounted for 0.4% of all Russians in 1897. b- The Russians in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania accounted ror 0.6% of all Russians in 1897. c- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were independent countrie countries in 1926.
Sources: C h islen n o st i so stav n a s e le n la SSSR; po dannym Vsesoyuznoy pereplsl naselenla 1979 goda, p. 138; Itogl Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naselenie 1970 goda. Vol. 4, pp. 12-15; Itogi Vsesoyuznoy pereplsl naselenla 1959 goda: SSSR. pp. 184, 202-208; Demko, 1969, pp. 210-212; Isu p o v , 1964, pp. 29-31; Krader, 1963, pp. 199, 212; Lewis, 1976, p. 402; Lorlmer, 1946, pp. 63-64; Sulkevich, 1940, pp. 55-58, 8 9 the 92.9% of the census of 1926. R greater share of Russians haue liued outside their home republic since the NEP years. This is linked to the spread of Russians for deuelopment and control during the Stalin years. But euen as Russian share of population in the Islamic republics has declined since 1959, the share of Russians mho Hue in these republics has gromn. This indicates that the migration of
Russians out of these areas has not kept up with the higher natural increase of Russians outside the Russian Republic.
lUhat has occured since 1959 is that a larger and larger share of
Russians Hue in non-Russian republics. Rnd their demographic presence is weaker there. This may haue the result of more and more
Russians feeling threatened, abandoned (liuing in economically lagging areas), sympathetic toward other nationalities' interests, or being influenced by non-Russian habits and attitudes. The higher birth rates may reflect some attitude change, or merely reflect the differences of age and Job structure between Russians in Russia and Russians in the
Islamic regions of the Souiet Union.
Russians systematically moued into the Islamic republics in the
1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and , seemingly, 1950s. Since 1959 local fertility 9 0 rates and Russian out-migration haue reduced the Russian presence, as mell as left more Russians In the USSR liuing as minorities in their republic of residence. This most llkeig means that the Islamic republics gained on the USSR economic norms during the first half of
Souiet rule, but haue lagged during the second half. Rt the same time, their lagging conditions, increased demographic predominance, and the larger share of Russians liuing among minority nationalities, has left Moscou# mith an increasingly frustrated population liuing in pouerty and mith femer barriers to shom their displeasure.
Rs for the influence of Islamic nationalities on Russians, this is not likely a major concern at present Rs of 1979 only 7.2% of Russians mere in Islamic regions, smaller than the share liuing in the Ukraine alone. Most of these 7.2% liued in Russian-dominated administratiue centers. Rnd, perhaps most important the language and cultural barriers that haue made "souietization" or "russification" of Rslans difficult mould also insulate Russians from many of the potential countereffects. Rnother factor is that the 1989 census mill probably shom a decline in the share of Russians liuing in the sin Islamic republics. Out-migration rates, the loss of younger adults, and 91 deteriorating economic conditions couid haue reduced population growth rates to leueis below that of the Russian Republic and the republics w est of the Urals.
2. Urbanization : in the Souiet Union the size and administraitue function of a settlement is crucial in determining the physical quality of life. Urban growth represents improued standards of liuing. While the USSR has had an uninterrupted increase in its ieuei of urbanization, the different republics haue had markedly different rates of urban growth.
in the latter years of the Tsarist era there were wide differences in urbanization leueis in the Empire. Between 1897 and 1913 these differences tended to increase, with the relatiuely highly urbanized regions of Rzerbaidzhania and Uzbekistan enceeding the Empire's auerage for growth. By 1926 there had not been any major changes in urban balance in the Islamic regions.
During the Stalin years there were three major trends In the
Islamic republics. Kazakhstan urbanized more rapidly than any republic in the USSR between 1926 and 1939. This coincided with the massiue infiun of Russians, which created a Russian majority by 1939. 160 ?
140-
P E R C 100 E N T Ka
80' Az
C.A 60
Ka
1897 1913 1926 1939 1950 1959 1970 1979 198
Figure 3. Level of Urbanization in Azerbaldzhan . (Az), Central Asia (C.A.), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to Average of Russian Empire/Soviet Union. N) TABLE 4
SHARE OF POPULATION IN URBAN PLACES ' (Soviet Union - 100)
RepublIc 1897 1913 1926 1939 1950 1959 1970 1979 1987 1989 Azerbaldzhan. 114 133 157 110 113 100 89 85 82 82 Kazakhstan 47 54 48 84 97 91 89 87 88 87 Kirgizia 64 69 68 56 71 70 66 62 60 58 Tadzhikistan 57 51 58 51 67 68 66 56 50 49 Turkmenistan 71 63 77 101 93 96 85 77 72 69 Uzbekistan 134 136 121 70 79 70 65 66 63 62 Russia 99 98 99 102 111 109 111 111 111 112 101 102 Ukraine 103 108 107 102 90 95 97 98 97 99 B elorussla 88 80 95 63 54 64 77 88 Estonia 109 104 a 102 121 118 115 112 109 109 110 107 108 Latvla 190 211 a 107 116 117 110 103 Lithuania 95 73 a 70 73 81 89 98 102 70 71 Moldavia 105 75 b 41 43 47 56 63 103 103 Armenia 82 58 106 87 108 104 106 106 83 83 85 Georgia 128 143 124 91 91 89 85
a- Estonia. Latvia and Lithuania were independent countries In 1926. b- The majority of Moldavia was within Romania. The sectlo of Moldavia within the Soviet Union was not a sep arate re p u b lic . The sectio n in the USSR had a value of 72.
Sources: Naselenie SSSR 1987. pp. 8-15; Vestnlk statlstlkl. 1990. No. 3, pp. 74-79,
« (.N 9 4 tUorld Uiar II did not alter this urban growth, flzerbaidzhania's growth was slowed until it became close to auerage in urbanization. Central
Asia lagged considerably before the war, but rebounded (in part owing
to the destruction of cities west of the Urals) after the war to come closer to USSR norms.
The uast differences of urbanization leueis were reduced by the
end of the Stalin era. Collectiueiy the Islamic republics were as close
to the country's norm as they haue euer been. Stalinization had made
progress In equalizing urban-rural balances.
Following Stalins death the Souiet Union euperienced an ouerall
growth in prosperity. This would leaue one to eupect euen more
equalizing of urban conditions. Howeuer, between 1950 and 1989 all
siH republics had nearly uninterrupted decline in their relatiue leuel of
urbanization. The decline obserued by Cole^ began in 1950, not in
1959. Sogers^ had described an end to conuergence in the 1970s. By
that time urbanization diuergence was already in its third decade.
The relatiue urban decline was seuere. Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan and
Turkmenistan lagged further behind the norm in 1989 than they did in
1897. Rzerbaidzhan and Uzbekistan were far below auerage in 1989. 9 5
Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan suffered absolute urban decline between 1970 and 1989.
The relatiue and absolute urban decline Is, no doubt, linked to the ouerall decline in standard of liuing noted by Meduedkou.^^ lola^ ^ has described the decreased urban access in these areas (combination
of liuing in urban places, their size, transportation links to them, and distance from them).
The lack of urbanization is surprising. iOinman^^ notes the
paradOM that Souiet Muslims are among the least urbanized in the
world, though they are the most highly educated and Islam
encourages it
Turkey represents an enample of what might haue been in
Islamic Souiet Union. In 1960 Rzerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan and all four
Central Asian republics were more urbanized than Turkey (65% the
Souiet ualue). Howeuer, by 1989 ^li sin were less urbanized than
Turkey (88% the Souiet ualue). And In Turkey a minimum of 10,000
residents are needed for a settlement to be urban.^^
lUhy has this occured? Most out-mlgrants (Russians and other
Slauic nationalities) haue moued out of cities. Aurai fertility rates. 9 6 along with a young population, haue led to an euplosion that more than compensates for migration to cities. Local mouement to cities, as discussed in Chapter 8, has not been as large as it could be.
This lag has been unnecessary. Rakhmatou^^ mentions that the large rural populations could easily be used to create new towns. This occured in Moldauia. Despite being the least urbanized republic in
1939 and the wartime damage, It has surpassed all four Central Asian republics. Armenia was less urbanized than Azerbaldzhan in 1950 and has had a weaker Russian presence. There was the earthquake of
1988. Yet Armenia has a relatiue urbanization of 185%, while
Rzerbaidzhan has a relatiue urbanization of 82% the USSR norm.
The lagging urbanization is not a mere academic measure.
Listengart ^ ^ giues a conuincing argument that accelerated urbanization is the key to Central Asia's deuelopment A system of well connected towns, as desctlbed by Rbdykadyrou^^ Is both feasible and would prouide greater equality in liuing conditions. Khoreu and
Likhoded ^ ^ note that Improuing urban-rural commuting would both smooth urbanization and prouide opportunities for rural residents who haue not made it into the city. These measures would not call for 97 massiue population dislocations, nor require massiue outlays by
Moscoui.
On the whole, urbanization patterns In the Lenin-Stalin era tended toward conuergence of the Islamic republics to the Souiet norm. The influK of Russians contributed greatly to Kazakhstan's rapid urbanization. On the other hand, Uzbekistan, and to a lesser entent,
Rzerbaidzhan had slowed urbanization, despite Russian in-migration.
Since 1950 the entire region has diuerged from Souiet urban norms. This pattern coincides with the out-migration and relatiue delcine of Russians in the area (one may speculate that a 1950 census would haue found a larger Russian share than in 1959). Giuen the lower leueis of urbanization in 1969, the Russian presence will likely be significantly smaller too.
There are seueral unhappy circumstance surrounding the relatiue and (in Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan) absolute urban decline of
Islamic USSR. Ulith urban deuelopment so closely linked to standard of liuing, these regions will likely show marked diuergence and decline ouer a period of three to four decades. Rnd this decline occured at a time when a less deueloped Islamic country with fewer natural 9 8 resources, Turkey, surpassed them in urban leueis. The euample of
Turkey, Moldauia and Armenia Indicate that the decline luas allowed, or euen assisted by Moscow's actions.
C. EMPLOYMENT
1. Nonemoloyment : The Souiet state guarantees full employment and had, until recently, bragged about hauing eliminated unemployment While It Is difficult to measure unemployment in the
Western sense (someone who has no earned income and Is actiuely seeking work). It Is possible to measure the number of those of eligible age who do not haue work In the public sector.
Much of the pouerty and poor employed:dependency ratio in the
Islamic republics has been blamed on population age structure. The state cannot fully control age structure. It does obligate Itself to prouide jobs for those who are of working age. Therefore, the ratio of nonemployed persons In the appropriate age group should be fairly constant, with uarlation based on those who uoluntarily do not work
(fulltime mothers, those who support themselues totally outside the public sector). While Muslims would haue more fulltime housewlues, those people of the wealthier regions could afford to Hue off one 9 9
300
250
Az 200 CA P E R C 150- Ka E Ka N T
100
1926 1939 1950 1959 1970 1979 1987
Figure 4 « Nonemployment in the Public Sector in Azer- baidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the USSR Average, 100
TABLE 5
NONEMPLOYMENT IN PUBLIC SECTOR PER 1000 PERSONS OF WORKING AGE (Soviet Union - 100)
1926 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1987 A zerbaldzhan 252 90 86 113 174 197 208 K azakhstan 155 123 125 96 130 129 134 Kirgizia 176 100 123 120 14 0 159 177 Tadzhikistan 282 86 116 120 172 192 223 Turkmenistan 196 91 91 99 132 148 170 U zbekistan 132 91 105 114 147 180 203 R ussia 85 80 90 98 93 88 82 U kraine 81 119 112 102 97 88 85 B e lo ru ssla 60 131 105 101 76 78 72 Estonia a 186 99 7 0 65 69 76 L atv ia a 196 99 75 56 55 52 L ith u an ia a 232 167 102 66 76 69 M oldavia a 227 122 96 97 104 102 Armenia 134 85 118 116 123 159 149 Georgia 192 96 110 117 133 112 85
a- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were Independent countries In 1926. Most of Moldavia was part of Romania.
Sources: Trud v SSSR: statlstlcheskly sbornlk. 1988, pp. 40-41, 76; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1979 godu. p. 390; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1959 Rodu, p. 591; Vsesoyuznaya perepls naselenla 17 dekabrya 1926 Roda. Volumes 8, 10, 14-16, Table 9, Volume 15, Table 11, Volumes 9, 11. Table 14, Volumes 26-28, 31-33, Table 2, Volume 25, Table 3, Volume 32, Table 19; Naselenla SSSR 1987; statlstlcheskly sbornlk. 8-15, 48-95; Itogl Vsesoyuznoy pereplsl naselenla 1959 goda. Table 12 In all 16 volumes. 101 income more easily.
What Figure 4 and Table 5 indicate is that taking care of employment has not been constant nor consistent In the 1926 census the Islamic republics had nonemployment rates far aboue the USSR norm. It can be argued that not enough peace time had passed to bring the benefits and new attitudes of the Souiet system to these regions.
During the Stalin years of 1939 and 1950 nonemployment In
Rzerbaidzhan sank to belom the USSR auerage. Central Asia also had belou; auerage nonemployment in 1939, but It rose to slightly aboue auerage in 1950. This mas likely ouilng to the fact that Central Asia had little wartime damage to repair and was not a priority region at the time. Kazakhstan saw a reduction in nonemployment in the Stalin years, but tire influH of Russians did not haue as much impact as enpected.
The conuergence typical of the Stalin era ended beginning in the
Khrushcheu era. Both Rzerbaidzhan and Central Asia haue euperienced steady and dramatic increases in nonemployment among those of working age. After some improuement in nonemployment in 102 the 1950s, most likely linked to the Uirgln Lands projects, Kazakhstan has also shown an Increase In nonemployment rates aboue those of the non-Islamic regions of the country.
It must be stressed that this Is not an age-structure problem, for which Moscow can be considered partially blameless. This is nonemployment among people of employable age. Rnd Moscow has been well aware of their presence. With so much work to be done In
Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Rzerbaidzhan, Moscow had the funding to employ these people. If they were not trained for the Jobs that needed to be done, Moscow could haue gluen them the training necessary for putting them Into useful Jobs.
There Is much euldence to argue that Moscow has shown neglect
In this area. Kazakhstan, for Instance, had higher nonemployment than Central Asia in 1950. Vet It Is much better off thanks to projects
In the 1950s and stabilization In the 1970s and 1980s. Rs recently as
1959 Rzerbaidzhan had a lower nonemployment ratio than nearby
Georgia. While Georgia has had a relatiuely nonemployment ratio In the 1980s, flzerbaldzhan's has climbed dramatically. Moldavia has shown the same pattern of convergence with USSR norms since Its 103 poor employment situation in 1950, primarily thanks to Russian presence and inuestment into the area.
This nonemployment is not uoluntary. Komsomolskaya orauda found that chronic unemployment and the lack of faith in the authorities in soiuing it contributed to the uiolence in Osh Prouince this past spring. Much of this was linked to hiring of nationalities from outside the republic.^ ^
Uiiuman^^ and others argue the Central Asia needs inuestment in labor-intensiue jobs. At present, labor-intensiue Jobs already dominate Central Asia's employment Bond agrees that labor- intensiue jobs would solue some of the problem. Howeuer, he claims that urban jobs will be unlikely to solue the problem, since he claims that Muslims resist rigid work schedules and congestion.^^ My own euperience in Turkey, Egypt Morocco and Kashmir hints that Muslims handle "congestion" as well as Westerners, end that rigid work habits are more of a concern than rigid schedules.
The Central Asians and Rzerbaidzhanis might look at Turkey for some inspiration. Turkey has a lower nonemployment rate (calculated
for ages 15-64) than did these regions in 1970 and 1980.^^ Much of 1 0 4 the official nonemployment in Turkey are farmers who own their land who use either barter or unrecorded sales to support themselues.
Also, males who haue yet to fulfill their military obligations obtain parttime temporary Jobs with relatiue ease in medium and large cities. In this respect, urbanization in Turkey has helped résolue many problems.
During the Stalin era there was a reduction in the nonemployment imbalances that enisted during the NEP census of 1926. Howeuer, beginning in the 1950s the Souiet state has reduced Its efforts In employing people of Central fisia and Rzerbaidzhan to the entent that nonemployment rates there are now twice the national auerage and growing worse. This failure to employ is a major cause of pouerty and uiolence in the region. Should neglect continue, the pouerty and uiolence will likely get only more seuere.
2. Employment in Industry and Construction: The Souiet state has an obligation not only to glue equal opportunity to get a Job, but also to prouide a balance in Job quality. Listengart describes Jobs in the secondary sector as prouiding new skills, which lead to better productiuity, which lead to a better standard of liuing for a region. 105
100
Ka Ac Ac
P CA E R C 50 K CA N T
25
1 9 4 0 1 9 5 0 1960 1 9 7 0 1 9 8 0 1987
Figure 5. Employed Peraona in Induatry and Conatruction In Azerbaidzhan (Ac), Central Aaia (CA), and Ka- zakhatan (Ka) Relative to Average for Soviet Union.
TABLE 6
SHARE OF EMPLOYED PERSONS IN INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION (Soviet Union - 100)
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1987 Azerbaidzhan 72 81 71 72 69 69 K azakhstan 57 78 81 82 79 79 K irgiz la 44 56 69 75 75 74 Tadzhikistan 32 39 57 63 62 64 Turkmenistan 52 60 61 58 54 54 U zbekistan 43 50 61 64 62 65 Russia 109 116 114 111 110 109 L atv ia 209 98 107 109 103 99 M oldavia 66 30 45 60 71 74 Armenia 66 88 95 106 105 109
Source: Trud v SSSR : statlstlcheskly sbornlk , 1988, pp. 40-41, 51-54, 57 -6 0 , 7 6. 106
Industrial and construction jobs also help establish the Infrastructure for local centers.22
industrial and manufacturing jobs not only prouide more skills and Infrastructure deuelopment, but also increase income. Industrial and construction jobs haue had the highest wage leuels for most of the Souiet era. Employment of this kind Increases the leuel of a region's income per employee.
uiuen lower leuels of urbanization in the Islamic republics, employment In Industi^ and construction is enpected to be lower.
Sagers has noted the need for better distribution of Industrial jobs, which infers a shortage in these republics.
Figure 5 and Table 6 confirm that employment In the secondary sector has indeed lagged In the Islamic republics. Euen during the
Stalin era, when conuergence was common in employment leuels, the
Islamic republics all logged noticeably behind the USSR auerage in secondary employment leuels. UJhat Is consistent with earlier results in the Stalin era is that between 1940 and 1950 all sin republics did improue their standing relatiue to USSR norms. 107
There haue been diuergent paths for the sin republics since 1950.
Kazakhstan has had little change in its relaUue secondary employment since the Stalin era. Rs the Russian share of population declined in the 1970s and 1900s, Kazakhstan's share in industrial and construction employment has lagged a bit further behind.
Rzerbaidzhan suffered a decline in the 1950s and has generally had slow decline since 1970. Central Rsia's employment In industry and construction has followed the pattern of the Souiet economy. The
1950s and 1960s saw an increase in relatiue employment leuel, a drop in the 1970s, and a slight recouery in the 1900s. The enception in
Central Rsia has been Turkmenistan, which has had continual decline since 1960 and has had the lowest Industrial and construction employment leuels in the Souiet Union since 1970.
Lagging employment in industry and construction becomes all the more seuere when taking into acount the nonemployed population of woiiking age. Opportunties for those who haue Jobs are more restricted here. For all those of working age the problem is critical.
The major cause and solution to this problem is the tentile industry. Hayit notes that in the 1960s Central Rsia and Kazakhstan 108 produced 70% of the cotton of the Souiet Union, yet had only 3.7% of its tentile mills. Cotton grown there with cheap labor was prouiding more confortable, higher-paying jobs in the Russian Federation.^*^ The creation of teutile factories in Central Rsia would assist both in Job quantity and quality, as well as reduced transportation problems.
Souiet sources claim that industrial and construction employment
Is high in these siH republics compared to "Third U/orld" countries.
Turkey had employment in manufacturing and construction of 32% the
Souiet norm in 1975, considerably lower than that of Turkmenistan.
Vet by 1987 Turkey's secondary employment was 47% the Souiet leuel. Turkey could pass Turkmenistan before 1995.
Rbdykadyrou is somewhat pessimistic about industrial deuelopment in some Central Hsian settings. He states that industry often destroys a regions positiue attributes (e.g., Kirgizia's clean air and fertile ualleys). He also states that people of this region of
Kirgizia haue skills too poorly deueloped to use for industry.^^ This assessment seems to beg the question. The Souiet state is responsible for the training. Enuironmentel damage from production of cotton and other irrigated crops is certainly harmful to the enuironment. 1 0 9
The shortage of industrial and construction jobs has led to an unusual political and economic decision in Centrai Rsia. In June of
1990 Moscow TO announced that a type of Central Asian common market had been created. The purpose of this common market was to control strategic materials (primarily industrial crops) and to establish processing Jobs.^^ The Asian republics appear to be attempting to solue the shortage of Industrial and construction jobs that not only was neuer resolued, but actually had grown worse under
Moscow's supeniision.
The Staiin era was characterized by some conuergence. Since then the sin republics haue followed different paths. Rzerbaidzhan has fallen behind since 1958, Turkmenistan since 1960, Kazakhstan since 1970, wiui the rest showing some recouery in the 1980s. The unifying link for ail the republics and time periods is that at no time has any republic reached the USSR norm for employment in these sectors. Added to lower employment leuels, this indicates clear neglect on Moscow's part
3. Employment in Machine Building and Metal Processing: This uarlable proued to be the most elusiue for the 1980s. Rs noted by 110
250
Az
200
P 150 E R C E N T 100 Ka
Az CA CA 50-
1926 1939 1950 1950 1970 1979
Figure 6. Share of Employees in Machine Building and Metal Processing in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to Average for USSR. Ill
TABLE 7
SHARE OF EMPLOYEES IN MACHINE BUILDING AND METAL PROCESSING (Soviet Union * 100)
1926 1939 1950 1959 1970 1979 Azerbaidzhan 233 77 81 71 66 69 Kazakhstan 26 62 149 70 81 83 K irg iz ia 26 39 70 65 74 84 Tadzhikistan 28 23 41 41 46 49 Turkmenistan 62 48 49 48 52 47 U zbekistan 62 36 24 54 53 51 Russia 104 111 123 119 115 111 Ukraine 112 106 61 86 93 102 B e lo ru ssia 49 46 62 59 81 96 L ith u an ia a b 32 59 82'* 84 Moldavia a b 34 33 50 67 Georgia 94 47 58 55 47 47
a - L ith u an ia was an independent country in 1926 . Most of Moldavia was part of Romania, b- Lithuania and Moldavia were Incorporated into the USSR too l a t e fo r some d a ta to be in c lu d e d .
Sources: Marodnoe khozyaystvo ----- SSR v ------godu; Azerbaid- zhania, 1984, pp. 43,52, 1962, pp. 26, 38; Kirgizia, 1982, pp. 61, 73, 1967, pp. 21, 29; Tadzhikistan, 1979, pp. 74-77, 89, 1962, pp. 38,43; Turkmenistan, 1979, pp. 38,42, 1964, pp. 30-31, 34; Uzbekistan, 1984, pp. 48, 58, 1967, p. 54; Russia, 1979, pp. 73, 74, 1959, pp. 147, 153; Ukraine, 1980, pp. 85, 90, 1959, pp. 58, 62-63; Belorussia, 1979, pp. 44, 54, 1962, pp. 49, 51; Lithuania, 1988, pp. 41, 43, 1960, p. 92; Moldavia, 19.86, pp. 65, 69-70, 1969, pp. 27, 45; Georgia, 1980, pp. 58, 61, 1963, pp. 29, 46; Marodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1979 Rodu. pp. 140, 149; Marodnoe RRozyaystVo SSSR v 1959 godu. pp. 147, 153; Itogi Vsesovuznoy perepisl naselenia 1959 goda. Tables 47 and 4 9 of all 16 volumes. 112
Ropawy data on employment In machine bulldiny and metal processing became Inaccessible after the mid-1970s. The reasons for this mas that machine building and metal processing are a major part of the military industrial complen. Data could be used to estimate true military enpenditures and employment Thus, It mas necessary to estimate employment by changes in marker productiuity and output using republic statistical sources. In the 1980s information In this area became euen more scarce.
The importance of employment in this area and opportunties to moonlight and transfer, make Jobs in this area a solid indicator of the opportunties giuen the employees of a specific region.
In the NEP year of 1926 there mere major differences in thé leuel of employment in machine building and metal processing. Kazakhstan and Central Asia lagged considerably, mhile Rzerbaidzhan mas mell deueloped in this sector (oming to petroleum drilling and processing equipment
The Stalin years of 1939 and 1950 shamed an atypical pattern for other uariables at this time. Employment in this area skyrocketed in
Kazakhstan to 149% the All-Union leuel. While there had been an 11 3 influK of Russians and urban deuelopment, it mas most unusual for any
Asiatic region to profit so dramaticaliy. Central Rsia's leuel of employment actually declined further below the norm. Only
Rzerbaidzhans conuergence (relatiue decline) followed a pattern typical of the Stalin era.
In the 1950s employment in this sector declined in Kazakhstan, rose modestly in Central Rsia, and began a steady 20 year decline in
Rzerbaidzhan. Kazakhstan's slight recouery in the 1960s was linked in part to the reluctant decision to locate a Tupoleu aircraft factory in
Alma-Ata (as part of a political deal). Rs of 1979 employment in machine building and metal processing lagged noticeably behind the
Souiet norm. Rnd this underemployment is actually worse, owing to higher nonemployment. The people of working age in Islamic Souiet
Union haue clearly been left behind in opportunities in this ultal industrial sector.
Listengart^^ also concluded that high-tech industry is desperately needed in Central Asia, Rzerbaidzhan, and the southern parts of
Kazakhstan (where the Kazakhs predominate). Only with the skills of higher-tech industries can the people of this area really be 1 1 4 assimilated into the Souiet economic system.
Gillula quoted a Kazakh Republic official, stating "... machine building ... is key to the deuelopment of backward areas", which includes much of his own republic. With the state budget hauing total control of outlays in this sector, Moscow has been in position to completely remedy the enisting imbaiances.^^ Giuen the progress made in Lithuania and Moidauia since 195B, the neglect of Central Asia is ineHcusable.
There would be many benefits to Moscow in training Central
Asians, Kazakhs and Rzerbaidzhanis in this sector. They would acquire skills they could take with them to other regions of the country.
Pouerty in these republics would be partially alleulated. On the other hand, Moscow had been reluctant to employ Asians in aircraft manufacturing, tank production, machine tooling, and other Jobs uital to the military. As long as Moscow has this fear and the Asiatic peoples are denied opportunities to high-tech jobs, economic
Inequality will continue.
4. Coilectiue _ Farm Employment: This a job of few opportunities and benefits. Income tends to be low and not reliable, the working 11 5
350 -1
p 200
/
1928 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1981
Figure 7. Share of Employed Persons Who Are Collective Farmers in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 11 6
TABLE 8
SHARE OF EMPLOYED PERSONS WHO ARE COLLECTIVE FARMERS (S o v ie t Union - 100)
1928 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1987 Azerbaidzhan 54 112 113 142 113 129 138 K azakhstan 239 109 96 67 . 37 41 43 K irg iz la 259 136 130 126 138 134 138 Tadzhikistan 46 154 160 180 199 193 193 Turkmenistan 48 125 126 153 217 275 303 U zbekistan 151 143 150 149 179 184 182 R ussia 86 95 84 75 67 65 64 U kraine 139 103 121 140 161 165 162 B e lo ru s s ia 57 110 144 156 161 154 148 E sto n ia a 0 35 65 58 62 7 6 L atv ia a 0 99 90 83 86 100 L ith u a n ia a 0 113 136 133 132 131 M oldavia b 86 170 220 257 195 181 Armenia 45 127 115 109 71 62 52 G eorgia 59 121 119 130 131 127 124
a- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were independent countries in 1928. b- Most of Moldavia was part of Romania in 1928. The section in the USSR (not a separate republic) had a value of 1.71 in 1928.
Source: Trud v SSSR: s t a t l s t l c h e s k l y s b o r n lk , 1988, pp. 40-41, 7 6. 1 1 7 conditions are harsh, the goods and services in the region of coliectiue farms are poor, and it is difficult to leaue the Job. fliso a Souiet citizen is literally born into this job. In a way, it is the bottom of the
Souiet-style caste system.
Coliectiue and state farms did exist before Stalin began his changes in the Souiet economy. Howeuer, they employed a small share of the ouerall work force, including that of the state-controled sector. The higher uaiues of Kazakhstan and Central Asia represent existing farms seized from local landlords or that were already independent in Rzerbaidzhan, priuate family farms were more common, and collectiuization was not as popular.
The first dramatic change in leuel of coilectiue farm employment occured in the early stages in the 1950s. Rzerbaidzhan s coilectiue farm employment conuerged and slightly exceeded the Souiet norm.
Kazakhstan conuerged from the other direction - It was reduced from
259% the national norm in 1928 to 109% by 1940. The Central Rsia's share of coliectiue farm employment rose nominally during this period, an anamoly in the tendency of conuergence in Stalinist years. 11 8
The period between 1940 and 1940 showed only moderate change.
Kazakhstan, a priority region for deuelopment, saw further decline
(conuergence) in its coliectiue farm employment Rzerbaidzhan was unchanged. Central Rsia diuerged higher from the norm. This cannot be explained by the decollectiuization of the western Souiet Union owing to war, for Oeiorussia and Moidauia increased their share of coilectiue farm employment It is mainly owing to the attention giuen to Russia and Kazakhstan, leauing Central Rsia behind.
Oetween 1950 and 1970 the patterns of coilectiue farm employment in the Islamic republics are diuerse. Kazakhstan, thanks to continued emphasis in its deuelopment had more rapid decline than was typical for the country as a whole. Rzerbaidzhan showed an increase under Khrushcheu, then a decline in colletiue farm employment in the prosperous 1960s. Coilectiue farms in Central Rsia, with their growing numbers of workers, were not conuerted to siate farms as rapidly as was common In the USSR.
Since 1970 the patterns haue been consistent Central Rsia and
Rzerbaidzhan haue continued to decollectiuize at a slower pace than the rest of the country, hauing further diuergence from the USSR 11 9 norm. Kazakhstan is conuerging with the national norm. Howeuer, this means slower "decollectiuization." Rs the share of Russians in
the republic has declined, attention in upgrading coliectiue farms has declined.
The relatiue rise in coliectiue farm employment in the Islamic republics has seueral enplanations. The enodus of urban population to other republics is one reason. Higher fertility rates in rural areas is another. These causes are often used to enplain the continued predominance of coilectiue farming in the Hsian republics.
But there is more to it than migration and fertility. Hayit notes that cotton production ("white gold") on these coliectiue farms is uery important to Moscow. Coilectiue farm labor is cheap, and cotton
production is labor-intensiue.^^ This allows Russia to use cheap raw
cotton for the their own tentile mills. It also delays the costs of
prouiding higher-tech and higher-paying jobs in Central Rsia.
R second interest is in handling unemployment UJimbush notes
that rural unemployment is more easily absorbed than is urban.^^ He
uiews Moscow's failure to create Jobs as a deliberate way to cut costs
and auoid problems in cities between Russians and local nationalities. 120
Coliectiue farm employment is not as high in islamic Souiet Union as in the Islamic luorld ouerall. For Instance, farm employment in
Turkey mas 506% the USSR coliectiue farm leuel In 1975. By 1987 it mas 543% the leuel.^^
While farming in Turkey Is certainly as undermechanized as in
Central Rsia, Kazakhstan and Rzerbaidzhan, it has certain aduantages.
Most Turkish farmers omn their omn land, and they decide mhat they grom and mhere it goes. Thus, there is less chemical poisoning of the soii, and crop rotation keeps it fertile. Food is sent out mhen there are surpluses. Rnd the climate is much more bearable, especially since the onslaught of desertification in Souiet Central Asia.
The enamples of "decoliecUuization" of otiier republics also indicates Moscom's interest in keeping coilectiue farming employment at higher leuels in Islamic areas. Armenia had a slightly higher share of coilectiue farm employment than Rzerbaidzhan in 1950. Vet mith similar climates, resources, and fertility rates, Armenia in 1987 had
Just 40% the coliectiue farm employment rate as Rzerbaidzhan.
it mould appear that Moscom has decided that the subsidized state farms should be stronger primarily in Russia and Armenia. 121
Centrai Asia, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia, and
Moidauia receiue lower priority. The rising relatiue share of coliectiue farming in the Baltics and Rzerbaidzhan may reflect the somewhat fauorable conditions there (income is higher in coilectiue farming in these republics than outside of it).
While the Stalin and Khrushcheu eras did reduce the coliectiue farm burden in Kazakhstan (thanks mainly to non-Kazakh migrants mouing in), during all the Souiet eras Central Asia and Azerbaidzhan ahaue remained strongly collectiuized. The reasons seem twofold: to guarantee the supply of the militarily useful crop cotton and the conuenience of auoiding dealing with unemployment.
5. Wages for the Proletariate and Workers in Seruices: The state establishes the base monthly wages for different jobs, for different
skill leuels, and for different regions. A large number of workers may
earn bonuses, but these will uary by the help, success and luck.
Bonuses may or may not be recelued; base wages are guaranteed.
In the NEP years most people were not employed by the state.
Howeuer, by 1940 the state was the ouerwheiming dominant
employer. Thus, earlier wages cannot be compared to those of 1940 1 2 2
110 Az
P 100 Ka
CA
kz 90
\ f
80 1 1 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1987
Figure 8, Average Base Monthly Pay for the Proletariate and Employees In the Service Sector in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union.
TABLE 9
AVERAGE BASE MONTHLY PAY FOR THE PROLETARIATE
(Soviet Union - 100)
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 198 7 Azerbaidzhan 107 103 96 90 88 81 K azakhstan 90 97 101 101 99 98 K irg iz ia 91 90 93 92 88 84 Tadzhikistan 110 98 97 96 86 82 Turkmenistan 106 103 105 107 104 98 U zb ek istan 90 93 87 94 92 82 R ussia 102 102 103 103 105 107 E sto n ia 97 99 102 111 112 113 G eorgia 101 99 93 87 86 87
Source: Trud v SSSR: statisticheskiv s b o rn ik . 1988, pp. 154-155. 1 2 3 when measuring state inuoluement in income.
Wages in 1940 hod small degrees of differentiation. At that time those in Tadzhikistan had the highest leuel of income for the proletariate and service sectors. Pay in Turkmenistan and
Rzerbaidzhan were also aboue norm. Howeuer, the larger populations of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan lagged behind the USSR norm for income ieuels by 107o.
Between 1940 and 1950 there was conuergence in pay throughout
the Souiet Union. Rzerbaidzhan lost some of its aduantage (due to a
reiatiue decrease in higher paying Jobs), whiie Kazakhstan workers
earned about 97% the notional norm. The diuerging decline of Centrai
Rsia is deceptiue: Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan conuerged toward
the norm with lower relatiue wage leuels, and Uzbekistan conuerged
by improuing its relatiue wage leue. Kirgizia remained a t its former
reiatiue ieuei. The year 1950 had the most baianced auerage base
monthly wages for all 15 republics in the Souiet Union of any of the
sample years.
Since 1950 there haue been three separate patterns in Islamic
Souiet Union. Rzerbaidzhani workers haue steadily fallen further 1 2 4 behind the USSR auerage for workers. By 1987 their wages were nearly 20% below the norm and below wages of euen Central Asian workers. Central Asian workers haue also endured relatiue decline from 1950 to 1987. Howeuer, a reiatiue rise in wages between 1960 and 1970 has enabled them to remain aboue the standards of
Azerbaidzhan.
Proletariate and serulce workers in Kazakhstan had continued progress between 1950 and 1960 until they were marginally aboue the
USSR norm. Since 1970 there has been a slow erosion of auerage reiatiue wages as Russians haue left and the job structure has changed.
The difference in lagging wage leuels for workers in Central Asia
and Azerbaidzhan is alarming. They are primarily the result of the
failure of Moscow to bring higher-tech jobs into these southern
republics. The increasingly rapid relatiue decline of the 1980s indicate
not only the loss of income, but also of the brain power necessary to
rebuild for the future. Uihen adding in the ieueis of nonempioyment,
along with the high dependency ratio of Rzerbaidzhan and Central
Asia, the job-income situation takes on catastrophic dimensions. 125
The Stalin years were marked by conuergence of the Islamic republics. Since then Kazakhstan, primarily thanks to priority projects and the Russian presence, has not yet euperienced a major decline. Howeuer, based on the tragic euamples of Central Rsia and
Rzerbaidzhan, one would suspect that the Kazakhs are not sharing in the ouerall good fortune of their republic.
Central Rsia and Kazakhstan's continuous decline since 1970 mirrors the ouerall economy of the USSR: as the economy declined in the 1970s and has begun crumbling in the late 1900s, these regions haue suffered the most Rnd as inuestments haue declined, Russians haue left, and the ouerall wage leuels only fall more rapidly.
The Inequality of wages for the proletariate and serulce workers leads to the following question: Rre Uiey caused by different kinds of job distribution in the republics, or are wages different for the same jobs in different regions? Gy isolating on one job aree, it is possible to discern If republic-based wage leuels haue impact.
6. lUages for Construction Workers: With different employment structures, it is not surprising that there are differences in wage leuels between the republics. Howeuer, workers doing the same job 1 2 6
120 1 Az
P 110 - E R C E N Az T 100 -
Ka CA
90 - CA / K a
80 1980 1987 1940 1950 1960 1970 Figure 9. Average Base Monthly Pay for Con struction Workers in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Ka zakhstan (Ka) Relative to Average for the Soviet Union.
TABLE 10
AVERAGE BASE MONTHLY PAY FOR CONSTRUCTION WORKERS (Soviet Union ■ 100)
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1987 Azerbaidzhan 121 115 102 102 101 99 K azakhstan 86 100 107 103 102 97 82 K ir g iz ia 84 91 92 99 89 Tadzhikistan 110 108 103 104 89 83 Turkmenistan 96 122 119 118 114 103 U zb ek istan 87 101 96 103 102 87 105 R ussia 101 100 102 103 104
Source : SSR: s t a t i s t ic h e s k iy sb o rn ik , 1 988, pp. 149, 164-167 , 170-171 , 178-181, 384-185 • 1 2 7 should haue much more convergent mage levels.
In 1940 the differences In average mages for construction morkers mere significant Construction morkers in Bzerbaidzhan received 21% more than the national norm, and 44% more than those in Kirgizia. The most likely enplanation Is that a greater share of morkers in Bzerbaidzhan mere operating machinery. This meant not only higher mages, but also more desirable marking conditions.
Given that mages in Central Asia for construction morkers mere iomer than for non-collective farmers overall, mage levels had an
Impact on overall income. Rt the same time, Rzerbaidzhan mould appear to have benefltted from differentiated mage levels. The differences in Income, then, are partly euplalned by mage differences for similar jobs.
Betmeen 1940 and 1950 there mas the enpected republic-level convergence of mages for construction morkers. Construction morkers In Kazakhstan mere earning the USSR average. Workers in
Central Asia mere actually earning above the average. Construction morkers in Rzerbaidzhan mere still earning superior mages, but to a lesser degree. 1 2 8
Since 1950 wages for construction workers followed similar trends as did wages for all proletariate and service workers.
Kazakhstan enperienced an increase between 1950 and 1960, followed by slow decline. Rzerbaidzhan has enperienced relative decline from 1950 through 1987. Central Asia euperienced decline from 1950 to 1960, a recovery in the 1960s, then rapid decline since
1970, accelerating in the 1980s.
In 1940 wage levels likely enplained some of the difference in overall income for those working outside collective farms. However, since 1950 wages for construction workers have for the most part been closer to USSR norms than have average wages for proletariate and service workers. This would indicate that differences in the kinds of jobs available play a major role. This Is especially true in
Rzerbaidzhan and Kazakhstan, with construction workers earning very close to the national norm (99% and 97% respectively), in
Central Rsia, wage differentials may be slightly more important.
Thus, the large differences in wages for similar jobs were reduced during the Stalin years. By 1970 the differences between the Islamic regions and the rest of the country were minor. They have remained 1 2 9 such in Rzerbaidzhan and Kazakhstan, where job distribution plays a more important role in income inequality. In Central Asia, howeuer, the state has not only allowed the number of more skilled Jobs to lag further behind, but pay (and most likely working conditions and productiuity) haue fallen euen further behind. While creating Jobs and training people for them is an inuolued process, changning pay leuels is not. Moscow's pay practices haue much to do with the income problems of Central Asia.
7. Pag for Collectiue Farmers: Unfortunately, republlc-leuel data for this uariable was not obtainable. The effects of Stalinist policies on pay for collectiue farmers would haue provided clues to how far conuergence was carried at that time.
As of 1960 the daily pay rate was aboue the USSR average in every republic eucept Tadzhikistan. Kazakh collective farmers earned 44% aboue the national norm. Collectiue farmers in Turkmenistan were being paid 32% aboue the norm. The shift during the Khrushchev era to a more consumer-oriented economy may haue provided the incentive and market for goods from these regions. 1 3 0
1 6 0 1
Ka 140-
P 120- E R Az C CA E N T 100-■
c a \ 80-
1960 1970 1980 1987
Figure 10. Average Pay per Collective Farmer for One Person-Day in Azerbaid- zhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to Average for Soviet Union, 131
TABLE 11
AVERAGE PAY PER COLLECTIVE FARMER FOR ONE PERSON-WORK DAY (Soviet Union ■ 100)
1960 1970 1980 1987 Azerbaldzhan 118 99 138 106 K azakhstan 144 124 112 106 K ir g iz ia 124 102 91 92 Tadzhikistan 93 107 110 80 Turkmenistan 132 155 118 94 U zbekistan 111 109 107 78 R ussia 104 101 101 107 U kraine 87 92 89 92 B e lo ru s s ia 70 86 92 111 E sto n ia 154 164 186 187
Source; Trud v SSSR: statisticheskiy sbornik, 1988, pp . 206—2 08 «
TABLE 12
POWER SUPPLY PER AGRICULTURAL WORKER (Soviet Union =■ 100)
1960 1970 1980 1986 Azerbaldzhan 65 58 42 34 K azakhstan 304 218 166 139 K irg iz ia 93 78 60 54 Tadzhikistan 61 58 47 43 Turkmenistan 89 80 54 4 6 U zbekistan 65 65 47 46 R ussia 116 119 128 130 E sto n ia 125 185 221 206
SSSR; statisticheskiy sb o rn ik . 1988, p. 248, 1 3 2
Since 1960 the three regions haue folioiued different paths of decline. Kazakhstan's relatiue daily pay declined continuously for 27 years. Rs of 1987 collectiue farmers were earning just 6% aboue the national auerage. Was this the result of outflow of the more skilled laborers? New wage policies? Equipment? Land inuestments?
Rzerbaidzhan endured a slump between 1960 and 1970, improuement in the 1970s, and rapid decline in relatiue wages in the
1980s. Rgain the questions are: What policies during these decades might haue caused this?
Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan were fortunate enough to haue major boosts in their relatiue daily pay rates between 1960 and 1970.
Howeuer, the general pattern for Central Rsia has been a decline in relatiue daily pay. This decline was entremely rapid between 1980 and 1987. While Central Rsia maintained an aboue-auerage pay rate euen into the late Brezhneu year of 1980, it has fallen significantly below the OSSR auerage in the Gorbacheu era.
The decline in relatiue pay for collectiue farming is particulalry important in Central Rsia. In the 1980s it was the most rapidly growing occupation. Rn increasingly larger share of collectiue farmers 1 3 3
Hue in this region. UHth higher nonempioyment rates and dependency ratios, it is crucial to local tueli-being that wage opporutunities be good, or else alternatiue jobs be prouided (which is clearly not the case).
In addition to gouernment pricing, inuestments and other inputs, another euplanation for the seuere decline In relatiue income surfaces. Kotlyakou has linked the enulronmental deterioration of
Central Rsia to the declining income leuels. There is less usable land per farmer, and the quality of land in use has declined. In addition, water quantity and quality haue eroded.^'^
A May 1990 article in the lOashinoton Post also comments on the enulronmental decline and Its effects on standards of liuing. It also goes further to mention that poor soil, poor water and poor air haue led to declines in learning and health.-- These factors, no doubt, haue had negatiue Impact on productiuity and training in using machinery.
A look at other uariabies may offer Insight into Moscow's direct resposnsibility in the relatiue wage decline of the collectiue farmers in Azerbaldzhan, Kazakhstan, and, most significantly. Central Asia. 1 3 4
JCa
200 -
P 150- E R C E N T 100 -
CA
Az
Az
1960 1970 1980 1986
Figure 11. Power Supply per Agricultural Worker in Azerbaldzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to Average for USSR. 1 3 5
8. Power per flqricultural UJorken Unfortunately, republic-leuel
data was found only for 1960 onward. Also, machine power ratings
are gluen for all of agriculture, which Includes both state farms and
collectiue farms. The presence of state farms, of course, affects the
horse power auailable per agricultural worker.
In 1960 Kazakhstan had a per-worker power rating that was
about three times the USSR auerage. This was, doubtless, linked to the masslue use of combines, tractors and other equipment for eutensiue
agriculture In the Uirgin lands area. Howeuer, since 1960 the relatiue power rating in the republic declined so rapidly that by 1986 It was only 39% aboue the national auerage. This relatiue decline in power rating was partially linked to the slower decollectlulzatlon rate In
Kazakhstan than for the country as a whole. More important, Moscow reduced inuestment in the area, once the Uirgin Lands project failed to
meet enpectations. And while power rating is still superior in this
region, the machinery by the 1980s would be older and less
productiue. The smaller share of collectiue farms would haue suffered
euen worse In the recent neglect of agriculture in the region. The
neglect of agriculture, and of collectiue farms, would haue had a 1 5 6 telling effect on income ieuels (fewer machine operators - a higher paying position - and less ouerali inuestment).
Both Central Rsia and Rzerbaidzhan were significantly beneath the USSR auerage in I960. The higher ieuel of collectiue employment was the major reason. Rs decoiiectiuization has slowed in these areas, the relatiue per-worker power ratings haue declined. By 1986
Central Rsia had a relatiue power rating Just under half the national auerage. Rzerbaidzhan was about a third of the auerage.
The effects on these two regions differ. Rzerbaidzhan has a fairly stable enuironment for producing highly ualued fruits and uegetables.
The decline in equipment hurts productiuity less than transport
Fortunately, there enists as sizeable local urban market for the produce. Ulhile lagging inuestment has harmed Rzerbaidzhan, the results haue not been as seuere.
The lack of equipment inuestment has been disasterous in Central
Rsia. Less machinery means less production and less pay. less machinery equates to lower skill leuels. Less machinery equates to harsher work conditions in an already harsh enuironment. Rnd the lower inuestment leuels of the 1970s and 1980s also translates into 1 3 7 older, less reliable, and more dangerous equipment The diuergence from national auerages is particularly cruel to Central Rsia.
9. Irrigated and Imnroued Land per 1000 Rural Residents: Well watered fields haue long been a measure of potential prosperity in arid regions. In the Islamic regions of the Soviet Union Irrigation has been used for a long time. This Is particularly true for Uzbekistan. The fact that this region has used it for centuries attests to the skill used
In Irrigation. The soils were still fertile when the Soviet era began.
However, this situation has changed recently. Moscow, In its quest for the white gold and other Industrial crops of Islamic USSR, has stepped up irrigation. Irrigation has been used eutremely heavily in the siu Islamic republics, with only Rrmenia having comparable levels of rural per-capita usage.
In 1970 every republic had at least twice as much irrigated land per 1000 rural residents as the national average. Since then each republic has had relative decline In irrigated land per 1000 rural residents. Tadzhikistan had a relative value of 275% the national average in 1970 and fell to 99% the USSR average by 1987. The most rapid decline for ail the republics occured between 1970 and 1979. 1 3 8
500-1
400-
P 300- E R C E Ka Az N T 200 - CA
Ka
100
1970 1979 1987
Figure 12. Irrigated Land per 1000 Rural Residents in Azerbaldzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA) and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 1 3 9
250
As
200 CA
P E R C E K a N Az T C % ^
Ka
50-
1970 1979 1987 Figure 13. Irrigated and Improved Land per 1000 Rural Residents in Azerbaldzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. TABLE 13 TABLE 14
IRRIGATED LAND PER IRRIGATED AND IMPROVED LAND 1000 RURAL RESIDENTS PER 1000 RURAL RESIDENTS (Soviet Union = 100) (Soviet Union = 100)
1970 1979 1987 1970 1979 1987 Azerbaidz ban 421 247 200 Azerbaidzhan 217 125 103 Kazakhstan 218 165 159 Kazakhstan 112 83 82 Kirgiz la 467 259 193 Kirgizia 241 123 99 Tadzhikistan 275 14 6 99 Tadzhikistan 142 74 51 Turkmenistan 485 382 325 Turkmenistan 250 193 167 Uzbekistan 343 222 174 Uzbekistan 177 112 89 Russia 39 68 70 Russia 52 74 80 Ukraine 42 59 68 Ukraine 59 68 78 Belorussia 0 21 19 Belorussia 172 195 215 Estonia 0 15 12 Estonia 895 658 621 Latvia 0 12 10 Latvia 635 551 632 Lithuania 0 11 16 Lithuania 517 585 583 Moldavia 46 51 58 Moldavia 31 31 36 Armen ia 243 154 132 Armenia 144 79 69 Georg ia 138 97 92 Georgia 99 68 63
Sources: Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v Sources: See Table 13. 1988 godu, pp. 473,477; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1979 Bodu, pp. 266,269; Naselenle SSSR 1987, pp. 8-15. 141
There ore seueral reasons for the decline. One factor has been the baby boom In Islamic regions. The largest difference in fertility rates
(see Figure 35 and Tables 44-45) occured betmeen 1970 and 1979. The rural population has grown much more rapidly here than in other areas.
R second factor has been state Inuestment Just as inuestment has dropped in agricultural machinery, it has also fallen in land improuments. The shortage of auailable local mater resources is one
reason. The decision to cancel the mater diuersion project of Siberian
riuers is another. Recognition of the growing enulronmental disaster in Central Rsia may also play a role In reducing Inuestments in irrigation projects.
Uiith employment in collectiue farms growing in the region,
quality land is crucial. For instance, Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan and
Uzbekistan all endured absolute decline in the number of hectares of
irrigated land per 1000 rural residents betmeen 1900 and 1907. This
IU3S another factor in reduced relatiue Income leuels for the period.
This mould reduce pay in both the public sector and on priuate rented
plots. 1 4 2
The shortage of quality land becomes euen more seuere when calculated based upon irrigated and improued ("ameliorated") land.
Most of the stuamps and marshlands that haue been drained are located in the western regions of the USSR. When including both kinds of high-quality land per 1000 rural residents, the relatiue decline since
1970 results in Kazakhstan and Central Rsia being below the national norm by 1987.
This kind of inuestment In high-quality land is not only becoming increasingly fauorable to the Baltic republics, Belorussia, and parts of
Russia and the Ukraine, but also has a cruel tw ist of logic. Higher leuels of inuestment in improued land haue come precisely in those regions where "decoiiectiuization" has been most rapid. In other words, the smaller the share of people depending on high-quality land for their income (from the public and priuate sector), the greater the
Inuestm ent Thus, much of the "wealth" of Baltic collectiue farmers can be enplained by fauorable Inuestment patterns. Meanwhile, as jobs in the city or on state farms haue been denied to them, Central
Asians and Kazakhs haue had less and less opportunity to use their physical labor on good land. 1 4 3
More seuere than the logging ouallabilltg of high-qualitg land has been the auallabilitg of arable land. Khfnchuk points out that between
1976 and 1984 the number of hectares per farmer declined compared to the USSR norm In all sin Islamic republics. For Instance, In
Uzbekistan it declined from 24% of the national auerage In 1976 to
22% In 1984. The highest relatiue share of hectares per worker In
1984 was In Kirgizia, with a ualue of 38%.^^
And the amount of high-qualltg and arable land In general Is likely to continue to decline In both relatiue and absolute terms. Roflkou^^ points out that while local needs are becoming Increasingly unfulfilled,
Moscow has reduced future planned eupanslon.
The problem Is made more serious due to mismanagement
Decisions on how to use the land and when to use It are made In
Moscow. As Olenes noted. It was only during the Khnishcheu era that regional economic agencies (the "sounarkhoz") had authority to make decisions as If they were separate branches.^^ Thus, the type of crop chosen (often cotton or rice with no crop rotation), the timing of planting, spraying, haruesting and sales are determined In Moscow by people who haue authority by politically-based appointments. 1 4 4
Meanwhile, the genuine iocal enperts watch as a centuries-oid system deteriorates into ruin.
Thus, since 1970 the iand situation has deciined in all sin Islamic republics, inuestments in quality land haue increased in other regions where this resource is less uitai. And as Central Asia has less quality land per 1000 rural residents (whose welfare is more directly tied to land quality, owing to shortages of machinery and other Jobs), the prospects of inuestments in this area grow less and less promising.
10. Labor Productiuity: As Table 15 illustrates, agricultural labor productiuity has not only declined in the siH Islamic republics relatiue to the USSR auerage, but in three republics - Azerbaidzhan,
Tadzhikistan, and Uzbekistan - in an absolute sense. In Central Asia and Kazakhstan output in 1985 was lower per worker than in 1980.
There was some recouery in the first two years of the Gorbacheu era.
Azerbaidzhan, which improued productiuity between 1980 and 1985,
had the misfortunate of being one of two to euperience decline (the other republic being Armenia).
The deciine in agricuitural iabor productiuity can be traced back to seueral causes. One is the decreasing mechanization of agricultural TABLE 15 TABLE 16
GROWTH IN AGRICULTURAL SHARE OF EMPLOYED PERSONS
(1980 = 100) (Soviet Union = 100)
1985 1987 1960 1970 1980 1987 USSR 115 129 USSR 100 100 100 100 Azerbaldzhan 105 91 Azerbaidzhan 50 55 76 64 K azakhstan 91 101 K azakhstan 75 81 99 94 K irg iz ia 92 102 K ir g iz ia 70 84 103 80 Tadzhikistan 90 88 Tadzhikistan 63 58 73 58 Turkmenistan 93 102 Turkm enistan 62 49 57 76 Uzbekistan 91 93 U zb ek istan 75 70 60 44 R ussia 120 134 R ussia 110 106 103 108 Ukra in e 121 141 U kraine 101 111 107 107 B e lo ru s s ia 143 183 B e lo ru s s ia 78 84 102 101 E sto n ia 105 115 E sto n ia 128 101 138 133 L a tv ia 126 138 L a tv ia 85 97 96 128 L ith u a n ia 140 160 Lithuania 59 86 82 89 M oldavia 116 132 M oldavia 47 105 129 101 Armenia 116 112 Armenia 83 70 108 93 G eorgia 114 121 G eorgia 50 35 41 43
Source; Trud V SSSR: s t a t i - S ource: Trud V SSSR; s t a t i s t i c h e s k i y sb o rn ik . stlchesklv shornlk, 1988, p. 104. 1988, pp. 244-245. 1 4 6 labor in the Islamic republics. R second reason is the decreasing incentiue to work, owing to relatiue decline in wages and goods to buy. R third reason is the shortage of high-quality land and arable land in general. Rs Khinchuk^^ and Rafikou^ point out, the land
situation is likely to get worse.
R fourth reason is the poor health of the workers. Rn article in
May 1990 described how water mismanagement has destroyed the
basis for animal husbandry in the area. People haue lost not only food
quality (protein), but are no longer are self sufficient in producing the
calories needed. So collectiue farmers continue to work in
increasingly aduerse conditions with increasingly poor health.^^
R fifth reason is illustrated in Table 16. Employed persons in
Rzerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan and Central Rsia are not improuing their
skill leuels. Laziness or no motiuation is unlikely - a higher skill Ieuel
translates into higher pay and, often, a physically less demanding job.
Giuen better opportunities by Moscow, the local population would
likely striue to imrpuoe their Job-related skills.
Moscow is directly responsible for the shortfalls in labor
productiuity in the Islamic republics, encept perhaps in the amount of 1 4 7 land auailable per 1000 persons or workers. On the other hand, If they had beeter opportunities to migrate to the cities to get Jobs, the rural residents of these republics would moue there, thus reducing the pop;ilatlon burden in the rural areas.
11. Other Emoloument Concerns: In addition to prouiding work, a suruiuabie wage, training, and work conditions, Moscow also prouides the funds for health and safety of workers. Table 17 reinforces the picture of increasing neglect from the state. In 1901 funding for employee safety and health ranged from about half to two-thirds in
Rzerbaidzhan and Central Asia. Only in Kazakhstan, with its strong
Russian presence, were funding leuels close to the national standard.
By 1987 the relatiue spending ieuels had declined in ail sin republics.
In Turkmenistan the funding was less than half per worker than the national auerage.
This lack of concern for safety and health clearly Indicates bias by
Moscow. Giuen a large number of dependents in their populations and a high rate of nonemployment among those of working age. Central
Asia and Azerbaidzhan should not pose major problems in funds for worker safety and health. Vet funding there lags seuerely. The only 1 4 8
TABLE 17
MONEY SPENT ON SAFETY AND HEALTH PER EMPLOYEE (S oviet Union “ 100)
1981 1987 Azerbaidzhan 55 51 K azakhstan 95 92 K irg iz ia 69 ■ 63 Tadzhikistan 61 58 Turkmenistan 52 45 U zbekistan 62 58 R ussia 113 113 L atv ia 118 120 Armenia 86 98
Source: Trud v SSSR: s t a t i s t I c h e s k i y sbornik. 1988, p. 141.
TABLE 18
SHARE or UNEMPLOYED GENERAL HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES OUT OF TOTAL PUPILS (S oviet Union = 100)
1981 1987 Azerbaidzhan 246 226 K azakhstan 133 99 K irg iz ia 227 203 Tadzhikistan 358 436 Turkmenistan 416 411 U zbekistan 121 238 Russia 58 43 E stonia 73 61 Moldavia 42 52
Sources; Trud V SSSR: s t a t i s t i - ches kiy sbornik. 1988, p. 93; Narodnoe khozyay- stvo SSSR V 1988 Rodu. p . 18 6. 1 4 9 republic with a respectable Ieuel has, until recently, been predominated by Russians. Kirgizia, with the second largest percentage of Russians in its population, ranked second. Rnd
Rzerbaidzhanis may also note that neighboring Rrmenia has not only had a higher Ieuel of funding, but one that improued between 1981 and 1987.
Vet another indication of Moscow’s neglect is unemployment among those just beginning their adult Hues. While some of the nonemployment among those of working age. It could be argued, may be uoluntary (women raising children, work on priuate plots, etc.), pupils of age 17 who haue completed general secondary education would not likely be raising a family (less so in Islamic republics than in
Slauic ones, as shown in Figure 36 and Table 46). Hauing completed secondary education, they would be employable In a uarlety of jobs.
Vet, unemployment in Central Rsia and Rzerbaidzhan among those hauing just completed secondary school ranges from twice the USSR auerage in Kirgizia to oyer four times the auerage in Tadzhikistan and
Turkmenistan. Perhaps as deuastating Is the huge increase in relatiue employment among this needy group in Central Rsia, the republic with 150 the largest jot) need among these republics.
Only in Kazakhstan is unemployment among general secondary graduates at about the national auerage. The euplanation, of course, lies in its large number of Russians.
Ouerali, Moscow, with its control of funding for Jobs and Job condtions, has clearly failed to assist Central Rsia and Rzeitaidzhan in keeping up with the rest of the country. R teenager in these republics faces greater prospects for being unemployed, being employed on a collectiue farm, working in more hazardous conditions, and hauing fewer prospects for getting a better paying Job, training in skills, or earning a decent wage. Population age structure and cultural habits cannot euplaln most of the problems of employment and income in these regions.
0. DOMESTIC
1. Electric Power Production: Rs one of the most uersatile energy sources, electricity Is a useful measure of deuelopment in the economy and domestic aspect of daily life. Owing to the presence of numerous employment indicators, electricity will be used here to measure domestic conditions. It is also useful, as described in 500n
400- Az
P 300- E R C E N T 200-
100
CA CA
1913 1928 1940 1950 1960 1970 1979 1988
Figure 14. Electric Power Production per Capita in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. U i TABLE 19
ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCTION PER CAPITA (Soviet Union = 100)
1913 1928 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1988 Azerbaidzhan 370 442 224 124 130 76 53 57 Kazakhstan 2 3 41 18 81 87 86 90 Kirgiz ia 0 2 14 23 31 39 4 7 56 Tadzhikistan 0 0 16 26 46 36 59 63 Turkmenistan 19 29 26 33 34 27 49 62 Uzbekistan 6 21 30 85 50 51 4 6 43 Russia 115 102 112 123 120 118 118 121 Ukraine 120 120 120 79 93 96 98 96 Belorussia 3 22 22 18 31 55 73 63 Estonia 45 a 72 72 83 279 281 188 Latvia 46 a 53 50 56 37 34 32 Lithuania 16 a 11 15 28 77 71 118 Moldavia 3 a 3 9 15 69 76 6 6 Armenia 40 68 120 131 120 79 85 7 6 Georgia 59 45 82 79 61 63 58 4 5
a- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were independent countries in 1928. Most of Moldavia was within Romania.in 1928,
Sources: Narodnoe Uhozvavatvo SSSR v 1988 godu. p. 379; Narodnoe khozyaystvo S_SSR_v 1979 godu. p. 168; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR za 70 le t, p. 162; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1961 godu. p, 215; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR 1922 - 1972, p. 159; 20 let sovetskov vlasti. 1937, p, 98,
% 1 5 3
Chapter 4, since its range of transmission is limited and it must be consumed close to the source.
At the end of the Tsarist era Azerbaidzhan had the country's leading per-capita output of electricity. This mas, no doubt, Uianks to large petroleum production on the Caspian sea. On the other hand,
Kazakhstan's and Central Asia's production mere negligible. In fact neither Kirgizia nor Tadzhikistan had any pomer plants. Aegionai deuelopment of pomer production mas entremely diurse at that time.
It mould appear that Lenin's NEP policy had relatiuely little impact on electric pomer distribution. Azerbaidzhan had an euen larger
"ouersupply" by USSA standards. Almost no progress mas made in
Kazakhstan or Central Asia. Lenin's NEP policy produced neither conuergence nor diuergence in electric pomer supply.
The Stalin years of 1940 and 1950 mere characterized by noticeable progress in greater equality of electric pomer distribution.
Azerbaidzhan's supply sank tomard the national auerage. This mas more likely due to dmindling oil reserues than deliberate cutbacks. At the same time, major progress mas made in Central Asia, particularly in Uzbekistan. Curiously, Kazakhstan remained far behind the rest of 1 5 4 the republics, despite the large presence of Russians there and major coal supplies in the region.
The change between 1950 and 1959 shaped the balance in
Kazakhstan and Central Asia up to the present Kazakhstan made its most rapid progress under Khrushcheu, while Central Asia declined to a relatiue leuel close to that at present Azerbaidzhan had a brief surge of growth.
Since 1959 there haue been few changes in the electric power balance. Kazakhstan, for the most part has had steady, slow improuement in its relatiue power supply. In 1988 it surpassed all the other Islamic republics. Central Asia has also had moderate relatiue growth. The enception to this is Uzbekistan, where there has been decline since 1970. But ouerall. Central Asia lagged behind the rest of the country to the same eutent in 1988 as in 1959.
Azerbaidzhan has enperienced a major decline from 1959 to 1988. in the Khrushcheu year it had a per-capita supply that was 30% the auerage for the country. By 1988 it was only 43% below the national auerage. 1 5 5
Ouerall, a greatly Imbalanced power supply system was giuen its greatest conuergence in the Stalin years. Since then the trend has predominatly been to the detriment of Azerbaidzhan (as local oil supplies became euhausted) and Central Asia (the baby boom, no doubt, getting blamed for this). Kazakhstan has benefitted, as In many other cases, from the strong Aussian presence.
Electric power generation can be influenced by local energy sources (such as hydropower) and Moscow's priorities. Giuen the energy resource balance in the USSA, Central Asia iscleariy being denied many opportunities for electric power deuelopment At the same time, Moscow has simply left the Caucasus to their own means.
UJith control of energy and the means to moue it, Moscow has changed its policy of electricity for all to that of electricity for its priority industries. The latter attitude that has preuailed since 1950 has been clearly to the detriment of Central Asia and Azerbaidzhan. Diuergence began here before the slump of the 1970s and 1980s.
2. New Apartments oer 1000 Newlywed Couoles: Housing is an item that has been in chronic short supply throghout Souiet history. The combination as wars, bureaucracy, shoddy workmanship, and rapidly 160 Az
Ka 140- CA
P 120- E R C E N Ka T 100-
80 -
CA
Az 60 1950 1960 1970 1979 1987 Figure 15, Number of New Apartments per 1000 Newlywed Couples in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union.
U i C7> 1 5 7
TABLE 2 0
NUMBER . OF NEW APARTMENTS PER 1000 MEULTWET) COUPLES (Soviet Union = 100)
1950 1960 1970 1979 1987 Azerbaidzhan 164 107 96 61 67 Kazakhstan 144 115 105 101 99 Kirgiz ia 127 75 95 64 61 Tadzhikistan 189 73 88 75 66 Turkmenistan 203 94 108 81 72 Uzbekistan 12 9 71 90 77 67 Russia 100 104 104 109 111 Estonia 76 91 121 153 137 Moldavia 54 136 91 79 93 Armenia 96 103 139 89 75
Sources: Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR V 1988 godu. P- 153; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR V 1979 godu. p. 425; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR V 196 9 godu. p. 563; Naseleriie SSSR 1987 : statisticheskiy sbornik. pp. 190-197. 1 5 8 growing population in the Islamic regions has made a bad situation worse, fls Gachechiladze notes, funding for housing (and other items) is based on ouerall population, not on actual local needs. Generally, funds haue been disproportionai to actual needs.^^
Housing construction has been inconsistent in the USSR. The number of newly completed units per 1000 newlyweds for the entire
USSR has been: 1940 - 543; 1950 - 516; 1960 - 1000; 1970 - 958;
1979 - 675; and 1987 - 768. Thus, only in 1960 and 1970 did housing construction come close to meeting the needs of newlyweds for the country. Uihen taking into account the loss of housing (age, fires, earthquakes, etc.), the backlog of demands, and the need of single people starting their own Hues, the housing shortage becomes more seuere.
In 1950 apartment completion in all sin Islamic republics was aboue norm for the USSR. In fact, Turkmenistan had a surplus of new apartments. In this instance, Moscow's planning methods worked to the aduantage of the peripheral areas. Marriage rates were comparatiuely low a t that time. UJortime disruption of couples had not been as seuere and did not lead to a "marriage boom as 1 5 9 occured in other parts.
Since 1950 the three regions haue had the same long-term trend - delcine - but different short-term trends. Kazakhstan has had gradual decline. Thanks to emphasis on projects in the republic, and the significant presence of Russians there, the republic had aboue- auerage leuels of apartment construction through 1979. It is in the
1980s that Kazakhstan's new housing suppig has sunk Just belom the auerage for the USSR. Giuen the out-migration of Russians (probabig of younger adult ages), the housing situation in Kazakhstan is in better shape than for the other flue republics.
Rzerbaidzhan has endured two periods of rapid decline: up to
1960 and up to 1979. Combined with uninterrupted decline from 1950 to 1979, euen the modest "comeback" in apartment construction in the 1980s has left Rzerbaidzhan with two-thirds the USSR auerage.
Giuen the ouerall USSn pdU eni, Rzerbaidzhan had 40% of its newlywed needs in apartments m et in 1979, and still ju st 50% in 1987.
Central Rsia has had the worst situation ouerall. R rapid relatiue decline between 1950 and 1960 changed this region from a "surplus" apartment region to a deficit region, fl modest recouery in 1970 still 1 6 0 left Central Asia (eKceptIng Turkmenistan) lagging. Since 1970 all four republics haue had continuous relaWue decline in new apartment stock. Kirigizia s large share of Russian population has not spared it from having the lowest amount of new apartments per 1000 newlywed couples in the USSR.
The results aboue confirm the conclusions of Gomostayeuo"^^ and others that the housing situation in Central Rsia is in uery poor shape.
Morton notes that housing is used by Moscow to limit migration to certain areas.^^ In effect, Moscow is keeping Central Aslans out of local cities with this shortage.
The reaction to apartment shortages in Asia haue been strong.
Lethal violence in Dushanbe in Februaryand Osh this June^^ resulted from housing shortages. Komsomolskaua orauda^^ and
Prauda report that the lack of faith in authorities is so strong that farm plots were seized to build shacks and shantytowns. lUhat is resulting are self-built slums similar to those in the largest South
American, African and Asian cities. This is an unfortunate irony in a country that promises the right to housing. 161
There may be some argument that a housing deficit would discourage larger families (a surrogate family control policy), fls
Bemstam notes, housing shortages do not reduce family size, but rather create more crowded conditions.'*^ If housing Is being used to try to control fertility rates, It Is failing and creating only more misery.
The lack of opportunity to moue to cities, and the growing population In rural areas has created a unique situation in the Islamic regions. Not only is rural lluing space In all s Ih republics below norm
(ranging from Tadzhikistan's 48% to Kazakhstan's 85% USSR auerage of
11.9 square meters per resident), there is less lluing space per person
In rural areas In Tadzhikistan and Rzerbaidzhan than in urban areas.^**
One of the few benefits of rural lluing was more space. In these two republics, euen that minor benefit has been lost.
In measuring well-being In Central Rsia and Kazakhstan, Hamilton
concluded that generally construction of facilities had kept up with
the USSR auerage.^* This Is clearly not the case In apartment
construction. The relatiue apartment "boom" of the late Stalin era gaue way to continual decline. Uihlle Kazakhstan has remained close 1 6 2 to All-Union auerages, Central Rsia and Azerbaidzhan haue only two-thirds as many new apartments being built per 1000 newlywed couples as the USSR ouerall. In absolute terms this is less than 500 new apartments per 1000 couples. Thus, in both relatiue and absolute terms, Azerbaidzhan and Central Asia are facing an increasingly deteriorating apartment situation. And this shortage appears to meet
Moscow's interest in controlling migration and urban unemployment
E. MEDICAL CARE AND HEALTH
The Souiet state guarantees the right to free medical care for each of its citizens. Access to this medical care and hsw well it works is an important measure of Moscow's attitude to a republic's well being.
1 Hospital Beds oer 10.000 Persons: Souiet sources generally boast of the achieuements in deueloping the backward areas' hospital
facilities. Sagers pointed out general conuergence (improuement) throughout the Souiet Union in facility deuelopment up through 1970.
After that, a diuergence trend was deueloping by the middle of the
1970s. 52 His work would lead one to eupect a relatiue decline in the late 1970s and the 1980s. 120
100
CA V
80 . Az
P E R C 60- E N T Az 40
20
1913 1932 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1988 Figure 16. Hospital Beds per 10,000 Persons in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. TABLE 21
HOSPITAL BEDS PER 10,000 PERSONS (Soviet Union = 100)
1913 1932 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1988
Azerbaidzhan 37 77 94 104 89 85 78 75 Kazakhstan 25 40 98 94 102 108 105 101 Kirgizia 9 60 60 72 89 98 95 89 Tadzhikistan 3 8 71 79 81 89 80 79 Turkmenistan 21 11 103 110 107 93 84 83 Uzbekistan 18 42 75 89 83 93 91 92 Russia 114 115 108 106 103 103 104 104 La tvia 192 na 157 129 138 109 109 106 MoIdavia 94 na 61 81 91 90 96 99 Georgia 62 96 90 98 92 84 86 84
Sources: Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1988 godu, p. 225; Naronoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1985 godu, p . 544; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR V 1979 godu, p. 531; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1959 godu. p. 791; Yerevan v tslfrakh, 1968, p. 191; Zdravo- okhranenle v SSSR: statlstlcheskliy sbornik, 1960, p. 135.
CP 1 6 5
Hamilton claims that facility deuelopment in Central Asia and
Kazakhstan has been close to the Souiet norm. The problem lies primarily in personnel. She also notes that Kazakhstan has done better than Central Asia.^^ From these tiuo works you would eupect conuergence and improuement up through 1970, some diuergence in the 1970s, and couergence in the 1980s. Kazakhstan, most likely, had more rapid deuelopment and endured less decline.
At the end of the Tsarist era the medical system in Islamic Russia lagged considerably behind the rest of the country. Hospital beds were, for all practical purposes, noneuistent in Tadzhikistan.
The NEP period prouided considerable progress in the distribution of medical facilities throughout the country. Progress was made throughout the country, despite the problems of dull War and coUectiuization. It most be noted, howeuer, that it was uery easy to iiT ip r o u e the standard of Central Asia, since they were so low to begin with. Another weak aspect in the deuelopment of medical facilities was that Tadzhikistan still lagged in accessibility to hospital beds nearly as much in 1952 as in 1915. 1 6 6
The Stalin years of 1940 and 1950 were characterized by continued conuergence. The first 33 years of Souiet ruie had been beneficial to the Isiamic republics in accessibility to hospital beds.
Stalin's policy was probably responsible for the improuement up to
1940. The Second World War would share some of the credit for the situation in 1940. fls the Nazis aduanced toward the Urals and
Caucasus, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaidzhan, and Uzbekistan would haue been protected zones still close to the front In addition to this, most of the wartime destruction occured in Russia, the
Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltics. The need to rebuild in those areas, coupled with the useful location of four republics would haue boosted relatiue ranking in medical facilities.
Since Stalin's times the sin republics haue taken slightly different paths. The hospital bed supply of Kazakhstan continued to outgrow the rest of the country up through 1970. The reduced pace of hospital construction has been offset in part by out-migration.
Central Asia also had growth up through 1970, followed by relatiue decline. Central flsia, howeuer, started behind Kazakhstan and neuer caught up. Thus, faciiity deuelopment there is about 10% 1 6 7 below the standard for the entire country.
Since 1950 Azerbaidzhan has euperienced relatiue decline to the point that it had only 75% of the bed auailablllty enjoyed by the country as a whole.
It would appear that both Sagers and Hamilton were partially correct Conuergence was the general trend between 1940 and 1970
(actually being more pronounced before this period). Moscow had concentrated on helping backward regions catch up in number of beds auailable. Since 1970 there has been a decline. Central Asia has not fared as badly as it has with other enuironmental factors. Kazakhstan has, predictably, fared better than the other flue republics.
These sin republics also appear uery well supplied with hospital beds when compared to Turkey. In 1980 the number of beds per
10,000 persons was 22.2, or 18% the Souiet auerage. By 1986 it had dropped to 20.6, or 16% the Souiet norm.^^ Isiamic USSR indeed was more fortunate in bed supply than their neighbor to the Southwest.
Howeuer, two factors reduce the accomplishments of Moscow.
One, the relatiue decline of Azerbaidzhan and Central Asia are clearly neglect. Georgia had a supply of beds similar to Rzerbaidzhan in 1970, 1 6 8 but now has a superior supply. Moldaula lagged behind Central Asia in
1970, yet now has a bed supply uery close to the USSR auerage. And giuen the difficulty in reaching hospitals in mountaineous and desert regions, the mere number of hospital beds does not Indicate true ease of access. Central Asians, Kazakhs and Azerbaidzhanis face longer distances ouer difficult terrain to reach medical facilities. The physicial enuironment would require either an ouersupply of facilities or else more urbanization. Neither, of course, has occured.
2. Physicians oer 10.000 Persons: While Central Asia and
Rzerbaidzhan lag moderately in hospital bed supply, the situation with physicians has been described far more critically. Gomostayeua euplalns that physicians tend to be too heauily concentrated in cities. This implies that less urbanized places such as the Islamic republics would lag in their supply in physicians. Meduedkou locates the weakest area of the Souiet Union in terms of supply of physicians in Central Asia, with Kazakhstan and Azerbaidzhan also lagging.^^
Hamilton claimed that seruices, including medical services, lagged considerably behind the distribution of facilities.^^ It is easy for
Moscow to locate buildings and beds where it wants. It is more 150 -I
125
100
P Az E Ka R C E N T
Ka
CA
1913 1932 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1988
Figure 17. Physicians per 10,000 Persons in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 1 7 0 TABLE 22
(Soviet Union = 100) 1913 1922 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1988 Azerbaidzhan 83 163 127 151 125 91 89 90 K azakhstan 22 31 54 65 74 80 85 90 K irg iz ia 11 31 48 68 75 76 77 81 Tadzhikistan 11 13 52 58 64 58 64 65 Turkmenistan 39 56 96 92 95 78 75 79 U zbekistan 17 56 59 70 72 73 76 80 R ussia 100 88 104 107 104 106 108 107 L a tv ia 144 a 167 103 132 131 120 114 M oldavia 78 a 53 71 71 75 83 92 G eorgia 100 200 168 183 169 133 123 132
a- Latvia was an Independent country in 1922 Most of Moldavia was in Romania in 1922.
Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR V 1988 godu. p. 222; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR V 1985 godu. p. 540; Narodnoe khozyavstvo SSSR V 1979 godu. p. 528; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR V 1959 godu, p. 788; Yerevan v tslfrakL, 1968, p. 183,
TABLE 23
PHYSICIAN :NURSE RATIO (S o v iet Union = 100)
1913 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1988 Azerbaidzhan 128 135 127 118 105 111 108 K azakhstan 102 70 85 81 86 89 89 K irg iz ia 115 70 99 94 91 105 91 Tadzhikistan 97 73 105 105 97 103 97 Turkmenistan 82 66 83 89 95 101 96 U zbekistan 80 78 120 101 99 94 90 R ussia 100 95 97 99 99 100 102 L atv ia 87 211 125 117 122 112 105 M oldavia 8 0 134 86 84 84 94 91 Georgia 111 158 157 147 126 117 123
Sources; Narodnoe khozyavstvo SSSR v 1988 godu, pp. 222-223; Narodnoe 'k.Roz'vaystVo’ SSSR V 197 9 godu, pp. 528-529; Z dravookhranenie V SSSR: s t'a tis tlc R e s k ly s b o r n ik , 1960, pp. 53-69; Yerevan v tsifrakh. 1968, pp. 181-182, 188,189. 171 difficult to locate and keep people where it wants.
Rzerbaidzhan had a relatiuely well developed medical system euen in the Tsarist era. The supply of physicians was much closer to the country's norm than that of hospitals. Apparently, a smaller share of physicians were linked to a hospital or clinic, which is perfectly normal when considering the difficulty of a patient traueling in mountaineous areas. Physician availability would be more useful than hospital beds.
Kazakhstan and Central Asia were woefully understaffed with doctors. The one bright spot in 1913 was th at Kirgizia and
Tadzhikistan had a visible supply of doctors, unlike the near absence of hospital beds. In these mountainous regions, medical personnel would travel better than patients.
The supply of physicians converged toward the norm in Central
Asia and Kazakhstan during the NEP years, Stalin years, and
Khrushchev years. Rzerbaidzhan enperienced an entremely rapid increase in its supply of physicians during the NEP years, then a convergence downward before 1940. It then enperienced an above average growth to 1950. 1 7 2
The miKBd NEP economy had offered opportunities for the highly educated people of the Caucasus (Including flzerbaldzhonis) to become physicians and return home. State-appointed doctors, along with a degree of enthusiasm, helped Improue the situation In Asiatic USSR.
Stalin readjusted appointments to reduce the "ouersupply" In the
Caucasus, thus producing ouerall conuergence. World War II, with the
Caucasus and Asiatic USSR safe, yet close to the front at times, boosted the pattern of conuergence further.
A pattern of conuergence continued during the Khrushcheu and early Brezhneu years. Homeuer, this proued to be to the disaduantage of Azerbadlzhan. Turkmenistan mas also a loser In this situation, mith
Its relatiue share dropping from a 95% in 1959 to 78% In 1970.
Since 1970 the number of physicians In Azerbaidzhan and Central
Asia haue increased at a pace roughly equal to that of the USSR. That
Is to say, the lagging standards of 1970 haue been maintained.
Kazakhstan, again oming to the out-migration of large numbers of
Slaus, has had Improuement In Its relatiue ratio of physicians per
10,000 persons. 1 7 3
The long-term pattern for number of physicians has been one of conuergence. NEP and Stalin produced conuergence of the supply of physicians, and four of the republics had a better supply situation in
1988 than in 1950. Rzerbaidzhan's relatiue decline has not been seuere, and Kazakhstan's supply continues to improue.
Ouerall, the Islamic republics haue had an improued supply of physicians during the Souiet era. Rod the situation, at the republic leuel, appears to be stable or improuing. Furthermore, Muslims in
Rsiatic and Southern USSR are much better off than those in Turkey, where the figures of 6.04 per 10,000 in 1979 and 7.21 in 1986 were
17% the USSR auerage for both years.^®
Howeuer, it is correct to say that the supply of physicians lags behind the supply of beds, and that Central Rsia is the weakest region in its supply of physicians. Giuen the progress made in Moldauia, the performance in Central Asia could haue been much better.
3. Phijslcian-Nurse Ratio: In addition to supply of beds and physicians, the quality of medical personnel has an impact on local health. It is assumed that the ratio of physicians to nurses (a term here used to couer all middle-leuel personnel) will reflect the ouerall 140 -t
Az
1 2 0 -
P. Az E R Ka C 100 E CA N T CA Ka
80-
60 1913 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1988
Figure 18. Physician:Nurse Ratio in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to Average for Soviet Union. 1 7 5 pyramid of medical personnel, thus the quality of physicians in a republic.
Rt the end of the Tsarist era Rzerbaidzhan's relatiue shortage of beds was made up not only in its abundance of physicians, but also their superior quality. The quality of physicians in Kazakhstan was adequate by standards of that time. Central Rsia, as in other health- related uariables, lagged.
Unfortunately, no data was auailable for middle-leuel personnel in the NEP years or early 1930$. Surprisingly enough, the ratio for 1940 shows diuergence from the Tsarist era. Rzerbaidzhan had a superior physician-nurse ratio, while the Rsiatic republics had declined compared to the Souiet Union's standards. This indicates that health care being administered in Central Rsia and Kazakhstan, while more widespread than in Tsarist times, was at a more rudimentary leuel.
The post-war year of 1950 was more typical of Stalin's time. Rll sin republics conuerged toward the norm. The rigid hierarchy and uniformity of Stalin’s time was making itself felt among medical personnel. 1 7 6
Since 1950 there has been a relatiue decline in the ratio in
Rzerbaidzhan and Central Asia, and a general increase in Kazakhstan.
The 1988 ratios still reflect a strong tendency toward uniformity throughout the country, but changes toward the detriment of quality of personnel in the Islamic south.
Hamilton states that there is an increasing shortage of middle- leuel and other medical personnel in Central flsia.^^ In a U.S. conteut, fewer nurses indicates a shortage of assistance. In the Souiet content, the decline in relatiue share of middle-leuel personnel has been enceeded by the decline of physicians. Not only is Central Asia lagging in quantity, but also quality of medical help. The decline has been particulariy sharp between 1979 and 1988.
This uariable leads to seueral possibilities. Initially, the Souiet state concentrated on minimal medical care for the peripheral regions.
World IJJar Two created a higher degree of medical presence in the country, which benefited the Asiatic republics m ost Since then, middie-leuel personnel haue been retained or assigned to the Islamic republics in iarger shares than better trained physicians. Either local training is geared to lower qualified personnel, or better skilled 1 7 ?
people are giuen "choicler" assignments, or better qualified personnel
are leauing more rapidly (oujing to the ease in which they can find
employment elsewhere).
Overall, the relative improvement of the late Stalin era ended
with Khrushchev. This has led to an apparent decline in quality of
medical personnel in Central Asia. Hzerbaidzhan (along with Armenia
and Georgia) still has its strong medical tradition. Kazakhstan has
been the usual enception to the deterioration. Also, rigid structure of
the Soviet medical system has kept quality from deteriorating as
rapidly in medical personnel as It has in other areas of daily
environment
Curiously enough, Turkey has a much higher physiclan-nurse ratio.
The 1979 ratio of 0.5126 was 145% the Soviet average. By 1986 it
reached 0.5877 or 158% the Soviet average.^® This indicates a higher
level of training for the fewer doctors they have, or else a shortage of
medical personnel for rudimentary tasks. Many citizens of Turkey
mentioned that the wait for medical care was long, but worth it. It
would seem that both interpretations are applicable. 1 7 8
The pattern of convergence during the Stalin era holds for quality of medical personnel. There has been decline since 1950, which accelerated in the 1980s. Kazakhstan was once again an enception to the trends of the other flue republics.
4. Infant Mortality Rates: Infant mortality reflects a multitude of abilities and attitudes of a society. It reflects technology, habits, health, fitness, attitudes about the present, and concern for the future. And while hospitals can be built that are well equipped or filthy concrete dumps, medical personnel can be competent and caring or untrained and apathetic. Infant mortality measures up much of the success and failure of a society.
Infant mortality rates are highest in Central Asia. But there is reason to suspect it is worse than official data indicate. Recent surveys of infant mortality rates in the Soviet Union^^ hint that the rates are actually 50-150% higher In Central Asia and Kazakhstan.
This underreporting Is due to local agencies, as well as parents themselves, altering ages or causes of death. Along with the absence of statistics from 1975 until the mid-1980s, this hints at a problem far worse than will be described here. 180 CA
160-
CA E N Ka T
120 -
Az 100
1927 1960 1970 1980 1988
Figure 19. Infant Mortality Rates in Azerbaidzhan (Az), C e n t r a l A sia CCA), and K a z a k h sta n CKa) R e l a t i v e
to the Average for the Soviet Union. •Ki 180
TABLE 24
LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (Soviet Union = 100)
1969-1970 1979-1980 1985-1986 Azerbaidzhan 100 101 101 K azakhstan 100 99 100 K irg iz ia 98 97 98 Tadzhikistan 101 98 101 Turkmenistan 99 95 94 U zbekistan 104 100 99 R ussia 99 100 100 L atv ia 101 102 102 M oldavia 100 97 96 G eorgia 104 105 104
Source: Rybakovskiy, L.L. (ed.), 1988, p. 132.
TABLE 25
INFANT MORTALITY RATES (Soviet Union = 100)
1927 1960 1970 1980 1988 Azerbaidzhan 100 122 141 111 109 K azakhstan 137 104 ' 105 120 118 K ir g iz ia 139 85 184 159 149 Tadzhikistan 139 85 186 213 198 Turkm enistan 138 120 187 196 216 U zbekistan 139 79 126 172 175 R ussia 105 105 93 81 77 L atv ia a 76 72 56 44 M oldavia a 93 94 128 93 G eorgia 101 104 102 93 89
Sources: Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR V 1988 g o d u , p. 29; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1965 godu. p. 42; Naselenie SSSR 1973: statisticheskiy sbornlk, pp. 69-83; Roi, 1984, p. 85; Lorimer, 1946, pp. 90-92. 1 8 1
In addition to underreporting of infant mortality rates, there are other problems in the data. Turkmenistan did not report an infant mortality rate in 1960. Homeuer, based on data for the Soviet Union and the other 14 republics for births and infant mortality rates, a rate mas caicuiated for Turkmenistan that is plausible. There masn't any reporting of infant mortality rates at the republic leuel in 1927, but calculations mere performed based on birth rates and the number of children still aKue and of children's age during the census.
Despite all these barriers to precision, the pattern of infant mortality is still very reuealing. The total for the Russian Empire and
Soviet Union have been: 1897 (European parts) - 279; 1914 - 269;
1926 - 174; 1940 - 181.5; 1950 - 80.7; 1960 - 35.3; 1970 - 24.7;
1980 - 27.3; and 1988 - 25.7. Infant mortality has declined on a regular basis in most countries except in cases of entreme hardship.
The rise betmeen 1926 and 1940 indicates hardship before UJorld War
II. The rise betmeen 1970 and 1980 occured during a time of peace.
The 1988 value is higher than the preceding tmo years. These peacetime increases in infant mortality are embarassing to Moscom. 1 8 2
The rate in the Soulet Union in 1988 was two and a half times that of the United States. Ulhat has not been noted is that Turkey, a "Third
World" country with much lower leuels of income, hospital and phsyciain auallability, and a mined public/priuate system of medical care, had infant mortality rates in the late 1980s that were lower than thos in Central Asia and Kazakhstan.^^ Turkey had a much higher rate than these republics In 1970. The wealth of the USSR has had less impact in sawing infants than the efforts in Turkey.
In 1927 Hzerbadizhan had a relatluely auerage infant mortality
rate, while Central Asia and Kazakhstan were aboue auerage. At that
time the lack of medical facilities and personnel, no doubt, played a
major role. Sanitation was also a major problem.
The infant mortality patterns of 1960 are surprising.
Azerbaidzhan, depsite its "surplus" of physicians of superior quality,
had an aboue auerage infant mortality rate. Central Asia, encepting
Turkmenistan, reported below-auerage rates. Giuen the shortage of
physicians, this is surprising. Kazakhstan had conuerged to just 104%
the USSR auerage. 1 8 5
Since 1960 the picture has changed dramaticaüg. In a period of prosperity between 1960 and 1970, absolute infant mortality rates actually climbed slightly throughout Central Asia. Azerbaidzhan enperienced a relatiue increase. Medical and health conditions, improuing in the USSR as a whole, had worsened slightly in these regions.
Since 1970 new trends haue emerged. Kazakhstan and Central
Asia showed rapid divergence between 1970 and 1980. This rapid increase in infant mortality rates was more than relatiue. As the
All-Union rate climbed, the rates in the Asiatic republics climbed even more rapidly. Central Asia on the whole had an infant mortality rate in 1980 about double that of 1960. The relatiue rates stabilized somewhat in 1988 compared to 1980.
Azerbaidzhan, meanwhile, had declining infant mortality rates between 1970 and 1979. This is part of the Caucasus situation, where the same pattern occured in Armenia and Georgia. The absolute and relatiue rate haue continued to decline in this region in the 1980s.
UJhat conditions led to the astronomically high infant mortality rates of 1970 and beyond? Were the rates of 1960 misrepresented 1 8 4
badly? Has medical care deteriorated? The uast differences In Infant
mortality rate mould seem unlikely, giuen the similarity in life
eupectancies for the Islamic republics compared to those of the USSR
(see Table 24).
One answer is declining urbanization. Zdrauookhranenie
Tadzhlkistana reported for 1986 infant mortality rates by prouinces,
and they were three times the USSR auerage in the highly rural remote
areas. Rt the same time, the infant mortality rate was higher In
hospitals in Dushanbe than in other places. The oueremphasis on shots
(about 300 in three years) and the lack of disposable syringes^*^ seem
likely contributors to the hospital problem.
The physician dilemna goes beyond quantity and quality. In 1987
all s Ik Islamic republics had a shortfall of pediatrists per 10,000
children. The lowest was Tadzhikistan at 58% the USSR norm, while
Hzerbaidzhan had 86% the USSR norm. Fortunately, the supply of
pediatrists was rising in relatiue and absolute terms. But giuen the
inability of many physicians to respond to an emergency quickly^^
(transportation problems in rural areas), the increased supply of
pediatrists may not be the answer. 1 8 5
In addition to medical care problems, there haue been reports of an enuironmental crisis. Demonstrations haue broken out against the testing of nuclear weapons in the Semipolatinsk region of Kazakhstan.
IDhile some authorities haue downplayed the dangers and results of these tests, many actiuists and journalists haue claimed mortality leuels for all ages haue increased, suicides haue increased (mental instability), health is poorer, and genetic defects in children are more common. The demonstrators and some officials haue called for the military to moue the tests to an uninhabited location.
n more widespread enuironmental danger has been reuealed.
Tashkent Radio reported in June that the use of tOHic chemicals per hectare was seuen times as high in Uzbekistan as the norm for the
USSR. Recording to Komsomoiskaya orauda^^ the rate of use in
Turkmenistan is 20 times the auerage for the USSR. The contamination of groundwater is such that breastmilk from mothers there is more tOKic than that of Uietnamese mothers in areas sprayed with Rgent
Orange.
Simply put, in much of Central Rsia's rural areas the ground w ater has lethal leuels of chemicals.^® Farming in rural Central Rsia includes TABLE 26 TABLE 27
INCIDENCE OF INFANT DEATHS CAUSED BY INCIDENCE OF STILLBORN INFECTIONS. PARASITES OR DISEASES IN CHILDREN AMONG TOTAL BIRTHS THE DIGESTIVE OR RESPIRATORY SYSTEMS (S o v ie t Union = 100) (Soviet Union ■ 100) 1980 1986 1984 1986 Azerba idzhan 101 98 Azerbaidzhan 149 174 K azakhstan 92 104 K azakhstan 141 125 K irg iz ia 79 87 K ir g iz ia 223 222 Tadzhikistan 135 139 Tadzhikistan 266 274 Turkmenistan 91 123 T urkm enistan 288 354 U zb ek istan 100 111 U zbekistan 226 249 R ussia 99 97 R ussia 59 45 U kraine 107 99 La tv ia 21 20 L a tv ia 62 62 M oldavia 124 95 M oldavia 118 86 G eorgia 106 114 G eorgia 96 90
Source; Naselenie SSSR 1987. Source: Naselenie SSSR 1987. pp. 400-407, pp. 316-317,
S 1 8 7 not only water- and airborne chemicals, but aiso 122-degree heat and declining soil fertillty.^^ All of this is due to cotton. Moscow's emphasis on cotton has led to the problems listed aboue, as well as desertification and increased risk of epidemics.^^ Uoronou and
Komaroua and Uoropayeu^^ state that any attempts to bring in more water and (presumably) cleaner water from Siberia on a large scale will only increase the chance of disease. The direct result of this enuironemntal contamination is the portion of infants dying from infections, parasites, digestiue tract ailments, or respiratory diseases is between 125% and 354% as high in the Islamic republics as for the
USSR ouerall (see Table 26). These kinds of deaths represent poor water and air.
In most industrial countries about half the Infant deaths occur in the first week. In Islamic USSR about 70% to 80% of the infant deaths are ouer one month oid.^^ This lingering death is more typical of
Africa and other regions with food problems. As Moscow TU reported in June of 1990^^, a third of the children of Ashkhabad suffer from hypertrophy or chronic malnutrition. 1 8 8
The food situation in Central Asia is more critical than that of the rest of the country. One reason is that 50% of the collectiue farmers, the most common form of employment, Hue below pouerty leuei.^^
The lack of money, along with deliueries of food to the state haue led to poor diets. Stebelsky noted that in 1970 [a good year] meat consumption was between 64% and 77% the recommended norm in the
Islamic republics.^^ The consumption of dairy products for that same year was 61% to 74% the recommended leuels.^^ The situation since this economic boom " year of 1970, of course, has worsened.
The growing of cotton has led to food shortages in two ways. One is that enuironmental deterioration has reduced productiuity of land and eliminated watering holes for animals. R second is that cotton growing remoues land from use for fruits and uegetables.^^ This is a double-edged sword typical of colonial systems.
The habits of the Central Asians themselues complicate matters further. The tradition of paying bridal money has not only suruiued in
Turkmenistan, but grown. Just as a couple are starting out together in life, the husband's family and husband must Hue in pouerty to pay the dowry. In its time of greatest need, the couple, especially the wife, is 1 8 9 working to support others.^ ^ And when shortages occur, by tradition first the child, then the wife, and finally the husband haue reduced food intake.
Some studies haue cited alcoholism as leading to seuere health problems in the 1970s. Among the Muslims, this would not be the case. Alcohol consumption in Azerbaidzhan and Central Asia ranged from 25% to 57% of the USSA auerage In 1988. Howeuer, the number of drug addicts admitted to hospitals per 100,000 residents was generally higher in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, with Turkmenistan hauing a rate of about four and a half times the USSA auerage.^^
The effect of drugs on children entends beyond pregnant mothers.
Crying children in Turkmenistan are often giuen drugged tea (one of the few items not yet in short supply) to make them stop crying. The child falls asleep and is often forgotten. In the long run this has led to starvation or death from drug ouerdoses.^^
An item that will be discussed in Chapter 8 is fertility. It should be noted here that the habits of bearing of children has contributed to starvation and sick children. Many women in Turkmenistan giue birth to chiidren euery 15 months or so on the auerage. In the past, 1 9 0 breastfeeding helped space pregnancies apart Howeuer, with the underfed and malnourished mother hauing little milk or bad milk, she is unable to breastfeed. Thus, the following pregnancy comes sooner.
This creates a situation of a weak mother hauing increasingly frequent pregnancies, leading to weaker and weaker children.^^ Combined with the food shortages, poor housing, poor medical care, an increasingly touic enuironment and ouerwork in harsh conditions, the increase in infant mortality rates in Turkmenistan is no surprise.
Ouerall, NEP saw minor success in equalizing the medical care situation throughout the Islamic republics. The period of Stalin's rule saw conuergence in facilities and personnel quantity and quality.
Since Stalin's time the number of beds and physicians per 10,000 has continued to improue in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, but decline in
Hzerbaidzhan. Physician quality seems to haue declined in
Hzerbaidzhan and Central Asia, but improue slowly in Kazakhstan.
Ouerall, Kazakhstan's situation is significantly better than that of the other fiue republics.
Both Kazakhstan and Hzerbaidzhan haue had infant mortality rates remain aboue the USSR auerage for all the years included in this 1 9 1 study. Central Asia, after hauing surprisingly beloiu-auerage rates in
1960, haue had disasterously high rates since then. There is reason to belieue the reality is much worse than the official data. A shortage of medical supplies, reduced medical care, increasing pouerty, lagging work conditions, decreased food production and consumption, an increasingly reduced or poisonous supply of water, and some local traditions haue led to these horrible conditions. The despara te situation can be blamed on Moscow's policies for cotton production in
Central Asia. And some of the habits of the local people haue made this situation worse.
F. SUMMARY OF AESULTS
The pre-Souiet era was characterized by significant diuersity in urbanization leuels, power production and medical care. The NEP period produced improuements in most areas of daily enuironment, but had both conuergence and diuergence. The Stalin years of 1940 and 1950 were strongly predominated by conuergence among the sin republics toward the USSR norm. In seuerai instances, some or all sin
Islamic republics achleued their best relatiue positions during 1950. 1 9 2
The Khrushcheu era (1959) and early Brezhneu years (1970) produced some mined results. For most variables the tendency was predominantly one of conuergence. However, Rzerbaidzhan's convergence was often from a position of advantage to one of lesser advanatage or even disadvantage.
The tendency from 1970 to 1979 was one of decline or divergence for Azerbaidzhan and Central Asia. The environment In Kazakhstan converged in most instances (either from superior to less superior, or from inferior to less inferior). The time between 1979 to 1987/1988 was predominantly one of decline (divergence in Azerbaidzhan and
Central Asia).
Moscow is either directly or indirectly responsible for all the daily life variables described in this chapter. Earlier attempts to equalize conditions in the lagging Islamic republics produced positive results, at least on the republic level. However, Moscow has demonstrated neglect or even deliberate intent (as in urbanization and housing) since 1970, or earlier in some areas of daily life, in Azerbaidzhan and
Central Asia. Kazakhstan, with its large portion of Russians, generally was characterized by development levels close to the USSR norm. 1 9 3
Howeuer, the outflow of Russians has been accompanied by some decline in the standard of daily enuironment.
Rs demonstrated in health care, the uariables analyzed in this chapter do not completeiy describe the results of Moscow's policies.
The health care uariables of hospital beds and physicians alone would leaue an impression of moderately lagging conditions. Vet, when added to infant mortality rates, collectiue farm employment leuels, nonemployment, lower income leuels, primitiue housing conditions, the use of chemicals in farming, etc., the picture becomes much worse.
RImost all the uariables in tills chapter produce a picture of improuing conditions in Islamic regions up through the 1950s, and in some cases, the 1960s. Since then Moscow has consistently allowed nearly euery aspect of the daily liuing enuironment it establishes to deteriorate. The deterioration has been slower in Kazakhstan, but it is decline neuertheiess.
So Moscow has allowed relatiue and absolute decline. Does this hold true for factors which inuolue both Moscow's decisions and the reaction of local population? CHAPTER un
ENUmONMENT-AEHRUiOR
R. INTRODUCTION
Education, political organizations, and goods and seruices are sectors of daily life that are dominated by state plans and inuestments. Hoiueuer, there is more local input into the results of these plans. Local authorities haue more opportunities to add their own rules" or simply auold state directiues. Also, the behauior of the local population influences the results as uiell. These sectors haue more mined inputs than those discusssed in the preulous chapter.
Gachechiladze glues an impressiue argument regarding Moscow's interest in reducing regional differences and ability to do so. fl repeated goal of Souiet socialism to minimize regional differences depends mainly on social consumption funds. Since Moscow controls well ouer 80% of these funds, it has the ability to smooth out inequalities. ^
1 9 4 195
Gachechiladze notes that poor planning has actually thwarted efforts to achieue regional equality. The criteria used to measure need are often faulty, causing some regions to get too much (resulting in waste), and others to haue a shortall. The euample Gachechiladze focused on was primary and secondary education in the Georgian
Republic. ^ Howeuer, the same criteria are used throughout the USSR, and the results haue been equally or more unbalanced in the Islamic republics of the USSR, e. EDUCRTION
Education has had as one of its goals the souletization of the country's different nationalities. Euen when education has been balanced out for uarious regions, successful "souletization " should not be assumed. Rs Feshbach points out, edcuation does not reduce ethnic consciousness, but may actually enhance it^ Behauior can be affected, but not necessariiy in the way intended by authorities.
1. Ratlo of Students in Higher Education to Puoils in Primary and
Secandarq Education: Gomostayeua measures educational deuelopment in terms of students per 1000 population plus the size of the institutions. The resuits indicate a healthy presence of higher 120 1
100
80- Ka P E R C 60 ■ E N T
40-
20 -
CA
Ka
1914 1927 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1988
Figure 20. Ratio of Students in Higher Education to Pupils in Elementary and General Secondary Schools in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. § TABLE 28
RATIO OF STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION TO PUPILS IN ELEMENTARY AND GENERAL SECONDARY SCHOOLS (Soviet Union ■ 100)
914 1927 1940 1950 195 9. 1970 1979 1988 0 179 96 123 74 77 56 62 Azerbaidzhan 76 Kazakhstan 0 2 39 57 63 67 65 0 0 40 70 70 65 52 56 K irg iz ia 43 Tadzhikistan 0 0 33 62 76 60 47 0 0 54 81 72 52 42 44 Turkmenistan 58 59 U zbekistan 0 188 65 89 95 76 127 123 Russia 98 104 101 114 111 113 127 81 126 79 95 103 99 106 Ukraine 100 105 Belorussia 0 65 55 56 64 84 226 a 170 159 106 119 109 107 E stonia 136 97 L atvia 75 a 179 135 98 129 0 a 68 74 85 102 100 117 L ith u an ia 67 Moldavia 0 a 25 57 53 60 62 0 134 146 133 90 83 82 85 Armenia 73 84 Georgia 12 249 165 131 113 96 a- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were independent countries in 1927. Most of Moldavia was w ith in Romania in 1927,
Sources: Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1988 godu, pp. 186, 197; Narodnoe khozyaj^stvo _SgSR „ 1070 . nn. 491. 496: Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1959 godu, pp. 728, 741-742:"Kulturnoe stroitelstVo SSSR: statisticheskiy sbornlk, 1956, pp. 80-115, 208-211. 1 9 8 education in flima-flta, Baku, Dushanbe, and Ashkhabad.^* Howeuer, these measures, particuiariy the "per 1000 residents" haue been cited as part of the probiem. By measuring the number of students uersus the number of pupils (a composite of age distribution and those eligible to continue - i.e. ouerall real demand for higher education), a different picture emerges.
In 1914 there were no institutions of higher education in any of the regions that later became Hzerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan and the republics of Central Asia. Thus, ail boasting about improuing higher education in these regions is in the conteut of a no lose situation.
The results in Azerbaidzhan and Uzbekistan appear most impressiue for 1927. Both republics had ratios that nearly doubied the auerage for the entire country. Howeuer, the progress in higher education, while real, was not so entreme. There had been limited success by that year in getting all school-age children into schools. So the gains of 1927 are impressiue only due to lower pupil enrollments.
By the Stalin years of 194B and 1950 enrollment In primary ana secondary education was nearly uniuersal. Thus, the improuement in higher education indicates true progress. Progress between 1940 and 1 9 9
1950 was partially due to the damage caused by UJorld tUar II. It was much easier to rebuild primary and secondary schools or educate children without them. Higher education reconstruction was more inuolued, thus, slower west of the Urals.
The pattern since 1950 is a uery familiar one. Hzerbaidzhan, which had been in a superior position in 1950, began a decline that has left it well below USSR standards for higher education attendance.
Central Rsia conuerged up to 1959, but has declined steadily since that time. Kazakhstan has had steady conuergence toward the USSR norm, with some regression between 1970 and 1979.
The result of the Souiet era has been to Improue education in all siH republics, but recent neglect has left Central Rsia and hzerbaidzhan with the weakest deueiopment in the country. Giuen the progress in Moldauia, Belorussia and the Ukraine since 1950 (when these three republics all lagged behind Centrai Rsia), the most recent conditions indicate neglect by Moscow. In addition, ouerall USSR student enrollment in higher education (compared to primary and secondary enrollments) has declined since 1970. Thus, the decline in
Central Rsia and Hzerbaidzhan means not only fewer opportunities, 2 0 0 but also fewer total students.
Higher education opportunities haue declined to a point where
Turkey, which lagged behind euery republic in 1979, had a higher student-pupii ratio in 1985 (47% the USSR norm) than Tadzhikistan and
Turkmenistan. ^ Turkey does not promise higher or secondary education as uniuersal rights.
There are a number of reasons for the lack of opportunity in higher education in Hzerbaidzhan and Central Rsia. Khualinskaya notes that higher education has been too concentrated around
Moscow, creating shortages in the rest of the country and learning enuironemntal problems in Moscow.^ She also giues the seuen criteria for how higher education is located: 1- a city's sociopolitical role, 2- industrial potential, 3- multlfunctlonallty, 4- history, 5- Infrastruc tural deuelopment, 6- physical setting, and 7- population size.^
RImost all of these factors operate against Hzerbaidzhan, Central Rsia, and Kazakhstan. These areas are less urbanized, haue less Industry, haue specialized role cities, and haue weak amenities. The underdeueloped nature of the urban networks (Moscow's decision) has been used by Moscow to restrict educational opportunities. 2 0 1
Quantity Is not the only problem. Pomarlna notes that the distrlbtulon of major programs at institutions do not meet local needs.
For Instance, Central Aslan universities put much less emphasis on medicine and primary teacher training than Is required In the surrounding enuironment of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.^ The qualifications of graduates mill not fill help local shortages.
A Komsomolskaqa nrauda article from 1987 cited another kind of problem In higher education. Women at the Kazakhstan Teacher
Training institution mere regularly given assignments In other schools and buildings - to clean floors!^ Since students cost less than fulltime morkers, this may have been a method by the state of saving on labor enpenditures. In any event, those momen mho actually completed their programs mould have been less mell prepared, and probably suffering from lomer morale.
The relative level of educational opportunity Increased In Stalin's era, and has since declined In Azerbaidzhan and Central Asia. Even in
Kazakhstan the student-pupll ratio Is just 76% of the USSR average.
And one cannot forget that pupil enrollment In the s Ih Islamic republics is by no means complete. The major causes seem to be the 2 0 2 criteria of using urban deuelopment and population size (rather than structure) to justify the distribution of study opportunities.
2. Share of Specialists with Degrees in Higher Education per 1000
Employed : Sagers noted that there has been a noticeable increase in the leuel of education achieued by the lagging regions.^ ^ lOinman describes the Muslims of the USSR as the most highly educated in the
Islamic World.Oespite the problems mentioned aboue in student opportunities, work assignments and transfers may haue balanced out the skill leuel of work forces at the republic leuel.
The educational opportunities created in Rzerbaidzhan and
Uzbekistan during NEP and Stalin's early years did haue an impact on higher educational leuels in the work force. No doubt, the migration of Russians to these areas were Important too. In 1940 the labor force of Kazakhstan and Central Rsia had around 60% the USSR leuel of higher education. Rzerbaidzhan had 138% the USSR norm for higher education degrees among its employed persons.
Between 1940 and 1959 the reiatlue degree leuel among employed persons improued in all sin republics. Rzerbaidzhan s degree leuel in its labor force was 41% aboue norm. Central Rsia had achieued the 2 0 3
140
120 - Âz
CA P 100 E R C E N T 8 0
40 t ' 19401959 1970 1980 1987
F ig u r e 21. Share of Employed Specialists with Degrees In Higher Education per 1000 Employed Persons In Azerbald- zhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 2 0 4
TABLE 2 9
SHARE OF EMPLOYED SPECIALISTS WITH DEGREES
(Soviet Union » 100)
1940 1959 1970 1980 1987 Azerbaidzhan 138 141 130 129 116 K azakhstan 63 83 90 88 92 K irg iz ia 55 110 105 103 100 Tadzhikistan 47 90 99 107 102 Turkmenistan 57 96 97 95 90 U zbekistan 63 101 108 107 103 R ussia 92 101 100 99 99 B e lo ru s s la 83 85 89 98 101 L ith u a n ia a 81 86 98 105 M oldavia a 69 78 87 91 Armenia 134 167 136 130 127
a- Lithuania and Moldavia have inflated for 1940 owing to a low employment level in the public s e c t o r .
Sources: Trud v SSSR: statisticheskiy sbornik. 1988, pp. 40-41, 48, 76; Narodnoe Rhozyaystvo SSSR v 1980 godu. p. 371; Narodnoe Rhozvaystvo SSSR v 1970 godu, p, 526; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1959 godu, pp. 608-609. 2 0 5
USSR norm.
Since 1959 the reiatlue leuels haue cluerged som uihat
Rzerbaidzhan has declined since 1959. Based on patterns of student enrollment and other factors, the decline in Rzerbaidzhan most likely begin in the early 1950s. Central Rsia enperience continued reiatlue improuement up to 1970, and some decline since then.
Kazakhstan has had sloiu, but reiatlue improuement since then.
The reiatlue leuels of higher education among the employed in
1987 offer a surprisingly healthy picture. Despite decline since 1959
Rzerbaidzhan still mas aboue the USSR aueroge. Central Rsia was at the USSR auerage. Kazakhstan had climbed in the 1980s to 92% the
USSR auerage.
The argument that Souiet Muslims are the best educated may hold true. Despite a surge in educational leuels in Turkey in the 1970s
(mainly thanks to students studying abroad), in 1980 Turkey the incidence of higher education degrees in the labor force was 38.8 per
1000 employed, or 40% the USSR leuel.^^
The relatiue leuel of education anceeded the student opportunity in higher education for euery year when data for both were auailable. 2 0 6
On the surface, Pomarina's argument that graduates need to be assigned to outlying areas has been the standard.
But much of this is statisticai deception. LUhlle pupil enrollment in
Islamic OSSR is not uniuersal (thus the student opportunties are euen weaker than they appear), unemployment is euen less so. The high nonemployment leuels alter the results significantly. If nonemployed persons were included, the number of degrees per 1000 persons of employable age would be significantly below Hll-Union auerages.
3. BaUo of Students in Secondary Specialized Education per 1000 pupils in Primary and Secondary Education: Technical skills haue been the backbone of economic construction and indiuidual opportunity.
While the prestige and uacation time is not as great for those with uocational-technical areas as in higher education, it is often much easier to moonlight and/or change residence.
Instruction of uocoitional-technical skills already euisted in
Rzerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan back in the Tsarist era.
State control of Industry led to more rapid aduancement in this kind of training than for higher education. By 1927 secondary specialized education was established in all s Ih Islamic republics. Student ratios, 250
200 .
P 150. E R C E Az N T 100.
CA CA 50 Az Ka
1914 1927 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1988
Figure 22. Ratio of Students in Secondary Specialized Education to Pupils in Elementary and General Secondary Education in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 3 TABLE 30
TO PUPILS IN ELEMENTARY AND GENERAL SECONDARY SCHOOL (Soviet Union - 100)
1914 1927 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1988 Az erbaId zhan 90 264 95 84 66 57 48 49 K azakhstan 42 80 94 80 87 76 75 85 K ir g iz ia 0 62 65 83 79 58 51 55 Tadzhikistan 0 132 96 90 55 49 38 35 Turkmenistan 0 284 115 90 85 54 45 45 U z b ek istan 72 309 71 82 66 56 54 64 126 121 R ussia 93 100 105 112 108 115 U kraIne 104 77 105 85 103 107 101 113 B e lo ru s s la 78 66 74 72 77 91 104 100 E sto n ia 36 a 63 179 132 135 117 104 L a tv ia 113 a 144 162 147 145 136 101 L ith u a n ia 180 a 60 71 110 122 110 113 M oldavia 390 a 34 80 57 72 81 80 Armenia 5 5 122 98 87 77 75 86 79 G eorgia 48 162 126 86 71 60 52 54
a- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were Independent countries In 1927. Most of Moldavia was within Romania In 1927.
Sources: Narodnoe khozvavstvo SSSR v 1988 godu. pp. 186, 199; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR V 1979 godu, pp. 491, 497; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1959 godu, pp. 728, 743-744 ; Kulturnoe stroltelstvo SSSR: statisticheskiy sbornik. 195 6, pp. 80-115, 232-235.
i 2 0 9 while inflated due to low pupil enrollments, were still impressive.
Convergence was more complete in secondary specialized education during the Stalin years than for higher education. Technical skills were of higher priority at that time, and the creation of institutions was easier in lagging areas than for higher education.
Since 1950 relative enrollments have lagged in Rzerbaidzhan. This is part of a pattern that includes Armenia and Georgia. The republics in the Caucasus have stronger traditions in higher education, and this has affected the balance. At the same time, Central Asia declined through 1979. Only a downturn in secondary specialized education in the whole USSR enabled Central Asia to have a relatively better situation in 1988.
Kazakhstan had growth in opportunities in the 1950s that then lagged in the 1960s and 1970s. A slight recovery in the 1980s may be a state response to local needs.
Opportunities in secondary specialized education developed in a pattern similar to those in higher education. Relative enrollments have been consistently higher in Azerbaidzhania (as In Its Caucasus neighbors), while they were Initially slightly lower In the other 2 1 0 republics. Relatiue decline has been stopped in the 1980s, making
Rsiatic USSR stronger in this technical education than in higher education at present.
The technical educational opportunities are certainly better for
Souiet Muslims than those in Turkey. lUhile the student-pupil ratio has improued in Turkey from 23 per 1000 in 1979 to 27 per 1000 in 1985, the iatter figure was only 27% the Souiet ualue and lagged far below euen the lowest republic ualiies in Central Rsia.
Pomarina stated that education needed to be altered to fit local
Job needs.^^ The alteration seems to haue occured to some degree in the 1980s in secondary specialized education. Since this area is easier to alter, that comes as no surprise. UJhether Moscow intends to upgrade opportunities in Asiatic USSR remains to be seen, but the
1980s do offer some hope that this will be the case. On the other hand, declining pupil enrollment leuels could be causing deceptiue results. Since Central Rsia's and Kazkahstan's recent relatiue improuement has come during a period of ouerail decline, it may indicate a stronger lack of interest in other regions of the country. 2 1 1
H Kazkhstanskaya orauda article In 1987 gaue reasons for pessimism in interpreting uocationai technical training. Rt that time the Kazakhstan Supreme Souiet attacked the entreme backward nature of training (teacher and student) in uocationai technical schools. The quality problems enperienced in higher education enisl in this area as well. Student enrollment may be declining here more slowly than elsewhere, but educational standards could be falling more rapidly. Hamilton noted th at Moscow has been somewhat attentiue in Kazakhstan and Central Rsia regarding facilities, but not seruices and quality.^ ^
4. Share of Employées with Secondary Specialized Degrees oer 1000
Empioued : Rs was the case in higher education, the relatiue share of employed persons with secondary specialized degrees has been higher in the Islamic regions than the student-pupil ratio. The most important enplanation for this is the higher leuels of nonemployment, as opposed to nonottendence at primary and secondary schools.
Between 1940 and 1959 all sIh republics conuerged toward the norm. Rs with higher education, this conuergence has brought about relatiue decline in Rzerbaidzhan, and improuement in Kazakhstan and 2 1 2
120
Az
110 -
100 Ka
E R 90-
Ka / CA
80- Az
70
60 1940 1959 1970 1980 1987
Figure 23. Share of Employed Specialialists with Degrees In Secondary Special ized Education per 1000 Employed Persons in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 2 1 3
TABLE 31
SHARE OF EMPLOYED SPECIALISTS WITH DEGREES IN SECONDARY SPECIALIZED EDUCATION PER 1000 EMPLOYED PERSONS (Soviet Union ■ 100)
1940 1959 1970 1980 1987 Azerbaidzhan 116 103 100 87 77 K azakhstan 81 97 97 93 98 K irg iz ia 67 101 96 86 87 Tadzhikistan 58 87 83 78 73 Turkmenistan 99 98 84 7 6 78 U zbekistan 67 81 82 81 85 R ussia 98 107 106 106 105 U kraine 97 90 96 98 100 E sto n ia a 108 108 110 109 M oldavia a 69 78 87 91 G eorgia 125 97 80 68 65
a- Estonia and M oldavia have inflated values of 22 and 278 f o r 1940 owing to low employment in the public sector.
Sources ; Trud v SSSR: s t a t t s t i c h e s k i v sb o rn ik , 1988, p p . 40 -4 1 , 48, 76: Narodnoe Khozvavstvo SSSR V 1980 godu, p. 371: Narodnoe khOZva'VBtvO SSSR "v 197 0 godu P. 526 : Narodnoe khoz vavstvo SSSR v 1959 godu pp. 610—611, 2 1 4
Central flslo. Rzerbaidzhans relatiue (but not absolute) decline reflected a reduced need for technicians, since oil supplies in the
Caspian were nearly euhausted.
Since 1959 Rzerbaidzhan has continued its relatiue decline. By
1987 its leuel of technical degrees in the employed labor force was
77% the Rll-Union leuel. Central Rsia and Kazakhstan had mirror image decline from 1959 to 1979, and near mirror-image recoueries between 1980 and 1987.
Threre was less success in Central Rsia and Rzerbaidzhan in the leuel of technical training in the labor force than for higher education.
Kazakhstan, on the other hand, has had greater relatiue success in secondary specialized education. The bias toward higher educat^* n enplains the difference in labor skill in Rzertaldzhan. The people with the best opportunity to leaue Central Asia haue been those with technical degrees. With Kazakhstan being close and hauing a better standard of liuing, some of those with technical degrees may haue moued there, improuing Kazakhstan's share of technical degrees in Its labor force. 2 1 5
Technical educational leuels In Central Rsia and Rzerbaidzhan, while diverging downward In the 1970s, still exceeded those in Turkey by a large margin. The number of employed persons with secondary specialized degrees in Turkey in 1970 was 21.6 per 1000 in 1970 and
30.5 per 1000 In 1980. This translated Into 20% and 23% the USSR norms for those years^®, a far cry from Turkmenistan's 76% In 1980
(see Table 31). it Is unlikely th at the number of technical degrees haue climbed all that rapidly in Turkey In the 1980s.
Rs such, conuergence was replaced with decline starting In 1959
(or earlier). The realtlue decline was reversed in the 1980s in
Kazakhstan and Central Rsia in part due to higher nonemployment leuels. Central Rsia and Rzerbaidzhan haue a better share of higher education degrees than secondary specialized degrees in their labor force. Unfortunately, the latter are more important in improuing one’s own dally environment
Pomarina notes that distribution of students does not equal distribution of skilled labor.^^ The superior situation of Central Rsia and Rzerbaidzhan In degree leuels compared to student leuels demonstrates this. Itihat Is possible Is that Moscow could still 2 1 6 establish projects and transfer skilled laborers to these regions.
Despite out-migration by Russians, the people remaining behind in
Kazakhstan haue benefitted from the transfer of skill received by
Kazakhstan in the 1950s and 1960$.^^ Euen though Russians are, most likely, the primary beneficiaries, there has been some increase in opportunities among Kazakhs as compared to Central Asians.
C. PRESTIGE RNO POLITICS
So far all the variables haue dealt with dally life at a basic leuel.
The only "priuileged people were those in the high-opportunity Jobs or student positions. Moscow has been compelled to maintain certain minimum levels owing to general promises of socialism. Howeuer, there has been less promised in the way of high-ranking positions in the economy and politics. The following two uariables should hint at
Moscow's attitude toward different republics at gaining the best society has to offer.
1. Researchers with Doctoral and Candidate Degrees oer Million
Employed : Owing to the lack of republlc-leuel data, the effects of
Lenin's and Stalin's policies on creating members of the economic elite cannot be analyzed. The 1950 distribution of persons with doctoral 2 1 7
180
160
140
Az
P 120. E R C E N T 100
80
CA CA
60 Ka
Ka
40 1950 1959 1970 1979 1987
Figure 24. Share of Research Workers with Doctoral and Candidate Degrees per M illion Employees In Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet U n io n . TABLE 32
SHARE OF RESEARCH WORKERS WITH DOCQTRAL AND CANDIDATE DEGREES PER MILLION EMPLOYEES (Soviet Union = 100)
1950 1959 1970 1979 1987 Azerbaidzhan 124 132 167 129 107 Kazakhstan 48 50 58 57 56 Kirgizia 46 71 74 63 65 Tadzhikistan 44 63 74 67 63 Turkmenistan 47 56 75 61 56 Uzbekistan 77 79 87 80 71 Russia 120 119 114 116 117 Ukraine 66 66 73 74 79 Latvia 52 80 98 99 95 Moldavia 31 38 53 58 63 Armenia 220 215 175 148 136
Sources; Trud v SSSR: statisti cheskiy sbornik. 1988, PP . 41, 76, 130; Vestnik statistiki. 1987, No. 4 , P • 45; Nardonoe khozyaystvo SSSR V 1979 godu. p. 108; Nardonoe khozyaystvo SSSR V 1959 godu, p. 758; Vestnik statistiki, 1956, No. 5, p. 90.
N) CD 2 1 9 and candidate degrees in the labor force was similar to that of students in higher education. Giuen that uariabie and preuious ones, it is likely that the Stalin years had tendencies ts^uard conuergence.
Between 1950 and 1970 all sIk Islamic republics experienced increases in their reiatlue share of persons with doctoral and candidate degrees. In Central Rsia and Kazakhstan this meant conuergence toward the OSSR norm, in Rzerbaidzhan this meant diuergence further aboue the norm, in fact, in 1970 Rzerbaidzhan had the second highest Incidence of doctoral and candidate degrees in their employed labor force of all the republics.
Since 1970 the pattern has been one of decline for all sIk republics. Rzerbaidzhan s decline has been more rapid than its preuious rise, leauing It reiatlue less well off In 1907 than In 1950.
Kazakhstan's relatiue decline has been moderate, leauing this republic in relatiueiy better standing in 1987 than in 1950. Central Rsia's decline matched their earlier rise.
Rll in all, the years of economic prosperity in the USSR brought about rapid increase In the number of researchers with prestigious degrees. The years of economic decline haue had an aduerse effect. 2 2 0
Most likely, these people were gluen their titles in the Islamic regions in the good years, and haue left the areas as the standard of liuing has suffered. Kazakhstan has been somewhat spared, owing to the larger share of Russians and the likely arriual of doctoral and candidate researchers from Central Rsia and Rzerbaidzhan.
I had enpected the quality of degrees to be fairly uniform throughout the 15 republics. Howeuer, there is reason to question this assumption. An article back in 1986 noted criticism by the Rcademy of
Sciences of the Kazakh SSR regarding the quality of diplomas and degrees in the republic. It reported that a large number of diplomas and records had been falsified, and that only 20% of the thesis in higher education had actually been defended.^^ This report was most likely aimed at the upcoming ouster of the Kazakh CP leader for corruption. On the other hand, many of the corruption charges seem to be authentic. Uihile the complaints were aimed at undergraduate education, it is not unlikely that this cheating on degrees did not eutend higher up.
Moscow had made an attempt to euen out the quantity of prestigous degrees in the Asiatic republics with Souiet leuels. 2 2 1
Howeuer, the declining standard of liuing following 1970 probably negated these efforts when many of these people left for better regions. R study of the nationality breakdown of these degree holders in 1970 and in 1987 would be most interesting. Would the local nationalities' share of degrees climb, not only because of the departure of Russians and other Slaus, but also because there was less motiuation for outsiders to moue to or remain in Central Rsia and
Kazakhstan just to receiue these degrees? While the republlc-leuel decline may be the recent pattern, greater equality between the
Russians and the locals (especially the "cheating" Kazakhs) may haue resulted.
2. Party Members and Candidates oer 1000 Persons of Eligible Rqe:
Sagers noted in his article published in 1982 that the conuergence of membership ieuels throughout the USSR had shifted toward diuergence in the 1970s. He attrributed this to demographic factors.^^ When measuring membership rates per 1000 persons, the younger populations of the Islamic regions would ha"e declining membership leuels, but still be fairly represented. His data were limited because population structure and membership leuels are more difficult to 2 2 2
140
120 ■
Az 100 E R C Ka E N 80 -
CA
60 . £A
40 1926 1939 1950 1959 19791970 1987
Figure 25. Party Members and Candidates per 1000 Persons of Eligible Age in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) R elative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 223
TABLE 33
PARTY MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES PER 1000 PERSONS OF ELIGIBLE AGE (S oviet Union = 100)
1926 1939 1950 1959 1970 1979 1987 Azerba idzhan 143 97 121 107 111 105 97 Kazakhstan 69 86 106 95 87 88 83 K irg iz ia 52 42 67 81 77 68 67 Tadzhikistan 9 42 56 62 70 63 54 Turkmenistan 66 62 79 83 74 70 67 U zbekistan 64 45 62 68 82 77 69 Russia na 120 133 118 115 110 113 B elo ru ssia 47 37 31 60 79 — 90 96 L atvia a 10 29 66 78 88 94 Georgia na 142 124 127 109 108 108
a- Latvia was an independent country in 1926.
Sources; Partiynaya zhizn. 1987, No. 21, pp. 6-7; Ezhegodnik Bolshoi sovetskoy entsiklopedii. 1979, pp. 13-176; Ezhegodnik Bolshoy sovetskoy entsiklopedii. 1970, pp. 28-193; Ezhegodnik Bolshoy sovetskoy entsiklo pedii. 1959, pp. 8-186; Partiynaya zhizn. 1983, No. 15, p. 16; Kommunisticheskaya partia Belorussii V tsifrakh 1918-1978, pp. 34-35; Kommunisticheskaya partia Latvii V tsifrakh 1904-1983 gg., p. 46; Kommunistichéskaÿa partia Azerbaidzhana v tsifrakh. 1970, p. 23; Kompartia Kazakhstana za 50 let 1921- 1971 gg.. p. 84; Kommunisticheskaya partia Kirgizli V tsifrakh 1918-1984, p. 25; Kommunisticheskaya partia Tadzhikistana v dokumentakh i tsifrakh (1924- 1963 gg., p. 37; Kommun~isitcheskoy partii Turkmeni- stana 60 le t, p,• 182 ; Kommunist icheskaya part ia Uzbekistana v tsifrakh. p. 26; Naselenie SSSR 1987: statisticheskiy sbornik. pp. 8-15, 48-95; Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naselenia 1959 goda. Table 12 in all 16 volumes; Vsesoyuznaya perepis naselenia 17 dekabrya 1926 goda. Volumes 8, 10, 14-16, Table 9, Volumes 9,11, Table 14, Volume 15, Table 11. 2 2 4 obtain at the prouinclal leuel.
Rappoport described membership leuels In the republics to be fairly uniform. This Indicated a strongly regulated quota system, which might not proulde equal distribution of actual power, but would prouide equal rank-and-file membership.^^
Rigby noted that the Party spread its Influence Into all sectors of the economy and society. Only In times of crisis would membership and efforts be concentrated on certain crucial areas.^'^ Otherwise, attempts were made to achleue balance by region, nationality, gender and social class.
Wesson claimed that the Party sought equality by region, but has neuer made any genuine attempt at equality by social group or nationality. Rigby described the stated goals; Wesson more the numerical results.
Hayit has described the role of the Communist Party In Turkestan
(which includes Kazakhstan and the four Central Rslan republics) as ensuring Russian control of the region. Despite standardized membership leuels, only 51% of the members were from local nationalities in the 1970s. The Party was unpopular in Turkestan, 2 2 5 although the specific reasons for this were not giuen. The lack of representation? The poiicies?
Since this section treats Party membership only on the republic leuel and for those of eligible age, there should be conuergent tendencies The demographics of Islamic regions would reduce membership per 1000 persons, but not per 1000 of eligible age. The nationality Issue also has no impact in this section.
During the NEP years Central Asia and Kazakhstan were greatly underrepresented. Rzerbaidzhan was significantly ouerrepresented.
The uprising against the Bolsheuiks probably had a negatlue impact on the Party's image in Centrai Asia. At the same time, the Party was strongest in urban areas, which would haue fauored Azerbaidzhan, but not Kazakhstan and s Ik of the Central Aslan republics.
Stalin's era has been characterized by conuergence in most uariables. This was certainly the case with Azerbaidzhan and
Kazakhstan. The former had been preulously ouerrepresented; the latter conuerged toward the norm simultaneously with the inflUH of
Russians. 2 2 6
Oddly enough, Central Asia fell further behind. This may haue been the result of stressful times", and this region mas not a priority to
Stalin.
The year 1950 saui patterns unusual for the Stalin era. While
Central Rsia became better represented, Kazakhstan and
Rzerbaidzhan exceeded the Party's norms. The most likely explanation mas the higher fatalities among Party members mest of the Urals during World War II.
The post-Stalin era had typical patterns. Rzerbaidzhan s share of
Party members has fallen until by 1987 it mas underrepresented.
Rzerbaidzhan, in general, has lost much of its influence in higher organizations and this mould effect recruitment
Central Rsia continued to conuerge upmard in the Khrushcheu and early Brezhneu years of 1959 and 1970. This gain in pomer mas most likely the result of personal alliances and deals that aided the tmo leaders. The decline has been part of Moscom's neglect in the late
Brezhneu years and Gorbacheus meak client system.
Kazakhstan's decline is likely linked to out-migration and the purge in early 1987. Folloming riots in RIma-Rta In Oecember 1986, an 2 2 7 anti corruption campaign began in Kazakhstan.^^ fln aduerse effect in local terms mas the selection of purged indiulduals. Almost all
Inltlaily mere Kazakhs.^^ When it mas suggested that a "certification campaign" be conducted to test Party loyalty and scrupples tuiice euery flue years, Central Committee secretaries mere enempt The
Central Committee, of course, mas Russian dominated. And none of those mentioned in the purges mas Russian.^^
While a decline in members per 1000 persons can be euplained by a younger population, a decline in members per 1000 of eligible age indicates a combination of reduced opportunity and lack of interest
One benefit of Party membership is job advancement and access to goods, if the Job situation is limited and goods eutremely scarce, the benefits may be non-euistent Ethnic conflicts mould also reduce the interest in recruiting and in being recruited.
"Glasnost" has both uncovered and permitted other activités detrimental to Party membership. In June of 1990 a rival party - the
Kazakhstan Social Democratic Party mas established.^^ This occured at a time mhen the Kazakhstan Communist Party reported losing 1852 members in one month.^^ It mill be most interesting to see future 2 2 8 data for Party membership for 1989 and 1990.
Respect for the Party hod begun to decline long before major riots and riual parties euisted. The Krigiz Party Central Committee reported major educational problems in the Party. In 1986 and 198? the Party had failed to faster respect for diuerse nationalities and patriotism uias reported to be poorly deueloped.^^ Tashkent Radio reported in the spring of 1987 increasing incidences of unregistered clergymen and religious healers, some of uihich mere Party members.^^ The
Party mas clearly not performing its duties.
Ouerall, from the iatter years of Stalin's rule up through
8rezhneu's early years Party membership had generally become more uniform at the republic ieuel. But since 1970 divergence in membership levels increased in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Both
Moscom and local interests mould seem to have been at mark.
Moscom's neglect of the region played a role. The population played one too, mith Russians leaving the area (some going to Baltic republics such as Latvia - see Table 33) and local interest apparently declining.
Given recent circumstances, mhatever opportunity Moscom had to integrate political ideology and local national interests mould seem to 2 2 9 be long past. The decline since 1987, most likely, has produced some interesting patterns in membership leuels. lUhlie the Western media looks at the Baltic and Caucasus region, deeper political dissatisfaction might well be occuring east of the Urals and Caspian.
0. GOODS RNO SERUICES
Uarious opportunities to increase income, acquire goods and services are provided by the state. However, local populations do not react identicaliy to these opportunties or lack of them. This section deals with variables that describe the interaction between Moscow and republic populations regarding employment, sales, preschool care and summer pioneer camps. The first item is linked to local poverty levels; the latter three Items are linked to the degree to which the public sector influences everyday lives.
1. Emoioyed Persons per 1000 Persons: The rapidly growing populations of Central Rsia, Rzerbaidzhan, and Kazakhstan are helping create a growing dependency ratio. Sagers^'^, Winman^^, and others have noted that the youthfulness of the populations of these republics is part of the reason for the poverty there. 1(30
Ka P 90- E Ka R C E N T 80-
CA 7 0- Az
60 19401950 19591926 1970 1979 19^7
Figure 26. Share of Persons Employed in Public Sector per 1000 Population in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. N> 0 4 2 3 1
TABLE 34
SHARE OF PERSONS EMPLOYED IN PUBLIC SECTOR PER 1000 POPULATION (S o v ie t Union - 100)
1926 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1987 Azerbaidzhan 63 95 97 84 68 72 77 Kazakhstan 87 92 92 95 86 89 91 K irg iz ia 88 93 80 78 77 76 75 Tadzhikistan 61 102 88 78 66 64 63 Turkmenistan 83 104 97 89 76 74 76 U zbekistan 74 103 94 79 70 68 69 R ussia 103 110 105 103 105 107 107 Ukraine 105 93 97 102 104 103 103 B e lo ru ssia 108 79 84 96 103 105 107 E stonia a 52 123 116 112 107 107 L atvia a 43 102 115 114 111 111 L ith u a n ia a 19 65 98 107 104 103 M oldavia a 21 93 99 100 98 99 Armenia 86 88 86 84 85 86 92 Georgia 74 95 91 89 91 95 103
a- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were independent countries In 1926. Most of Moldavia was part of Romania in 1926.
S ources: Trud v SSSR: s t a t i s t i c h e s k l y s b o r n ik , 1988, pp. 40-41, 76; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSS'R v 197 9 godu. p. 390; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1959 Rodu, p .591; Vsesoyuznaya perepis naselenia 17 dekabrya 1926 goda. Volumes 27, 28, 31, 33, Table 2, Volume 25, Table 3, Volume 26, Tables 2-3, Volume 32, Table 19; Naselenie SSSR 1987: statisticheskly sbornik, pp. 8-15, 232
It was shown in Chapter SIk that much of the employment problem rests with failure to provide for those who are of working age. With that problem combined with the age problem, the situation has reached crisis proportions. And this situation could have been at least partially avoided.
During the 1926 census Azerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan, and Central
Asia had smaller portions of their population working than the Soviet norm. As Table 34 shows, the other non-Slavic republics of Armenia and Georgia also had low employment rates. With most employment still outside the state sector, local circumstances (primarily traditions and population age) dictated the results.
The Stalin years had the characteristic convergence pattern in employment-dependecy ratios. By 1940 Central Asia actually had a higher employment-dependency ratio than the country as a whole.
Before Moscow is congratulated, part of this relative employment boom was the result of low employment rates in the public sector among the newly acquired Baltic republics and Moldavia. As these regions had their employment controlled by the public sector in the
1940s, the relative employment-dependency ratio of Central Asia 233 declined. Hoiueuer, in 1950 the employment-dependency ratio of
Central Rsia, Rzerbaidzhan, and Kazakhstan mere less than 10% belom the USSR norm and better than those of Lithuania and Belorussia.
Between 1950 and 1970 the employment-dependency ratio of
Central Rsia and Rzerbaidzhan diuerged well below the Souiet auerage. Kazakhstan, after growth up to 1959, also endured decline up to 1970. There were seueral reasons for these declines. The infamous rapid popuiation growth was one reason. Moscow's failure to prouide Jobs for those of working age was another. R third factor was female non-employment during this time. This will be discussed in Chapter Nine.
Since 1970 the relatiue employment-dependency ratios of
Rzerbaidzhan and Kazakhstan haue improued. Those of Central Rsia declined between 1970, then improued in 1979. lUhy?
Population age structure has not improued In these areas.
Moscow has not had much impact on employing those of working age.
Instead, the aging populations west of the Urals haue created greater employment-dependency problems there, which partially
"compensate" for the young, growing populations of Islamic USSR. 2 3 4
Female employment has increased In the public sector of collectiue farms. Thus, the aging population of the Souiet West and the increasing burden on women of the Souiet East haue produced the effect of relatiue improuement of emplogment-dependencg ratios in the Islamic republics.
fls such, the Stalin gears produced conuergence in amplogment- depedency ratios for the Islamic regions. Since then, lagging employment has predominated. Euen with the modest improuement since 1970 in Kazakhstan and Rzerbaidzhan, and since 1979 in Central
Asia, flue republics fell between 23% and 37% below the USSR norm, while Kazakhstan, with its Russian-Kazakh minture, was nine percent below the norm in 1987.
Turkey, with its own rapid population growth and a predominantly priuate sector for employment, has auoided some of the hardships of the Islamic portions of the USSR with better employment In 1970
42.5% of all Turkish citizens were employed. In 1980 this had increased to 42.9%.^^ These ualues were 96% and 91% of the Souiet auerages for those years, or better than any of the siu Islamic republics, including Kazakhstan. This in a country with no guarantees 2 3 5 from the state for jobs!
2. State Retail Trade oer Caolta: The distribution of goods and seruices through the state system giues a uery reliable measure of the successes and failures to include local populations in the Souiet system and "way of life." fls with other aspects of enuironment and behauior, the performance in the Islamic regions has not been good.
Sagers pointed out that there are some problems In price comparisons from one region to another.^^ Howeuer, the differences in prices are not so large as, for instance, in the United States. Also, range of prices in the state sector Is much narrower than for those on the black or grey markets. Souiet tradition, as illustrated by
Gomostayeuas research on the daily health of major cities^^, accept the prices of uarious regions as comparable.
State per-caplta retail trade in 1928 was heauMy concentrated in flussla and the Ukolne. Secondary concentration was around the
Caspian Sea, which benefitted Azerbaidzhan and Turkmenistan. The rest of the country lagged greatly in the deuelopment of the state retail system. Unfortunately, without data from the pre-Souiet era, it
Is impossible to determine whether this was neglect on Moscow's 2 3 6
100
90- Az Ka
P 80 - E R C E N T 70 -
CA
60 . Az
Ka,
50 Y
1928 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1988
Pigure 27, State Retail Trade per Capita la Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 2 3 7
TABLE 35
STATE RETAIL TRADE PER CAPITA ( S o v iet Union - 100)
1928 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1988 Azerbaidzhan 85 98 94 70 62 59 59 K azakhstan 49 72 86 94 87 86 84 K irg iz ia 60 67 70 73 73 71 69 Tadzhikistan 46 71 75 68 62 58 54 Turkmenistan 78 105 102 86 73 70 70 Uzbekistan 62 86 87 77 65 63 61 R ussia 107 114 116 111 110 110 110 Ukra in e 103 85 78 85 91 92 94 B e lo ru s s ia 80 62 57 72 91 101 110 E sto n ia a 124 128 139 150 147 154 L a tv ia a 108 112 137 148 144 145 L ith u a n ia a 62 58 85 110 117 126 M oldavia a 46 50 61 76 85 90 Armenia 54 89 88 77 79 81 83 G eorgia 72 99 92 82 77 83 90
a- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were independent countries in 1928, Most of Moldavia was part of Romania.
S o u rces: Narodnoe khozyavstvo SSSR v 1988 godu. p. 104; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1987 godu. p. 457; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1979 godu. p. 455; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1970 godu. p. 579; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1959 godu. pp. 611,641, 2 3 8 part, or progress.
fls with most other apsects of daily life, the Stalin years were
characterized by conuergence of retail trade per capita throughout
the country. The retaii network - when euciduing newly acquired
Moldauia - was the most baianced in 1940 for the entire Souiet era.
Since 1950 the pattern of retail trade reflected that of the rest of
daily life in the Islamic republics. Kazakhstan euperienced relatiue
growth up through 1959, then has endured slow decline. Centrai flsia's
rapid growth ended around 1959, and per-capita retail sales haue
lagged further and further behind the country euer since, flapid
decline occured in flzerbaidzhan between 1950 and 1959, and slower, but steady decline has followed.
The decline shown in Figure 27 and Table 35 for the Islamic republics mirrors the pattern obserued by Schroeder for 1960 - 1970 -
1980. The traditional enplanation, of course, has been the rapid
population growth in the region.^^ Howeuer, a major portion of the
fault lies with the state's low employment of people of working age.
Other factors are inuolued. Tadzhibayeua states that the delcine in retail sales in Turkmenistan is due, in large part, to the increasing 2 3 9
dependency of large families on their rented plots.^ The state
system does not prouide the food needed by rural residents, fl survey by Khinchuk for 1976 and 1984 indicated that the urban-rural ratio of
state food sales was much higher in Rzerbaidzhania and Central Asia
and increasing.^^ This reinforces the conclusion that much of food
trade must be outside the state system in rural areas. And as the rural share increases, this pattern of trade affects the republic system more and more.
State neglect is partly due to faulty planning criteria. Bystrova and Bukibayeva describe the distribution and services system as inadequate since it is based on total population, rather than the particular features of location and age.^^ Many Items in high demand are in short supply (due to underestimation of the group needing such products), as well as many items not being purchased since they are in ouersupply or are of little use to local needs.
Even more sinister factors are involved. Interrepublic trade has figured into retail problems. The governments of Kazakhstan and
Kirgizia seized control of enports of strategic items during the past winter. In June 1990 Tadzhikistan restricted the enport of 2 4 0 agricultural and consumer goods.'^ In April 1900 Uzbekistan not only restricted enports, but also required Uzbek Identification In order to purchase goods In stores.^^ Two months later Uzbekistan seized full control ouer the supply of cotton, silk, leather and fur/*^
The reasons were uery simple. Uaiuabie products were being euported out that created Jobs and better food supply in European
USSR. By retaining these products, more Jobs could be created at home, and more products would be auallable In local stores. Central
Rsia, Rzerbaidzhan, and Kazakhstan had been euportlng their wealth
In return for Inadequate or unusable goods.
Illegal products haue replaced many of the state-controlled goods. The pouerty-stricken areas of Asiatic USSR utilized the anti- alcohol campaign to some aduantage. Moscow Radio described opium production In Central Asia as abundant in 1986. This was in part due to weaker superulsion by the Communist Party and other agencies, lower use of alcohol among Muslims, and the need to generate alternative income. Based on an Izuestia report in June 1990 that the 1989 anti- poppy campaign uncovered over 100,000 plantations in Kazakhstan and Central flsia^^. It appears this form of alternative Income has 2 4 1 been a part (cause and/or reaction to) of lower actiuity in state retail trade.
The rigidly controlled system under Stalin led to the Souiet Union's greatest equality of state retail trade. Since that time, employment problems, lower paying jobs, increasing dependency on priuate plots for food, increasing population rurallzation, and increasing use of outside income and recreational drug sources haue caused the state market in Central Asia and Rzerbaidzhan to lag precipitously behind that of the rest of the country. Euen Kazakhstan, with its large
Russian population and higher price structure, has only 84% of the per-capita norm of the USSR state retail system. Giuen the pouerty of the Islamic regions, this is not Just local habits, but local habits being enhanced by a shortage of opportunties prouided by Moscow.
Hopefully, the republic gouernments will résolue some of the imbalances.
3. Percent of Eligible Children in Preschool: Daycare and other preschool facilities haue been a necessity for Souiet families. The distribution of facilities hints at Moscow's interest in the women of the region. How fully they are used prouides insight into local trust In 2 4 2
140
120
CA 100
Ka P E R C E N T
Ka 60 - CA
40 - Az
1940 1950 1959 1970 1988
Figure 28. Percent of Eligible Children in Preschool in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 2 4 3
TABLE 36
PERCENT or ELIGIBLE CHILDREN IN PRESCHOOL (Soviet Union =100)
1940 1950 1959 1970 1980 1988 Azerba idzhan: 136 92 59 32 35 34 Kazakhstan 61 58 61 81 85 91 Kirgizia 43 69 61 49 52 52 Tadzhikistan 44 52 55 30 30 28 Turkmenistan 183 140 116 51 52 53 Uzbekistan 111 75 65 41 63 62 Russia 111 122 126 132 120 122 Ukraine 87 71 73 103 106 105 Estonia 72 85 128 135 117 117 Moldavia 167 67 36 59 113 121 Armenia 99 95 77 68 67 67
Sources : Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR V 1988 godu. p. 194; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1959 Rodu, pp. 736-737; Kulturnoe stroltelstvo SSSR; statisticheskly sbornik. 1956, pp. 192, 198; Vestnik s t a t i s t i k i , 1987, No. 1, p. 63; Itogi Vaesoyuznoy perepisl naselenia 1959 goda. Table 12 of all 16 volumes.
TABLE 37
PERCENT OF SCHOOL CHILDREN IN SUMMER PIONEER CAMPS (Soviet Union = 100)
1950 1959 1970 197 9 1986 Azerbaidzhan 71 57 36 39 43 Kazakhstan 66 57 63 . 68 64 Kirgizia 42 57 40 45 60 Tadzhikistan 22 37 29 35 35 Turkmenistan 55 42 36 71 70 Uzbekistan 47 43 63 54 61 Russia 124 129 119 120 123 Ukraine 81 81 108 113 105 Estonia 95 90 128 105 112 Moldavia 27 27 61 127 133 Armenia 76 60 173 126 119
Sources : .Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR za 70 le t. pp. 536. 54 Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR V 1979 godu. p. 491; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR V 1959 godu. pp. 728, 738-739; Kulturnoe stroltelstvo SSSR: statistichi skiy sbornik, 1956, pp. 6-39, ;96-197. 2 4 4 the ouerall Souiet system.
In 1940 the preschool network was somewhat balanced throughout the Islamic republics, with the euceptions of remote
Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan. Rzerbaidzhan and Uzbekistan were in a superior position by Souiet standards. Tuftmenistan had the best deueloped system in the country. This deuelopment can be traced to
Stalin s desire to bring these regions into Souiet ideology.
Since 1940 Rzerbaidzhan has fallen behind the ouerall system.
UJhile the same has occured in neighboring Rrmenia, the decline there has been far less seuere. By 1970 about a third of eligible children were in daycare in Rzerbaidzhan (see Figure 28).
Central Rsia fell from a region with auerage deuelopment in 1940
to one with about 40% the Rll-Union auerage in 1970. What is most surprising about these declines is that they occured in years of economic prosperity. Facilities should haue been in greater abundance. The full weight of the baby boom had not yet been felt.
Kazakhstan has been an enürely different story. There was a modest lag in deuelopment between 1940 and 1950, but since then
Kazakhstan has steadily conuerged with Rll-Union standards. The 2 4 5 presence of Russians there is, no doubt, a factor. Euen more
Important has been the urbanization established there. Preschool establishements haue been much more auallable in cities than rural areas.
Since 1970 Rzerbaidzhan and Central Rsia haue had modest improuement in the share of children in preschool facilities. Faciiity construction may haue increased. Local residents may haue become more willing to use them. Standards of number of children per employee and/or room haue been relaued
Rs of 1988 Kazakhstan had 91% the use rate. Central Rsia and
Rzerbaidzhan, despite modest "improuement in usage", had usage rates of 54% and 34% the USSR norm. Tadzhikistan (predominated by people of Iranian linguistic ties) and Rzerbaidzhania (people of the
Shiite branch of Islam) show both low total and declining usage rates since the 1979 reuoiution in Iran. The family tradition aspect of that reuolution may haue had some impact
The pattern of preschooi usage in Rzerbaidzhan and Central Rsia follow the general patterns of decline and poor seruice described by
Sagers and Hamilton.^^ Rs Bystroua and Bukibayeua noted, 2 4 6
Moscow's share of the blame lies in planning per 1000 persons, rather than planning by age groups.^^ Based on the age structure, this would leaue the Souiet South chronically underdeueloped for preschool seruices when compared to the rest of the country.
The shortage of preschool space has been much more than relatiue. Petmecky noted that Souiet plans had eupected to be able to handle 4.2 million children by 1942. Vet, there were 30 million employed mothers at tlie beginning of the war with Germany.^^ Euen the peace after the war and the prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s aided little. Reuesz claims that in 1969 only 20% of the ouerall need in preschool space was being m et^^ Combining relatiue rank and absolute space, about 5% of Tadzhikistan's need was met In 1940, and about 6% in 1969. This was hardly much improuement in any terms.
It ccuid be argued that Muslims are not interested in using the facilities (with eutended families being common, "ease" of taking children out to work on the farm, mistrust of the system, etc.).
Howeuer, recent surueys of preschool use and complaints about shortages suggest otherwise. In 1987 about 9% of desired preschool space was not met in the USSR. The figures for the Islamic republics 2 4 7 were: Rzerbaidzhan - 2%; Kazkhstan - 14%; Kirgizia - 17%;
Tadzhikistan - 23%; Turkmenistan - 21%; and Uzbekistan - 10%. fls the Souiet figure had declined In the 1980s, the figures for all sin republics had increased.^^
It is uery difficult to measure the quality of the spaces auallable, plus how much unmet need was neuer registered. Most likely, there was a larger share of unmet need not registered in Central flsia (in the
United States a larger share of unemployed persons are not registered among groups hauing the highest official rates - lack of success leading to lack of effort or apathy). Just as infant mortality rates are most undercounted in Central flsia, the lack of needed preschool space is most likely more undercounted there.
fls women become increasingly prenaient in collectiue farm work
(see Chapter 9) and the conditions become increasingly worse (see
Chapter 6), the need for preschool care grows. The decreased leuels of usage in the prosperous years were likely linked to more women at home, while economic decline has forced more women to fulltime work in the public sector. lUhateuer the case, there is clearly a greater need for more facilities in Central flsia and Kazakhstan than In 2 4 8
the rest of the country. Based on conditions in education, there is, no doubt, greater need for quaiity too.
4. Summer Pioneer Camns: Preschool facilities free the parents for daily work and is linked with employment and income. Camps are linked more closely for free time for recreation, fls such, the two uariables not only indicate state and family interaction, but also relatiue attitudes toward the ualue of work and leisure.
The patterns of relatiue usage of preschool facilities and summer pioneer camps haue differed. Preschool faciiity deuelopment occured much earlier throughout the USSR, including the Islamic regions. In
1950 preschool usage was much higher in all six republics. Since this was true for the entire country, Moscow was primarily responsible for this distinction.
Summer camps haue been less deueloped in Kazakhstan than has been the case for preschool space. Many of those who moued to
Kazakhstan were single people. Many of those leauing, presumably, would be families. The shortage of leisure facilities may be a contributing factor, fls such, Kazakhstan has not euperienced the steady conuergence in summer camp usage as has been typical for 80-r
70-
Ka Ka
P 60- E CA R C E N T 50-
CA Az
4 0 -
30 1950 1959 1970 1979 1986
Figure 29. Percent of School Children in Summer Pioneer Camps in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan ro (Ka) R e la tiv e to the Average fo r the S ov iet Union. ê 2 5 0 many other uariables. The reasons may be as simple as physical geographic attributes (particularly distances) or demographics.
Summer camp usage in Rzerbaidzhan has been lour since 1950 and declined through to 1970. Hoiueuer, since 1970 summer camp usage has increased more rapidly than for the USSR as a whole. lOith economic hardship, this may haue been an inenpensiue method of enjoying what the republic has to offer - scenery and clean conditions outside the cities. Rs the enuironmentol mouement has gained strength in recent years, there may be an increased interest in outdoors actiuities.
Central Rsia was the weakest region of summer camp usage in
1950. Howeuer, it conuerged toward the norm steadily up through
1906. By that year usage was up to 56% Souiet norms.
lUhile the usage is improuing in Central Rsia and Rzerbaidzhan, the ouerall result is seuere lagging in summer camp usage compared to the rest of the country. The conuergence of Central Rsia seems less rosy when compared to the rapid deuelopment of these camps in
Moldauia, whose usage climbed from 27% the national norm in 1950 to
133% in 1986. Rzerbaidzhan and Rrmenia had similar leuels of summer 2 5 1 camp usage in 1950 (71% to 76%), yet by 1986 the gap mas 43% to
119%. Clearly, Moscom has chronically neglected deuelopment of summer camps In regions of the USSR mith much outdoor potential.
On the other hand, the demand in these republics may not be great. School children here haue often been used to help mith planting and haruesting. It is likely that they are too important as laborers
(outside the public sector) to let go for the summer. This hidden labor may also euplain much of the economic actiuity going on outside the state retail sector.
In short, the underdeuelopment of summer camp usage, unlike that for preschool facilities, may be more closely linked to parental attitudes than opportunities prouided by the state. Unfortunately, no suruey or data mas found regarding unmet needs in this area.
E. SUMMBRV OF RESULTS
Many of the patterns obserued for enuironmentol uariables in
Chapter 6 repeated themselues for the enuironmental-behauioral uariables in this chapter. Conuergence mas the norm in the Stalin years of 1940 and 1950 (indicating relatiue improuement in Central
Rsia and Kazakhstan, and relatiue decline in Rzerbaidzhan). Since that 2 5 2 time Kazakhstan has generally continued to conuerge (Improue) toward national noms, while Rzerbaidzhan and Central Asia haue declined.
Ouerall, participation by residents of the sin Islamic republics in the Souiet system lagged in nearly euery area. The two major enceptions - share of degree holders In the employed labor force - can be enplained as a function of lower employment rates. Population growth has been used to enplain much of these problems in preuious studies. Howeuer, nine of the ten uariables in this chapter haue eliminated population age-structure as a factor, and still found significant underdeuelopment or underuse in the Islamic regions.
The more critical the actiulty, the greater the lag. Getting into higher or secondary specialized education is not as important to influence as obtaining candidate or doctorate degrees or hauing Party membership. And in the latter two areas the lag was greater.
Preschool use is more sIgnlAcant on a day-to-day basis than summer camp usage, and as of the late 1980s it was more weakly deueloped In
Islamic areas. 2 5 3
There has been some merit In saying that Souiet Muslims mere among the best educated In the morld. Homeuer, the edge they haue had has eroded or euen disappeared uihen compared to a poorer society, Turkey, which does not make promises (but does allow better opportunities abroad). And In employment, the residents of socialist
Azerbaidzhan, Central Asia and Kazakhstan haue more problems than those of predominantly capitalist Turkey, which has nearly Identical population problems.
Ouerall, the degree of underdeuelopment In these areas of life was surprising. Education, Party membership, and preschool facilities haue generally been based on strict quotas systems applied for the entire country. One simple eupianation of the Imbalance since 1950 is the system of measuring need per 1000 residents." As pointed out, serulces and opportunities in education, Party membership, jobs, retailing, and childrens serulces need to be geared bu age groups.
Moscow's neglect in urban deulopment has caused many of the problems, since education. Party membership, and serulces are most closely linked to urban critiera. Local habits are inuoiued too - disinterest in politics, enposure to the state's Ideology, need for 2 5 4 children as laborers, and the use of Illegal drugs (opium, coclane) as a source of income and recreation.
Based on this chapter and the preuious one. It Is likely that there has been some convergence in behaulor In the Lenin and Stalin years
(and beyond In Kazakhstan), but divergence In behavior since then. As
Moscow has neglected the Isalmic region's daily environment, local solutions and habits have most likely been reinforced. CHAPTER uni
BEHRUIOR
R. INTRODUCTION
While the Souiet system has placed numerous limitations on indiuidual behauior, there are still a number of choices an indiuidual can make there. There is some freedom to choose in which locale to reside, and nearly unlimited freedom on whether to marry, diuorce and the number of children a couple (or single mother) has. The uariables in this section reflect the attitudes of republic populations.
B. MIGRATION
While migration patterns in the Stalin years were strongly influenced by compulsary relocation, ouer time it has been an increasing matter of choice. In this sense, it is an encellent measure of the desirability of a location or the unwillingness of local populations to moue (do the relatiue aduantages of the system elsewhere really mean anything?).
2 5 5 TABLE 38
ANNUAL AVERAGE NET MIGRATION PER 1000 POPULATION
1940 1950/51 1958/59 1969/70 1978/79 : .1986/87 Azerbaidzhan + 6.43 +10.62 -4 .06 -1.11 -2.61 -4.78 • Kazakhstan -9.24 + 9.39 +18.41 -0.78 -4.41 -7.02 Kirgiz la +30.11 -8.89 +5.3 2 +0.33 -4.09 -5.63 Tadzhikistan +9.76 +13.25 +4.58 +1.97 -3.13 -3.18 Turkmenistan +21.57 -9.44 +7.42 +1.71 -1.84 -2.82 Uzbekistan +10.63 +7 .64 +2.33 +2.14 -1.58 -4.95 Russia +3.27 -1.64 -1.96 -0.73 +1.17 +1.10 UkraIne +8.21 +3.65 +1.69 +1.56 -0.11 +0.56 Belorussla +1.01 -15.06 -6.97 +0.43 -0.28 -0.32 Estonia +2.85 +10.53 +4.47 +10.50 +3.14 +2.94 Latvia -3.08 +2 .88 +1.78 + 5.23 +2.4 9 +3.51 Lithuania +5.45 . -8 .08 +2.68 +2.65 +1.65 +1.62 Moldavia -8.16 +8 .86 +4.01 +0.78 -4.59 +0.98 Armenia +0.98 -7.87 +3.44 +5.49 -0.32 -2.91 Georgia +1.14 +2.03 +2.05 -2.03 -3.50 +1.4 3
Sources; Naselenie SSSR 1987: statlstlcheskly sbornlk, pp. 8-15, 110-126; Naselenle SSSR 1973: statlstlcheskly sbornlk. pp, 69-83; Vestnlk statlstikl, 1990, No. 3, pp. 74-79.
5 a> 2 5 7
Rs indicated in Table 38, Central Rsia was generally a net recipient of migrants from 1940 to 1970. Kazakhstan receiued massiue influHes of people in the 1950s (linked to Stalin's policies and Khrushcheu's
"Uirgin Lands" project). Rzerbaidzhan receiued more migrants than it lost during the Stalin years.
The gains from migration shrank in Central Rsia during the 1960s, while Kazakhstan and Rzerbaidzhan were net losers. Since 1970s all siH republics haue been net losers and at increasing rates.
These net migration flows correspond roughly to what others haue obserued. The Meduedkou report noted that in 1986 the biggest losers in net migration were the southern republics and the Ukraine.
Rt the same time, the Raltics, the Moscow region and lUestem Siberia haue had net in-migration.^ Knabe noted that there had been increasing net outflow from Central Rsia and Kazakhstan.^ Rowland had predicted growing outflow from Central Rsia in the latter 1980s owing to reduced inuestments.^ Whether measuring migration by an indiuidual year, a pair of years, or all the years ouer a decade, the conclusions haue been the same. This indicates that the short-term patterns and long-term patterns haue been mutually consistent 2 5 8
The mouement out of Central Rsia would initially seem beneficial, since it does haue a surplus of labor. Howeuer, the out-migrants haue not been the rural Central Asians (as Moscow desires), but urban
Russians. Rowland'^ and others haue predicted that the 1989 census will indicate major reductions in the Russian presence owing to migration. This is certainly consistent with the patterns between
1959 and 1979.
The outflow of Russians has been so strong that some measures haue been taken or proposed to bring some back. The Rzerbaidzhan! gouernment has offered the housing and jobs that Russians left in
Baku, as well as protection. The gouernment has described the recent euodus of Russians from the city as "unwanted."^ This could be an attempt to keep Russians there in order to encourage inuestment, or else to placate Moscow's concern about local loyalty.
The failure of Central Asians to leaue the region has many causes and euplanations. IDiuman^ and Feshbach^ euplain that Russians themselues haue created barriers, such as the failure to create sufficient wage incentiues (for poorly trained workers), adequate settlements, and non-Russian schools. Low mobility has led to an 2 5 9 increase in the Central Asians share of the population in their own repuhiics. ^ This further discourages out-migration.
The net out-migration from the Islamic republics has reduced growth rates, a desirable consequence/* Howeuer, the migrants within the Islamic republics haue not been leauing the ouerpopulated rural areas. In 1985 the migrants in all sin republics were less likely to moue from rural to urban areas than anywhere else in the USSR.***
Of greater concern, the percentage of migrants mouing to urban areas declined from 1979 to 1985.**
There are many enplanations for the failure of migrants to leaue their rural regions with all their unemployment and pouerty for the city. There are numerous administratiue barriers to migration into the cities. Apartments, when auailable, are too small for Central Asian families. Pooriy trained workers are not needed in the cities. All of the problems noted in chapters sin and seuen make it difficult for the employment and congestion problems to be solued by Central Asians within their own republics.
The net out-migration from the Islamic republics has been a reaction to the economic problems created or unresolued by Moscow. 2 6 0
Unfortunately, those who are leauing haue the least need to moue to improued conditions, while those most needy are unable to take aduantage of euen the limited opportunities of cities in their own republics.
C. MRRRIR&E RNO DIUORCE
1. Marriaqe-Diuorce Ratio: Sagers considered marriage a surrogate for social order and diuorce a surrogate for social disorder.^ ^ This interpretation of marriage and diuorce seems unjustified at present since the regions with the highest ratios (Rzerbaidzhan, Rrmenia, and
Central Rsia) are also the ones with most frequent ethnic uiolence.
Howeuer, during the years couered by Sagers' research, this was perhaps ualid. Owing to a shortage or total absence of media information on uiolence at that time, it was perhaps the only way to approKimate order and disorder.
Zuidrinsh considers marriage and diuorce encellent measures of attitude changes in society.^^ R higher ratio would indicate more ualue on family and less ualue on public life. Conuersely, as this ratio fell, one could surmise that public life was of greater concern or had greater influence on people. 2 6 1
450 -I
400 ■
350
300
Az
P 250 - E R C CA E N T 200
Ka
ISO
Ka
100
fCA
50 Az
1940 1950 1959 1970 19871979 Figure 30. Marrlago-Elvorce Ratio In Azer baidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazekhatan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. TABLE 3 9
RELATIVE MARRIAGE-DIVORCE RATIO (Soviet Union =100)
1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1987 Azerbaidzhan 47 87 193 140 267 274 Kazakhstan 94 436 386 160 141 119 Kirgizia 57 539 389 202 196 176 Tadzhikistan 51 227 362 227 234 216 Turkmenistan 51 150 301 192 239 220 Uzbekistan 44 311 433 225 257 223 Russia 99 80 84 89 85 85 Ukraine 131 144 93 93 96 95 Latvia 163 42 44 59 60 81 Moldavia 293 176 119 121 141 115 Armenia 49 523 370 202 310 244
Sources: Naselenie SSSR 1987 ; statisticheskiy sbornik. pp. 190- 197; Naselenie SSSR 1973 : statisticheskiy sbornik. pp. 150-165.“ ------
ro » N) 2 6 3
In 1940 the marriage-diuorce ratios were below-norm in the
Islamic regions, fls will be shown later, this was due to the entreme political conditions at the time. UJith more normal circumstances since the Stalin era, the Islamic republics haue all had ratios aboue the norm for the Souiet Union, with all sin republics peaking in the 1950s.
During the 1960s the relatiue ratios fell throughout the Islamic republics. This may haue been due to greater interest among males in pursuing greater educational and employment opportunities, fls
Lapidus noted, women were still more strongly committed to the idea of marriage. Based on the 1970 census, the number of women claiming to be married enceed the number of males by 1,345,000
This would indicate diuergent attitudes toward the meaning of marriage and cohabitation. This would haue been most noticeable in the regions undergoing the greatest change in attitudes toward marriage - the Islamic regions.
Since 1970 there haue been diuergent patterns in the sin republics. Marriage stability has continued to fall, despite the out-migration of flussians. This indicates either a conuergence in attitudes among the Kazakhs and flussians or greater instability 2 6 4 among the Russians or mined marriages due to out-mlgratlon.
Central Rsia and Rzerbaidzhan euperienced increased marital stability in 1979. The de-emphasis of public life may haue been a reaction to declining economic opportunities at the time. This trend as continued in Rzerbaidzhan, while economic problems in the 1980s haue led to greater instability in Central Rsia.
Uolkou has attributed increasing diuorce rates in Islamic regions to the stresses of adpating to modem, urban life.^^ This does not seem to bear out when comparing rates with another Islamic region euperiencing modernization and urbanization - Turkey. Despite rapid urbanization in the 1980s, the marriage-diuorce ratio nearly doubled between 1979 and 1986, with ualues being 576% and 705% the Souiet norm for those years.^^ The changes in neighboring Islamic countries and modernization do not appear to be the cause of the declining ratios in Central Rsia and Rzerbaidzhan. The realities of Souiet life, cultural or economic, are the cause.
2. Marriage before 20 Years of flge: One of the assumptions about
Muslim women is that they marry early in life. In Souiet Central Rsia many of the young brides were children at the time their family or a 2 6 5
200
175 -
CA
R 125
Az
100
Ka
75
50 1945 1955 1960192519351915 1919 1929 1939 1949 1959 1964 (Year of birth)
Figure 31. Share of Rural Women Married before Age 20 per 1000 Surveyed In Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 2 6 6
TABLE 40
WOMEN AGE 20 OR YOUNGER AMONG ALL WOMEN GETTING MARRIED IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA
1867-70 1880 1890 1900 1910 Musi1ms 47.6 47.7 53.1 53.7 58.6 Orthodox 59.5 59.6 59.0 59.1 56.6 C atholics 37.7 39.3 38.0 36.4 37.0 Protestants 27.8 29.0 26.7 27.1 29.5 J ews 59.8 53.5 35.2 24.5 24.0 Russia 57.4 56.7 56.0 55. 9 54.5
Source: Rybakovskly, 1988, p. 78.
TABLE 41
SHARE OF RURAL WOMEN MARRIED BEFORE AGE 20 PER 1000 SURVEYED (Soviet Union = 100)
(Year of birth) 1915-19 1925-29 1935-39 1945-49 1955- 59 1960-6' Azerbaidzhan 110 173 138 123 62 53 Kazakhstan 116 150 132 103 79 80 Kirgizia 124 180 156 130 107 104 Tadzhikistan 147 197 175 181 151 130 Turkmenistan 135 216 151 112 80 49 Uzbekistan 114 182 170 146 122 104 Russia 97 81 93 91 97 104 Lithuania 53 78 53 60 67 74 Moldavia 129 184 117 97 103 117 Georgia 132 .14 3 86 95 89 91
Source: Naselenie SSSR 1987: statlstlcheskly sbornlk, p. 201. 2 6 7
guardian arranged for them to become the property of a male. This
practice of buying young brides mas one of the first Islamic
institutions attacked by new Souiet laius. In 1821 the purchase of
brides was made illegal.^ ^ The minimum age for femaies to iegally
marry was set at age 16 in 1926, and later this was increased to 18.^^
Rs Table 40 demonstrates, teenage brides were not much more
common among Muslims than among those of the OrthodOK faith in
Tsarist Russia. It was only on the eue of Uiorld War I that a higher
share of Muslim women were married before age 20 than among
OrthodoK women. In addition, arranged marriages were by no means
confined to the Islamic faith.
in the years prior to World War II, the incidence of teenage marriage among women of Islamic regions was higher than for the
rest of the country, but not eutraordinarily much higher. It was
following the war that the relatiue rate of teenage marriage become
dramatically higher In the Islamic republics than for the country as a
whole. Howeuer, this was less linked to changes in attitudes among
the Muslims than among those in the European sectors. The loss of
young males and the deuastation of war had affected the Slauic and 2 6 8
Baltic populations far more than those located outside the inuaded areas.
Since 1945-1949 the relatiue rate of early marriage among the women of the Islamic regions has steadily declined. Educational opportunties haue, no doubt, played a role in this. Increased employment leuels in the public sector also haue influenced the increasing trend to delayed marriage for women.
Howeuer, the trend in the late 1970s and early 1980s was so dramatic that women of Rzerbaidzhan and Kazakhstan were significantly less likely to marry young than was typical for the country as a whole. Euen Central Asian women had about the same odds of marrying before 20 as those throughout the rest of the country.
Education and employment are not the full answer for the continued decline. Reuesz noted that a large number of girls no longer attended Central Asian schools as teenagers and that bride purchases were still being done (illegally, of course).^ ^ Uihat has most likely occured in the 1970s and 1980s is that economic decline has led families to keep their girls home to do work (especially on collectiue 2 6 9
farms), and that the growing practice of bride purchases has brought
a price tag that not as many families can afford.
In addition to bad economic times reducing Uie "auailability" of
younger brides, the relatiue decline of younger brides is likely linked
to an underreporting or delayed reporting of marriages.
Arrangements for marriage can be made and actually accomplished,
while the authorities are in the dark.
All in all, the relatiue decline of officially registered teenage
marriages among those women of the Islamic regions began as a
result of greater opportunties in the post-war economic boom, but
haue continued due to pouerty and illegal actiuities. This behauior indicates a growing trend toward both traditional habits and a reaction by people liuing in a deteriorating economic enuironment.
3. Diuorce and Aemarriaqe: The marriage-diuorce ratio in the Souiet
Union was relatiuely low in 1940. Diuorce rates were highest in the
Islamic republics. Yuri Meduedkou attributes these high rates to the
purges in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and the mouement to the East
(forced or out of fear) in 194D, which caused many women to diuorce
to protect themselues and their children from their husbands' guilt. 2 7 0
100
Ka
80
Az P 60 E CA R C E N Az T 40
Ka CA
20 -
——;— ----I— ------1 1958 1969 1978 198 4 1959 1970 1979 1985
Figure 32. Incidence of Divorce per 1000 Married Couples in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 2 7 1
TABLE 42
INCIDENCE OF DIVORCE PER 1000 MARRIED COUPLES (Soviet Union =100)
1958-59 1969-70 1978-79 1984-85 Azerbaidzhan 60 65 45 41 Kazakhstan 28 68 82 85 K irg izia 26 54 66 60 Tadzhikistan 28 51 57 60 Turkmenistan 42 57 57 57 Uzbekistan 26 51 53 52 Russia 123 116 115 115 Latvia 200 162 145 135 Moldavia 68 78 76 79 Armenia 28 41 33 34
Source: Naselenie SSSR 1987: statlstlcheskly sbornlk. p. 208.
TABLE 4 3
SHARE OF DIVORCED WOMEN WHO MARRY AGAIN WITHIN 10 YEARS PER 1000 DIVORCED WOMEN (Soviet Union =100)
(Year of Divorce) 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 Azerbaidzhan 63 64 46 34 30 Kazakhstan 105 104 104 104 102 K irg izia 113 122 91 89 98 Tadzhikistan 137 125 106 106 86 Turkmenistan 82 77 67 52 60 Uzbekistan 95 97 82 73 59 Russia 107 109 109 108 110 Latvia 101 127 125 126 114 Moldavia 114 109 99 99 98 Armenia 55 39 33 17 18
Source; Naselenie SSSR 1987; statlstlcheskly sbornlk, p. 207. 2 7 2
Ka
CA Ka 100
90
80
CA P 70 E R C Az E M T 60
50
40
Az 30 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 (Year of Divorce)
Figure 33. Share of Divorce Women Who Marry Again within 10 Years per 1000 Divorced Women in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakh stan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 2 7 3
The high diuorce rate has been of concern to the state since it affects fertility rates and, thus, the labor and military conscription supply. Petmecky noted that diuorce tuas made difficult in Nouember
1940 not for the sake of family stability, but rather labor supply and social order.^^ The major obstacle to diuorce mas the cost; it simply mas too eupensiue for most couples to pay for.^^ The cost of diuorce mas also increased mith each succeeding one (from 50 rubles for the first to 150 rubles for the second to 300 for the third). By 1944 the lams included a stipulation that a couple had to proue a need for diuorce. All of this led to a major decline in diuorce, particularly in the Islamic regions (see Figure 30 and Table 39).
As shomn in Figure 32, the marriage-diuorce ratio mas higher in
Islamic regions in the post-Stalin years oming to decreased diuorces.
Since the late 1950s fiue of the Islamic republics haue had diuorce rates per 1000 married couples mell belom the USSR aucrage. Only in
Kazakhstan has there been a significant trend tomard conuergence mith the national norm. This trend could reflect changing habits of
Kazakhs or the instability of marriages among the rapidly out-migrating Russian population. 2 7 4
Cultural habits other than attitude toward diuorce likely play a role in the relatiuely low diuorce rates of Central Asians and
Azerbaidzhanis. Zuidrinsh notes that alcoholism is the leading cause of diuorce in Latuia.^^ The lower frequency of alcoholism among
Muslims (or absence among true belieuers") would account for a reduced rate. And the Kazakhs may haue higher rates, since they haue higher incidences of drug abuse than other Islamic peoples.
Aosenberg cites physical abuse as a major cause for diuorce in the
USSA.^"^ Lapidus notes that half of diuorces are requested by women, and mentions drinking and abuse.^^ Abuse, traditonally, would not be a reason for diuorce among Muslims. In addition, Islamic societies haue traditionally not permitted women to file for diuorce (although one Egyptian woman noted that a Muslim woman can make the man wish for one}.
Howeuer, with diuorce legally auailable in the USSR, it is more common among Muslim women there than in other countries. Hayit notes that the low leuel of Anancial support for couples from both the state and friends has put greater stress on marriages.^^ Reuesz links most diuorces in Islamic areas to crowded housing conditions. Ulith 2 7 5 few priuote apartments auailable, in-laws haue become Increasingly inuoiued in marriages (since the couple must Hue with them) and this has led to rapid increases in diuorce in the Islamic regions of the USSR when compared to other Islamic socities (where couples may haue better opportunity to Hue with fnendsL^?
It would appear that traditional attitudes toward diuorce haue changed little among the Islamic people of the USSR, but that the legal opportunity for women and the aduerse housing situation has increased its rate to being among the highest in the Islamic world.
Remarriage after diuorce is uery rare for Muslim women. Most women who remarry do so only after the death of their husband, in which they become the wife of his oldest brother or a oldest stepson.
Uiithin the USSR it would be logical that women who were willing and able to diuorce, would feel freer to remarry.
In the late Stalin years remarriage among diuorced women was as common in Kazakhstan and Central Rsia as for the rest of the country.
This was true in the early Khrushcheu years as well. Apparently, those women who broke with Islamic tradition by diuorcing continued to be as independent by remarrying. 2 7 6
Howeuer, after 1959 this changed. The relatiue rate of remarriage has plummeted In Central Rsia In the Brezhneu and Gorbacheu years.
There are seuerai reasons for this. Based on other behauloraS
attributes, It Is likely that traditional habits became more common.
Thus, those women who had diuorced In more liberal" times, were
unable to remarry. The Increase In bridal dowries made diuorced
women a greater risk. Also, the harder times of the 1970s and 1980s
has made a dowry on a "high risk" bride unaffordable.^^ Rs Haylt has
noted, a diuorced or rejected bride has tradlUonaliy been welcomed
back by her family. They receiued the first dowry for her and now
they can better support her and. If she has a good Job, welcome her
own financial aid to the famlly.^^ In the hard times of the 1970s and
1980s a diuorced women is too much of a risk for a man's family, and
the woman's family is unlikely to be unhappy with her return.
Thus, both Islamic tradition and Souiet economic reality haue
discouraged remarriage among Central Asian women. In
Rzerbaidzhan, where the marriage-diuorce ratio has been far aboue
the national auerage and where diuorce has become Increasingly less
common In recent decades, the plummet from the Khrushcheu years 2 7 ? was from 64% the USSR remarriage rate to 307o. The attitudes there haue become euen more traditional.
Hs with diuorce and other behauioral uariables, women of
Kazkhstan haue been increasingly likely to remarry. By 1985 they were 85% as likely as the national norm. As with diuorce, this could reflect changes in attitudes among Kazakh women, or else reflect the growing instability and independence of women among the uery mobile Russian population.
Rs such, during the 1950s remarriage rates were close to the USSR norm in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, while Rzerbaidzhan had a distinctiuely lower rate. Since then Central Asia and Azerbaidzhan haue followed similar trends to reduced remarriage, while Kazakhstan has conuerged with Souiet norms. The Central Asians and
Rzerbaidzhanis may haue different attitudes than Kazakhs or are merely reacting to an enuironment that has relatiuely deteriorated much more rapidly.
D. CHILDREN
DJith no legal or ideological restrictions regarding the number of children, and with abortion free upon demand, family size is indicatiue 2 7 8 of attitudes and lluing conditions. There has been a stated intent by
Souiet leaders to make child-bearing easier by prouiding between eight to siuteen weeks of maternity leaue, along with daycare and a shorter working day for new mothers.^^ Howeuer, Petmecky noted that before World War II Souiet newspapers receiued letters regarding the lack of state help to new mothers and that enpecting mothers rarely receiued their full maternity leaue and continued to be giuen heauy manual labor tasks.^^
Although poorer and limited to below norm housing space and quality, Rzerbaidzhanis, Kazakhs and Central Asians haue continued to haue large families. Howeuer, the relatiue size of their families haue not remained constant.
Sagers noted that crude birth rates are uery useful in measuring a region's population growth potential. He noted that crude birth rates in Islamic republics had increased dramatically in the 1970s and concluded that this indicated diuergent behauior there.^^ Howeuer, th*» noie refined measures of fertility indicate other behauioral patterns. 2 7 9
1. flge-SeH Specific Birthrate and Cumulative Fertility Rate: Rs shown in Figure 34 the age sen specific birthrates in the Islamic republics were close to those of the USSR in 1940. Since then, howeuer, the gap between these sin republics and the rest of the USSR grew up until 1979. From that point on Kazakhstan has conuerged with the USSR. Since 1970 relatiue rates in Rzerbaidzhan and Central
Rsia haue conuerged with the USSR norms.
The pattern for cumulatiue fertility rates is similar (see Figure 35).
This leads to the conclusion that age sen specific results haue been more a result of family size than the age structure of the women hauing children.
Estimated fertility rates for 1926 and for 1939 demonstrate a conuergence of the Islamic republics with the rest of the country during the early Stalin years. This would appear to be a logical consequence of both reduced marriage-diuorce ratios of the prewar years in these republics, as well of rapid urbanization and deuelopment of these areas. Enforced equality in the economy had its impact on family Hues moreso in these regions than in the other republics, where Souiet-style socialism had taken root earlier. 2 8 0
250
225 -
CA
200 ■
P E R C 175 E N T
150
Az
125 -Ka Ka
CA
100 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1987
Figure 34. Incidence of Births per 1000 Women Ages 15-49 In Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 250 -I
200 -
P 150 HKa E Az R Ka CA C E N Az T 1 0 0 ------
5 0 -
1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 1987
Figure 35. Cumulative Fertility Rate in Azerbaidzhan (Az) , Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 2 8 2
TABLE 44
INCIDENCE OF BIRTHS PER 1000 WOMEN AGES 15-49 (Soviet Union = 100)
1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1987 Azerbaidzhan 101 121 184 205 141 132 Kazakhstan 119 126 161 146 135 129 K irg iz ia 109 129 158 205 184 177 Tadzhikistan 101 118 139 253 242 238 Turkmenistan 116 145 182 252 216 201 U zbekistan 109 118 179 241 214 203 Russia 95 88 93 81 84 85 L atvia 54 57 67 81 76 81 Moldavia 81 135 126 109 107 108 Armenia 157 120 179 141 118 111
Sources: Naselenie SSSR 1987: statlstlcheskiy sbornik. pp. 48-95, 110-125; Vestnik statistiki. 1980, No. 11, p. 76; Naselenie SSSR 1973: statlstlcheskiy sbornik. pp. 69-83, 136-138; Itogl Vsesoyuznoy pereplsl naselenla 1959 goda. Table 12 and Table 13 of all 61 volumes; Vestnik statistiki. 1987, No. 1, p . 50.
TABLE 4 5
CUMULATIVE FERTILITY RATE (Soviet Union ■= 100)
1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 1987 Azerbaidzhan 137 111 177 193 153 115 Kazakhs tan 144 132 157 139 133 125 K irg iz ia 121 121 151 202 197 167 Tadhikistan 140 112 137 247 263 225 Turkmenistan 131 128 180 247 232 188 U zbekistan 113 121 176 235 224 184 R ussia 109 106 93 82 83 87 L atvia a 60 68 80 82 85 Moldavia a 90 127 107 104 110 Armenia 147 175 168 134 107 102
Sources: Naselenie SSSR 1987: statlstlcheskiy sbornik. pp. 209-214; Naselenie SSSR 1973: statlstlcheskiy sbornik. pp. 69-136; Vestnik statistiki. 1987, No. 1, p. 50; ItoRi Vsesoyuznoy pereplsl naselenla 1959 R o d a . Table 12 of all 16 volumes; Lorimer, 1946, pp. 90-92. 2 8 3
The divergence noted In crude birth rates held up through 1970, but not since then. The population growth momentum of the 1950s and
1960s led to higher crude rates in the 1970s and 1980s, euen though the Islamic republics were undergoing declining fertility rates, fls
Bemstam noted there was often underreporting of births in the high birth areas in the early postwar years, with the result being crude rates that were euen higher later on.^^
Why did the Islamic regions display growing, diuergent fertility rates in the 1950s and 1960s, and declining, converging rates in the
1970s and 1980s? In fact, fertility in the USSR has generally increased in the past 10 years, while declining in the Islamic regions.
Zuidrinsh provides a clue. Fertility among many Souiet citizens has been linked in surveys with housing conditions, work load, and domestic load.^^ During the 1950s and 1960s the economies of the
Islamic regions were growing. This freed many women from work in the public sector and provided more opportunity for child-bearing. In the late 1970s and 1980s, conditions have declined, with women now more visible in public sector jobs. This reduces the time and energy
(and resources) for raising families. 2 8 4
Bemstam noted that Muslims had traditionally had less interest In birth control deuices in earlier years.^^ He neglected to mention the likely shortages enperienced in the Islamic republics, fls the Souiet state gained an increasing awareness and interest in Islamic fertility rates, measures were taken to increase these opportunities.
Hayit describes that the tradition of giuing gifts when a son was born led to greater desire for children in general in traditonal Islamic societies. With growing economic wealth and opportunity in the
Khrushcheu and early Brezhneu years, the gifts and other community support would haue been greater than during the years of economic decline.
Kingkade notes other potential state impacts on fertility. The
Souiet tradition had been to giue longer maternity leaues to those who had worked longer (which fauors delayed pregnancy). In the early Brezhneu years this was changed so that full maternity leaue was giuen regardless of time on the job. Plus there were special prouisions for financial aid to the poor.^^ These changes eased the burden of younger mothers in the Islamic regions who were just beginning their family Hues. Hence, the higher fertility rates of the 2 8 5 early Brezhneu years posed a decreased financial and health burden on women at that time.
By 1981 maternity leaue was increased to one year of paid leaue to working women. In 1986 it increased to one and a half years. This was combined with increasing assistance for the first and second
child, and decreased assistance for later children.^^ This had the
impact of creating greater reiatiue pouerty among fulltime mothers
and greater ease for those working and hauing smaller families. In
the harsher conditions of the 1980s, this aduersely impacted on the
traditional Islamic family patterns compared to the rest of the USSR.
The decline of fertility among women of the Islamic republics
cannot be attributed to Russification or urbanization. As the presence
of Russians and other non-Muslims declined and as the Islamic regions
became increasingly rural in both relatiue and, in certain cases,
absolute terms, fertility rates declined. Economic reasons are giuen
aboue. Howeuer, it is possible the Souiet Muslims were part of an
international pattern. From 1968 to 1978 to 1985 fertility rates
declined in nearby Islamic countries. In Turkey they fell from 240% to
189% to 166% the USSR norm for these years. In Egypt they fell from 2 8 6
272% to 252% to 201% the USSR norm. Euen in Iran they fell from
513% to 266% to 255% the USSR norm (7.507 to 6.047 to 5.657 In absolute terms).^^ The declining fertility rates may haue been a combined reaction to Souiet economic realities as well as a greater
International Islamic phenomenon. These three countries had diuerse patterns of urbanization and ideology, but the same fertility changes.
The general pattern for age-sen specific birth rates and fertility rates mas conuergence in the early Stalin years, diuergence up through the early Brezhneu years, and then conuergence up through the Gorbacheu years. It would appear these patterns were the result of the ability of local people to follow their traditions as Moscow and/or the economy permitted and, in recent years, perhaps part of an International trend In the Islamic world.
2. Hue Births oer 1000 UJomen Ages 15-19: Further euidence of the change In women's dally roles in the Islamic republics Is giuen by the fertility patterns for teenage women. Traditionally Islamic women married In their early teens and began child bearing soon thereafter.
The 1959 census Indicated that Islamic women still continued to haue their first child earlier than for the USSR as a whole. Teenage 2 8 7 180 -,
Ka
160
Az
140 -
CA
P 120 - E R C
100 Ka
CA
60
Az
1959 1970 1979 1987
Figure 36. Incidence of Live Births per 1000 Women Ages 15-19 in Azerbaidzha- nia (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Ka zakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 2 8 8
TABLE 46
INCIDENCE OF LIVE bIRTHS PER 1000 WOMEN AGES 15-19 (S o v iet Union = 100)
1959 1970 1979 1987 Azerbaidzhan 147 134 44 46 Kazakhstan 166 99 96 92 K irg iz ia 138 135 105 88 Tadzhikistan 89 132 96 86 Turkmenistan 135 110 55 47 U zbekistan 131 137 90 85 R ussia 97 93 ]Q4 108 L atvia 58 89 89 101 Moldavia 116 92 99 101 Armenia 129 136 105 128
Sources; Rybakovskiy, 1988 . p. 106; N aselen ie SSSR 1987 statlstlcheskiy sbornik, pp. 209-214.
TABLE 4 7
INCIDENCE OF LIVE BIRTHS PER 1000 WOMEN AGES 45-49 (S oviet Union = 100)
1959 1970 1979 1987 Azerba idzhan 592 486 288 214 K azakhstan 332 310 238 214 Kirgiz ia 518 697 844 871 Tadzhikistan 664 1248 1556 1843 Turkmenistan 68 0 1083 1144 1014 U zbekistan 768 931 781 729 Russia 60 38 25 29 L atv ia 26 17 19 43 Moldavia 183 90 63 71 Armenia 328 176 88 71
Sources: Rybakovsky, 1988 p. 101; Naselenie SSSR 1987 : statlstlcheskiy sbornik, pp. 209-214. 2 8 9 fertility was highest in Kazakhstan, where the population was the most likeiy to seminomadic.
Between the 1959 and 1970 censuses this pattern was altered.
Teenage women in Kazakhstan delayed child-bearing to the point of being auerage by Souiet standards. Much of this, no doubt, was linked to the growing urban opportunities and accompanying change in lifestyle for Kazakhs.
Howeuer, teenage fertility remained well aboue the USSR norm in
Rzerbaidzhan and in Central Rsia (where it climbed). During the relatiue prosperity of the early Brezhneu years it was easier for the local families to be more traditional.
Since 1970 teenage fertility has dropped in ail siu Islamic republics.
Hs will be shown in Chapter 9, this was m ost likely caused by the declining economic conditions and the increased presence of women in the public labor force. Prosperity had not blended the Islamic population into "Souiet" patterns of teenage fertility. Rnd increasing pouerty had called for a solution that reduced early pregnancies to below Souiet norms, in either case, the Islamic republics maintained a distinctiueness from the rest of the country, with Kazakhstan being 2 9 0 the usual sKceplion.
3. Hue Births per 1000 UJomen Ages 45-49: tJUhlle early pregnancy was once a distlnctlue trait for rural Muslims, another was the continuation of child-bearing into the final years of fecundity.
Child-bearing, while difficult at any age, becomes increasingly so after the age of 35. In conditions of pouerty it raises particularly seuere health problems both for the mother and the child.
Late pregnancies were quite common in Islamic areas well past
World War II. In fact, as recently as the mid-1960s fertility rates were higher for women in their late forties than in their late teens.
Increasing job and educational opportunities may haue delayed marriage and child-bearing, but it did not haue much impact on the traditional lengthy child-bearing.
Since 1959 late child-bearing has declined in all the USSR's republics, but at different rates. Between 1959 and 1970 there was a fairly rapid decline in Rzerbaidzhan and Kazakhstan, which has slowed in the 1970s and 1980s. Despite these tendencies toward conuergence
In these two republics, late fertility is still ouer twice that of the USSR norm. Women in these republics are still quite distinct or 2 9 1
1000 CA
800 -
P 600 - Az E R C E N T 400 - Ka
Az 200 Ka
1959 1970 1979 1987
Figure 37. Incidence of Live Births per 1000 Women Ages 45-49 in Azerbaidzha- nia (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Ka- zakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 2 9 2 unassimiiated in late child-bearing.
The Central Rslans haue become euen more distinct from the USSR norm. Between 1959 and 1970 relatiue late fertility increased in all four republics. Increased prosperity in Central Rsia not only translated into early child-bearing, but also lengthier (relatiue to the rest of the USSR). Since 1970 Central Rsia has maintained late fertility rates that are between nine and ten times that of the USSR norm.
In Uzbekistan there has been some conuergence since 1970. Rs of
1987 women in their late forties were merely seuen times more likely to haue children than an auerage Souiet woman. Howeuer, in the other Central Rsian republics, women haue had children late at rates increasingly aboue the USSR norm. In 1987 a Tadzhik Republic woman was 18 times more likely to haue a child than women in the rest of the country.
These higher fertility rates are uery reuealing about the strength of traditions. Surgery and other preuentatiue measures haue obuiousiy not become widespread among them. The desire for large families is obuiousiy still strong, despite the health problems in a declining economic and natural enuironment for many of them. 2 9 3
Increased presence In the public sector has delayed child-bearing, but not reduced it. The strongest effects, of course, are on women who are working on collectiue farms with all their enuironmental problems.
4. Unwed Mothers and Abortions: Among two taboos in the Islamic tradition are women hauing children out of wedlock and abortions. In a less mobile rural population these traditional taboos would be not only stronger than in urban areas, but also more likely to be discouered.
Unfortunately, statistics on unwed mothers and abortions at the republic leuel haue appeared only recently. Long-term analysis for the different Souiet eras are not yet possible and may neuer be.
Howeuer, the trends of recent years do shed some light on the strength of these taboos in the Islamic regions.
In 1980 the share of births to rural unwed mothers (as a share of ouerall births) was significantly lower in four of the Islamic republics.
Kazakhstan, predictably, was one of the republics with a near-norm rate. The other was Kirgizia. Most likely, this reflects the presence of
Russians in the republic (where there is a greater rural percent of
Russians than in the other republics) and the difficulty Russian women 2 9 4
TABLE 48
SHARE OF BIRTHS AMONG RURAL UNMARRIED WOMEN (Soviet Onion =■ 100)
1980 1986 Azerba idzhan 30 24 K azakhstan 97 107 K irg iz ia 113 104 Tadzhikistan 70 41 Turkmenistan 11 16 U zbekistan 29 22 Russia 154 166 E sto n ia 327 387 Moldavia 82 101 Armenia 34 70
sbornik, p. 217 .
TABLE 4 9
INCIDENCE OF ABORTIONS AMONG WOMEN AGES 15-49 (S o v iet Union = 100)
1975 1980 1985 Azerbaidzhan 41 38 31 K azakhstan 103 97 . 90 K irg iz ia 80 75 74 Tadzhikistan 51 44 39 Turkmenistan 58 50 41 U zbekistan 49 43 47 R ussia 119 120 123 E sto n ia 101 95 91 Moldavia 85 89 96 Armenia 57 38 30
Source; Naselenie SSSR 1987 statlstlcheskiy sbornik. p. 319. 2 9 5 would haue finding suitable spouses.
Between 1980 and 1906 there were not major changes In this relatiue frequency of births to unwed mothers. In three republics it became euen less common (an Influence from Iran?). There was a slight increase In Turkmenistan, but children with rural unwed mothers still constituted the lowest share In the entire USSR.
This may seem triulal encept for what has happened In Armenia.
The Armenians also haue stronger family traditions than do the Slaulc populations, yet the share of births to rural unwed mothers Increased dramatically between 1980 and 1986. This could be the result of a change In economic conditions, or else a genuine change In attitudes.
The Russian Impact Is almost nonenistant, giuen the uery small number of Russians In Armenia, particularly In rural areas.
Ouerall, the taboo against single mothers is uery strong in rural
Islamic communities. Only the strong Russian presence In Kazakhstan and Kirgizia haue altered this. Rnd most likely this represents not a change In behauior among the Muslim women, but an Increased incidence of single mothers among the non-Muslims In these areas
(since stable family would be hard with the out-mlgratlon of Russians. 2 9 6
Abortions also clearly distinguish people of the Islamic regions from the Slaulc. The major obstacle here Is the lock of abortion statistics on an urban rural basis or local basis. Abortion has been a sensltlue issue In the Souiet media. A recent newspaper article described the abortion rate in the USSA as hauing reached alarmingly high proportions.^ The reason Is the health Implications for mother and child. Aeducing it through legal means or other seems difficult
Euen In the Stalin years before Uiorld War II, when abortion was seuerely restricted (owing to desire for future labor supply), Illegal abortions were fairly common In Moscow Itself.^^
The Incidence of abortion reflects the presence or absence of
Ausslans In each republic. In 1975 In Kazakhstan the abortion rate was about at the national norm, and It was In the same range In
Kirgizia. The lack of a breakdown makes it difficult to say whether there was any Impact by the Kazakhs and Kirgiz, or whether this reflects merely a higher use by Ausslans due to unstable marital conditions for them.
The trend In all sin republics was for abortion - In both relatiue and
In absolute terms - to decline, while It increased among Slaus. 2 9 7
Whether this Is an indication of more trational attidues, the increase of rural populations in many of these republics, or the out-migration of Russians cannot be determined. R study of abortion rates in nearby
Islamic countries (such statistics are missing due to the sensitive nature there) would be perhaps indicatiue of the cause.
In any event, the people of Central Rsia and Rzerbaidzhan have made distinctiuely less frequent use of abortion since 1975 than other
Soviet citizens (encept Rrmenians). Rnd with the very small number of
Russians in Rzerbaidzhan, and its lowest rate of usage among the
Islamic republics, it is safe to say that culture has a great, if not predominant share of the credit or blame for this. This is in keeping with the conclusions of a study by Bemstam of derived abortion rates for Central Asians in the 1970s. The siK republics with the lowest rates were the siu Islamic republics. Based on nationality proportions, he derived that Central Asians had the lowest usage of abortion and at a rate much lower than suggested by the republic fiugures.^^
In addition to culture, mistrust of declining medical core may also play a role in the declining abortion rates in the Islamic regions. 2 9 8
E. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The behauioral data reflect both the enuironment established by the leadership in Moscoiu and the impact of local traditions and attitudes. Conuergence of behauior mas most common during the pre-mar Stalin era. This mas, no doubt, the result of both enforced uniformity throughout the USSR and more equal conditions.
Migration patterns in the Stalin and Khrushcheu eras mere indicatiue of Moscom s interest in deueloping the remote republics in the interests of the national economy. These regions mere hardly the most attratiue in terms of deuelopment, but became attractiue In terms of personal aduancement and oming to a strong push by authorities. As deuelopment of Islamic regions of the USSR declined in priority, all of the Islamic republics became net losers of migrants. At the beginning of the Gorbacheu years the net out-migration from these republics mas greater than anymhere else in the Souiet Union.
The standard of liuing as established by Moscoms priorities must be faulted for this loss of people.
The marriage-diuorce ratio in Islamic regions mas belom the USSR norm in 1940 oming to entreme politics. Local purges and the arriual 2 9 9 of eKiled couples led to increased diuorce. Many divorces were those from the UJest who separated In Rsia. Since the Stalin years fiue of the SiK republics haue remained well aboue the USSR auerage for marital stability. Only in Russian-predominated Kazakhstan has the marriage-diuorce ratio conuerged significantly toward USSR norms.
Early marriage in rural Islamic regions was close to the USSR norm
Just before the war. Following Stalin s death, they rose quickly.
Howeuer, early marriage has declined rapidly in all the Islamic regions. By the beginning of the Gorbacheu era, it was below the USSR norm in Central Rsia. The reasons are less likely to be changing attitudes, as much as changing economic enuironment and the need for women to remain at home to work.
Diuorce and remarriage after diuorce remain far less common in the Central Rsian republics and flzerhaidzhan than in the USSR ouerall.
Unfortunately there are no data from the prewar years to test whether Stalin's enforced uniformity affected these areas of life as well. Howeuer, the pattern in the postwar years has been clearly to moue toward or stay in the traditional pattern of fewer legal marital breakups. Kazakhstan, predictably, is the major enception, with 3 0 0 diuorce rates conuerging on the USSR auerage. The decline in Russians in Kazakhstan is likely matched by increasing marital instability among the Russians there.
Fertility rates were close to the norm in 1940, probably as a direct result of Stalinist policies. Since then the ouerall fertility rates haue remained well aboue the USSR norm. Howeuer, there has been some impact of Moscow's policies in fertility. Increasing relatiue and absolute pouerty outside Kazakhstan has led to delayed child-bearing and a relatiue reduction in ouerall fertility rates. Howeuer, fertility rates for women in the oldest child-bearing years is uery distinct from those of the rest of the country and show no sign of conuergence euen in the declining economy. The changes in fertility do not represent a break from traditional attitudes as much as local conditions. The major component appears to be young women being kept a t home longer and in working in the public sector more to help the family get by before starting their own families.
The taboos of unwed mothers and abortion show no sign of hauing been changed in the Islamic regions. If anything, Rzerbaidzhans enample (being free of a strong Russian presence) indicates a trend 3 0 1
toward more traditional habits.
It would appear that the Stalin era had a major impact on behauior, but not on attitudes. Only the moue to cities and the presence of
Russians seems to haue major differences in how people feel about
marriage and children. Uiith a declining presence of Russians and economic benefits offered by Moscow, the share of outside influences
are most likely coming from neighboring Islamic countries. CHAPTER IH
FEMALE-MHLE RATIOS
A. INTRODUCTION
In June 1990 Uzbekistan declared that a number of Its local lams and plans mould supercede Soulet lams and plans. The stated purpose of this moue at the time mas to ensure that critical goods mould remain in Uzbekistan in order to protect motherhood and children in the republicJ This proclamation dealt mith the continued pouerty of this Central Asian republic and the concern for traditional ualues.
The Souiet Union has proclaimed itself a champion of momen's political and economic equality. "Job equality" for momen mas necessary for the Souiet Union in order to start and maintain its industrial gromth.^ The 1936 Constitution guaranteed equal rights for momen, but this mas aimed more at momen as "mark units than as people. ^ Paluanoua notes that preschool and daycare mere designed to get momen more into public life.^ Public life, in the Souiet case,
302 3 0 3 means employment in the public sector.
lOhile Souiet institutions mere supposed to prouide momen outlets to résolue social issues, at present non-Souiet institutions seem to be performing a role. Rosenberg notes that 75% of current church membership are momen. This is one of the places they can escape the social problems they enperience.^ Increasing attendance in Islamic mosques, on the contrary, do not offer social outlets for Islamic momen. Since tradition permitted males only, or that momen be strongly restricted in attendance and participation, the reduction of the importance of Souiet institutions may indeed be more restrictiue in Rzerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan and Central Hsia.
8. RESIDENCY RNO EMPLOYMENT
1. Eemale-Male Rural Residency: In traditional Islamic society momen stay behind in the uillages, mhile the males seek out the opportunities of the cities. One of the mays to break traditions in
Isalmic regions (inside or outside the Souiet Onion) is for females to reach the less traditional cities.
During the Souiet era the share of momen in cities compared to men has been aboue the country's norm in the Islamic republics. Rt 3 0 4
105 M
Ac p 100 E R CA C Ka E N T Ka
90 1979 1987 1926 1959 1970 Figure 38, Female-Male Adult t RatioRat io forfo r RuralRur Residency " in Aaerbaidchan• ■<_!_____ (Ac), / a _\ CentralA M ^ V a 1 Asia & a 4 a (CA),X f l A i and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union.
TABLE 5 0
FEMALE- MALE ADULT RATIO FOR RURAL RESIDENCY ( - S o v i e t Union » 100)
1 9 2 6 1 9 5 9 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 7 Azerbaldzhan 1 0 1 97 98 101 104 K a z a k h s t a n 97 97 98 96 93 K i r g i z i a 99 97 95 96 95 Tadzhikistan 1 0 0 94 92 99 96 Turkmenistan 1 0 1 94 94 95 97 U z b e k i s t a n 98 95 93 96 97 R u s s i a 101 101 102 101 1 0 2 E s t o n i a a 98 95 96 94 M o l d a v i a a 97 96 98 96 G e o r g i a 1 0 0 95 94 94 95
a- Estonia was an Independent country In 1926. Most of Moldavia was part of Romania in 1926.
Sources': Naaelenie SS3R 1987 ; atat 1sticheakiy abornlk. pp. 48-95; Vaesoyuznaya perepls naselenla 17 dekabrya 1926 goda. Volumes 8, 10, 14-16, Table 9, Volumes 9, 11, Table 14, Volume 15, Table 11. 5 0 5
first glance this might indicate major success in separating momen
from tradition-bound uillages.
There has been success in getting momen in Islamic regions into
cities. Homeuer, the relatiueiy lomer femaie-male adult rural residency ratios haue been caused by the influu of Russian momen.
Bemtmeen 1926 and 1959 rural residency rates for momen fell in
Rzerbaidzhan and Central Asia mith the arriuai of Russian momen.
lOith the outflom of Russians since 1959, the female rural residency
rates for these regions haue increased. The failure to urbanize in
Central Asia has meant far more reduced opportunities for local
momen than men.
The situation in Kazakhstan has been different Since 1970 rural
residency rates for momen haue fallen. This is due to ethnic intermarriage. Kazakh males haue been less likely to leaue the
republic than Russian males. This has meant that Russian miues of
these Kazakh males are staying too.
Ouerall, rural residency for momen has not been significantly
different on a republic leuel In the Islamic regions, euen back In 1926,
to dram major conclusions on mhether the Souiet era has changed 3 0 6 attitudes or opportunities between men and women in the cities. The relatiueiy strong enforcement of monogamy in the USSR has, perhaps, reduced the likelihood of the "surplus" females being left behind to rural wealthy men, thus making leauing these "surplus females free
to moue. In this way, legal opportunity may haue played more a role
than attitude changes.
2. Female-Male Ratio for Nonemnioyment In the earliest days of
the Souiet era measures were taken to get Islamic women to work in
the public sector. Paluanoua notes that employers in Islamic regions
often hired couples or entire families in order to ensure the women
could accept work. Ht the same time, the maternity leaue policy was
implemented to insure that the woman could return to the job.^
These measures were aimed at reducing male resistance to hiring
females.
Other measures were taken to get women to work, yet continue
to bear children. Howeuer, as Bemstam notes, increased financial
support has neuer had a prouen significant effect on fertility, while
the increased independence of women has had aduerse effects on
family size.^ Giuen that fertility rates should remain below the leuels 400
CA
300
P E R C 200 Az CA E 'Az N T Ka
100 Ka
1926 1959 1970 1979 1987
Figure 39. Female-Male Ratio for Nonemployment among Those of Working Age in Azerbaidzhan C.Az) , Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union.
o 3 0 8
TABLE 51
FEMALE-MALE RATIO FOR NONEHFLOYMENT AMONG THOSE OF WORKING AGE ( S o v i e t Union - 100)
1 9 2 6 1 9 4 0 1 9 5 0 1 9 5 9 19%0 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 7 Azerbaidzhan 1 8 5 n a na 128 210 176 197 Kazakhstan 60 na n a 2 0 6 1 4 8 1 3 8 1 3 5 K i r g i z i a 4 0 7 1 1 5 1 2 0 1 1 9 1 6 9 1 3 9 1 4 8 Tadzhikistan 3 1 9 127 122 127 263 234 2 4 9 Turkmenistan 4 3 5 97 1 6 1 1 5 2 23 7 2 2 9 2 3 3 U z b e k i s t a n 29 3 n a n a 1 2 9 22 3 1 8 7 19 4 R u s s i a 8 3 n a n a 89 73 77 68 U k r a i n e 85 n a n a 1 0 7 1 1 6 92 94 B e l o r u s s l a 71 n a n a 79 81 67 59 E s t o n i a a n a n a 95 38 35 26 L a t v i a a n a n a 1 1 2 48 29 3 L i t h u a n i a a n a n a 1 1 9 2 3 8 96 71 M o l d a v i a a n a n a 10 8 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 0 A r m e n i a 1 3 2 n a n a 1 4 6 3 9 2 1 4 2 1 5 5 G e o r g i a 1 0 5 n a n a 1 3 9 2 7 4 2 1 9 2 3 7
a- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were Independent countries In 1926. Most of Moldavia was part of Romania.
Sources: Trud v SSSR: statlstlcheskly sbornlk. 1988, pp. 76, 107-108; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1979 godu. p. 392; Zhenshchlnv 1 detl v SSSR; statlstlcheskly sbornlk. 1985, pp. 16, 48; Zheshchlny 1 detl v SSSR; Statlstlcheskly sbornlk. 1961, p. 129; Zhenshchlna v Klrgtzskov SS k i kratklv statlstlcheskly spravochnlk. 1960. p. 34; ZheaRchtna v Tadzh'lksRoy SSR; kratkïÿ" statlstlcheskly spravochrilk. 1960, p. 32; Zheshchlna V Turkmenskoy SSR: Rratkly statlstlcheskly spravoch nlk. 1960, p. 35; Vaesoyuznaya perepls naselenla 17 dekabrya 1926 goda~ Volumes 8, 10, 14-16, Table 9, Volumes 9, 11, Table 14, Volume 15, Table 11, Volumes 25, 27, 31-33, Table 2, Volumes 26, 28, Table 4; Naselenle SSSR 1987. pp. 48-95. 3 0 9 desired by the gouemment, retaining women in work has become euen more crucial to the Souiet gouemment's economic plans.
Rosenberg noted that unemployment during the New Economic
Policy hit women harder than men.^ This was particularly true in
Central Asia and Rzerbaidzhan, where the Russian presence and central authority was not yet euident In Turkmenistan the female-male nonemployment ratio was ouer four times that of the
USSR auerage. The tradition of keeping women out of public work was certainly uery strong during the NEP era.
Unfortunately, data for 1940 and 1950 are incomplete. Howeuer, the results from the three smallest Islamic republics - Kirgizia,
Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan - follow the general pattern for the
Stalin era (see Table 51). Female-male nonemployment fell dramatically in these republics, to the point that it was lower in
Turkmenistan in 1940 than for the USSR as a whole. Stalin-era policies must haue been significant for this equality. Rs letters in the Souiet press indicated in the 1930s, employers not only eagerly hired women, but often did not grant them maternity leaue and euen left them in the Jobs requiring heauier manual labor.^ It would seem that in many 5 1 0 cases women did not haue the option of being nonemployed, euen in latter stages of pregnancy.
Dodge comments that in 1959 nonemployment among women was particularly high in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Rzerbaidzhan, since traditions remained strongest there.^^ This dissertation has a slightly different perspectiue. While female nonemployment was more common in all siu Islamic republics than for the USSR ouerall, it was certainly lower than in the NEP years. In Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan It was at the same reduced leuel as in the late Stalin years.
Reuesz noted in his studies that female nonemployment was quite high in Kazakhstan and Tadzhikistan In the 1960s.^ ^ This analysis is correct, but somewhat misleading. While relatlue female nonemployment rates increased in Rzerbaidzhan and Central Rsia
(owing to Increasing prosperity and the tendency for them to stay home for child-raising), women in Kazakhstan were less likely to be unemployed in the public sector. In fact, between 1959 and 1987 female-male nonemployment consistently conuerged toward the national norm in Kazkhastan. Rs Russians haue left, those remaining behind haue had greater opporutunities than in other islamic areas. 3 1 1
Plus, fertility rates are low, indicating less emphasis on family life in
Kazakhstan.
In both Central Asia and Azerbaidzhan, female nonemploy men! declined somewhat during the 1970s, but has started climbing in the
1980s. Bernstam euplains this as a result of increased urban employment in the 1970s, which declined In the 1980s.^^ Souiet journalist Ubayduileua states that unemployment in the 1980s in
Central Asia has been concentrated in rural areas, particularly among women. She points the finger at Moscow's failure to create labor-intensiue industrial jobs, which would benefit women during the off season.^ ^ Moscow's failure to create job opportunities has been hardest on rural women in Central Asia.
As Figure 39 shows, female nonemployment rates compared to those of males has always been higher in the Islamic republics (with one eHceptlon). Most of the conuergence since 1926 occured during the Stalin era. Since then female-male nonemployment rates haue uarled, as the economy has uaried, but tended toward dluergence.
While Islamic culture accounts for the women being singled out more,
Moscow must be blamed for the reduced employment opportunities 3 1 2 that haue resulted in women being increasingly locked out of public life.
Rs bad as the nonemployment balance is in Rzerbaidzhania and
Central Rsia, it has been much higher in Turkey in the 1970s and 1980s.
Both in years of prosperity and in years of economic malaise, Turkish women haue had unemployment rates compared to the men that haue been ouer four times that of V 4et Union, or nearly twice as high as any single republic in the S nion.^^ The Souiet system can be blamed for not fulfilling its promise of equal and full employment opportunties, but it has performed better than its capitalist islamic neighbor to the south.
Not all female nonemployment can be considered negatiue. In a suruey conducted in the Souiet press this year 80% of the women responded that they haue paying jobs only because their husbands' incomes are not sufficient to carry the famiiy alone.^^ It would seem
the difference in the reaction to prosperity in the 1960s (less female employment In the public sector) and the 1970s (increased female employment in the public sector), among the Muslims and Russians depended more on opportunity than on attitude. On the other hand, 3 1 3 the nsKt section loill show that female nonemployment In Central Rsia and Rzerbaidzhan has been uery slelectiue. Nonemployment for
Muslim women has been in the more desirable jobs, not throuyhout the economy in general.
3. Female-Male Ratio of Collectiue Farm Emoloyment Outside of the prison-labor system and the military, collectiue farming has generally been the worst Job in the Souiet Union. Uihile it has become somewhat profitable in the Baltic republics in recent decades, due to desertification, reduced quality and quantity of water supplies, and increasing use of chemicals it has become increasingly dangerous and low-paying in Central Rsia.
In 1940 female-male employment on collectiue farms was Just below the USSR norm (see Talbe 52). This is consistent with other aspects of the Stalin-era enuironment - conuergence throughout the entire system. Petmecky s contention that women had more manual labor Jobs in pre-war Souiet Union^^ may haue applied more to the
Russian areas, whereas at least some of the Islamic habits were in euidence. The increased female employment on collectiue farms between 1940 and 1950 was, no doubt, due to the absence of males 3 1 4
175
CA 150
P E R C 125 E Az N T Ka CA
100
Ka
1959 1970 1979 1987
Figure 40. Female—Maie Ratio of Collective Farm Employment as a Share of Total Employment in Public Sec tor in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakh stan (Ka) Relative to the Ave rage for the Soviet Union. 3 1 5
TABLE 52
FEMALE-MALE RATIO OF COLLECTIVE FARM EMPLOYMENT AS A SHARE OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN PUBLIC SECTOR (Soviet Union =100)
1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1987 Azerbaidzhan na na 118 123 149 176 K azakhstan na na 119 79 7 9 7 9 K ir g iz ia 99 120 102 90 99 105 Tadzhikistan 90 108 100 118 144 144 Turkmenistan 93 118 110 129 146 161 U zbekistan na na 105 125 147 162 R ussia na na 97 90 86 82 U kraine na na 110 109 105 108 B e lo ru s s la na na 92 102 99 95 E sto n ia na na 104 84 73 73 L a tv ia na na 99 83 80 74 L ith u a n ia na na 99 93 86 82 M oldavia na na 94 104 113 109 Armenia na na 113 114 116 114 G eorgia na na 105 122 137 158
Sources: See Table 51. 3 1 6 during the war and the failure of many to return.
Dodge noted that female employment was much lower than male employment In Islamic regions In 1959.^^ This was not the case In collectiue farming. IDhlle the reduction in collectiue farming ouerall benefltted women the most In Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan and
Turkmenistan, In all s Ih Islamic republics employed women were more likely to be on collectiue farms than In the USSR as a whole.
The reduction of collectiue farm employment since 1959 has been slower In Rzerbaidzhan and Central Asia than In the USSR ouerall. This has meant that women In these regions haue lost opportunities for other jobs. Male employment on collectiue farms has declined at rates normal for the USSR. The female-male ratio Increased slowly between 1959 and 1970, but has risen dramatically as the economy and job opportunities haue failed to keep pace with population growth. Women in Azerbaidzhan and Central Asia haue bom the brunt of the shortage of jobs outside collectiue farms.
This has not been the case In Kazakhstan. Collectiue farm employment has been low there, particularly for women. The lower female employment rate on collectiue farms In this republic most 5 1 7 likely reflect the relative abundance of job opportunities for everyone as Russians depart lUith lower fertility rates, It Is unlikely that raising children Is the primary enplanatlon.
The rapid rise In relative female-male employment rates on collective farms In Central Rsia and Rzerbaidzhan supports
Rosenberg's contention that Muslim women In the 1980s continue to have the worst jobs.^^ The progress made In women leaving collective farm Jobs in earlier decades was owing to Stalin-era policies of uniformity in the USSR and reduced need for women to work In the public sector In the 1960s. Rs collective farm employment has climbed in these regions and Jobs elsewhere have not Increased, women have been forced to take on these Jobs to support the family.
Once again, tradition has handed women a setback in a situation created by Moscow's regional and national economic policies.
C. EDUCRTION
1. Students in Higher Education and Secondary Specialized Education:
Ever since the earliest days of the Soviet Union there has been an official policy of getting women Into post-secondary education. In
the 1920s there were specified minimum quotas for women in 3 1 8
Ka / 100
P 80- KTT E R C E Az N Uz T 60 Az
KTT X 40-
20 -^— 1940 19591970 1979 19871950
Figure 41. Female-Male Ratio of Students in Higher Education and Secondary Specialized Education per 1000 Persons Ages 17-24 in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Kazakhstan (Ka), Kirgizia-Tadzhikistan-Turkmenistan (KTT), and Uzbekistan (Uz) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 3 1 9
TABLE 53
FEMALE-MALE RATIO OF STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION AND SECONDARY SPECIALIZED EDUCATION PER 1000 PERSONS AGES 17- 24 (Soviet Union = 100)
1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1987 Azerbaidzhan 56 na 58 56 53 74 Kazakhstan na na na 104 87 105 K irg iz la 38 60 102 98 94 110 Tadzhikistan 34 42 66 50 45 57 Turkmenistan 35 41 76 56 49 72 Uzbekistan na na na 61 60 75 R ussia na na na 110 93 103 E stonia na na na 82 71 92 Moldavia na na na 98 97 120 Armenia na na na 75 66 76
Sources ; Vestnlk statlstlkl. 1989, No. 1 , p. 49; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1988 godu. pp. 197, 199; Zheshchlny 1 detl v SSSR; statlstlcheskly sbornlk. 1985, pp. 16, 42-43; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1979 godu, pp. 496-497; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1987 Rodu. pp. 548-549, 556; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR V 1959 Rodu, pp. 741-744; Zhenshchlny 1 detl v SSSR; statlstlcheskly sbornlk. 1961, p. 74; Kul- turnoe stroltelstvo SSSR: statlstlcheskly sbornlk. 1956, pp. 208-211, 232-235; Narodnoe khozyaystvo Azerbaldzhanskoy SSR v 1962 godu, p. 184; Zhen shchlna V Klrglzskoy SSR; kratkly statlstlcheskly spravochnlk. 1960, pp. 17, 73, 74, 77; Zhenshchlna V Tadzhlkskoy SSR; kratkly statlstlcheskly sbornlk. 1960, pp. 15, 70-71, 74-75; Zhenshchlna v Turkmen skoy SSR; kratkly statlstlcheskly sbornlk, 1960, pp. 17, 63-64; Naselenle SSSR 1987. pp. 48-95; ItoRl Vsesoyuznoy pereplsl naselenla 1959 goda. Table 12 of volumes for USSR, Kirgizia, Tadzhiki stan and Turkmenistan. 3 2 0 institutions of higher educationUnfortunately, data was unauallable at the republic leuel on the presence of women In post-secondary education.
The Incomplete data that are auallable suggest steady progress In getting women enrolled In Islamic republics. The female-male ratio of students In higher and secondary specialized education rose from below 40% the national norm In 1940 to (as a group) ouer 80% by
1959. Rzerbaidzhan showed almost no change during this same period.
This apparent Increase In educational opportunities for women may haue been decpetlue. Dodge noted that In 1959 Indigenous
Central Asian women were uastly underrepresented In post-secondary education. It Is not altogether clear whether the 80% location quotient represented this representation, or whether they were represented at leuels considerably below this.
Lapldus also claimed that local women were underrepresented In higher education In Central Asia In 1959, but that some progress was ulslble between 1959 and 1970.^^ At the same time, the relatlue female-male ratio In higher and secondary specialized education 3 2 1 declined in Azerbaidzhan, Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan between 1959 and 1970. During the 1960s great strides were made in enrolling women in these institutions. The progress in Central Asia and
Azerbaidzhan was made in absolute terms, but did not enjoy the same rates of success as the country ouerall.
Dieckmann noted that euen those women who were in higher education were predominantly preparing for lower paying and lower prestige jobs, such as teaching. This phenomenon, he noted, was not peculiar to socialism or particular regions of the OSSA, but enisted in the Federal Aepublic of Germany as well.^^ Within Central Asian institutions the ouerwhelming emphasis for locals was in primary education.
Between 1970 and 1979 all sin republics endured relatlue declines in female student enrollments. This occured at a time when post-secondary enrollment declined throughout the OSSA ouerall. Once again, as ouerall opportunities declined, it was the women of the
Islamic regions who took the brunt of regression.
While education for Muslim women in the OSSA took a step back in the 1970s, they were more fortunate than their counterparts in 3 2 2
Turkey. Post-secondary education for women in Turkey was not only considerably lower, but also regressed in the late 1970s. In 1975
Turkish female-male student ratios were 28% the Souiet norm. This was 26% by 1980. In addition, women were ouerwhelmingly put into either primary teaching or domestic sciences in segregated schools.^^
Uihateuer the limitations for Muslim women in the USSR, they were not as severe as those in their southerly neighbor.
The Gorbachev era has turned around the female male ratio for all sin Islamic republics. Kazakhstan, for instance, was able to have an enrollment above the national norm. Rzerbaidzhan had its highest enrollment ratio in the period covered, and Central Asian residents also enjoyed new opportunities. It will be necessary to find further data to determine whether these opportunities were being taken by the Russian women left behind, or whether local women were finally being included in larger numbers.
During the Soviet era women have indeed enjoyed increased opportunties for education. The record certainly exceeds that of foreign Islamic societies. However, female enrollments still remain below the norm in Rzerbaidzhan and Central Rsia, with local women 3 2 3 still, most likely, lagging considerably. Enough time has passed to haue created equality in this state-controlled sector. The gains made in the Gorbacheu era may be too late.
2. Higher or Secondary Specialized Degrees per 1000 Employed:
While women in Islamic regions haue lagged considerably in educational opportunties (or in working toward them), there has been greater success in obtaining degrees. It would seem that the entra effort required to get into higher or secondary specialized education carried ouer into more successful performance as students.
Dodge noted in 1959 that women throughout the Souiet Union were more likely to gain degrees than their enrollments would haue suggested. He noted the gap was considerable in Muslim areas, but conceded that they were catching up.^^
Dodge's analysis was somewhat misleading. While women in the
Islamic areas did lag behind the norm in obtaining degrees, their efforts were actually more successful giuen their enrollments. In
Central Hsia and Rzerbaidzhan women had a relatiueiy higher number of degrees than they had enrollment Giuen the higher performance in the USSR of women ouerall, this would indicate a uery high degree of 3 2 4
140
Ka 120 Ka
P E , R C 100 E N T CA
CA 80
Az, Az
60 1960 19791970 1987
Figure 42. Female-Male Ratio for Employed Persons with Higher or Secondary Spe cialized Degrees per 1000 Employed in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 3 2 5
TABLE 54
FEMALE-MALE RATIO FOR EMPLOYED PERSONS WITH HIGHER OR SECONDARY SPECIALIZED DEGREES PER 1000 EMPLOYED (Soviet Union = 100)
1960 1970 1979 1987 Azerbaidzhan 69 81 76 68 K azakhstan 123 113 114 115 K irg iz ia 94 104 106 102 Tadzhikistan 74 84 77 74 Turkmenistan 75 77 77 74 U zbekistan 75 85 85 87 R ussia 103 103 104 104 E sto n ia 105 97 93 87 Moldavia 104 97 99 101 Armenia 96 95 81 81
Sources: Trud v SSSR: statlstlcheskly sbornlk. 1988. pp. 118 -119; Zhenshchlny i detl v SSSR: s t a t i s t i- cheskiy sbornlk. 1988, p. 55; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR V 1980 Rodu. p, 371; see also Table 51.
TABLE 55
FEMALE-MALE RATIO OF RESEARCHERS WITH DOCTORAL AND CANDIDATE DEGREES PER MILLION EMPLOYED FEMALES AND MALES (Soviet Union = 100)
1960 1970 1979 1987 Azerba idzhan 81 106 104 102 K azakhstan 124 131 131 131 K ir g iz ia 123 132 145 130 Tadzhikistan 98 139 140 146 Turkmenistan 130 122 121 110 U zbekistan 129 125 118 113 R ussia 99 98 98 97 U kraine 91 87 87 91 L atv ia 117 125 127 114 M oldavia 94 84 97 92 Armenia 84 122 113 113
Sources; Trud v SSSR: statlstlcheskly sbornlk, 1988, pp. 130-131; Vestnlk statlstlkl, 1981, No. 1, p. 75; Zhenshchtriy v SSSR: statlstlcheskly sbornlk, 1975, pp. 82-83; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 197 0 Rodu. p. 65 9; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1959 Rodu, p. 758; see also Table 51. 3 2 6 motiuation and success among women in this area.
There are negatiue aspects to this phenomenon. The higher leuel of achieuement in Kazakhstan suggests that It is the Russian women who are benefitting most from progress In getting degrees. Rs
Rosenberg noted, degrees are uery common for employed women, but this has little effect on Job quallty.^^ Women continue to haue jobs that haue greater physical requirements (such as collectiue farming) and lower prestige and pay. Education has often proued to be only a temporary respite from being second-class citizens.
Between 1960 and 1970 there was conuergence in the share of degrees held by employed women. On the surface this would appear to be progress. Howeuer, with increased nonemployment among women in Central Rsia and Rzerbaidzhan during the 1960s (staying at home to raise families), this apparent gain was less a matter of women being better educated than a reduction In employment
Since 1970 educational leuels among women in Central Rsia and
Rzerbaidzhan haue fallen further back of the Souiet norm. The decline between 1970 and 1979 can be easily enplained by reduced enrollments (see Figure 41). 3 2 7
Howeuer, the reduced leuel of degrees among women in these flue republics beUuen 1979 and 1987 has another euplanation. While relatlue female-male enrollment ratios rose In Central Asia and
Rzerbaidzhan In the Gorbacheu era, their relatlue leuel of degrees declined. This can be partially euplalned by Increased employment
(mainly on collectlue farms). It Is also linked to the out-mlgratlon of well-educated women from the area. Naturally, the women who are leauing are ouerwhelmlngly non-lndlgenous. This certainly detracts from the apparent gains of earlier years. Not only haue the higher achleuements of non-lndlgenous women blocked local opportunities, but also haue led to a draining of the area of much-needed talent as the non-lndlgenous women haue le ft In Kazakhstan and Kirgizia, where the Russian population Is still relatluely large, there has been geater progress In retaining the better-educated women.
Ouerall, women haue performed admirably In Islamic areas when gluen the opportunity for higher or secondary specialized education.
The drawbacks haue been the low leuels of Inclusion of Indigenous women (outside of Kazakhstan and Kirgizia), the outflow of women from this area, and the failure to employ these well-educated women 3 2 8
In Jobs that carry greater prestige. Instead, women continue to be gluen lower-prestige, physically more demanding employment
0. PRESTIGE AND POLITICS
1. Researchers with Doctoral and Candidate Degrees per Million
Employed : Dodge noted that women lagged considerably behind men in obtaining these highly desired degrees throughout the Souiet Union in 1959. Child-bearing, of course, made it more difficult for women to make progress in obtaining these degrees, but he noted that in built biases explained most of the gap between men and women in 1959.^^
If In built biases and child-bearing are major contributors to lagging achieuement by women in obtaining doctoral and candidate degrees, then women in Islamic regions should lag further behind than anywhere else in the Souiet Union. This, on the surface, has not been the case.
UJhiie the female-male ratio in Rzerbaidzhan lagged considerably
In 1959, there has been much progress since then. Between I960 and
1970 the ratio improued dramatically In Rzerbaidzhan, and steadily in
Kazakhstan. In 1970 all sin Islamic republics had an aboue-norm female-male leuel of degrees among those employed. 3 2 9
Ka
Ka
CA 120
P 110 E R C E Az N T 100
90
Az
1960 1970 1980 1987
Figure A3, Female-Male Ratio of Resear chers with Doctoral and Candidate De grees per Million Employed Females and Males in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 5 3 0
Since 1970 women In Kazakhstan haue continued to haue much higher leuels of doctoral and candidate degrees compared to their male counterparts. The major reason for this has been higher leuel of retention of women. Another aspect, howeuer, Is that higher ranking males haue had greater opportunities to leaue Kazakhstan for regions west of the Urals. The lack of opportunity in the country ouerall has led to "greater" opportunity In Kazakhstan, most likely among
Russians.
Central Asia showed relatlue decline in their female-male degree ratios. Since enrollments were up, and employment among women generally down, this reflects the loss of degree-holding women from the area. These women, most likely, were non-lndlgenous.
Since 1970 the relatiue ratio of women to men who haue doctoral or candidate degrees has declined in all flue republics of Azerbaidzhan and Central Asia. Howeuer, this does not Indicate a loss of local opportunity. Employment among women has Increased due to economic hardship; thus, the base for this uariable has diluted the result Also, these republics still haue more fauorable ratios than the national norm. Euen including lower ouerall employment among 3 3 1 women, these republics are roughly average by Souiet standards.
The Islamic republics haue not lagged behind the rest of the country in making the most prestigious degrees auailable to women.
The lag in these regions is due to the Souiet system. The negatiue aspects haue been the lockout of indigenous women from these degrees (the blame for which is shared by local habits and Moscow) and the lack of opportunity for women to advance out of the region.
And whereas women haue higher leuels of education than men, the bias is stili to give the better positions to men. The situation in
Islamic regions appears consistent with the USSR ouerall.
2. Communist Party Membership: The best ticket up the ladder in the Souiet Union has been through Party membership. To the credit of the early Bolsheviks, major efforts were made to increase the leuel of participation of women in the process. The meeting of the Russian
Congress of Female Communists of the East (later becoming incorporated Into the republic organizations of the Communist Party) was an early attempt to recruit local women into the Party.^^ Quotas were established for both women and local nationalities.^^ Rt first glance this would haue benefitted local women, but often the two 1 1 0 -1
100
Az CA P E Ka R C 90 E N Ka T
80 -
Az
70 1926 1950 1959 1970 19791939
Figure 44. Female Share of Communist Party Members and Candidates in Azerbaidzhan (Az), Central Asia (CA), and Kazakhstan (Ka) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 3 3 3
TABLE 56
FEMALE SHARE OF COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES (Soviet Union = 100)
1926 1939 1950 1959 1970 1979 1984 Azerbaidzhan 45 69 124 107 89 Kazakhstan 71® 79 103 89 84 K irg iz ia 42 112 104 96 92 98 106 T a d z h ik ista n 41 86 103 96 81 84 89 Turkmenistan 45 75 101 95 84 91. 98 U zbekistan 57 97 105 91 86 92 B e lo ru ssla 91 92 87 83 91 96^ L atvia c 97^ 132 146 149 140 137
a - 1927 b- 1978 c - L atv ia was an Independent country In 1926. d- 1941 e- 1983
Sources : Partlynaya zhlzn. 1986, Ho. 14, p. 2 4 and 1987, No. 21, p. 11; KommunlstIcheskaya partis Azerbald- zhana y tslfrakh. 1970, pp. 52-53; Kompartla Ka- zakhstana za 50 let 1921-1971 gg., 1972, pp. 84, 137, 193, 237, 322; Kommunlstlcheskaya partis Klr- glzll y tslfrakh 1918-1984 r r .. 1984, pp. 28, 54, 55, 90; Kommunlstlcheskaya partla Tadzhlklstana v dokumentakh 1 tslfrakh (1924-1963 r r . ) . 1965, pp. 37, 98, 156-157, 214-215; Kommun1stIcheskaya partla Tadzhlklstana v tslfrakh za 60 let 1924- 1984 RR.. 1984, pp. 72, 78, 79; KommunlstIcheskaya partla TurkmenIstana v tslfrakh 1925-1966. 1967, pp. 17. 56, 113, 158; Roi, 1984, pp. 56-57; Kommu nlst Icheskaya partla Uzbeklstana v tslfrakh, 1954, pp. 22, 65, 113, 159; Kommunlstlcheskaya partla Uzbeklstana v tslfrakh, 1979, pp. 276, 324; Kommu nlst Icheskaya partla Belorussll v tslfrakh 1918- 1978, 1978, pp. 154-155; Kommunlstlcheskaya partla Latvll y tslfrakh 1904-1983. 1984, pp. 46, 72, 123, 181, 234, 263. 3 3 4 goals were mutually eucluslue.
liJhile women lagged considerably behind men In Party membership in the Islamic regions In 1926, the situation was comparable to the USSR situation ouerall. During the Stalin years these quotas In Islamic regions led to female representation, while still lagging noticeably behind men, reaching Rll-Union leuels by 1950.
Since 1950 female Party membership has continued to climb throughout the Souiet Union. The recruitment for these ualued positions slackened in all Islamic republics between 1950 and 1970.
There was a resurgence in Central Asia between 1970 and 1984.
The apparent success in recruiting women in Islamic republics is muted by seueral factors. Rigby has noted that female membership has imporued slowly and steadily throughout the Souiet era, but that indigenous women of Central Asia, Azerbaidzhan and, to a lesser eutent, Kazakhstan haue not made up much ground.^^ Lapidus noted that Central Asian women haue been greatly eucluded at aii leuels throughout the Souiet era.^^ Rosenberg states that women euerywhere are underrepresented (only 29% of members, but still increasing In the 1980s), but occupy only seuen percent of the 3 3 5 secretarial posltions.^^ Naturally, indigenous women in Islamic republics do not haue such lofty achieuement in the Party.
Ouerall, there was steady progress in recruiting women Into the
Party throughout the Souiet era. During the Lenin and Stalin eras the
Islamic republics caught up to Souiet standards, hut haue fallen behind since then. Much of this progress is window dressing. Conuergence was predominantly thanks to non-indigenous women ("trapped” in these regions) and with women, particularly indigenous ones, locked out of positions of responsibility in the Party. Uiith the decline of
Party prestige in the 1980s, opportunities for those in the Party as the economy has collapsed, and nationalism more ohuious, it is likely that the lag is actually more seuere as of 1990 than in earlier years. And
Moscow must shoulder the blame for hauing failed to get female Party membership up to empioyment and educational leuels. As with other aspects of the political and social enuironment, the failures of the system to prouide opportunities haue hurt Islamic women the most
E. SÜMMAAV OF AESÜLTS
During the Souiet era much progress has been made toward including women in work, education and politics. For all seuen 3 3 6 uariables eHamined in this chapter, the female-male balance was better in the iate 1980s than In the earliest years.
Howeuer, the Souiet system has failed In many ways during Its 70 years. Most of the progress made in the Islamic republics occured during the Lenin, Stalin and Khrushcheu years. Since 1970 there has been a lack of progress in many areas. Rnd most of the progress made, as euidenced by Kazakhstan and, to a lesser eutent, Kirgizia, has been among non-indigenous women, rather than local Muslim females.
LUomen in the Islamic republics haue generally had lower leuels of rural residency than males. Howeuer, this is mainly thanks to non indigenous women in the region hauing fewer opportunities to leaue the region. This is due to biases back in the European areas and some effect from ethnic intermarriage - indigenous men and the
Russian women.
Nonemployment among women was reduced after the NEP era, but has tended to grow since 1959. Reduced female employment in the 1960s was the result of Islamic habits. Since then it has been the result of lack of opportunities. The lower leuels of female 3 3 7 nonemployment In Kazakhstan and Kirgizia (although still above the
Soviet norm) indicates that the unemployment situation is far morse for indigenous women than republic data indicate.
The one area where local women in Central Asia and Rzerbaidzhan have maintained signifcant "progress" is in employment in the public employment in the public sector on coilective farms. Rs coilectiue farm employment has been reduced throughout most of the Soviet
Union, it has been reduced much more slowly in Central Asia and
Rzerbaidzhan. Since 1970 female employment in the public sector of coliective farms has increased in absolute terms in Central Asia. Ulhat this has meant is that men are increasingly predominant among those entering the shrinking urban job market, and women are increasingly working on the coilective farms rather than pursuing careers or raising families earlier in their life. In Kazakhstan, where collective employment has always been very low, women haue been spared this ordeal to some eutent.
Most of the progress made in enrolling women in higher and secondary education was made up to 1959. Between 1959 and 1979 little was done to enroll women in leuels equivalent to the Souiet 3 3 8
Union ouerall. Only In the early Gorbacheu era haue female enrollment leuels in the Islamic regions begun to conuerge again. Giuen that female enriollment leuels stili lag considerably, and that non-indigenous women benefit the most, the program has to be considered a failure. Much of the blame lies In the failure of females
to finish high school in rural areas of Central Asia and Rzerbaidzhan.
lUomen haue prouen themselues quite capable once they enter into
the higher educational system. Howeuer, with empioyment leuels being low for indigenous women, and the number of higher education and secondary specialized education degrees being low for them, the system has failed here too. And there are signs that there is some regression in this area in Azerbaidzhan and Central Asia. As enpected,
Kazakhstan and Kirgizia, with their large Russian populations, haue
superior leuels of degrees among women who are employed.
Howeuer, as noted seueral times, the employment situation for women often does not take aduantage of their skills or reward them for their educational achleuements as well as it does for men. The situation for indigenous women who haue succeeded in getting these degrees is worse. 3 3 9
The success in getting doctoral and candidate degrees in these
regions is mainly tied to the lack of opportunities for Russian women
in getting out of the region. Rt the same time, lower employment
leuels for indigenous women euplain much of the apparent success.
Ouerall, this was an area where women In the republics haue made,
perhaps, the best success when compared to women in other regions.
But it is also an area where success has been uery poor for the
country ouerall. In other words, women in Central Rsla and
Rzerbaidzhan haue been nearly equally unsuccessful in obtaining
these highest degrees as women throughout the USSR.
Party membership has seen a steady rise in female participation
throughout the Souiet era. Rnd women in Islamic regions (including indigenous) haue benefitted from this. But, most of the progress occured during the Lenin and Stalin eras. Since 1950 there has been a
general regression in the recniiUng of women in the Souiet Union and in Islamic regions in parUcular. R female membership leuel of less
than 30% is hardly something to gloat ouer, especially giuen the 66 years the Party has had to acheiue a balance. 3 4 0
The brunt of the failure of the Souiet system to include people of the Islamic republics In the Souiet system has fallen on women. Some of this Is, of course, linked to local customs and habits. Howeuer, much of It, based on patterns In Kazakhstan and Kirgizia, is linked to the failure of the Souiet system to prouide enough opportunities for eueryone In these regions and to enforce many of the regulations and quotas. Women were low on the social ladder in traditional societies of Islamic regions, and haue remained so in the Souiet era.
Howeuer, they haue made some progress, certainly when compared to women of Turkey - an Islamic society that also has claimed to work toward Improuing economic, political and social conditions for women ouer a period of seueral generations. Rs In the
Souiet Union, much of the progress made Is thrown out the window when times get bad. CHAPTER H
CONCLUSIONS
a. PURPOSE RND GOALS
In recent years there haue been numerous about the problems of
inequality and poverty In the USSR's Islamic regions. In the majority
of cases the data presented is brief or else focused entirely on Just
one or two aspects of the Souiet economy or society. A few studies
haue presented data for the entire Souiet era, but these studies usually couer the USSR as a mhoie, not at republic leuel.
The purpose of this dissertation has been to study houf much inequality there has been in the sin Islamic Souiet republics -
Azerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan - ouer the entire Souiet era when compared to the rest of
tlie country. Rt what times haue some or all of the republics
conuerged toward the norm for the Souiet Union, and at what times haue they diverged from the USSR norm? Has there been a consistent
3 4 1 3 4 2 pattern of the policies during one era leading predominantlg to conuergence, while the policies of another era haue led to diuergence? The Souiet leadership was defined by intervals of close to a decade. The years chosen for this study occured either in a year during which a census was conducted or in a year commonly used in statistical reporting. The "eras" are defined as Tsarist (1897 and
1913), Lenin's New Fconomic Policy (1926), Stalin (1939 and 1950),
Khrushcheu (1959), Brezhneu (1970 and 1979), and Gorbacheu (1987).
A second aspect has been to study uariables reflecting the daily enuironment as created by Moscow, the daily enuironment as created by a combination of Moscow's policies and local behauior, uariables describing daily behauior, and uariables describing female entry into the public sector (employment, education, politics). Haue Moscow's policies and efforts to create more equal conditions (or failure to do so) led to conuergence in the behauior of local nationalities? Or haue local nationalities remained distinct regardless of conditions?
There were 46 major uariables used to study the eueryday enuironment and behauior in the sin republics ouer the Souiet era. As argued in Chapter 4, these uariables both reflect significant aspects of 3 4 3 the daily enuironment and behauior. Some of them are either uariabies not found in other studies (thanks to new data now auailable), or a redefinition of uariables used in preuious studies in order to giue more meaning to the results (e.g., cumulatlue fertility rates rather than crude birth rates). This study was limited to data on the republic ieuei, due to the shortage of usable data at the proulnce
(oblast) leuel. While this leaues data "contaminated" with the influence of non-indigenous peopies in these sin republics, the strong predominance of local nationalities in four republics - Rzerbaidzhan,
Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan - and growth toward indigenous predominance in Kazakhstan and Kirgizia do demonstrate the impact upon Islamic nationalities.
Ouerall, the dissertation has searched for and found strong euidence that the policies of different Souiet eras haue had diverse effects on the enuironment of the people in the sin Islamic republics, and that despite changes in their enuironemt, the people of the
Islamic regions haue demonstrated behauior statistically distinct from the other nationalities of the Souiet Union. 3 4 4
B. FINDINGS OF DISSERTATION
1. Enuironment. The uariables auailable for the pre-reuoiutionary era (Russian presence, urbanization, electricty, medical facilities and personnel) Indicate great leuels of diuersity euisted in the Russian
Empire. In some respects Uzbekistan and Rzerbaidzhan were well deueloped. In terms of material wealth and conuenience, they lagged noticeably behind the European regions of the empire. The other republics lagged noticeably.
The NEP era produced a minture of conuergence and diuergence.
Ouerall, Moscow's decisions on daily life had not taken full effect in the Islamic republics. It was during the Stalin years that conuergence throughout the Souiet Union became the norm. Ulhile there has been some recent adjusting of data for this period, and it is safe to assume some of the data may need further corrections, the force and uniformity at which Stalin implemented his control and decisions would haue logically produced increasing uniformity or conuergence in the country.
The late Stalin era and the Khrushcheu era contained a min of conuergence and diuergence. !n some respects the dally enuironment 3 4 5 of the Islamic republics began falling behind during these years. Euen in areas in which conuergence continued, the pattern toiuard conuergence was slowed.
The tendency of the 1970s was for decline in the dally lluing enuironment of the s Ih Islamic republics. The euception to this relatiue decline was Kazakhstan, which had more Russians than
Kazakhs. Uihlle there has been some conuergence In the 1980s, the predominant pattern in the most significant uariables (urbanization, nonemployment, infant mortality) has been continued decline. And as the Russian share of the population has declined, Kazakhstan too has begun enperiencing some of the relatiue decline typical of its southern neighbors.
Ouerall, the most significant tendencies toward conuergence or equality occured during the Stalin years. The most significant tendencies toward diuergence or decline in the Islamic republics occured in the Brezheneu years, particularly the 1970s. Rs this decline has continued in many respects into the 1980s, some republics now find themselues as far behind in certain ways (e.g., urbanization) as they were back in the Tsarist years. Moscow has clearly failed to 3 4 6 create an enuironment in Azerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan and Central Asia that is comparable to that in the rest of the country ouerall. Based on data of the 1970s and 1980s, Moscow has gluen up trying.
2. Enuironment-Behauior . Education, prestige, political inuoluement, and use of seruices followed many of the patterns demonstrated by urbanization, employment, standard of liuing, and medical care.
The uariables auailable for the Aussian Empire (educational)
Indicated great diuersity, with Uzbekistan and Azerbaidzhan relatluely deueloped in some aspects (a result of long-standing urban deuelopment). Uiith quota systems in place during the NEP and Stalin years, conuergence took place in educational achieuement, prestige employment, and political inuoluement.
Since the Stalin years there has been a minture of conuergence and diuergence. The Khrushcheu years and early Brezheneu years saw some patterns of conuergence, but some included the decline of education and political inuoluement in Azerbaidzhan. Since 1970 all patterns of diuergence haue been to the detriment of the Islamic regions, and most patterns of conuergence haue been the relatiue decline in Central Asia and Azerbaidzhan in areas where they had 3 4 7 aboue-norm conditions. As mas the case for urbanization, mork and health, Kazakhstan has been spared much of the relatiue decline and actually continues to improue in some areas.
The decline of Rzerbaidzhan and Central Asia in these areas is inencusable. Quota systems, well established in the Souiet Union, barriers to migration, and state-assigned jobs could easily haue made up for the ineqauiities. The number of schools and students is established by Moscom. The appointments of prestigious workers is done or approved by Moscow. Party membership is directed by
Moscow. The indoctrinational daycare and pioneer seruices are determined by Moscow.
As the data show, Lenin and Stalin (and to some entent
Khrushcheu) created increasing opportunities or obligations for more social and political inuoluement in the Islamic regions. Brezhneu and
Gorbacheu haue reduced the opportunities or orbllgations for social and political inuolument in the Islamic regions. And as in dally liuing and work, the more crucial the aspect of daily life (Party membership, high-leuel research Jobs), the more divergent the Islamic republics are. The enception, of course, is Kazakhstan. Clearly, Brezhneu and 5 4 8 his successors haue had little interest in enabling Central Asians and, to a lesser entent, the Rzerbaidzhanis to share the benefits and power at the top of Souiet society. The areas of relatiue equality remain those of lesser significance.
5. Behauior. The data for behauior tied to searching for job opportunities (migration) and a satisfactory family situation
(marriage, diuorce, number of children) giue strong support to the premise that the populations of the Islamic republics haue indeed not been assimilated into the mainstream of Souiet thinking. While there haue been statistically contradictory patterns of conuergence and diuergence in recent years, these reflect more traditional responses to conditions created or tolerated by Mosocw, rather than behauior desired by Moscow.
Migrational patterns uiuidly demonstrate the attention that Stalin gaue to the Islamic regions and the reduced attention giuen them by his successors. The mouement of people to these areas in the pre-war era was the result of people mouing to assigned Jobs, people mowing to where new jobs were being created, and people fleeing from the
European areas due to political reasons. As the number of Russians 3 4 9
(and other "Europeans ") grew in the Islamic republics, the standard of liuing Improued. Rs the standard of liuing Improued, more Russians were attracted to the s I h republics.
Conuergence was the pattern for marriage, diuorce and family size during the Stalin era. It Is difficult to say whether this was from
Increased "souletlzatlon" of the people, or whether regulations and liuing conditions forced this. The political circumstances of 1940, no doubt, played a role In this. Masslue purges and the migrations they caused led to greater family Instability. In 1940 the Incidence of diuorces and number of children bom In the Islamic regions came closer to the USSR norm during the Stalin years than at other times.
Since the Stalin years the Islamic populations haue reasserted their distlnctlueness. Diuorce has not been nearly as common In the
Islamic republics (euen in Kazakhstani, as in the rest of the USSR.
Shiite Rzerbaidzhan, perhaps partly owing to Its pronlmlty to Iran, maintains the most distinct pattern of all. Diuorce Is rare and not getting any more common, despite an ouerall Increase in society.
When the economy was Improuing In the 1960s, the response In the Islamic republics was not to conuerge with the Souiet norms, but 3 5 0 to diuerge. UJomen became less ulslble in public employment and had more children. Opportunities for men were sufficient to carry the load. Rs the economy declined in the 1970s and 1980s, women haue become more uisible in the public sector and haue had fewer children.
This does not reflect attitude change, but rather the response to insufficient opportunities for men to carry the economic burdens alone. Marriage among Islamic females has become increasingly delayed - they are staying home to help their families. The result has been fewer children among Islamic females in their teens, but high numbers of children still being born when the women are in their forties. The decline in fertility in the Islamic regions (at a time it has been rising in the rest of the USSR), reflects the economic and enuironmental hardships and the delayed marriages that result, not a reduced desire for children.
Abortions, which are so common among European Souiet citizens, haue become relatluely less common among Muslim women. Shi ite
Rzerbaidzhan remains the most conseiruatiue of all in this regard. Rnd the problems of alcoholism haue neuer reached All-Union leuels in the
Islamic regions. 3 5 1
Since the patterns of conuergence in the pre-w ar Stalin era, marriage, diuorce and fertility haue shown distinctiuely Islamic influence in all sin Souiet republics. Shiite Rzerbaidzhan has remained the most distinctiue in auoiding diuorce and abortions. Centrla Asia remains the most distinctiue in fertility rates. lUhile Kazakhstan has been the closest to Souiet norms, it has become increasingly more
non-Souiet in the past two decades as the number, and quite likely, influence of Russians has declined.
While the Islamic republics show distinctiuely diuergent behauioral patterns in marriage and family from their other fellow
Souiet citizens, they haue been influenced somewhat by the system.
Diuorce rates and fertility rates, while hauing changed in Islamic societies outside the Souiet Union, still remain at more traditional lower leuels. The Muslims of the Souiet Union haue been part of the ouerall rise in diuorce and decline in fertility taking part in the entire
Islamic world, but it has occured earlier and more noticeably in the
USSR. One can only speculate as to whether this is the result of
Moscow's policies, or the earlier aduent of urban deuelopment (with its accompanying inter-republic and intra-republic migration) and 3 5 2 uniuersal education. Or this could be the result of including women in
the public sector of society.
4. lOomen and Men in Societu. Soviet society has had much greater
success in enabling and pushing Islamic women into higher levels of
education, prestigious employment and politics than have Islamic
societies outside the Soviet Union. Islamic women by every measure
are more involved in public life now in the Soviet Union than in the
pre-Soviet years.
However, there is much evidence that many of these gains either
fell short of their goals of equality (by Soviet standards) and/or are
euperiencing a return to increased male dominance in the public
sector. One euample is rural residency. In both pre-revolutionary
society and in Soviet society, cities have been the places of
opportunity. Uihile women in the Islamic regions had increasing
access to cities in the NEP and Stalin years, this opportunity has begun
declining since 1970. fls the overall number of opportunities have
declined, the ratio of women to men in rural areas has risen in all sIk
Islamic republics; most slowly, of course, in Kazakhstan. Rural
residency is highest for women in Shi ite flzerbaidzhan. This is, most 3 5 3 likely, a reflection of the increased influence of Iran on daily attitudes.
While employed Islamic women in all sIh republics haue made as great strides in achieuing prestigious positions as haue their counterparts elsewhere In the USSR, women In the Islamic republics haue not caught up in public employment ouerall. Rt no time in Souiet history haue women in the Islamic republics euer been publicly employed at the same leuels as women in the other nine republics.
Neither political leadership nor economic takeoff and decline haue broken this pattern. Women, as in other Islamic societies, always haue had higher nonemployment rates.
When economic condtions haue improued rapidly, such as during
NEP or in the 1960s, female nonemployment in the Islamic areas rose euen further aboue that of men (unlike in the non-Islamic regions) so that women could haue more children. When economic conditions declined, female nonemployment declined, but neuer to the leuel of male nonemployment And the jobs they took were the worst ones.
The absolute growth of collectiue farm employment in Central Asia and
Rzerbaidzhan has occured despite reduced employment for men in this 3 5 4 sector. As male nonemployment greui In the 1970s and 1980s, they became less and less employed on collectiue farms. lOomen took up the slack by taking these positions. No doubt enulronmental deterioration in rural Central Asia and Azerbaldzhan Is one reason that women are working in these areas in increasing numbers, as men prefer unemployment ouer jobs in these rural chemical hades.
lOomen haue neuer achieued their share of membership in the
Communist Party - neither Islamic women nor others. Uihile there was conuergence in the Stalin and Khrushcheu eras, Islamic women haue fallen further behind their non-lslamic counterparts in gaining access to the Party. With less than a third of all Party members being women, with female-male ratios being substandard in the Islamic republics, with local women being uastly underrepresented, and with
Party membership declining in the late 1980s, Islamic membership in the Communist Party is uery uncommon and increasingly so. The quota system neuer remotely come close to achieuing the Party's stated goal of political gender equality for Islamic women.
5. Ouerall. The Souiet Union has claimed to haue as some of its goals equality in liuing conditions, economic opportunities, and political 3 5 5 opportunities for peoples of all regions, all nationalities and both genders. Inequality has been one of the most common and most forceful criticisms of the pre-Souiet past and of countries outside the
Souiet-style socialist system.
As shown by seueral uariables, there certainly was a great deal of diuersity in liuing conditions and habits In the late Tsarist years. Uhth some enceptions in urbanization and education, the Islamic regions lagged far behind those of European Russia In material conditions and
"modern habits".
The NEP years were characterized by ouerall improuements in daily life, but only the most basic and simplest ones reached the
Islamic regions. This resulted from the lack of time the Souiet system had to reach these remote regions, the shortage of capital and personnel in which to carry them out, and the continuation of traditional attitudes shown by local people. The NEP years did not haue full impact on Azerbaidzhanis, Central Asians and Kazakhs, but did set the groundwork for what followed.
UJhat followed was the Stalin era. Conuergence was the norm not only in daily liuing enuironment as dictated by Moscow, but also in 3 5 6 social habits. Rt no other time mas the pattern of conuergence or equality in society so clear as during the Stalin years. The Stalin era managed to achieue equality in seueral basic aspects (employment leuels, for enample). Uihile there is justifiably still some skepticism of data from this era (despite recent additions and changes), there should be no doubt that conuergence or greater equality mas the norm
for the Stalin era, both in dally enuironment and in daily social behauior.
The Khrushcheu era and early Brezhneu years shomed mined patterns. Conuergence continued to be the norm in employment, education, standard of liuing, and political opportunity. Homeuer, the peoples of Rzerbaidzhan and, in particular, Central Rsia demonstrated more traditional ualues in marriage, diuorce and child-bearing than citizens in the other nine republics. Increased prosperity did not haue the same behauioral results - on the contrary, it enabled them to haue more children and keep an increased number of momen out of the public sector.
The late Brezhneu years and Gorbacheu years haue been characterized by ouerall decline in the Souiet economy, mith increased 3 5 7
divergence (or decline) in the Islamic republics. The increasing leuel of
attention typical of the earlier Souiet years to Islamic regions has
been replaced with declining leuels of attention. This covered not only
economic development, but also educational, political and
seruice-sector development, fls attention from Moscow and the
presence of Russians declined, the people of flzerbaidzhan and Central flsia have statistically behaved more distinctively. While they were certainly never completely assimilated into the Soviet mainstream,
they are now becoming far less likely to feel part of the system or act like European Soviet citizens.
The pattern of convergence and divergence in the Soviet Union has
followed another pattern, fls the economy has prospered, the
tendency was toward greater equality (eucepting in child bearing), fls
the economy has declined, society has not only tended toward greater
divergence, but also in a selective way. The first regions to suffer
were the more remote (i.e.. Central flsia and flzerbaidzhan). The
strong Russian presence in Kazakhstan has reduced the impact there.
The people who suffered the most were the ones at the bottom of the social pole - women and children. Women had the greatest reduction 3 5 8 in opportuntles for better jobs and political opportunities. They also were increasingly placed in the most hazardous working conditions, such as working on the poisoned collectiue farms or gluing birth to children with shorter internals between children and into their forties.
LUhere child welfare needs were greatest, they were least euident.
Daycare for Islamic children is seriously underprouided and, worse, infant mortality rates show signs of going far beyond the Souiet
Union's own poor standards as industrial countries go. Turkmenistan has reached an infant mortality rate that is more typical of Third
World countries.
The increasingly conuergent enuironment of Lenin, Stalin and, to a lesser entent, Khrushcheu was replaced with the increasingly diuergent enuironment of Brezhneu and Gorbacheu. The earlier conuergence during the Lenin and Stalin years had some impact on behauior, but obuiousiy neuer eliminated local Islamic traditions and attitudes. The diuergent conditions, reduced suppression of public enpression, and increased nationalism in the Souiet Union, the concepts of equality and full "souietization" of habits are becoming less likely to be achieued and, perhaps, irreleuant Souiet Muslims 3 5 9 statistically appear to haue less and less in common uiith Russians,
Ukrainians and other "Europeans ", and more and more in common with their brother Turks.
C. FURTHER STUDY
The major barrier in studying the enuironment and behauior of the
Islamic nationalities of the Souiet Union remains the resolution and unauailabiiity of data. This dissertation used republic-leuel data owing to the shortage of meaningful data at provincial leuels or specifically for different nationalities. Rnother factor is that the most useful information from the 1989 census has not been published as y e t
Statistical sources for the siu Islamic republics do euist, but there are fewer copies and less complete collections within the United
States than for the USSR or Russian Republic. The Ohio State University
Main Library has only one recent republic statistical yearbook from
Uie Islamic regions (Uzbekistan - 1988). Ideally, more sub-republic information for these republics should become available if statistical information continues to be published more openly and completely. 5 6 0
The newt step in research would be to study the differences in provinces within the Islamic republics ouer the Souiet era. fls the figures and tables on the following seuen pages demonstrate, flussians (who dominate the population of Kazakhstan's capital, flima-flta, and the majority of Russians in Uzbekistan Hue in Tashkent, the republic's capital) do appear to haue impact on a republic's locational quotient. However, based on the three uariables
(physicians per 10,000 persons, new apartments per 1000 newlywed couples, and marriage-diuorce ratio) as illustrated in Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan, it wouid seem that the presence of Russians does aiter the locational quotient of a republic, but the presence of Russians does not alter the basic pattern of conuergence and divergence. The areas outside the Russian-dominated republic capitals probably haue the same tendencies of conuergence and divergence as the sin republics haue shown in this study; the areas outside the areas predominated by Russians are simply worse off or more distinct from the Souiet norm.
There are, of course, problems with what kind of data is given at the prouinciai leuel (for instance, cumulative fertility rates, infant 400 "
AA
P E AA R C 2 00' E N T
100 - K4
KA
1913 1940 1950 1959 19^0 1979 Î9&7
Figure 45. Physicians per 10,000 Persons in Kazakhstan (KA), Alma-Ata (AA), and Rest of Kazakhstan ( R) R elativ e to the Average for the Soviet Union.
o>LM 300-
C 200-
100 -
UZ
1913 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 Tg&s
Figure 46. Physicians per 10,000 Persons in Uzbekistan (UZ), Tashkent (T), and Rest of Uzbekistan (R) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union.
5 3 6 3
TABLE 57
PHYSICIANS PER 10.000 PERSONS IN KAZAKHSTAN; WHOLE REPUBLIC, ALMA-ATA. REST OF REPUBLIC (S o v iet Union = 100)
1913 1 940 1 950 1959 1 970 1979 1988 Kaza khst an 22 54 65 74 80 85 90 Alma -Ata 333 261 345 315 306 237 218 Rest of Republic 22 48 54 61 67 75 81
Sourc es: Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR V 1979 godu, p. 5 28; Naro dnoe khozy aystvo SSSR V 1988 godu, pp. 19, 222; N aselen ie SSSR 198 7 : s t a t i s t ic h e sk iy sb o rn ik , p. 10 ; Vestnik statistiki, 1971. No. 11, p. 95; Vestn ik statistiki, 1980. No . 12 p. 7 6; Vestnik statistiki, 1989. No. 11, pp . 69 79; Yerevan v tsifra kh. 1968, pp . 181-184.
TABLE 58
PHYSICIANS PER 10,000 PERSONS IN UZBEKIST AN ; WHOLE REPUBLIC. TASHKENT. REST OF REPUBLIC (Soviet Union = 100)
1913 1940 1950 1959 1970 1979 1988 U zbekistan 17 59 70 72 73 76 80 Tashkent 94 290 286 281 232 191 182 Rest of Republic 13 37 46 46 54 63 67
Sources: See Table 57. 5 6 4
1201 P k — F KA AA E 100 " R C E 80" N T 60. 19 TT tT 198 7
F ig u re 47, Number of New Apartments in Kazakhstan (KA), Alma-Ata (AA), and Rest of Kazakhstan (R) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union.
120
UZ C
N UZ T
1970 1979 1988
Figure 48. Number of New Apartments in Uzbekistan (UZ), Tashkent (T), and Rest of Republic (R) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 3 6 5
TABLE 59
NUMBER OF NEW APARTMENTS PER 1000 NEWLYWED COUPLES IN KAZAKHSTAN: ENTIRE REPUBLIC , ALMA-ATA , REST OF REPUBLIC (Soviet Union = 100)
1970 1979 1987 K azak h stan 105 101 97 Alma-Ata 108 118 99 Rest of Republic 104 99 96
Sources; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1979 godu. p. 415; Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1988 godu, p. 153; Naselenie SSSR 1987: statisticheskly sbornik, p. 192; Vestnik statistiki» 1971, No. 11, pp. 89-90; Vestnik statistiki, 1980, No. 12, pp. 67-68; Vestnik statistiki, 1988, No. 12, p p . 62-64.
TABLE 60
NUMBER OF NEW APARTMENTS PER 1000 NEWLYWED COUPLES IN UZBEKISTAN; ENTIRE REPUBLIC , TASHKENT. REST OF REPUBLIC (Soviet Union = 100)
1970 1979 1987 U z b e k ista n 90 77 67 T ashkent 113 108 96 Rest of Republic 87 74 61
Sources: See Table 59. 3 6 6
200 ' P E KA R C 100' E AA AA N T
1970 1979 1987
F ig u re 49. Marriage-Dlvorce Ratio for Kazakhstan (KA), Alma-Ata (AA) and R est of R ep u b lic (R) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union.
R
300- UZ UZ
1970 1979 1987
Figure 50. Marriage-Divorce Ratio for U z b e k ista n (UZ), T ashkent (T) and Rest of R ep u b lic (R) Relative to the Average for the Soviet Union. 3 6 ?
TABLE 61
MARRIAGE- DIVORCE RATIO FOR KAZAKHSTAN: WHOLE REPUBLIC. ALMA-ATA, REST OF REPUBLIC (Soviet Union = 100)
1970 1979 1987 Kaza k h sta n 160 141 119 Alma -A ta 75 64 77 Rest of Republic 177 157 124
Sources: Naselenie SSSR 1987: statisticheskiy sbornik, p. 192; Vestnik statistiki, 1971, No. 11, p. 89; Vestnik statistiki. 1980, No. 12, p. 67; Vestnik statistiki, 1988, No. 12, pp. 62-63 .
TABLE 62
MARRIAGE-DIVORCE RATIO FOR UZBEKISTAN: WHOLE REPUBLIC, TASHKENT , REST OF REPUBLIC (Soviet Union = 100)
1970 1979 1987 Uzbekistan 2 25 257 223 Tashkent 70 87 127 R est of R epublic 332 339 263
Sources: See Table 61. 3 6 8 mortality rates, uarious employment data, female-male data are either nonenistent or spotty). Crude uariables, as used in earlier studies, euist, but many of the most Important uariables used in this study would haue to be eliminated.
There is a shortage of data for earlier years in Souiet history.
Many data that are routinely reported at present were either neuer published or neuer computed for pre-war years. Their reliability would also be more suspect The best couered at the prouinciai leuels in pre-war years would be production figures (such as electricity or hospital beds) or bureacucratic functions (students enrolled, physicians employed). Euen data for the republic capitals is limited for those years in Rzerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan and Central flsia.
Giuen its population size, economic significance, key location, and the better auailability of data, Uzbekistan is the most logical focus for study at the sub-republic leuel. Prouinciai data is auailable from the different censuses (the problem being the changes in the location of boundaries and in the number of prouinces). Data for Tashkent haue been relatiuely abundant (seueral being annually reported in Uestnik statistiki ). flnd the collections for Ohio State and the United States are 3 6 9 as current and complete with Uzbekistan as with any Islamic republic.
The next project will be to study many of the uariables (or approKimations of them) in this dissertation, but at the prouinciai leuel in Uzbekistan, as well as different uariables including nationalities - language use, urban-rural location, enrollment in higher education. Party membership, etc.
Comparisons with other Islamic societies will probably proue somewhat difficult. While Turkey has a well established gouemment bureaucracy and has a census euery Hue years, there is much data it giues that are not comparable to data used in this research. The
Turkish gouemment measures seueral aspects of the economy, society, and politics differently. Sources from Egypt and Iran are less frequently updated, and their auailability in the United States more limited. Howeuer, thanks to uarious United Nations and United States gouemment estimates, some meaninful comparisons (education, urbanization, marriages-diuorce rates, fertility rates, mortality rates, etc.) can be made. It would be interesting to see, for enample, if
Uzbeks are statistically more Turkish than "Souiet". 3 7 0
I beiieue that the results and conclusions of this dissertation will
be further born out by study at the sub-republic leuel of the Islamic regions of the USSR. The patterns of conuergence and diuergence ouer
time should be similar. The major difference, most likely, is that the
degree of equality/inequality will probalby be greater and more clearly distinguished between Russians and the local nationalities. The gender gap among Muslims should also be more graphically demonstrated at the sub-republic leuel than at the republic leuel. nPPENOIK
Table 63 Islamic and Republic Nationalities as a Percent of Ouerall Population of Russian Empire and Souiet Union: 1897 - 1989
Table 64 Share of Islamic and Republic Nationalities Who Hue In Their Omn Republic or Proulnce
Table 65 Mean Ualues for Uariables for the Russian Empire and the Souiet Union
3 7 1 3 7 2
TABLE 63
ISLAMIC AND REPUBLIC NATIONALITIES AS A PERCENT OF OVERALL POPULATION OF RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND SOVIET UNION; 1897 - 1989
1897 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 Azerbaidzhanis a 1.16 1,34 1.41 1.81 2.09 2.37 Kazakhs 2.88 2.70 1.83 1.73 2.19 2.50 2.85 K irg iz 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.46 0.60 0.73 0.89 T adzhiks b 0.67 0.72 0.70 0.88 1.11 1.48 Turkmen c 0.52 0.48 0.48 0.63 0.77 0.96 Uzbeks 2.36 2.66 2.86 2.88 3.80 4.75 5,84 Abkhaz 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0,04 Adyges na d d 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 B alk ar s na 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 B a sh k irs* a 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.52 0,51 Chechens 0.18 0.22 0.24 0.20 0.25 0.29 0,34 C herkess* na d d 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 D a g e sta n is 0.40 0.44 0.51 0.45 0.56 0.63 0.72 Ingush e 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 Kabards 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.12 0,12 0.14 K arachay na 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 Karakalpaks 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.15 O s s e tis * 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 T a ta rs * 2.03 2 .00 2.54 2.38 2.45 2,41 2.42 Abazas na 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0,01 0.01 Afghans 0.001 0.004h na 0.001 0.002 na 0.002 Arabs 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.004 na na 0.003 B a lu c h is na 0.01 na 0.004 0.01 0,01 0.01 Dungans na 0.01 0.003 0.01 0.02 0,02 0.02 Kurds 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0,04 0.05 P e r s ia n s * 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0,01 0.01 Turks a 0.01 na 0.02 na 0,04 0.07 U ighurs 0.06 0.03 0 .06 0.05 0.07 0,08 0.09
MUSLIMS 11.07 12.07 12.30 11.84 14.51 16,70 19.41 NGN-ASSIMILATED 8.88 9.38 9.03 8.77 11.31 13.53 16.24 MUSLIMS 3 7 3
TABLE 63 (con tin u ed )
1897 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 1989 R u ssia n s 44.66 52.91 58.41 54.65 53.37 52.43 50.80 Ukrainians 17.95 21.22 16.56 17.84 16.86 16.16 15.46 Belorussians 4.72 3.22 3.11 3.79 3.74 3.61 3.51 E s to n ia n s na 0.11 0.08 0.47 0.42 0.39 0.36 L a tv ia n s 1.15 0.10 0.07 0.67 0.59 0.55 0.51 Lithuanians 1.33 0.03 0.02 1.11 1.10 1.09 1.07 M oldavians 0.90 0.19 0.15 1.06 1.12 1.13 1.17 A rm enians 0.94 1.07 1.27 1.33 1,47 1.58 1.62 G eo rg ian s 1.09 1.24 1.33 1.29 1.34 1.36 1.39
* More than 5% spoke Russian as their native language in 1979 census.
a- No population figure for Azerbaidzhanis in 1897. They were counted as Bashkirs or Turks, b- The 350,400 Tadzhiks listed for 1897 did not include many counted as part of other nationalities, c- The 281,400 Turkmen listed for 1897 did not include many counted as part of other nationalities, d- Adyges and Cherkess listed as one nationality in 1926 and 1939. e- Some Ingush were counted as members of other nationalities in 1897.
Sources; Akiner, 1983; Lorimer, 1946, pp. 51, 69; Roi, 1984, pp. 76-79; Sulkevich, 1940, p. 16; Wixman, "Demographic Trends 1984, p. 47; Chislennost i sostav naselenia SSSR: po dannym Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naselenia 1979 goda, pp. 71-73; Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naselenia 19 7 0 goda. Vol. 4, pp. 9-11; Soviet Economy in a Time of Change, 1979, p. 693. 3 7 4
TABLE 64
SHARE OF ISLAMIC AND REPUBLIC NATIONALITIES ~WHO LIVE IN THEIR OWN REPUBLIC OR PROVINCE
1897 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 Azerbaidzhanis na 84.3 na 84.9 86.2 8 6 .0 Kazakhs 96.3 93.6 74.6 77.0 79.9 80.7 K irg iz 61.8 86.7 8 5 .2 86.4 88.5 88.5 T adzhiks na 63.1 7 1 .9 75.2 76.3 77.2 Turkemn na 94.2 91.0 92.2 92.9 93.3 Uzbeks 77.3 84.5 8 3 .5 83.8 84.0 84.9 Abkhaz na 98.2 na 93.5 92.8 91.4 Adyges na na na 82.8 81.6 79.5 B a lk a rs na 99.7 na 80.4 86.3 90.0 B ash k ir s na 87.7 na 74.6 72.0 68.2 Chechens na 91.4 na 58.3 83.1 8 0 .9 C herkess na 81.9 na 79.3 78.4 74.1 D a g e sta n is na 8 4.9 na 78.0 77.7 76.5 Ing u sh na 94.4 na 45.5 72.1 72.4 K abards na 87.5 na 93.5 94.6 94.4 K arachay na 95.2 na 83.3 86.1 8 3.3 Karakalpaks na 79.4 na 90.4 92.2 92.9 O s s e tis na 69.3 na 67.6 68.7 67.2 T a ta rs na 4 0 .0 na 27.1 25.9 2 6.0
R u ssia n s 91.1 87.2 80.3 85.8 83.5 82.6 U k ra in ia n s 77.9 74.4 na 86.3 86.6 86.2 Belorussians 81.2 84.8 na 82.5 80.5 8 0 .0 E s to n ia n s na — — 86.7 90.3 91.8 92.9 L a tv ia n s na — — 91.9 92.7 93.8 93.4 Lithuanians 97.7 — — 98.7 92.5 94.1 95.1 M oldavians 70.0 —» — 86.8 8 5.0 84.4 85.1 Arm enians na 47.4 na 55.7 62.0 65.6 G eorgians na 98.5 96.0 96.6 96.5 96.1
Sources; Akiner , 1983; Lewis , 1976, p. 402 * Vsesoyuznaya perepis naselenia 17 dekabry a 1926 %oda: kratkie s v o d k i. V ol. 3 , Tables 2-3; I t o g i Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naselnia 1970 goda. V ol. 4 , T able s 2-3; Chislennost i s o s ta v naselenia SSSR: po dannym Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naselenia 1979 goda. Tables 13, 36. TABLE 65
MEAN VALUES FOR VARIABLES FOR THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND THE SOVIET UNION
T ab le No . 1913 1926 1939/40 195 0 1959/60 1970 1979/80 1987/88 T ab le i 14 .8 17 .9 17.9 3 2.5 38.9 47 . 9 56.3 62,3 66.0* T able 5 18.8 38.3 31.2 34.2 17 .8 18 .2 17 .2 T able 6 23.9 26.5 35.2 36.1 36.3 35.8 T able 7 10.9 53.4 89.4 89.2 130.3 138.3 151.1 T able 8 6.9* 45.7 40.3 28.3 15 .6 11.0 9.4 T able 9 33.1 64.2 80.6 122.0 163.3 202 .9 T able 10 36.3 65.6 93.0 149.9 202.3 257.2 T ab le 11 1.4 0 3 .9 0 5.52 7.51 T able 12 5.7 12.7 25.6 32.7 T able 13 103 169 214 T able 14 200 335 417 T able 16 783 1 1 1 5 2673 3584 T able 17 34 .3 48 .9 T able 19 13 33* 249 510 1270 3066 4717 5999 T able 20 543 516 1000 958 675 792 T able 21 13 14* 40 56 76 109 123 131 T ab le 22 1.8 1.6* 7.9 14.6 19.5 27.4 36.3 43.8 T able 23 0.61 0.33 0.37 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.38 T able 24 44.4 68.6 69.3 67.7 69.0* T ab le 25 279 269 174 181.5 80.7 35.3 24.7 27.3 24.7 T able 27 9.1 9 . 9* T able 28 16.1 14.7* 23.3 37.4 68 . 0 93.1 111.3 113.4 T able 29 14 . 6 4 1 .0 64.1 95.9 118.7 T able 30 6.9 16.5* 28.0 39.0 57 . 2 89.2 104.7 99.1 T able 31 23 . 9 60.6 93.4 131.4 154.1 T able 32 794 1326 2321 3384 4064 T able 33 14.3 21.8 58.6 63.1 93.7 96.8 101.9 04 T able 34 586 322 379 377 443 474 464 •« j TABLE 65 (c o n tin u e d )
Table No . 1897 1 9 1 3 1926 1939/40 1950 1959/60 1970 1979/80 1987/88 T able 35 78* 93 201 342 639 964 1289 T able 36 9 .0 9.3 11.5 37.0 54.0 58.0 T able 37 9.3 13.4 17.9 26.6 32.9* T able 39 5.98 30.89 10.57 3.72 3.03 2 . 92 T able 41 301 166 291 4 08 398 413* T able 42 5.3 11.5 15.2 14.1* T able 44 139.5 102.0 88.7 65.7 69.9 79.6 T able 45 5.446 4.422 2.797 2.416 2 .273 2.521 T able 46 29.2 30.4 39.4 44.4 T able 47 5 .0 2.9 1.6 0.7 T able 48 8.71 8.2 9 * T able 49 105.7* 102.3 100.3* T able 50 1.023 1.033 1.053 1.030 1.035 T able 51 8 , 285 1.561 1.273 1.175 1.058 0.853 0.724 T able 52 1.311 1.106 1.225 0.974 0.866 0.756 T able 53 1.292 1.026 0.785 1.084 1.370 1.301 T able 54 1.335 1.392 1.404 1.5 4 0 Tab 1 e 55 0.264 0.370 0.337 0.354 0.360 T able 56 11.5 15.3 18.6 19 .9 21.9 25.6 28.8*
* See original table for precise year that this value appears.
Sources ; See original tables for data sources.
•oUN o>
CONUERGENCE AND DIUERGENCE IN THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLICS OF THE SOUIET UNION
AND THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE: 1913 - 1988
Uolume II
DISSERTATION
Presented In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University
By
Robert 0. Gross, B.H., C.S.T.R.S.S., M.A.
The Ohio State University
1991
Dissertation Committee: Approved by
Emilio Casetti
S. Earl Brown ______Emilio Casetti Yuri U. Medvedkov Department of Geography TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOOTNOTES...... 3 7 7
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 409
KKI FOOTNOTES
Chapter 1
1. T. Zaslauskaya, The Second Socialist Reuolution (London: I B. Tauris e Co. Ltd., 1990), p. 13.
2. 20 lei aouetskoy ulasti: statisticheskip sbomik (Moskua: Krasnyy proletary, 1937), p. 71.
3. Zdrauookhranenie u SSSR (Moskua: Gosstatizdat TsSU SSSR, 1960), p. 5.
4. Narodnoe khozuaystuo Uzbekskoy SSB za 60 let (Tashkent Uzbekistan, 1984), p. 7.
5. "Communist Party Is losing members", Columbus Dispatch, duly 5, 1990, p. fl-2.
6. Olga L. Meduedkou and Yuri I). Meduedkou, "Disaduantaged Groups and Backward Regions In the Souiet Union", Final Report to National Council for Soulet and East European Research (Columbus: Ohio State Unluerslty, 1990), pp. 23-24.
7. Zaslauskaya, op. cit, p. 12.
8. Ibid., pp. 53-58.
9. Meduedkou, op. cIt, pp. 24-25.
10. Ibid., p. lu.
11. Ibid., p. 11.
3 7 7 3 7 8
Chapter 2
1. Matthew Jay Sagers, Regional Inequalities in the USSR: 1940- 1975 (Columbus: Ohio State Uniuersity, 1980), abstract p. 2, p. 81.
2. Rndrew R. Bond, "Spatial Dimensions of Gorbacheu's Economic Strategy", Souiet Geography: Reuieui and Translation. 1987, No. Oil, pp. 490-523.
3. Meduedkou, op. cit.
4. FOIS Daily Report Souiet Union. June 12, 1990, p. 118, June 14, 1990, pp. 116-117.
5. Ibid., January 8, 1987, pp. 81-2.
6. Ibid., January 7, 1987, pp. R4-6.
7. "Gorbacheu's Popularity at Home Wanes amidst Adulation in West", Seattle Post-Intelligencer. July 31, 1990, p. A-13.
8. Columbus Dispatch, op. cit.
9. Sagers, op. cit, p. 81.
10. G.R. Gomostayeua, "Social infrastructure Leuels in the Largest Cities of the USSR: A Measure of the Quality of Life", Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation. 1986, No. 6, pp. 368-376.
11. Matthew Jay Sagers, "Regional Distribution of industrial Employment in the USSR", Souiet Geography: Reuiew end Translation . 1984, No. 3, pp. 166-176.
12. James W. GiSlula, "The Economic interdependence of Souiet Republics", Souiet Economy in a Time of Change (Washington: US Gouernment Printing Office, 1979), pp. 618-655. 3 7 9
13. Meduedkou, op.cit.
14. Sagers, Regional Inequalities .... op. cit.
15. Ann Littmann Rappoport, Souiet Policies toward Its Union Reoublics: A Compositional flnalgsis of "National Integration" (Columbus: Ohio State Unluerslty, 1978).
16. George Oemko and Roland Fuchs, Annals of the RAG. 1979, No. 2.
17. Gillula, op. cit., p. 619.
18. Martin C. Spechler, "Regional Oeuelopments in the USSR, 1958- 1978", Souiet Economu in a Time of Change (Washington: US Gouernment Printing Office, 1979), pp. 141-163.
19. FBIS Dailg Report: Souiet Union. June 21, 1990, pp. 119-121.
20. Theodore Shabad, Geographic Aspects of the New Souiet Fiue-Vear Plan", Souiet Geooraohu: Reuiew and Translation. 1986, No. 1, pp. 1-16.
21. U.U. Pokshisheuskiy, "Geography of Ethnic Groups and Processes”, Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation. 1987, No. 8, pp. 591-607.
Chapter 3
1. Ronaiij Winman, The Peonies of the USSR: An Ethnographic Handbook (Rrmonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1984).
2. Ronald Winman, "Demographic Trends among Souiet Moslems (1959-1979) , Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation. 1984, No. 1, pp. 46-60.
3. S.A. Tokareu, Etnoorafia narodou SSSR. (Moskua: Izd-uo Moskouskogo uniuersiteta, 1958). 5 8 0
4. Zeu Katz (éd.), Handbook of Major Souiet Nationalities. (New York: The Free Press, 1975.
5. Uiktor luanouich Koziou, The Peoples of the Souiet Union. (Bloomington: Indiana Uniuersity press, 1988).
6. "CompleHities of the Kurdish Problem", Current Digest of the Souiet Press ICDSPl. 1990, No. 10, p. 30.
7. Rleuandre Benningsen, e t al., Souiet Strategy and Islam. (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1989).
8. Ibid., p. iK.
9. Ibid., p. 11, 20-21.
10 Ibid., pp. 20 21.
11. (Uiuman, "Demographic Trends ...", 46-60.
12. Ibid., p. 48.
13. Ibid., p. 52.
14. Ibid., pp. 51, 55.
15. Jeremy flzrael, Souiet NaUoanlitg Polities and Practices. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), pp. 363-390.
16. Meduedkou, op. cit, p.11.
17. Benningsen, et. al., op.cit, p. 11.
18. Ozel Sayl, Turk bugukleri (Istanbul: Serofset Y. Serim, 1966), pp. 6-7, 14-15, 20-21.
19. "RIma-Bta daki hodiseleri", Cumhuriyel. December 27, 1986, p. 3. 5 8 1
20. Azeri Firebrand Pushes Pan-Moslem Agenda", CDSP. 1989, No. 52, p. 13.
21. B.P. Krautsou (ed.1, Torzhestuo leninskog natsionainog oolitiki. (Msokua: Izd-uo UPSh I AON pri TsK KPSS, 1965).
22. Oaymlrza Haylt, Som letrussischer Kolonialismus und Imoerialismus In Turkestan (The Hague: P.M. Klop Printers, 1965), Turkestan zmlschen Aussland und China (Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1971), and Turkestan im Herzen Euroasiens (Koein: Studienuerlag, 1980)
25. Edward Allworth (ed.), The Nationality Ouestion in Souiet Central Asia (New York: Prager Publishers, 1975).
24. Albert Gerutis and Hans Aychener (ed ), Ooelker in Ketten (Bern: Steiger Druck AG Bern, 1978).
25. Borys Lewytzkyj, "Souetski) narod" - "Bas Sowietuolk": Nationa- litaetenoolitik asl Instrument des Sow fetimperiaiismus (Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe Uerlag, 1985).
26. A.M. Gindin, S.G. Markin, U.A. Seuertseu, Aazuitie natsionalnykh otnosheniy u SSSR (Msokua: Uysshaya shkola, 1985).
27. Rasma Karklins, Ethnic Relations in the USSR: The Persnectiue from Below (Boston: Alien O' Unwin, 1986).
28. Robert Conquest (ed ). The Last Empire: Nationality and the Souiet Future (Stanford: Hoouer Institution Press, 1986.
29. Benningsen, et. al., op. cit
50. Ibid., p. in.
51. Ibid., p. 18.
52. Ibid., p. 15. 3 8 2
33. Ibid., p. 17.
34. "Islam", Bolshaya souetskapa entsikloneriia. 2nd edition (Moskua; Bolshaya souetskaya entsiklopedla, 1953), Uol. IB, p. 516.
35. Hayit, Soiu jetrussischer Kolonialismus .... p. 43.
36. Benningsen, e t al., op. cit, p. 22.
37. Hayit op. cit, p. 43.
38. Bennignsen, e t al., op. cit, p. 30.
39. Ibid., p. 36.
40. FBIS Daily Report Souiet Union. March 19, 1907.
41. Ibid., Rpril 13, 19B7, pp. U1-U4.
42. Ibid., April 22, 19B7, pp. 01-06.
43. Ibid., June 15, 1990, p. 125, and June IB, 1990, p. 116.
44. "Dushanbe: Rumors Spark Riots, Deaths", CDSP. 1990, No, 7, p. 12.
45. "Inuestigation Continues", CDSP. 1990, No. 12, p. 31.
46. FBIS. op. cit, February 25, 19B6, p. R14.
47. FBIS. op. cit, June 14, 1990, pp. 116-117.
40. FBIS. op. cit, December 1, 1906, p. R6.
49. "Return of a Holiday", CDSP. 1990, No. 12, p. 34.
50. FBIS, op. cit, June 14, 1990, pp. 116-117. 3 8 3
51. FBIS. op. cit., June 14, 1990, pp. 118 119, and “First Newspaper for Moslems', CDSP. 1990, No. 22, p. 28.
52. "Koran Being Printed", COSP. 1990, No. 2, p. 34.
53. FBIS. op. cit., June 14, 1990, pp. 116-117.
54. FBIS. op. cit., June 12, 1990, pp. 120-121.
55. "Islam", Bolshaya souetskaya entsiklooedia. 3rd edition (Moskua: Souetskaya entsikiopedia, 1972), Uoi. 10, p. 486.
56. "Drifters", CDSP. 1989, No. 51, p. 25.
57. Meduedkou, op. cit., p. 11.
Chapter 4
1. Spechler, op. cit., pp. 143-144.
2. Leon Festinger, Conflict. Decision, and Dissonance. (Stanford: Stanford Uniuersity Press, 1964), and fl Theory of Coonitiue Dissonance . (Stanford: Stanford Uniuersity Press, 1962)
Chapter 5
1. Richard H. Rowland, "Regional Migration and Ethnic Russian Population Change in the USSR (1959-1979)", Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation. 1982. No. 10, pp. 557-583.
2. Sagers, Regional inequalities .... p. 76.
3. Meduedkou, Disaduantaged Groups .... p. 35. 3 8 4
4. fl.M. Lola, "EKisting Systems of Settlement in the USSR and Some Research Problems Relating to the Transformation of Systems", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation. 1983, No. 1, pp. 18-30.
5. N.S. Ginzburg, "R Microgeography of Settlement in the Pamir Highlands", Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation. 1986, No. 6, pp. 398-435.
6. T.R. Rbdykadyrou, "Socioeconomic Problems of Settlement in Issyk-Kul Oblast of the Kirgiz SSR", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation . 1985, No. 9, pp. 674-679.
7. John P. Cole, "Changes in the Population of Larger Cities of the USSR, 1979-1989", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation. 1990, No. 3, pp. 160-172.
8. O.G. Khodzhaeu, I.R. Ilin (ed.), Reqionalnye oroblemu razultia qorodskikh i selskhikh ooseleniy SSSR (Moskua; Nauka, 1988).
9. George J. Oemko, Roland J. Fuchs (ed.), Geographical Studies on the Souiet Union (Chicago: Uniuersity of Chicago, 1984).
10. fl.S. Zholkou, Razuitie sotsialistlcheskogo qoroda (Moskua: Ekonomika, 1984).
11. Boris Sergeyeuich Khoreu, Problemg qnrodou (Moskua: 1971).
12. Chauncy D. Harris, Cities of the Souiet Union: Studies on Their Functions. Size. Densitu. and Growth (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970).
13. 20 let souetskoy ulasti. op. cit, p. 71, and Oostizhenia souatskoy ulasti za sorok let u tsifrakh: statisticheskiy sbomik (Msokua: Gosudarstuennoe slatisticheskoe Izd-uo, 1957), p. 247.
14. UJiHman, "Oemographic Trends ...", pp. 51 53.
15. Bond, op. cit. 3 8 5
16. Sagers, Regional Ineoualities .... pp. 82-83, and "Regional Distribution
17. Ibid.
18. Stephen Rapauiy, "Regional Emplyment Trends In the USSR: 1950 to 1975", Souiet Economy in a Time of Change, op. cit, pp. 600-617.
19. Gillula, op. cit
20. F.M. LIstengurt, "Ways of Perfecting the Pattern of Settlement in the USSR", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation. 1985, No. 9, pp. 653-665.
21. Nikolay Uoznesenskiy, The Grouiing Prosperity of the USSR. (M o s c o l u, 1941).
22. RIastair McRuley, Economic Welfare in the Souiet Union: Pouerty. liuing Standards, and Ineoualitg (Madison: Uniuersity of Wisconsin Press, 1979).
23. Sagers, Regional Inequalities .... p. 80.
24. Rbram Bergson, The Real National Income of Souiet Russia since 1928 (Cambridge: Haruard Uniuersity Press, 1961), pp. 421-428.
25. Ibid., pp. 321-344.
26. U.M. Kotlyakou, "Geography and Ecological Problems", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation. 1988, No. 6, pp. 559-576.
27. Ksenya Khinchuk, "Rgricultural Labor Force in the Souiet Union", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation. 1987, No. 2, pp. 90-115.
28. Ibid. 3 8 6
29. A .m . Rafikou, "Enuironmentai Change in the Southern Aral Region in Connection with the Drop in the Aral Sea Leuel, " Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation. 1983, No. 5, pp. 344-353.
30. Narodnoe khozgagstuo SSSR u 1987 godu (Moskua: Finansy i statistika, 1987), p. 53.
31. Timothy Sosnouy, The Housing Problem in the Souiet Union (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, Inc., 1954).
32. Sagers, op. cit., pp. 74-75.
33. Bergson, op. cit., pp. 315-317.
34. Gornoskayeua, op. cit., pp. 369-370.
35. Henry ID. Mortan, The Souiet Quest for Better Housing - an Impossible Dream \ Souiet Economy in a Time of Change (IDashington: US Gouernment Printing Office, 1979), pp. 790-810.
36. R.G. Gachechiiadze, "Geography and the Social Consumption Funds", Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation. 1985, No. 1, pp. 19-25.
37. Sagers, op. cit., p. 76.
38. Gomostayeua, op. cit., pp. 372-373.
39. Sagers, op. cit.
40. Gomostayeua, op. cit.
41. kL. (Dard Kingkade, "Recent and ProspecDue PopulaDon Growth in the USSR: 1979 2025 , Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation. 1988, No. 4, pp. 394-412.
42. Sagers, op. cit., pp. 76-77. 3 8 7
43. "It's Easy for Children's Hues to Come to an Abrupt End Here", CDSP. 1990, No. 20, pp. 1-4, and "It's Easy for Children's Hues to Come to an Abrupt End Here", COSP. 1990, No. 24, pp. 31-32.
44. N.B. Barbash, "Physical Deuelopment of Infants as an Indicator of the Condition of the Urban Enuironment", Souiet Geography: Aeuieuj and Translation. 1983, No. 3, pp. 204-212.
45. Sayers, op. cit., p. 77.
46. Bergson, op. cit., pp. 353-358.
47. I.Ü. Pomorina, "Regional characteristics of Higher Education and Secondary Specialized Education in the USSR", Souiet Geooraohu: Reuiem and Translation. 1984, No. 1, pp. 42-45.
48. M.S. Khualinskaya, "Economic Geography of Higher Education in the USSR ", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation. 1984, No. 6, pp. 381-389, and " Some Aspects of the Spatlla Organization of Higher Education in the Souiet Union ", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation. 1986, No. 7, pp. 461-468.
49. Sagers, op. cit, p. 77.
50. Gomostayeua, op. cit.
51. Louuan E. Nolting and Murray Feshbach, "ADD Employment in the USSR - Definitions, Stats tics and Comparisons , Souiet Economy in a Time of Change ItUashington: US Gouernment Printing Office, 1979), pp. 710-758.
52. T.H. Rigby, Communist Party membership in the USSR: 1917-1967 (Princeton: Princeton Uniuersity Press, 1968).
55. Robert G. lOesson, Lenin s Legacy: The Story of the CPSU (Standford: Hoouer Institute Press, 1978). 3 8 8
54. Sagers, op. cit., pp. 78-79, and The Spatial Distribution of Communist Party Membership in the USSR, 1970 75 , Souiet Geooraohu: Reuiem and Translation. 1982, No. 9, pp. 477-494.
55. Rappoport, op. cit., pp. 94-97.
56. Uiiuman, op. cit., p. 51.
57. P.P. Zuidrinsh (ed.), Naselenie souetskoy Latuii (Riga: Zinotne, 1986), pp. 140-161.
58. Bergson, op. cit, pp. 305-314.
59. Sagers, Regional Ineoualities .... pp. 70-73.
60. Gomostayeua, op. cit., p. 372.
61. Khinchuk, op. cit., pp. 110-113.
62. N.P. Bystroua and G.S. Bukibayeua, "On the Inequality of Rural Seruices Prouision in the USSR", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation . 1988, No. 8, pp. 762-769.
63. G.N. Tadzhibayeua, "Consumption of Food and Non-Food Goods by Rural Households in the Turkmen SSR", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation. 1990, No. 3, pp. 195-201.
64. fi. Petmecky, Botschemistisches Fraenschicksal im Soeoel der Somietpresse und -gesetze (Berlin: Zentratuerlag der NSDfiP Franz Cher Nachf.G.m.b.H., 1941), pp. 42-44.
65. Bystroua and Bukibayeua, op. cit.
66. Sagers, op. cit., pp. 75-76.
67. Bystroua and Bukibayeua, op. cit. 3 8 9
68. Robert R. Lewis, "The Postwar Study of Internal Migration in the USSR", Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation. 1969, No. 4, pp. 157-166.
69. U. Toukun, "The Improuement of the Registration of Migration", Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation. 1969, No. 4, pp.179-185.
78. R. Uolkou, "Questions about Migration in the program of the 1970 Census", Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation. 1969, No. 4, pp. 186-191.
71. Zh.R. Zayonchkouskaya and U.i. Pereuedentseu, The Present State and Basic Problems in the Study of Migration in the USSR", Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation. 1969, No. 4, pp.167-178.
72. Jeff Chinn, Manipulating Souiet Population Resources (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1977).
73. Bernd Knabe, Beuoelkerunqsentwicklung und Binnenwanderungen in der UdSSR: 1967-1974 (Berlin: Ouncker und Humbolt, 1978).
74. Sagers, op. cit., p. 83.
75. I' I. Pereuedentseu, "Contemporary Migration in the USSR", Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation. 1969, No. 4, pp. 192-208.
76. Richard H. Rowland, "Union Republic Migration Trends in the USSR during the 1900s", Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation. 1988, No. 9, pp. 809-829.
77. Robert fl. Lewis and Richard H. Rowland, Population Redistirbution in the USSR (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979).
78. Rowland, "Regional Migration ...", op. cit, "Regional Population Distribution in the USSR: 1979-84 , Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation . 1986, No. 3, pp. 158-181, and "Union Republic ...", op. c it 3 9 0
79. Murray Feshback, "Prospects for Outmigration from Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the Newt Decade", Souiet Economy in g Time of Change (IDashington; US Gouernment Printing Office, 1979), pp. 656 709.
80. lOiHman, "Demographic Trends op. cit pp. 55-60.
81. R.G. Uishneuskiy (ed.), Brachnost rozhdaem ost sm ertnost u Rossii i u SSSR (Moskua: Statistika, 1977).
82. Vu.fl. Koroleu, 8rak i razuod: souremennye tendentsii (Moskua: Vuridicheskaya literatura, 1978).
83. Rndrey Gaurllouich Uolkou, Razuod: demograficheskiu asoekt (Moskua: Statistika, 1979).
84. R.G. Kharcheu, Brak i semya u SSSR (Moskua: Mysl, 1979).
85. iUesley R. Fisher, The Souiet Marriage Market Mate-Selectinn in in Russia and the USSR (Neiu York: Prager Publisher, 1980).
86. Sagers, op. cit, p. 78.
87. Zuidrinsh, op. cit, pp. 76-122.
88. Ibid., pp. 101-111.
89. Eicke Florkowski, Das somjetische Ehescheidungsrecht (Goettingen: 1967).
90. Petmecky, op. cit, pp. 14-21.
91. Luszlo Reuesz, Die Frau im Sowjetreich (Bern: Steiger Druck RG, 1969), pp. 57-61.
92. Zuidrinsh, op. cit, pp. 101-111. 3 9 1
93. Sergey Isaeuich Golod, Stabilnost semi; sotsioloqicheskiu i demograficheskig asoekty (Leningrad: Nauka, 1984}.
94. Kharcheu, op. cit.
95. Nikolay Fedorenko, Uosoroizuodstuo naselenia I tnidouykh resursou (Moskua: Nauka, 1976).
96. Uishneuskiy, op. cit.
97. Rndrey Gaurilouich Uolkou (ed.), Kak Izuchayut rozhdaemost: sbomik stateg (Moskua: Finansy i statistika, 1983), Oemografi- cheskie protsessg i ikh zakonomemost (Moskua: Mysl, 1986), and Mptodologia demooraficheskoqo orognoza (Moskua: Nauka, 1988).
98. Sagers, op. cit. ,p 83.
99. R.G. Uishneuskiy and R.G. Uolkou, Uosoroizuodstuo naselenia SSSR (Moskua: Finansy i statistika, 1983).
100. U.R. Borisou, Perspektiuy rozhdaemosti (Moskua: Statistika, 1976).
101. L.L. Rybakouskly (ed ), Uosoroizuodstuo naselenia i demografi- cheskaga oolitika u SSSR (Moskua: Nauka, 1987).
102. T.U. Ryabuskin, Trudouge resursy i zdoroue naselenia (Moskua: Nauka, 1986), and Souetskaya demografla za 70 let (Moskua: Nauka, 1987).
103. Zuidrinsh, op. cit, pp. 123-178.
104. Kingkade, op. c it
105. "Its Easy for Children's Hues to Come to an Rbrupt End Here", CDSP. 1990, No. 20, pp. 1-4. 3 9 2
106. Borisou, op.cit.
107. "The Mother of God In Jeans", CDSP. 1990, No. 10, pp. 30-31.
108. Petmecky, op. cit, p.9
109. Ibid., p. 14.
110. Ibid., pp. 17, 19.
111. G.N. Serebrennlkou, The Position of Uiomen In the USSR (London; Uictor Goilancz Ltd., 1937).
112. Kai Thomas Kleckmann, Die Frau in der Som|etunion (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Uerlag, 1978).
113. Tatyana Mamonoua (ed.), lUomen and Russia (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984).
114. Norton T. Dodge, OJomen In the Souiet Economy (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1966).
115. Gail lUarshofsky Lapldus, lUomen in Souiet Society: Eouality. Deuelooment and Social Change (Berkeley: Unluerslty of California Press, 1978).
116. Reuesz, op. c it
117. Rakhima Khodieuna Bminoua, The October Reuolution and iUomen's Liberation in Uzbekistan (Moscow: Nauka, 1977).
118. Fannina lU. Halle, lUomen in the Souiet Fast (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1938).
119. Gregory J. Massell, The Surrogate Proletariate (Princeton: Princeton Uniuersity Press, 1974). 3 9 3
120. Serge Zeyons, La reuolution des femmes au coeur de Iflsie souietioue (Paris: Editions sociales, 1971).
121. Francine du PlessiH Gray, Souiet IDomen: lOalking the Tlghtrooe (New York: Ooubleday, 1989).
122. B.P. Paluanoua, Emansioatsia musulmanki (Moskua: Nauka, 1982).
123. Ve.P.Busygin, N.U. Zorin, Z.Z. Mukhina, Selskaya zhenshchina u semeynoy I obshchestuennoy zhizni (Kazan: Izd-uo Kazanskogo uniuersiteta, 1986).
124. Petmecky, op. cIL, pp. 7, 28-29.
125. Reuesz, op. cit, pp. 7, 35.
126. CDSP. 1990, No. 20, op. cit, and 1990, No. 24, pp. 31 32.
127. CDSP. 1990, No. 20, op. cit
128. FBJÜj June 21, 1990, p. 119.
129. Petmecky, op. cit, pp. 28-35.
130. Paluanoua, op. cit, p. 282.
131. Serebrennlkou, op. cit, pp. 231-233.
132. Dodge, op. cit, pp. 36,40.
133. Reuesz, op. cit, pp. 13, 34-35.
134. IDomen a t UJork and a l Home", CDSP. 1990, No. 23, pp. 21-22.
135. Bond, op. cit 3 9 4
136. Serebrennlkou, op. cit., pp. 88-89.
137. Reuesz, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
138. Chanie Rosenberg, UJomen and Perestroika (London: Bookmarks, 1989), p. 17.
139. COSP. 1989, No. 52, op. cit.
140. COSP. 1990, No. 20, op. cit.
141. COSP. 1990, No. 24, op. cit.
142. Paluanoua, op. cit, p. 260.
143. Oodge, op. cit., pp. 109-122.
144. Ibid., pp. 107-108.
145. Lapidus, op. cit., pp. 135-155.
146. Reuesz, op. cit., p. 36.
147. Lapidus, op. cit., pp. 123-160.
148. Serebrennlkou, op. cit, pp. 126-127.
149. Oodge, op. cit., pp. 140-159.
150. ibid., pp. 236-237.
151. Ibid.
152. Lapidus, op. cit, pp. 155-160.
153. Uiesson, op. cit 3 9 5
154. Rigby, op. cit.
155. lUilliam N. Mandel, Souiet Women (Neui York: Anchor Books, 1975).
156. Lapidus, op. cit, pp. 198-231.
157. Rigby, op. cit
158. Lapidus, pp. 198-231.
Chapter 6
1. Rzen Firebrand ...", CDSP. op. cit
2. Paul E. Lydolph, "Recent Population Characteristics and Growth In the USSR ", Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation. 1989, No. 10, pp. 711-729.
3. UliHman, Deumgraphic Trends ...", op. cit, p. 46.
4. "Panel on Nationalism in the USSR: Enuironmentai and Territorial Aspects \ Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation. 1989, No. 6, pp. 441-509, and Mikhail S. Bemstam, "The Demography of Souiet Ethnic Groups in Ulorld Perspectiue ", The Last Empire: Nationality and the Souiet Future (Stanford: Hoouer Press Publications, 1986), pp. 314-368.
5. Rowland, "Regional Migration ... ", op. cit, p. 574, and "Union Republic ... ", op. cit, p. 827.
6. Rowland, "Regional Population ..."", op. cit, p. 177.
7. "The Road Home", CDSP. 1990, No. 15, p. 27.
8. Cole, op. cit, pp. 171-172. 3 9 6
9. Sagers, Regional Inequalities .... op. cit
10. Meduedkou, op. c it
11. Lola, op. cit, p. 27.
12. lUiKman, "Oemographic trends ...", op. cit, p. 57.
13. Turkiye istatistik gilligi 1987 (Ankara: Oeulet Istatistik Entsitusu Matbasasi, 1988).
14. Yu.B. Rakhmatou, "Current Nature Protection Problems in the Deserts of Uzbekistan", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation. 1988, No. 9, pp. 852-857.
15. Listengart, op. cit, p. 661.
16. Rbdykadyrou, op. cit
17. B.S. Khoreu and U.N. LIkhoded, "Rural-Urban Commuting In the USSR"", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation. 1983, No. 8, pp. 570-586.
18. FBIS. June 14, 1990, pp. 116-117.
19. UJiHman, op. cit, p. 53.
20. Bond, op. cit
21. Turkiye istatistik .... op. cit, p. 170.
22. Listengart, op. cit.
23. Sagers, " Regional Distribution ... ", op. cit, and Regional Ineoualities .... op. cit 3 9 7
24. Baymirzo Hayit, Turkestan Im Herzen Euroasiens (Koein: Studienuerlag, 1980), pp. 160-161.
25. Turkiye istatistik .... op. cit, p. 56.
26. Rbdykadyrou, op. cit.
27. FBIS. June IB, 1990, p. 121.
28. Rapaujy, op. cit., p. 609.
29. listengart, op. cit.
50. Gillula, op. cit, pp. 619, 651.
31. Hayit, op. cit, pp. 154-156.
32. S. Enders lOimbush, "The Souiet Muslim Borderlands", The Last Empire .... op. cit, pp. 222-223.
33. Turkiye istatistik .... op. cit, p. 56.
34. Kotlyakou, op. cit.
35. "In Central Asia Death Stalks the Children", Washington Post May 22, 1990, pp. HI, BIB.
36. Khinchuk, op. cit, p. 96.
37. Rafikou, op. cit, pp. 344-345.
38. Leslie Dienes, "Regional Planning and the Deuelopment of Souiet Rsia", SouJeT^ Geography: Reuiem and Translation. 1987, No. 5, pp. 287-314.
39. Khinchuk, op. cit 3 9 8
40. Rafikou, op. cit
41. lUashlnpton Post, op. cit.
42. Gachechiiadze, op. cit.
43. Gomostayeua, op. cit., pp. 369-370.
44. Morton, op. cit., pp. 799-800.
45. CDSP. 1990, No. 7, op. cit.
46. In an Emergency Situation", CDSP. 1990, No. 25, p. 14.
47. FBIS, June 18, 1990, p. 119.
48. FBIS. June 19, 1990, p. 121.
49. Bernstam, op. cit., p. 344.
50. Zdrauookhranenie Tadzhikistana. 1988, No. 1, inside back couer.
51. Eden Hamilton, "The Social Contract and Uiell-Being in the USSR: R Comparison of Central Rsia, Kazakhstan and the Donetsk-Onieper Region", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation. 1989, No. 2, pp. 109-129.
52. Sagers, Regional Inequalities .... op. cit, pp. 188-196.
53. Hamilton, op. cit, pp. 127-128.
54. Turkiye istatistik .... op. cit, p. 95.
55. Gomostayeua, op. cit, pp. 372-373.
56. Meduedkou, op. cit, p. 35. 3 9 9
57. Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 112, 127-128.
58. Turkiye istatistik .... op. cit., p. 182.
59. Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 112, 127-128.
60 Turkiye istatistik .... op. cit., p. 102.
61. Infant Mortality in the USSR", CDSP. 1989, No. 50, p. 26.
62. Turkiye istatistik .... op. cit., pp. 34,74.
63. Zdrauookhranenie Tadzhikistana. 1988, No. 2, back cover.
64. Ibid.
65. Uestnik statistiki. 1989, No. 1, p. 55.
66. UJashlnqton P ost op. c it
67. FBIS. June 6, 1990, p. 105, "The Semipalatlnsk Test Range", CDSP. 1990, No. 7, pp. 31 32, "When the Stamp of Secrecy Was Remoued", CDSP. 1990, No. 7, p. 32, and "Rbout the Test Range", CDSP. 1990, No. 10, p. 31.
68. FDIS. June 20, 1990, p. 117.
69. CDSP. 1990, No. 24, op. c it
70. CDSP. 1990, No. 20, op. c it
71. CDSP. 1990, No. 24, op. c it
72. Katlyakou, op. c it 400
73. R.G. Uoronou and L.U. Komaroua, "Eualuation of the Medical- Geographic Setting in the Midland Region of the USSR and Possible Changes Resulting from the Proposed Interbasin Transfer of Water from Siberia to Central flsla", Souiet Geography: Reuietu and Translation. 1983, No. 7, pp. 503-515.
74. G.U. Uoropayeu, et al., The Problem of Redistirhution of Water Resources in the Midlands Region of the USSR", Souiet Geograohu Reuieuj and Translation. 1983, No. 10, pp. 713-717.
75. CDSP. 1990, No. 24, op. cit
76. FBIS. June 15, 1990, p. 127.
77. CDSP. 1990, No. 24, op. cit.
78. Ihor Stabelsky, "Regional Food Imbalances in the USSR: The Enample of Meat in 1970", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation . 1987, No. 1, pp. 34-43.
79. Ihor Stabelsky, "Milk Production and Consumption In the Souiet Union", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation. 1988, No. 5, pp. 459-475.
80. Washington Post, op. cit.
81. CDSP. 1990, No. 20, op. cit
82. Uestnik statistiki. 1989, No. 6, pp. 60-61.
83. COSP. 1990, No. 20, op. cit
84. Ibid. 4 0 1
Chapter 7
1. Gachechiladze, op. cit., pp. 19, 21.
2. Ibid., p. 24.
3. Feshbach, op. cit, p. 679.
4. Gornostayeua, op. cit, p. 373.
5. Turkiue istatistik .... op. cit, pp. 119-120, 130.
6. M.S. Khuaiinskaya, "Some Aspects of the Spatial Organization of Higher Education in the Souiet Union", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation. 1986, No. 7, pp. 461-468.
7. M.S. Khuaiinskaya, "Ecopnomic Geography of Higher Education in the USSR", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation. 1984, No. 6, pp. 381-389.
8. Pomarina, op. cit, pp. 44-45.
9. FBIS. January 13, 1987, pp. R7-12.
10. Sagers, Regional Ineoualities .... op. c it
11. UiiHman, "Demographic Trends ...", op. cit, p. 57.
12. Turkiue istatistik .... op. cit, pp. 52-53.
13. Pomarina, op. cit, p. 45.
14. Turkiue istatisUk .... op. cit, pp. 119-121.
15. Pomarina, op. cit, p. 45.
16. FBIS, January 9, 1987, pp. Ü1-2. 4 0 2
17. Hamilton, op. cit.
18. Turkiye istatistik .... op. cit., pp. 52-53.
19. Pomarina, op. cit., p. 42.
20. Ibid., p. 43.
21. FBIS. August 25, 1986, pp. R9-12.
22. Sagers, The Spatial Distribution op. cit
23. Rappoport, op. cit., pp. 94 98.
24. Rigby, op. cit., pp. 512-513.
25. IDesson, op. cit.
26. Haglt Turkestan im Herzen .... op. cit, pp. 110-111.
27. FBIS. January 6, 1987, pp. R4-5.
28. FBIS. January 21, 1987, pp. B5-6.
29. FBIS. February 9, 1987, pp. R8-10.
30. FBIS. June 5, 1990, pp. 104-105.
31. FBIS. June 12, 1990, p. 119.
32. FBIS. January 7, 1987, pp. R9-10.
33. EËIS, April 13, 1987, pp. RI9-20.
34. Sagers, Regional Inequalities .... op. c it
35. Ulinman, op. cit, p. 51. 4 0 3
36. Turkiue istatistik .... op. cit., p. 170.
37. Sagers, op. cit., pp. 70-73.
30. Gornostayeua, op. cit.
39. Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Social and Economic Aspects of the Nationality Problem \ The l ast Empire .... op. cit., pp. 303-307.
40. Tadzhibayeua, op. cit., pp. 195-201.
41. Khinchuk, op. cit., p. 111.
42. Bystroua and Bukibayeua, op. cit., p. 767.
43. "Enterprises Protest" and "Enport of GoodsBanned", CDSP. 1990, No. 9, pp. 11-12.
44. FBIS. June 6, 1990, p. 101.
45. FBIS. June 5, 1990, p. 103.
46. FBIS. June 21, 1990, pp. 120-121.
47. FBIS. September 16, 1986, p. R8, and June 20, 1990, p. 116.
48. Sagers, op. cit., pp. 75-76.
49. Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 112, 127-128.
50. Bystroua and Bukibayeua, op. cit., p. 767.
51. Petmecky, op. cit., pp. 41-45.
52. Reuesz, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
53. Uestnik statistiki. 1989, No. 1, p. 57. 4 0 4
Chapter 8
1. Neduedkoü, op. cit., p. 43.
2. Knabe, op. cit.
3. Rowland, "Union Republic ...", op. cit., p. 158.
4. Rouiiand, ibid., p. 818, "Regional Population op. cit, p. 177, and "Regional Migration ...", op. cit.
5. CDSP. 1990, No. 15, op. cit., p. 27.
6. Ulinman, "Demographic Trends ...", op. cit, pp. 53, 59.
7. Feshbach, op. cit., pp. 669, 675-678.
8. Ulinman, op. cit., p. 55.
9. Rowland, "Regional Population ...", op. cit, p. 158.
10. Uestnik statistiki. 1986, No. 8, p. 80.
11. Rowland, "Union Republic ...", op. cit., p. 820.
12. Sagers, Regional Ineoualitg .... op. c it
13. Zuidrsnsh, op. cit., pp. 101-111.
14. Lapidus, op. cit., p. 251.
15. üoikou, op. cit.
16. Turkige Istatistik .... op. cit, pp. 69-70.
17. Reuesz, op. cit, p. 7. 4 0 5
18. Paluanoua, op. cit., p. 153.
19. Reuesz, op. cit., p. 35.
20. Petmecky, op. cit., pp. 19-21.
21. Rosenberg, op. cit, p. 94.
22. Reuesz, op. cit, pp. 9-10.
23. Zuidrinsh, op. cit., pp. 101-111.
24. Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 9.
25. Lapidas, op. cit, p. 255.
26. Hayit, Turkestan im Herzen .... op. cit., pp. 164-194.
27. Reuesz, op. cit., pp. 57-61.
28. CDSP. 1990, No. 20, op. cit.
29. Hayit, op. cit., p. 165.
30. Paluanoua, op. cit, p. 12.
31. Petmecky, op. cit, pp. 16, 37-39.
32. Sagers, op. cit., p. 83.
33. Bemstam, op. cit., p. 332.
34. Zuidrinsh, op. cit., pp. 140-161.
35. Bemstam, op. cit, pp. 336-340.
36. Hayit, op. cit., pp. 170-177. 4 0 6
37. Kingkade, op. cit., p. 394.
38. Ibid., p. 395.
39. 1986 Demographic Yearbook (Neiu York: United Nations, 1988), pp. 548, 560, 563.
40. CDSP. 1990, No. 10, op. c it
41. Petmecky, op. cit, pp. 17-19.
42. Bernstam, op. cit, pp. 337-342.
Chapter 9
1. Efili, June 21, 1990, p. 119.
2. Dodge, op. cit, pp. 2-3.
3. Petmecky, op. cit, pp. 7, 29.
4. Paluanoua, op. cit, pp. 252-253.
5. Rosenberg, op. cit, p. 54.
6. Paiuanoua, op. cit, p. 282.
7. Bernstam, op. cit, pp. 344-346.
8. Rosenberg, op. cit, pp. 82, 85.
9. Petmecky, op. cit, pp. 31-35.
10. Oodge, op. cit, p. 40.
11. Reuesz, op, cit, p. 13. 4 0 7
12. Bernstam, op. cit., p. 345.
15. Bond, op. cit.
14. Turkiue istatistik .... op. cit., p. 170.
15. CDSP. 1990, No. 23, op. c it
16. Petmecky, op. cit., p. 30.
17. Oodge, op. c it, pp. 164-174.
18. Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 20.
19. Paluanoua, op. cit., p. 260.
20. Dodge, op. cit., pp. 109-111, 118-121.
21. Lapidus, op. cit., pp. 135-161.
22. Oieckmann, op. cit., pp. 72-73.
23. Turkiye istatistik .... op. cil, pp. 44, 121, 130.
24. Oodge, op. c il, pp. 140-159.
25. Rosenberg, op. cil, p. 20.
26. Oodge, op. cil, pp. 236-237.
27. Paluanoua, op. cil, p. 16.
28. Wesson, op. c il
29. Rigby, op. cit. 4 0 8
30. Lapidus, op. cit, pp. 208-214.
31. Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 20. BIBLIOGRBPHV
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Pcmorina, i.U. "Regional Characteristics of Higher Education and Secondary Specialized Education in the USSR", Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation. 1984, No. 1, pp. 42-45.
Rafikou, R.R. Enuironmental Changes in the Southern Rral Region in Connection with the Drop in the Rral Sea Leuel", Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation. 1983, No. 5, pp. 344-353.
Rakhmatou, Vu.B. "Current Nature Protection Problems in the Deserts of Uzbekistan", Souiet Geoqraohu: Reuiew and Translation. 1988, No. 9, pp. 852-857.
Rapawy, Stephen, "Regional Employment Trends In the USSR; 195D to 1975", Souiet Economy in a Time of Change, pp. 600-617.
Rowland, Richard H. "Regional Migration and Ethnic Russian Population Change in the USSR (1959-1979)", Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation . 1982, No. 10, pp. 557-583.
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Sagers, Matthew Jay. "Regional Distribution of industrial Employment in the USSR", Souiet Geooranhy; Reuiew and Translation. 1984, No. 3, pp. 166-176.
Sagers, Matthew Jay. "The Spatial Distribution of Communist Party Membership in the USSR, 1970-1975", Souiet Geography: Reuiew and Translation . 1982, No. 9, pp. 477-494. 4 1 3
Schroeder, Gertrude E. "Social and Economic Aspects of the Nationality Problem", The Last Empire: Nationality and the Souiet Future. (Stanford: Hoouer Press Publications, 1986).
Shabad, Theodore. "Geographic Aspects of the Neui Souiet Flue-Vear Plan", Souiet Geography: Aeuieiu and Translation. 1986, No. 1, pp. 1-16.
Spechler, Martin C. "Aegional Deuelopments in the USSA, 1958-1978”, Souiet Economy in a Tims of Change (Uiashington: US Gouernment Printing Office, 1979).
Stabelsky, Ihor. "Milk Production and Consumption in the Souiet Union", Souiet Geography: Aeuiem and Translation. 1988, No. 5, pp. 459-475.
Stabelsky, Ihor. "Aegional Food Imbalances In the USSA: The Enampie of Meat in 1970", Souiet Geography: Aeuiem and Translation. 1987, No. 1, pp. 34-43.
Tadzhibayeua, G.N. "Consumption of Food and Non-Food Goods by Aural Households in the Turkmen SSA", Souiet Geography: Aeuiem and Translation . 1990, No. 3, pp. 195-201.
Toukun, U. "The Improuement of the Aegistration of Migration", Souiet Geography: Aeuieui and Translation. 1969, No. 4, pp. 179-185.
Uolkou, A. "Ouestions about Migration in the Program of the 1970 Census", Souiet Geography: Aeuiew and Translation. 1969, No. 4, pp. 186-191.
Uoronou, A.G. and Komaroua, L.U. "Eualuation of the Medical-Geographic Setting in the Midland Aegion of the USSA and Possible Changes Aesulting from the Proposed Interbasin Transfer of Uialer from Siberia to Central Asia", Souiet Geography: Aeuieui and Translation . 1983, No. 7, pp. 503-515. 4 1 4
Uoropaeu, G.U., et. al. "The Problem of Redistribution of Water Resources in the Midlands Region of the USSR ", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation. 1983, No. 10, pp. 713-717.
Ibimbush, S. Enders. "The Souiet Muslim Borderlands ", The Last Empire: Nationality and the Souiet Future. (Stanford: Hoouer Press Publications, 1986), pp. 222-223.
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Zayonchkouaskaya, Zh.R. ami Pereuedentseu, U.l. "The Present State and Basic Problems in the Study of Migration in the USSR ", Souiet Geography: Reuiem and Translation. 1969, No. 4, pp. 167-178.
RIma-ata daki hadiseleri , Cumhuriuet. December 27, 1986, p. 3.
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Panel on Nationalism in the USSR: Enuironmental and Territorial Rspects ", Souiet Geography: reuiem and Translation. 1989, No. 6, pp. 441-509.
BOOKS flkiner, Shirin. Islamic People's of the Souiet Union. (Boston: Kegan Paul International, 1983). 4 1 5
Rlluiorth, Edward (éd.). The Nationality Question in Souiet Central Asia. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973). flmlnoua, Rakhlma Khodleuna. The October Reuolutlon and IDomens Liberation In Uzbekistan. (Moscow: Nauka, 1977).
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Benningsen, et. al. Souiet Strategy and Islam. (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1989).
Bergson, Rbram. The Real National Income of Souiet Russia since 1928. (Cambridge: Haruard Uniuersity Press, 1961).
Borisou, U.fl. Persoektluy rozhdaemosti. (Moskua: Statistika, 1976).
Busygin, Ye.P., Zorin, N.U., Mukhina, Z.Z. Selskaya zhenshchina u semeunoy i obshchestuennoy zhizni. (Kazan: izd-uo Kazanskogo uniuerslteta, 1986).
Chinn, Jeff. Manipulating Souiet Population Resources. (New York: Holmes G Meier Publishers, Inc., 1977).
Conquest, Robert (ed.). The Last Empire: Nationality and the Souiet Future. (Stanford: Hoouer Institution Press, 1986).
Demko, George J. The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan 1896-1916. (Bloomington: Indiana Uniuersity, 1969).
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Dodge, Norton T. Women in the Souiet Economy. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1966).
Fedorenko, Nikolay. Uosproizuodstuo naselenia j trudouykh resursnu. (Moskua: Nauka, 1976). 4 1 6
Festinger, Leon. Conflict. Decision, and Dissonance. (Stanford: Stanford Uniuersity Press, 1964).
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Fisher, Wesley fl. The Souiet Marriage Market: Mate Selection in Russia and the USSR. (Netu York: Praeger Publisher, 1980).
Florkomski, Eicke. Das soujjetische Ehescheidunysrecht. (Goettingen: 1967).
Gerutis, Albert and Rychener, Hans(ed ). Uoelker in Ketten. (Bern: Uerlag Schweiz. Ostinstitut Bern, 1978).
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Golod, Sergey Isaeuich. Stabilnost semi: sotsiolooicheskiy I demoqraficheskiy asoekty. (Leningrad: Nauka, 1984).
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Halle, Fannina W. Women in the Souiet East. (New York: E.P. Dutton D Co., Inc., 1938).
Harris, Chauncy 0. Cities of the Souiet Union: Studies on Their Functions. Size. Densitu. and Growth. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970).
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Karklins, Rasma. Ethnic Relations in the USSR: The Persoectiue from Belom. (Boston: Alien & Unwin, 19B6).
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Leuiis, Robert A., Roiuland, Richard H., and Clem, Ralph S. Nationality and Population Change in Russia and the USSR: An Eualuation of Census Data. 1897-1970. (Neiu York: Praeger Publishers, 1976).
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Massell, Gregory J. The Surrogate Proletariate. (Princeton: Princeton Uniuersity Press, 1974).
Mcfluley, fliastair. Economic Welfare in tbe Souiet Union: Pouerty. Liuinq Standards and Inequality. (Madison: Uniuersity of Wisconsin Press, 1979).
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Sulkeuich, S. Territoria i naselenie SSSR. (Moskua: Krasnyy proletary, 1940).
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Uolkou, Rndrey Gaurilouich (edj. Oemoqraficheskie orotsessu i Ikh zakonomernost. (Moskua: Mysl, 1986).
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Zeyons, Serge. La reuolutlon des femmes au coeur de IRsie souietique . (Paris: Editions sociales, 1971).
Zholkou, R.S. Razuitie sotsialistiocheskoqo qoroda. (Moskua: Ekonomika, 1984).
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Souiet Economy in a Time of Change. (Washington: US Gouernment Printing Office, 1979). 4 2 1
DISSERTATIONS
Rappoport, Ann LIttmann, Souiet Policies toward Its Union Republics: 0 Compositional Analysis of "National Integration . (Columbus: Ohio State Uniuersity, 1978).
Sagers, Mattheiu Jay. Regional Inequalities in tbe USSR: 1940 - 1975. (Columbus: Ohio State Uniuersity, 1980).
ENCVCLOPEOIRS
Bolshaya souetskaya entsiklooedia. 2nd edition. (Moskua: Bolshaya souetskaya entsiklopedia, 1955).
Bolshaya souetskaya entsiklooedia. 3rd edition. (Moskua: Souetskaya entsiklopedia, 1972).
PAPERS FOR CONFERENCES
Meduedkou, Olga L. and Meduedkou, Yuri U. Oisaduantaged Groups and Backuiard Regions in the Souiet Union " Final Report to National Council for Souiet and East European Research. (Columbus: Ohio State Uniuersity, 1990). 4 2 2
PERIODICALS
Central Aslan Reuieuj. (London: Eastern Press Ltd., 1953- ).
Columbus Dispatch. (Columbus: Dispatch Printing Company, 1871- ).
Current Digest of the Souiet Press: Reuiem and TranslaDon. (Columbus: Dhio State Uniuersity, 1949- ).
Daily Renort Souiet Union. (Aleuandrla, Uirginia: Foreign Broadcast information Seruice).
Partiynaya zhizn. (Moskua: Prauda, 1919- ).
Souiet Geoqraohy: Reuiem and Translation. (Situer Spring: U. H. LUInston and Sons, 1960- ).
Uestnik statistiki. (Moskua: Finansy i statistika, 1919- ). lUashinqton Post (Uiashington: Uiashington Post Company, 1878- ).
Vezheqodnik Bolshou souetskoy entslklonedii. (Moskua: Souetskaya entsiklopedia, 1957- ).
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